a unified theory of ethics, rashed ahmad

7/29/2019 A Unified Theory of Ethics, Rashed Ahmad

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Rashed Ahmad

A Unified Theory of Ethics! Ahmad 1


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A Unified Theory of Ethics

Abstract: In this essay, I argue that by unifying utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism, Kants

second formulation of the categorical imperative, and sentientism, we can come up with a moral

theory, a unified theory of ethics, which solves the objections that these other theories have. I

provide possible objections, and I show how they could be solved by this proposed theory.

However, this theory does not command or oblige anyone to follow it because, as I explain, there

is no free will and there are no obligations; this theory simply explains how we can know what is

morally right and what is morally wrong. This theory also does not acknowledge intentions

because, as I show, intentions do not matter to what the action really caused. This unified theory

of ethics has a clear flowchart that makes it easy to know whether the action is morally right or

morally wrong.

The following is an explanation of the questions that are on the flowchart.

1st question: Will the action use a sentient being (X) merely as a means to an end? X refers

to the sentient being that is being used as a means to an end. This means that one is using a

sentient being against his/her/its interests, including the interest of avoiding pain and death. By

sentient being, I mean any individual that is conscious or at least can feel pain.

2nd question: Will the action save any sentient being(s) from harm? By any sentient beings, I

mean other than (X). Harm includes suffering, injury, or death.



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3rd question: Is the sentient being (X) that is being used a threat to society (i.e., other sentient

beings) if the action was not taken? One must first acknowledge the difference between a real

threat and what one believes as a threat. Here, threat means a real threat. It does not matter

what you believe or feel; what matters is what actually is a threat. In other words, the sentient

being (X) will cause danger, harm (possibly including death), or injury.

4th question: Will the action that uses sentient being (X) decrease the threat level to society

that is caused by (X)? The word society here includes other sentient beings.

5th question: Is there another action that could be taken that causes a lower amount of harm to

that sentient being (X) than this action?

6th question: Will this action decrease overall well-being? By overall, I mean taking every

sentient being into account. By well-being, I mean the state of health, happiness, pleasure, self-

fulfillment, etc.

7th question: Will this action increase overall well-being?

The proposed unified theory of ethics combines utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism,

Kants second formulation of the categorical imperative, and sentientism. This theory goes

through a series of structured questions to figure out whether an action is morally right or wrong.

It starts with the question, Will the action use a sentient being merely as a means to an end? It

is rather obvious that this question combines Kants second formulation with sentientism. The

reason sentient beings are included is because of the assumption that all sentient beings have an

interest in avoiding pain and there is no sufficient reason to differentiate non-humans from



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human beings. There are two sides to these structured questions. Depending on the answer to that

question, one can then go to another question.

On the first side, if it were answered, Yes, the action will use a sentient being (X) merely

as a means to an end, then the next question will be, Will the action save a sentient being, other

than (X), from harm? The reason I mentioned Other than (X) is that if the action saves (X)

from harm, then one would not be using (X) merely as a means to an end in the first place, which

would take us to the other side of the flowchart. If the answer to the previous question is No,

then the action is morally wrong. However, if the answer is Yes, then one should ask, If the

action was not taken, will the sentient being (X), that is being used merely as a means to an end

be a threat (be dangerous) to society? Again, if the answer is No, then it is morally wrong

because every sentient being has an interest, and there is no sufficient reason to use the being

merely as a means to an end. Nonetheless, if the answer to the previous question is Yes, then

another question arises: Will this action decrease the threat level (dangerousness) to society that

is caused by X? Once again, if not, then there is no good reason for using that being as merely a

means, and, therefore, the action in question is morally wrong. If the answer is Yes, then it will

take us to our last question on the first side. One should ask, Is there another action could be

taken that causes a lower amount of harm to that sentient being (X) than this action? If the

answer is Yes, there is another action that could be taken. then it would be morally wrong to

take the original action because one could act to cause a lesser amount of suffering. This might

show the importance of negative utilitarianism. However, if the answer is No, this is the most

efficient (i.e., causing the least amount of suffering) way to do it. then it is a morally right thing

to do.



