agricultural terrorism and the us response system’ · rjb biosecurity seminar keele may 2011 1...

RJB Biosecurity Seminar Keele May 2011

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Agricultural terrorism and the USresponse system’

Richard Byrne

Centre for Rural Security

Harper Adams University College

Shropshire, TF10-8NB,

United Kingdom

[email protected]


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A new kind of war

‘ it is very important to concentrate on hitting the

American economy with every available tool ….the

economy is the base of its military power …….. The United

States has a great economy but it is fragile’.

Osama bin Laden broadcast on December 27th 2001


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Asymmetric warfare

‘Unanticipated or non-traditional approaches to

circumvent or undermine an adversary’s strengths while

exploiting his vulnerabilities through unexpected

technologies or innovative means’

US Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Centre


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‘it is war not between peoples as such, but war amongst

peoples’

(Smith, 2005)


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Agroterrorism

The deliberate introduction of an animal or plant

disease with the goal of generating fear over the

safety of food, causing economic losses and/ or

undermining social stability’

Monke, (2008)


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Who’s thought of using Agroterrorismbefore ?

• Canada (1960s) Anthrax, Rinderpest

• Egypt (present ?) Anthrax, Brucelloisis, Equine Encephalitis

• France (1970s) Potato beetle, Rinderpest

• North Korea (present ?) Anthrax

• South Africa (1993) Anthrax

• Syria (present ?) Anthrax

• UK (1960s) Anthrax

• US (1969) Anthrax, FMD, potato blight, Newcastle disease, wheat fungus ……

• Russia (1992) see US


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Why would a terrorist targetagriculture?

•Kill

•Maim

•to generate economic impacts - local, regionally, nationally andinternationally

•population fear - to get noticed

•population fear - pressure on governments


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Domestic Terrorists

• Animal rights activists

• Anti- GMO groups- agri sabotage

• People with grudges against individuals/ groups

• People who seek to destabilise markets for economic gain

• People who derive ‘excitement from malicious acts

• People with a extreme religious or political agenda


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How could disease be spread ?

• contaminated feed

• infected animal

• animal material

• spray duster

• direct release of pathogen


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Is it likely ?

• Food chain - has been seen to be vulnerable over the years

• 1984 - infection of salad with Salmonella in USA by religious cult

• 2001 - US animal rights activist intercepted hoping to export FMD fromUK to US


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US Agroterrorism Policy

•Cold War

•1999 onwards Congressional hearings on Agroterrorism


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Post 9/11

•Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) – Defence of USAgriculture and Food

•Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

•US Department of Agriculture (USDA)

•Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)


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The Threat - US Analysis

Judged to be a credible threat

• International

• Domestic

• Lone operator

• Extortion

•Icon Foods, military suppliers, schools, hospitals….


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Issues for US policy makers

• Technology freely available - internet

• disaffected scientists

• kitchen sink labs

• terrorists who do not fear infecting themselves

• mobile populations - human/ wildlife/ livestock

• multi-centre - high concentrations of livestock


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Feasible CBRN

• ‘Al-Queda is actively seeking materials and knowledge relating tochemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weaponry’

(MI5 2005, Intelligence and Security Committee 2006).

Crop diseases and pests

Zoonotic

non-Zoonotic diseases

radiological material

• Sourcing of material


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Key Biological agents

Disease Host(s) Zoonotic

Foot and mouth disease(FMD)

Cloven footed domestic and wildanimals – cattle, sheep, pigs etc

X

Anthrax All warm blooded animals v

Brucellosis Mainly cattle, but also sheep, pigs,dogs and goats

v

Highly pathogenic avianinfluenza (HPAI) in particularH5N1

Poultry and bird species v

Glanders Mainly horses Some strains canaffect people

Swine vesicular disease Pigs X

Rinderpest Cloven footed domestic and wildanimals – cattle, sheep, pigs etc

X

Newcastle disease Poultry X

Cent re for Disease Cont rol (CDC) (2003 and 2005),

Katz (2004), Ungerer and Rodgers (2006)


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Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)

• US Modelling

• few curies of radiocaesium (CS-137)

• detonated with around 5kg of high explosive would cover an area of some40ha with contamination.

• population would increase their chance of getting cancer by 5%

• (Kelly, 2002, Eraker, 2004)


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US Planning Considerations

• decontamination - cost and practicalities

• persistent and non-persistent contaminants

• damage to soil resource

• storage of radiological/ contaminated material

• abandonment of land/ decline in land values

• loss of confidence in rural economy


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Federal Preparedness

•Department of Homeland Security - lead agency

•$818 m/y security funding for agriculture (2007)

•Deterrence and prevention

•Detection and response

•Recovery and management

•Border security - Internal and External

•Intelligence - FBI


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US Department of Agriculture

• Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

• Based in US and 27 ‘Host’ Countries

• Food Safety and Inspection Service

• (FSIS)


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Food Industry - VulnerabilityAssessment

CARVER + Shock

Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack

Accessibility - ability to physically access and egress from target

Recuperability - ability of system to recover from an attack

Vulnerability - ease of accomplishing attack

Effect - amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in

production

Recognisability - ease of identifying target

Shock is an assessment of the health, economic and psychological impacts


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The food sector and agriculture

• Caterers – restaurants, cafes etc

• Grocery retailers

• Food and Drink wholesalers

• Food and drink manufacturers

• Agricultural wholesalers

• Food and drink supply industry – food processing machinery

• Distributors

• Agricultural supply industry – animal feed, fertiliser, pesticides etc

• Fishing industry

• Farmers and primary producers


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State Preparedness

• State’s Homeland Security Taskforce

• Agroterrorism/ Agrosecurity Taskforce

• Linked to USDA, DHS

• Emphasis on

• planning - carcass disposal etc

• training and awareness raising

• first responders

• AGROSECURITY


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State Preparedness - CommunityResponse

• State Agricultural Response Team (SART)

• Bottom Up approach

• First Responders

• Community vulnerability assessment and planning

• Planning for ALL rural emergencies


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US State Advice to land managers toraise their awareness ?

• be aware of routines and changes in routines around your site

• suspicious activities - staff and visitors

• suspicious vehicles, packages, unexpected deliveries, gifts etc

• monitor health of stock and wildlife

• report signs of stress, sudden death or community illness

agricultural terrorism and the us response system’ · rjb biosecurity seminar keele may 2011 1...

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