China’s Hegemony in

Cambodia

To what extent can the Sino-Cambodian

A dissertation submitted to the School of Government and

International Affairs

Z0967012Supervisor: Claire Sutherland

Word Count: 9982

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Offensive Realism

2.2 Offensive Realism and the Rise of China

2.3 Critiques of Offensive Realism

2.4 The Sino-Cambodian Relationship and Offensive Realism

3. Soft-Power

3.1 Culture

4. China’s Military Influence in Cambodia

4.1 Sino-Cambodian Military Relations

4.2 US out, China in

4.3 Japan as a Balancer

5. The Alignment of Foreign Policy

5.1 The South China Sea5.1.1 Cambodia as a proxy in ASEAN

5.2 The One China Policy

6. Resources

6.1 Energy Security

6.2 Food Security

7. Conclusion

Bibliography

1

AMM

ASEAN

BoP

CCP

IR

OCP

OR

PRC

PLA

RCAF

RGC

SCS

SEA

US

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Balance of power

Chinese Communist Party

International Relations

One China Policy

Offensive Realism

People's Republic of China

People’s Liberation Army

Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

Royal Government of Cambodia

South China Sea

Southeast Asia

The United States of America

Abbreviations

2

1.Introduction

Since China’s open-door policy began in 1979, kick-starting the country’s

impressive economic growth, International Relations (IR) scholars have debated

whether China’s rise would be peaceful (Yan, 2001) or if the disruption it caused to

the status-quo would lead to conflict (Mearsheimer, 2001). Offensive Realism (OR)

sits in the latter camp; it sees the structure of the international system as creating

a world of perpetual security competition which forces states to pursue power in

order to reduce insecurity. Therefore, offensive realists expect China to seek

maximum power which can only be obtained from hegemony.

2018 marks the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and

Cambodia, however, the close friendship seen today began in 1997. After Hun Sen

ousted his co-Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh, in a bloody coup, China did not

adhere to the international condemnation and impose sanctions – a repeated

occurrence in the next two decades – instead, it recognised Hun Sen’s legitimacy

and donated $6 million in aid (Chon, 1999). This marked a turning-point in the Sino-

Cambodian relationship and so began the patron-client relationship this

dissertation will analyse. Chinese aid to Cambodia has been increasing year on

year, the Kingdom supports Beijing politically in return for economic assistance

without the conditions of western aid. Cambodia has undoubtedly become China’s

most reliable ally in SEA, and the great influence China holds here is akin to

hegemony.

This dissertation will analyse the Sino-Cambodian relationship in the context

of OR. It argues that China is following the path of OR, to a large extent, on a

scaled-down form in Cambodia. OR is usually observed through a regional or global

lens but the study of its application on the state-level allows the complexities of

China’s power acquisition to be analysed. This analysis also presents evidence from

3

the Sino-Cambodian relationship of China’s hegemonic ambitions elsewhere in

Southeast Asia (SEA), supporting the original offensive realist view of regional

hegemony. Thus, the central argument that China possesses offensive realist

intentions speaks to the ‘China’s rise’ debate in IR on the side that China will not

rise peacefully.

The evidence presented here of OR taking place on the state-level lends

support to the predictive power of the theory and the way states are expected to

behave towards a China pursuing hegemony. Policy-makers should prepare for the

possibility of intense-security competition between the United States (US) and

China, and a concurrent US-led balancing coalition in SEA, checking Beijing

(Mearsheimer, 2014:392). Moreover, understanding how China employs OR in

Cambodia offers insight into how China plans to proliferate its hegemony

throughout SEA, which will have foreign policy implications for these nations.

First, the theory of OR, as according to John J. Mearsheimer, will be

summarised and critically assessed to provide a framework for the empirical

analysis. OR is then evaluated in the context of the Sino-Cambodian relationship,

initially in terms of China’s soft-power in Cambodia (Chapter 3), which shows how

China uses cultural tools to maximise its power. Chapter 4 examines the military

relations between the two countries within the context of OR, in particular it

demonstrates how the increasingly close relationship is pushing America out of

Cambodia. It also illustrates American buck-passing, a feature of OR, whereby

Japan acts as the main check on China’s military power in Cambodia whilst the US

remains on the side-lines. Chapter 5 examines how Cambodia acts as an extension

of Chinese foreign policy, and how this is moving China closer to a position where it

could bid for hegemony. Specifically, Cambodia’s role as a proxy for China in the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the South China Sea (SCS)

and the One China Policy (OCP) will be assessed. Lastly, Chapter 6 looks at China’s

4

energy and food needs to argue that the Sino-Cambodian relationship is increasing

China’s power through resource security. These chapters work together to reveal

how China is behaving as a good offensive realist in Cambodia and supports OR by

showing that China is preparing to become a potential regional hegemon.

Observing OR through this narrower lens offers insight into how China might make

a future bid for hegemony in SEA and what shape this would take.

2.Theoretical Framework

Over the past forty years, China has experienced remarkable economic growth and

made extraordinary gains in power. Whilst it has become fact that China is ‘rising’,

there remains much debate amongst IR scholars about what exactly China’s

intentions are with regard to other states and the international system as a whole.

This dissertation is specifically concerned with whether China will attempt to

pursue hegemony but does not intend to scrutinise if a hegemonic bid would be

successful or not. On the one hand, Waltz and other defensive realists cite the

balance of power (BoP) as reason that China would not pursue hegemony: states

would ally together to balance against China which would compromise its security

and prove self-defeating (Waltz, 1979:126). On the other hand, the argument with

which this dissertation is concerned, sees China as wanting to dominate the

international system to maximise its security. First proposed by Mearsheimer in

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), OR asserts that the best way for China

to survive under international anarchy is to achieve regional hegemony.

2.1 Offensive Realism

Rather than using human nature to explain the actions of states like classical

realists, OR is a structural theory, seeing the structure of the international system

as the driving force behind state behaviour. In its simplest form, OR reasons that

the anarchical structure of the international system means states are never fully

5

secure unless they are hegemon, thus, great-powers will strive to achieve

hegemony when opportunity-cost is low. OR is based on five bedrock assumptions:

1. The international system is anarchic as opposed to hierarchic; states are the

key actors and there is no ultimate arbiter in the system.

2. All states have offensive military capabilities with the ability to hurt one

another.

3. States can never be certain about other states’ intentions; states will always

be suspicious of each other.

4. Survival is the primary goal of great-powers and dominates all states’

motives.

5. Great-powers are rational actors.

(Mearsheimer, 2001:30-32)

Owing to these assumptions, Mearsheimer (2001:29) argues that great-

powers are constantly competing and searching for ways to gain power over their

rivals, with the final goal being hegemony. He defines a hegemon as ‘a state that is

so powerful that it dominates all the other states… [and] is the only great-power in

the system’ (Mearsheimer, 2001:40). His interpretation starts to digress from the

standard definition when he applies the concept in a narrower sense, to specific

geographical areas. Mearsheimer (2001:44) maintains that the ‘stopping power of

water’ – the world’s oceans – limits the power projection ambitions of states,

rendering global hegemony unachievable. Moreover, the world is a heterogeneous

mix of cultures, beliefs and political ideas, creating obstacles for great-powers

trying to extend their influence; it is unlikely any state today is naïve enough to

believe they could achieve all-out global hegemony. Therefore, the best outcome

for a great-power in our anarchic and unpredictable world is to become a regional

hegemon.

6

However, a hegemon still needs to be the only great-power in the system, so

a country bidding for regional hegemony has the additional aim of preventing other

great-powers from becoming regional hegemons elsewhere. OR views a great-

power’s ideal situation as when they are ‘the only regional hegemon in the world’

(Mearsheimer, 2001:42). For the past 120 years, the US has held this enviable

position; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and currently there is no other

hegemon. Moreover, it has successfully acted as an off-shore balancer and stopped

aspiring hegemons, such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan,

from being victorious (Mearsheimer, 2001:41).

Recently, China has emerged as a potential threat to the US’ sole regional

hegemonic status, increasingly making moves to try and dominate Asia and push

America out – much like the US did with European powers in the Western

hemisphere in the nineteenth century (Mearsheimer, 2006a:162). Currently, the US

plays a preponderant role in the politics, economics and security of Asia. It must

maintain this strong presence and influence to keep the region in check and ensure

China does not become a rival great-power which could meddle in its own regional

affairs. In accordance with OR, the US has tried to offset China’s rise in the region

with various balancing and engagement strategies; as long as the US is able to

uphold the existing BoP, whereby it is the most powerful state, by definition, China

cannot become regional hegemon (Godwin, 2004:83). The US has behaved in line

with OR in the past and remains determined to endure as the only regional

hegemon. OR sees no room in the international system for two regional hegemons,

for they will only be fully secure as the world’s single most powerful state.

