after abbottabad: pakistan -...

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Crisis Director: Noor El-Edroos

Chair: Merita Salihu

Vice-Chair: Auste Kriukelyte

BACKGROUND

GUIDE 2012 After Abbottabad: Pakistan

Military Cabinet

FCMUN V After Abbottabad: Pakistan Military Cabinet

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Pakistan Military Cabinet! If you are going to be a part of this committee, my guess is that you

are fond of orchestrating covert operations, enjoy guarding (and perhaps selling?) precious nuclear secrets, and

delight in navigating through delicate political situations. Even if you were not before, we hope you look

forward to them now! We surely will be working tirelessly to keep you involved and challenged throughout the

weekend.

Now that I have (hopefully) sold to you the merits of picking the most exciting committee at FCMUN 2012,

allow me to introduce myself. My name is Noor El-Edroos and I will be the Crisis Director for this committee. I

am a senior at Mount Holyoke College, majoring in Economics and International Relations. I have been

involved with FCMUN from my very first year, and this year I will be saying good bye to what has always been

an incredibly exciting conference. Having chaired committees in all three previous FCMUN‟s, I have never

experienced the thrill of being in a crisis room; I hope to leave my last FCMUN with all my wishes for

wreaking havoc fulfilled!

As you have probably guessed by now, I have a penchant for dramatizing everything, and this committee will

be no exception. Luckily, this committee and the issues at hand provide a lot to work with. As most of you are

aware, the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden has been characterized as one of the most significant

moments in recent history. There can be some debate about whether the capture is truly a significant

breakthrough, but there is little doubt that Pakistan is, and will remain a vital focal point for all matters

pertaining to the war on terror. As delegates in this committee you must work to articulate a diplomatic, as well

as strategic stance on this issue. Besides that, you must also continue to further Pakistan‟s strategic interests in

the region, and sort out the military‟s various foreign and domestic entanglements. The relevant external

„powers‟ will continue to exert pressure on this committee to carry out actions in their favor, but it is up to the

delegates to determine what pressures they will yield to, and what ultimately will be in the best interests of the

country (Hint: This is supposed to sound cryptic, and somewhat suspicious).

Although this committee will be set on May 2nd 2011, and the subsequent days, it will benefit delegates to stay

informed about Pakistan‟s current domestic situation and international interactions. It is highly possible that the

crisis staff will „borrow‟ crises from real life events.

If at any point you have questions about the committee, or regarding your position, please don‟t hesitate to

email me at: [email protected]. Your committee staff is extremely excited to meet all of you!

Best,

Noor El-Edroos, MHC‟12

mailto:[email protected]


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Introduction

This committee will simulate a high level, emergency meeting of the Pakistani Military Cabinet in the

immediate aftermath of the attack and capture of Osama bin Laden in the northwest city of Abbottabad. The

committee will be chaired by General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, and the cabinet will

comprise some of the most senior, and well-placed military men in Pakistan. The first committee session will be

dated May 2, 2011, a day after bin Laden was killed. Delegates are encouraged to come into the first session

with ideas on how to respond to recent events, and combine those with any efforts they could provide based on

their portfolio powers. This guide should be sufficient in explaining both the events, and respective portfolio

powers.

Besides damage control from the event itself, delegates should also anticipate a backlash from both domestic

and international fronts, and outline a plan of action that will minimize all potential threats and challenges

Pakistan will inevitably face in the coming days. The end of one committee session will represent the passage of

one day. Though the killing of bin Laden will serve as a main backdrop for the cabinet meeting, it will, by no

means be the only challenge the body will have to tackle. There will be a host of ongoing domestic and

international issues the committee must confront simultaneously. It is up to the delegates to make politically

sensitive decisions, that are not at odds with other goals of the military, and do not compromise the internal

stability, and global perception of Pakistan.

