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ESS YS

Whereto

Transhumanism

he Literature Reaches

ritical ass

BY NICHOLAS AGAR

ranshumanisms, accordingo its proselytizers,the intellectualand culturalmovement that af-

firms thepossibility

anddesirability

of funda-

mentally improvingthe human condition through ap-

pliedreason,especiallyby developingandmakingwidelyavailabletechnologiesto eliminateaging and to greatlyenhancehuman intellectual,physical,and psychological

capacities. 'Transhumanistsook forward o descendents

who areposthumans, futurebeingswhose basiccapaci-ties so radically xceedthose of presenthumansas to be

no longer unambiguouslyhuman by our currentstan-

dards. 2These posthumansmay be resistant o disease

and imperviousto aging, have unlimitedyouth and

vigor, and reach ntellectualheights as far above anycurrenthuman genius as humans are above other pri-

mates. They mayhave

increasedcapacityor

pleasure,love, artisticappreciation,and serenity nd experiencenovel states of consciousness hat currenthuman brains

cannot access. 3Posthumansmay go so faras to escapethe limitations of physicalityby uploading themselves

onto computers.

When lastI checkedthe Web site of the WorldTran-

shumanistAssociation,an organizationormed to agitatefor transhumanism, learnedthat it had a globalmem-

bershipof 3,744. But transhumanists renot the philo-

sophically marginalized,technology-obsessedTrekkies

that this numbermight suggest.Transhumanist hinkers

present heirview aboutwherewe should be headedwith

a keenawareness f how we might get there.Theiroppo-

nents, not they, tend to be the ones guilty of arguingfrom caricatures f the technologies n question.

With the publication n the last few yearsof several

bookson transhumanism, decenttranshumanistitera-

turehas now been amassed.Those settingout this litera-

ture include the Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom,

who directs he Futureof HumanityInstitute at Oxford

Universityand maintains he influential Transhumanist

FAQ ;James Hughes, executive director of the World

TranshumanistAssociation,whose syndicated alk show

Changesurferadioputsthe case for transhumanismn a

weekly basis; Gregory Stock, author of the book Re-

designingHumans,which saw him

pitted

in

public

fora

againstFrancisFukuyama whosebook, OurPosthuman

Future,also publishedin 2002, warned of the threatto

humans and human nature from the new genetic tech-

nologies);the sciencejournalistRonald Bailey,who ar-

gues for a libertarian ake on posthumanizing echnolo-

gies;and SimonYoung,who combinesadvocacyof tran-

shumanismwith composingandplayingthe piano.4Intellectual movements are often given unity by a

shared enseof who the enemyis. Transhumanistseclare

theirmost implacable oes to be a groupof thinkerstheycall bioconservatives r, more insultingly, bio-Lud-

dites. Prominentamong the bioconservatives re Leon

Kass,Francis

Fukuyama,Bill

McKibben,and

JeremyRifldkin. lthough there are differencesbetween them,

these thinkers harea desireto keepus and our nearde-

scendents human, even if this means keeping us and

them dumb, diseased,and short-lived.They identifythe

technologies hat enthusetranshumanists s distinctively

threatening o our humanity.

NicholasAgar, Whereto ranshumanism?he Literature eaches Criti-

calMass, HastingsCenterReport7, no. 3 (2007):12-17.

12 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT May-June 007

This content downloaded from 146.201.208.22 on Thu, 10 Oct 2013 09:28:56 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions




Human and Posthuman

The TranshumanistFAQ ells usthat posthumansare no

longer unambiguously human by our current stan-

dards. 5 his leads to the questionsof what our current tan-

dardsfor humanityare and whetherthey should be trusted.

One of history'sessons s thatseemingdifferentdoesnot suf-

fice to make someone nonhuman.Europe's geof exploration

led to many encountersbetween humanswho struck each

other as so strangeas to belong to differentspecies.If we are

to avoidmistakes ike these,we need definitionsof humanityand posthumanity hat look deeperthanappearances.

