Sir Winston Churchill HSMUN Conference

SWCHSMUN 2014

SWCHSMUN 2014Ad Hoc Committee of the Secretary General: Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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Table of Contents

Background History……………………………………………………………Pages 2-3

Increasing Equality among Member States……………………….Pages 3-6

Combating Extremist Non-state Actors……………………………..Pages 7-9

Energy Security…………………………………………………………………Pages 9-11

Balancing Against Western Powers…………………………………..Pages 11-13

Committee Structure………………………………………………………..Pages 13-14

Committee Positions………………………………………………………..Pages 14-21

What are Crisis Committees?............................................Page 22

Directives and Notes………………………………………………………..Pages 23-25

Flow of Debate: Crisis Committees…………………………………..Page 26

Sources…………………………………………………………………………….Pages 27-30

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Background History

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization saw its beginnings in the Chinese Revolution. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed to the world that the Chinese people had stood up and 64 years later, the world is still enraptured by China’s rise. Transitioning from an impoverished nation to the world’s second largest economy in less than a century, China shocked the international community with the strength and speed of its growth. After years of developing economically as an isolated player on the world stage, China began to play apart in a number of cooperative multilateral bodies. Prior to creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China demonstrated - in numerous examples - behavior that pointed to an increased focus on multilateralism and diplomacy. As a part of Hu Jintao’s “Peaceful Development Road,” China explicitly stated that part of its development plan is to take “practical steps to establish fraternal relations with surrounding regions and promote cooperation in maintaining regional security.” This confirms the positive attitude China projects about its multilateral approach to integration with the modern world.

Though initially instigating an isolationist policy after the revolution, China slowly began committing itself to international bodies of diplomacy with its official recognition from the United Nations in 1971. This process accelerated in the late 1970’s under Deng Xiaoping’s era of reform. In 1978 China opened up to the rest of the world by establishing its foreign trade currency as the Yuan. This led China to join several international financial groups, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The 1980s also brought increased involvement from China in joint peacekeeping operations. Despite its previous resistance against UN peacekeeping activity, in 1984, China set forth its seven principles for peacekeeping operations. Four years later, China officially became a member of the UN Peace Keeping Special Committee. China furthered its commitment to multilateral efforts with the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Originally known as the “Shanghai Five,” the organization was founded in 1996 for the purpose of peacefully resolving border disputes in the central Asian region. Given the unrest on China’s western borders,

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this provided an ideal solution to the four other invitees. The member states include the initial five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) as well as Uzbekistan, which was added in June 2001. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has since continued to serve as a prime example of a multilateral forum for central Asian nations.

FIRST CHALLENGE FOR THE SCO

Increasing Equality among Member States

While the SCO is ostensibly a step by China towards diplomatic discussion and compromise, many see the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an example of China using multilateral efforts to advance its own national interests. The organization has publicly declared its commitment to protect freedoms, in accordance with the priorities and obligations of member states, as well as to “maintain and develop relations with other States and international organizations.” However, characteristics of the SCO support the claim that the organization is simply a tool China uses to advance its own interests. First, the secretariat body of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is based in Beijing. As the main permanent executive body of the SCO, the secretariat has the

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responsibility of drafting policy documents and ensuring that these policies are enacted. As such, China enjoys a tremendous advantage, in that it can use its authority as the host country to alter these positions. Moreover, China has exerted pressure over the direction of policy. Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen confirm this when they write that, “Meanwhile, China continues to dominate the SCO’s economic agenda, including negotiations to establish an SCO Free Trade Area (FTA), an SCO Development Bank, and Beijing offering $10 billion in loans for member states. All of this alarms Russian strategists who see China encroaching on Moscow’s Central Asian interests.” The fact that China has the ability to craft the policy of a multilateral organization to such a direct degree demonstrates that the SCO is less of a legitimate form of regional collaboration and more of a tool for achieving regional hegemony.