Consequently, Mearsheimer affirms that China cannot rise peacefully.

2.2 Offensive Realism and the Rise of China

Mearsheimer (2014:368) believes that should China continue its remarkable

economic growth, it will act in accordance with OR. That is, in order to maximise

7

power, China will attempt to dominate Asia and make a bid for regional hegemony.

Mearsheimer (2010:389) believes that China will attempt to dominate the Asia-

Pacific, however, this discussion will predominantly consider ‘region’ to mean SEA.

With Japan to the east, Russia to the north and India to the west, China, acting as a

rational actor, would attempt to dominate SEA first.

Mearsheimer (2014:375) claims that regional hegemony offers China the

best chance of settling ongoing territorial disputes in its favour. Contested

sovereignty in the SCS, as well as China’s longstanding claim that Taiwan is a

breakaway province to be reunified with China, will be more easily resolved when

there is an outright dominant power in the region with coercive ability. Moreover,

regional hegemony would give China control of vital sea lanes in Asia needed for

transporting natural resources, most crucially oil, from Africa and the Persian Gulf

(Mearsheimer, 2014:379). Therefore, regional supremacy would help China to fully

maximise its security by allowing it to expand its territory and secure resource

access, both of which increase China’s power relative to other great-powers.

When discussing China’s hegemonic desires, it must be clarified that there is

no expectation of Beijing trying to ‘conquer’ Asia in the same way the British

pursued hegemony in the nineteenth century. Rather, Chinese hegemony would

take the shape of a Sinic-Monroe Doctrine formed through the creation of ‘a zone of

super-ordinate influence’ in the region (Kelly, 2014).1 Mearsheimer outlines how

China would attempt this. First, China will seek to maximise the power-gap with its

powerful neighbours, by increasing its economic might so that no other power has

the wherewithal to challenge it (Mearsheimer, 2014:370). Second, China will

attempt to push America out of the region, particularly in terms of maritime

presence (Mearsheimer, 2014:374). China can be expected to build military and

1 Much like US President Monroe’s 1823 Doctrine warned that European meddling in the western hemisphere would be considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the US (Dent, 1999:3), China is beginning to make it clear that American ‘assistance’ in the Asia-Pacific is unwelcome. 8

naval forces capable of accessing strategic areas of the world and deterring US

interference in Beijing (Mearsheimer, 2014:368). As well as decreasing US influence

in the region, these ambitious goals would weaken Japan militarily as it became

more isolated, serving to maximise the power-gap (Mearsheimer, 2014:374). Third,

China will pursue strategic interests outside of Asia; China might interfere in South

and Central America so as to ‘cause Washington trouble in its own backyard’ to

limit the US’ ability to interfere with Beijing’s prospects of regional hegemony

(Mearsheimer, 2014:377). Kelly cites three further additions to this list which China

may pursue: the establishment of a renminbi currency bloc in parts of Asia, a

regional trading area and the alignment of Asian states’ foreign policy to China’s

(Kelly, 2014).

Such conditions may sound farfetched, accordingly Mearsheimer concedes

that China is not currently in a positon to pursue such ambitious goals and make a

bid for hegemony: ‘Contemporary China… is constrained by the global [BoP], which

is clearly stacked in America’s favour’ (Mearsheimer, 2014:362). He qualifies that,

in line with OR, a potential hegemon’s security is kept as the number one priority

and motivator. As rational actors, great-powers will only consider offensive action

when an opportunity arises in which the benefits outweigh the risks (Mearsheimer,

2014:21). Therefore, OR with regards to China is a predictive theory. Nevertheless,

OR has not been without its critics and various IR scholars take issue with

Mearsheimer’s pessimistic view of future world politics.

2.3 Critiques of Offensive Realism

OR derives from the Realist school, hence, other IR schools of thought hold the

same criticisms as with any realist theory. For instance, Liberalism maintains that

Realists downplay the role of international institutions and that, especially in the

current globalised world, economic interdependence ties countries together,

creating strong incentives for peace (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010:117). Accordingly,

9

this mutual prosperity indicates that China’s rise will be peaceful. However,

Mearsheimer (2014:408) sees this post-Cold War view of a cooperative and

community-based world order as intolerably optimistic, arguing that security

considerations trump economic ones. He argues that war can sometimes bring

economic and strategic benefits ‘greater than the prosperity lost from damaged

interdependence’, citing the abundance of resources in the SCS as a potential

flashpoint for Chinese military action (Mearsheimer, 2014:409). There are also

criticisms of OR from within the Realist school itself. All types of realism hold the

same core beliefs – statism, survival and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:101) –

but disagree over the order of importance in which these rank.

Kirshner (2010) argues from a classical realist perspective and condemns

Mearsheimer for presenting dangerous policy prescriptions for the US over China.

Instead, he accepts that classical realists are enormously apprehensive about the

rise of China, but that Mearsheimer’s over-reliance on structural variables ignores

how state behaviour is shaped by domestic politics, ideology and lessons learned

from history (Kirshner, 2010:57). However, when taking history and politics into

account, there is support for China following OR. Since Mao Zedong established the

People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has made every effort to overcome

its ‘century of humiliation’, a period characterised by numerous defeats – notably

the Opium Wars – and foreign occupations such as the Japanese invasion of

Manchuria. Since then, China has learned not to let stronger powers determine its

fate. For example, Mao was intent on developing China to the industrial and

scientific levels of the great-powers – the infamous Great Leap Forward had the

primary objective of overtaking Britain in less than fifteen years (Dikkoter, 2010:56)

– this demonstrates China’s ambitions for superiority and disrupting the Western-

dominated international system. More recently, similar ambitions were shown with

the financial opening of the country and the ‘Go Out’ strategy, making China a

major outgoing foreign direct investment and aid lending country (Wang, 2016). 10

This clear desire for economic power, as well as the focus on expanding and

modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),2 are conducive to Mearsheimer’s

theory showing that China is not simply preserving the existing BoP.

Defensive Realism is another variant of structural realism and shares many

of the same basic assumptions as OR. However, the final goal of hegemony

distinguishes Mearsheimer’s theory from that of defensive realists who instead

argue that the BoP means states wish to maintain their position in the system and

maximise security rather than power (Waltz, 1979:126). With security in mind,

states are motivated to maintain the status quo in order to prevent the possibility

of dangerous balancing coalitions, therefore, states’ survival can be secured

without the power acquired from hegemony (Snyder, 2002:152). Both theories

concur that a state’s primary goal is security, yet, they diverge over how this is

achieved and it is here I believe Mearsheimer’s realism to be superior: is any state,

other than the hegemon, ever fully secure under the anarchical international

system? In order to maximise security, states must maximise their share of world

power (Mearsheimer, 2001:410) and this can be seen in the Sino-Cambodian case.

2.4 The Sino-Cambodian Relationship and Offensive

Realism

In the following chapters, China’s actions in Cambodia and the patron-client

relationship between the two countries will be considered within the theoretical

framework of OR. This will be assessed in two ways. Firstly, although OR as outlined

by Mearsheimer is a supra-state theory, this analysis considers the applicability of

the general theory of OR on a state, rather than a regional-level. It will examine the

extent to which China is acting in Cambodia how Mearsheimer would predict it to

act as a hegemon in SEA. Secondly, it looks at how far China’s actions in Cambodia

suggest it is preparing to make a bid for regional hegemony in the future – through

2 Between 2007 and 2016, China has seen the biggest growth in military expenditure, increasing 118% (Fleurant et al., 2017:2)11

grooming Cambodia to help it reach a position where a hegemonic bid would be

propitious. Empirical examples demonstrate that China is using its hegemony in

Cambodia to acquire more power; in this sense, China’s power acquisition is

exponential.

Before examining the empirical evidence, it is useful to understand why a

Chinese bid for hegemony was rational in Cambodia and not, at least for the time

being, in other parts of SEA. Described as a ‘thin piece of ham between two fat

slices of bread’ (Economist, 2017), Cambodia is sandwiched in between Thailand

and Vietnam, much larger countries in terms of population and wealth. Therefore,

Cambodia was susceptible to the Chinese charm offensive, seeing China as a

counterweight to its neighbours. Pragmatically, Cambodia was in a fragile state

economically in 1997 with its population and political stability still suffering from

the brutal years of Pol Pot’s rule, prompting the Chinese to see it as fertile ground

for power acquisition. The next chapter will assess how China is exhibiting

behaviour in line with Mearsheimer’s theory in Cambodia in terms of soft-power.