Francis Fukuyama thinks

that we should acknowledge

genesasmarking he boundaries

of humanity. He says everymember of the human species

possessesa genetic endowment

that allows him or her to be-

come a whole human being, an

endowmentthat distinguishesa

human in essence from othertypes of creatures. 'The idea

that one is human by virtue of

possessinga genome that givesrise to traits typical of humans

may correctly classify posthu-

manizing technologies that

workby modifyinggenes.But it

seemsto misclassifyposthuman-

izing technologies that work

without modifying genes.A de-

scendant of ours modifiedwith

multiple cybernetic implants,after the fashion of the Borgfrom Star Trek:TheNext Generation,may be posthumanat

the same time as being genetically ndistinguishablerom hu-

mans.

LeeSilverimaginesa future n which genetically nhanced

GenRichpeoplebecome so different romunenhancedNatu-

rals hatinterbreedings no longerpossible.7 suspect hatthe

idea of reproductivesolationmay be a morepromisingdefi-

nitional starting point than the possession of a human

genome.According o the biologicalspeciesconcept,a speciesis a collectionof individuals hat interbreedor arecapableof

doing so and do not breedwith individualsbelongingto dif-

ferentbiologicalgroups.Posthumanity

will havearrivedwhen

we have beingswhose enhancements solate them reproduc-

tively from humans.Breedingbetweenposthumansand hu-

mansmaybe physiologically mpossiblebecauseof geneticor

cyberneticalterations.Or it might simplybe the casethat we

find each other so profoundlyrepellent hat interbreedings

mutually unthinkable. We can imagine that this repulsioncould be much more profoundthan that resulting rom the

racistthinkingto whichhumansseemsusceptible, reating e-

productivebarriershat are more enduringthan those racism

occasionally reates.

This account of posthumanitymaybe vulnerable o coun-

terexamples,but it should at least serve as a workingdefini-

tion. Scientistsoften begin investigationsof unfamiliarphe-nomenaequippedwith definitions hat theyexpectto modifyas they find out more. Although a more complete under-

standing of the posthuman condition may lead to an im-

proveddefinition,the idea of

beings reproductivelysolatedfrom humansby their enhancements hould serve to get de-

bate underway.

Evolutionary Humanism

SimonYoungclaims o find

support for transhumanism

from evolutionarytheory,8and

he goes on to suggest that an-

other term for transhumanism

is evolutionary humanism.

Young's ntuition appears o be

that since evolution is takinghumans toward posthumanity

anyway, t can'thurt to give it a

push. For him, evolution is es-

sentiallya processof complexi-fication. He says that as con-

scious products of the evolu-

tionaryprocess,we humansare

imbued with a Will to

Evolve. 9 t is the Will to Evolve

thatgivesrise to a moralimper-ative to become posthuman.

Young chides bioconservatives

for wanting to leave humanity

astaticspeciesgoing nowherefast-forever. ''

Attempts to extract moral claims from the evolutionary

process are risky,and these risks grow when dealing with

somewhatpoetical nterpretationsf the evolutionaryprocesssuch asYoung's.According o a moreprosaicdefinition,evo-

lution is simply change in gene frequencies.While they do

hope to bancertainwaysof controlling he humangene pool,bioconservativescertainlydo not seek keep the human gene

pool entirelystatic.A global ban on posthumanizing ech-

nologieswould leave our speciessubjectto the same evolu-

tionarypressuresor changeas always.Evidenceof the

dangerof

drawingmoralconclusions rom

evolutionarypremisescomesfrom the factthat,whileYoung's

poeticalinterpretation f evolutionpresentsposthumanityas

its goal, one could just as easily look at the evolutionary

processandextracta bioconservativemoral.Althoughchangeis essential o the evolutionaryprocess, t is, paradoxically,n-

titheticalto evolutionary uccess.A speciesfailsin evolution-

arytermsby going extinct. One way to go extinct is to have

no descendents.But anotherway to go extinct is to have de-

scendentsthatare so differentas to count as differentspecies.

Transhumanistsre not

marginalized,echnology-

obsessed rekkies. heypresent heirviewabout

wherewe shouldbeheaded

with a keenawarenessof

how wemightget there.

May-June 007 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 13





For example,the dinosaurspecies Archaeopteryxs undeni-

ablyextinct eventhoughbirds,which mightbe descendeddi-

rectly from Archaeopteryx,are found on every continent.

