after paris- a strategy to defeat isis

7/24/2019 After Paris- a Strategy to Defeat ISIS

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After Paris: Thoughts on how NATO might defeat ISIS

Marshall Palmer

The November 13th attacks that left 129 dead in Paris have outraged the world and for obvious

reasons prompted a reassessment of Western counterterrorism policy and counter-ISIS strategy.Before last Fridays attacks in Paris the commonly accepted belief held by Western intelligence

agencies was that the next terrorist attack in a Western country would be much like the last: small-

scale, planned locally, and executed by lone wolf amateur fighters. The ISIS terror network was

assumed to be a decentralised system, relying upon the radicalisation of self-starters abroad rather

than based upon the infiltration of western societies by trained professionals. The counter-terrorism

strategy used by NATO states was based on intelligence initiatives into communities where there

was potential for radicalisation and the slow attrition of ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria by NATO air

power coupled with the ground based initiatives of Iraqi, Syrian, Syrian rebel, and Kurdish forces.

Despite the fact that many powers including NATO, Russia, Iran, the Syrian government and

Syrian moderate rebel forces, and the North African, Levantine, and Gulf states all considered ISIS

as a serious threat, the consolidation of a single counter-ISIS coalition was stifled by global and

regional geopolitics, resulting in an international effort that was loosely coordinated and at times

counterproductive. As such a strategy has now manifestly failedthe attacks in Paris appear to

have been carried out by trained professionals in regular contact with ISIS leadershipit is now

necessary to rethink Western counter-ISIS strategy.


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Among the new strategies now being proposed, most call for a hard and fast NATO-led retaliation

against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, France has already launched its largest airstrikes yet

against training camps and ammunition dumps in Raqqa, Syria. Though for the moment Presidents

Francois Hollande and Barack Obama have ruled out the use of ground troops, it is not

inconceivable some may be committed in the future. Predictably, the usual suspects are already

eagerly clamouring for the commitment of more ground troops into Iraq and Syria. Even those with1

a more in-depth understanding of the region, including James Stavridis, the former NATO Supreme

Commander, seem to think the time has long since come to launch a conventional war against

ISIS, with up to 10,000-15,000 NATO troops entering the region.2

The most hysterical of responses calling for the reintroduction of Western troops into Mesopotamia

treat ISIS as if it were an existential threat, rather than a dangerous but comparatively minor

security risk. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that many of those calling for a significantly increased3

ground presence are also quick to decry the attacks in Paris as the unwelcome but expected

resumption of fire in a tectonic clash of civilisations. The massacre in Paris is a tragedy and4

understandably creates the desire for a ferocious, annihilating retaliation, yet an effective response

needs to consider the proportionality of the threat. The Second World War, an existential conflict if

there ever was one, saw the death of approximately 65 million in a 7-year war which cost the

United States the modern equivalent of $3.6 trillion dollars. In comparison, several thousand

Westerners have been killed by terrorism since the 9/11 attacks while the United States spent on

the Iraq War alone over $5 trillion dollars in a campaign that lasted longer and yielded much less

definitive results. In addition to their price tag, further large scale military operations, even that

much more reasonably proposed by the likes of Stavridis, are likely to remain as ineffective as their

predecessors. The use of Western ground troops to dislodge ISIS from the territory it now occupies

would at best temporarily diminish ISIS ability to maintain a centralised command-and-control

structure, but it would also likely cause a spike in support for ISIS and recreate the bloody

conditions of the Iraqi insurgency. Whether accurate or not, there is a widespread perception

among Arabs in the Middle East that Western and American policies are not implemented to self-defend but rather to imperialistically steal oil and destroy Islam. Al-Qaeda and ISIS predecessor,

al-Qaeda in Iraq, greatly benefitted from this perception in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in

See for example, Max Boot, How to Fight a Real War on ISIS, https://1

www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/real-war-paris-isis/.

E.g. http://time.com/4118026/paris-attacks-admiral-james-stavridis/.2

By way of comparison to the 148 people killed by terrorists this year in France, 16,000 Americans3

will have become victims of homicide by the years end.

See for example, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/16/u-s-4

republicans-see-a-clash-of-civilizations-french-president-says-no/.
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/real-war-paris-isis/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/16/u-s-republicans-see-a-clash-of-civilizations-french-president-says-no/http://time.com/4118026/paris-attacks-admiral-james-stavridis/


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2003. Another robust Western intervention into the heart of the Middle East would do little to

combat this image and would therefore be likely to fail in its attempt to reach a sustainable political

resolution.