The Pakistani military has come under increasing pressure within the last few years to crackdown on terrorism

both within its borders, and across the region. Relations with the United States have been extremely volatile,

and the first half of 2011 saw this „partnership‟ put to test on a number of occasions. On the domestic front, the

military has also been criticized for undermining the legitimacy of the civilian government, and impeding the

democratic process. Political commentators have also continued to call attention to the supposed

misappropriation of national resources by the military to further the military industrial complex. The delegates

must remain cognizant of these ongoing concerns at all times, and should not relegate them to the sidelines

while tackling the bin Laden issue.


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Military Rule in Pakistan

“The story of Pakistan is the story of ambitious and adventurist generals denying the people their rights.”

- Former air force chief, Mohammad Asghar Khan, 1983

The military, as it exists within the Pakistani political fabric has been 64 years in the making. To contextualize

the scale and engagements of the military as they are now, it is important to look back at the historical trajectory

of the army. Although Pakistan was founded as a democracy after the partition of the Indian sub-continent, the

army has for the most part, sustained itself as one of the country's most powerful institutions. Hence, the

military has continuously found itself embroiled in local politics, and has often steered Pakistan‟s foreign policy

and diplomatic engagements in the international arena.

Coups have been commonplace in Pakistan‟s political history, and even during periods of the military‟s hiatus,

democratic governments have consulted the military before taking most strategic decisions. Political leaders

have, throughout Pakistan‟s history, been keenly aware of the military‟s propensity to propel itself into

mainstream politics during times of crisis. Foreign governments and independent analysts have, on a number of

occasions expressed concerns that the military is in no way under the control of the civilian government. Rather,

the opposite is assumed.

This was not always the case. In the first few years of Pakistan‟s existence, the military remained considerably

removed from political entanglements. In fact, for its first decade, the Pakistani military reflected the British

Indian tradition of working under the overall command of the civilian leadership. It avoided active and direct

involvement in politics and day to day affairs of the government, striving for discipline and internal cohesion

instead.

Although the Pakistani military inherited some of these traditions, two inter-related developments set

into motion the gradual rise of the military to power. These were the erosion of the civilian political institutions

and processes, and the gradual ascendancy of the military in the polity. This was simultaneously accompanied

by a bolstering of the military‟s garrison and financial reserves. The Baghdad Pact of 1954, the South East

Asian Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization all led to a significant transfer of funds to the

military from the United States and England.

Gradually, the military became an important factor in the decision making process, and played a key role in

guiding foreign and security affairs. The military

formally assumed power in October 1958, when it

displaced the civilian leadership and institutions

altogether and assumed power directly. This was

the first military regime of Field Marshal Ayub

Khan and remained a military regime from 7

October 1958 to 8 June 1962. After this, under the

1962 Constitution, Ayub Khan was appointed

President, and held civilian office until 25 March

1969. Ayub Khan‟s assumption of power marked a

shift in the military‟s orientations and dispositions

towards the political process. Khan's rule lasted


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until 1969, when he was forced to resign following serious unrest.

This regime was succeeded by another military regime; Pakistan‟s second martial law was imposed on

March 25, 1969, when President Khan abrogated his own constitution and handed over power to the Army

Commander-in-Chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan stayed in power till 20 December

1971. He stepped down following the civil war, which resulted in independence for Bangladesh -formerly East

Pakistan -, and military rule came to an end, temporarily.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the new president, introducing a new constitution that came into effect in

1973. Although Bhutto was championed initially for restoring the primacy of the civilian government, he was

unable to fully empower civilian institutions in his later years. Moreover, he became increasingly dependent on

the military to sustain his political power. Hence, when Bhutto‟s victory was challenged after the elections of

1977, the military stepped in to fill the power vacuum. Hence, on 5 July 1977 General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq

deposed Bhutto in military coup, and declared martial law.

General Zia ul-Haq ruled the country under martial law up to December 1985. Under martial rule, Zia

ul-Haq cancelled democratic elections, and limited political activity, although political parties were allowed to

remain active. Moreover, the military took up key administrative and political posts that were previously held

by civilians and politicians. This form of government lasted until the end of 1985, after which, under the

amended 1973 Constitution, he appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister, continuing as President

with enhanced powers until his death in a plane crash on 17 August 1988.