Youngworries hathumanitymaybe headednowhere.Butby

protectingus from the technologiesof genetic modification,

bioconservativesmay be interpretedas striving o protecthu-

manityagainstevolutionary ailure.I imaginethat most bio-

conservativeswill find this evolutionaryparsingof theirposi-

tion unfamiliar-indeed, those whose bioconservatism isbasedon religiouspremisesarelikelyto reject t outright-butit does suggest that facts about evolution support no view

aboutthe moraladvisability f posthumanity.

Procreative Liberty and Transhumanism

The much debated notion of procreativeibertymay offer

a less philosophically fanciful route to posthumanity.Transhumanists re foremostamong those arguingthat par-ents should be free to use genetic technologies to enhance

their children's haracteristics.GregoryStockproposes hat we

view the technologies hat will enable the selection of modifi-

cation of our genetic constitutions as germinalchoicetech-nologies. RonaldBaileyindicateshis liberalleaningsin his

selectionof the title LiberationBiology or his defense of tran-

shumanism.12His form of liberalism s of the libertarian ari-

ety. He combines defenses of individual choice regarding

posthumanizing echnologieswith skepticismabout a role for

the state.JamesHughes's usionof transhumanismwith social

democracy differs; he emphasizes individual freedom but

wants to allowthe state to correctinequalitiesn accessandto

discourage ndividuals from making bad choices.13 Despitetheirdifferences, hese writersare unifiedby a confidencethat

the choices icensedby procreativeibertywill eventuallymake

us

posthuman.They predict

hat

parents

ree to enhancetheir

children'sntellects,physicalconstitutions,and life expectan-cieswill chooseto do so.

But the connectionbetweenposthumanityandprocreative

liberty s less obvious thantranshumanistsendto assume.For

example, transhumanistspresent IVF as a forerunner of

posthumanizingtechnologies.'4But there is a differencebe-

tween a technology that gives children to people sufferingfrom infertility and technologies of genetic enhancement.

Beingfree to have childrendoes not straightforwardlymplya

freedom to changethem in ways that happento please you.

AlthoughJohn Robertson,the most prominentadvocateof

procreativeliberty, does defend genetic enhancement, he

thinks that it should be recognizedas an extension f procre-ativelibertyrather hanamongthe coreinterestsprotectedby

it.15Advocates of enhancement as a procreative iberty and

transhumanists ave a common foe. Bioconservatives isplay

the samehostilitytowardthe suggestion hatprospectivepar-

ents shouldbe free to enhance theirchildren hat they do to-

ward transhumanism.One reason for this opposition is that

they, like transhumanists, hink that a freedom to enhance

necessarilyakes us towardposthumanity.16ut thereis actu-

allya significantgap between the two views. Classical iberals

do not present hemselvesas marketinganyparticular iew of

human excellence.Ratherthey defend institutions that allow

individuals o make their own choicesabout how to live. Lib-

eral pluralismabout the good life carriesover to decisions

about what to view as an enhancement.The many different

views about which is the best life lead to equallymanyviews

about what modifications o children'sDNA actuallyenhance

them. Liberals skonly thatourchoices be consistentwith ourchildren'swell-being.17Transhumanistsiffer rom liberals n havingdefiniteviews

about the kinds of procreativehoices thatprospectiveparentsshould be making-they should be takingthe first steps to-

ward posthumanity,choosing, if possible, to have children

who are much smarter,healthier,and longer-lived han ordi-

nary humans. While liberalswould protect the choices of

prospectiveparentswith posthumanvalues,they also want to

protectthe choicesof parentswho lack such values. It is not

hard to think of choices that would excite transhumanists t

the same time as beingwidely rejectedby parentsallowedto

alter heirchildren'sgenomes.There seems a big difference,or

example,betweengeneticallyalteringJohnnyso that he is tenIQ points smarter han he would otherwisebe, and makinghim smarter han his parents o the same extent that they are

smarter hanprimates.The prospectof beingviewedby one's

child as permanentlyin the da-da stage of developmentwould be a pretty errifying rospect o manymums and dads.

