RETENTION

CONSTITUTION

Art. XIII, Sec. 4The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

RA 6657, Sec. 6Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: provided, further, that original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: provided, however, that in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same

or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.n case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: provided, however, that those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.

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RETENTION/ LOI 474DAEZ v. CA

FACTS: Daez was the owner of a Riceland, which was being cultivated by the

respondents under a system of share-tenancy. Private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating

that they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Armed with such document, Daez applied for the EXCEPTION of said

riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.

DAR Undersecretary denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law.

When the Exemption of the riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 was finally denied; Daez next filed an application for RETENTION of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

Daez was allowd to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law.

This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President.

Private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of the Office of the President which CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the decision of declaring subject land not exempted from coverage of PD27 is tantamount also to landowner being deprive of right of retention under RA6657

HELD: Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.

It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865

hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.

The issuance of EPs and CLOs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.

(Guys, take note na lang sa difference ng retention at exemption. Baka tanungin ni Atty)

***The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention, are different.

PD. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right.

RETENTION LIMIT 7 hectares. landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present.

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LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family.

Exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.-right of retention requisite under CARL are the following:(1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".

ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES v. DAR

FACTS:1. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres is the registered owner of several

properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees.

2. Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office petitions for exemption from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were denied.

3. Archbishop appealed and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres.

4. This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.

5. The matter was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari.

6. The petition was dismissed by the CA. Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not as administrator of the Roman Catholic properties, these subject properties should have been exempt from the OLT?

HELD: The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to

under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership. To do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers.

The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 are plain and require no further interpretation — there is only one right of retention per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single party.

Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have the power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage

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the transferred properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as contemplated by the law. This matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform. In that case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lands of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform.

Archbishop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject properties is unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale under PD 27 and RA 6657 defeats such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts to prevent their lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trustee has no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA 6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, wherein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the disposition is necessary for the laws to be effective.

Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop cannot claim that the alleged conditions of the donations would have primacy over the application of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditions of the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishop's control. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the conditions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it would be a simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without limit under the protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donation, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream.

Archbishop's contention that he is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove these lands from the coverage of agrarian reform. The lands in Archbishop's name are agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the exemptions.

Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agrarian reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not appear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administrator does not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 or RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic

Administrator of Davao, Inc. does not create another definition for the term "landowner."

Petition Denied.

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LOI 474

HEIRS OF GRIÑO v. CA (GR No. 165073)Letters of Instructions No. 474 and PD1529

FACTS:1. Juan Griño (now deceased) owned 2 properties: (1) 9.35-hectare

agricultural land, and (2) a 50-hectare coconut land mortgaged to DBP as security for a loan.

2. The agricultural land was placed under the coverage of PD27 so his tenants were given the Certificates of Land Transfers preparatory to the Emancipation Patents if they could pay (as ordered by DAR)

3. Griño filed a petition for cancellation of the CLTs saying that he was deprived the opportunity to be heard, the riceland only covered over 6 hectares of the property, and several of his children and grandchildren who had no residential lots might need the land to build their homes. He also offered to give 7 hectares from his 50-hectare coconut land instead.

4. However, the 50-hectare property was later dationed to DBP to settle the loan in 1985. Grino also died in 1985 before CARL took effect.

5. In 1989, DAR regional director Maraya dismissed his petition saying that Griño, being an owner of a 50-hectare untenanted land, is not entitled to the exemption/retention pursuant to LOI 474. (Maraya Order)

6. In 1997, the heirs sought exemption of the 9.35 hectare land from the coverage of PD27 and CARL claiming that Griño had 7 children-heirs and were entitled to 5 hectares each pursuant to Sec. 6 of CARL.

7. In 1998, DAR regional director dismissed the application for retention declaring that the reckoning date of the Operation Land Transfer was in Oct. 21 1972 (PD27’s effectivity) and not the date of CARL’s effectivity.

8. With this, the heirs appealed to the DAR Secretary but was denied. Pursuant to LOI 474, Griño was not entitled to exercise his retention right over subject property under PD 27. As such, he is also not entitled to exercise said right under RA 6657. Same rule applies to his successors-in-interest.

9. CA affirmed Order of the DAR Secretary since the Maraya order has been duly served and has reached finality. (res judicata applies as well as estoppel and laches)

ISSUES: (1) WON Griño have a right of retention/exemption over his tenanted agricultural land pursuant to LOI 474— NO(2) WON a petition for cancellation of CLTs is tantamount to an application for retention – NO

RATIO: (1) The applicants-appellants assert their right of retention and their right to choose the area to be retained pursuant to Sec. 6 of RA 6657. But, it is established that Griño, Sr. was not entitled to exercise his retention right over subject property under PD 27. As such, he is also not entitled to exercise said right under RA 6657. Same rule applies to his successors-in-interest.