Under the guise of regional dispute resolution, China has established an organization that it can dominate in order to expand its own power. Wuthnow confirms that, “China’s efforts, through the SCO, to re-structure strategic relationships with its neighbors and to coordinate among members and observers, demonstrate its willingness to create new institutions that better serve its interests.” In addition, Wuthnow points out that “the SCO does not involve a joint security guarantee among its members, but operates on a looser principle of selective cooperation.” The purpose of such a principle is clearly to expedite action so that China may enact its goals more directly. Finally, the aims of the SCO benefit Chinese national interests in that they cultivate a “Shanghai Spirit” of supporting authoritarian regimes. Since most of the member nations of SCO are seen as authoritarian, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization doubles as a support net in which, “cooperating in a multilateral context may enhance their shared values and political systems while, at the same time, promoting common strategic interests.” Therefore, the bulk of existing evidence strongly suggests that the underlying purpose of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is actually to serve China’s national interest of expanding its influence.

Another strong criticism of the SCO has been its lack of true cooperation. For instance, the constant rivalry between China and Russia - fueled by a history of distrust - continues to present a challenge to securing effective agreements from

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the SCO. This is exemplified by the competition between the two nations to secure pipelines in the central Asian region. Additionally, in 2007 the SCO attempted to create a “unified energy market” for the purpose of promoting energy cooperation as well as regional development. Yet this agreement failed to produce the desired results because, according to Michael Raith and Patrick Weldon, “[The SCO] currently lacks the ability to forge an energy or natural gas cartel.” This shows the inability of the SCO to effectively serve the purposes that China claims – namely international cooperation. Indeed, Evan Feigenbaum comments that, “it is hard to point to concrete achievements in many of these areas-except on the basis of bilateral or non- SCO agreements and understandings.” Additionally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s lack of substantive response to 9/11, other than issuing a condemning statement, confirms this idea. While a strong reaction to combat terrorism would seem appropriate given the shared interests of the SCO member states in that regard, SCO’s insubstantial response displays the lack of functioning legitimacy of the organization. Jia reaffirms this argument by writing that as a result of its responses to 9/11 and other crises, “SCO was generally perceived as something politically symbolic, not as an international organization with much substance, let alone one with great promise.” Thus, the largely ineffective products of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization confirm that since the organization does not function as a forum of multilateral debate, China has yet to demonstrate legiti-mate commitment towards joining the ranks of its peers; instead, China continues to pursue its own goals.

While China and Russia are largest actors in the SCO with the potential to easily shape global events, membership in the SCO presents a unique opportunity for the smaller Central Asian states to ‘hedge’ against China and Russia. The SCO is the best forum for smaller states to address their concerns and win gains vis-à-vis China and Russia. While China and Russia have comparatively more domestic demand and capacity to build in isolation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the SCO observers and dialogue partners in Central Asia are less able. Most of these authoritarian regimes are concerned about gaining domestic

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stability and legitimacy as well as building access to markets and investments in energy collection and transport infrastructure.

The benefits of collaboration are unlikely to be fully realized until Tajikistan and Uzbekistan can reach an agreement on the division of scarce water resources. Uzbekistan is comparatively better off than Tajikistan, which remains the poorest of all the post-Soviet republics in terms of GDP per capita. However, Tajikistan is upstream from Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan’s vast cotton industry is reliant upon a dependable water supply from its northern neighbor. In spite of that, Uzbekistan still uses nearly 60 percent of the entire region’s water, so the division of resources between states in the region threatens to be a source of tension that could thwart the creation of any type of ‘hedge’ against China or Russia.

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SECOND CHALLENGE FOR THE SCO

Combating Extremist Non-state Actors

One of the chief concerns of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been combating extremist non-state actors. The declaration on the establishment of the SCO states that:

“Shanghai Cooperation Organization gives a priority attention to regional security and takes all necessary measures for its provision. Member-states will have close cooperation with the aim of implementation of Shanghai Convention on fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, including the establishment of regional anti-terrorist structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”

This has proven to be a crucial objective for several members of the SCO. China in particular holds a vested interest in uniting against non-state actors. After a history of tumult, China officially established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1959 and the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965. This brought on a

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number of Uyghur and Tibetan demonstrations against Chinese rule, which have continued to the present times. Since 2009, 122 Tibetans have protested Han Chinese rule through self-immolation. Additionally, Chinese authorities attributed the car explosion on October 28, 2013 that killed five people and injured 38 Uyghur terrorists. This dissent poses a serious threat to the nationalistic ideology that the Chinese government has widely promoted. Japan Times contributor Jeff Kingston writes that,

“The fundamental problem is that the dictates of Han nationalism don’t leave much space for anything resembling multiculturalism beyond a Disney-fied celebration of colorful costumes and quaint customs… In a country that has lost its moorings while experiencing tremendous socioeconomic convulsions, nationalism is a reassuring and expedient ideology that creates a sense of unity among a people riven by yawning disparities, injustice and corruption.”