Transhumanistsmay acceptthat some people may appealto procreativeibertyto justify rejectingposthuman options.Transhumanistsmerely want to defend their own right to

make posthuman procreative hoices. Furthermore,hey do

not envisagethe arrivalof posthumanitywithin one genera-tion. Rather,they see its arrivalas more gradual.Successive

generationswill enhancetheiroffspring n waysthat are com-

patiblewith a healthyrelationshipbetweenparentand child,

takingus to posthumanityperhapsover the courseof a few

centuries.But it is unclearwhether liberals would counte-

nance even this more gradualapproach.Those who defend

enhancementas procreativeibertythink that it establishesa

presumptionn favorof permittingenhancement hatmay,on

occasion,be overturnedby conflictingmoralconsiderations.

The idea that procreativeibertycan be overriddendoes not

set it apartfrom other liberties.Forexample,the freedomof

speech permitsone to advocateone'spoliticalviews. But the

harms that resultfrom racialvilificationsufficeto cancel the

presumptionn favorof this freedomevenif the only way you

can presentyour politicalviews is by engaging n racialvilifi-cation.

One much-discussedpossibleharm is an exacerbationof

social inequalities.Opponents of enhancementpredictwar,

slavery, nd genocideas humansface off against heirgenetic

superiors.iiIf the harmsresulting rom racialvilificationsuf-

fice to cancela presumptionn favorof the freedomof speech,

it is easyto imaginethat a significantrisk of war,slavery, nd

genocide might override-or at least significantlyrestrict-

the presumption n favor of a freedomto enhance. Hughes'






democratic ranshumanismprovidesa partialresponse o this

concern. He would subsidizeaccessto posthumanizing ech-

nologiesforpeoplewho couldnot otherwiseafford hem. But

liberalsshould not be concernedonly with problemsof un-

equalaccess.Many people will rejectthe technologiesof en-

hancementevenif they haveaccess o them. Religious unda-

mentalistshave a vision of the good life that excludesgeneticenhancement. f theyact on thatvision,theywill exercise heir

procreativeibertyby rejecting veryopportunity o genetical-ly enhance their offspring.Defenders of procreative ibertywill defend the rightof each successivegenerationof religiousfundamentalists o make this choice.

Supposethat the freedom to

enhancewill createlarge nequal-ities. Nick Bostrom and Ronald

Bailey find strife and genocide

unlikely results. Bostrom ex-

pressesconfidencein the powerof the laws and institutions of

modernsocietiesto preventslav-

ery and slaughter.19 resumably,

this confidence carries over tothe lawsand institutionsof post-modernsocieties.Bailey inds re-

assurancen the globalspreadof

liberal nstitutions hat he thinks

will prevent posthumans from

victimizing genetically inferior

humans, just as they prevent

technologically uperiorhumans

from exploiting technologicallyinferiorones.20One could ques-tion Bailey'saithin the powerof

liberal institutions to protect

technologically inferior people.But even if this is conceded, there are reasons o doubt that

liberal nstitutionswill preventgrimoutcomes.

If bioconservatives re right, then liberaldemocracy tself

may be underthreat.Fukuyamamakes the point that liberalsocialarrangements refounded on a roughempiricalequali-ty of citizens.21Peopleof varyinggifts acknowledge achother

as citizens because they understand that relations betweenthem aremutuallybeneficial.On one view,ourmutualrecog-nition as citizensdependson our mutual recognitionas po-tential contributors.We can imagine that supremely ntelli-

gent posthumansmay see no value in liberalsocial arrange-ments that include those whose ancestorshave

rejectedthe

path of genetic enhancement. Humans won't be acknowl-

edgedas citizensbecausetheywill beviewed ashaving ittleto

offer.Ifwe arefortunate,posthumansmayaccordus the samemoralstatusthat we shouldgrant chimpanzees-a status that

fallswell short of citizenship.

