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Accountability
in the
Digital Age
Social, Technological, Political, and
Commercial Implications
Angelina Bishman
Submitted to the 2016 Robert Davies Commemorative Essay Award
Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship
University of Oxford
A consideration of the challenges of digital
accountability and a theorisation of potential solutions
that combine the public and private sectors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary Page 1
Introduction Page 2
Chapter 1) Accountability in the digital age Page 4
1.1) The three properties of accountability: transparency, standards and liability
Chapter 2) Analysing accountability in four domains of the digital age Page 6
2.1) Social domain: personal privacy
2.2) Technological: the regulatory gap
2.3) Political domain: cyberterrorism
2.4) Commercial domain: monopolisation
Chapter 3) Potential solutions and policy implications Page 11
3.1) Extrapolating Patterns
3.1.1) Technology is a human, not a technological issue
3.1.2) Fostering accountability in the digital age requires the respective and
combined efforts of the public and private sector
3.2) The “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma” Model for evaluating accountability decisions in the
digital age and their ethical implications
Conclusion Page 16
List of Works Cited Page 17
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this essay, I will challenge the popular assumption that increasing accountability irrespective of
the context always proves beneficial. Specifically, I will argue that accountability in the digital age is
a concept that involves tradeoffs and implications for different stakeholders. My argument is
structured into three chapters. First, I define accountability as a relational concept that must satisfy
three properties: transparency, standards and liability. I proceed to transpose this definition of
accountability to the digital age such that each property reflects distinctive demands of the digital
age. Second, I evaluate the current climate of accountability in four domains of the digital age:
social, technological, commercial and political. I largely restrict my analysis of each domain to an
explicit issue, chosen based on its contemporary resonance. Third, I extrapolate two patterns about
accountability in the digital age that can influence policy prescriptions. I conclude the third and final
chapter by introducing the “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma” model, which is borne out of my findings. I
propose that the model helps to facilitate analysis of accountability decisions in the digital age and
their ethical implications.
2
In recent decades, accountability has transformed from a “culturally innocuous term” to a “cultural
keyword” (Dubnick, 2014: 23). Evidence of this transformation is prominent. Forgotten are the days
when uttering “accountability” conjured up banal images of a financial audit where companies’
ledgers were examined for ill-‐considered postings according to objective criteria. Today,
accountability broaches many contexts, from healthcare reform to business ethics. This essay seeks
to transpose accountability to yet another context: the digital age. When defining accountability in
the digital age, it is insufficient to invoke a de-‐contextualised dictionary definition of accountability
or trace its etymological roots. Rather, a plausible definition should heed how the concept is
currently being used.
When one uses accountability, it is typically used in conjunction with modifiers– one speaks of
political or financial accountability where accountability is “surrendered to its contextualized
meanings” (Dubnick, 2014: 27). Whatever substantive meaning accountability might have is
therefore “overwhelmed and subordinated to the demands” of the digital age’s specific task
environments (ibid). At a cursory glance, there are two demands that accountability in the digital
age necessarily considers: practical and ethical. Both demands imply the importance if not urgency
in formulating a well-‐considered and operational definition of accountability in the digital age.
Practically, defining accountability in the digital age can provide us with a useful instrument “to be
pulled” from the policy toolbox to manage specific problems (Dubnick, 2014: 25). Though we have
already felt the immense impact of the digital revolution, we are only just beginning to understand
its implications. This is exacerbated by the inherent difficultly in our current regulatory systems
staying attuned to the rapid pace of technological development. Defining accountability in the
digital age could advance discussions about how we can be both proactive and reactive in the face
of novel technologies and their risks.
Ethically, defining accountability in the digital age is closely tied to efforts to bring about change and
reflects the view that current governance of the digital age is not sufficiently ethically robust. Today,
accountability has “become narratively intertwined” with the promises of justice, efficiency and
greater administrative performance, signifying the way that the term has become “discursively
associated with what are perceived to be higher public values” (ibid: 33). Defining accountability in
the digital age could stimulate discussions about whether or not fostering accountability in this area
INTRODUCTION
3
makes our relationship with technology more (or less) sensitive to public values and ethical
commitments.