How then might the group be defeated? In my view, a successful strategy must be capable of both

both rapidly eliminating the immediate threat as well as creating the long term conditions which

preclude the groups reincarnation as something equally or even more deadly. Crucially, it must

result in political reconciliation between the disenfranchised Sunni tribes and the Shia-led

governments of Iraq and Syria. Taking heed of the successes and failures of the Bush

administrations immediate response to the 9/11 attacks, I believe a new strategy must proceed in

five stages.

First, the enemy must be defined and the conditions that might constitute victory considered. In the

aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush declared war on every terrorist group of global

reach. In doing so, he pitted the United States against a vague and ever expanding group of

enemies. What should have been a laser-like focus against al-Qaeda cells in Afghanistan

escalated into an unrealistically ambitious campaign against groups with tenuous or non-existent

ties to the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, the Presidents inability to precisely define the enemy gave

carte-blanche to regimes around the world to ruthlessly pursue any group that they self-defined as

terrorist. Although ISIS is a more discrete political group than al-Qaeda, it too must precisely be

defined lest its allies in name or appearance are mistaken for allies in substance. Regrettably, I

think, Francois Hollande has already too broadly defined ISIS, having conflated it with Islamic

terrorist groups in Mali and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Instead, he would be better served to focus

solely on the central group controlling territory in Iraq and Syria and on their immediate operatives

hidden within Western societies. The progress of victory should be measured against the

destruction of this group and the establishment of lasting political institutions in Iraq and Syria that

preclude its resurrection.

Second, NATO countries should seek to build a broad international coalition while depriving ISIS of

its own allies, on both a macro and micro scale. As in the aftermath of 9/11, most of the work has

already done itself. ISIS is without a single state sponsor and, as the outpouring of sympathy in

response to the Paris attacks across the Islamic world has shown, has manifestly failed in its call to

recruit the worlds Muslims to its cause. After 9/11, the United States was able to capitalise on the

worlds sympathy and succeeded in bringing together erstwhile foes, including Iran and Russia,

into a broad coalition against al-Qaeda. Cooperating through the United Nations and other

multilateral institutions, American allies provided invaluable assistance as international intelligence

cooperation became streamlined and as al-Qaedas bank accounts were frozen and its


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international cells disrupted. Today, NATO should focus on the consolidation of all the various-anti

ISIS states and actors into a single broad coalition, fighting under the neutral and multilateral

banner of the United Nations. On a micro scale, after 9/11, the CIA and American special forces

succeeded in winning tribal allegiances in Afghanistan; actions which isolated the Taliban regime

and provided crucial intelligence on the location of al-Qaeda terrorists and, nearly, Osama bin

Laden himself. A similar undertaking needs to be made now, with the thrust of the effort aimed at

Sunni tribes currently allied with ISIS in Iraq and Syria. As during the American surge, NATO

should recognise that most of these tribes are not wedded to the idea of a global jihad but are

rather allied with ISIS because they have been excluded from meaningful participation in the Shia-

dominated Iraqi and Syrian governments. NATO should think like the Godfather and use the

diverse set of tools it is equipped with, including bribes, threats, and promises, to win over tribal

allegiances. Ultimately, however, a sustainable solution involves the combined international5

pressure by Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Gulf monarchies, and the United States on their various

patrons to encourage a new political settlement between the Sunni tribes and the Syrian and Iraqi

governments.

Third, and relatedly, a concerted effort needs to be made to degrade insofar as possible ISIS

financial and logistical resources. Here, the importance of winning over the allegiance of Sunni

tribes becomes even more clear, as the lions share of ISIS revenue is taken from the extortion of

the 8 million people under its control. Meanwhile, states around the world must strengthen efforts

against their citizens and charities sending finances abroad in support of ISIS. While no state has

an interest in facilitating terrorist financing, the Gulf states in particular could make substantially

more of an effort in the way of interdicting funds sent abroad. Their reluctance so far to make such

an effort is based partly on domestic security concerns (they fear their regimes will become

unstable if they appear to be acting as puppets of the United States) and partly on regional

geopolitics (they distrust Shia governments almost as much as they do ISIS.) This underscores the

need for positive international diplomatic action to both assure their geopolitical security and to

cajole them out of negligence. If made on the condition these states will step up their counter-terrorism efforts, the further sale of American arms to the Gulf states might be capable of achieving

both objectives.

While avoiding a large and visible ground presence, NATO should fourthly provide all manner of

other military assistance to the Iraqi government, moderate Syrian forces, and the Kurdish

The historical precedent for this is strong. During the initial invasion of Afghanistan, American5

special forces won over Afghan warlords for as little as $50,000 in cash. According to LSEProfessor Christopher Coker, one warlord asked for time to reflect. The next day the US Air Forcedropped a precision bomb outside his headquarters. When the Americans called him back, theyoffered only $40,000. Not surprisingly, he accepted.


