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POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEECHAIRMAN: Lady Jay Gutierrez VICE-CHAIRMAN: Juan Paulo Abello, MEMBERS: Nicolas Tristan Hinayon,Vanessa Alogoc, Mignon Chrix Cu, Grace Binuya, Jean Paul Dato, Danna Buenaventura, Rosyn Alvaran,

Jaynee Dialola

RECOLETOS DE MANILA SCHOOL OF LAW

RECOLETOS NOTESCENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS 2006Political Law

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Introduction:

The study of Administrative Law pertains to the field of public law. In thePhilippines this continues to bear the influence of principles introduces bythe United States.

In its broadest sense it refers to the entire organization and operation of government. It is in this sense that the Revised Administrative Code of 1917was formulated. Its four books include provisions on the organization, powersand general administration of the executive, legislative and judicialdepartments of government, the organization and administration of departments of government, the organization and administration of bureausand offices, of local governments as well as the laws governing publicofficers. According to Cuthbert W. Pound, this branch of legal systemincludes the entire system of laws under which the machinery of the stateworks and by which the state performs all governmental acts, such as theadministration of justice, the collection of taxes, duties, imposts and excises,the regulation of trade and commerce, the raising and supporting of armiesand navies, the government of territories and foreign possessions, and thepromotion of general welfare by regulative measures of all sorts. The entirefield of political law as understood in this jurisdiction would thus beencompassed in this concept.

In a less comprehensive sense, Administrative Law refers to that part of public law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of the administrative authorities, and indicates to the individual remedies forthe violation of his rights.

But in a technical sense Administrative Law covers a more limited field.Pound refers to it as that branch of modern law under which the executivedepartment of government acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicialcapacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community, as under laws regulating publiccorporations, business affected with a public interest, profession, trades andcallings, rates and prices, laws for the protection of public health and safetyand the promotion of public convenience and advantage. It is the lawgoverning regulatory agencies but it is concerned not only with rule-making,the settlement of contested matters and the distribution of benefits but alsoindicates the remedies available to those aggrieved by administrative

action.

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SEPARATION OF POWERS

Basic to the Philippine constitutional system is the principle thatsovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanatesfrom them. Explicit provisions separate the powers of government intoexecutive, legislative and judicial and distribute them among three differentbranches.

The 1935 Constitutional formulation was: Executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines. Legislative powers shall be vestedin the Congress of the Philippines composed of a senate and a House of Representatives. Judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court andsuch inferior courts as may be established by law. Even before 1935Constitution, the government established by American administratorsobserved the principle with some modifications, particularly during the earlyperiod when the Philippine Commission as a body performed legislativefunctions and the individual members headed the executive departments of government. The Governor-General was chairman. The 1935 Constitutionintroduced a more rigid separation of powers. Under it, a legislator could nothold any other office or employment in the government without forfeitingseat. The 1973 Constitution, adopting a form of parliamentary governmentintroduced a fusion of legislative and executive powers by providing for theelection by the National Assembly for the program of government. Theprovision that the National Assembly and the executive power shall beexercised by the Prime Minister with the assistance of the cabinetestablished no coordinate, separate and

Independent executive branch . The President was reduced to asymbolic head of state, the real power in the government being the PrimeMinister. But he and the Cabinet were responsible to the National Assembly.

However, the scheme was never put into operation. Instead, by amendmentsto the constitution in 1976, the powers of the incumbent president weremaintained and augmented. A modified form of presidential/parliamentarysystem was introduced in 1981, under which, the classification of governmental powers into executive, legislative and judicial is reiterated butseparation of powers and its corollary rule of non-delegation of power wasneither well defined nor strictly observed.

Under the 1976 and 1981 amendments, the legislative power is still vestedin the unicameral legislature, but the President is head of state and chief executive. Some features of the parliamentary system are retained. There is

a Prime Minister who heads the Cabinet, a majority of whose are members of legislature. The president has control of the ministries while supervision overthem pertains to the Prime Minister. The legislature may withdraw itsconfidence from the Prime Minister and the latter may seek to dissolve thelegislature. These innovations can affect administrative law significantly.

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Under the 1973 Constitution as amended, the President may exerciselegislative functions by virtue of direct grant of authority to legislate bydecree or under provisions authorizing the legislature to delegate legislativepowers to him.

The Constitution still clearly indicates the source of all governmentauthority is the people and that through the Constitution as an expression of sovereign will, they have delegated their exercise to various arms of government indicating the conditions and limits of the powers to beperformed. The separation between legislative and executive

Powers is less marked because the President legislates and through theministers subject to his control participates in the regular legislative work.

These do not mean however, that the performance of legislative functionscan now be transferred to administrative bodies without limit.

Since the main branches of government are by constitutional fiatassigned definite functions, it follows that unless the constitution permits it,and they cannot abdicate these functions and escape responsibility for themby delegating them. According to the Supreme Court in an earlier case, thedoctrine against non-delegation is based on the ethical principle that suchdelegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed bythe delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediatelyupon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Hence, the test to determine permissible delegation continues toapply under the amended Constitution.

Principle of Delegation of Powers:

Administrative Agencies are delegated Quasi-legislative power, whichpertains to the power to create, alter, modify, and promulgates rules andregulations but such power can be questioned as to:

Whether the administrative agency is conferred with such power. To answerit, We must look at the law which created the administrative agency, The

powers and functions of administrative agencies are defined in theconstitutional provisions or in the legislative enactments, whether national,regional autonomous or local, creating them.

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The cases that follow inquire into the validity of the legislation of powers. They illustrate the factors taken into account by the courts and thetests applied in the determination of whether or not a particular delegation islawful. What powers may be delegated or conferred? Was the statutecomplete when it left the legislature? Does the law provide sufficientstandard to guide the delegate in the performance of the functionsconferred? How is the existence of these standards determined? When arestandards determined? What standards are considered sufficient? These andother questions come before the courts and the decisions, particularly of theSupreme Court are instructive.

Completeness test:

o The law must be complete as there is nothing left for theadministrative bodies to interpret it but to implement the lawbased on its completeness.

