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Foundation BriefsAdvanced Level March Brief

Resolved: The United States should suspendall assistance to Pakistan.


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March 2012 Table of Contents

foundationbriefs.com Page 1 of 114

Table of ContentsTable of Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 1The New Foundation Brief ................................................................................................................................. 4

Key Organizational Changes .............................................................................................................................. 5

Hierarchical Sections ...................................................................................................................................... 5

Hierarchical Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 5

Definitions............................................................................................................................................................... 6

Topic Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 7

Defend Your Source ............................................................................................................................................... 9

Author Index ..................................................................................................................................................... 10

Organization Index ........................................................................................................................................... 11

Laying the Foundation .......................................................................................................................................... 13

The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations .................................................................................................. 13

U.S. Interests ..................................................................................................................................................... 13

U.S. Aid Levels ................................................................................................................................................. 14Pakistans Nuclear Issue ................................................................................................................................... 14

Pro Evidence ......................................................................................................................................................... 15

General .............................................................................................................................................................. 16

A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence: ............................................................................. 16

Pakistan Has Different Objectives .................................................................................................................... 18

Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat .................................................................................................. 19

Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists ........................................................................................................... 20

Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists ........................................................................................... 25

Support for the Haqqani Network ..................................................................................................................... 27

Allegations of Aiding Taliban .......................................................................................................................... 29

Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 31

Inability To Find Bin Laden ............................................................................................................................. 32

Aid Creates Perverse Incentives ....................................................................................................................... 34


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March 2012 Table of Contents


Aid to the Military Remains Essential .............................................................................................................. 78

Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential ............................................................................................................ 79Education Aid Is Critical .................................................................................................................................. 83

Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics ............................................................................... 84

Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most ............................................................................................. 86

Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse ....................................................................................... 87

Ties to China ..................................................................................................................................................... 88

Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence ................................................................................................... 89

Ties With Iran ................................................................................................................................................... 90

Ties With Saudi Arabia..................................................................................................................................... 93

Pro Counters.......................................................................................................................................................... 95

Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated .......................................................................................................... 96

Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible ..................................................................... 99

Afghan Supply Lines Dont Depend on Pakistan ........................................................................................... 100

Suspension Will Not Cause Gov. Collapse .................................................................................................... 101

Conditionality Not the Answer ....................................................................................................................... 102

Humanitarian Aid Not Effective ..................................................................................................................... 103

Con Counters ...................................................................................................................................................... 104

China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely .................................................................................................. 105

Military Aid is Productive .............................................................................................................................. 106

Pakistani Military Not To Blame .................................................................................................................... 107

Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban ................................................................................................. 108

Conditional Aid Would Succeed .................................................................................................................... 109

Contentions ......................................................................................................................................................... 110Pro Contentions ............................................................................................................................................... 111

Con Contentions ............................................................................................................................................. 113


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March 2012 The New Foundation Brief


The New Foundation BriefHere at Foundation Briefs, we came into the 2011-12 season determined to completely reimagine our

brief and make it even easier to use while introducing more content, better analysis and a broader scope. We

encourage you to read through the following pages carefully so that you know how everything is structured,

why evidence appears in the order it does, and even where to look for sections of analysis. We are always

looking to improve and cannot do so without your help and guidance. After all, you are the debater and we are

simply here to support you. So email us [email protected] let us know what you thinkgood or bad.

Redesigning the brief required the introduction of new and exciting sections. They are listed below with

a brief explanation of what is packed into each section and why we made the transition.

Topic AnalysisThis is a general reflection on the resolution. It will provide to you an impression of the topic at hand,

challenges you will face while debating, and a picture of where we see the debate headed.

FrameworkOften times, the most important part of the debate is to actually win before the debate begins. With this

section, we will set you up for such a feat. With unique analysis on how to lay the conditions for victory, you

will be guaranteed to begin battle already with an advantage.

Strategy SectionsFoundation Briefs is committed to making sure you understand the evidence provided to you. We will never

simply throw quotes at you and hope you can understand what we are trying to imply. That is where the

Strategy Section comes in. At the beginning of all major sections (i.e. the section in the brief regarding al-

Qaeda) there will appear a small section of original Foundation Briefs analysis to tell you how we see the

evidence being used, what rhetoric will please the judge and which counterarguments to be prepared for.

Defend Your SourceSometimes just telling a judge the source of your information doesnt quite convey its validity. Having

debated countless rounds, we realize that there is nothing as credible as being able to tell the judge exactly who

the author is and what he or she does or why your judge should listen to the organization being quoted.

Foundation Briefs provides you with this information for each and every author and organization we quote

unless it is a source we know is credible and everyone has heard of (i.e the New York Times or CNN). Just look

for the red text below the source to tell you what to look up in the Defend Your Source Section.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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March 2012 The New Foundation Brief


Key Organizational ChangesJust as we introduced a number of key sections to revolutionize our brief, we have done the same with

organizational features. They too are listed below so you know exactly how to find what you are looking for.

With the new Foundation Brief, there is no questioning how important a piece of evidence is or how we think it

should be usedevery single piece of evidence is where it is for a reason. See below to understand our

reasons.

Hierarchical Sections

As with last season, all of the evidence in each Foundation Brief will be broken down into sections. The

most crucial arguments will come first. It is our intention that these sections will serve as excellent

foundations for contentions throughout the month. Although these sections were a feature of our briefs last

year, we have renewed our commitment to making sure that the most relevant sections come first.

Hierarchical Evidence

Arguably the most important change we made to our organization is that evidence is now organized

from most to least important. This means that if you only want the most crucial sources and the most relevant

ideas, you will see such evidence in the first few sources of each section. These essential sources of each section

are considered the Core Evidence Section, what you will want to include in your contentions. Following thecore will be the Supporting Evidence Section, which will give you greater understanding and further nuance to

the argumentdont ignore this section! Evidence in this section is still very important; it just might not be

ideal to put in your time-constrained ~1 minute contentions. Finally, the Counter Evidence Section will come

at the end of the brief.

Important note: Webpages and online articles that are long and continuous will always be cited as page one (1).