Therefore, China turned to the SCO as a mechanism for pushing foreign governments to restrict “anti-China” activities in their territory so as to prevent non-state actors from gaining support from neighboring countries.

Russia struggles with its own non-state actors that threaten its national unity. The Chechens form an ethnic minority group that resides in Russia’s North Caucus region. Allowed varying degrees of autonomy, the Chechens have resisted Russian rule for over 200 years. This culminated, after the fall of the Soviet Union, with a coordinated effort for independence. Two destructive wars later, the Chechens continue an insurgency against the Russian government. The Chechens are responsible for a number of terrorist attacks, such as the attack ordered by separatist leader Shamil Basayev on a school in Beslan in which more than 300 people died. After Basayev’s death in 2006, Chechnyan violence escalated to a suicide bombing at a Moscow metro station, which killed 39 people. Furthermore, experts claim the Chechen groups are tied to Al Qaeda. This has made securing regional stability by combating non-state actors a priority for the Russian government as well.

Afghanistan has also voiced concern over the threat of non-state actors. Though Afghanistan currently holds observer state status rather than official membership,

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the religious extremism, terrorism, and drug trafficking in the state make it a priority for the SCO in preserving the stability of the region. President Hamid Karzai has highlighted several non-state actors including Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as significant groups worth the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s attention. As a result, the SCO members signed the “Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” at their first meeting in June 2001. This convention marked one of the first attempts by a region organization to define terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

Another key effort in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s fight against non-state actors was the establishment of its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). The goals of this structure include, “coordinating anti-terrorist activities such as extradition and information exchange; second, disrupting the financing of terrorist groups; third, coordinating security force exercises and jointly processing information provided by the members; and finally, monitoring and assessing joint anti-terrorist activities.” It is in the interest of all member, observer, and dialogue states that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization work together to combat non-state actors.

THIRD CHALLENGE FOR THE SCO

Energy Security

The richness of the Central Asian region necessitates a discussion on energy security. With Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russian, and Uzbekistan controlling 21.4 percent of the world’s oil reserves and 45 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves, it is not surprising that members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have placed great focus on energy-related issues. Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted the importance of Central Asia’s energy resources by attending a tour of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Professor of Chinese Studies at Georgetown University, James Reardon-Anderson confirms that by making an unprecedented visit of four of the five capitals of Central Asia’s former Soviet Republics, Xi Jinping, “really underlines how important that region is to China’s future.”

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As the largest oil exporter in Asia, Kazakhstan has created a source of competition between Russia and China. Russia hopes to move Kazakh oil through northern pipelines in Russia rather than southern lines. China realizes that Kazakh oil could alleviate its geopolitical tensions in the east as it searches for an alternative to oil from East Africa and the Persian Gulf. Oil from these regions is currently shipped across the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of Malacca, and up the South China Sea. China responded by strengthening its naval presence in the region, which aggravated the South China Sea territorial disputes. Despite serious attempts by both Russia and China to secure Kazakh oil, Reardon-Anderson notes that, “[Nursultan] Nazarbaev, the president for life of Kazakhstan, has pretty effectively played the two parties off against one another. So there is a kind of tripartite negotiation going on there over the price and supply of oil.” The SCO began working on energy security in 2004 when it created an action plan that facilitated cooperation between the organization’s energy producing nations (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) and its consumer nations (China, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan). Members continued to promote their interest in joint energy projects at the Moscow Summit in October of 2005.

Two years later, current Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin pushed for an energy agreement, claiming it could provide a powerful push for regional projects in the interests of all member states. To prove his commitment, Putin promised that Russia would invest $2 billion in Kyrgyzstan. Putin argued, “I am convinced that energy dialogue, integration of our national energy concepts, and the creation of an energy club will set out the priorities for further cooperation.” As a result, that year at the Bishkek summit, SCO leaders agreed to create a “unified energy market” that would send energy from energy rich nations to energy scarce nations in order to promote development in those states. Some westerners have expressed concern over a gas cartel between SCO members, especially if Iran were to obtain membership. David Wall, a regional expert at the University of Cambridge’s East Asia Institute, called the arrangement “OPEC with bombs.” However, further examination of the cooperation mechanism reveals that the agreement actually lacks the power to create an energy or natural gas cartel. The 2008 Energy Club has failed to work as much more than a consultative body.