Thus far, no Pakistani leader, both military and civilian had much sympathy for Islamic radicals. Zia ul-Haq

however, was different. From the moment he grasped power, Zia made Islam the centerpiece of both his

administration and his military. Zia‟s Islamic campaign pervaded every aspect of the Pakistani state. The legal

system, the economy, the education system, and even his political dealings maintained a specifically Islamic

emphasis. Throughout his period in office, Zia rewarded the only political party to offer him consistent support,

the Jamaat-i-Islami (literally, Islamic Party). Members of this religiously motivated party were given jobs in the

judiciary, the civil service, and other state institutions.

Zia made a special effort to reform the military and to create a more „puritanical‟ and devout army.

Emphasis was laid on organizing prayer times and religious fasts for army personnel. Some religious groups

were also allowed to operate in the

army with relative freedom. In

particular, the Tablighi Jamaat, the

largest Islamic organization in

Pakistan at the time was allowed to

become active within the military. Zia

also wanted religion to be integrated

into the syllabus of the Military Staff

College, and he encouraged the study of

Islam‟s teachings regarding the

conduct of war. All the Quranic

passages relevant to war were printed

and distributed in military circles.

Zia‟s rule also coincided with

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in


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1979. His dictatorship became the linchpin of US strategy in the region, which is why Washington also turned a

blind eye to Pakistan‟s nuclear program. Throughout the 1980„s, the ISI served as the main vehicle through

which the US conducted its covert operation in Afghanistan. Officers from the Pakistani Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) were responsible for training the Afghani „mujahedeen,‟ and in some cases even determined

which groups the CIA would ally itself with. Many of the mujahedeen were a mix of Afghan resistance fighters

and Afghan refugees who had crossed into Pakistan at the onset of the Soviet invasion and later been recruited

to fight the Soviet „infidels‟. Their military might was bolstered by Orthodox Muslims from other Arab nations

who answered the international call to jihad against the Soviets. To justify their active participation in this

operation, Zia‟s military men argued that Soviets would inevitably posit that the guerillas were fronting for

American imperialism. Moreover, the physical presence of CIA operatives in Afghanistan would confirm these

Soviet claims; it was more prudent for US to operate through its “conduit,” the ISI. Hence, minimal CIA

presence in Afghanistan, and no physical means of directly funneling arms and equipment to Afghani guerilla

inevitably meant that the US had to rely largely on the ISI. Meanwhile, domestically, the government

patronized the Jamaat-i-Islami, which had never won more than 5 percent of the vote anywhere in the country.

Its cadres were sent to fight in Afghanistan, its armed student wing was encouraged to rally support from

campuses in the name of Islam, and its ideologues were ever present on television and in the print media. The

ISI was now instructed by the military leadership to assist the formation of other, more extreme jihadi groups.

Religious schools began to be established in the countryside, especially in the frontier provinces. In fact, all

contemporary issues regarding increasing radicalization within the Pakistani Military, as well as the mounting

cross border flow of militants are repeatedly traced back to Zia-ul-Haq‟s policies.

Following a long period of civilian rule, with power oscillating between Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan

People‟s Party (PPP), and Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), Pervez Musharraf assumed

the mantle following a bloodless coup in October 1999. As opposed to Zia ul- Haq, Musharraf was deemed the

„liberal autocrat,‟ and soon after assuming office, began espousing „enlightened moderation‟ which hoped to

counter some of the increasingly radical elements within Pakistani society. 9/11 was to change the course of

Musharraf‟s regime substantially. He was soon propelled to the forefront of the war on terror as the voice of

moderation, and potential „anchor of stability‟ in a region of instability.

When the US asked for his cooperation on the global War on Terror, Musharraf was inclined to agree

because it would also allow him to move against similar elements at home, at least superficially. At the time, the

US provided him with an official list of seven demands. They were:

1. Stop Al Qaeda operatives at the Pakistani border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden;

2. Give the United States blanket over flight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence

operations;

3. Provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations

against the al Qaeda;

4. Provide the US with intelligence information;

5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist attacks;

6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and


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7. If the evidence implicated Bin Laden and al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break

relations with the Taliban government.