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March 2012 Definitions


DefinitionsShould

used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness

indicating a desirable or expected state

- Oxford English Dictionary

Suspend

temporarily prevent from continuing or being in force or effect

defer or delay (an action, event, or judgement)

- Oxford English Dictionary

to debar temporarily especially from a privilege, office, or function

to cause to stop temporarily

to set aside or make temporarily inoperative

to defer to a later time on specified conditions

-Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Assistance

Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical

supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. US assistance takes three forms--developmentassistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

-Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005

the activity of contributing to the fulfillment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose

- Princeton University


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March 2012 Topic Analysis


Topic AnalysisFor over a decade now, Pakistan has been elevated to top importance in the United States foreign policypriorities. These two nations refer to each other as allies publicly, but their relationship has been strenuous and

in the last year incredibly fragile. The United States relies on Pakistan to combat terrorism within Pakistans

own borders as well as Afghanistan. Indeed, many experts on the Middle East believe that a long-term solution

to peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without Pakistans help. However, such ideal cooperation now

seems increasingly wishful thinking the separate aspirations and identities of the two nations clash.

In May 2011, the United States killed Osama bin Laden deep within Pakistans borders, raising

questions as to Pakistans knowledge of the Al-Qaeda leader but also enraging Pakistanis for violating theirnations sovereignty. Since then, relations have deteriorated as one crisis after another pushes diplomacy to

collapse. The United States is becoming increasingly willing to publicly state that the Pakistani military is

actively supporting terrorismthe exact opposite of what nearly $20 billion in U.S. aid over the last decade has

tried to encourage it to do. Moreover, a November 26, 2011 incident between U.S. forces and Pakistani soldiers

left 24 Pakistanis dead after confusion between the two forces lead to a firefight. This has greatly damaged

relations. Pakistan has shut off supply lines to Afghanistan and the United States is threatening to withhold

military funding.

This resolution attempts to address this growing tension and explore the best route for the United States

to pursue with Pakistan. The Pro side will attempt to argue that relations are currently strained to the point thatonly drastic action will push relations back on track. In looking at the resolution, there are a few key terms that

shape the debate in important ways. First, we are debating the suspension of assistance. This implies that

withholding aid is temporary. This is so crucial to the Pro side because the argument becomes not about

abandoning Pakistan, but instead more about trying to encourage Pakistan to modify its behavior. Thus, the Pro

will need to clearly outline the goals it hopes to achieve in suspending assistance. Additionally, the resolution is

dealing with all assistance. This is quite a burden of proof for the Pro side and makes the resolution much more

about the theory of diplomacy than about targeted programs we ought to reevaluate. By affirming this

resolution, the United States would make a very strong statement (which the Pro will argue is necessary).

After reviewing the evidence, debaters will quickly come to realize that the United States is, at the veryleast, justified in withdrawing its assistance to Pakistan. There is strong evidence that Pakistan neglects counter

terrorism efforts, and in fact supports certain terror networks. What is important though is not whether the

United States is justified in suspending assistance, but whether it should. These are two very different things.

While Pakistan has not been an outstanding ally, the Con will be able to make convincing arguments that

suspending assistance will only make matters worse. They can do this while still acknowledging the imperfect

nature of assistance. Therefore, it is advisable for both sides, but Pro especially, not to spend large amounts of


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March 2012 Topic Analysis


time listing the faults of Pakistan but instead focusing on the causal link between suspending assistance and

better achieving U.S. policy objectives.

The general direction that the Pro will take is explaining the truly fundamental differences in Pakistan

and U.S. interests. Much of U.S. policy dealing with Pakistan is very wishful and essentially ignores harsh

realities in the hope that somehow Pakistan will help the United States. In reality, Pakistan sees an unstable

Afghanistan, and a good relationship with the Taliban, as vital to Pakistani security. Additionally, no matter

how much the U.S. would like Pakistan to focus its military efforts on counter terrorism, this is not likely to

happen beyond defeating militants that pose direct threats to the Pakistani military and government. Instead, the

deep historical rivalry with India will continue to be the emphasis of Pakistans military strategy. The Pro must

highlight these deep differences and conclude that such differences are too big a gap to bridge. Aid to Pakistan

simply cannot persuade Pakistan to abandon their longstanding objectives.

On the Con it will be hard to ignore these assertions. However, the Con must argue that despite these

differences, assistance to Pakistan still remains the best strategy to achieve U.S. policy objectives. The United

States does not have much choice in its alliance with Pakistan, and providing robust assistance allows the

United States to better monitor Pakistans nuclear arsenal and carry out its own counter terrorism operations.

While Pakistan supports some terrorist organizations, U.S. assistance also contributes to the legitimate effort

from Pakistan to fight militants in its own border and has led to the capture or killing of high level Al-Qaeda

operatives. The Con will not try to portray the alliance as perfect, but rather as a necessity to combat terrorism

and one that is primarily kept intact through financial assistance.

This seems to be one of the more interesting topics of the year, and we wish you luck in your debates.


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Defend Your Source


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March 2012 Author Index


Author Index

Nancy Birdsall

Nancy Birdsall is the founding president of the Center for Global Development (CGD) in Washington, DC,

USA, and former executive vice-president of the Inter-American Development Bank. She co-founded CGD in

November 2001. Prior to becoming the President of CGD, Birdsall served for three years as Senior Associate

and Director of the Economic Reform Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her work at

Carnegie focused on issues of globalization and inequality, as well as on the reform of the international

financial institutions.

Bill Keller

Bill Keller is a writer for the The New York Times, of which Keller was the executive editor from July 2003

until September 2011.

Sumit Ganguly

Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations and is a Professor of

Political Science at Indiana University in Bloomington.

Daniel Markey

Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations.

Moeed Yusuf

Moeed W. Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at the United States Institute of Peace Center in the Center for

Conflict Analysis and Prevention and is responsible for managing the Institutes Pakistan program. Yusuf will

be engaged in expanding USIPs work on Pakistan to cover aspects that remain critical for the U.S. and Pakistanto better understand the others interests and priorities. His current research focuses on youth and democratic

institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country.


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March 2012 Organization Index


Organization Index

Belfer Center

The Belfer Center is the hub of the Harvard Kennedy School's research, teaching, and training in international

security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy.

Brookings Institution

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. in the United

States. One of Washington's oldest think tanks, Brookings conducts research and education in the socialsciences, primarily in economics, metropolitan policy, governance, foreign policy, and global economy and

development. It is one of the most respected such think-tanks in the world having been founded in 1916.

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force

for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the worlds preeminent international policy

institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from

energy and climate to global development and economic integration.

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Situated at the nexus of theory and practice, the Combating Terrorism Center serves as an important national

resource that rigorously studies the terrorist threat and provides policy-relevant research while moving the

boundaries of academic knowledge. The CTCs distinguished scholars, international network of experts, and

access to senior U.S. government leadership set it apart from any other like enterprise.