3.Soft-Power

This chapter explores how China is successfully using soft-power in Cambodia to

increase its own power as per OR. There are many definitions and uses of the term.

For the purpose of the following discussion soft-power will be defined as the ability

‘to obtain the outcomes one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than

coercion or payment’ (Nye, 2008:94). Nye (2008:96), the coiner of the original 12

concept, cites three channels of effective soft-power: culture, political values and

foreign policies. In Cambodia, China’s main source of soft-power is culture. The

issue of foreign policy will be discussed in Chapter 5 because Cambodia’s

alignment with China over international issues is not necessarily due to their

perceived legitimacy or moral authority, as would be espoused from soft-power, but

through economic incentives (‘carrots’).

Mearsheimer makes no mention of soft-power in The Tragedy of Great Power

Politics, however, the Sino-Cambodian case exemplifies how soft-power can be

used effectively by a great-power for its hegemonic desires. If soft-power leads to

the outcome a state wants, and that outcome according to OR is hegemony, then

states should be expected to utilise such means. Mearsheimer’s focus on power

accumulation through the size of a state’s military (Chapter 4), a form of hard-

power, contradicts the assumption of state’s rationality. If China were to use

military might to gain hegemony in Cambodia, there is a high risk of a

counteracting balancing coalition forming against it – this would damage China’s

economy and diminish its power – and these consequences would be magnified if

attempting this on a regional scale. Alternatively, the use of soft-power has won

influence in Cambodia without these risks, so when thinking rationally, China is

more likely to use such tactics.

Moreover, OR posits that all states fear each other due to the absence of a

central authority in the international system and uncertainty about others’

intentions. This fear varies across time and space; the more power a state has, the

more fear it generates among its rivals which acts as a ‘motivating force’ and

intensifies security competition (Mearsheimer, 2001:32). Such conditions explain

why official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) speeches have repeatedly referred to

China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and rebutted claims that China seeks hegemony (Glaser &

Medeiros, 2007:294): reducing the perceived threat of China will reduce the chance

13

of states coming together to balance against it. In the 1990s, Beijing realised

displays of hard-power – the seizure of reefs in the SCS and missile tests in the

Taiwan Strait – increased fear amongst Asian nations about China’s regional

intentions (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007:293). Since then, although hard-power

remains, there has been a noticeable shift to exertions of soft-power, which are not

overtly threatening. This can be seen in the transfer of Chinese culture to

Cambodia.

3.1 Culture

China’s cultural soft-power, like investment and aid, has the power to influence and

persuade but, beyond that, the integration of Chinese culture has the ability to

entice and attract (Nye, 2008:95). In 2007, Chinese President Hu affirmed that he

would ‘enhance the influence of Chinese culture worldwide’ (China Daily, 2007);

this can be seen in Cambodia in terms of education, food, media and beliefs (Heng,

2012:75). Cambodian Chinese-language schools funded by the PRC – which makes

them cheaper and less corrupt than standard schools – are heavily over-subscribed

(Reddick & Co, 2017). This, along with the ostentatious Confucius Institute in

Phnom-Penh, shows how Mandarin education has been spreading throughout the

country. Moreover, Kurlantzick (2007:69-70) identifies a ‘feeder system’ in

Cambodia where children who excel in these schools are invited to study in the

PRC, fully immersing them in the Chinese culture, which they bring back to their

homeland. The US has unintentionally facilitated the success of this tactic by

tightening student visa policies (Kurlantzick, 2006:3), adding to the declining US

influence in Cambodia. Additionally, Chinese New Year has become more

prominent, with up to 80% of Cambodians celebrating it (Heng, 2012:78),

evidencing their shared belief systems.

This cultural transfer, along with the close ties between the respective ruling

parties, has established a strong Chinese presence in Cambodia. However, contrary

14

to proponents of the ‘peaceful rise’ camp, such as Xin and Worm (2011) who see

Chinese soft-power as symbolic of a ‘genuine desire for peace’, Chinese soft-power

in Cambodia is motivated by strategic self-interest and demonstrates a desire to

maximise power. For example, Confucius Institutes, both inside and outside of

Cambodia, manipulate the way China is presented to their students by restricting

what can be taught, for instance, about Taiwan and Tibet. This has led to

complaints that the Institutes are Trojan Horses for Chinese influence and culture

(Paradise, 2009:662). Moreover, the proliferation of Mandarin education in

Cambodia is a double-edged sword for increasing Chinese power: as well as

spreading culture, a Mandarin speaking workforce will encourage more Chinese

investment, further deepening bilateral ties and increasing the Chinese diaspora in

Cambodia. Therefore, China has effectively used cultural soft-power to increase its

attractiveness, which, in turn, has facilitated its ability to pursue hegemony in

Cambodia.

Mearsheimer dismisses culture, asserting that structural realists ‘ignore

cultural differences among states’ (Mearsheimer, 2006b:72). However, the Sino-

Cambodian case shows how it can be used to support the theory of OR. Shared

culture creates a deep-seated connection between the patron and client state and

in this way is a longer-term strategy than financial investment or well-timed

‘donations’ used to charm the changeable political elite. Soft-power targets the

masses and, if done right, can permeate everyday life; even seemingly small

things, like changing from using spoons to chopsticks (Chan, 2013), increases

China’s influence and thus its power in Cambodia. Mearsheimer (2001:10)

concedes that his version of OR simplifies reality by ‘emphasizing certain factors

while ignoring others’, yet, in the China-Cambodia case soft-power has been a tool

used to increase Chinese power hence should be considered when evaluating China

as a potential regional hegemon.

15

One reason cultural soft-power has been so effective in Cambodia is a result

of the country’s history, a reality also disregarded by Mearsheimer. After the four

years of the Khmer Rouge rule from 1975 to 1979, Cambodia’s cultural heritage

was near obliterated, offering China a ‘golden opportunity’ to introduce Chinese

traditions and values into the rebuilding of Khmer society (Burgos & Ear,

2013:107). Therefore, China was able to follow the path of OR through soft-power

means in Cambodia due to country specificities. These tactics might not enjoy the

same success in other SEA countries with a more established national identity, so,

more in line with Mearsheimer’s OR, China would use coercive tactics such as

military intimidation. Overall, cultural soft-power efforts in Cambodia have been an

effective means of gaining power for China, and supports OR on the state-level.

16

4. China’s Military Influence in Cambodia

Over the past two decades, Chinese military assistance towards the Royal

Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) has increased significantly manifesting in the

form of financial aid, professional military education and joint operational events

(Becker, 2017). Boosting Cambodia’s military capability gives China a strong ally in

the region who supports its foreign policy stance on contentious issues such as the

SCS and OCP (Chapter 5). Furthermore, in line with OR, China’s investment in the

RCAF is part of the larger aim of pushing the US out of Cambodia and also

demonstrates America’s buck-passing of the China threat to Japan.

China regards Cambodia in much the same way the US does Latin America:

as its ‘backyard’. The US provides military assistance to nearly every Latin

American country, delivering weapons, holding joint training exercises and working

together on domestic issues such as drug cartels (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017:6). This

mirrors China’s strategic interests in Cambodia, showing how China is copying the

current regional hegemon in fortifying its neighbours militarily. Lastly, the

tightening military relationship has benefits for China in potential conflict: a strong

Cambodia can act as buffer to US-led containment along its southern flank (Ciocari,

2014:256) and provide access to tactical ports and airfields, increasing China’s

security. In this way, China’s military interests in Cambodia are the means to the

end of maximising the PRC’s power.

17

4.1 Sino-Cambodian Military Relations

The PLA has played an important role in developing the close Sino-Cambodian

relationship. The tightening military ties have been extremely visible, seen through

the millions of dollars’ worth of donated arms deliveries and large bilateral military

exercises, which appear to be growing year on year. To illustrate, in 2012, China

accounted for just over 20% of Cambodian arms imports, a year later, this had

increased to nearly 60% (Sipri, n.d). Although many of the specifies of such

dealings are not known, China is making a significant financial and human

investment into the RCAF. A notable military donation came in the form of the

Infantry Institute which is one display of the considerable military education China

provides Cambodia, with China paying for both the ongoing expansion and a

portion of the operating costs (Belford & Thul, 2015). Furthermore, Cambodian

military cadets enrolled at the school must spend six months in a PLA academy in

China (Belford & Thul, 2015). This demonstrates China’s linkage of military

investment to the spreading of its cultural influence (Chapter 3) which is especially

strategic when moulding future Cambodian military leaders.