The 9/11 Commission Report States:

“Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of the

NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every [emphasis added] US request for support

in the war on terrorism. The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top

military commanders had agreed to all seven demands [emphasis added]. „Pakistan will need full US support

as it proceeds with us,‟ the embassy noted. „Musharraf said the Government of Pakistan was making substantial

concessions in allowing the use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan

was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that, he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his

decisions.‟”

Relations with US since 9/11

In the post-9/11 period, Pakistan‟s association with the US in the war against the Taliban pitted the army against

its own tribes, and by 2007 with Islamic militants inside the settled parts of the northwest. Pressure from the US

continued to mount on Pakistan to plug the gaps in the porous 1,350-mile border with Afghanistan. Hence, the

army has had to move front and center in the fight against terrorism both on the border, and inside the country, a

role which is seen to be stretching its already pressed resources. On the al Qaeda front, no other country has

provided more intelligence support, committed more troops, and captured more al-Qaeda operatives than

Pakistan. On a number of occasions, Pervez Musharraf has reminded the international community “we

[Pakistan] have broken the back of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.” To some extent, there are also remains a fundamental

lack of trust between both sides as some expect the United States to decamp from Afghanistan as it did

following the Soviet withdrawal, leaving Pakistan to deal with a hostile tribal force on both sides of the Afghani

border.

From the American side, there has always been a lingering doubt about Pakistan‟s commitment to core US

interests. Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to


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distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistani‟s

perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns about

Islamabad‟s ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani

territory. This concern is particularly serious considering that Pakistan was among the leading recipients of U.S.

aid both in the first half of the 2011 fiscal year, and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22

billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. The May 1st revelation that Osama bin Laden had

enjoyed a lengthy and comfortable refuge within Pakistan is bound to intensify these concerns.

Capture of Osama bin Laden

On May 1, a team of US Navy SEALS conducted a covert operation that, in a span of 40 minutes captured and

killed Osama bin Laden, founder of the Al Qaeda. This operation took place just 35 miles north of the capital of

Islamabad, and a one-half mile from Pakistan‟s premier military academy.

The location and circumstances of this death immediately raised concerns from Washington about

Pakistan‟s commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism. Besides a questioning of

the efficacy of Pakistani efforts in counterterrorism, there were also immediate calls to curtail U.S. assistance to

Pakistan. The first few responses to this event called for a deeper inquiry into Pakistan‟s role and potential

complicity in bin Laden‟s refuge.

President Obama‟s chief

counterterrorism advisor, John

Brennan, told reporters it was

“inconceivable that Osama bin

Laden did not have a support

system” in Pakistan.

Pakistan‟s, and particularly

the military‟s credibility suffered a

significant blow from these events.

Most criticism levied against the

military emphasized two

conclusions: either Pakistani

officials were at some level

complicit in hiding the fugitive, or

the country‟s military and

intelligence services were grossly

incompetent in their search for top

Al Qaeda leaders.

Relationship with Militants

Even after Soviet withdrawal, the ISI maintained its contacts and operations with Islamist networks in Central

Asia and Afghanistan. Once the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, the ISI did not as great an amount of

leverage as before, but they did have key contacts and used them effectively. One element was the outpouring

of support from religious schools or madrassahs on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. The

Islamist parties in Pakistan also established direct contacts with the Taliban, sending delegations to Mullah

Omar who was the de facto head of state for Afghanistan at the time, and the spiritual head of the Taliban

besides that. It has also been reported that the ISI employed Pakistani mullahs to mould and manipulate Mullah

Omar and planted their own representatives within his own inner circle.


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Hence, one compelling reason for believing that the rank and file of the army is becoming increasingly radical

is the ever close relationship between the military and various Islamic militant groups and Jihadis. Pakistani

soldiers are bound to be affected by their experience of working and fighting with Jihadis. Caught up by the

romance of the Mujahedeen‟s struggle, some Pakistani soldiers have come to admire their civilian militant

counterparts. Throughout the 1980‟s, Pakistani soldiers became used to fighting alongside the Mujahedeen in

Afghanistan. Similarly, in Kashmir, army regulars and civilian Islamic militants have co-operated closely.