Congressional Research Service

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of

Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative processfrom the early considerations that

precede bill drafting, through committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various

agency activities.


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March 2012 Organization Index


Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank,

and publisher.

Foreign Affairs

Since its founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American

foreign policy and global affairs. It is published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a non-profit and

nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and

international affairs through the free exchange of ideas.

The Heritage Foundation

Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institutiona think tankwhose

mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise,

limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.

INSCT

The Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) at Syracuse University provides cutting-edge

interdisciplinary research, graduate-level education, and public service on law and policy challenges related to

national and international security.

Rand Corporation

RAND Corporation is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to

the United States armed forces by Douglas Aircraft Company. Rand has been in business since 1948 and

currently is comprised of over 1,700 employees from all around the world. It is currently financed by the U.S.

government and private endowment corporations including the healthcare industry, universities and private

individuals. The organization has long since expanded to working with other governments, private foundations,international organizations, and commercial organizations on a host of non-defense issues. RAND aims for

interdisciplinary and quantitative problem solving.


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March 2012 Laying the Foundation


Laying the FoundationThe Current Status of Pakistan and Relations

Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009.

Web. 1 Feb. 2012.http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf

Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.

Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. All of the nightmares of the twenty-first century

come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, military dictatorship, and above all,

international terrorism. Terrorist bombings and other militant attacks have become a near-daily scourge in

2008. (Pg. 1)

"Civilian Aid to Pakistan Continues despite Growing Tensions, U.S. Says." CNN. 21 Jan.

2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. .

Relations between the two countries have worsened since the U.S. airstrike in November killed 24 Pakistani

soldiers along the border with Afghanistan.

"Civilian assistance to Pakistan continues and has not been interrupted since the tragic November 26 incident,"

Provost, Claire. "Sixty Years of US Aid to Pakistan: Get the Data." The Guardian. 11 July

2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. .

The Obama administration has announced it will withhold more than one-third of all military assistance to

Pakistan - an aid envelope worth some $800m (498m). The withheld aid includes funding for military

equipment and reimbursements for selected Pakistani security expenditures - including a payment of $300m for

counterinsurgency programmes.

U.S. InterestsKronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009.


http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf


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March 2012 Laying the Foundation


A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan

include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; democratization and human rights protection; the

ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. (Pg. 0)

U.S. Aid LevelsKronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009.



Pakistan is among the worlds leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining more than $5.3 billion in overt assistance

since 2001, including about $3.1 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received about$6.7 billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. (Pg. 0)

Pakistans Nuclear IssueKerr, Paul K., and Mary Beth Nikitin.Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and

Security Issues. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 30 Nov. 2011. Web. 1 Feb.

2012. .Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.

Pakistans nucleararsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could belarger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional

delivery vehicle.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf


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Pro Evidence


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March 2012 Pro: Genera


General

A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence:

The Pro evidence is broken up into two primary sections that appear in the most logical order possible.

First, we provide you with evidence that the United States would be justified in suspending Pakistans aid

based on a number of factors such as support of terrorists, differing objectives the inability to find Bin

Laden. Next, evidence is provided to prove that the US is not only justified in suspending aid, but that it

in factshould. While this distinction is minimal semantically, it is essential. Evidence to support the fact

that the US should suspend aid include things such as Aid Provides Perverse Incentives etc.

Vira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman.Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for

Strategic and International Studies, 5 May 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012.

.See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info.

Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of crossborder sanctuary for

Taliban and Haqqani militants, and that prolong the fighting and cause serious US, ISAF, and Afghan

casualties. This assessment shows, however, that Al Qaida and the Taliban are only part of the story. There are

many other movements and tensions that feed violence and extremism in Pakistan, and which grow out of a

government that has consistently failed to meet the needs of Pakistans people over a period of decades. (Pg. ii)

There are tremendous shortfalls in the Pakistani governments capacity and willingness to provide for its

citizens in ways that discourage a rising tide of violence and separatist movements. These failures interact with

a growing wave of Sunni-Deobandi radicalization that manifests in anti-state violence and sectarian intolerance.

A significant resulting uptick in terrorist violence has been accompanied by a gradual perversion of the

Pakistani social fabric, intimidating secularism at the expense of militant Islam. (Pg. ii)

Pakistani military operations too have not been ideal from the US context. The selective counterinsurgency

approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani

interests, and thoselike the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban -- that may have future strategic utility

in reestablishing Pakistans sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies. (Pg. iii)

As senior US officials and officers have made all too clear along with some Afghan counterpartsthis means

some elements of the Pakistani governance and forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the

United States and Afghanistan. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in Pakistani and US relations, and

complicating the prospects for future US aid. It also is helping to strengthen extremists who ultimately may

become an active threat to Pakistan. (Pg. iii)


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March 2012 Pro: Genera


Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6

February, 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2012.Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.

There exist widely-held suspicions among foreign governments and independent analysts alike that Islamabads

civilian government does not fully control the army, that the army does not fully control the intelligence

agencies, and that the these intelligence agencies have lost their ability to rein in the very militant groups they

helped to create. Moreover, anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan, and a significant segment of

the populace has viewed years of U.S. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an

impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization there. Underlying the anti-American

sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam.

(Pg. 2)

Krasner, Stephen. Talking Tough to Pakistan. Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91

Issue 1. Web.Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info.

The country is the world's worst nuclear proliferator, having sold technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea

through the A. Q. Khan network. Although Islamabad has attacked those terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and

the Pakistani Taliban, that target its institutions, it actively supports others, such as the Haqqani network, the

Afghan Taliban, and Hezb-i-Islami, that attack coalition troops and Afghan officials or conspire against India.

Pakistan also hampers U.S. efforts to deal with those groups; although many Pakistani officials privately

support the drone program, for example, they publicly exaggerate the resulting civilian deaths. Meanwhile, theyrefuse to give the United States permission to conduct commando raids in Pakistan, swearing that they will

defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. (2-3)

Washington's current strategy toward Islamabad, in short, is not working. Any gains the United States has

bought with its aid and engagement have come at an extremely high price and have been more than offset by

Pakistan's nuclear proliferation and its support for the groups that attack Americans, Afghans, Indians, and

others. (3)


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March 2012 Pro: Different Objectives


Pakistan Has Different ObjectivesFitzgerald, Erin, and Varun Vira. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Afghanistan,

Central Asia and Pakistan. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12

Sept. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012.


