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Page 1: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)
Page 2: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Acknowledgments

• Giovanni Vigna (UCSB)

• Chris Kruegel (UCSB)

• Engin Kirda (Eurecom)

• Paolo Milani (TUV)

Page 3: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Reading

• Hackers, Heroes of the Computer Revolution by Steven Levyhttp://www.gutenberg.org/etext/729

• The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier by Bruce Sterlinghttp://www.mit.edu:8001/hacker/hacker.html

• The Jargon File, version 4.4.7 by Eric S. Raymond http://www.catb.org/jargon/oldversions/jarg447.txt

Page 4: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

References

• SecurityFocus.com– Bugtraq– Focus-ids– …

• Phrack.org• Milw0rm.com• Packetstormsecurity.org• Zone-h.org• Many other security sites…

Page 5: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Intro

Page 6: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)

network:

Page 7: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)

network:

software

software

software

Page 8: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)• Applications run on operating systems

network:

OS

OS

OS

Page 9: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)• Applications run on operating systems• interoperate through protocols

network:

OS

OS

OS

protocolsprotocols

Page 10: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)• Applications run on operating systems• interoperate through protocols

Designed by humans Not perfect!

network:

OS

OS

OS

protocolsprotocols

Page 11: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Errors, bugs, and failures

• Networks: composed of hardware whose behavior is determined by software (roughly...)• Applications run on operating systems• interoperate through protocols

Designed by humans Not perfect!

network:

OS

OS

OS

protocolsprotocols

A human error may introduce a bug (or fault)The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology defines “fault” as “an incorrect step, process, or data definition in a computer program”

When a fault gets triggered, it might generate a failure...

Page 12: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)
Page 13: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Security BugsErrorsFailures

• A security error is made by a human• As a consequence, a security bug is introduced– A security bug is also called a “vulnerability”– When the bug is triggered (or “exploited”)

it generates a security failure– The security of a system is compromised...

Page 14: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)
Page 15: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Security

Page 16: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Other security problems

• There is an overall concept of “system security” in terms of– Privacy/Confidentiality– Integrity/Consistency– Availability

• Some applications work as designed but contain vulnerabilities– When installed in systems with a conflicting security policy

• “We thought it was a good idea to let allow students to have PHP applications in their web home directories...”

– When configured insecurely• “Our secure remote terminal service is protected by a 16 character

password, which is currently set to ‘AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA’...”

Page 17: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

There is nothing to worry about , because…

• No one will do that!• Why would anyone do that?• We’ve never been attacked• We’re secure: we use

cryptography• We’re secure: we use ACLs• We’re secure: we use a

firewall• We’ve reviewed the code,

and there are no security bugs

• We know it’s the default, but the administration can turn it off

• If we don’t run as administrator, stuff breaks

• But we’ll slip the schedule• It’s not exploitable• But that’s the way we’ve

always done it• If we only had better

tools...

Page 18: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Meanwhile in the real world…

Source: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics

Soft

war

e vu

lner

abili

ties

Page 19: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Security Analysis

• Security analysis is the process of determining the security of a system– With respect to a set of known design guidelines– With respect to a set of known security problems– With respect to its environment

• It answers questions like:– Is it designed securely?– Is it implemented securely?– Is it deployed and configured securely?

• The security analysis process is difficult to automate and requires experience and skills

Page 20: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Goals and skills

• Learn how to identify design and implementation vulnerabilities in operating systems, network protocols, and applications

• Learn by example: vulnerabilities and how to exploit them– The Devil Is In The Details– Lesson learned, attack patterns, design patterns

• Learn about protection/detection mechanisms and techniques• Skills:

– Ability to understand and assess the security implications of networked systems

– Ability to perform the security analysis of a system– Ability to understand and contribute to the research on this topic

Page 21: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

History

• Crypto is old (Caesar Cipher)• Even hacking has a bit of a history

Page 22: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Brief history of hacking

• 1876. Alexander Graham Bell invents telephone. • 1878. First teenage males flung off phone system

by enraged authorities.

Page 23: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

But also in other fields…

• In 1961, students from Caltech (California Institute of Technology, in Pasadena) hacked the Rose Bowl football game.

• 1982, MIT hacked the Harvard-Yale football game. Balloon with ‘MIT’ popped out of the ground.

Page 24: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Seriously now…

• 1972, John Draper builds the blue box and starts phone phreaking

• Dec 1973, Bob Metcalfe, “The Stockings Were Hung by the Chimney with Care,” Request for Comments no. 602

• August 1986: German hackers penetrate Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory systems and try to obtain secrets to be sold to the KGB

• November 1988: The Internet worm brings down the Internet (Robert Morris Jr.)