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In fact, most of the energy cooperation between Central Asian states takes place outside of the SCO. Russia and China have each begun constructing pipelines through the territory of their central Asian neighbors. Unfortunately, this competition between the two nations could serve as an impediment to overall coordination of the SCO.

FOURTH CHALLENGE FOR THE SCO

Balancing Against Western Powers

Finally, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization faces the challenge of balancing against the strength of the western nations. Many aspects of the U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia, particularly its emphasis on democratic reforms, concern the SCO nations. Many have referred to the SCO as a counterweight to NATO. In a declaration of the SCO member states adopted in May 2012, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization criticized the U.S. anti-ballistic missile program claiming that the system would damage international security. This reflects Russia’s concern that the U.S. anti-ballistic missile plans would undermine Russia’s strategic potential. Thus, the coordinated SCO stance against the U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems illustrates the organization acting as a counterweight against NATO. In 2009, the organization defined cyber warfare as the dissemination of information “harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states”, arguing that this should be treated as a “security threat”. Cyber-espionage and cyber warfare are increasingly important to major powers and have become a major sticking point between China and the U.S. in recent years. The 2009 SCO agreement on the definition of cybersecurity amounts to a step towards limiting freedom of expression on the internet. Moving forward, this is likely to come at odds with Western policies regarding cybersecurity that place a lot more weight on protecting freedom of speech.

Some argue that the SCO has thus far demonstrated a far more limited purpose, involving merely a forum for discussing trade and security issues. However, the SCO expresses its desire to balance against the West in several other key examples. First, some believe that China and Russia hope to use the SCO as a united front against U.S. interests in the region’s energy supplies. In 2005 the

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization also urged the United States to set a deadline for pulling out of the region. Many saw this as a direct challenge to the U.S. presence in Central Asia. Consequently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has pulled together its resources in an attempt to counter the strong western presence in the region. Additionally, many members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization stand as counterweights against the U.S. push for democratic reform. Russia and China view the U.S. presence in the region as an attempt to contain their policies, and have thus turned to the SCO as a source of strengthening their defense.

Afghanistan also provides an opportunity for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to demonstrate its strength against NATO and the western nations. In 2012 the SCO adopted the policy that the group would adopt common responses to any crises that emerged in the region. At a meeting in Shanghai Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared, “The situation in Afghanistan and around it raises major concerns. We should actively participate in all international discussions on Afghanistan-related problems, coordinating our positions.” Russia and China used this united front of the SCO to strengthen their position against foreign troops in Afghanistan. The two nations claim that foreign troops in Afghanistan adopt functions that well exceed mere policing. While NATO provided peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan to supplement the U.S. presence, the SCO contributed little to the effort.

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However, Russia and China jeopardized the projection of unity among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization by conducting join military exercises without the rest of the member states in the summer of 2013. The two nations drew questions by naming the exercises “Peace Mission 2013.” This is what the SCO called their organization’s joint military exercises for the past several years. Therefore, the four other member states’ absence in the Ural Mountains exercises created doubt about the true nature of the organization’s unity, especially when compared with that of NATO.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization currently functions according to mostly Chinese and Russian direction, the SWCMUN SCO committee will operate under a more idealistic perspective. All states present are encouraged to participate equally throughout the conference, and all delegates will be granted voting powers. This means that member states, observer states, and dialogue partners will all be treated equally for voting purposes. The goal of this committee should be to maximize the effectiveness of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a multilateral body. Each committee position has specific advantages, and no one country will be allowed to dominate discussion in the room. Through diligence and collaboration the smaller powers will be able to fight

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for influence within the SCO. Border and resource arrangements are a frequent source of tension. While internal politics are a central part of the committee, delegates are encouraged to strive for SCO-wide collaboration. This is especially important in building a strategic counterweight to NATO and countering Western influence in the region. Crises, whether internal or external, can happen at any point in time and will occur relatively frequently. Delegates should come prepared to build a stronger SCO, one that is legitimate on the world stage and well-balanced internally. While the term ‘well-balanced’ is subject to interpretation, an effective SCO will be more tightly knit and able to take on external challenges moving forward.