The radical Islamist sentiment of some former Pakistani soldiers is evident in the Tanzeemul Ikhwan

movement. Based in a madrassa 90 miles from Islamabad, the organization is made up of retired army

personnel. The supreme leader of Tanzeemul Ikhwan, Mohammad Akran Awan, campaigns for radical Islamic

reform within Pakistan. Claiming to have support from numerous serving officers, dozens of retired officers,

and hundreds of retired officers at his command, he has openly threatened to bring about an Islamic revolution.

Besides that, a wide range of extremists have sympathizers within the military. Groups supporting the Kashmiri

Jihad, such as Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakat-ul- Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, and other

Deobandi organizations have relied on support from Pakistan‟s intelligence agencies to wage a war of attrition

against the Indian army. The legacy left by President Zia ul-Haq during the late 1970s and through the early

1990s further solidified the government‟s ties to extremist groups. A senior Pakistani editor defines the 1980s as

a period when Pakistan‟s intelligentsia “exploited the fanaticism of the jihadi warriors to fight Pakistan's proxy

wars for it in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir. In pursuing this strategy, the military acted as a midwife,

giving birth to a murderous jihadi culture which went on to consume it.”

In recent times, the ISI in particular has been subjected to particular criticism for supporting terrorist groups.

These concerns have been particularly heightened as the Pakistani government seeks increased aid from

Washington with assurances of fighting militants. In fact, a number of US officials have chided the ISI for what

they deem to be „duplicitous‟ behavior. In May 2009, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated, "to a certain

extent, they play both sides." These accusations were rationalized with the claim that the ISI maintains links

with groups like the Afghan Taliban as a "strategic hedge" to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once U.S.

troops exit the region. Similar allegations were made in the July 2010 Wikileaks documents. The documents

described ISI's links to militant groups fighting U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan.

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen singled out another militant network that he

believed to be associated with the

ISI, the Haqqani network: “It‟s

fairly well known that the

Pakistani military‟s Inter-Services

Intelligence agency has had a long

relationship with the Haqqani

network.” The Haqqani Network

has been identified as

Afghanistan‟s most capable and

sophisticated insurgent network.

Within Pakistan, the Haqqanis are

said to enjoy sanctuary in the tribal

areas along the Afghanistan

border. With the backing of

elements within the Pakistan

security establishment, the


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Haqqanis have used their sanctuary in the North Waziristan Agency of Pakistan to operate across the border in

southeastern Afghanistan.

In response to increased coalition activity against the Haqqani Network in both Pakistan (via drones) and

Afghanistan (via Special Operations Forces), the Haqqanis have increasingly sought new Pakistani sanctuary

and additional infiltration routes to continue to battle coalition forces for control of southeastern Afghanistan.

Structure of the Military and Important Institutions

The Pakistani army is the biggest force in its defense mechanism.

As it stands now, the Army employs 651,000 personnel, and

maintains 500,000 in the reserve force. The Army, combined with

the Navy and Air Force, constitutes the 7th largest military in the

world.

Familiarity with the structure of the Pakistani Army will be helpful

for delegates, as all decisions pertaining to military actions should

be articulated within the existing framework of the military.

The Pakistani Army is divided into two main branches: Arms and

Services. Arms include infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and

communications, while Services include the Ordinance Corps, the

Education Corps, and the Military Police Corps, among others.

A Corp in the Pakistani Army usually consists of two or

more Divisions and is commanded by a Lieutenant General. Some delegates in this committee will hold the post

of Corp Commander. Divisions in the army are commanded by major general, and usually hold three Brigades

including infantry, artillery, engineers and communications units in addition to logistics (supply and service)

support to sustain independent action. A Brigade is under the command of a brigadier and comprises of three or

more Battalions of different units depending on its functionality. Each battalion is made up of roughly 600 to

900 soldiers.