Case:

CIA. GRAL DE TABACOS v Board of Public Utility

32 PHIL 136

1916

Facts: Section 16 of Act 2307 provides and gives the Board of Public

Utility the power to require every public utility to furnish annually a detailedreport of finances and operations, in such a form and containing suchmatters as the Board may from time to time by orders prescribe. Pursuantto this, the Board dictated an order to the company to present a detailedreport. From this order the company appealed to the Supreme Courtcontending that said section of Act 2307 is invalid as an undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: The provision conferring authority on the Board is very general. This section authorizes the Board to require detailed reports from publicutilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, and the

principle upon which it will proceed to the exclusive discretion of the Board. There are no sufficient standards.

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The case of Interstate Commerce Com. V. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 US194, is different because the case at bar, the provision does not lay downthe general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed. Nordoes it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically,everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act,how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. There isundue delegation of legislative power. Order set aside.

Self standard:

o The law must provide a standard to guide the delegate in theexercise of the power conferred to him. How these standards aredetermined, and what standard are deemed to sufficient.

Case:

PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN

293 U.S. 388

On July 11, 1933, the President, by the Executive Order, prohibited thetransportation of interstate and foreign commerce and petroleum and theproducts produced thereof or withdrawn from storage in excess of theamount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any StateLaw or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,

commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a state. This actionwas based on sec. 9 of Title 1, Sec. 709 (c) That section provides:

(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstateand foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced orwithdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or orderprescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other dulyauthorized agency of a state. Any violation of any order of the presidentissued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not exceeding P100, or imprisonment, for not exceeding six months or both.

On July 4, 1933, the president by Executive Order authorized thesecretary of interior to exercise all powers vested in the President forpurpose of enforcing Sec. 9 (c) of said act and said order. On July 15, 1933,the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out the presidentsorders of July 11 and 14, 1933.

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Section 9 (c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to control theproduction of petroleum and petroleum products within a state. It does notseek to lay down rules for guidance of state legislatures or state officers. Itleaves to the states and their constituted authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the presidentsauthority by reference to the basis, or extent of the states limitation of production. Section 9 (c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances orunder what conditions, the president is to prohibit the transportation of theamount of the petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of thestates permission. It establishes no criterion to govern the Presidentscourse. It does not require any finding by the president as a condition of hisaction. The Congress in Section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to thetransportation of the excess production. So far as this section is concerned, itgives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and tolay down the prohibition or not to lay it down, as he may see it. Anddisobedience to his Orders is made a crime punishable by fine orimprisonment.

The Court has had frequent occasion to refer to these limitations and toreview the course of congressional action. In every case in which thequestion has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We thinkSection 9(c) goes beyond these limits. As to the transportation of oilproduction in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared nopolicy, has established no standard, and has laid down no rule. There is norequirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which thetransportation is to be allowed or prohibited.

Potestas Delegata, non delegare potest:

What has been delegated cannot be further delegated.

The Legislative branch delegates its power to create, alter and modifylaws to the president eg. Executive Orders. The president cannot delegatesuch power to its subsidiary

Exception to the rule:

When such power are necessarily implied for the exercise of the expresspower.

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Publication:

When required:

1. Rules and regulations which are penal in nature

Penal regulations

US Vs. Panlilio

28 Phil 608

Facts: On February 22, 1013, the carabaos of Panlilio having beenexposed to rinderpest were, in accordance with an order of a duly authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral andconducted from one place to another for the purpose of working them.

Issues: 1) Whether Panlilio is liable under Act No. 1760.

2) Whether Panlilio is liable under Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal

Code.

Held: 1) The only sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibit acts pronouncethem unlawful are 3,4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. Sec.6 simply authorizes the Director Agriculture to do certain things, amongthem, par (c) to require that animals which are suffering or exposed theretoto be quarantined at such place and time as may be deemed by him

necessary to prevent the spread of the disease.Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of

Agriculture neither prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided anypunishment for a violation of such orders. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may be possibly be said to have the force of law, arenot statutes and a violation of such of such orders is not penal offense unlessthe statute itself somewhere makes a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any waytherein

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2) The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of ActNo. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The facts as recited in the complaint constitutea violation of Art. 581, par 2 of the Penal Code which penalizes any personwho shall violate regulations issued with reference to any epidemic diseaseamong animals.

Judgment modified. and affects the interest of the general public, mustbe published, except those which are internal in nature

2. Those which affects the rights of an individual granted by law

Further illustration:

Hilado Vs. Collector of Internal Revenue

100 Phil 288

Facts: Petitioner claimed in his 1951 income tax return the deduction of the portion of his war damage claim which has not been paid. He claims thatsaid amount represents a business asset with the meaning of said Act whichhe is entitled to deduct as a loss in his return for 1951. Under sec. 338 of theNational Revenue Code, the Secretary of Finance in the exercise of hisadministrative powers, caused the issuance of General Circular No. V-123 asan implementation or interpretative regulation of Sec. 30 of the same code,allowing such deduction. Such circular was later found to be wrong and wasrevoked by Circular No. V-123 of the same Secretary of Finance.

Issue: Whether the secretary of Finance has the power to repeal orrevoke Circular V-123

Held: It is contended that the power to pass upon the validity of GeneralCircular No. V-123 is vested exclusively in our courts in view of the principleof separation of powers and therefore, the secretary of Finance actedwithout authority in revoking it and approving in lieu thereof General CircularNo. V-123. It cannot be denied, however, that the Secretary of Finance isvested with authority to revoke, repeal or abrogate the act or previousrulings of his predecessors if thereafter the latter become satisfied that a

different construction should be given.

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With regard to the contention that the General Circular V-123 cannotbe given retroactive effect because it would affect or obliterate the vestedright acquired by petitioner under the previous circular, suffice it to say thatthe Circular General V-123, having been issued on a wrong construction of law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer.

The reason is obvious: a vested right cannot spring from a wronginterpretation.

It seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officercannot change a law enacted by congress. A regulation that is merely aninterpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneousbecomes a nullity. An erroneous construction of the law by the TreasuryDepartment of the Collector of Internal revenue does not preclude or estopthe government from collecting a tax which is legally due.

Art 2254, - no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissionswhich are against the law or which infringe upon rights of others. (New CivilCode)

However;

,

letters of instructions and those which are interpretative. Need not be published and those which affects the internal business of the administrative agency without affecting the rights of a privateindividual

( see article 2 of the civil code and section 5 of theadministrative code)

Section 3 . filing

Every agency shall file with the UP law center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this codewhich are not filed within 3 months from the date shall not there after be thebasis of any sanction against any party or persons

Records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary shall carryout the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agencyand shall be open to public inspection.