I will now define accountability in the digital age by taking a fundamental definition of accountability
and adapting it to the demands of the digital age. Mostly, there is profound agreement that
accountability is a relational concept that satisfies three properties: transparency, standards and
liability. Accountability is organised around a relationship between an agent, who owes an account,
and a principal, to whom the account is owed; the properties of transparency, liability and standards
function to sustain that relationship. Accountability’s main objects are individuals, businesses,
national governments, public–private partnerships, non-‐state actors and international institutions.
Importantly, accountability does not have to be a relationship between two objects exclusively: a
threefold relationship is possible when national governments and international institutions
collaborate to keep a certain agent accountable. Moreover, individual objects are not confined to
being either an agent or a principal; they can in different circumstances be both.
4
As previously defined, accountability is a relation that satisfies three properties: transparency,
standards and liability. I will now outline each property in two ways: first, as it has been
traditionally conceived, and second, as it is adapted to the demands of the digital age.
Agent-‐principal relationships intrinsically involve asymmetry of information: the agent knows more
about its own behaviour than anyone else. Increased transparency clearly reduces this asymmetry,
enabling the principal to examine the agent's behaviour and hold it accountable.
Transparency can be adapted to the digital age in two ways. First, the digital age sees data being
more easily acquired and shared. Therefore, intuitively, the digital age is a more transparent one.
However, the deluge of data has also made discerning relevant information more difficult. Second,
technological innovations have allowed for data encryption, which clearly reduces transparency by
rendering information inaccessible.
Accountability differs from coercion in that it appeals to previous standards– formal and informal.
These standards offer predictable measures designed to mitigate potential harm or promote
compliance.
Accountability standards can be adapted to the digital age in one way: devising appropriate
standards involves considering important trade-‐offs between control and innovation: overbearing
standards can potentially stifle technological progress.
Property Two: Standards
Property One: Transparency
CHAPTER 1: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The Three Properties of Accountability
5
Without liability, accountability processes are empty because they are unenforceable. To be
accountable is also to be liable for one’s actions. The type of standards that an agent breaches
determines the agent’s liability: breaching mandatory standards typically has more severe
repercussions than breaching voluntary ones.
Liability is adapted to the digital age by considering the fact that various industries have introduced
new and unpredictable risks. The prospect of being liable or punishable can incentivize agents to
harness opportunities of the digital age more responsibly.
Property Three: Liability
6
“The digital age” is a broad term referring to all the phenomena that characterise the historical
shift from traditional industry to information computerisation (Shell, 2007). To achieve a
manageable yet comprehensive analysis of the digital age, I will compartmentalise it into four
explicit areas: its social, technological, political and commercial implications. Each area will be
explored via a key issue, followed by an assessment of its current climate of accountability.
The Four Domains of The Digital Age and Their Key Issues
Issue Area: Personal Privacy
In the digital age, governments have amassed private information on their citizens with
unprecedented efficiency. Businesses have behaved similarly, acquiring information on consumer
“spending habits, magazine subscriptions, web-‐surfing activity and credit history” (Solove &
Rotenberg & Schwartz, 2006: 163). Often, consumers are unwittingly complicit in their own privacy
breaches by signing away terms and conditions. The threat to privacy worsens as governments and
businesses increasingly share information with each other.
Appraising the current climate of accountability
Transparency: We often know little about the use of our personal information. Roberts (2006: 18)
highlights that “disclosure laws have been carefully tailored” to ensure that certain government
enclaves, like the security sector, operate in secrecy. Whilst there are pragmatic reasons for limited
governmental transparency here, the right to privacy, once eroded, is difficult to recover. We require
The Social Domain
CHAPTER TWO: EVALUATING ACCOUNTABILITY IN FOUR DOMAINS OF THE DIGITAL AGE
7
that the knowledge gap is bridged by an effective and ‘tech-‐savvy’ media, who inform the public as
to how their data is being used.