Posthuman Values as Human Values

Onewayto avoid hispossible ragmentationf society

would be to find something to say to those who insistthat theirconceptionof the good life is not transhuman.NickBostromthinks that the valuesof bioconservativesmay turn

out to be posthumanwithout their being awareof it. They

may just be ignorant of their desireto geneticallyenhance

their children.Bostromexplainsthat oureveryday ntuitions about val-

ues areconstrainedby the narrowness f our experienceand

the limitationsof our powersof imagination, ontinuingthat

someof our idealsmaywell be

located outside the space of

modes of being that areaccessi-

ble to us with our current bio-

logical constitution. 22 o showhow our valuesmightbe covert-

ly posthuman,he enlistsa dispo-sitionaltheoryof value, accord-

ing to which something is a

value for you if and only if youwould want it if you were per-

fectly acquainted with it and

you were thinkingand deliber-

atingas clearlyaspossibleabout

it. 23 The dispositional theoryallows for adjustments of our

values n response o blindspotsin our knowledge. Consider a

music lover who has never lis-

tened to Bach'sB-minor Mass.

The Mass may be among his

musicalvalues f it were the case

that he would enjoy it were he

to be acquaintedwith it. The dispositionalaccount enables

Bostrom to saythat posthumanvalues that seem beyondour

comprehensionmay nevertheless all within the ambit of ourcurrentdispositions.Not evenGarryKasparovouldgrasp he

basicprinciplesof eight-dimensional hess,butpresumably e

wouldenjoyit werehe fullyacquaintedwith it. The samemaybe true for moderatelygifted chessplayers.If we were to be

properlyacquaintedwith the hideouslycomplexsymphonies

produced by posthuman composers, we would find them

beautiful ratherthan unintelligiblerackets.Posthumansym-

phonies are, therefore,among our musical values. It seems

only rightthat we

should seek to modifyourselvesandour de-scendentsso as to betterappreciatehesethingsthat we value.

But there is somethinga bit odd about Bostrom'sexpan-sion of our values.The dispositional heoryhelpsus to acceptsome thingswith which we may be unfamiliaras values.Butit also instructsus to rejectsome of the valuesthat we cur-

rentlycreditourselveswith. Forexample,you maypronounceyourselfa fan of Wagner'sRing Cycle afterlistening to the

couple of minutes of Ride of the Valkyries eatured n the

movieApocalypseow. Yet f exposure o the full fifteenhours

Despiteprotestationso the

contrary,ranshumanists

takepridein achievementsthat aremeaninglessxcept

byreferenceohumanity-

suchas writingine books

defendingranshumanism.






would cause you to withdrawyour endorsement,then the

Cycledoes not belong amongyourmusicalvalueseven if youthinkit does. The dispositional heory'spropensity o subtract

values as well as addingthem leadsto some awkwardnessor

Bostrom'sproposed posthumanizing of our values. I find

Bach'sB-minorMassto be a beautifulpieceof music.But we

can imaginethat posthumanappreciators f music may find

it triteand so not value it at all. Or perhaps heywill valueit,

butonly as an inoffensivewee ditty.Bothposthumanviews ofthe Massarefine;requiringus to echo them seemswrong.Bostrom'sapproachmay also lead to some puzzlingaddi-

tions to our values. Our intellectualshortcomingsarenot the

only reasonwe fail to be fully

acquainted with things we

might value. The olfactoryca-

pacities of dogs make them

awareof things in slightly off

meat that elude us. Perhapsour

indifference o slightlyoff meat

is just an artifactof our olfacto-

ry narrowness. Consider

posthumans whose olfactoryenhancement makes them

awareof all the thingsthatdogsdetect in off meat. They mightderiveas much enjoymentfrom

the smell of off meat asdogsdo.

If we arepermittedto resistthe

argumentthat the olfactorysu-

periority of dogs means we

shouldacceptsome of theirval-

ues as our own, then there

seemsno reasonwe shouldhave

to admitthe kindsof values hat

the superior ntellectsor senses

of posthumanspermit them to

entertain.

Humanity as a Local Value

Bostrom'sadviceo explore urvalues utsus on theright

path, at any rate. But rather han leadingus to discover

that we are all covertly ranshumanists, suspectit may lead

us to better understandour connectionwith our humanity.Some of our values are universal.When we identifythem

as suchwe saythat they arevalues for everyone.Good exam-

ples arecore moralvalues.One'smoralstatus shouldnot de-

pend on who is makingthe judgment.Youare a morallycon-

siderablebeing irrespective f whetheryour spouseor a com-

plete stranger s askingthe question. Other valuesare local.