Moreover, allowing the heirs to resurrect the retention issue years after its denial would not only be a major setback for the government’s agrarian reform program, but would also be unjust to the beneficiaries who are now fullpledged owners of the lands they till.

(2) In the SC, petitioners raised the ff. arguments: The Maraya Order denying Griño’s petition for cancellation of CLTs

appeared only in 1998—6 months after the PARO had declared that no CLTs had been issued. Hence, the supposed Maraya Order upholding said CLTs could not be held against herein Petitioners, as even the PARO did not know of their existence (assuming they existed at all).

There was no substitution of heirs in relation to the supposed Petition for Cancellations of CLTs, so petitioners cannot be bound by Maraya Order

Addressing the Order to a dead person, without showing that it was validly served upon any heir or representative, does not constitute valid notice upon herein Petitioners.

A Petition for Cancellation of CLTs is not tantamount to an Application for Retention. The issuance of CLTs is not a bar to the Petitioner’s exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed right of retention.

The case of Daez v. CA which also involves a denial of a petition for cancellation of CLTs, shows that the right of retention can still be exercised under RA 6657 after such denial

But these were only raised for the first time which is against all rules of procedure. Petitioners are estopped. The SC also held that “[s]ince no notification appears to have been undertaken by the heirs, [it] find[s] no merit in

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petitioners’ claim that there was no substitution of heirs and the denial of Griño’s petition for cancellation of CLTs does not bind them.” DAR cannot be faulted if no substitution of parties took place when Griño died because it was the duty of the heirs to notify such tribunals of litigant’s death

Petition was dismissed. Lands still belong to the tenants.

Note: PD. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right.RETENTION LIMIT: 7 hectares. landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present.

LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family. Thus, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.

Right of retention requisites under CARL:(1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (4) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".

ESTREBILLO v. DAR

FACTS:1. The petitioners, with the exception of two1, are the recipients of

Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land in Sta. Josefa, Agusan Del Sur.

2. The parcels of land were formerly part of a forested area owned by respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).

3. Petitioners occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

4. On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

5. HMI requested that 527.8308 hectares of the landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

6. HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

7. In 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.

8. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.

9. In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings.

10. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor.

11. RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972.

12. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration - denied. 13. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB - affirmed the RARAD Decision.

1 The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of Eps.

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14. CA: dismissed the petition for review on Certiorari for failure to comply with the requirement on certification against forum shopping –Estribillo was the signatory of the certification and there was no SPA authorizing him to sign on behalf of the other petitioners.

15. Petitioners contend that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.

ISSUE: WON the EPs were indefeasible and hence still valid and subsisting. YES.

RULING: The transfer certificates of title (TCTs) issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents acquire the same protection accorded to other Transfer Certificates of Title.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of DAR. Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title.

The DARAB is grossly mistaken. Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings.

After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of PD No. 1529, or Property Registration Decree the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs.

SC cited Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.:“where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.”

The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

NOTES:On Certification against Forum Shopping

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase “plaintiff or principal party” who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition.

While the petitioners reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habalhabal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’ organization.

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PEOPLE v. DONATO

FACTS:1. Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He

was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. 2. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the Writ of

Habeas Corpus (WoHC). 3. A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was later

agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial.

4. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas.

5. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail.

6. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. 7. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he

has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail. NO.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas waived his right to bail when he withdrew

his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

The doctrine of waiver extends to the rights and privileges of any character, and since the word "waiver" covers any conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy.

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes:

a) Those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested, andb) Those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of

personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived, those of the second may be.

The right to bail is one of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

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PNB v. NEPOMUCENO

FACTS: 1. On November 28, 1973, petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted

respondents a P4M credit line to finance the filming of the movie Pacific Connection.

2. The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents’ real and personal properties, to wit: (1) a 7,623 square meters parcel of land located in Malugay Street, Makati (Malugay property); (2) a 3,000 square meters parcel of land located in North Forbes Park, Makati (Forbes property); and (3) several motion picture equipment.

3. The credit line was later increased to 6M on January 14, 1974, and finally to 7.5M on September 8, 1974.

4. Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties with the Sheriff’s Office of Pasig, Rizal.

