On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to
167th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas
PETITION FOR W RIT OF M ANDAMUS
K EN P AXTON 
 Attorney General of Texas
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
 Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-2995
Fax: (512) 474-2697
 Relator : State of Texas
 Relator’s Lead Counsel:
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
 Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-2995
Fax: (512) 474-2697
 Respondent:  Hon. David Wahlberg Judge of 167th District Court, Travis County, Texas 509 West 11th, 8th floor
 Austin, TX 78701
Brian T. Thompson
 Austin, Texas 78701
 Austin, Texas 78701
 Austin, Texas 78703
Index of Authorities ................................................................................... v  
Statement of the Case ............................................................................viii  
Statement of Jurisdiction ......................................................................... ix  
Ways. ....................................................................................... 5  
 A.  It Was an Abuse of Discretion for the Trial Court
to Hold Texas Marriage Law Unconstitutional and
Immediately Enjoin Its Enforcement Without
First Notifying the Attorney General, as Texas
Law Commands. ............................................................. 5  
Texas Marriage Law Unconstitutional and
Enjoining Its Enforcement While Those Laws Are
Under Review in This Court. ......................................... 7  
II.  
Threatens Continued Serious, Imminent Harm. ................... 9  
III.  There Is No Adequate Remedy by Appeal Because the
Harm Is Imminent and No Interlocutory Appeal Is
 Available. ............................................................................... 14  
The State Has a Justiciable Interest in the Outcome of
the Underlying Proceedings. ................................................. 15  
773 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 2014) ............................................................ 11
Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett,
35 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2000) ................................................................ 10
 DeBoer v. Synder,
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014) ............................................................. 13
Grigsby v. Reib,
In re Jorden,
249 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2008, orig. proceeding) .......................... 4, 5, 6
In re Prudential Ins. Co. v. Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ...................................................... 4, 5, 6
In re State,
San Antonio, May 28, 2014, orig. proceeding) ......................... 5, 6, 8
In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n,
85 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. 2002) .............................................................. 14
In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B.,
326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. granted) ........... 8, 15
 Kitchen v. Herbert,
(D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013) .................................................................. 12
 
State v. Naylor,
330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. granted) ................. 8
Terrazas v. Ramirez,
Walker v. Packer,
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules  
TEX. CONST. art I, § 32 ....................................................... viii, ix, x, 1, 3, 8
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ........................................................................... 15
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ......................................................................... 15
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a) ............................................... 14
TEX. F AM. CODE § 2.001 ......................................................... viii, ix, x, 1, 3
TEX. F AM. CODE § 2.012 ......................................................... viii, ix, x, 1, 3
TEX. F AM. CODE § 6.204 .............................................................. viii, 1, 3, 8
TEX. F AM. CODE § 6.204(b) ................................................................ ix, x, 9
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(a) .................................................................... ix
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.010 .................................................................. x, 15
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.010(a) ............................................................... 5, 7
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.021 ...................................................................... 15
TEX. R.  A PP. P. 52.1 ................................................................................... ix
 