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On the other side, if the answer to the first question, Will the action use a sentient being

merely as a means to an end? is No, then we ask the two utilitarian questions. First, Will it

decrease overall well-being? If yes, then it is morally wrong. If the answer is No, then one

should ask one last question, Will it increase overall well-being? If the answer is Yes, then

the action is morally right. If the answer is No, then the action has no effect, and as a result, it

is neither morally right nor morally wrong.

This theory does not command everyone to follow it. It does not oblige any being to go

by the rules, but rather it explains what is morally right and what is morally wrong. This theory

also does not acknowledge intentions because intentions do not matter concerning what the

action really causes. If X intended to scare Y to promote laughter but that action made Y have a

heart attack and die, then the action was morally wrong even if X did not intend to do such a

thing.

In the next paragraphs, I present some moral theories and how this theory answers the

objections against them, and I also explain why the theory does not command and why intentions

do not matter.

Kants Formulations of the Categorical Imperative

Kants second formulation of the categorical imperative is Act in such a way that you

treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same

time as an end and never merely as a means to an end (Kant, 36). There are two problems with

this theory. First, it ignores sentient beings that are not humans. As Peter Singer puts it, If a

being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into



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consideration (Singer, Equality, 325). Singer goes further by explaining that preferring

humans over other sentient beings would make the person who gives preference to humans over

non-humans no different from racists:

Pain is pain, and the extent to which it is intrinsically bad depends on factors like

its duration and intensity, not on the species of the being who experiences it.

Hence there is no justifiable basis for drawing the boundary of value around our

own species. To do so is to give preference to the interests of members of one's

own species, simply because they are members of one's own species. This is

speciesism, a moral failing that is parallel to racism, because it attempts to put a

morally crucial divide in a place that is not justified on any basis other than a

preference for us over them. To put it another way, if we are prepared to defend

practices based on disregarding the interests of members of other species because

they are not members of our own group, how are we to object to those who wish

to disregard the interests of members of other races because they are also not

members of our own group? [Singer, Environmental, 332]

There is no rational justification to prefer Homo sapiens over other sentient beings.However, my theory acknowledges that problem and takes sentient beings into moral

considerations. Does that mean we should ban eating sentient animals? While it is wrong to kill

sentient animals that pose no threat to community, this theory does not claim that we should ban

eating sentient animals since the word should implies obligations, and as I explain later in this

paper, there cannot be any obligations.

The second problem with Kants second formulation is that it presumes that we have freewill. Although I do not think we have free will, I will assume that we do for this arguments sake.



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If we have free will, then that means we can choose what to do. However, we cannot choose our

desires, since they are determined. This means we do not have an ultimate free will. In

Schopenhauers words, A man can do what he wants, but not want what he

wants (Schopenhauer, quoted in Einstein, 9). Furthermore, every action is motivated by a

desire. By using a valid form of a categorical syllogism, we can conclude that every action is

determined. To clarify, I put this claim in symbolic form:

T = is determined.

D = comes from a desire.

C = is a choice.

1. (x) (Cx > Dx) (all choices are from desires).

2. (x) (Dx > Tx) (all desires are determined).

3. Therefore: (x) (Cx > Tx) (therefore, all choices are determined. Note: this argument can also

be put in the form of a chain argument).

Moreover, a recent experiment in neuroscience showed that the experimenters were able

to know, with an accuracy greater than 80%, what choice a subject would make before the

subject becomes aware of her choice by 700 milliseconds (Fried). Since the subject can be aware

only after thoughts arise, the subject cannot be said to be deliberately causing any of her thoughts

to arise. Ergo, one does not freely will anything at all. In case there are doubts concerning the

previous line of reasoning, I present it here in symbolic form:

T = Thoughts arise before one becomes aware of them.

D = One deliberately causes ones thought.

F = One has free will.



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1. T Premise 1 (Frieds experiment).

2. T > ~D Premise 2 (by definition).

3. D F Premise 3 (by definition).

4. ~D 1, 2 (modus ponens).

5. F > D 3 equivalence.

6. ~F 4, 5 (modus tollens).