5. The auction sale was rescheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale, as stipulated in the Agreement to Postpone Sale, until finally, the auction sale proceeded on December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest bidder in the amount of P10M.

6. Respondents filed an action for annulment of foreclosure of foreclosure sale contending that, among other grounds, the foreclosure sale was null and void for lack of publication.

7. RTC: ordered the annulment and setting aside of the foreclosure and auction sale.

8. CA: affirmed in toto

ISSUE: WON the parties could validly waive the posting and publication requirements under the law (Act. No. 3135). NO.

RULING: It is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of

notices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.

Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale

may proceed without need of re-publication and reposting of the notice of sale. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No. 3135.

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.

The statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

NOTES:On alleged estoppel:

We also cannot accept petitioner’s argument that respondents should be held in estoppel for inducing the former to re-schedule the sale without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale. Records show that respondents, indeed, requested for the postponement of the foreclosure sale. That, however, is all that respondents sought. Nowhere in the records was it shown that respondents purposely sought re-scheduling of the sale without need of republication and reposting of the notice of sale. To request postponement of the sale is one thing; to request it without need of compliance with the statutory requirements is another. Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act that would have estopped them from questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-compliance with Act No. 3135.Contract of adhesion:

In addition, the Agreement to Postpone Sale signed by respondents was obviously prepared solely by petitioner. A scrutiny of the agreement discloses that it is in a ready-made form and the only participation of respondents is to affix or adhere their signature thereto. As such, their terms are construed strictly against the party who drafted it.

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CONVERSION v. RECLASSIFICATION

ROS v. DAR

FACTS:1. Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land (Cebu).2. By virtue of a Municipal Order, these lands where reclassified as

industrial lands (Mar. 25, 1992).3. The Provincial Board adopted the ordinance with the passage of a

Resolution and a Provincial Ordinance (April 3, 1995).4. They wanted to develop the lands as an industrial park, to which they

secured all the necessary permits.5. Despite the permits, DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands

for industrial use and directed them to cease and desist from further developing then land.

6. Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction.

CLAIM: If the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in order for the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall within the DAR’s conversion authority.

7. RTC dismissed the complaint.RTC: Local Government Code expressly provides that Municipalities may authorize reclassification of agricultural land to non-agricultural. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion may be exercised only from the date of the effectivity of CARL.

8. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality pursuant to the LGC has the effect of taking such lands out the coverage of CARL and beyond DAR’s jurisdiction.

HELD: No, it is required that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having undergone reclassification.

RATIO:

CONVERSION: Act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR.

RECLASSIFICATION: Act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses sucj as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.

Mere classification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. The owner has to undergo a process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

Authority of DARJune 15, 1988: CARL took effect.April 3, 1995: Issuance of Provincial Order for reclassification.

Agricultural lands reclassified BEFORE the effectivity of CARL are exempted from conversion.

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RA 6657, Sec. 65

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: provided, that the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

Grounds:1. Land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural

purposes.2. Locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic

value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes. Prohibition: Irrigated or irrigable

AWARDED LAND

FULL PAYMENT

ALARCON v. CA

FACTS: 1. Respondent, Pascual and Santos Inc. owns several saltbeds in Parañaque.

Petitioners were tenants of the saltbeds under a 50-50 tenancy agreement since 1950.

2. In 1994, the gov’t of Parañaque authorized the dumping of garbage on the adjoining lot which polluted the main source of salt water. Thus, affecting the salt production.

3. Petitioners informed respondent about this but resp. failed to stop it. So, petitioners filed a formal protest with the city gov’t.

4. The complaint was ignored so they filed another complaint with the Regional Agraran Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) against the mayor for maintenance of peaceful possession and security of tenure with damages.

5. Subsequently, they amended their complaint and asked for damages and disturbance compensation instead. (invoking Sec. 7, 30, and 31 of RA 3844)

6. RARAD held that under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 which was issued in 1981, the subject saltbeds were reclassified to residential lands so the tenurial relationship between petitioners and respondent has already been severed. With this, petitioners are entitled to disturbance compensation pursuant to Sec. 36 of RA 3844

7. On appeal, DARAB affirmed RARAD. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for review with CA. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the tenant is entitled to disturbance compensation – NO, there was no final order of conversion. It was merely reclassified.