A decade into the war, however, it has become increasingly apparent that Pakistan has a fundamentally different

set of strategic priorities from the US, a fact that US experts have privately recognized since long before 9/11.

Pakistan continues to focus on the Indian threat, does not trust the US, and sees it as a temporary actor that will

again abandon the region in 2014if not before. As a result, Pakistan is perceived to continue maneuveringindependently to secure its interests in a post-American Afghanistan. (Pg. 8)

Keller, Bill. "The Pakistanis Have a Point." The New York Times. 14 Dec. 2011. Web.

What America had in mind for Afghanistan was antithetical to Pakistans self-interest. The only time period

between 1947 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that Pakistanis have felt secure about Afghanistan is

during the Taliban period, from 1996 to 2001, says Vali Nasr, an American scholar of the region who is

listened to in both academia and government. Now the Bush administration would attempt to supplant the

Taliban with a strong independent government in Kabul and a muscular military. Everything about this vision

is dangerous to Pakistan, Nasr says.

Pakistans military ruler at the time, Pervez Musharraf, saw the folly of defying an American ultimatum. He

quickly agreed to the American demands and delivered on many of them. In practice, though, the

accommodation with the Taliban was never fully curtailed. Pakistan knew Americas mission in Afghanistan

would end, and it spread its bets. The Bush-Musharraf relationship, Vali Nasr says, was sort of a Hollywood

suspension of disbelief. Musharraf was a convenient person who created a myth that we subscribed to

basically that Pakistan was on the same page with us, it was an ally in the war on terror and it subscribed to our

agenda for Afghanistan. (7)



Still, there is a much more straightforward explanation for Pakistan's behavior. Its policies are a fully rational

response to the conception of the country's national interest held by its leaders, especially those in the military.

Pakistan's fundamental goal is to defend itself against its rival, India. Islamabad deliberately uses nuclear

proliferation and deterrence, terrorism, and its prickly relationship with the United States to achieve this

objective. (4)


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March 2012 Pro: Different Objectives


Pakistan's double game with the United States has been effective, too. After 9/11, Pakistan's leaders could

hardly resist pressure from Washington to cooperate. But they were also loath to lose influence with the

insurgents in Afghanistan, which they believed gave Pakistan strategic depth against India. So Islamabad

decided to have things both ways: cooperating with Washington enough to make itself useful but obstructing the

coalition's plans enough to make it nearly impossible to end the Afghan insurgency. This has been an

impressive accomplishment. (4)

Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat

Goldberg, Jeffrey, and Marc Ambinder. "The Ally From Hell." The Atlantic. Dec. 2011.

Web.

There is evidence to suggest that neither the Pakistani army, nor the SPD itself, considers jihadism the most

immediate threat to the security of its nuclear weapons; indeed, General Kayanis worry, as expressed to

General Kidwai after Abbottabad, was focused on the United States. According to sources in Pakistan, General

Kayani believes that the U.S. has designs on the Pakistani nuclear program, and that the Abbottabad raid

suggested that the U.S. has developed the technical means to stage simultaneous raids on Pakistans nuclear

facilities. In their conversations, General Kidwai assured General Kayani that the counterintelligence branch of

the SPD remained focused on rooting out American and Indian spies from the Pakistani nuclear weapons

complex, and on foiling other American espionage methods. The Pakistani air force drills its pilots in ways of

intercepting American spy planes; the Pakistani military assumes (correctly) that the U.S. devotes many

resources to aerial and satellite surveillance of its nuclear sites. (4-5)


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March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists


Toleration of Insurgents and ExtremistsKronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011.



Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to

distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding

Pakistanis perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns

about Islamabads ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from

Pakistani territory. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently

years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of thenow deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of

existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or

capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2011

and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military

reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among

ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious

challenges to U.S. decision makers. (Pg. 0)

Still, there are few signs that Pakistans current civilian leaders are willing and able to seriously address the

outcomes of their countrys security policies and move them in the direction of moderation. Even in internaldiscussions these leaders continue to shirk responsibility for increased rates of extremism there, and they

continue to place the bulk of blame on the United States. This perspectiveapparently widespread among the

Pakistani public, as wellarguably omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist

militancy in the region (including the provision of vital support to Afghanistans Taliban regime throughout

most of the 1990s). By nearly all accounts, this support continues, albeit selectively, to date. (Pg. 3)


Web.

While the hostility and distrust have increased of late, the relationship between the two countries has been shot

through with rage, resentment, and pretense for years. The relationship has survived as long as it has only

because both countries have chosen to pretend to believe the lies they tell each other.

Pakistans lies, in particular, have been abundant. The Pakistani government has willfully misled the U.S

for more than 20 years about its support for terrorist organizations, and it willfully misleads the

American government when it asserts, against the evidence, that rogue elements within the ISI are

responsible for the acts of terrorism against India and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Most American officials

are at this late stage convinced that there are no rogue elements of any size or importance in the ISI; there are


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only the ISI and the ISI assets that the ISI (with increasing implausibility) denies having. (The ISIs S Wing, the

branch of the service that runs anti-India activities, among other things, is said to have a very potent alumni

association, in the words of Stephen P. Cohen, a leading American scholar of Pakistan based at the Brookings

Institution.) A particular challenge the ISI poses is that while it funds and protects various jihadist groups, these

groups often pick their own targets and the timing of their attacks. The ISI has worked for years against

American interestsnot only against American interests in Afghanistan, but against the American

interest in defeating particular jihadist networks, even while it was also working with the Americans

against other jihadist organizations. (6)

The past two U.S. National Intelligence Estimates on Pakistanwhich represent the consensus views of

Americas 16 spy agenciesconcluded with a high degree of certainty that Pakistani support for jihadist groups

has increased over the past several years. (7)

The ISI also helps foment anti-Americanism inside Pakistan. American and Pakistani sources allege that

the ISI pays journalists in the Pakistani press, most of which is moderately to virulently anti-American,

to write articles hostile to the United States. An American visitor to Pakistan can easily see that a particular

narrative has been embedded in the countrys collective psyche. This narrative holds that the U.S. favors India,

punishes Pakistan unjustifiably, and periodically abandons Pakistan when American policy makers feel the

country is not useful. America is a disgrace because it turns on its friends when it has no use for them, says

General Aslam Beg, a retired chief of staff of the Pakistani army, in an efficient summation of the dominant

Pakistani narrative. A Pew poll taken after the Abbottabad raid found that 69 percent of Pakistanis view the

U.S. as more of an enemy; only6 percent see the U.S. as more of a partner. (7)

Sympathy for jihadist-oriented groups among at least some Pakistani military men has been acknowledged for

years, even inside Pakistan; recently a brigadier, Ali Khan, was arrested for allegedly maintaining contact with a

banned extremist organization. While we were reporting this story, militants invaded a major Pakistani naval

base near Karachi, blowing up two P-3C Orion surveillance planes and killing at least 10 people on the base.