Some directorates of the military that will be of extreme relevance for this committee include the Inter-Services

Public Relations (ISPR), and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISPR is the directorate allocated the

responsibility of handling the public relations requirements of the Armed Forces. The ISPR is entrusted with the

responsibility with presenting a positive image of the military, and for relaying information about military

operations and decisions. Most of the military‟s communication with the media and public occurs via the ISPR.

The more well known of the two directorates, and for good reason, is the ISI, Pakistan‟s inter-services

intelligence agency. The objectives and ambitions of the ISI have never been fully disclosed, leading many

political leaders and commentators to deem it a „state within a state.‟ In fact, many have raised doubts about

whether the army even controls the intelligence agencies.

It is considered so because of its history of circumventing the incumbent governments‟ control to orchestrate a

number of covert operations, all the while maintaining communication with a number of militant outfits. It is

difficult to construct an exhaustive list of the ISI‟s engagements, but some of their responsibilities include

intercepting and collecting domestic and foreign intelligence; surveillance over foreigners, the media, politically

active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani

diplomats serving outside the country.


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These two directorates have been specifically highlighted because the nature of the crises demands that

delegates utilize their services. Although control of these institutions may fall under the purview of some

delegates in this committee, other delegates are welcome to request their services as well. As such, delegates

with control of these directorates do not have exclusive rights over them.

Committee Structure and Purpose

This committee is structured as an emergency cabinet meeting of the most trusted and well-placed military

officials that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani will need to consult with in the immediate aftermath of the Osama

bin Laden capture and killing. This committee should expect to deal with a number of crises that are likely to

occur simultaneously. It is up to the delegates to determine what is of utmost priority, and what can be

temporarily sidelined. Each committee session will simulate subsequent days, and delegates should be ready to

expect developments on existing crises alongside newer challenges in every new session.

As mentioned previously, although the death of Osama bin Laden will be the most immediate concern facing

the cabinet, it will by no means be the only one. Pakistan is a highly volatile country, and wakes up to new

challenges everyday. As the military controls a number of variables determining the political, social and

economic climate of Pakistan, it should be expect to deal with a diverse set of crises, some of them not even

traditionally considered „military‟ matters.

Although delegates in the cabinet will primarily make decisions, delegates should also maintain correspondence

with a host of external stakeholders. They may sometimes only be able act after consultation with external

parties. Some of these could include, but may not be limited to: the civilian government, the United States

Military, other military leaders not represented in the cabinet, political parties, other foreign states, and any

other relevant parties that it deems necessary to communicate with. Crisis will be functioning as all these

aforementioned parties, so delegates should specify in their notes who they would like their communication

directed to.

Because of the fast paced nature of events, there will be no moderated caucuses set on a specific topic. This is

done in the interest of facilitating quicker discussion on crises as they may arise. The committee will not be turn

based, and by default, every delegate will have 45 seconds to speak once recognized by the chair.

Actions taken by the committee must be articulated through directives. If a delegate wishes to take unilateral

action that lies within their portfolio powers, they can write and sign a personal directive. If they wish their

actions to be covert, they can submit it as a confidential directive to the chair, although there remains no

guarantee that their actions may not be intercepted by others within the committee, or other stakeholders outside

the committee. The point of this cabinet however is to encourage collaboration between delegates, hence the

committee staff would encourage delegates to work together to issue joint directives, which would then be

voted on by the rest of the committee. For a committee directive to pass, it must have at least three signatories,

and should receive majority vote from the committee members.

Delegates should be open to their positions changing through the course of the weekend. This can happen

through a number of ways. Delegates showing impeccable strategic acumen should expect to be rewarded,

while any delegate whose loyalty to the Pakistani military comes under question should expect to face

consequences. Delegates are encouraged to challenge the status quo, both within the military, within Pakistan,

and even internationally, as long as it is within realistic bounds.