Standards: Imposing standards on governments through democratic expectation of government
transparency is always rational, especially if they render the intelligence services null. More rigorous
standards regulating the private sector’s use of customer data would, however, be welcome. A
requirement for more accessible terms and conditions would be a useful first step to bridge the
knowledge gap between consumers and data-‐monopolists. Furthermore, standards should be
updated to better acknowledge the fact that governments and businesses now partake in
information sharing.
Liability:
Trust-‐based accountability can possibly be relied upon when consumers keep companies
accountable to established norms for data collection. This is enabled by the possibility of a consumer
boycott, as long as the knowledge gap is bridged by an effective and ‘tech-‐savvy’ media. However,
the fact that companies can seek to excuse and, perhaps, even cover-‐up their misuse of consumer
data means that a deterrent through sanctions may be necessary. This is particularly true in complex
domains which are not easily understood by the public. While the government cannot be kept
completely accountable by statute, the public should continue to pressure governments not to
overstep their boundaries.
Issue Area: The Regulatory Gap
It is widely acknowledged that the "tech industry" is the dominant entrepreneurial force of our age.
Whilst software advancement reaches incredible heights, our legislative systems lag behind. This
‘regulatory gap’ can lead to impotent governance and moral hazards where technologies are used
with no expectation of potential punishment.
Appraising the current climate of accountability
Transparency: The explorative nature of technological progress means that the tasks performed by
these companies are very difficult to understand. However, the difficulty in understanding how a
company is harnessing new technologies has no bearing on the importance of companies upholding
The Technological domain
8
transparency in their use of these technologies. For instance, the use of artificial intelligence raises
ethical questions and is also highly complex (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2011).
Standards: Using standards to close the regulatory gap will stifle innovation to some degree. The
alternative is companies catering to the whims of consumers whilst regulators are rendered
impotent, as agents use new technology to evade accountability by exploiting the regulatory gap.
However, an early imposition of light regulation followed by gradual increments in standards is likely
to be the best approach. This requires those forming the standards to collaborate with ‘thought
leaders’ in the relevant technological fields and seek to establish the likely risk areas and how best to
deal with them. The alternative is a knee-‐jerk legislative response which harms technological
progress as the longer-‐term as companies refrain from innovation.
Liability: There are certainly cases where sanctions-‐based accountability should be preferred to trust-‐
based accountability. Artificial intelligence (AI) is an area which needs to be dealt with carefully,
particularly when it is required to answer questions of morality (Bostrom and Yudkowsky: 2011).
Areas such as this should be involve the potential for sanctions, as the costs of not doing so may be
too great.
Issue Area: Cyberterrorism
The emergence of cyberterrorism– “politically motivated attacks on computer systems for achieving
violent outcomes”– attests to the fact that the digital age is “altering the nature of conflict” (Arquilla
& Ronfeldt, 2001: 1). Nearly every institution and individual is tied to a virtual network to some
extent, making us vulnerable to cyberterrorism in various forms. Moreover, while cyberterror tactics
cannot replace conventional terrorist tactics, they do have the distinct advantage of serving as a
“force multiplier”: they can create more effect when executed in concert with other traditional
terrorist activities (CEDAT 2008: 73).
Appraising the current climate of accountability
Transparency: Whilst cyberterrorism operates on the basis of opacity, there are measures to create
more transparency. At the international level, this occurs via intelligence-‐sharing amongst countries.
At the national level, governments can use their own technological prowess (aided by the private
The Political Domain
9
sector) to infiltrate cyberterrorist networks. Private firms, such as Palantir Technologies, have also
aided governments in their efforts to identify perpetrators amongst the mass of online data.