A great-power bidding for hegemony would be expected to build strong

armed forces capable of accessing strategic areas of the world. Cambodia holds a

geopolitically strategic position in SEA, especially due to its coastal border with the

Gulf of Thailand, an important trade area with access to the SCS. China’s interests

are evident through its investment in the Port of Sihanoukville, situated on the

coast of the Gulf, which has been transformed into a ‘Chinatown’ of sorts (Thul &

Tostevin, 2017). If threats were to arise in the region, China has secured access to

a ‘sea-accessible location from which to launch a response’ and with fourteen

Chinese donated naval ships docked in Sihanoukville, threats can quickly be

quashed (Burgos & Ear, 2010:620). Moreover, Cambodian airfields could ‘make up

for China's lack of in-flight refuelling capacity for warplanes providing maritime air

cover’ (Marks, 2000:100). Therefore, China’s military assistance in Cambodia is 18

largely done with its own security interests in mind. Mearsheimer (2001:83) asserts

that ‘power in international politics is largely a product of the military forces that a

state possesses’, so China’s control over the RCAF increases its relative power. As a

regional hegemon, China would exert influence in the most strategically important

areas of SEA and military diplomacy has effectively achieved this in Cambodia.

4.2 US out, China in

This section will establish how China’s tightening defence relationship with

Cambodia is meeting the narrative of OR by pushing the US out of Cambodia. As an

aspiring hegemon, China is intent on removing the US military from SEA which

clashes with American desires to maintain influence and prevent a potential

hegemon from being successful. Therefore, when applying OR on a state-level, we

should expect to see the US and China bidding for military influence in Cambodia.

The US and Cambodian military have had a tumultuous relationship. Unlike

the Chinese, all US aid and assistance to Cambodia is conditional, coming with

‘strings attached’. On numerous occasions throughout Hun Sen’s premiership, the

US has stopped aid on account of human rights abuses and undemocratic policies.

After the 1997 coup, where an estimated 100 Cambodians were killed, the US

imposed a ban on bilateral aid to Cambodia, which was not lifted until ten years

later (Lum, 2007:8). More recently, in February 2018, the US government

announced it would be suspending military assistance programmes due to

Cambodian ‘setbacks in democracy’ (Whitehouse.gov, 2018). Such policies have

often worked in China’s favour by creating a larger vacuum for military influence.

This was demonstrated in 2010 when Washington ceased a donation of 200 army

trucks to Cambodia after Phonm-Penh deported asylum-seeking Uighurs back to

China, who then stepped in with a similar delivery of vehicles along with 50,000

military uniforms (Phorn, 2014). This calls into question the effectiveness of future

US military sanctions in Cambodia and shows how China’s ‘no-strings attached’

19

defence aid is successfully diminishing US influence whilst consequently

augmenting Cambodia’s dependence on China.

Where the variables are the US and China, Cambodia’s foreign military

relations appear to be inversely proportional – that is, as Cambodia increases its

military relationship with China, it decreases its military ties with the US.

Significantly, in 2017, Cambodia announced it would be stopping its joint military

exercises with the US, citing the need to focus on ‘more pressing matters’

(Sokhean, 2017). Yet, the international community did not find this excuse very

convincing and there was speculation as to whether Cambodia loosened its ties

with the US per China’s request; Beijing likely holds great clout as Cambodia’s

largest donor of military aid (Sokhean, 2017). Notably, just a few weeks before this

announcement, Cambodia held its first joint military drill, Golden Dragon, with

China. Golden Dragon simulated disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, very

similar to the cancelled US exercise (Paviour, 2016). Cambodia’s pivot away from

the US was reaffirmed in April 2017 when the Royal Government of Cambodia

(RGC) announced it was terminating the work of a US Naval unit, which included

twenty planned projects such as the building of schools and hospitals (Hunt, 2017).

Whether influenced by China or not, this move by Phnom-Penh demonstrates how

committed Cambodia is to removing US influence, even in humanitarian form.

Weakening US-Cambodia military ties are part of a more general pivot away

from Washington and towards Beijing. Many of the trends in Sino-US competition in

Cambodia transcend military influence, extending to economic assistance and

diplomatic relations which fit into the wider context of China’s bid for hegemony in

Cambodia. For example, the annual US-Cambodia military exercise was about more

than humanitarian training, it established a common ground between the two

countries and nurtured a personal relationship (Parameswaran, 2017). A similar

theme can be seen as China presses for the use of renminbi in bilateral trade with

20

Cambodia (Reuters, 2018) and encourages the tourism sector to accept the

Chinese currency where currently the US dollar is used (Thul, 2016). Therefore, the

above evidence represents an eroding of US-Cambodian relations on a larger scale,

which, according to OR, is conducive to China’s hegemonic intentions.

Following offensive realist logic, the US should be trying to decrease China’s

sizable standing in Cambodia. This was evident in President Obama’s pivot to Asia,

an attempt to rebalance American foreign policy from the Middle East to Asia. For

example, in a visit to Cambodia in 2010, Secretary of State Clinton urged the

country to avoid becoming ‘too dependent’ on China (Pomfret, 2010). However, the

US has another option other than directly balancing China in Cambodia, and that is

to buck-pass the threat to another great-power.

4.3 Japan as a Balancer

Mearsheimer (2001:141) writes that a regional hegemon prefers to prevent rivals in

other areas from gaining hegemony by ‘stand[ing] aside and allow[ing] the local

great-powers to check the threat’. This is known as ‘buck-passing’ and can be seen

in the way the US relies on Japan to balance China in Cambodia. This transfer of

responsibility to Japan is less costly for the US than balancing a far-off potential

hegemon like China and since Japan does not want a superpower on its doorstep,

limiting China’s military influence in SEA is strategically beneficial to itself as well.

Cambodia’s defence relationship with Japan has remained strong despite

China’s growing influence in Cambodia, with the two states upgrading their

bilateral relations to a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2013 (Chanborey, 2016). This

shows that Japan has thus far been an effective ‘buck-catcher’. Japan’s presence in

Cambodia would be difficult for China to replace as Japan-Cambodia relations have

been resilient since 1991 and, unlike the US, there are not decades of distrust

between the two countries. Tokyo continues to support Phnom-Penh amid

international criticism, exhibited through the donation of 10,000 ballot boxes for 21

the upcoming election, despite the US and European Union deeming it illegitimate

(Thul, 2018). Japan is motivated to maintain influence in Cambodia due to the

security-dilemma: as China’s security increases, Japan’s decreases. In that case,

owing to their geographical proximity, there is more at stake for Japan if China’s

sphere of influence continues to grow. Tokyo realises that if it were to pull aid from

Cambodia, China will take the opportunity to fill the gap, just as it has done with

the US. Therefore, through the lens of OR, Tokyo’s ongoing ties with Cambodia can

be seen as a move to guarantee Japan’s survival.

Likely, Cambodia is aware of its reputation as a client state of China and in

an effort to prove its neutrality it will continue to uphold military ties with other

powers in the region. However, Japan’s pacifist constitution means that, at the

moment, it cannot offer Cambodia the same military relationship it enjoys with

China. This casts doubt over Japan’s future as a buck-catcher. If Japan were unable

to contain China, OR dictates that the US would step into balance against it in

Cambodia (Mearsheimer, 2014:141). However, the US, as ‘leader of the free world’,

has a duty to condemn the autocratic practices occurring in Cambodia; as the only

regional hegemon in the world with the strongest military, it would be less

concerned about losing influence in a small state in a faraway region. Thus, here

lies an issue with the scaling down of OR to the state-level: it also scales down the

threat of potential hegemon’s actions than if occurring on a regional-level. If China

were acting in the same way in the whole of the SEA region, the US would be more

likely to intervene, for it would present a more serious threat to the BoP.

Overall, the tightening Sino-Cambodian defence relationship fits the

narrative of OR on the state-level by showing how Beijing is using its hegemony to

push Washington out of Cambodia. As US presence decreases, Cambodia becomes

increasingly dependent on China, offering Beijing more leverage to bend Cambodia

to its will (Chapter 5). Furthermore, as succinctly put by Becker (2017)

22

‘understanding the ways in which China has developed its military relationship with

Cambodia can shed light on how the PLA is pursuing military engagement

elsewhere in [SEA]’. Therefore, a similar push against the US should be expected as

the PLA increases its influence in other areas of the region and pursues a Sinic-

Monroe Doctrine.