Confusion in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015 ........................ 13
Kathleen Gray & Gina Damron, Federal Appeals Court
Extends Freeze on Michigan Gay Marriages,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (March 25, 2014) .......................................... 13
Chuck Lindell, Travis County Clerk Issues First Legal Gay
Marriage License in Texas, A USTIN A MERICAN-
STATESMAN (Feb. 19, 2015)............................................................... 4
Injunction 5, De Leon v. Perry, 5:13-cv-00982-OLG
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014) ............................................................... 11
Order, In re Marriage of A.L.F.L. and K.L.L., No. 04-14-
00364-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, August 13, 2014) ................... 9
Response to Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief,
In re Texas, No. 15-0135 (Tex., filed Feb. 19, 2015) ...................... 12
Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, U.S. to Recognize 1,300
Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 10, 2014) ................................................................................ 13
Nature of the Case: This mandamus proceeding challenges an
unappealable temporary restraining order
Constitution and Texas Family Code sections
2.001, 2.012 and 6.204 unconstitutional.
Respondent: Hon. David Wahlberg
Texas
lawsuit seeking a TRO, preliminary
injunction, and permanent injunction to
declare unconstitutional Article I, section 32
of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family
Code sections 2.001, 2.012, and 6.204 and
allow Travis County Clerk Dana DeBeauvoir
to issue a marriage license to Real Parties in
Interest Sarah Goodfriend and Suzanne
Bryant. Within minutes of the lawsuit being
filed, the district court granted a TRO, ruling
that Article I, section 32 of the Texas
Constitution and Texas Family Code sections
2.001, 2.012, and 6.204 are unconstitutional,
and commanding the county clerk to cease
and desist from complying with Texas
marriage law. The court also waived the
statutory 72-hour waiting period for marriage
licenses. Shortly thereafter, DeBeauvoir
the trial court’s order.
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has original jurisdiction to issue the requested writ of
mandamus because the State seeks to mandamus a district court judge.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(a); TEX. R.  A PP. P. 52.1.
This petition was not first presented to the court of appeals due to
the extremely time-sensitive nature of this matter and the serious harm
that could arise absent prompt relief. The trial court ruled
unconstitutional Article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution and Texas
Family Code sections 2.001, 2.012, and 6.204(b) and issued a temporary
restraining order purporting to allow the Travis County Clerk to issue a
marriage license to the plaintiffs. MR Tab C. This ruling may cause
same-sex couples to seek marriage licenses across the State, and county
clerks may mistakenly rely on that order to begin granting such licenses.
If that occurred, the harm to the couples, state officials, and the general
public would be difficult if not impossible to undo. Although this Court
stayed the TRO, a clear statement is necessary so that all judges within
Texas understand that this Court or the U.S. Supreme Court will decide
the constitutionality of Texas law.
 
(1)  
Trial courts are required to notify the Attorney General of a
constitutional challenge to Texas law before holding the law
unconstitutional. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 402.010.
 Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold
Texas marriage law unconstitutional and enjoin its
enforcement without first notifying the Attorney General of
this constitutional challenge?
(2)  
 Article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution defines marriage in
Texas as only “the union of one man and one woman.” Texas Family
Code section 2.001 prohibits issuance of a marriage license for
“persons of the same sex”; section 2.012 declares that it is a
misdemeanor for a county clerk to violate Texas marriage law; and
section 6.204(b) declares any marriage between persons of the same
sex void.
 Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to hold these
laws unconstitutional and command the county clerk to
cease and desist applying them when the constitutional
 
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to
167th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas
PETITION FOR W RIT OF M ANDAMUS 
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS:
Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
State of Texas seeks relief from the trial court’s order holding that Article
I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family Code sections
2.001, 2.012, and 6.204 (collectively, Texas marriage law) violates “the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
 Amendment to the United States Constitution.” MR Tab C at 1. The
trial court abused its discretion because (1) it held Texas law
unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement of the law without first
notifying the Texas Attorney General, as required by statute; and (2) it
failed to wait for this Court’s resolution of the constitutionality of
longstanding Texas marriage law, which is currently under review.
 
2
 As a result of the trial court’s ruling, at least one same-sex couple
has been issued an invalid marriage license, but there may have been
more. Moreover, the state of the law in Texas has been needlessly cast
into doubt. Relief from this Court is necessary to avoid the legal chaos
that would follow if the trial court’s ruling is mistakenly interpreted as
authorization for the creation or recognition of same-sex marriages in
Travis County or throughout the State. The actions of the plaintiffs, as
well as events in Utah, Michigan, and Alabama demonstrate the gravity,
reach, and imminence of this harm absent mandamus relief.
There is also no adequate remedy by appeal, given the inability of
the State to file an interlocutory appeal. The Court should grant the
petition for writ of mandamus and (1) order the trial court to vacate its
ruling that Texas marriage law is unconstitutional (or at the very least
stay the ruling pending this Court’s resolution of the constitutional
issues); (2) confirm that any marriage license issued pursuant to the trial
court’s improper order was void ab initio; and (3) clarify that it is an abuse
of discretion for any state court to hold Texas marriage law
unconstitutional or enjoin enforcement of that law while those issues are
 