Standards: Cyberterrorism can arise "anywhere in the world”, making “investigation, producing
evidence and taking the offenders to court an immense task that can only be achieved through
international cooperation” (Cottim). However, there are currently significant deficiencies in the
international standards for combating cyberterrorism. As laws are instituted or revised according to
new trends in cyberterrorism, more discussion is necessary to make clear what the national and
international procedures should be in terms of handling cyberterrorism.
Given that technology companies’ products are being used by cyberterrorists, companies are now
also being held responsible for destructive use of their products. The capitulation of MasterCard and
PayPal to political pressures in the WikiLeaks saga demonstrated how private sector ‘inaction’ is
considered increasingly indefensible (Greenberg, 2011).
Liability: Given the detrimental effects of cyberterrorism, the notion that governments should leave
internet-‐communities to self-‐regulate is quickly abandoned in favour of instituting legal sanctions
against cyberterrorists. Scholars maintain, however, that legal measures are insufficient for
containing cyberterrorism and liability needs to be cultivated elsewhere. This has already occurred
via public and private sector advocacy of responsible use of virtual platforms.
Issue area: Monopolisation
There is much talk of the "digital divide": the inequalities that arise from differences in the access to,
use of, or benefit from information and communication technology. It is also apparent in the
commercial realm, where certain businesses’ superior use of technology leads to them achieving
monopoly status. Silicon Valley provides an awesome hub for entrepreneurship but breeds
monopolies which justifiably concern anti-‐trust regulators (Fairless & Drozdiak, 2015). Overregulation
of these firms may stifle innovation but the concentration of economic power within these firms can
have detrimental effects.
Appraising the current climate of accountability
The Commercial Domain
10
Transparency: Many commercial initiatives rely on monopolisation and, therefore, privatisation of
data in order to make profit. As such, it is often difficult to obtain the relevant data which would
allow the public and government to establish whether or not a company is engaging in
anticompetitive practice.
Standards: Determining appropriate standards of accountability practice among businesses with
monopolistic intentions involves delicate trade-‐offs. Pro-‐competition regulation should, in terms
of free-‐market theory, encourage the efficient provision of any given good. However,
Schumpeterian economics indicates that stripping companies of their monopolistic power will
stifle innovation (Magnusson, 1962).
Liability: Antitrust law already exists, but the emerging regulatory gap means that there is a strong
likelihood of government increasing sanctions on monopolies.
11
CHAPTER THREE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Upon evaluating four climates of accountability, two patterns can be extrapolated about
accountability in the digital age with important policy implications.
1. Accountability in the digital age is a human, not a technological issue
The speed of technological developments complicates efforts to operationalise accountability in the
digital age. Although it is important to acknowledge that the tools at our disposal may be
insufficient in regulating technological developments, we should be cautious about consigning
ourselves to ‘technological determinism’: a view that underlines the unintended consequences of
the digital age in which technology constitutes an autonomous, exogenous force shaping society
(Smith & Marx, 1994). The major problem with technological determinism is that it absolves us from
responsibility for our “making and use of technology” (Wyatt, 2008). Such a view should be
displaced by the more plausible view of “interplay” between society and technology where each
“responds dynamically to the moves of the other” (Cranor and Wildman, 2003: introduction).
By recognising that there is a dialectical relationship between society and technology, we better
understand the fundamental role of human agency, willpower and innovation in rendering the
digital age a more successful, equitable and benevolent project. Instead of fixating our gazes to the
speed of technological development, we should be more attentive to how the ‘stickiness’ of our
institutions has also contributed to various regulatory gaps where existing legislation proves defunct in regulating novel technologies. Just as humans have designed technologies with far-‐
reaching capabilities, humans can also effectively reform the institutions in which these
technologies are utilised. More thought is needed however about reforming our institutions
strategically. We should begin by questioning various established views about what constitutes
strategic reform; in this essay, for example, we have analysed whether increasing accountability in
the digital age always proves to be beneficial as it is popularly assumed.