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Section 4 Effectivity:

In addition to other rule making requirements provided by law notinconsistent with the administrative code, each rule shall BECOME EFFECTIVE15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF FILING AS ABOVE PROVIDED UNLESS ADIFFERENT DATE IS FIXEDBY LAW OR IN CERTAIN CASES OF IMMINENTDANGER TO:

o Public healtho Safety,o Welfare

The existence of which must be expressed in a statementaccompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures tomake emergency rules known to persons who may be affected.

Illustrations:

People vs. Que Po Lay

94 Phil 640

Facts: defendant was found guilty of violating C.B. Circular No. 20 whichrequires the sale of foreign exchange to the C.B. within one day followingreceipt of such foreign exchange. Appeal from the CFI claiming that saidCircular 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act oromission imputed to the defendant.

Held: It is true that Circular 20 of the C.B. is not a statute or law butbeing issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it

has the force and effect of law according to the settled jurisprudence.Moreover, as a rule, circulars like No. 20 of C.B. which prescribes a penaltyfor its violation should be published before becoming effective for the peopleto be officially informed. Before the public may be bound by its contents,especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be publishedand the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and itspenalties.

If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 has not been published as requiredby law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no suchcircular to be violated and consequently the accused committed no violation

of the circular, and the trial court may be said to have no jurisdiction. Thisquestion may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raisedin the court below.

In this case, although Circular No. 20 was issued in 1949 it was not publishedin the Official Gazette until No. 1951, that is, about 3 months after

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appellants conviction of its violation. It has no effect before publication. Trialcourt has no jurisdiction.

Quasi judicial powers:

The administrative agency has the power to adjudicate cases falling inwithin their jurisdiction. Likewise, administrative bodies have the power toinvestigate a case. Such investigation must be given greater weights by allcourts of the law by reason of its expertise and wisdom to handle the case.

Decision Imposing Criminal Sanction

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

Scotys Department Store Vs. Micaller

52 O.G. No. 11, 5119

99 Phil 762

1956

Facts: This is a petition for review of an order issued by Ho. Jose S.Bautista, Associate Judge, CIR, finding respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor practice imposing upon them a fine of P100, at the same timeordering them to reinstate petitioner, Nena Micaller, with pack pay fromDecember 1, 1953 until her actual reinstatement, which was affirmed by thecourt en banc .

Issue: Whether or not the Court is justified in imposing a fine and has the jurisdiction to impose penalties under Sec 25 of RA 875.

Held: Said section provides;Sec. 25. Penalties any person who violates the provision of section

three of this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundredpesos, or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than oneyear, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

Any other violation of this Act is declared unlawful shall be punished byaffine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than five hundred pesos in eachoffense.

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The above provision does not specify the court that may act when theviolation charges call for the imposition of the penalties therein provided. Itmerely states that they may be imposed in the discretion of the court. Doesthe word court employed therein refer to the CIR under sec.2(a) of thesame Act which provides that Court means the Court of Industrial Relations unless another court shall be specified.

After mature deliberation, this court has reached the conclusion that,said provision notwithstanding, that word cannot refer to the CIR for to givethat meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to everyaccused by our Constitution. We refer to those which postulate that Noperson shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the rightto be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and causeof the accusation against him to have a speedy and public trial, to meet thewitnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure theattendance of witnesses in his behalf.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the CIR in dealing withunfair labor practices cases negates these constitutional guarantees to theaccused. And this is so because among other thins, the law provides that therules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall be controlling andits spirit and intention of this act that the CIR and its members and HearingExaminers shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts ineach case speedily an objective and without regard to technicalities of law orprocedure. It is likewise enjoined that the court shall not be bound solely bythe evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all othermeans such as but not limited to ocular inspection and questioning of wellinformed persons which results must be made part of the record. All thesemean that an accused may be tried without the right to meet the witnesses

face to face and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence andnot beyond reasonable doubt. This is against the due process guaranteed byour Constitution. It may be contented that this gap may be subserved byrequiring the CIR to observe strictly the rule applicable to criminal cases tomeet the requirements of the Constitution but this would be tantamount toamending the law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our government.

A comparative study of the jurisdiction of the CIR and of the CAR createdby RA 1267 is enlightening. Note that both Acts (nos. 857 and 1267) containgeneral provision prescribing, in one a penalty of fine of not less than one

hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not less than one month or more than one year, or both by such fine orimprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.

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And in another, a penalty of not exceeding two thousand pesosimprisonment not exceeding one year or both in the discretion of the Courtupon whose person who violates any of the provisions therein specified. Butwhile RA 1267, as effect the CAR provides that criminal proceedings shouldbe prosecuted as an ordinary jurisdiction upon an administrative court. Itexpressly says so in an unmistakable language. Again Congress has made itsintention clear when it amended that law by eliminating entirely this criminal

jurisdiction originally conferred upon CAR. This was made manifest when theCongress enacted RA 1409 repealing those provisions affecting this criminal

jurisdiction aforementioned.

In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose thepenalties provided for in section 25 of AR 875 lodged in ordinary courts, andnot in CIR, notwithstanding the definition of the word Court contained insec 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the CIR in so far as it imposed afine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.

JURISDICTION

Administrative agencies may only exercise such powers as are explicitlyor necessary implication conferred on them by law. Such agencies can onlyadjudicate matters coming within their jurisdiction; otherwise their decisionwould be void. In a number of cases the Supreme Court has held that thePublic Service Commission and its successor, the Board of Communicationshad no jurisdiction over cases and involving complaints for injury caused bythe Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., to transmit telegrams andto impose fines such failure. The grant for the supervisory power to theagency did not include jurisdiction over claims based on breach of contract.

They were for the courts of justice to decide.

In the leading case of Scotys Department store Vs. Micaller the SupremeCourt held that the CIR had no jurisdiction to impose penalty for violation of

certain penal provisions of law for this violated the due process guaranteegiven to defendants in criminal cases.

However, certain statutes authorize agencies other than the courts toimpose administrative fines to ensure efficient enforcement of law. Thus, theCommissioner of the Internal Revenue is authorized to impose surcharges asan administrative penalty for late filing of payment of taxes; theCommissioner of Immigration may collect a fine administratively for an aliencertificate registration.