filed a lawsuit in Travis County District Court challenging the
constitutionality of Article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution and
Texas Family Code sections 2.001, 2.012, and 6.204. MR Tab A. The
plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order, a preliminary
injunction, and a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Texas
marriage law so that Travis County Clerk DeBeauvoir could issue them
a marriage license. MR Tab A. Minutes after the lawsuit was filed, the
trial court granted the TRO. MR Tab C. In its order, the court held that
the “unconstitutional statutory and state constitutional prohibitions in
Texas against same-sex marriage, including as set out in and applied
through Texas Family Code §§ 2.001, 2.012, and 6.204, and in Article I,
§ 32 of the Texas Constitution” caused an “ongoing violation of [the
plaintiffs’] rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
through the denial of their vital, personal right to marry.” MR Tab C at
 
4
a marriage license. See Chuck Lindell, Travis County Clerk Issues First
Legal Gay Marriage License in Texas, A USTIN  A MERICAN-STATESMAN 
(Feb. 19, 2015), available at http://atxne.ws/17vl7lo.
The Attorney General was not notified of the constitutional
challenge or the order by the parties or the court. In fact, the State
learned of the order only because the county clerk notified a federal
district court of the order in an unrelated same-sex marriage case. MR
Tab E. Upon learning of the order, the State immediately intervened in
the case and sought emergency relief from this Court. This Court stayed
the trial court’s ruling soon after. MR Tab F.
 A RGUMENT 
Mandamus relief is available where (1) a court abuses its discretion
and (2) there is no “adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 & n.47 (Tex. 2004) (citing Walker v.
 Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). A trial court “has no discretion
in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts, even if
the law is somewhat unsettled.” In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 424 (Tex.
 
5
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Id.;  Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at
135.
I. THE TRIAL COURT A BUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MULTIPLE W  AYS.
 A.  It Was an Abuse of Discretion for the Trial Court to
Hold Texas Marriage Law Unconstitutional and
Immediately Enjoin Its Enforcement Without First
Notifying the Attorney General, as Texas Law
Commands.
The trial court’s ruling should be vacated for not following statutory
procedural requirements. Texas law requires that a party challenging
the constitutionality of Texas law must file a form with the trial court
advising it of the constitutional challenge, and the trial court must notify
the Attorney General of the constitutional challenge. TEX. GOV’T CODE 
§ 402.010(a). “The purpose of this statute is to provide the attorney
general with the opportunity to be heard on issues important to the laws
of the state—the laws the attorney general’s office is charged with
defending and enforcing.” In re State, No. 04-14-00282-CV, 2014 WL
2443910, at *2 (Tex. App. —San Antonio, May 28, 2014, orig. proceeding).
Neither the parties nor the trial court provided notice to the
 Attorney General of the constitutional challenge, the TRO, or the
constitutional ruling against Texas law. Rather, the Attorney General
 
6
learned of the ruling from a notice filed in an unrelated federal same-sex
marriage lawsuit. See Advisory Letter to the Court, Zahrn v. Abbott,
Case No. 1:13-CV-00955-SS, Doc. 28 (February 19, 2015), MR Tab E. The
trial court’s failure to notify the Attorney General of the constitutional
challenge violated section 402.010 and was therefore a clear abuse of
discretion. In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 424; Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at
135.
In a similar case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals granted
mandamus relief when a trial court in a same-sex divorce case declared
Texas marriage law unconstitutional without first notifying the Attorney
General and providing an opportunity for the State to defend the law. In
re State, 2014 WL 2443910, at *4 (holding that “the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to provide notice to the attorney general of a
constitutional challenge to Texas state laws” and ordering the trial court
to vacate its order declaring Texas marriage law unconstitutional). The
same reasoning applies here, and the trial court’s ruling should be
vacated. Because the trial court’s order was improperly issued, any
marriage licenses issued in purported reliance on that order were
improperly issued and are void ab initio.
 