Pakistani security forces required 15 hours to regain control of the base. Experts believe that nuclear weapon

components were stored nearby. In a series of interviews, several Pakistani officials told The Atlantic that

investigators believe the militants had help inside the base. A retired Pakistani general with intelligence

experience says, Different aspects of the military and security services have different levels of sympathy for

the extremists. The navy is high in sympathy. (8)

The U.S. government has lied to itself, and to its citizens, about the nature and actions of successive Pakistani

governments. Pakistani behavior over the past 20 years has rendered the State Departments list of state

sponsors of terrorism effectively meaningless. The U.S. currently names four countries as state sponsors of

terror: Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. American civilian and military officials have for years made the case,

publicly and privately, that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorismyet it has never been listed as such. In the

last 12 months of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, for example, Secretary of State James Baker wrote a

letter to the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, accusing Pakistan of supporting Muslim terrorists in


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Indian-administered Kashmir, as well as Sikh terrorists operating inside India. We have information indicating

that [the ISI] and others intend to continue to provide material support to groups that have engaged in

terrorism, the letter read. At this same time, a talking-points memo read to Pakistani leaders by Nicholas Platt,

who was then the American ambassador to Pakistan, asserted, Our information is certain. The memo went on:

Please consider the serious consequences [to] our relationship if this support continues. If this situation

persists, the Secretary of State may find himself required by law to place Pakistan on the state sponsors of

terrorism list.

The Baker threat caused a crisis inside the Pakistani government. In his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and

Military, Husain Haqqani, the current Pakistani ambassador to Washington, writes that Javed Nasir, who was

the ISI chief during this episode, told Prime Minister Sharif, We have been covering our tracks so far and will

cover them even better in the future. The crisis was resolved, temporarily, when Nasir was removed as ISI

chief the following year. (8-9)

In 2008 Mike McConnell, who was then President Bushs director of national intelligence, confronted the ISI

chief, General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, with evidence that the ISI was tipping off jihadists so that they could escape

in advance of American attacks against them. According to sources familiar with the conversation, McConnell

accused Pakistan of not doing everything it could to rein in the Pakistani Taliban; he asserted that American

intelligence had concluded that most Pakistani assets were still deployed against India. How dare you tell me

how our forces are deployed?, Pasha said to McConnell. McConnell then provided Pasha with evidence to

back up his assertion. (10)

Lashkare-Taiba, like other groups supported and protected by the Pakistani government, does not have a perfectrecord of complying with ISI instructions, according to a Pakistani source familiar with the relationship. Even

though Lashkar cells maintain contact with ISI officers, they operate according to their own desires and

schedules. The ISI funds them and protects them, but doesnt always control their choice of targets and

timing, the Pakistani source says. (16)


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Vira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman.Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for



Pakistans political leadership has shown far too little courage in the face of radical extremism, often

choosing appeasement, over principle. The silence in the aftermath of the assassinations of two prominent

liberal lawmakers - Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minorities Ministerhas

been deafening and has allowed the intimidation of all but the most courageous of progressive politicians and

activists. Few government officials attended the funerals,81and some such as Interior Minister Rehman Malik

have publicly sided with the religious right, including Maliks declaration that, I will shoot a blasphemer

myself. In the aftermath of the assassination too, it now appears that the Minorities Ministry post that Bhatti

headed will be abolished, in another blow against religious minorities.

Even before their assassinations, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and another legislator Sherry Rehman, were

some of the only supporters of reform. They were afforded virtually no support from their own parties, and

today, Sherry Rehman, the last still alive, remains bunkered down in her Karachi home and has since withdrawn

her amendment proposal. Many politicians have chosen to pander to radical Islamist extremists, or the

criminal underworld for political advantage. President Musharraf recently labeled Nawaz Sharif a closet

Taliban, in reference to his Islamist leanings, a perception shared in some circles in Washington. The Sharifs in

Punjab for example have links to various Sunni Islamist groups, which have influence in their voting districts

Bajoria, Jayshree. "A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan." Interview by Daniel Markey.Council on Foreign Relations. 26 Sept. 2011. Web.Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.

From a Pakistani point of view, it's very clear to them that this doesn't end with Haqqani, which is part of the

reason for their reluctance. Pakistanis ask me, "Look if we cede ground on one group, you'll be coming at us

again on another." Where does this end? And why does the United States, from their perspective, get to define

who the threats are? So it makes them skeptical about what we're actually up to.

The problem is within the Pakistani security establishment, that they continue to believe that arming and

working--actively and passively--with various militant groups serves their purposes. And they continue not tobelieve that these groups are necessarily dangerous to Pakistan or counterproductive to regional security. (1)


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"Pakistan Suspected of Tipping off Insurgents." United Press International. 11 June 2011.

Web.

Marc Grossman, U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell gave overhead surveillance video and other information on the guerrilla locations in mid-May to

Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the Inter-Services

Intelligence spy agency, officials told The Washington Post. The information was shared in a "trust-

building" campaign after the Osama bin Laden killing, but when Pakistani troops raided the sites in

North and South Waziristan June 4, they found them abandoned. U.S. officials suspect the ISI of tipping

off the extremists (1)

The evidence above is a robust account of the various state activities that suggest Pakistan is an active

participant (or a willing blind eye) in terrorism.

The reasons for supporting terror networks are clear: Pakistan does not see all terrorists as fundamentally

dangerous. Instead, it seeks to turn some to its own advantage, particularly against India and to

destabilize Afghanistan.

Continuing assistance will only perpetuate this problem. The United States has for years tried to work

with top Pakistani officials to stop such actions, but has thus far failed. This is because the U.S. has no

credibility in its threatsit has so far only used words. Suspending assistance would be an effective step

in communicating for the first time that the United States will not tolerate a lenient policy on terrorism.


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March 2012 Pro: Support for Haqqani Network


Support for the Haqqani NetworkKronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011.



The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, based in the FATA, is commonly

identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.

Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and longstanding U.S. requests that the Pakistani

military launch operations against the Haqqanis North Waziristan haven, saying their forces are already

stretched too thin. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistans inaction is the countrys decades-

long relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in the army and ISI that his group representsperhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtun-based influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan. (Pg. 20)

But it was a September 13 attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively

changed the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The well planned and executed assault sparked a 20-hour-long

gunbattle and left 16 Afghans dead, five police officers and at least six children among them. Although U.S.

officials dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents weakness, the ability of militants to undertake a

complex raid in the heart of Kabuls most protected area was seen by many as a clear blow to a narrative which

has Afghanistan becoming more secure. (Pg. 20)

U.S. and Afghan officials concluded the Embassy attackers were members of the Haqqani network. Days afterthe raid, Adm. Mullen called on Gen. Kayani to again press for Pakistani military action against Haqqani bases.

Apparently unsatisfied with his counterparts response, Mullen returned to Washington, DC, and began ramping

up rhetorical pressure to previously unseen levels, accusing the ISI of using the Haqqanis to conduct a proxy

war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Secretary Panetta issued what was taken by many to be an ultimatum to

Pakistan when he told reporters that the United States would take whatever steps are necessary to protect our

forces in Afghanistan from future attacks by the Haqqanis. Then, during September 22 testimony before the

Senate Armed Services Committee, Mullen issued the strongest and most direct U.S. government statement on

Pakistani malfeasance of the post-2001 era, saying,

The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that [September 13] truck bomb attack, as wellas the assault on our embassy. We also have credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on

the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.... In choosing to

use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan, and most especially the

Pakistan army and ISI, jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistans

opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.... By exporting violence, theyve

eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They have undermined their international

credibility and threatened their economic wellbeing. (Pg. 20-21)


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March 2012 Pro: Support for Haqqani Network




On September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made his last

official appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his speech, he bluntly criticized

Pakistan, telling the committee that "extremist organizations serving as proxies for the government of

Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers." The Haqqani network, he

said, "is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency [ISI]." In 2011

alone, Mullen continued, the network had been responsible for a June attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in

Kabul, a September truck-bomb attack in Wardak Province that wounded 77 U.S. soldiers, and a September

attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul. (1)


Web.

When asked why the U.S. doesnt target the factories located on Pakistani territory that produce the improvised

explosive devices deployed by the Taliban against American troops inside Afghanistan, the same senior

Obama-administration official said: What we want to do, above all else, is not lose progress on the core goal

of defeating al-Qaeda, a goal that calls for continuing to cooperate with, and to fund, the ISI. So: the U.S. funds

the ISI; the ISI funds the Haqqani network; and the Haqqani network kills American soldiers. (17)


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March 2012 Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban


Allegations of Aiding TalibanSommerville, Quentin. "Pakistan Dismisses Nato Report on Afghan Taliban Links."BBC

News. 1 Feb. 2010. Web. 2 Feb. 2012.

The report - State of the Taliban - is based on material from 27,000 interrogations with more than 4,000

captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters and civilians. The BBC's Quentin Sommerville in Kabul

says the document is painful reading for international forces and the Afghan government.

The report says the Taliban are helped by Pakistani security services.

It claims the insurgents remain defiant and have wide support among Afghans.

Our correspondent says the report fully exposes for the first time the relationship between Pakistan's ISI

intelligence service and the Taliban.

It notes: "Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly."

It says Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders.

"Senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of

ISI headquarters in Islamabad," it said.

And the Taliban's second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in a raid on a madrassa nearKarachi nearly two years ago.

It quotes a senior al-Qaeda detainee as saying: "Pakistan knows everything. They control everything. I

can't [expletive] on a tree in Kunar without them watching. The Taliban are not Islam. The Taliban are

Islamabad."

Our correspondent says the report seems to suggest that the Taliban feel trapped by ISI control and fear they

will never escape its influence.

Pakistan is finding it harder to convince outsiders it is not helping the Afghan Taliban and giving safe

haven to its leaders. In effect, the accusation is that Pakistan is betting on the insurgents being thestrongest power in Afghanistan and most likely ally once Nato leaves - something Islamabad of course

strenuously denies.

The leak of this report comes at a particularly sensitive time. Pakistan is already blocking the supply route to

coalition forces in Afghanistan, following a Nato attack in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. With

increasing pressure being heaped on Pakistan, public support here for formally ending co-operation with the

West simply grows.


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March 2012 Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban



Web.

According to a secret 2006 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan, Available evidence

strongly suggests that [the ISI] maintains an active and ongoing relationship with certain elements of the

Taliban. A 2008 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the ISI was providing intelligence and

financial support to insurgent groupsespecially the Jalaluddin Haqqani network out of Miram Shah, North

Waziristanto conduct attacks against Afghan government, [International Security Assistance Force], and

Indian targets. By late 2006, according to the intelligence historian Matthew Aid, who documents the

dysfunctional relationship between the ISI and the CIA in his forthcoming book, Intel Wars, the U.S. had

reliable intelligence indicating that Jalaluddin Haqqani and another pro-Taliban Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar, were being given financial assistance by the ISI (which of course receives substantial financial

assistance from the United States). (9)

Pakistan provides assistance to the Haqqani network and to the Taliban in Western Pakistan. They do this

to destabilize Afghanistan.

This is a security strategy that Pakistan has employed for a long time, which it believes fits into its vital

interests. Pakistan believes that U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is imminent, and that

Afghanistan will quickly become a violent region once again. As such, Pakistan funds these groups so

that it an have influence and some sway over the situation.

This fits in with the historical approach that Pakistan previously took. Pakistan supported the Taliban

when they were in power because the Taliban were able to limit violence on the Pakistan border. Thus,

such support from Pakistan is in the hope that future results are the same.

Assistance must be withheld because this evidence shows that Pakistan is working to undermine U.S.interests in the regionAfghanistans stability is a top priority. Moreover, this deeply held interest by

Pakistan shows that assistance is unlikely to change Pakistans long-term goals and the money is only

being used to eventually kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.


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March 2012 Pro: Negative Impact on Afghanistan


Significant Negative Impact on AfghanistanKronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011.



Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011, Afghan officials still openly accuse

Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. Pakistans mixed record on battling Islamist

extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory, the

Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network leading among these. (Pg. 18)

In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents, the U.S.