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A tribunal may have jurisdiction over a case before it, but where it actsin a spirit of hostility and unfairness, its decision will be set aside. In BayaniVs. Collector of Customs, the Attorney-General recommended a new trialbecause he found that the appellant had not been given a fair and fullhearing. The Board of Inquiry conducted its entire examination of witnessesin a spirit of hostility, intimidating ignorant witnesses. For that reasonaccording to the court, the Board was rendered incapacitated to weigh andconsider the evidence impartially

Administrative agencies authorized to decide disputes coming fromwithin their jurisdiction are not by law precluded from delegating the powerto hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the agency will bemade. In American Tobacco Co. Vs. Director of Patents the Supreme Courtheld that the rule requiring an officer to exercise his own judgment anddiscretion does not prevent him from utilizing, as a matter of a practicaladministrative procedure, that of the subordinate to investigate and report tohim, the facts on the basis of which he makes his decision. It is sufficient thatthe judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officerauthorized by law. Due process of law requirements of fair hearing do notrequire that testimony should be actually taken by the same officer who willmake the decision. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to presenthis case and submit, there is no question that the requirements of dueprocess and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decisionsremains with and is made by said officer. It is however, required that to givethe substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of makingdeterminations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifiesthem. The hearing officer made preliminary rulings on the myriad questionraised at the hearings, but the ultimate decision on the merits of all theissues and questions involved was left to the Director of Patents.

Administrative due process:

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

Ang Tibay Vs. CIR

69 Phil 635

1940

Facts: The Solicitor General on behalf of the CIR filed a motion forreconsideration while respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for new

trial, and vacting of the judgment of the majority of this Court. This concernsthe laying of employees of Ang Tibay belonging to the NLU Inc.

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Issue: Whether there was due process observed in the CIR Proceedings.

Held: The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated inthe law of its creation. It is more an administrative board than a part of theintegrated judicial system of the nation. It is narrowly constrained bytechnical rules of procedure. However, this does not mean that it can entirelyignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due trialsand investigations of an administrative character.

There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

Right to hearing; Tribunal must consider the evidence presented; Decision must be supported bys some evidence; Supporting evidence must be substantial; Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented or at least

contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; The body of CIR or any of its judges must act on his own independent

consideration of the law and facts, and not simply accepts the views of the subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

Decide in such manner that parties can know the various issuesinvolved and the reason for decision.

In light of the foregoing principles, we observe here that the record isbarren and cannot support a conclusion of law. Motion for new trial isgranted to receive all evidence to determine the main issue which is on thelay off the employees.

Southech Development Corporation Vs. NLRC G.R NO. 149590 ; January 12, 2005

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter directing the NLRC togive due course on the respondents appeal. The facts are as follows:Respondents Rodrigo Lopez and Reynaldo Gamutan were employed asmachine operators of petitioners SDC in 1990s. On September 1999,

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respondents were directed to submit their explanation why they had not bedisciplinarily dealt with for insubordination unsatisfied with the reasonpetitioner suspended the Respondents for one month, but RespondentsRefused to acknowledge the notice of suspension. Respondents were advisedto consult SDC presidents, Ricardo Lu, but Respondents paid him no heedbut continue to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor Arbiterdecided the case on the Negative for the Respondents were given theopportunity to explain their side yet, they denied by NLRC on September 29,2000 because Respondents filed it beyond 10 calendar-day period. Thus, hefiled petition for certiorari alleging that they were deprived of due process.

Issue:

Whether or Not Respondents were denied due process

Whether or Not NLRC grave abused its administrative direction by denyingadministrative due process.

Held:

No. Court of appeal must yield to the technicality which aims to servethe broader interest of substantial justice. In administrative cases there arerequisites that must be complied with citing the case of Surigao Del NorteElectric Cooperative Vs. NLRC that first, Right to a hearing, whichRespondents here for was given but did not comply with the ReglementaryPeriod of appeal second, tribunal must consider the evidence presentedwhich NLRC did, Third, decision must have something to support itself,Fourth, Evidence must be substantial, Fifth, decision must be based on theevidence adduced at the hearing, or at least contained in the record. Anddisclosed to the parties, which The labor Arbiter and NLRC did, Sixth, Theboard must act on its own consideration of facts or independently arriving onits own decision, which NLRC did and Lastly, Decisions must be rendered in

such a manner that the parties to the Controversy can know the variousissues involved and reasons for the decision rendered. That the NLRC did butrespondents did not comply within the 60 day period and 10 day period forappeal.

As to the second issue, NLRC being an administrative agency chargedwith quasi judicial power complied with the requirements of administrativedue process. Administrative agencys findings of facts are given finality, if supported with substantial evidence which the technical rules and thereglementary period provided by law

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Negligence of the counsel Binds His client.

Wherefore, the decision of NLRC is reinstated and court of appealsdecision be set aside.

Right to a Hearing does not mean a formal court hearing neither thenecessity for a cross examination but it is enough that both partiesconcerned may air their side through position papers ( Ppl. Vs.Mutuc, supra) or through an answer with supporting papers.

Augusto R. samalio Vs. Court of Appeals, CSC and Bureau of Immigration GR no. 140079 ; March 31, 2005

Facts:

Samalio , Petitioner here in this case , is an intelligence officer chargedfor violation of CSMC 46 Rule 2 election 1, for dishonesty , oppression andmisconduct . The fact are as follows on February 2, 1993 at NAIA , Ms. WengSai Qin was holding an Uruguayan passport and was waiting for her friend.Pajarillaga, an immigration officer noticed the said passport of Ms. Sai Qinwas fake.Sai Qin, a Chinese National. Who do not even know how to speakother language. Was holding an Uruguay passport and enclosed there in thatshe is an Uruguay national. That gave Pajarillaga a queue that it was faked.Pajarillaga brought Sai Qin to samalio to have her investigated. Pajarillagaleft the investigation room a minute after. On the investigation pad, Sai Qingave Samalio 500 dollar bill in exchange for certification of authenticity of passport, Samalio returned her passport, but did not issue such certificationSai Qin left the area , on her way out , Sai Qin discovered that it did not hearan immigration arrival stamp, thus, Sai Qin filed a complaint against Samalio.On February 9, 1993, The bureau of immigration and deportation chargingSamalio for violation of CSMC NO.46 , Rule 2 Section 1, for dishonesty ,

oppression , Misconduct disgraceful and immoral conduct Likewise , requiringSamalio to submit his answer to the charges with supporting statement anddocuments. As a consequence , Samalio was preventively suspended whilethe case was pending. Later on , Petitioner submitted an answer butunsatisfactory so the case was set for formal hearing he fore the board of discipline of BID. The case has always been suspended thus , he was given apetition to dismiss but did not dismiss instead he was given 5 days toprevent additional witnesses on February 6, 1995, Samalio filed a motion fordismiss but denied on February 16, 1995 motion to dismiss was granted andthe case be set a new on February 22 1995 on July 25, 1995,

he was found guilty by BID commissioner liwag and was denied on June 2,1997 the said decision was appealed to civil service commission on