7
Given the serious danger that the trial court’s order may embolden
other courts to hold Texas marriage law unconstitutional and suspend
enforcement of the law without notice to the Attorney General, the Court
should clarify that it is an abuse of discretion for any Texas court to rule
on the constitutionality of Texas law without first notifying the Attorney
General and providing an opportunity for the State to defend the law, as
required by Texas Government Code section 402.010(a).
B.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Holding
Texas Marriage Law Unconstitutional and Enjoining
Its Enforcement While Those Laws Are Under Review
in This Court.
The trial court also abused its discretion because it held Texas
marriage law unconstitutional and commanded the county clerk to cease
enforcing the law while the constitutional validity of these laws is
currently being considered by this Court. A court’s failure to stay a
constitutional ruling while that issue is pending in this Court is an abuse
of discretion.
The constitutional issues addressed in the trial court’s order are the
same issues under review by this Court in In re Marriage of J.B and H.B,
No. 11-0024, Naylor v. Daly, No. 11-0114, and In re State of Texas, No.
 
8
2013. Specifically, these cases address whether Article I, section 32 of
the Texas Constitution and Texas Family Code section 6.204 violate the
federal constitution. The trial court’s refusal to stay its hand and defer
to this Court on these serious constitutional questions was a clear abuse
of discretion.
This is not the first time a trial court improperly failed to wait for
this Court’s ruling on these issues. After the San Antonio Court of
 Appeals granted mandamus relief when the trial court declared Texas
marriage law unconstitutional without first notifying the Attorney
General, In re State, 2014 WL 2443910, the trial court again held Texas
marriage law unconstitutional. The court of appeals then stayed all trial
court proceedings because the issues were “similar to issues in two cases
pending before the Texas Supreme Court— In the Matter of the Marriage
of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. granted),
and State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet.
granted)”—namely “the constitutionality of Texas marriage law under
 
9
Texas Family Code.” Order, In re Marriage of A.L.F.L. and K.L.L. , No.
04-14-00364-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio, August 13, 2014).
The trial court’s order is an abuse of discretion because it frustrates
this Court’s resolution of these issues on a statewide basis. For this
reason too, this Court should, by mandamus, direct the trial court to
vacate its order and to declare void any invalid marriage licenses issued
in reliance on the trial court’s improper order. Again, the Court should
make clear that it is an abuse of discretion for any court to strike down
as unconstitutional Texas marriage law without staying that ruling
pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s and this Court’s resolution of those
issues.
II.   A BSENT M ANDAMUS RELIEF,  THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
THREATENS CONTINUED SERIOUS, IMMINENT H ARM.
The trial court’s order has already resulted in the issuance of an
invalid marriage license to a same-sex couple, in violation of Texas law.
That license is invalid because the county clerk relied on a trial-court
order lacking legal authorization. Furthermore, Texas Family Code
section 6.204(b) provides that “[a] marriage between persons of the same
sex . . . is contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this
 
10
this provision remains in effect, and that provision renders void any
same-sex marriage in Texas, no matter when or where it was entered
into.
Moreover, the district court did not purport to strike down the
common law of marriage in Texas, which has always limited marriage to
one man and one woman. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1130
(Tex. 1913) (“Marriage is not a contract, but a status created by mutual
consent of one man and one woman.”). The Legislature began to codify
the common law in 1997, but in doing so, it did not abrogate the
background common law principle that marriage is limited to opposite-
sex couples. See Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 16 (Tex.
2000) (explaining that a statute abrogates the common law only when its
express terms or necessary implications clearly indicate that intent).
If the trial court’s invalid order were allowed to stand, it could
produce a host of additional legal and practical problems that undermine
the public interest in predictable and clear legal rules. The court’s order
may lead other parties, courts, and county clerks to mistakenly believe
 
the erroneous creation and recognition of other same-sex marriages in
Travis County or throughout the State.
 And many practical problems will surely arise. If the same-sex
couple here takes other actions in reliance on the invalid marriage
license, those actions could be difficult and costly for officials and affected
third-party actors to detect and correct. That is why federal courts in
numerous cases have stayed injunctions against state marriage laws.
See, e.g., Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 2014)
(staying injunction against Mississippi marriage law due to “[t]he
inevitable disruption that would arise from a lack of continuity and
stability in this important area of law”); Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Lift the Stay of Injunction 5,  De Leon v. Perry, 5:13-cv-00982-OLG
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014), ECF No. 91 (refusing to lift a stay, entered by
the district court, of a federal-court injunction against Texas marriage
law due to the same concerns).
These problems are real, not theoretical. As this case proves, a
single court’s erroneous ruling on Texas marriage law may be relied upon
by other courts, counsel, and litigants seeking invalid marriage licenses.
 