• December 1994: Kevin Mitnick attacks the Supercomputer Center in San Diego using a TCP spoofing attack

• 2010: Stuxnet attack uranium enrichment facilities in Iran

Page 25: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Cap’n Crunch

• In 1972 John Draper finds that the whistle that comes with the Cap’n Crunch cereal produces a sound at 2600 Hz

• The 2600 frequency was used by AT&T to authorize long-distance calls

Page 26: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Phone Phreaking

• John Draper became “Captain Crunch” and built a blue box – produced a number of different tones that could

be used for in-band signaling– Draper was eventually sentenced to five years’

probation for toll fraud– His story became an integral part of hacker culture

Page 27: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Who else? Steve Wozniak

Page 28: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Metcalfe’s story

• Inventor of Ethernet• “The Stockings Were Hung by the Chimney

with Care,” Request for Comments no. 602• Identifies vulnerabilities in the ARPAnet• Says we should worry

Page 29: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The German Hackers Incident

Cliff Stoll was a system administrator at LBL in August 1986• On his first day, he started investigating a 75 cent

accounting discrepancy for CPU time• He found out that an account had been created with no

billing address• More investigation identified the presence of an intruder• Instead of cutting out the intruder, Cliff Stoll decided to

monitor the intruder in order to find out who he/she was and how he/she was able to gain privileged access

Page 30: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The German Hackers Incident

• The intruder was using a configuration problem in the Emacs editor– Emacs can work as a mailer and it used the

“movemail” program to move a user’s inbox from /var/spool/mail to the home directory using interlocking

– The LBL configuration of /var/spool/mail didn’t allow the program to work as an uprivileged process

– Therefore the “movemail” program was installed setuid root

Page 31: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The German Hackers Incident

• In this configuration, movemail allowed anybody to move files to any directory of the system

• The intruder used the bug to substitute his own copy of the “atrun” program, which is executed every 5 minutes to perform scheduled jobs and housecleaning tasks

• The program ran with administrative privileges• After the execution of the operation the legitimate

copy would be copied back to hide tracks

Page 32: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The German Hackers Incident

• The intruder gained administrative privileges and started creating accounts and backdoor programs

• The intruder was using the LBL hosts to connect to military systems in the MILNET

• Military sites and databases were searched for keywords such as “SDI” (Strategic Defense Initiative), “stealth”, “SAC” (Strategic Air Command), “nuclear”, “NORAD”

• Cliff Stoll, at this point, called the FBI

Page 33: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The German Hacker Incident

• With the help of the FBI and of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) he was able to trace the intruder to Hanover

• 1989: the investigation ends with the arrest of Markus Hess in Germany, who apparently worked for the Eastern Bloc

• Markus was sentenced to a year and eight months and a 10,000 DM fineHe was put on probation

• Other “hackers” were involved in the break-in and received similar sentences

Page 34: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

1988 The Internet Falls Over• November 2, 1988: The “Internet worm”, developed by Robert T.

Morris, was injected in the Internet• A mistake in the replication procedure led to unexpected

proliferation• The Internet had to be “turned off”• Damages were estimated in the order of several hundred

thousand dollars• RTM was sentenced to three years’ probation, a $10,000 fine,

and 400 hours of community service• The CERT (Computer Emergency

Response Team) was created as a reaction to this incident

heh-heh

Page 35: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The Internet Worm

• A worm is a self-replicating program that spreads across a network of computers

• The worm worked only on Sun 3 systems and VAX computers running BSD UNIX

• The worm consisted of two parts:– A main program– A bootstrap program

Page 36: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

The Internet Worm

• First step: Remote privileged access– fingerd buffer overflow

char line[512];line[0] = ‘\0’;gets(line);

– sendmail (the DEBUG option allows one to specify a number of commands to be executed)

• The bootstrap program (99 lines of C code) was transferred using a connection from the infecting machine

• The bootstrap program was compiled and run, causing the transfer of a precompiled version of the main program on the infected host

Page 37: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Kevin Mitnick• One of the most well-known “hackers” in the

community• 1982: One-year probation for breaking into PacBell’s

offices• 1982: Enrolls at University of Southern California and

uses campus machines to perform illegal activities: 6 months of juvenile prison in Stockton, California

• 1987: Mitnick breaks into SCO. Sentence: three-year probation

• 1988: Enrolls at Pierce and misuses campus systems. Expelled, appealed unsuccessfully

• 1988: Mitnick breaks into DEC and steals software. Caught by FBI. One-year sentence at Lompoc, California

Page 38: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Kevin Mitnick

• 1992: Mitnick violates probation and goes into hiding

• 1994: California Department of Motor Vehicles issues $1-million warrant for Mitnick's arrest on charges of fraudulently trying to acquire driver identification

• Christmas 1994: Mitnick accused of invading San Diego Supercomputer Center

Page 39: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Kevin Mitnick against SDSC

• A very sophisticated TCP spoofing attack• The attack exploits the trust between hosts:

– X-terminal: diskless SPARCstation running Solaris 1

– server: host providing boot image to x-terminal

– X-terminal allows unauthenticated logins (and command execution requests) coming from server

– Denial-of-service attack against server– Impersonation of server with respect to the x-

terminal when executing:

rsh x-terminal "echo + + >>/.rhosts"

Page 40: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Kevin Mitnick

• February 1995: FBI arrests Mitnick in Raleigh, North Carolina.Sentenced to 46 months in prison (concurrently with a 22-month sentence)

• January 2000: Mitnick released from prison after almost 5 years (probation forbade him from connecting to the Internet or sending e-mail)

• January 2003: Mitnick can surf the Internet after 8 years

Page 41: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Other Stories

Page 42: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Other Stories

Page 43: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

2010 Stuxnet: attacking Iran’s nuclear program

Page 44: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Stuxnet

• four zero days• 1 known exploit• 2 stolen certificates• 2 rootkits (one in PLC!)• 2 Siemens security issues

• 1 target

Page 45: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Is this a course on hacking?