Because there is no free will, Kants second formulation cannot be valid since it starts by

presuming that we do have free will. Moreover, even his first formulation of the categorical

imperative, Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it

should become a universal law without contradiction (Kant, 30), presumes that we have free

will, and it commands people to act in such a way. On the other hand, my theory does not

command anyone. It just explains what is morally right and what is morally wrong. Moreover,

this is the reason why there are no obligations. If there are obligations, O, then the theory can

command people to follow it, C. Also, the theory can command people to follow it if and only

if there is free will, F. However, we do not have free will. As a result, the theory cannot

command people to follow it. By modus tollens, there are no obligations:

1. O > C Premise 1.

2. C F Premise 2.

3. ~F Premise 3.

4. C > F 2 equivalence.

5. ~C 3, 4 (modus tollens).

6. ~O 1, 5 (modus tollens).



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Also, as a result from assuming that we have free will, Kant believes that we shouldpunish wrongdoers for the sake of retribution. Since my theory does not include free will, it asks

only for rehabilitation with the least amount of suffering. For example, we put someone in prison

for killing another person until we make sure he is socially corrected. According to my theory,

giving that person a death penalty would be morally wrong because there is another action that

can be done that causes less suffering. Furthermore, for instance, assume that we find a pill that

can make that person to be socially corrected; then even putting that person in prison would be

morally wrong.

The question might be raised, Why am I even trying to explain morality when there is no

free will or obligation? As Francis Bacon once said, Scientia potentia est (Bacon, quoted in

Stern, 283),orKnowledge is power. I am explaining what a socially healthy society could be

like. Even though there are no obligations, I hope this theory becomes a bigger part of a causal

chain. Knowing what is right and what is wrong can in fact change our actions. Changing ones

beliefs can change ones behaviors.

Objections to Utilitarianism

The first objection to utilitarianism is an objection that shows how we can violate

someones rights in order to increase overall well-being. The example goes as following:

Suppose that a surgeon is presented with a poor, homeless, unemployed person

with no relatives, someone whose existence produces little if any benefit for

anyone, but who is a perfect tissue match for four brilliant, productive individuals

who produce great good for society and have large families that depend on them,

and are all going to die soon unless they receive four different organ transplants.



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According to utilitarianism, the surgeon would be morally obligated to murder the

poor person and harvest his organs to save the other four: there is no question that

humanity as a whole would be better off if she were to do that than if the poor

person were allowed to live and the other four condemned to die. But there must

be something seriously wrong with a theory that says it is our duty to violate an

innocent person's right to life. [Anderson]

Utilitarianism will have problems with this objection. However, this theory has nothing to

do with duty. Also, since this situation will require using a sentient being as a means to an end

and that person is not a threat on society, it is morally wrong to do such thing. Furthermore,

suppose the one who is being used as a means to an end is, in fact, a threat to society. Would it

then be justified in killing that person for the sake of saving other patients? Even though it will

decrease the threat level caused by that person, it is still not justified. The reason it is not justified

is that there is another action that could lower the threat level and cause a lesser harm towards

the one being used.

Another objection or criticism is the trolly dilemma, which was developed by Philippa

Foot. The dilemma goes as follows: Suppose there is a trolly heading towards 5 people.

However, you can flip a switch, and the trolly will head towards one person. all the people are

too far to be alerted. Would you flip the switch? Alternatively, in another scenario, you can push

a person who is sufficiently overweight to stop the trolly from killing 5 people in front of the

runaway trolley. Would you push the overweight person to his death?

To utilitarianism, it might be a dilemma because if one decided to flip the switch or, in

the other scenario, push the overweight person, then one would have committed murder and



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violated human right in order to promote overall well-being. Nevertheless, my theory will find

no problems with this so-called dilemma. Any action that will be taken will be morally wrong.

Therefore, the best thing to do is not to be wrong and refrain from taking action. In other words,

one cannot do something morally wrong if one has done nothing. Similarly, assume there is child

drowning. If one just stands there and does nothing, then can we say that what the bystander has

done is morally wrong? I do not think so. It would definitely be morally right to save the child,

but it will not be morally wrong to do nothing about it. Emotionally, one would want to conclude

that it is wrong to leave the child drowning. It is certainly not good to let the child drown but not

wrong as well. Rationally, the one who was standing by did not use a sentient being as a means

to an end and did not cause a decrease in the overall well-being. Ergo, unless one is obligated or

has free will, we cannot say one did something morally wrong.