5.The Alignment of Foreign Policy

This chapter evaluates how China uses its dominant role in Cambodia to gather

support for foreign policy objectives, especially in its two most important territorial

disputes, the SCS and OCP. The more support a foreign policy objective has, the

more chance there is of a favourable outcome which will produce gains in power.

Cambodia has shown clear signs of following Chinese foreign policy, most notably

in its role as ASEAN Chair in 2012 and in its refusal to recognise the government of

Taiwan. Such examples support the notion that China is hegemon in Cambodia with

Cambodia acting as an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy. Mearsheimer

(2014:375) predicted that China would use the power it gained from hegemony to

help settle territorial disputes. Cambodia’s endorsement of the aforementioned

policies demonstrates this already occurring on a state-level.

23

5.1 The South China Sea

OR can be seen in the Sino-Cambodian relationship in the issue of the SCS through

the accusations that Cambodia is acting as a Chinese puppet in ASEAN over the

maritime dispute. Control of the SCS is essential for any future Chinese bid for

hegemony; Mearsheimer (2001:87) writes that ‘a navy need not control all of the

sea all of the time, but it must be able to control the strategically important parts…

and deny the enemy the ability to do likewise’. Power over the sea would help to

expel the US Navy from the area, pushing them beyond the ‘first island chain’

(Mearsheimer, 2014:374) and increasing pressure on Taiwan (section 5.2).

The SCS is a vital trade route: the waters see one-third of global maritime

trade, amounting to $5 trillion, pass through them each year (Beech, 2016). Even

more significant is the natural resource potential of the sea, a factor which makes

the area especially important for China (Chapter 6). The sea boasts ten percent of

the world’s fisheries (Beech, 2016), responsible for feeding the seafood diet of most

Asians, and, though largely underexplored, is estimated to contain 11 billion barrels

of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (EIA, 2013). Winning control of the

SCS would make the regional environment more conducive to a Chinese bid for

hegemony. Therefore, as well as demonstrating Chinese hegemony in Cambodia,

Cambodia’s alignment with China in the SCS dispute illustrates how Cambodia is

important for China’s future hegemonic designs.

5.1.1Cambodia as a proxy in ASEAN

Four of the six claimants to the SCS are members of ASEAN, therefore, the

organisation has inevitably experienced the spill-over of their national interests.

ASEAN has a unique way of managing member-states’ competing interests. The

practice of musyawarah (consultation) and muafakat (consensus) are part of the

‘ASEAN way’ whereby the organisation strives for unanimous decision-making

(Caballero-Anthony, 2005:72). Through its relationship with Cambodia, China uses

24

muafakat against ASEAN to abet its ambitions in the SCS. Two notable instances

demonstrated this: the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2012 and 2016. Under

Cambodian-chairmanship, the 2012 AMM saw ASEAN break with tradition when, for

the first time in forty-five years, the Ministers failed to agree on a joint-

communique. The Cambodian Minister, Hor Namhong, rejected the drafted

statement, arguing that it reflected the bilateral disputes of Vietnam and the

Philippines with China and thus had no place in the communique (Bower, 2012).

This echoes China’s repeated assertion that it wishes to deal with the SCS issue on

a one-on-one basis and not have it brought up in multilateral discussions; although

not directly coming out in support of its territorial claims, Cambodia firmly upholds

China’s foreign policy of non-interference. Moreover, press reports that Hor

Namhong was consulting with Chinese officials over the drafted statement (Bower,

2012) add to the accusation that Cambodia was acting under Chinese will. Two

months later, China pledged over $500 million in loans and grants to Cambodia,

thanking Cambodia for its help in maintaining a good relationship with ASEAN

(Reuters, 2012), this suggests such loans acted as the ‘carrot’ for Phnom Penh’s

resilient stance.

Similarly, 2016 saw Cambodia block any mention of The Hague ruling of the

same year that ruled China’s historic claims to the SCS had no legal footing.

Cambodia’s objections led to the release of a watered-down statement which

simply expressed that ASEAN remained ‘seriously concerned’ over ongoing

developments in the SCS (ASEAN, 2016:29), but did not mention China by name.

Two weeks before the AMM, China had given Cambodia $600 million in aid

(Khemara, 2016), once again showing how China bought influence over the ASEAN

agenda via Cambodia.

A weakened ASEAN is favourable to China’s hegemonic bidding; it would shift

the BoP in Asia, creating a vacuum for China to gain more power and move the

25

international environment closer to one where a bid for hegemony would be

rational. The aforementioned AMM episodes have called the relevance and

longevity of the regional body into question as the very principle of consensus

decision-making, which ASEAN prides itself on, was ineffectual. Beijing’s patron-

client relationship with Cambodia enabled it to use ‘divide and rule tactics’ to foster

mutual distrust in the grouping and proved that its decision-making mechanisms

can be exploited (Thu, 2018:10).

Without a unified ASEAN position on the SCS, China can prevent an anti-

China security coalition from forming (Marks, 2000:99) because each member of

ASEAN is weaker as an individual state, save Singapore. In the last few years, China

has been increasing its bilateral ties with its two main rivals in the SCS, Vietnam

and the Philippines, which appear to have successfully softened ASEAN’s stance on

the issue (Pertiwi, 2017). For example, after accepting significant funding from

China, the Philippines have all but abandoned their issues over the SCS with

President Duterte announcing a ‘separation’ from the US both economically and

militarily in 2016 (Ide, 2016). This suggests that China’s success at puppeting

Cambodia in ASEAN has resulted in effective bilateral talks. With claimant states

more vulnerable without the formal backing of ASEAN, for the time being, China

has been able to negotiate favourable outcomes over the SCS. Moreover, on a

multilateral level, China and ASEAN have stated their intent to develop a SCS code

of conduct which critics see as a tactical move from China to buy time to

consolidate its maritime power (Morales & Pomfret, 2017).

Similar tactics of one-on-one diplomatic talks have been employed with the

countries in the Mekong River regional dispute. The Mekong has the potential to

become another flashpoint between ASEAN and China: China’s dam building

upstream in the river is creating problems, such as drought and salinization, for

countries downstream who rely on the river for food and irrigation. Although

26

Cambodia is one of the countries affected, Hun Sen’s support has effectively been

bought after China promised funding for a new expressway and airport (Vannak,

2018). Ultimately, China has been using Cambodia to create internal disunity within

ASEAN which has diminished the body’s power and increased its own, supporting

the offensive realist view of China as a power-maximiser.

5.2 The One China Policy

The OCP is a core Chinese policy, supported by Cambodia, which sees Taiwan as a

breakaway province that belongs to China. Regaining Taiwan would increase

China’s power and security due to its strategic value; positioned at the edge of the

SCS, unification would allow China to be more assertive in its maritime dominance.

Much like the disputed territory in the SCS, China is using its hegemony in

Cambodia to increase support for the OCP. If China were regional hegemon, it

would increase pressure on Taiwan through its ability to control other countries’

foreign policy, this can be seen in Cambodia, supporting OR on the state-level. This

would further China’s aim to isolate Taiwan internationally (Roy, 2013:200).

Cambodia’s acceptance of the OCP is not unique; China now makes the

cutting of formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan a standard for any country it develops

close relations with (Li, 2017). However, the RGC has more robustly supported the

policy in comparison to other countries. For example, Hun Sen banned the

Taiwanese flag from Cambodia on account of respecting Chinese sovereignty.

Similarly, Cambodia has repeatedly blocked any official Taiwanese presence in the

country, such as the establishment of a trade office in Phnom Penh which would

boost Taiwanese investment (Soumy, 2017). This commitment to the OCP is a

result of the strong patronage China commands over Cambodia; it indicates

adverse consequences for Taiwan if China is able to proliferate its dominance in

SEA. Moreover, if Taiwan were to declare independence, China’s 2005 anti-

secession law states that China would use military force in response (Roy,

27

2013:199). For reasons outlined in Chapter 4, Cambodia could be called upon to

assist the PLA, demonstrating the country’s strategic importance for China’s power

maximisation.

Regardless of the absence of diplomatic relations, Cambodia continues to

welcome bilateral trade with Taiwan: $744 million in 2015 (Soumy, 2017).