COMMITTEE POSITIONS

China

China’s entry on the world stage has included a number of efforts to accept responsibility for constructing a modern world and promoting peace. This could be construed in a way that depicts China as a peaceful power prepared for compromise. However, upon further examination the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reveals that in fact, China merely uses these multilateral memberships as a reputation boost. Moreover, the structure, aims, and ineffective actions of the SCO uncover China’s true plans of regional influence and expanded power. Therefore, rather than latent acceptance, member states, observer states, and dialogue partners must work to ensure all voices are heard. Delegates are encouraged to demonstrate aim through cooperative debate rather than allowing dominance by a single member.

Russia

Russia and China are largely viewed as the two powers pushing the SCO forward. Russia and China have a complicated relationship with views that both complement and conflict with each other as well as with the other member states of the SCO. Russia has a lot to gain from economic, infrastructural, and security cooperation with the world’s second largest economy, and Russia’s vast natural resource wealth ensures that China will continue to push for cooperation moving

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forward. Officials on both sides routinely note their shared desires to bring the two countries closer together. As the Chinese middle class emerges, China will likely view Russia as an increasingly important trading partner and Russia can use this to its advantage within the context of the SCO. Russia, however, faces an increasingly strong China that may be able to wield more power in the SCO vis-à-vis Russia if the former is not kept in check.

Russia has some advantages in gaining the cooperation of former Soviet Central Asian countries. The legacy of Soviet bureaucratic culture, cultural elements, and a shared language makes for a more natural partnership between Russia and Central Asian states. Despite the growing ties between Central Asia and China, Russia remains the single largest outside actor in the region.

Kazakhstan

As previously discussed, Kazakhstan’s vast oil reserves have created competition between Russia and China. Kazakhstan, like most of the Central Asian countries, has a strong incentive to pursue greater cooperation with China. With China’s economy rapidly expanding and its interests becoming more global, Kazakhstan stands as a potential key partner in the region. For Kazakhstan, working with China promises enticing cooperation on economic and infrastructure projects as well as more cultural exchange. Kazakh leaders, however, are perhaps privately concerned about the consequences of greater long-term cooperation with China. China’s role in the international community is still comparatively in its infancy, and many leaders are worried that China will become a too prominent player in the region in the long-term.

Uzbekistan

While much of the analysis of the SCO focuses on its potential to weaken U.S. and European influence in the region, one of the SCO’s most prominent stated goals is to work against terrorism and extremism. Uzbekistan, home to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), has a lot to gain from forming a partnership with SCO states with greater resources to prevent terrorism. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan capitalizes on the poor border security in the region, and today it

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mostly operates out of bases in Tajikistan and Northern Afghanistan. The Fergana valley that lies mostly within Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan is another terrorist hotspot. Poverty and unemployment create the opportunity for fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups to gain support among the Muslim majority region’s youth. The borderless quality about terrorist groups in Central Asia makes it hard for Uzbekistan to singlehandedly fight against its activities. The countries of the SCO are collectively in a much better position to combat the IMU as well as other terrorist organizations.

Thus far, the SCO has not taken many concrete steps in combating terrorism. Because the SCO is already seen as anti-Western, forming a SCO security force would be viewed as aggressive by many Western onlookers. Uzbekistan faces the challenge of getting SCO member states to work together in combating terrorism in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, like other smaller members of the SCO, has a lot to gain from a multilateral security agreement between the SCO countries. The country’s capacity for undertaking military missions is quite weakened, and collaboration with the larger security forces of China, Russia, and Kazakhstan would help the country build the capacity of its military forces.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s location next to China’s Muslim-majority Xinjiang Province makes good China-Tajikistan relations a top priority for leaders of both countries. In recent years, China’s relationship with Tajikistan has been complicated by border disputes. In 2011, the two countries reached an agreement over the status of the Pamir Mountains on Tajikistan’s eastern border with China. Tajikistan ceded around 350 square miles to China. Reportedly, this was a little more than 5 percent of the land that China sought. To onlookers in the region, this is an example of appeasing China. Tajikistan’s position to negotiate with China is weakened. China is the principal investor in the Tajik economy, owning significant positions of the energy and infrastructure sector.