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November 26, 1997 but dismissed for lack of merit and affirmed the decisionof Liwag. Thus, filed a petition for Review to CA but was denied as well.

Hence, Certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Samalio was denied due process

Held:

No. Time and Again, that there had been several instances when peopleconceived that right to a hearing means, a formal hearing and that there bea cross examination of witnesses. Right to be heard connotes, opportunity tobe heard not only in courts but also on position papers, answers, statementsand documents presented and shall be determined by the court if it suffice toconvict an individual or not based on their papers sent to the court. On thepresent case, Samalio need not interpose before the court that he wasdenied due process, the mere fact that at the time when there has beenpostponement, he may file a motion to dismiss but did not instead sought foradditional days to present witnesses but did not avail of such. He likewisesubmitted his answer from the complaint and supporting statements tointerject his innocence yet not sufficient. He was likewise given the chance toappeal to CSC and CA and submitted his position paper where through suchpaper, He was heard but not sufficient to strengthen his innocence. In allthese circumstances, It shows that Samalio had all the chance to be heardbut the decision is up to the body who will determine the evidencepresented. BID being an investigative body and conferred Adjudicatorypower will weigh the strength of the evidence not withstanding theConstitutional right of an accused on the presumption of innocence. BIDconsidered Samalios side through his answer but not strong enough to

overcome all the allegations against him.

When required

Sicat Vs. reyes

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100 Phil 505 ; 1956

There is no question that in the tenancy case instituted by ArcadioLagmen against his landlord Froncisco Liongsion before the court of Industrial Relations, Alipio Sicat was not a part even if he was the tenantplaced in the land by the latter to take the place of the former. However,when that case was called by trial on the merits, the parties submitted anamicable agreement wherein, among other things, stipulated as follows:

That the parties respectfully pray his Hon. Court to order thereinstatement of the petitioner Arcadio Lagman a tenant of the respondent inthe said remaining portion of his holding beginning the crop year 1956-1957and to order the present tenant, Alipio Sicat, to vacate said remaining landholding, and the dismissal of the respective claims of herein parties.

The above agreement, which serves as basis of the ejectment of AlipioSicat, cannot be binding and conclusive upon the latter, who is not a party tothe case. Indeed, the order, as well as the writ of execution, cannot legallyenforce against Alipio Sicat for the simple reason that he was not given hisday in court. It is well-settled that No person shall be deprived of life, libertyand property without due process of law. And by due process of law, wemen a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,and render judgment only after trial, or as this court has said due process of law contemplates notice opportunity to be heard before judgment isrendered, affecting one person or property. It is, therefore evident that theorder of the lower court dated ob January 23, 1956, as well as the writ of execution of July 6, 1956, are null and void, the same having been issued byit in excess of jurisdiction.

When Not Required

Cancellation of Passport

: Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason of withdrawalor cancellation of the passport were not clear or doubtful. But where theholder of the passport is facing criminal charge in our courts and left thecountry to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in theexercise of discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held tohave acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing or canceling suchpassport.

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. Whendiscretion is exercised by an officer vested with upon an undisputed fact,such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder,hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the

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Antonio et al . Vs. Honorable Francisco Villa and OMB Task Force onPublic Works and Highways

G.R NO. 144694 ; March 28, 2005

Facts:

Antonio , Ramirez and Tel Equen were charged of falsification of documents as to purchases and bidding held on May 10, 1990 which it didnot really occur. The facts are as follows. Aguano, supply officer of (MPED)Mountain province engineering district issued a requisition voucher for theconstruction of Mainit bridge in Barangay Mainit , Mt. province . Ramirez ,assistant district engineer, favorably but the said bidding did not really occur, they issued a letter requesting or borrowing the baileys and constructionmaterials of bailey bridge construction project from Ifugao Engineeringdistrict handled by Mabunga . As a result, they were able to get thesematerials from the DPWH potia Depot. Thus, Mainit Bridge was constructedthe materials used were from the IED on the strength of the request letterissued by Tel Equen Mabunga. All the components borrowed were returnedto IED in January 1, 1991. On September 11, 1990 the concerned citizens of ifugao wrote a letter to the ombudsman to conduct investigation on thedelayed completion of a bridge in Mitapia , Lamut, Ifugao. The OMB taskforce, an investigative body of DPWA found Antonio, Tel equen and Ramirezguilty of falsification of documents that there was no bidding that occurredon May 10, 1990 but instead look it from the IED. The said facts are negatedby the NBI, according to the NBI, There was a conspiracy between IED, MPEDand Aguana and Dangayo OMB filed an administration complain fordishonesty and was found guilty thus petitioner here in filed an appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not OMBs investigation be given credence

Whether or not there was a denial of due process

Held:

Yes. OMB is an administrative body created and given the power toinvestigate on cases coming within its jurisdiction .Investigation gathered by

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an administrative agency charged with investigative powers be given withfinality in all courts. Questions of facts, as to whether there was a biddingconducted, or none is determined by OMB and their findings are conclusivein all courts. Thus, No question as to OMBs finding be given credencebecause it is conferred by law creating it. Findings of fact can only becontested if judgment is base a on misapprehension of facts.