Therefore, the economic interdependence critique of OR has some validity here and

suggests limits to China’s predominance in Cambodia. If Beijing were to ask Phnom-

Penh to cease economic ties with Taiwan, the RGC would expect them to fill the

gap in their $678 million leather, tobacco and machinery imports from Taiwan

(Taiwan Trade Mission, 2016). As well as this being an economic feat for China, this

would truly put Cambodia’s commitment to the OCP to the test; it is not a certainty

that Cambodia would meet such a monumental request. This demonstrates a

limitation to OR’s application on the state-level which would likely be replicated on

the regional-level considering Taiwan’s significant trade with other SEA countries.

The economic isolation of Taiwan, although effective for reunification, is unlikely

given Taiwan’s increasing investment in the region.

That said, Mearsheimer (2014:377) states that ‘coercion or the actual use of

force is the only plausible way China is going to regain Taiwan’. Military force is a

much surer way of reunification and if China acquires more loyal allies like

Cambodia, this is a probable option. China’s war games in the Taiwan Strait in April

2018 (Ramzy, 2018) were a reminder that the PLA’s strength is growing and

indicate that China will only intensify its dedication to the OCP.

Overall, OR can be seen in China’s ability to coerce Cambodia into aligning

with its foreign policy. China’s determination to dominate the maritime component

of SEA and secure lost territory exposes its drive for power acquisition. This

analysis has highlighted China’s intentions for future regional hegemony: Beijing

continues to manipulate ASEAN in order to bypass the repercussions of its actions

28

in the SCS. Overcoming the issue with other claimants removes a significant

obstacle to the expansion of China’s sphere of influence in SEA. Moreover,

Cambodia’s stringent support of the OCP demonstrates how effective China can be

as a hegemon in dictating another country’s foreign policy. This strategy moves the

regional environment in SEA nearer to one where China could make a bid for

regional hegemony. The next chapter examines how China is using its hegemony in

Cambodia in a similar way to meet its resource needs.

6.Resources

Burgos and Ear (2013:3) claim that ‘China’s hunger for massive amounts of energy

is driving policy in Beijing’, this can be seen through its relationship with Cambodia.

29

A state’s energy supply-chain system underpins the continuity of a country’s

society, economy and military (Leung, 2014). OR sees resource security as one of

China’s highest priorities because, in order for a hegemonic bid to be plausible,

China must continue its substantial economic growth and it cannot do this without

natural resources. Moreover, the legitimacy of the CCP regime rests on its ability to

bring wealth and prosperity to its people. With a rapidly expanding middle class

and a population growing by 0.62% per year, China must secure the resources

needed to meet their demands for products and services (Burgos & Ear, 2010:621).

As history has shown, the emergence of an unhappy middle class can bring about

revolution, something the CCP wants to avoid at all costs. Aside from this economic

motive, resources are finite and this fact decreases every state’s security.

Therefore, as the foundation of OR is that great-powers are first and foremost

concerned about survival, states must have secure access to resources in order to

survive and hegemony is the best way to do so.

Only once a state has maximised power within the confines of its borders

can it effectively project power elsewhere in the region and consolidation of this

domestic power comes through the means of financial prosperity, as shown by the

US in the second-half of the 19th century (Mearsheimer, 2001:244). Energy

resources are needed to sustain China’s manufacturing-based economy and food

resources must be secured to feed the workforce behind it. For these reasons,

China is increasingly anxious about its growing import dependency on faraway

places which are politically unstable, such as sub-Saharan Africa, so has begun to

look for ways to secure resources closer to home. Furthermore, relying on imports

for vital supplies is risky for a potential hegemon as global commodity markets can

be unpredictable. This is currently demonstrated by recurring reports of a budding

trade war between the US and China since President Trump took office.

30

More so, Mearsheimer (2001:143) stresses the link between relative wealth

and military strength. The military forces a state possess make for the most

effective form of power since ‘economic might is the foundation of military might’

(Mearsheimer, 2001:143). This explains why China is so concerned with securing

resources. ‘Abundant wealth and a large population are prerequisites for building

formidable military forces’ (Mearsheimer, 2001:56), thus, with demographics on

side, China must strengthen its economy.

Therefore, a secure supply of energy and food helps a state maximise its

power and subsequently its security within a region; with assured resource supplies

in place, China would be in a better position to bid for regional hegemony. The

tightening Sino-Cambodian relationship is conducive to these natural resource

needs: Cambodia has underexplored oil and gas reserves and only 30% of its land

was cultivated as of 2011 (Siphat, 2015:200). Chinese influence in Cambodia offers

China the opportunity to exploit these resources for its own regional hegemonic

ends.

6.1 Energy Security

China’s hegemony in Cambodia assists it in securing much needed inexpensive

energy sources, specifically oil and hydropower. China’s energy needs have

primarily been met by coal which can be found in abundance within China (Dong et

al., 2017:215). However, the burning of coal brings greater pollution than natural

gas or oil, therefore, China has been looking elsewhere for resources. Cambodia is

a realm of opportunity when it comes to natural resources, although widely

unexplored, there are estimates that just one licensed exploration area in

Cambodia holds 400-700 million barrels of oil and 3 trillion feet of gas (Allwright et

al., 2015:4). Consuming 11 million barrels of oil daily (Slav, 2017), it is no wonder

China has been investing heavily in the Cambodian resource sector, as illustrated

by its $620 million contract in 2016 to build Cambodia’s first oil refinery (Reuters,

31

2016). Future oil endeavours in Cambodia should occur with relative ease given

that ‘the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority, which administers oil contracts,

is under the direct control of a prime minister and deputy prime minister all too

happy to sing China’s praises’ (Burgos & Ear, 2010:622-623). This demonstrates

how following OR on the state-level has had positive economic consequences for

China and lends impetus to pursuing regional hegemony.

Currently, China imports around half of its oil from the Middle East and one-

fifth from Africa (OEC, 2016), two politically volatile regions which bring financial

and security risks. The kidnapping and murder of five Chinese oil workers in Sudan

in 2008 is an extreme example of such risks. Although a dated example, this shows

why China would rather get its resources from a less unpredictable supply. China

has invested heavily in the RGC and, despite accusations that the Chinese have

contributed to the butchery of democracy in Cambodia, Hun Sen is set to win the

upcoming election, safeguarding his power for another five years and making the

political climate there relatively stable. Although Cambodia cannot fully replace oil

from China’s current suppliers, it does offer potential in a world of limited

resources, increasing China’s relative power and consequently the possibility of a

bid for regional hegemony.

Cambodia’s strategic positioning also meets China’s hunger for resources. As

previously stated, hegemony in Cambodia provides access to the Gulf of Thailand

which is believed to contain oil and gas reserves (Ciorciari, 2014:258) and through

which the SCS can be reached which has great resource potential. Also accessible

is the Malacca Strait, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it sees sixteen million

barrels of oil pass through it daily – much of that heading for China (EIA, 2017). Any

disruption, be that piracy or a possible US naval blockade in the Malacca Strait,

threatens China’s energy security (Hamzah, 2017). Therefore, reliable access to the

32

waterway offers China greater security and is one explanation for its investment in

the port of Sihanoukville.

Moreover, China’s commitment to building hydropower plants in Cambodia

suggests they are fortifying their energy security with renewable sources. In the

future, Cambodia hopes to export electricity generated from hydropower to

neighbouring countries (Nordensvard et al., 2017:11) and China’s investment in

Cambodian dam-building will put them at the front of the queue. Therefore, China’s

hegemony in Cambodia provides it with promising access to potential natural

resources and with a more secure way to access resources in general.

6.2 Food Security

Rapid urbanisation since 1978 and environmental degradation has reduced

available arable land – China lost 6.2% of its farmland between 1997 and 2008

(Bloomberg News, 2017) – thus jeopardising food security in China. With nearly 1.4

billion mouths to feed, China’s increasing dependency on food imports makes the

power vulnerable to boom-bust cycles of ‘high food prices… and policy-induced

supply shocks’ (Burgos & Ear, 2010:630). However, China’s hegemony has allowed

it to make Cambodia ‘the site of [its] agricultural outsourcing’ (Siphat, 2015:200)

and exploit its abundant farmland. For example, Chinese investors receive cheap

access to Cambodian cropland, at only three percent of the price in China, on

account of the countries’ close relationship (Jingjing, 2016). Moreover, in 2015 one-

quarter of China’s aid to Cambodia went to the agricultural sector (Grimsditch,

2017:42) demonstrating their commitment to securing food resources closer to

home. Hence, the Sino-Cambodian relationship strengthens China’s food security

and subsequently its economic security.