proceedings yesterday from a probate-court ruling, Mr. Thompson
claimed that these reliance concerns are “wholly speculative.” Response
to Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief at 2, In re Texas, No. 15-0135
(Tex., filed Feb. 19, 2015). Yet that same day, he relied on that probate
court’s ruling—that Texas marriage law is unconstitutional—for his
other client to convince a court to issue the TRO to the plaintiffs here.
MR Tab A. Mr. Thompson’s own actions demonstrate that the State’s
concerns are not “wholly speculative.” Response to Emergency Motion
for Temporary Relief at 2, In re Texas, No. 15-0135.
The experience of other states confirms the dangers of allowing the
trial court’s order to stand. In Utah, for example, same-sex couples
married within hours of a district court’s decision to enjoin application of
Utah’s same-sex marriage ban.  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-CV-217,
2013 WL 6834634, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013). The district court and
the Tenth Circuit denied Utah’s stay motions, but the Supreme Court
granted a stay, restoring the enforceability of Utah’s marriage law during
the appeal. But even after that decision was stayed by the Supreme
 
13
sex marriages entered into while the order was in place, creating legal
uncertainty and practical confusion about the status of those marriage
licenses. Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, U.S. to Recognize 1,300
Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y.  TIMES  (Jan. 10, 2014), available at
http://nyti.ms/1E490so.
Similar developments occurred in Michigan when a federal court
struck down Michigan’s marriage law, but refused to stay the effect of its
 judgment. See  DeBoer v. Synder, No. 2:12-cv-10285, 2014 WL 1100794
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014). The Sixth Circuit granted a stay less than
one day later, restoring the validity of state marriage law, but in the
interim 321 same-sex couples obtained marriage licenses and at least 299
couples were married. Kathleen Gray & Gina Damron, Federal Appeals
Court Extends Freeze on Michigan Gay Marriages, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(March 25, 2014), available at http://on.freep.com/17PJonj.
 Alabama, too, is experiencing similar confusion. See  Richard
Fausset, Fresh Challenge to Gay Marriage Increases Confusion in
 Alabama, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015, at A12, available at 
http://nyti.ms/1CO7c2q.
14
III.  THERE IS NO A DEQUATE REMEDY BY A PPEAL BECAUSE THE H ARM
IS IMMINENT AND NO INTERLOCUTORY A PPEAL IS A  VAILABLE.
There is no adequate remedy by appeal from the trial court’s order
because further harm from the order could occur at any time and no
interlocutory appeal is available. The trial court’s order is interlocutory
and is not immediately appealable by the parties. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE § 51.014(a); In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 85
S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. 2002); see also  Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson,
53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that section 51.014 should be
“strictly construed as a narrow exception to the general rule that only
final judgments and orders are appealable” (quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, the defendant (Travis County Clerk DeBeauvoir) could not
seek immediate appellate relief, even if she wanted to (which is unclear).
 Any motion for reconsideration of the court’s order would take time, all
the while leaving the trial court’s ruling—and the uncertainty it
creates—in place. And because the harm is imminent, any later
interlocutory appellate remedy would be inadequate.
 