Ambassador to Afghanistan has suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul

for reconciliation talks. He asks that Pakistan support the process by allowing those willing to talk to be given

the opportunity to do so. Afghan President Karzai has echoed these complaints, saying insurgent leaders inside

Pakistan are not sufficiently independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own. (Pg. 18-19)

At the time of this writing, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are at a new nadir. On September 20, Afghan High

Peace Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his Kabul

home by a suicide bomber, dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks. Afghan officials suspect the

ISI played a role in the murder, saying the attacker was Pakistani and the attack had been planned in

Quetta. They also criticize Islamabad for its alleged failure to cooperate in the related investigation.

Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the assassination, but the Afghan president has continued to

accuse Pakistan of using terrorism as official policy. Most recently, in October, Afghan intelligence

officials claimed to have halted a plot to assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culpritsan

Egyptian and a Bangladeshiwere based in the FATA and affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the

Haqqanis. (Pg. 19-20)


Web.

Public pronouncements to the contrary, very few figures in the highest ranks of the American and Pakistani

governments suffer from the illusion that their countries are anything but adversaries, whose national-securityinterests clash radically and, it seems, permanently. Pakistani leaders obsess about what they view as the

existential threat posed by nuclear-armed India, a country that is now a strategic ally of the United States.

Pakistani policy makers The Atlantic interviewed in Islamabad and Rawalpindi this summer uniformly believe

that India is bent on drawing Afghanistan into an alliance against Pakistan. (Pervez Musharraf said the same

thing during an interview in Washington.) Many ofPakistans leaders have long believed that the Taliban,

and Taliban-like groups, are the most potentdefenders of their interests in Afghanistan (6)


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March 2012 Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden


Inability To Find Bin LadenKronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21

October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012.Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.

On May 1, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of

Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in a compound one-half

mile from the countrys premier military academy, just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1)

The location and circumstances of OBLs death exacerbated Washingtons long-held doubts about Pakistans

commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail U.S.

assistance to Pakistan. The news of OBLs whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistans role andpotential complicity in his refuge. President Obamas chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told

reporters it was inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system in Pakistan. For a wide

array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic conclusions: either

Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the countrys military and intelligence

services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al Qaeda leaders. In either case, after many years of

claims by senior Pakistani officialsboth civilian and militarythat most-wanted extremist figures were

finding no refuge in their country, Pakistans credibility suffered a serious blow. (Pg. 6)

Parliament subsequently issued a strong condemnation of the U.S. raid and again called for a halt to U.S.-

launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. It also threatened to close land lines of communication throughPakistan that are vital to supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, public demonstrations took a

bellicose, anti-American cast. (Pg. 7-8)


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March 2012 Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden




A case in point was the raid that killed bin Laden. Rather than embrace the move, Pakistani officials reacted

with fury. The police arrested a group of Pakistani citizens who were suspected of having helped the United

States collect intelligence prior to the operation and delayed U.S. interrogations of bin Laden's three wives for

more than a week. Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the ISI, condemned the U.S. raid before a

special session of parliament, and the government passed a resolution pledging to revisit its relationship with

the United States. Of course, the operation was embarrassing for the Pakistani military, since it showed the

armed forces to be either complicit in harboring bin Laden or so incompetent that they could not find him under

their own noses. But Pakistan could easily have saved face by publicly depicting the operation as a cooperative

venture. (3)

The fact that Pakistan distanced itself from the raid speaks to another major problem in the relationship: despite

the billions of dollars the United States has given Pakistan, public opinion there remains adamantly anti-

American. In a 2010 Pew survey of 21 countries, those Pakistanis polled had among the lowest favorability

ratings of the United States: 17 percent. The next year, another Pew survey found that 63 percent of the

population disapproved of the raid that killed bin Laden, and 55 percent thought it was a bad thing that he had

died. (3)


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March 2012 Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives


Aid Creates Perverse IncentivesAaron, David. "The World after Bin Laden."RAND Corporation. 3 May 2011. Web. 10

Feb. 2012. .Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info.

The evidence is mounting that Pakistan was complicit in sheltering bin Laden. He was, in large part,

Pakistan's meal-ticket to billions of dollars in U.S. aid. Islamabad has been doing just enough to keep the

money flowing but not enough to kill the golden goose. This is no longer tenable.

Did Pakistan ever seriously intend to stop al Qaeda and the Taliban from using its territory as a sanctuary?

Bandow, Doug. "Foreign Aid, Or Foreign Hindrance." Forbes. 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 16 Feb.

2012. .

The problems run deep. Alejandro Quiro Flores and Alastair Smith of New York University charged that The

aid dynamic is similar to that of Pakistans war against insurgents: as long as the United States is willing to pay

Pakistan ever more to eradicate extremists, Pakistan will not decisively defeat them; the graft that

counterterrorism aid brings outweighs the political cost of some continuing violence.

Aid incentives are all wrong. Observed Tate Watkins of the Mercatus Center: Systematic foreign aid creates

opportunities for corruption, cultures of dependency, and disincentives to development. The aid faucet

misaligns incentives between donors and recipients, making it extremely difficult to turn off the flow.

Yusuf, Moeed. "Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan

Partnership in Post-9/11."Defence Against Terrorism Review 2.1 (2009): 15-30. Web.Please see author index for bio.

The post-9/11 U.S. policy towards Pakistan has entailed a six-pronged approach: (i) coerce Pakistan; (ii) buy-out Pakistan; (iii) do it ourselves; (iv) emphasize the seriousness of the threat faced by Pakistan itself; and (v)

ensure that Pakistans tensions with India remain in check. (19)

The buy-out approach had two negative spin-offs. First, the Bush administration used the Pakistani ruler cum

Army Chief, Parvez Musharraf as their point man, in the process undermining the mainstream democratic

forces in the country.11 In the final outcome, the US lost goodwill with the Pakistani masses as it was largely

seen as having contributed to the sustainability of a dictatorship. Second, the overwhelming focus on coalition


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March 2012 Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives


support funds as reimbursement for Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror meant that US aid was doing little to

alleviate the economic plight of the Pakistani masses. (20)

In fact, the Pakistani establishment was equally adept at realizing the client-based nature of the relationship and

internalized the aid as little more than direct reimbursement for the costs of fighting the War. In a text book

example of perverse incentives, the transactional nature of the arrangement had in fact created an incentive for

Pakistan to prolong the effort as much as possible; the longer Pakistan remained involved in tactical operations,

the higher the reimbursements would be. (23)

The incentive structure laid out by the US to goad Pakistan into aligning its strategies with American goals

needs an urgent overhaul. Indeed, such is the level of perverseness of the framework that a rational actor model

would predict maximum Pakistani gains if it were to choose a policy option somewhere between impressing

upon the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the Obama administration while the US is still in a position ofrelative weakness to actively supporting the Taliban in increasing the misery of Coalition troops in Afghanistan

in the hope that it would lead to their forced withdrawal. (26)


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March 2012 Pro: Military Uncooperative


Military UncooperativeVira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman.Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for



Despite these bonds, the Armys limited cooperation with the American in Afghanistan has reflected

significant problems. The initial operations in the FATA were widely interpreted in the ranks as subservience

to the US, which caused deep consternation. Low willingness to fight fellow Muslims led to several

humiliating incidents, including the surrender of over 200 soldiers to a small group of militants in

September 2007. Similarly earlier operations in 2004 led to desertions amongst the paramilitary FrontierCorps, and helicopter pilots refused to bomb targets.