In Chapter Two, we saw how operationalising accountability in the digital age involves conducting
difficult trade-‐offs: between control and technological innovation and between personal privacy
and security. Just as it can be misleading and dangerous to equate technological change with
progress (Wyatt, 2008), it can also be misleading and dangerous to conceive of accountability in the
Extrapolating Patterns
12
digital age as only conferring benefits on society. Accountability is a value-‐laden term with different
implications for its diverse stakeholders. We can recall that, vis-‐à-‐vis the issue of personal privacy,
increasing accountability could result in increased symmetry of information between individuals
whose data was being collected and data collectors. However, increasing accountability could also
undercut national security and potentially foster unhelpful distrust between the two parties.
Awareness that accountability is not a one-‐dimensional phenomenon can lead to strategies for
reforming our institutions that pay greater attention to the benefits of incremental change. Given
that citizens have an inherent difficulty managing their affairs in the absence of stability and
predictability in law, piecemeal and ad hoc institutional change could prove more beneficial than
reactive, hurried forms of legislative change. Most importantly, incremental change could give more
room to public debate, moral reasoning and education for ascertaining the costs and benefits of
increasing accountability in the digital age on a case-‐by-‐case basis.
2. Fostering accountability in the digital age requires the respective and combined efforts of
the public and private sector
The public and private sector can serve to counter-‐balance each other in accountability terms. We
have seen how governments can exploit technological advances to amass information on its citizens
more effectively. Even though some businesses have collaborated with governments in information-‐
sharing, other companies have sought to counteract these processes: the market for privacy has
flourished. This market paradoxically complements the growing market for personal information–
there is a counter-‐demand for individuals wanting to keep that information private.
Differently, the public and private sector can also constitute mutual aids to better uphold
accountability terms. For example, the fight against cyberterrorism has seen an outsourcing from
the public to the private sector. This is exemplified by the establishment of Cyber Fast Track (CFT) by
the U.S. Homeland Security, which awarded short-‐term contracts to private entities for targeted
network-‐security projects. CFT was part of a government-‐led shift towards “democratized, crowd-‐
sourced innovation” (Schmidt & Cohen, 2014: 168).
13
The "Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma" model below is used as a basis for answering and evaluating the following
questions:
1. Would a change in the level of accountability in the principal-‐agent relationship be
accepted by the principal?
2. Would a change in the level of accountability be ethically permissible?
It must be stated, however, that this model is not empirically grounded but rather is used to
consolidate the analysis performed thus far into a single construct. Therefore, it is borne out of the
earlier analysis performed, rather than formulated independently and then applied. The assumptions
which it rests upon prevent it from being wholly realistic but it is nonetheless a useful analytical
device for considering these questions.
The diagram shown below illustrates a single possible principal-‐agent relationship within the context
of the model. The notation within the diagram, however, applies to all potential accountability
structures.
The "Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma" Model
New Ethical Codes for the Digital Age
14
Key
As explained below, α, β and γ are calculated in the same manner but are distinguished for the
purposes of this model as follows:
-‐ “α” relates to the primary principal-‐agent relationship.
-‐ “β” relates to all other accountability relationships which both are affected by and affect the
Principal. This is illustrated within the diagram by existing as part of a closed loop of accountability
relationships, which “α” is also a part of.
-‐ “γ” relates to all accountability relationships which do not affect but are affected by the Principal,
i.e. those which do not satisfy the criteria to be an “α” or “β”.
𝛼!, Any 𝛽!" and Any 𝛾!" The value of each variable is the net benefit of the level of
accountability of this relationship to a particular party, “I”.
N.B. Accountability is itself a function of transparency, standards and liability, as previously defined.
The 'i' subscript is used to differentiate between different betas and gammas.