To clarify, I will give an example that might evoke fewer emotions than the previous one.

Assume there were two persons fighting to the death and a third person who had nothing to do

with the fight was standing there and watching. Can we then say that the person who is watching

the fight is doing something morally wrong? One would be doing the right thing if one stops the

fight, but since that person cause of the fight, then that person did not do anything wrong. Our

intuitions sometimes mislead us and make us want to assert fault when there is none.

Another objection to utilitarianism is that it is hard to predict the consequences of an

action. In some cases, it would be hard to calculate the consequences, but that does not mean

right and wrong do not exist. The proposed theory can help people make better decisions

depending on how good someones predictions. Even though the proposed theory gives guidance

on how one could act, this is not the purpose of the theory. The purpose of the theory is to give



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an explanation of what is morally right and what is morally wrong regardless of intentions and

the ability to calculate whether the outcome of an action is right or wrong.

However, if one honestly said that she will go to the mall later today, but something

happened and she could not go, then would it be morally wrong? Does intention matter here?

The thing is, she was not lying but saying what she was expecting to do later. The action still

matters. Nonetheless, the difference between lying and this action is that one is using a sentient

being as merely a means to an end, and the other is not. Also, because it is something happening

in the future, she was telling the truth about her anticipated actions, and that is what she was

expecting. Even though she did not mention the word expecting, it was rather implied.

In a conversation about this proposed theory with one of my professors, he asked me

what if there was a sniper who was trying to shoot a president of a poor country. However, the

sniper accidentally shot somewhere near the president, and oil came out from that place, and this

enriched the general population. Was it morally wrong? I would say, No, it was not. and the

reason is that, first, the sniper did not use the president as merely a means to an end, even though

he tried. Second, he increased overall well-being. However, arresting the sniper might be

justified as a morally right thing to do because he might be a threat to society, according to my

theory.

Intentions do matter in a sense that every single cause and effect matters. In that sense,

every particle since the big bang and whatever was before that matters. Just as we should not

consider a cause that happened a thousand years ago, we should also not take intentions into

considerations when we want to know whether the action was morally wrong or right. Intention

and previous conditions are all parts of the effect or the action, but what really matters is the



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action itself. Nonetheless, intentions do matter when we have to apply rehabilitation to a person.

This means that if one was intentionally using innocent sentient beings as merely means to an

end and increasing overall suffering, then this person is a threat to society. It would be morally

right to rehabilitate that person. On the other hand, if the same action was done but the person

did not intend it, then it would still be a morally wrong action but that person might not need

rehabilitating because she might not be a threat to society. Moreover, no one can know the

intentions of anyone else besides oneself. Even then, one cannot always be sure about ones

intentions. Furthermore, having intentions implies that we can deliberately choose them, and this

presupposes that we have free will, and that brings us to a bigger problem.

Objection to Negative Utilitarianism

One of the most famous criticism to negative utilitarianism was presented by R. N. Smart.

His argument goes as follows:

Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly

destroying the human race. Now it is empirically certain that there would be some

suffering before all those alive on any proposed destruction day were to die in the

natural course of events. Consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish

suffering, and would be the rulers duty on NU [negative utilitarianism] grounds.

[542].

If one destroyed the world, then one would have used sentient beings merely as means.

Since he used innocent sentient beings that are not dangerous, this action would be considered

morally wrong according to the proposed theory. However, for the sake of the argument, let us



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assume that everyone is a threat to another if threat is used loosely and everyone is competing

with others for resources. Even if threat were used loosely, it would still be morally wrong to

destroy the world since there are other actions that could be taken to lower the threat level and be

less harmful to all sentient beings, for example, lowering the reproduction rate (not forcibly), or

increasing agriculture (without using sentient being as a means to an end). There are many ways

to decrease the threat level dramatically without causing any harm towards sentient beings.