In particular, Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan are strained. Analysts have described the relationship as a sort of “undeclared Cold War”. Tajikistan, one of

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the poorest of all states in Central Asia, relies upon Uzbek oil exports and suffers chronic energy shortages that lead to power outages across the country. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have had border disputes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In an effort to curb drug trafficking and terrorist activities along the 1,200 kilometer disputed border, Uzbekistan unilaterally decided to place mines in rural areas. This has led to numerous civilian causalities and heightened tensions between the two countries. While most of the border disputes have been resolved, tensions remain high between the two countries.

Kyrgyzstan

For the past 20 years, Kyrgyzstan has sought greater integration with Russia and other regional allies. Being a small country without resources comparable to those of Kazakhstan, for example, Kyrgyzstan is at a disadvantage in negotiations with Russia. Russia generally feels that it does not have much to gain from increased cooperation. That being said, Russia is seeking a greater presence in the region to combat an increasingly powerful China. Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement for the creation of a joint military base with the Russian Air force in 2012. This is to begin in 2017 and the contract will run until 2032. As China gains more power in Central Asia, the importance of Kyrgyzstan as a strategic ally in the region grows for China and Russia. Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are strong, and the countries share linguistic and cultural ties. As Kyrgyzstan’s major trading partner and main investor in the Kyrgyz economy, Kazakhstan is incredibly important for Kyrgyzstan.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has the status of observer state within the SCO. Bordering the southern border of multiple SCO member states, Afghanistan is in a key strategic location. It is widely known as a hotspot for terrorists and drug production. Over 90 percent of the world’s non-pharmaceutical grade opium is produced in Afghanistan, and Afghani opium supply lines run throughout Central Asia, through Russia, and to Eastern Europe. Afghanistan’s loose control of its territories makes it a perfect location for numerous terrorist training camps; multiple terrorist

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networks are known to operate out of Afghanistan. The government in Kabul has, at best, tenuous control of the areas outside of Kabul. The Taliban is known to operate effectively in many rural areas, and Islamic extremism is a problem in most, if not all, Central Asian states. Due to these problems, Afghanistan is oftentimes denounced by other SCO member states, as the drug trade and terrorist networks create problems throughout the region.

India

Indian Prime Minister Salman Khurshid recently pushed for India’s admission into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Current members of the SCO have been unable to make a decision regarding India’s relationship to the SCO. China, while it publically advocates a closer relationship with India, has not said anything concrete about India’s status in the SCO. Indian policymakers foresee the SCO as making a greater contribution in handling the region’s security as international troops withdraw from Afghanistan. Significant and contentious border disputes also exist between India and China, complicating the two countries’ relationship and acting as a potential setback to India’s admission to the SCO. If admitted, however, India would significantly increase the percentage of the world’s population represented by SCO countries. India’s status as a more legitimate democracy than most, if not all, of the other SCO member states would also add diversity to the group.

Iran

An observer state since 2005, Iran has been seeking member status in the SCO for quite some time. The international sanctions that have come as a result of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program have made Iran’s admission into the SCO a politically contentious issue. Iran has much to gain from full membership status in the SCO, including a greater role in determining Afghanistan’s development post-withdraw and building economic partnerships with Central Asian and Russian economies. With its easy access to ports on the Indian Ocean, Iran may become a viable point of trade for landlocked Central Asian countries sometime in the near future. How-ever, Iran’s admission to the SCO likely faces condemnation from the

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international community. This could make the SCO look more hostile to Western onlookers.

Mongolia

Mongolia has attended annual SCO dialogues for multiple years. Theoretically, Mongolia should be able to gain easy admission to the SCO. Currently, no disputes of large global importance involve Mongolia. The region will likely become more important as energy demands grow in China. Russia’s already massive energy sector may see Mongolia as a prime location for oil and gas pipelines in the years to come. Currently, little energy infrastructure has been built in the Russian Far East, and Mongolia has little to no energy infrastructure. As relations between China and Russia strengthen, Mongolia’s geopolitical location may rise in importance.