They dependon who is judging.The valueswe placeon fam-

ily and friendsareto a largeextentlocal.A parentcan expectthatyou recognize he moralconsiderability f her child, but

she should not expectyou to valuehim justas she does.

Localvalues are high on the list of those that contribute

meaningto our lives. We haveattachments o particular eo-

ple, places,andtraditions.The places heyoccupyin our lives

insulate them againstcertain kinds of optimizing reasoning:Youwouldn'tswapyour child for anotherchild, even if that

childweremanifestly marter nd betteratsport.Yourattach-

ment to your life partnersurvives he recognitionthat Brad

Pitt or AngelinaJolie might have objectivelygreaterappeal.You continue to supportyourfootball teameven thoughyouknow it is one of the weakest n the league.It seems to me

that much of the value we place on our own humanity islocal. I valuehumanitybecauseI'm human. I wouldn'ttrade

my humanityforposthumanityeventhoughI recognize hat

posthumansare objectively superior.Its being a local value

means that I do not expect the

value that I place on humanityto be accessible o posthumans,

just as, pace Bostrom, posthu-man values aren't available to

me.

What is it about the local

value of being human that is so

compelling?There seems to me

to be something rightabout thebioconservativesuggestion that

our lives are given meaning bythe struggleagainsthumanlimi-

tations. Forexample,there is no

objective property of the uni-

verse that instructsus to find it

remarkablethat someone can

run one hundred metersin ten

seconds flat. Runningone hun-

dred meters n ten secondsis re-

markableonly in a human-rela-

tive sense: we recognize it as

close to the limit of what is pos-sible for humans. Our admira-

tion for the top sprinterssur-

vives the recognitionthat cheetahsand posthumanathletes

could coverthe distancemuch morequickly.The local value

of humanity nformsourrelationshipswith others.We choose

to haveother humansas our life partnersbecause, n part,we

want our struggles o make senseto them. We alsochoose to

have humans as children because, in part, we want our

achievementso be meaningful o them.

Universalvaluesarecompulsory n a way that local values

are not. One cannotjustifiablygnorethe moralworth of an-

otherhumanbeing.

But one can lack a local valuesimplyby

failingto standin the requisiterelationship o the thing that

is a candidate or valuing.Transhumanistsmay concedethat

humanity is a local value for some, but deny that it is for

them.They would point out that someonewho lacksany re-

gardfor theirhumanityis not makinga mistake n the same

kindof wayas someonewho is unconcernedaboutthe effects

of his actions on morallyconsiderablebeings. I suspectthat

many avowed transhumanists re actuallymotivatedby the

local value of humanity,their protestations o the contrary

Theuniversal alueof

preventing nd curing

disease s not inconsistentwith valuinghumanity.Theres nothing pookily

posthuman boutsomeone

reaching ldagewithout

succumbingo cancer.






notwithstanding.Transhumanistsake pride in achievements

that aremeaningless xceptby reference o humanity.I imag-ine that they take pleasure n writing fine books defendingtranshumanismratherthan feeling annoyance they weren't

able to ask a time-traveling osthuman o givethe subjectafar

superior reatment.

Insistingthat its value is local helps us to avoid some un-

pleasant implications of valuing humanity. For example,

JamesHugheswarns hat human-racism s a consequenceofbioconservatives' ocus on humanity.He says that human-

racistswant to deny citizenship .. to posthumans, ntelligentanimalsand robots. 24 utwe cannotforgetthatmoral status

is a universal, ather hana local,value. It cannot be denied to

posthumans.

Mistakinguniversalor local valuesmightexplain he awk-wardnessof some bioconservative laims.Fukuyama's efense

of human natureallowshim to endorse he use of biotechnol-

ogy to treatorpreventdisease.However,havingsaid, No one

can make a briefin favor of pain and suffering, he proceedsto do precisely hat,saying hatmanyof thehighestand most

admirablehuman qualities .. are often related to the way

thatwe react o, confront,overcome,andfrequently uccumbto pain,suffering,and death. 25When it comes to terribledis-

eases,there seems a big differencebetweenconfrontingand

overcoming,on the one hand,andconfrontingandsuccumb-

ing, on the other. It would be callousto retainpain and suf-

fering f we could eliminate hem so that the fortunateamongus can overcomeand emergewith our charactersdeepened.