Furthermore, when I used the word threat in my flowchart, I mean direct threats conducted by

sentient beings such as killing, torturing, causing injury, inflicting unwanted pain, etc.

Other Possible Objections

One of the possible objections could be that the proposed theory cannot be proven to be a

correct theory by using logic. However, this is not true. It might be hard to prove it logically, but

it is not impossible. Just as we can prove that morality is objective, we can do the same within

objective moral theories. The argument goes as the following: Either subjectivism or relativism

is correct, or moral objectivity must be correct. Neither subjectivism nor relativism can be

correct. Therefore, moral objectivity must be correct. (Anderson)

The reason that subjectivism and relativism cannot be correct is because both of these

theories are self-contradicting theories. An example of how subjectivism can be a self-

contradictory concept is the following: assume Jack says he believes that abortion is wrong. The

previous statement is equivalent to saying that he thinks that the statement Abortion is wrong.

is more likely to be true than Abortion is not wrong. If Jack is a subjectivist, he would say that

Abortion is wrong. and Abortion is not wrong. are equally correct. However, according to



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logic, either P or not-P can be true but not both. Subjectivism would break that rule by saying

both are true, which is logically impossible. The same thing is true for relativism; it argues that

there is no universal law, but it commands tolerance towards other cultures, which is a universal

law (Anderson).

There are other problems with subjectivist or relativistic theories, but my point is that we

can argue the same way by saying that either the proposed objective moral theory presented here

is correct or one of the other objective moral theories is correct. It cannot be one of the other

objective moral theories because they have some flaws in them. Therefore, the proposed theory

must be the correct theory. However, if this theory is found to have a serious flaw in it, then we

should look for another theory. If we cannot find any flaws in it, then there is a high possibility

that this theory is the correct moral theory or the most accurate theory.

Another possible objection is stated as the follows: A theory that requires us to calculate

all the consequences of an action for all the people who might eventually be affected by it, and

then to do the same for every alternative action, would paralyze us with indecision. We would

have to do so much research and calculation in order to do the right thing that we would never be

able to act at all (Anderson).

This so-called objection could be argued against all moral theories, not just consequential

theories. In any moral theory, if you really care about doing the right thing, then you will have to

think before taking an action. Nevertheless, since this theory is presented in a flowchart, it will

be easily memorized and applied. With little practice, one will be able to take action with just a

few seconds of thinking. Also, how we want reality to be has nothing to do with how it really is.

It might be true that it is difficult to calculate, but that does not mean it does not give us the right



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answers. Physics is hard for many people and requires a lot of calculating; however, it tells us

how the world works. Just as the physical world will not change because someone does not

understand physics, there is an objective morality whether anyone understands it and can make

use of it or not.

In conclusion, by unifying utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism, Kants second

formulation of the categorical imperative, and sentientism, we can come up with a moral theory

that solves the objections that these others theories have. The unified theory of ethics does not

command or oblige anyone to follow it since there is no free will, but it simply explains how we

can know what is right and what is wrong. Even though it does not command anyone to follow it,

it still can affect peoples choices by being part of causal chain of their actions. This theory could

be easily explained through logic and it has a clear flowchart that makes it easy to know whether

the action is right or wrong.



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Works Cited

Anderson, James. "Jim Andersons Home Page" 24 Dec. 2011. Web. 31 Jan. 2012.

.

Einstein, Albert, and Carl Seelig.Ideas and Opinions. New York: Crown Trade Paperbacks,

1995.

Fried, Itzhak, Roy Mukamel, and Gabriel Kreiman. "Nternally Generated Preactivation of Single

Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition."Neuron 69.3 (2011): 548-62

Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd ed., translated by James W.

Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett, [1785] 1993.

Singer, Peter. Equality for Animals? In Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence.

ed. Susan J Armstrong. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Print. Pages 323-330.

Singer, Peter. Environmental Values In Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence.

ed. Susan J Armstrong. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Print. Pages 330-336.

Smart, R. "Negative Utilitarianism."Mind, New Series, 67.268 (1958): 542-543.

Stern, Alfred. "Science and the Philosopher."American Scientist, 44.3 (1956): 281-295.

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a unified theory of ethics, rashed ahmad

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