RATIO:Under Secs. 30 and 31(1) of RA 3844, a landowner of agricultural land is

liable to pay disturbance compensation only when he petitioned the court to eject or dispossess the tenant on the ground that the land has already been

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reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural. Without such a petition, he has no obligation to pay disturbance compensation because the mere reclassification of the land does not ipso facto extinguish the tenancy relationship between tenant and landowner.  It was only in 1994 that their relationship was disturbed due to the dumping of garbage by the city government which polluted the source of saltwater.

RA3844: A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. He can be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law: a tenant can be lawfully ejected only if there is a court authorization in a judgment that is final and executory and after a hearing where the reclassification of the landholding was duly determined. If the court authorizes the ejectment, the tenant who is dispossessed of his tenancy is entitled to disturbance compensation. (Sec. 36)

The RARAD decision is not yet final and executory because it was made subject to a petition for review with the CA and is pending with the SC. Moreover, it is the landowner who has the burden of proving the existence of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 36

The reclassification of the land is not enough to entitle them to disturbance compensation. As held by the Court of Appeals, the parties can still continue with their tenurial relationship even after such reclassification. In fact, it is undisputed that in this case, the parties continued with their landlord-tenant relationship even after the enactment of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01.

It was only in 1994 when this relationship was interrupted because of the dumping of garbage by the Paraaque City Government. Clearly, it was this latter event which caused petitioners dispossession, and it would be unfair to oblige respondent to pay compensation for acts it did not commit.Finally, the case of Bunye v. Aquino does not apply in the instant case. We allowed the payment of disturbance compensation in the said case because there was an order of conversion issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform of the landholding from agricultural to residential. The decree was never questioned and thus became final. Consequently, the tenants were ejected from the land and were thus awarded disturbance compensation

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform

Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.A mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.Petition denied. Pascual Inc. does not have to pay disturbance compensation

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PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. CA

FACTS:1. Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing

the Prov. Government to purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees.

2. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

3. RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.

4. CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.

5. SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).

6. CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public use).

ISSUES: 1. WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the

expropriation is for a public use.2. WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is

restricted by the CAR Law?3. WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of

inadequacy of the compensation offered?

HELD/RATIO:1. The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is

authorized and valid. SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of public purpose. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.

In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) Invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.

2. No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.

3. Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the just compensation.

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FORTICH v. CORONA

FACTS: - A large parcel of land was owned by Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management Dev. Corp. in Sumilao, Bukidnon. This land was leased by Del Monte as a pineapple plantation. But, Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao became interested in the property and enacted an ordinance converting said land to industrial/institutional to attract investors.- DAR rejected the land conversion and opted to put the same to CARP so that the property would be distributed to the farmers. The case reached to the Office of the President.

1. On March 29, 1996, the OP issued a decision converting this agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area.

2. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries (Sumilao farmers) staged a hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in QC. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.

3. Because of this, the OP re-opened the case and through Dep. Exec. Sec. Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. It said that only 44 hectares will be converted into agro-industrial land and that the remaining 100 hectares will be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but there was “no result” because the justices voted 2-2 in resolving such MR.

4. Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc. The Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR cannot be referred to the Court en banc because of a technicality. (It based its reasoning on Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution. As regards MATTERS, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a matter, the earlier decision of the Court is upheld.)

ISSUE: WON the land may be awarded to the Sumilao farmers – NO

RATIO: (1) Applicants for intervention were not tenants of petitioner NQSR Management, but were merely seasonal farmworkers in the pineapple plantation

leased by Del Monte. The subject land is also neither tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory acquisition.

Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled to receive a just share of the fruits of the land.

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas: under the agrarian reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right given to landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the land they till, while the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land without a right to own.

It is also noteworthy that even the “win-win” Resolution did not recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said resolution.

(2) The movants complain that the case decided on the basis of “technicality”. Newspaper columnists insist that this case be resolved not on mere technical grounds. However, when the OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management, and all others who should be benefited by the said decision. Thus, the issue here is not a mere question of technicality but that of substance and merit.

[Justice Panganiban: (j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.]

But even if the other issues which the movants describe as “substantial”, were tackled, namely: (a) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (b) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (c) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (d) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March

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29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned issues.

(a) while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself is not irrigated because it is planted with pineapple by Del Monte.

(b) The said NCA was declared null and void by DARAB as early as 1992. Deciding in favor of Quisimbing, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte

(c) the Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70’s and another 100 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received “just compensation” up to this time. Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about for the land is not tenanted

(d) Sec. 20 of R.A. 7160 is clear. It grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities. As clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners, this is for the eventual benefit of the many, not just of the few.

Win-win resolution affirmed. Petition in the SC Denied with Finality.

For those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for those who understand, no explanation is necessary.

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