The empirical evidence examined here supports OR in the Sino-Cambodian

relationship over the liberalist argument of economic interdependence. As has been

shown, China’s quest for resources is centred around limiting its dependence on 33

unreliable sources. China can enhance its security by increasing its ‘capabilities

and control over the external environment’ (Layne, 1993:11); hegemony is the

safest way to accomplish this. As China becomes more powerful, it will become less

dependent. As written by Roy (1994:159) over twenty years ago: ‘Today's weak

China has to suffer the vulnerabilities of interdependence, but tomorrow's strong

China will not’. China’s expanding sphere of influence is increasingly moving it

towards the China of tomorrow. The Cambodian case acts as an example of how

hegemony can successfully maximise resource access in a specific area which

provides incentives for China to expand its sphere of influence to secure more

resources. Ultimately, the Sino-Cambodian relationship is beneficial for a future

Chinese hegemonic bid as the improved access to and availability of resources for

export increases China’s power capabilities. It also demonstrates how China would

exploit the resources of SEA if it were a regional hegemon.

34

7.Conclusion

This dissertation has shown that the Sino-Cambodian relationship follows the path

of OR to a large extent. China’s use of soft-power in Cambodia demonstrates how it

uses cultural transfer to minimise the fear of its encroaching presence in Cambodia.

Through the spreading of their language and customs, China successfully created a

favourable environment for investment and for maintaining a close political

relationship. This desire to glorify Chinese culture lends support to OR as it has

been proven to be an effective means of gaining power, and therefore security in

an insecure world. OR can be seen through China’s determination to push the US

out of Cambodia militarily, which fits into the wider narrative of China wanting to

remove the US from the SEA region as a whole. Furthermore, the US is buck-

passing the burden of China’s influence in Cambodia to Japan, who in turn is acting

in accordance with OR by balancing China’s presence through aid donations and

political support. Cambodia’s foreign policy alignment with China demonstrates the

RGC’s devotion to the PRC, even at the expense of regional and international

criticism. This analysis also showed the strategic importance of China’s influence in

Cambodia by way of its membership in ASEAN and its stringent support for the

OCP, both of which assist China’s expansionist desires for regional hegemony.

Lastly, OR was shown in the Sino-Cambodian relationship through China’s

resources needs. The link between resource security and China’s economic power

35

is indivisible; economic power translates into military might and increases the

chances of a power’s survival. Therefore, OR explains China’s voracious appetite

for food and energy resources in Cambodia and further demonstrates Cambodia’s

strategic importance as a route to the Gulf of Thailand and the Malacca Strait.

This research lends support to the current scholarship predicting China’s

‘unpeaceful’ rise. As well as demonstrating China’s offensive realist actions, China’s

intentions to expand its sphere of influence have been highlighted. Mearsheimer

(2014:361) states ‘we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in

world politics’; understanding how China has achieved hegemony in Cambodia on

the state-level provides a basic ‘roadmap’ for how China will act in other SEA

countries. Indeed, there are already signs of China replicating its Cambodia

strategy in the rest of the region, especially in Laos and the Philippines (p. 23). As

China derives more power from its hegemony in Cambodia, it can utilise this in the

rest of the region, as in the case of ASEAN and the SCS.

This is not to say that China’s hegemonic successes will be replicated in the

rest of SEA as the US and other great-powers in the Asia-Pacific, as well as Russia,

will go to great lengths to prevent this. Inasmuch, identifying China as a revisionist

power has implications for policy. Determined to remain the sole regional

hegemon, America will try to weaken China in similar ways it did the Soviet Union

during the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 2010:390). Consequently, the world should

prepare for intense security competition between the US and China.

Overall, the Sino-Cambodian case makes for an effective display of OR. China

is acting as a ‘good’ offensive realist in Cambodia as it is attempting to push the

current regional hegemon, the US, out of the country whilst expanding its influence

through soft-power and coercion. China’s actions in Cambodia are made with

underlying intentions of power acquisition, be that donating military equipment or

offering scholarships to students attending Chinese schools, the PRC always has its

36

own survival in mind. Therefore, the theory of OR seems best fit to describe China’s

relationship with Cambodia.

OR follows that to guarantee survival, China will attempt to become regional

hegemon. Hegemony does not happen overnight – in the US’s case it took 115

years – and China’s behaviour in Cambodia suggests that it is taking a piecemeal

approach to hegemony, exercising patience until the international environment is

conducive to one where a hegemonic bid would be rational and profitable for power

procurement. This would be a severe challenge to American primacy and trigger

heightened great-power competition. Thus, China’s offensive realist ambitions

present a threat to the international order as we know it and should not be ignored.

Bibliography

Allwright, L., Hubert, D. and Kirkwood, G. (2015) “Oil Revenue Prospects for Cambodia: An Economic Analysis of Block A Offshore”, Resources for Development Consulting. Available at: http://www.res4dev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cambodia_Oil_Revenue-Report.pdf (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

ASEAN (2016) “Chairman’s Statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits”, ASEAN.org. Available at: http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-28th-and-29th-ASEAN-Summits-rev-fin.pdf (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Becker, J. (2017) “What Is the PLA’s Role in Promoting China-Cambodia Relations?”, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-is-the-plas-role-in-promoting-china-cambodia-relations/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Beech, H. (2016) “Inside the International Contest Over the Most Important Waterway In the World”, Time. Available at: http://time.com/4348957/inside-the-international-contest-over-the-most-important-waterway-in-the-world/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Belford, A. and Thul, P. C. (2015) “Chinese influence in Cambodia grows with army school, aid”, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-china-military/chinese-influence-in-cambodia-grows-with-army-school-aid-idUSKBN0MT0SW20150402 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Bloomberg News. (2017) “Farming the World: China’s Epic Race to Avoid a Food Crisis”, Bloomberg. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-feeding-china/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Bower, E. Z. (2012) “China Reveals Its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at:

37

https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-reveals-its-hand-asean-phnom-penh (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Burgos, S. and Ear, S. (2010) “China's Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources”, Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 615-639

Burgos, S. and Ear, S. (2013) The Hungry Dragon: How China’s Resource Quest is Reshaping the World (Oxford: Routledge)

Caballero-Anthony, M. (2005) Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)

Chan, C. (2013) “Within Confucius Institutes, China Spreads Soft Power”, The Cambodia Daily. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/within-confucius-institutes-china-spreads-soft-power-28386/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Chanborey, C. (2016) “Japan’s Vital Role in Cambodia’s Strategic Reconfiguration”, Khmer Times. Available at: https://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/22736/japan---s-vital-role-in-cambodia---s-strategic-reconfiguration/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

China Daily. (2007) “Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress”, ChinaDaily.com. Available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/24/content_6204564_8.htm (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Chon, G. (1999) “Evolving Relations: China, Vietnam’s Cambodian Impact”, The Cambodia Daily. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/evolving-relations%E2%80%88chinavietnams-cambodian-impact-90722/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Ciorciari, J. D. (2014) “A Chinese model for patron–client relations? The Sino-Cambodian partnership”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 245–278

Dent, W. D. (1999) The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (Westport: Greenwood)

Dikötter, F. (2010) Mao’s Great Famine (New York: Walker & Co.)Dong, K., Sun, R., Li, H. and Jiang, H. (2017) “A review of China’s energy

consumption structure and outlook based on a long-range energy alternatives modeling tool”, Petroleum Science, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 214-227

Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B. C. (2014) “Realism” in The Globalization of World Politics, Sixth Edition, eds. Baylis, J. Smith, S. and Owens, P. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 99-112

Economist, The (2017) “Why Cambodia has cosied up to China”, The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21715010-and-why-it-worries-cambodias-neighbours-why-cambodia-has-cosied-up-china (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

EIA. (2013) “South China Sea”, U.S Energy and Information Administration. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

38

EIA. (2017) “The Strait of Malacca, a key oil trade chokepoint, links the Indian and Pacific Oceans”, U.S Energy and Information Administration. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32452 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Elman, C. (2004) “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 563-576

Fleurant, A., Tian, N., Wezeman, P. D., Wezeman, S. T. (2017) “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Glaser, B. S. and Medeiros, E. S. (2007) “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Accession and Demise of the Theory of “Peaceful Rise””, The China Quarterly, Vol. 190, pp. 291-310