No. Citing the case of Ang Tibay Vs. CIR, The following requisitesmust be complied in all administrative proceedings : (1) The right to ahearing, which includes the right of the party interested to present his owncase and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must considerthe evidence presented; (3) The decision must be supported by evidence; (4)

The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be rendered on theevidence present at the hearing, or at least contained in the record anddisclosed to the parties affected; (6) The administrative body or any of its

judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law andfacts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;and (7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, renderits decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know thevarious issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunityto explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heardbefore judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficientlymetTel-Equen, Ramirez, and Antonio participated in all levels of the presentproceedings, from the Ombudsman to this Court. In fact, during thepreliminary conference held on 27 November 1992 before Graft InvestigationOfficer Lamberto T. Tagayuna, the parties agreed to submit the case forresolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Due process in anadministrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar tothose in the courts of justice. Thus, Tel-Equen, Ramirez, and Antonio can no

longer request for the cross-examination of the witnesses against them. The Constitution provides that "[p]ublic office is a public trust. Public officersand employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve themwith utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act withpatriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."Tel-Equen, Ramirez, andAntonio's acts fail to show that they have lived up to this public trust.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50324 is AFFIRMED. Jimmie F. Tel-Equen,Rolando D. Ramirez, and Rudy P. Antonio committed acts of dishonesty,falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the

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best interest of the service. They are DISMISSED from the service, and shallsuffer the accessory penalties of dismissal

But instances of both administrative and judicial proceedingsinvolving the same facts and usually the same party respondent/dependent had come up.

In Galang Vs. CA the Supreme Court pointed out that there was nocompatibility between the administrative case for exclusion of an alien or acriminal case for violation of certain provision of the immigration law,although both proceedings arose from same facts. The alleged conflictsbetween the said proceedings according to the then Justice Concepcion, wasat best purely physical not legal, in the sense that one does nullify or setaside the other.

Courts usually leave to the administrative forum questions of reinstatement, payment of back salaries, etc. in case acquittal in criminalcase. An exception is People Vs. Consigna where the Supreme Court foundabsolute lack of evidence to prove charges of malversation and orderedreinstatement.

Evidence, Rules and Quantum of

Generally, administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rulesregarding the admission of evidence in the ordinary courts of justice. Theyare not necessarily requires to take into account in the determination of cases only such evidence as may have been presented by the parties. Thus,an administrative agency may at times make its own inquiry into the facts atissue and take judicial notice of certain other matters. But its decision mustbe supported by substantial evidence.

Judicial ReviewExcept when the Constitution requires or allows it, judicial review may be

granted or withheld as Congress chooses. Thus, the law may provide that adetermination made by an administrative agency shall be final andirreviewable. In such case, there is no violation of due process.

GENERALLY

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One of the obstacles to the development of administrative law wasreluctance to accept the exercise of adjudicative functions by officers orbodies not pertaining to the judiciary. In the separation and distribution of powers, judicial power has been vested in one Supreme Court and suchinferior courts as may be created by law. The Constitution gives thelegislature the power to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court and todefine and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Legislature hascreated administrative agencies with powers more dynamic and broaderthan the ordinary courts of justice.

Thus, in Lopez Vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, Feb. 19,1999,it was held that the rule must be served in order to prevent unnecessary andpremature resort to courts. Besides, sec 187 of RA 7160 expressly providesthat administrative remedies must be exhausted before constitutionality orlegality of a tax ordinance may be challenged in court. Note however, thatonly those decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rule on exhaustion of administrativeremedies.

Modes of Appeal:

Petition of review to the administrative body then to the office of the president, but not when the department head is an alter ego, thus, file anappeal to the RTC, then to the CA under rule 43 of the Rules of Court, thenby Petition for review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court if denied by theCourt of Appeals

Appeal

Section 19 of the administrative code provides:

Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from afinal decision of the agency may be taken to the department head.

Perfection of appeal:

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Within 15 days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated thecase a notice of appeal:

Served to parties concerned copies to parties concerned and paying therequired fees

If denied:

Perfection of appeal during the remainder of the remaining period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial.

If decision if reversed:

Perfection 15 days from receipt of the resolution of reversal withinwhich to perfect his appeal.

Certiorari

The Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari When any tribunal, board, orofficer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor anyplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a personaggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging thefacts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling ormodifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board orofficer.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings anddocuments relevant and pertinent thereto.

Prohibition


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Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition When the proceedings of anytribunal, corporation, board or person, whether exercising functions judicialor ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with graveabuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved therebymay file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts withcertainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendantto desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.

The petition shall be accompanied by certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings anddocuments relevant and pertinent thereto.

Mandamus


Sec. 3. Petition for Mandamus When any tribunal, corporation,board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the lawspecifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, orunlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or officeto which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrievedthereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts withcertainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding thedefendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the actrequired to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay thedamages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of thedefendant.

Declaratory Relief


Sect. 1. Who may file petition for declaratory relief Any personinterested under a deed will, contract or other written instrument, or whoserights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance,may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action to determine anyquestion of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statuteand for a declaration of his rights or duties there under.

Habeas Corpus


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Section 1 . To what habeas corpus extends Except as otherwiseexpressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus, the writ shall extend toall cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprivedof his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld fromthe person entitled thereto.

Injunction


Section 1. Preliminary Injunction defined; classes A preliminaryinjunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the final

judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It may alsorequire the performance of a particular act, in which case it shall be knownas a preliminary mandatory injunction.

Quo Warranto


Section 6. When an individual may commence such an action (QuoWarranto) A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or positionusurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an actiontherefore in his own name.

Extent of Judicial Review

GENERALLY

Laws creating administrative agencies and providing fro judicial reviewmay indicate the scope of that review. Questions of law or of both law and

fact will depend on the enabling act. The mode of judicial review indicatedwill determine the scope of judicial inquiry.

CONSTITUTING PROVISIONS

In cases brought from the COMELEC on certiorari , inquiry is limited toquestions involving absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

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discretion. It is within the constitutional authority of the legislature toprescribe the extent of review which may be exercised.

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The act providing for uniform procedure for appeal in specified agencies,makes reference to the scope of judicial review by setting the manner andperiod for appeal, whether it involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions.

The Law Fact Distinction

There is no clear-cut line can be drawn to separate questions of law fromquestions of fact. The distinction between question of law and question of fact gives little help in determining how far the courts will review. They arenot two mutually exclusive kinds of questions. Matters of law grow downwardinto roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without break intomatters of law.