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Committee Positions

Lieutenant General Syed Muhammad Owais, Commander, Army Air Defense Command

The Army Air Defense Command is entrusted with the task of monitoring the air defenses of Pakistan, and

protecting it from local and foreign threats. As such, it focuses mostly on anti-air craft defense. It operates

independently of the Pakistan Air Force, although there is some knowledge sharing between the two services.

At this point, it has allocated one division towards the northern region of Pakistan, while four divisions guard

the southern region.

Lieutenant General Ahmed Shoji Pasha, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence The Director General of the ISI is responsible for overseeing the three main wings of the ISI: the Internal wing which deals with counter-intelligence, and the political climate inside Pakistan, the External wing which handles all intelligence beyond Pakistan‟s borders, and the Analysis and Foreign Relations wing. It is reported that General Pasha‟s appointment was based on Washington‟s recommendation, because of his supposed anti-Taliban views.

General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

A four star general, the Chairman Joint Chief oversees an advisory body consisting of representatives from all

three forces, army, navy and air force. This committee is responsible for dealing with all military aspects of

state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the three services. During peacetime, the

committee’s principal function is planning, and in times of war, its Chairman advises the President on the

conduct of warfare,

Lieutenant General Waheed Arshad, Chief of General Staff

The Chief of General Staff oversees the General Staff Branch of the military, and oversees some of the most

critical directorates of the military, including Military Operations and Military Intelligence. The CGS also

monitors the induction of all military equipment, and the strategic supply of equipment within the military.

Lieutenant General Jamil Haider — Commander, Army Strategic Forces Command

The Army Strategic Forces Commander is responsible for commanding all of Pakistan's land based strategic

forces. This position also involves regulating the safety of nuclear assets, and missiles. Surveillance,

reconnaissance and information warfare are additional concerns for this position.

Rao Qamar Suleman, Air Chief Marshal

The Air Chief Marshal is currently the highest-ranking 4-star officer in the Pakistan Air Force. Reporting

directly to the President and Prime Minister, he must oversee the organization, training, and equipping of

reserve and civilian forces serving in the Pakistan Air Force and overseas. He is also part of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Committee.

Lieutenant General Muhammad Alam Khattak, Commander, XII Corps, Quetta

The XII Corps was raised in 1979 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to curb Soviet

expansionism alongside XI Corps in Peshawar. XII Corp primarily focuses on guarding the Bolan Pass, and

monitoring the flow of al Qaeda and Taliban operatives across the western borders. It is also frequently

involved in quelling threats from Balochi insurgents.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-aircraft_warfare


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Lieutenant General Khalid Rabbani, Commander, XI Corps, Peshawar

The XI Corps has been the most active corp engaged in the war on terror. It is also the only corp located in the

Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, and as such is constantly engaged in fighting in the northwest. The corp has a

history of engagement with Afghanistan, and orchestrated most of the Pakistani involvement in the Soviet war

in Afghanistan, and was reinforced after 9/11. The XI Corp also commands the paramilitary Frontier Corps

(FC) composed of 80,000 paramilitary soldiers recruited from the northwestern tribal areas.

Lieutenant General Mohammad Zahirul Islam, Commander, V Corps, Karachi.

V Corps is the only corp to be stationed in Sindh province. The corps played a heavy role in controlling ethnic

strife in Karachi in the late 1980s and through the 1990s. Since then, the responsibility for administering peace

in Karachi has been delegated to the Rangers, a paramilitary group, but from time to time, the army has to step

in. Although the army in Karachi has not been actively involved in combatting militant networks, it should

monitor all transport networks originating from Karachi.

Lieutenant General Khalid Nawaz Khan, - Commander, X Corps, Rawalpindi.

The X Corps has its headquarters in Rawalpindi, but also has brigades assigned to Kashmir. As such it has not

been as active in the war on terror efforts, but actively monitors the borders with India, and has been responsible

for recent conflicts with India in the Jammu and Kashmir region. Throughout Pakistan‟s military history, the

11th Infantry Brigade has also been involved in facilitating military coup d‟etats.