Pakistan

The proposed Shanghai Cooperation Organization energy club will mean a great deal to Pakistan in the years to come. Under this agreement, members of the SCO would gain access to financing for energy infrastructure projects from SCO member states. Pakistan currently imports the bulk of its oil from Qatar, something that is expensive for the poverty-stricken country. The U.S. advocates this as well as the building energy infrastructure through Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan, Iran, and Russia support the creation of an Iran-Pakistan oil pipeline as well as a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline. United States lobbying in Afghanistan has prevented further progress on some of these projects, but things are expected to move forward in the near future.

Belarus

Belarus has a particularly close relationship with Russia and benefits greatly from the military partnerships between the two countries. In the mid-1990s, there were even talks of Russia absorbing Belarus, though these were merely discussions and not generally taken seriously on too high of a level. Recent diplomatic rows has been created as a result of Belarus’s deadline of Russia’s

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supposed $500 million offer that Belarus accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia as part of Russia in 2009. Belarus’s opening of talks with the EU on the certification of milk products led to the so-called Milk War, during which time Russia banned all milk imports from Belarus. Despite slight rifts, Russia and Belarus show much solidarity on important SCO-relevant issues.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka enjoys generally warm relations with other SCO member states, and it has been a dialogue partner of the SCO since 2009. Frequently a victim of extremist violence, the country would gain significantly from anti-terrorism actions taken by the SCO if these are to occur in the future. Currently, China has significant investments in Sri Lanka’s oil and gas industry, and there are multiple oil exploration projects surrounding Sri Lanka. If oil is found in the vicinity of Sri Lanka, this could have an enormous impact on Sri Lanka’s relationship with other SCO member states, particularly with China.

Turkey

In December 2013, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his previous statement that Turkey would end its seeking of membership status in the European Union if it was granted full membership into the SCO. Given the EU’s status as a primary player on the world stage, these statements by the Turk-ish head of state cannot be taken lightly. This symbolizes the SCO’s increasing importance internationally. (It should, however, be noted that Turkey has been seeking admission to the EU for quite some time now.) Turkey mostly has economic advantages to gain if it is fully admitted into the SCO.

ASEAN

Like the SCO, ASEAN is a regional development organization. It has attended SCO summits as a guest and has some similar objectives as the SCO. ASEAN as an organization also has close economic ties to China. In 2010, the China-ASEAN free trade area came into effect. This is the third largest trading area in the world in terms of nominal GDP and the largest in the world in terms of population size. It is

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predicted that trade between ASEAN member states and China will grow significantly moving forward. ASEAN’s relationship with Russia is growing, and future partnerships in the areas of energy security and military collaboration are viewed as possible outcomes.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan’s strict foreign policy of “positive neutrality” keeps it from being a more active player on the international stage. As such, it has not submitted an application or membership in the SCO and is not an observer state. It has shown up to some meetings as a guest, but it has never taken an active role in dialogues. Turkmenistan, however, does have a plethora of hydrocarbon reserves. Recent talks with Russia over natural gas exports, while not conclusive, have shown early signs at Turkmenistan’s willingness to cooperate with Russia and increasing energy exports. The United States, China, and the EU have also displayed interest in gaining access to these reserves, a factor that has the potential to cause friction between SCO member states China and Russia.

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What are Crisis Committees?

Crisis Committees are specialized groups at SWCHSMUN that spend most of their time dealing with real-time events that require immediate attention and action. These crises range from terrorist attacks to natural disasters to corruption within a certain organization. Common considerations of crisis committees include: understanding the crisis and its implications, informing (or not informing) the press and public, undertaking immediate damage control, reacting to the actions of other groups, and preventing future crises.