Then facts are the so called jurisdictional and constitutional facts. Jurisdictional facts are those facts upon which an administrative agencyspower to act depends. While constitutional facts are those involvingconstitutional issues.

Questions of Law

A party challenging administrative action may direct his attack againstthe constitutionality of the very statute creating the agency and grantingpowers; or against the validity of agency action if these transcend the limitsestablished by law; or against the correctness of its interpretation and

application of the law. These involve questions which must ultimately bedecided by the courts of justice. However, administrative bodies may becalled upon initially to consider legal issues falling within jurisdiction.

Questions of Facts

Reference has been made to the distinction drawn in the statutesbetween question of law and question of fact and the power of courts toreview them. But when the issue involved is whether a certain thing exists or

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whether an event has taken place or which of two versions of a happening isthe correct one, a question of fact is raised.

Finality is attached to the findings of fact of some agencies when thesefindings are supported by substantial evidence. But there is reserved to thecourts the power to review the findings of fact when the evidence supportingthem is not substantial, and whether evidence is substantial or not is for thecourt to say.

Questions of Facts and Law :

Questions of Fact and Law are to be determined by the Administrative body,conferred by law, to exercise it is given more weight and conclusiveness by all courts.

Me Shurn Corporation and Samy Chou Vs. Me Shrun Workers and Rosalina Cru z

GR No. 156292 ; January 11, 2005

Facts:

On June 7,1998 employees of Me shurn Corporation organized a unionwho had pending application in bureau of labor relation . On June 17, 1998petitioner corporation . placed the respondents on forced leave.

On June 23,1998 respondents corporation applied for a petition of certification and in May 7,1999 it was granted Aug 4, 1998 respondentstaged a strike vs. petitioner Corporation. On Aug 31, CBA that officers of the

union will sign an agreement containing a guarantee that upon their returnwork, no labor org. will be organized. Instead be mediators.

On Nov 5, 1998 there came an election of officers. As a consequence,laid off its employees. Petitioner Corporation. Contends that they do not havean option if they will not lessen their employees they might loose their profitand may not pay these employees because of insufficiency of profit.

These filed a force for illegal dismissal in NLRC L.A pay their backwages and rein state them hence appear, but dismissed by CA for lack of merit for lack of Jurisdiction

Issue:

Whether or not CA has no jurisdiction of this Case

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Held:

Yes. The NLRC has jurisdiction on the determination of existence of ER & EE relationship question of fact are determined by the administrationand questions of law are the court. On this case it is right that thedetermination and issuance of permit and certification it left to the sounddirection of administration body and may not be denied by any agreement. Itis the DOLE who handles jurisdiction on legitimate labor organization andtasked to determine the labor organization as provided by the law creatingit. The question of legitimate labor organization is a question of fact left toadministration body charged of investigating and determining it and not thecourt. Courts are not tiers of facts but of law.

Question of Discretion

When a matter has been committed to agency discretion, courts arereluctant to disturb agency action on it. But a party may get a court tointervene against arbitrary action or grave abuse of discretion.

METHODS OF ENFORCEMENT

Some agency actions may be taken directly and without a hearing. Thus,for non-payment of taxes a summary distrait of personal property or a levyon real property may be made by administrative authorities. Or nuisancemay be abated summarily. The enforcement of agency decisions may bedone with or without recourse to the course, depending on the governingstatutes. Under licensing statutes, agencies may grant or refuse a licensedepending on whether the applicant has complied with requirements of thelaw; and violations of the conditions or regulations under which the grant, orits revocation. Again the intervention of the courts may or may not benecessary depending on the applicable laws. A previous chapter discussedhow violation of agency orders or decisions may be punished as contempt

either directly by the agency or through court action.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING ENFORCEMENT

Patent Law

Sec. 32. Cancellation of patent If the Director finds that a case forcancellation has been made out, he shall order the patent or any specifiedclaim or claims thereof cancelled. The order shall not become effective untilthe time for appeal has elapsed or, if appeal is taken, until judgment onappeal becomes final. When the order or judgment becomes final, any rights

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conferred upon the patentee by the patent or any specified claim or claimscancelled thereby, shall terminate. Notice of cancellation shall be publishedin the Official Gazette.

Labor Code

Art. 128 Visitorial and enforcement powers

The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall havethe power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing,compliance with the labor standards and provisions of this code basedon the findings of labor regulations officers or industrial safetyengineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement for theirorder, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of thelabor regulations officer and raises issues which cannot be resolvedwithout considering the evidentiary matters that are not verifiable inthe normal course of inspection.

The secretary of Labor may likewise order stoppage of work orsuspension of operations of any unit or department of anestablishment when non-compliance with the law or implementingrules and regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the healthand safety of workers in the workplace. Within twenty-four hours, ahearing shall be conducted to determine whether an order for thestoppage of work or suspension of operations shall be lifter or not. Incase the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shallpay the employees concerned their salaries or wages during the periodof such stoppage of work or suspension of operation.

It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delayor otherwise render ineffective the orders of the secretary of Labor orhis duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority

granted under this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issuetemporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwiseassume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement ordersissued in accordance with this article.

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Art. 224 Execution of decisions, orders or wards

The Secretary of Labor, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter may, upon his own initiative or on motion of any interested party,issue a writ of execution requiring a sheriff or a proper officer to executefinal decisions, orders or awards of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter, orcompulsory arbiters or voluntary arbitrators

Stare Decisis and Res Judicata in Administrative Matters

A prior judgment by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction may constitute abar to subsequent action where there are: (a) identity of parties, (b) identityof subject matter, and (c) identity of issues. This is the doctrine of res

judicata. On the other hand, a judgment may operate to precludeconsideration of question previously decided in a prior suit where the litigantis not a party under the doctrine of stare decisis whereby the decision of theSupreme Court on a particular issue will be followed by the court and courtsof inferior thereto until overruled by it. It will be seen that these doctrineapply to judicial decisions.

Executive and administrative Functions:

Issuance of licenses, grants rights and privileges and promulgates rulesand regulation but such rules must not contradictory to the general lawneither can it amend the general law or change the scope of the general law.It must be in compliance of the general and cannot extend its scope.

Illustrative case:

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS(FORMER SECOND DIVISION) and NEOLITO DUMLAO, respondents.