Page 46: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Hacking• The term “hacker” was introduced at MIT in the 60s to describe

“computer wizards”• It has been eventually used to denote “malicious hackers” or

“crackers”, that is, people that perform intrusions and misuse computer systems

• We will use the term “hacker” with this last connotation keeping in mind that it is also used to describe

[…] someone who lives and breathes computers, who knows all about computers, who can get a computer to do anything. Equally important,

though, is the hacker's attitude. Computer programming must be a hobby,something done for fun, not out of a sense of duty or for the money. (Brian Harvey, University of Berkeley http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~bh/hackers.html)

Page 47: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Other terms of the hackers’ jargon

Page 48: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)
Page 49: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Other terms of the hackers’ jargon

• 31337, l33t, eleet: Clueful. Plugged-in. One of the cognoscenti. Also used as a general positive adjective. This term is not actually native hacker slang; it is used primarily by crackers and warez d00dz, for which reason hackers use it only with heavy irony. The term used to refer to the folks allowed in to the “hidden” or “privileged” sections of BBSes in the early 1980s (which, typically, contained pirated software). A true hacker would be more likely to use “wizardly”. Oppose “lamer”

• haXOr• 0-day exploit

Page 50: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

All your base are belong to us

Page 51: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Ethics• Is malicious hacking/cracking legal? NO!• Is it legal to discuss vulnerabilities and how they are actually

exploited? YES, and it is a good thing, provided that…– The goal is to educate and increase awareness– The goal is to teach how to build a more secure computing

environment• A full disclosure policy has been advocated by many respected

researchers, provided that…– The information disclosed has been already distributed to

the parties that may provide a solution (e.g., vendors)• See: Responsible vulnerability disclosure process (IETF Internet Draft)

– The ultimate goal is to prevent similar mistakes from being repeated

Page 52: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Legality

• In the Netherlands– Since 2006: all penetration in computer systems is

illegal, even if it does not involve “cracking the security”

– Destruction of computers, networks, and data, or rendering them unusable is against the law• This now includes DoS and DDoS attacks

– Spreading of malware is punishable by law (upto 4 years in prison)

Page 53: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Legal hacking: penetration testing

Page 54: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Would you hire a hacker?

• Depends…• Would you fire a hacker?

Page 55: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Case study

high-level: what are the steps?details of steps in remainder of the course

Page 56: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Penetration of a Bank System

• Bank X (millions of accounts, hundred thousands of online• accounts) asks for vulnerability analysis• Assumptions: “hacker-style”

– No previous knowledge about topology/services– No inside help

• Initial data– Small set of IP addresses– Access to one online account– Letter from the bank verifying that we were working for them

• Goal is to determine if there is a way to break the security of the system

Page 57: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Penetration of a Bank System

Process:• Network analysis– Target acquisition– Service scanning– Vulnerability exploitation

• Banking service analysis

Page 58: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

IP Sweep

Starting nmap by Fyodor ([email protected], www.insecure.org/nmap/)

Host sales.bankx.com (192.168.20.1) appears to be up.

Host sales1.bankx.com (192.168.20.4) appears to be up.

Host sales4.bankx.com (192.168.20.5) appears to be up.

Host sales2.bankx.com (192.168.20.20) appears to be up.

Nmap run completed -- 256 IP addresses (4 hosts up) scanned in 1 second

Page 59: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Target acquisition

Page 60: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Target acquisition

Page 61: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

traceroute

Page 62: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Target acquisition

Page 63: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Service scanning

Different types of scans– TCP half-open scan– TCP connect– TCP FIN scan– FTP bounce scan– UDP scan

Page 64: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

TCP port sweep

Page 65: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

UDP port sweep

Page 66: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

FTP bounce attack

Allows one to open TCP connections bypassing the firewall protections

• Used to perform internal scanning• If upload is enabled can be used to attack

services filtered by the firewall

Later

Page 67: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Inside scan

Page 68: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

Vulnerability Exploitation

Two-step process, based on available services– Checking for the presence of vulnerabilities

• Mail-based• DNS-based• FTP-based• WWW-based

– Exercising the vulnerabilities that could possibly be in place

Page 69: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

When we are in…

• a new game begins– what do we want to use our bot for?

Page 70: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)

All of this stuff

• and more• will be detailed in the upcoming lectures

Page 71: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)
Page 72: Acknowledgments Giovanni Vigna (UCSB) Chris Kruegel (UCSB) Engin Kirda (Eurecom) Paolo Milani (TUV)