Simulation OverviewParliamentary Procedure Specific to Crisis CommitteesThe same parliamentary procedures used for General Assemblies and Special Committees apply to Crisis Committees as well. However, Crisis Committees (such as the US National Security Council) tend to be more informal than other committees, that is, they require a limited use of parliamentary procedure. They are often times more unstructured, and the flow of the committee is heavily dependent on the discretion of the chair. The chair will make his/her procedural preferences clear at the start of the first committee session. There may be a speaker’s list, yet most committees do without one. There is often no official setting of the agenda, as debate tends to flow between topics and is determined by the pertinent crisis at hand. In general, discussion occurs through moderated caucuses in which the chair calls upon delegates to speak. Delegates motion for moderated caucuses of a specified length and speaking time and on a specified topic. Many issues may be discussed concurrently and crises introduced by the crisis staff may interrupt discussion. Occasionally, unmoderated caucuses (motioned for by a delegate) are held in which formal debate is suspended and delegates speak at will in groups of their choosing. In voting, a motion for an unmoderated caucus takes precedence over a motion for a moderated caucus. Often, motions are simply passed without voting if there are no competing motions. Action is taken through directives, and there are generally no working papers or resolutions, unless the chair so desires. Notes are used to communicate between delegates while the committee proceeds. They are often used to work with delegates of similar viewpoints to coordinate actions. Questions can also be sent to the chair (or crisis staff) in a note.

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Directives and NotesDirectivesIn order to carry out any action during committee, a directive must be sent by an individual, a group of individuals, or the committee as a whole. If it is not on behalf of the entire committee, then the delegate(s) can choose to make the directive private and it will not be revealed to the whole committee. If the chair deems necessary, the directive may need to be introduced by a requisite number of writers. To pass a directive on behalf of the whole committee, a simple majority vote is required. The chair will hold a vote as each directive is introduced. There are three types of directives – Action Orders, Communiqués, and Press Releases. Action orders are used to direct troops, agencies, individuals, etc. to take an action that is within the authority of the committee. An individual may only send an action order if it is within his powers. A communiqué is used to communicate with foreign governments, or individuals outside the committee. A press release is used to reveal information to the public.

Examples of Directives

Action Order

Direct Allied forces to invade Normandy, France on June 6th. Paratroopers shall bedropped behind enemy lines on June 4th. Landings shall take place at Utah, Omaha,Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches.

-The Allies

Communiqué

To the Emperor of Japan:We demand an immediate, unconditional surrender by all Japanese forces within 48hours, or we shall be forced to unleash heretofore unimaginable devastation upon yourcities. - The Allies

Press Release

Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. - Franklin D. Roosevelt

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Examples of Notes- To a member of the same committee

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Franklin D. RooseveltFrom: Winston Churchill[Message on inside of Note]We ask that you work with us to increase intelligence efforts directed against our so-calledallies, the Soviets, so that we will not be surprised by any actions they take after the war.- Winston Churchill

To a member of another committee

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Leaders of Romania, AxisFrom: Josef Stalin, Allies[Message on inside of Note]Seeing as the defeat of Nazi Germany is near, we would advise you to make a deal with theSoviet Union now or we will show no mercy when the time for your defeat arrives.- Josef Stalin

To chair or crisis staff

[Address Section on outside of Note]To: Chair/CrisisFrom: Winston Churchill[Message on inside of Note]What is the current disposition of British forces in the Middle East?- Winston Churchill

An Outline of Typical Crisis Committee Flow A moderated caucus takes place with delegates outlining their position. A delegate motions for a moderated caucus on a specified topic of a specified

length with a specified speaking time. Delegates discuss actions to take regarding that topic through the moderated

caucus and through notes. Delegates submit directives to the chair to take an action and motion to

introduce the directive. Discussion on the directives will proceed through the current moderated

caucus and amendments may be proposed and voted on. A delegate will motion to vote on a directive and the directive is either passed

or rejected.

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A crisis will occur, oftentimes in the middle of debate. The crisis staff will introduce new information or developments through news articles, videos, intelligence reports, etc.

Discussion will shift informally or through a new moderated caucus to discuss this development.

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FLOW OF DEBATE: CRISIS COMMITTEES

Moderated caucus takes place where

delegates outline their positions

A delegate motions for a moderated caucus with a

specified length on a specified topic with a

speaking length

Delegates discuss actions to take

regarding that topic through speeches and

notes

Delegates submit directives to the chair to take an action and motion to introduce

their directive

Discussion on directives will proceed

through the current moderated caucus

Amendments may be proposed and voted

on

A delegate will motion to vote on a directive,

which will either be passed or rejected

A crisis will occur. The crisis staff will introduce

new information or developments through news articles, videos,

intelligence reports, etc.

Discussion will shift informally or through

a new moderated caucus to discuss this

development

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