We can avoidmakinga brief n favorof painandsuffering

by advocating he eliminationof horriblediseasesasa univer-

salvalue.This meansrecognizing hat the dominant effect of

metastaticcancer s to thwart human flourishingrather han

to deepen the charactersof onlookers and occasional sur-

vivors. The universalvalue of preventingand

curing

disease

does not seem to be inconsistentwith the local valueof hu-

manity.There doesn'tseem to be anythingspookilyposthu-man about someone who makes it throughto a ripeold agewithout havingsuccumbedto cancer.

I cannotpretendto havecoveredall of the ways in which

transhumanists an make their case, for transhumanism s a

movement brimmingwith fresh ideas.Transhumanists uc-

ceed in makingthe intuitiveappealof posthumanityobvious

even if theydon'tyethave the arguments o compeleverybodyelse to accepttheirvision.

1. World Transhumanistssociation, TranshumanistAQ,http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/46/,ccessed

March7,2007.2. Ibid., ttp://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.3. Ibid., ttp:ll//www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.4. Ibid.Follow ttp:ll//www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTAor

theWeb iteof theWTA. nformationboutHughes'sadio how anbefound thttp:l//ieet.org/index.php/IEET/csr.tock'sndFukuyama'sdissonantakes nposthumanityanbe found nG.Stock,RedesigningHumans: ur nevitable eneticutureBoston,Mass.:HoughtonMif-flin,2002) andE Fukuyama,OurPosthumanuture:ConsequencesftheBiotechnologyevolutionNewYork: arrar,trausndGiroux,002).

ForBailey's efense, ee R. Bailey,Liberation iology:TheScientificndMoral Case or the BiotechRevolutionAmherst,Mass.:Prometheus

Books,2005), andforYoung ee S. Young,Designer volution: Tran-

shumanistManifestoAmherst,Mass.:Prometheus ooks,2006).

5. World TranshumanistAssociation, TranshumanistFAQ,

http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/56/.

6. Fukuyama,OurPosthumanuture, 71.

7. L. Silver,Remaking den:How GeneticEngineeringnd CloningWill Transformhe AmericanFamily(New York:HarperPerennial,

1998),epilogue.8. Young,Designer volution.

9. Ibid.,182-84.

10. Ibid.,41.

11. Stock,Redesigningumans.

12. Bailey,LiberationBiology.

13.J.Hughes,CitizenCyborg:WhyDemocraticocietiesMustRespondto theRedesignedumanof the Future(Cambridge,Mass.:Westview,

2004).

14. Forexample,Hughes,CitizenCyborg, ailey,LiberationBiology,Stock,Redesigningumans.

15.J. Robertson,Childrenof Choice: reedomnd theNewReproduc-tiveTechnologiesPrinceton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress,1994).

16. Fukuyama,OurPosthuman uture.

17. SeeN. Agar,LiberalEugenics:n Defense f Genetic nhancement(Oxford,U.K.: Blackwell, 004).

18. SeeG. Annas,L.Andrews, nd R. Isasi, Protectinghe Endan-

geredHuman:Toward nInternationalTreatyProhibitingCloningandInheritableAlternations, mericanournalof Law and Medicine28,nos.2/3 (2002): 151-78.

19. N. Bostrom, InDefenseof PosthumanDignity, Bioethics 9,no. 3 (2005), 202-214.

20. Bailey,LiberationBiology, 71.

21. Fukuyama,OurPosthumanuture.

22. N. Bostrom, HumanGeneticEnhancements: Transhumanist

Perspective, ournal f ValueInquiry 7 (2003):493-506, at495.

23. Ibid.

24. Hughes,CitizenCyborg,v.

25. Fukuyama,OurPosthumanuture, 71.




agar - whereto transhumanism

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