15
IV.  THE STATE H AS A JUSTICIABLE INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF THE
UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS.
The State has a justiciable interest in the underlying case because
Texas law has been challenged and the State has a strong and well-
recognized interest in defending the validity of Texas law. See, e.g.,
Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 721-22 (Tex. 1991) (recognizing the
 Attorney General’s legitimate role in representing the State in a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of a Texas statute); In re Marriage of
J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. filed)
(noting “the State’s important right to be heard on the constitutionality
of its statutes”); TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 402.010, 402.021. As the chief legal
officer of the State, the Attorney General represents the State in civil
litigation, and “has broad discretionary power in carrying out his
responsibility to represent the State.”  Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 92
(Tex. 2001) (citing TEX. CONST. art. IV, sections 1, 22; TEX. GOV’T CODE 
§ 402.021).
PRAYER 
 
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
 Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-2995
Fax: (512) 474-2697
M ANDAMUS CERTIFICATION 
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(j), I certify that
I have reviewed this petition and that every factual statement in the
petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or
record. Pursuant to Rule 52.3(k)(l)(A), I certify that every document
contained in the appendix is a true and correct copy
/s/ Michael P. Murphy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on February 20, 2015, the foregoing document was
served via File & ServeXpress or electronic mail upon counsel for real
parties in interest. A courtesy copy was also sent to counsel for real
parties in interest by electronic mail.
Brian T. Thompson
 Austin, Texas 78701
 Austin, Texas 78701
 Austin, Texas 78703
19
The Respondent was served a copy by U.S. Mail, sent February 20, 2015.
Hon. David Wahlberg Judge of 167th District Court, Travis County, Texas 509 West 11th, 8th floor
 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: (512) 854-9310 Fax: (512) 854-6425
RESPONDENT 
In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2), this
brief contains 2907 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempted
by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
TAB
Temporary Restraining Order ............................................................. A
Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order ....................................... C
72 Hour Waiver Form .............................................................................. D
Letter to Judge Sparks in Zahrn v. Abbott .............................................. E
Order from Texas Supreme Court Staying
Temporary Restraining Order ...........................................................F
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs Sarah Goodfriend and Suzanne Bryant have filed Plaintiffs' Original Petition
and Application for Temporary Restraining Order, supported by affidavit, against Defendant
Dana DeBeauvoir, the County Clerk of Travis County.
It clearly appears from the facts set forth in the Application that because of the current,
unconstitutional statutory and state constitutional prohibitions in Texas against same-sex
marriage, including as set out in and applied through Texas Family Code §§ 2.001, 2.012, and
6.204, and in Article I, § 32 of the Texas Constitution, Plaintiffs
are
a marriage license by Defendant DeBeauvoir.
The Court finds that unless the Court immediately issues a Temporary Restraining Order,
the unconstitutional denial
a marriage license to Plaintiffs will cause immediate and
irreparabledamage to Plaintiffs, based solely on their statu as a same-sex couple.That
irreparable injury includes the ongoing violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
through thedenial of their vital,
personal
 
 
that PlaintiffGoodfriend's health condition strongly militates in favor of issuing immediate
relief, before a hearing can be held on Plaintiffs' request for temporary injunction and before a
final trial on the merits of permanent injunctive relief. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law
for the damage and the continuing harm that this course of action is causing them and will
continue o cause them, and thus the only remedy available to Plaintiffs is the issuance of a
temporary restrainingorder to prevent that ongoingunconstitutional denial
of
Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Dana DeBeauvoir, County Clerk of
Travis County, is hereby commanded forthwith to cease and desist relying on the
unconstitutional Texas prohibitions against same-sex marriage as a basis for not issuinga
marriage license to Plaintiffs Sarah Goodfriend and Suzanne Bryant.
The clerkof this Court shall on the filingof the bond, as specified below, issue a
temporary order in conformity with and the terms of this Order
ThisOrdershall remain in
Order is signed.
ThePlaintiffs' request for temporary injunction shall be set for heanng on  g
2 15 at^ ju f ^
This
Order
shall not be effective unless and until Plaintiffs execute and file with the clerk
a
cash
law
PRESIDING) JUDGE
 
 
 
 
 NO. 15-0139
O N MOTION FOR TEMPORARY R ELIEF
ORDERED:
1. Relator’s emergency motion for temporary relief, filed February 19, 2015,
is granted in part. The trial court order dated February 19, 2015, styledSarah Goodfriend
and Suzanne Bryant v. Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk , in the 167th District
Court of Travis County, Texas, is stayed pending further order of this Court.
Done at the City of Austin, this February 19, 2015.
BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
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