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Peshmerga. The past year of air strikes and slow advances made by ground forces have been

successful in attriting and containing ISIS, but now there is a new urgency for the development of

an aggressive rollback strategy. NATO special forces should therefore be deployed alongside local

forces in leading the reconquest of territory. Western support is crucial not only in destroying ISIS,

but also in obtaining favourable leverage in any peace agreement reached at the wars end.

Indeed, it seems the crux of any peace agreement that brings together the Shia and Sunni in Syria

rests on the mutual acknowledgement by the United States and Russia that the Assad regime (if

not Assad himself) and the moderate rebels will need to share power in a postbellum Syria.

Fifth and finally, the West must do all of the above while forcefully restating and carrying out in

practice an appealing ideological argument centred on its core values of tolerance, compassion,

and human rights. A new effort must be made to both encourage the integration of Muslim

communities, including Muslim refugees, into Western society and to facilitate the elimination of

anti-Muslim bigotry within Western society. This must be begin with Western leaders making a

forceful denunciation of far right nationalism in Europe and the United States. Facile narratives that

blame the attacks in Paris on Islam, refugees, or, in the warped mind of Ted Cruz, American

unwillingness to bomb civilians should be publicly refuted and dismissed. It is encouraging to see6

the new Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, and President Obama taking such steps, and

one hopes that their example will be repeated across Europe by both politicians and everyday

citizens. Yet this alone is not enough. While the attacks in Paris have no excuse, Western leaders

must acknowledge that their own foreign policies have generated a not-irrational resentment of

Western states across the Middle East. While past actions cannot be undone, three major sources

of resentment can, in theory, be addressed. The first, of course, is Washingtons unqualified

support for Israel. So long as American politicians continue to turn a blind eye to unethical Israeli

policy and the theft of Palestinian land and as long as Western countries are unwilling to recognise

Palestine as a state, many Arabs and Muslims will continue to see the West in imperialistic terms.

A second important source of resentment that could also be addressed is the continued operation

of the Guantanamo bay detention centre, a place long assumed (not unfairly) to torture, humiliate,and imprison Muslims without charge. Regrettably, there does not appear the political will in

Washington to close Guantanamo, though not from lack of effort by President Obama and other

key Democrats. Third, while Western reliance on autocrats in the Middle East is in many ways7

necessary for the stability of the regional balance of power, this reliance has come at the cost of

engendering a jihadist movement. After all, modern jihadist ideology first emerged as a form of

Ted Cruzs comments can be seen here: https://www.tedcruz.org/news/cruz-america-must-stand-6

with-our-allies-against-the-scourge-of-radical-islamic-terrorism/.

Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) most recently made a forceful argument to close Guantanamo7

in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/opinion/lets-finally-close-guantanamo.html?_r=0.
https://www.tedcruz.org/news/cruz-america-must-stand-with-our-allies-against-the-scourge-of-radical-islamic-terrorism/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/opinion/lets-finally-close-guantanamo.html?_r=0


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Islamic resistance to the brutality of the Egyptian dictatorship. As long as Middle Eastern dictators

and autocrats repress their people, ISIS promise of a pure Islamic Caliphate will continue to

endure as will al-Qaedas pledge to wage war against those regimes international and Western

patrons. (It is worthwhile, however, to point out that the vast majority of resistance, including that by

Islamist parties, to Middle Eastern dictatorships has been admirably non-violent, progressive, and

in many ways democratic.) While it would be a fools errand for the West to simply forgo its current

alliances with Middle Eastern regimes, the West must restart as multilaterally as possible the soft

democratic initiatives began by President Bush in the mid-2000s. Doing so, however, will require

Western political will to interact with and acknowledge the political reach of moderate Islamist

parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Regrettably, there seems little appetite to do so at the

moment in Washington or in Europe; a pattern likely to continue so long as the regional balance of

power remains fragile.

Strategy, it must be remembered, is the starting point rather than the ending point. All of the stages

outlined above are far easier said than done, and even the best plans have been laid to waste as

forces clash, enemies cheat, and luck intervenes. As the points above suggest, a great deal of

diplomatic flexibility and realpolitik is already called upon Western leaders, especially Presidents

Hollande and Obama. Should they end up following a plan similar to the one Ive pondered above,

they would be well served to rely on these instincts in the months ahead as they lead us through a

chaotic world of regional instability, extremist ideologies, and hazardous local and international

politics.

after paris- a strategy to defeat isis

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