1. Because the principal is self-‐interested, its desire for increased accountability is governed by the
following function (with the subscript "P" representing the principal):
∆𝑓 𝛼! ,𝛽! = ∆𝛼! + (∆𝛽!")!
!!!
Where:
∆𝑥 Represents the change in 𝑥
Decision rule:
The principal accepts the increase in accountability where: ∆𝒇 𝜶𝑷,𝜷𝑷 > 0
2. To account for the effect of a change in accountability in ethical terms, the effect is
expressed in relation to all existing parties (with "A" representing all parties affected by a
change in the primary accountability relationship):
∆𝑓 𝛼!,𝛽!, 𝛾! = ∆α! + (∆𝛽!")!
!!!
+ (∆𝛾!")!
!!!
Decision rule:
The change in accountability is ethically permissible where ∆𝒇 𝜶𝑨,𝜷𝑨,𝜸𝑨 > 0
15
The model is developed from the perspective of the principal because it is considered to be the
primary driver of the level of accountability. This is presupposed as, based on the examples
discussed, they typically wield the ability to alter the accountability relationship. The principal is
assumed to be self-‐interested and rational but there are various different incarnations of self-‐
interest. If the principal is the government, self-‐interest translates into political self-‐preservation and
pleasing the electorate. If, however, the principal is a company, then self-‐interest is restricted to the
success of the company and satisficing key stakeholders.
The decision rule for the first question encompasses the primary principal-‐agent relationship and any
relationships which, if affected, would in turn affect the principal. The “γ” relationships do not affect
the principal and therefore are not included in the decision rule. Take an example where the principal
is the government and the agent is a "tech monopolist" providing a popular service to consumers.
Increased accountability benefitting the government may be accompanied by a backlash from
consumers, if it restricts the ability of the company to provide the service. In this case, the net effect
of the change in accountability may result in a localised net gain (∆𝛼! > 0) but an overall net loss
(∆𝑓 𝛼! ,𝛽! < 0) for the principal, so the change would be rejected.
The decision rule for the second question incorporates all of the human effects of the change in
accountability. Thus, we are assessing the effect of the decision on all direct and indirect
stakeholders. The decision rule therefore qualifies as an ethical one by considering the welfare of all
parties. As such, the model produces both an incentive-‐based and ethics-‐based outcome. The use of
ethics here is distinct to the digital age because it incorporates the interconnectedness which defines
the digital age.
There are, however, clear limitations to the model. It makes the assumption that no “γ” relationship
affects the principal, which in practice may not be the case. There is also no explicit
acknowledgement of the interrelation of the accountability links, which are seen instead as a series
of single bilateral interactions. Furthermore, the ethics-‐based decision-‐making rule is fairly simplistic,
though there is scope for nuances. One option would be to require Pareto-‐optimality, whereby a gain
to society cannot be accompanied by a net loss for any individual group. This could perhaps be
softened for the sake of pragmatism to allow small net costs for some parties in order to benefit of
society as a whole. In any case, this model hopes to enable principals to incorporate an ethical
calculation into accountability decision-‐making processes.
16
CONCLUSION
I began this essay by defining accountability in the digital age as a relational concept based on
three properties: transparency, standards and liability. I employed this definition to evaluate the
current climates of accountability in the social, technological, political and commercial domains of
the digital age. Various striking findings ensued. First, it was apparent that accountability in the
digital age proved to be a human, not a technological issue. Specifically, within each of the four
domains of the digital age, accountability is clearly a value-‐laden term, with different meanings
and implications for the different stakeholders involved– whether it be cyberterrorists or
businesses or public-‐private partnerships. Second, it was apparent that fostering accountability in
the digital age involves the respective and combined efforts of the public and private sector. This is
because they can act as beneficial counterweights or mutual aids in accountability terms. In order
to understand the policy implications of my findings, I proceeded to use the “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma”
model to evaluate accountability decisions in the digital age and their ethical implications.
Word Count: 3,999 (excluding title pages, table of contents and list of works cited)
17
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