G.R. No. 147009. March 11, 2004

Ponente:

AZCUNA, J.

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Facts:

The Civil Service Commission (CSC), through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, brings before the Court the issue of regularity of the CSCsinstitution of disciplinary administrative proceedings against an erring civilservant on the basis of an anonymous letter-complaint.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated October30, 2000 and Resolution dated February 6, 2001 in CA G.R. SP No. 56098.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 4, 1997, the CSC received an anonymous letter-complaintagainst Neolito Dumlao (Dumlao), a Department of Education Culture andSports Supervisor of Binalonan, Pangasinan. The letter-complaint containedallegations that Dumlao: 1) never received a college degree; 2) neverreceived a Master of Arts degree in English; and 3) has many pendingcriminal cases.

On March 13, 1997, the CSC requested Director Antonio R. Madarang tolook into these allegations and, if necessary, conduct an investigation. OnAugust 4, 1997, Madarang submitted his Report of Investigation stating thatDumlao failed to finish his four-year Liberal Arts Course.

On August 7, 1997, the CSC wrote to the Commission on Higher Education(CHED) to verify the educational attainment of Dumlao. On September 15,1997, the CHED confirmed that Dumlao did not finish his four-year LiberalArts Course from the University of Pangasinan.

On September 18, 1997, the CSC formally charged Dumlao with Dishonestyand Falsification of Official Document.

After receiving Dumlaos Answer, the CSC conducted formal hearingswherein both parties presented testimonial and documentary evidence. OnMay 21, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 99-1056 finding Dumlao guiltyunder the administrative charge and ordered his dismissal from the service.

Dumlao filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied on October 27,1999.

Dumlao elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petitionfor review on certiorari . The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision thatgranted the petition and set aside the resolution dismissing Dumlao from theservice. It ruled that the CSC was without jurisdiction to conduct an

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investigation and file a formal charge on the basis of a mere anonymousletter-complaint.

Issues:

1. May the Civil Service Commission arrogate upon itself to providesomething which the Administrative Code of 1987 did not provide for?

2. Does this affect jurisdiction?

Held:

In the first issue, we rule in the negative. Administrative rules andregulations are intended to carry out, not supplant or modify the law. Withthis, we cannot but hold with disapprobation the pertinent provision, viz., thesecond paragraph of Section 8 of Resolution No. 99-1936. Where the lawmakes no distinction, one does not distinguish.

What is contemplated under Sections 46 and 48 is the initiation of acomplaint against a civil service official or employee, much like theinstitution of a criminal complaint, by filing a complaint for preliminaryinvestigation by the fiscal, which vests the fiscal with the quasi-judicialdiscretion to determine whether to file a criminal case in court. In the caseat bar, the CSCRO was without jurisdiction to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation on the anonymous complaint. May the CSCRO then file aformal charge against petition? We rule in the negative .

The complaint is dismissible at the outset. Section 48 (2), Chapter 6,Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 provides:

(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other person, the complainantshall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of hiswitnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of suchpapers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shalldismiss the case

Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in theCivil Service, provides:

SEC. 8. Complaint.

The complaint shall contain the following:

d. certified true copies of documentary evidence and affidavits of his witnesses, if any; and

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e. certification or statement of non-forum shopping.

In the absence of any one of the aforementioned requirements, thecomplaint shall be dismissed.

In short, the Court of Appeals deemed the anonymous letter as a complaintwhich failed to comply with the formal requirements of the law.

The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was subsequently deniedin the assailed Resolution. Hence, this petition.

The CSC assigns two errors:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the CSC Regional Office waswithout jurisdiction to conduct an investigation on the anonymous complaint.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the CSC Regional Office cannotfile a formal complaint against Dumlao on the basis of an anonymouscomplaint.

The petition is meritorious.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in considering the letter-complaint asthe complaint referred to in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 and the UniformRules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. A plain reading thereinreadily shows that the complaint under said statute and rules both refer tothe actual charge to which the person complained of is required to answerand indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation should hisanswer be deemed not satisfactory.

In contrast, the letter-complaint in issue simply contained thefollowing averments:

1. A department of Education Culture and Sports, Supervisor based inBinalonan is an undergraduate. He never had a college degree. His name isNeolito Dumlao, presently assigned as supervisor based in Binalonan,Pangasinan. He claims to have finished his college degree in U Pang., shortfor University of Pangasinan in Dagupan City. xxx. A check with the registraroffice will shock you.

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2. Dumlao also claims to have taken his M.A. in English at the ZaragozaCollege of Tayug, Pangasinan. Check that one too and you will be surprised.

3. He also has many pending cases in court; all criminal cases that includesforgery, falsification of public documents, and estafa

As can be seen from the bare contents of the anonymous letter, it was nota complaint within Section 8, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on AdministrativeCases in the Civil Service which requires the full name and address of thecomplainant and of the person complained of, a narration of the relevant andmaterial facts, and certification of non-forum shopping. Neither did it, byitself, commence administrative proceedings, requiring an answer fromDumlao described under Section 48 (2) of E.O. No. 292, but merely triggeredan investigation by the CSC.

Indeed, the letter-complaint is just a plain and simple letter. It was merelya communication sent to the CSC Regional Office to call its attention to theeducational background of Dumlao that is not different from an informationor tip given by telephone to the Regional Office. To say that the CSC cannotact upon the information because it was from an anonymous caller, or in thiscase an anonymous writer, would result in an absurd and restrictiveinterpretation of E.O. 292 and effectively deprive the Government of itsdisciplining power over people who hold a public trust.

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CivilService, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer oremployee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without beingsubscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the discipliningauthority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao wasvalidly acquired.

As regards the actual guilt of Dumlao, the Court notes that while thepetition filed before the Court of Appeals raised both questions of law andfact, the appellate court limited itself to ruling only on the question of law

and refrained from making a ruling on the facts. The Court, not being a trierof facts, is not in a position to determine whether the facts presentedwarrant a finding of guilt against Dumlao. Consequently, this case isremanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings solely todetermine the sufficiency of the evidence against Dumlao.

WHEREFORE , in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and theassailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

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56098 are REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals forfurther proceedings in consonance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Doctrines:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contestsrelative to the election, returns, and qualifications of membersof the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winningcandidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs

jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdictionbegin.( GEORGIDI B. A

admin memo aid

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