Godwin, P. H. (2004) “China as Regional Hegemon?” in The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, ed. Rolfe, J. (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies) pp. 81-101

Grimsditch, M. (2017) “Chinese Agriculture in Southeast Asia: Investment, Aid and Trade in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar”, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Southeast Asia, pp. 1-73. Available at: https://th.boell.org/en/2017/06/22/chinese-agriculture-southeast-asia-investment-aid-and-trade-cambodia-laos-and-myanmar (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Hamzah, B. A. (2017) “Alleviating China’s Malacca Dilemma”, Institute for Security and Development Policy. Available at: http://isdp.eu/alleviating-chinas-malacca-dilemma/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Heng, P. (2012) “Cambodia–China Relations: A Positive-Sum Game?”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 57-85

Hunt, L. (2017) “Cambodia Raises Diplomatic Alarm With Seabee Decision”, VOA News. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/cambodia-raises-diplomatic-alarm-with-its-seabee-decision/3803834.html (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Ide, W. (2016) “Duterte Announces Philippine 'Separation' from US”, VOA News. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/duterte-declares-philippine-separation-from-us/3559129.html (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Isacson, A. and Kinosian, S. (2017) “Putting the Pieces Together: A Global Guide to U.S. Security Aid Programs”, WOLA Research Report, pp. 1-187. Available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/publication-putting-pieces-together-global-guide-u-s-security-aid-programs/ (last accessed: 1st April)

Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. (2010) Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 4th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Jingjing, M. (2016) “Chinese firms rush into Cambodian farming”, Global Times. Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1010299.shtml (last accessed: 1st April)

Kelly, R. E. (2014) ‘What Would Chinese Hegemony Look Like?’, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/what-would-chinese-hegemony-look-like/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

39

Khemara, S. (2016) “China Gives Cambodia $600M in Exchange for International Support”, VOA News. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/china-gives-cambodia-millions-exchange-international-support/3421648.html (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Kirshner, J. (2010) “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 53-75

Kurlantzick, J. (2006) “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vol. 47 (no issue number available)

Kurlantzick, J. (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press)

Layne, C. (1993) “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great-powers Will Rise”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 5-51

Leung, G. (2014) “Energy in China”, Royal Geographical Society, Interview with the Royal Geographical Society. Available at: https://www.rgs.org/schools/teaching-resources/energy-in-china/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Li, J. (2017) “What is the one-China policy and how did it become the bedrock of Sino-US ties?”, South China Morning Post. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2053881/what-one-china-policy-and-how-did-it-become-bedrock (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Lum, T. (2007) “Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32986.pdf (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Marks, P. (2000) “China's Cambodia Strategy”, Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 92–108

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great-power Politics (New York: Norton)Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006a) “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, Current History, Vol. 105, No.

690, pp. 160-162Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006b) “Structural Realism” in International Relations Theories:

Discipline and Diversity, eds. Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 71-88

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2010) “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 381-396

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014) The Tragedy of Great-power Politics: Updated Edition (New York: Norton)

Morales, N. J. and Pomfret, J. (2017) “South China Sea code of conduct talks to be "stabiliser" for region - China premier”, Reuters. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-asean-summit-southchinasea/south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-talks-to-be-stabiliser-for-region-china-premier-idUKKBN1DE06C (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

40

Nordensvard, J., Siciliano, G. and Urban, F. (2017) “China’s dam-builders: their role in transboundary river management in South-East Asia”, International Journal of Water Resources Development

Nye, J. (2008) “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1, pp. 94-109

OEC. (2016) “Where does China import Crude Petroleum from?”, The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Available at: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/2709/2016/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Paradise, J. F. (2009) “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power”, Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 647–669

Parameswaran, P. (2017) “Who Loses When Cambodia Cuts US Military Drills?”, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/who-loses-when-cambodia-cuts-us-military-drills/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Parameswaran, P. (2018) “The Truth About US-China Competition in Cambodia”, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-truth-about-us-china-competition-in-cambodia/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Paviour, B. (2016) “Drills Highlight Deepest Chinese Military Ties in Decades”, The Cambodia Daily. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/drills-highlight-deepest-chinese-military-ties-decades-122064/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Pertiwi, S. B. (2017) “Is China Winning in the South China Sea?”, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/is-china-winning-in-the-south-china-sea-2/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Phorn, B. (2014) “Cambodia cashes in on China’s New Silk Road initiative”, Asian Correspondent. Available at: https://asiancorrespondent.com/2014/11/cambodia-cashes-in-on-chinas-new-silk-road-initiative/#SuR5eXLGPgsJTlsO.97 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Pomfret, J. (2010) “Clinton urges Cambodia to strike a balance with China”, Washington Post. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/01/AR2010110101460.html (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Ramzy, A. (2018) “China Conducts War Games, and Taiwan Is the Target”, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/world/asia/china-war-games-taiwan-.html (last accessed: 22nd April 2018)

Reddick, J. and Co, C. (2017) “In Cambodia’s Chinese-language schools, a hard push for soft power”, The Phnom Penh Post. Available at: https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-post-depth/cambodias-chinese-language-schools-hard-push-soft-power (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Reuters Staff. (2012) “China gives Cambodia aid and thanks for ASEAN help”, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-china/china-gives-cambodia-aid-and-thanks-for-asean-help-idUSBRE88306I20120904?irpc=932 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

41

Reuters Staff. (2016) “China firm wins deal to build Cambodia's first oil refinery”, Reuters. Available at: https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL3N182245 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Reuters Staff. (2018) “China urges Cambodia to use yuan in bilateral trade”, Reuters. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-currency-yuan/china-urges-cambodia-to-use-yuan-in-bilateral-trade-idUKKBN1FQ0KC (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Ross, R. S. (2009) Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power and Politics (London and New York: Routledge)

Roy, D. (1994) “Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 149-168

Roy, D. (2013) Return of the Dragon (New York: Columbia University Press) Siphat, T. (2015) “Patterns and Impacts of Chinese Assistance in Cambodia” in

Impact of China's Rise on the Mekong Region, ed. Santasombat, Y. (New York: Palgrave) pp. 195-226

SIPRI. (n.d.) SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Slav, I. (2017) “The World’s Top Oil Consumers”, OilPrice.com. Available at: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/The-Worlds-Top-Oil-Consumers.html (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Snyder, G. H. (2002) "Mearsheimer's World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 149-173

Sokhean, B. (2017) “Cambodia Cancels Exercise With US Military”, The Cambodia Daily. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/cambodia-cancels-exercise-with-us-military-123545/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Soumy, P. (2017) “Hun Sen Bans Taiwan Flag from Cambodia”, The Cambodia Daily. Available at: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/hun-sen-bans-taiwan-flag-from-cambodia-124609/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Taiwan Trade Mission (2016) “Taiwan Aims to Further Boost Business with Myanmar and Cambodia”, TaiwanTrade.com. Available at: http://mission.taiwantrade.com.tw/TradeMission/index.aspx?MissionID=TT1628 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Thu, H. L. (2018)“China's dual strategy of coercion and inducement towards ASEAN”, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1417325 (no issue number available)

Thul, P. C. (2018) “Japan donates ballot boxes worth $7.5 million for Cambodia election”, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-japan-politics/japan-donates-ballot-boxes-worth-7-5-million-for-cambodia-election-idUSKCN1G50CR (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Thul, P. C. and Tostevin, M. (2017) “Cambodia goes all-in on China in casino port city”, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-

42

politics-china-insight/cambodia-goes-all-in-on-china-in-casino-port-city-idUSKBN1E101E (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Thul, P.C. (2016) “China's ally Cambodia considers use of yuan to lure more tourists”, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-cambodia-china-yuan/chinas-ally-cambodia-considers-use-of-yuan-to-lure-more-tourists-idUKKCN10E174 (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Vannak, C. (2018) “Key agreements signed with China on expressway, airport”, Khmer Times. Available at: http://www.khmertimeskh.com/50101599/key-agreements-signed-china-expressway-airport/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill)Wang, H. (2016) “A Deeper Look at China’s “Going Out” Policy”, Centre for

International Governance Innovation. Available at: https://www.cigionline.org/publications/deeper-look-chinas-going-out-policy (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Whitehouse.gov (2018) “Statement from the Press Secretary on Reduction in Assistance to the Government of Cambodia”, The White House. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-reduction-assistance-government-cambodia/ (last accessed: 1st April 2018)

Xin, L. and Worm, V. (2011) “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 69-89

Yan, X. (2001) “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 26, pp. 33-39

43