Major General Athar Abbas, Director General Inter Services Public Relations Directorate

The ISPR is responsible for relaying military information to the media and civil society. Throughout Pakistan‟s

history, the ISPR has also produced documentaries, television shows, sitcoms, and sponsored patriotic music to

bolster the public perception of the military. In times of crisis, it is also holds press conferences with media

personnel to clarify the military‟s stance and position on ongoing events.

Major General Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmad, DG Military Operations at CGS Branch, General Headquarters.

The MO directorate is responsible for outlining the operational plans of the army, orchestrating plans for

maintenance of internal security, coordinating military cooperation with foreign troops, and monitoring troop

movement in conjunction with the Army Chief, and the CGS.

Major General Farrukh Bashir, - General Officer Commander Special Service Group (SSG)

The Special Services Group (SSG) is an independent command division of the Army, and is an elite special operations

force, similar to the Green Berets in the US Military. The SSG are used to provide security to various vital points

such as the strategic nuclear facilities in Pakistan, and also on the Indo-Pakistani border. Major General Bashir

is stationed currently in Cherat, in the northwest part of the country; hence the SSG is also being employed in

counter-terrorism operations as well. Overall, the SSG are trained to tackle issues such as asymmetric warfare,

unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, hostage rescue, personal recovery, and counter-terrorism.

Major General Allah Ditta Khan, DG Counter-Terrorism at ISI Directorate

Specifically within the ISI, Maj General Ditta Khan is responsible for overseeing intelligence efforts to gather

information about terrorist groups, and their locations. Before the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden, the


Page 13 of 15

ISI has had a mixed record with counter-terrorism. Pakistan‟s relations with the US have become increasingly

tense over this matter in the last few years, as American officials have expressed frustration at the pace of ISI

efforts to identify and curb the spread of terrorist groups.

Location of Military Corps


Page 14 of 15

Works Cited

“Pakistan Army Accuses US of „negative Propaganda’" Dawn. April 21, 2011

<http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/21/pakistan-army-chief-defends-anti-militant-struggle.html>

Ali, Tariq. The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. Scribner, 2009.

Anwar, Haris. "Pakistan‟s Army Faces Parliament Over Bin Laden Raid Failures." Bloomberg Business Week.

May 13, 2011. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-13/pakistan-s-army-faces-parliament-over-bin-

laden-raid-failures.html>

Douglas, Jehl. "A Nation Challenged: Islamabad; Pakistan to Cut Islamists' Links to Spy Agency." The New

York Times, February 20, 2002 <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/20/international/asia/20STAN.html>

Dressler, Jeffrey, and Reza Jan. The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing

Insurgency. The Institute for the Study of War, 2011.

<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_in_Kurram_web.pdf>

Jones, Owen. Bennet. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. Yale University Press, 2003.

Jones, Seth. G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. WW Norton & Co Inc, 2010.

Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars within. Oxford University Press, USA, 2008.

Nawaz, Shuja. “Focusing the Spy Glass on On Pakistan‟s ISI.” The Huffington Post. October 2, 2008.

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shuja-nawaz/focusing-the-spy-glass-

on_b_131153.html?show_comment_id=16407996>

Rais, Rasul. Bux. Recovering the Frontier Stage: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan. Rowman &

Littlefield, 2008.

Walsh, Declan. "Whose Side is Pakistan's ISI really on?" The Guardian May 12, 2011.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/isi-bin-laden-death-pakistan-alqaida>

http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/21/pakistan-army-chief-defends-anti-militant-struggle.html

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-13/pakistan-s-army-faces-parliament-over-bin-laden-raid-failures.html

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-13/pakistan-s-army-faces-parliament-over-bin-laden-raid-failures.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/20/international/asia/20STAN.html

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_in_Kurram_web.pdf

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shuja-nawaz/focusing-the-spy-glass-on_b_131153.html?show_comment_id=16407996

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shuja-nawaz/focusing-the-spy-glass-on_b_131153.html?show_comment_id=16407996

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/isi-bin-laden-death-pakistan-alqaida


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Weaver, M. A. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2003.

Williams, L. F. R., and NS Hyslop. The State of Pakistan. Faber & Faber, 1966.

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