Some soldiers found themselves dishonored in their local communities, which is not surprising given the fact

that the army and the militants recruit from the same areas, particularly in the Punjab. Lieven points to this trend

as one of the most dangerous, pointing out that when men from a high-status institution such as the army have

trouble finding suitable brides, it points to a significant change in its perceived role in society.


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March 2012 Pro: US Must Force Change


U.S. Must Force ChangeCurtis, Lisa. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism

Policies." The Heritage Foundation. 12 May 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012.

.Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info.

The onus is now on Pakistan to demonstrate that it is willing to work more closely with the U.S. to target other

terrorists sheltered within its borders and to cooperate more fully with the U.S. goal of stabilizing Afghanistan.

Without a change in perspective from Pakistans security establishment on these crucial issues, the relationship

would seem to be poised for failure. Simply maintaining the status quo is no longer feasible.

Pakistans decision to side with the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 was halfhearted. This became clear to the

world when bin Laden was killed in a Pakistani garrison city 10 days ago. Pakistan must decide whether it will

finally throw its full weight into the fight against global terrorism. The outcome of its decision will determine

the future of relations with the U.S. as well as Pakistans regional strategic position and standing among

civilized nations.



Washington's tactic--criticism coupled with continued assistance-- has not been effectual. Threats and censure

go unheeded in Pakistan because Islamabad's leaders do not fear the United States. This is because the United

States has so often demonstrated a fear of Pakistan, believing that although Pakistan's policies have been

unhelpful, they could get much worse. Washington seems to have concluded that if it actually disengaged and

as a result Islamabad halted all its cooperation in Afghanistan, then U.S. counterinsurgency efforts there would

be doomed. Even more problematic, the thinking goes, without external support, the already shaky Pakistani

state would falter. A total collapse could precipitate a radical Islamist takeover, worsening Pakistani relations

with the U.S.-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan and escalating tensions, perhaps even precipitating a nuclear

war, between Pakistan and India. (2)

Despite Pakistan's ongoing problematic behavior, however, aid has continued to flow. Clinton even certified in

March 2011 that Pakistan had made a "sustained commitment" to combating terrorist groups. Actions such as

this have undermined American credibility when it comes to pressuring Pakistan to live up to its side of

the bargain. The United States has shown that the sticks that come with its carrots are hollow. (5)

The only way the United States can actually get what it wants out of Pakistan is to make credible threats to

retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. demands and offer rewards only in return for cooperative actions


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March 2012 Pro: US Must Force Change


taken. U.S. officials should tell their Pakistani counterparts in no uncertain terms that they must start playing

ball or face malign neglect at best and, if necessary, active isolation. Malign neglect would mean ending all U.S

assistance, military and civilian; severing intelligence cooperation; continuing and possibly escalating U. S.

drone strikes; initiating cross-border special operations raids; and strengthening U.S. ties with India. Active

isolation would include, in addition, declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, imposing sanctions, and

pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support, as well. (5)

A combination of credible threats and future promises offers the best hope of convincing Islamabad that it

would be better off cooperating with the United States. In essence, Pakistan would be offered a choice between

the situation of Iran and that of Indonesia, two large Islamic states that have chosen very different paths. It

could be either a pariah state surrounded by hostile neighbors and with dim economic prospects or a country

with access to international markets, support from the United States and Europe, and some possibility of detente

with its neighbors. The Indonesian path would lead to increased economic growth, an empowered middle class,

strengthened civil-society groups, and a stronger economic and social foundation for a more robust democracy

at some point in the future. Since it would not directly threaten the military's position, the Indonesian model

should appeal to both pillars of the Pakistani state. And even if Islamabad's cooperation is not forthcoming, the

United States is better off treating Pakistan as a hostile power than continuing to spend and get nothing in

return. (7)

Markey, Daniel. "The Gloves Come Off." Foreign Policy Magazine. 23 Sept. 2011. Web.Please see author index for bio.

Washington believes it has relatively little to lose in its bilateral relationship with PakistanU.S. officials peerinto the future, they see little reason to expect that relations with Islamabad are likely to improve. Indeed, there's

precious little evidence to suggest that the trajectory of the U.S.-Pakistan relations will go anywhere but

downhill. If there is already a realistic chance that this relationship will rupture and that the benefits of bilateral

cooperation will eventually be lost, why not press Pakistan now while Washington still enjoys some positive

leverage and before relations hit rock bottom?

Of course, for Washington's coercion to work, it has to be credible. Tough talk alone is not about to sway the

generals in Islamabad. But today's threats are already more serious than those of the past because they have

been made in public -- and because Congress has already signaled that it will make assistance to Pakistan

conditional upon action against theHaqqani network. (1)


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March 2012 Pro: Pakistan Heavily Dependent on Aid


Pakistan Heavily Dependent On AidGoldberg, Jeffrey, and Marc Ambinder. "The Ally From Hell." The Atlantic. Dec. 2011.

Web.

Pakistan, for its part, can afford to lose neither Americas direct financial support, nor the help America

provides with international lending agencies. Nor can Pakistans military afford to lose its access to American

weapons systems, and to the trainers attached to them. Economically, Pakistan cannot afford to be isolated by

America in the way the U.S. isolates countries it considers sponsors of terrorism. (18)

Abbas, Hassan. "A Low in Cycle of U.S.-Pakistan Ties." Interview by Bernard

Gwertzman. Council on Foreign Relations. 23 May 2011. Web.Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.

U.S. support to Pakistan is crucial in so many different ways: help with getting rid of the debt burden,

supporting the Pakistani military, and now for the past two or three y

advanced level march 2012

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