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A Successful Enterprise System Re-Implementation Against All Odds

A SUCCESSFUL ENTERPRISE SYSTEMRE-IMPLEMENTATION AGAINST ALL ODDS

- A MULTISOURCING CASE STUDY

Per Svejvig, Department of Business Administration, Business and Social SciencesAartius University, Denmark, [email protected]

ABSTRACTAchieving success in enterprise systems (ES) implementations is challenging. The success rate isnot high in view of the sums invested by many organizations in these companywide systems. Theliterature is charged with reasons for unsuccessful implementations, such as a lack of topmanagement support and insufficient change management. Contrary to this research, empiricaldata from an ES re-implementation in a Scandinavian high-tech company shows successfulimplementation despite many problematic shifts in outsourcing partners. Therefore, it is naturalto ask: why was the re-implementation of the ES at SCANDI successful despite the major troublesencountered during the project? Building on critical success factor (CSF) analysis of ten CSFscombined with an investigation into the institutional structures at play, we present severalreasons for the successful implementation. The CSF analysis shows an equivocal result: fourfulfilled, three partially fulfilled and three not fulfilled. Even the two top CSFs, top managementsupport and change management, are either not fulfilled or only partial fulfilled. However, theinstitutional analysis provides additional explanations, such as a few heroes acting as glue in aconfiicting multisourcing environment and resilience towards ES implementations created overmany years. Important implications from this study are that one should be critical of CSFs andthat the combined analysis can guide both practitioners and researchers to understand andposition factors better for success in ES implementations.

Keywords: Enterprise system, ERP, Critical Success Factors, Institutional Theory,Implementation, Case Study

INTRODUCTIONEnterprise systems (ES) have been a major trend in both the private and the public sector over thepast decade. They have been on the market since the beginning of the 1990s (Jacobs et al. 2007)as a solution to the growing tendency for globalization, mergers and acquisitions (Chang et al.2003) and as a way to optimize and improve business operation (Häkkinen et al. 2008). Theimplementation of an ES is often complex due to enterprise-wide integration and datastandardization, the adoption of "best-practice" business models involving re-engineering ofbusiness processes, compressed schedules and, finally, the participation of a large number ofstakeholders (Soh et al. 2000: 47). Some companies have gained an important increase inproductivity and speed (Häkkinen and Hilmola 2008), while others have experienced failure-prone ES implementations (Grabski et al. 2003; Sumner 2003). Still others have highlyoverestimated the value of ES (Davenport 1998; Robbins-Gioia 2002) and realized that thebenefits did not materialize (Lindley et al. 2008) in as straightforward a manner as the vendorsprescribed (Howcroft et al. 2004). There are several reasons why these large-scale technochange

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projects involving enterprise systems either fail or are failure-prone, and they are well treated instudies as either critical success factors (CSFs) or risk factors (Chou et al. 2008; Finney et al.2007; Grabski, Leech et al. 2003; Sumner 2003) or as failure stories in trade publications(Kanaracus 2008; Krigsman 2008) and academic literature (Chen et al. 2009; Markus et al. 2000;Myers 1994).

Most of the existing literature has thus focused on failure stories and CSFs based on failure-proneimplementations, rather than the opposite in the form of "success stories," which are rare exceptfor vendors promoting their ES software with nice testimonials and a few research studies aboutsuccessful ERP implementations (e.g. Carton et al. 2008; Eibanna 2006; Stapleton et al. 2004).This makes our study of the successful ES re-implementation in a large Scandinavian utilityorganization, SCANDI, a deviant case study (Miles et al. 1994: 28), from which we can gain anunderstanding of the unusual manifestations of an ES re-implementation. We adopt Berg's (2001)interpretation of successful implementation, where success is designated as relative, dynamic andmulti-dimensional, and argue that the re-implementation ES project (RE-ES project) is successfulat least from a management perspective. The launch of the RE-ES project was changed severaltimes, adding up to eight months' delay, and the project cost also increased considerably duringthe course, so why declare the RE-ES project a success? The RE-ES project was deemed to be afailure considering the very troublesome implementation process with many outsourcing partnersand problematic shifts in responsibilities, but against all odds the ES was finally launched inJanuary 2009. The business survived the re-implementation with no major operationaldisruptions, and the system has been in operation ever since. The overall goals of the project werefurthermore fulfilled, fertilizing the ground for future business opportunities, which outweigh theadditional cost and time. The research question arises from curiosity about the fairly unusualproject course and is as follows: Why is the re-implementation of the enterprise system atSCANDI successful despite the major troubles encountered during the project?

This study differs from mainstream CSF research, which pursues the development of a list ofCSFs and/or risk factors. Instead this paper evaluates a pre-defined list of CSFs and discusseshow they fit a specific ES implementation. The paper furthermore takes a multi-theory approachadding the institutional perspective, which complements the CSF analysis. Finally the empiricalstarting point is a deviant case study about a successful implementation, contrary to most studiesin this research stream.

The paper is organized as follows. First we introduce the two theoretical perspectives used in thepaper, which are guidelines for successful implementation based on critical success factors(Finney and Corbett 2007) and institutional theory (Scott 2008) for considering wider contextualinfiuences. Then we explain our research methodology based on the interpretive paradigm(Walsham 2006). The section that follows outlines the case study. The analysis is then presentedfollowed by concluding remarks and the summing up of significant insights.

THEORY: TWO COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES ON ENTERPRISE SYSTEMSIMPLEMENTATIONPollock and Williams (2009: 5) argue that much of the research on ES is largely gathered aroundtwo complementary perspectives. The first is "the managerial or technical understanding of ES"



focusing on economic efficiency and improved financial performance (Dillard et al. 2006). Thisperspective is contrasted with a second perspective labeled "the social study of enterprisesystems," the focus of which is on the uniqueness of the structure and practices in theorganization (adapted from Pollock and Williams 2009: 5). Both perspectives will be applied inthis paper as theoretical lenses for understanding the re-implementation project, and will bedetailed in the following sections.

The managerial and technical understanding of enterprise systems - Critical success factorsThe managerial and technical understanding of ES is evidenced in trade publications, consultancyreports, supply-dominated information (vendor white papers, brochures, manuals, etc.) and muchacademic literature (adapted from Dillard and Yuthas 2006; Pollock and Williams 2009). Theliterature presents ES as generic systems, which can be recycled across similar organizations andnow also increasingly across different industry sectors or organizational forms (e.g. from theprivate to the public sector). ES are thus viewed as transformative technologies containinguniversal logics that can be applied to all kinds of organizations (Bendoly et al. 2005; O'Leary2000) based on the way companies operate in general (Davenport 1998). Jacobs and Weston(2007: 363) explain that "Generic ERP software packages are already increasingly tailored tospecific market segments ... Preconfigured software modules incorporating best practices andstandard business processes will simplify future implementations," and this illustrates theunderstanding of the universal ES with best practices and standard business processes that can bediffused to different market segments.

There is a strong managerial focus in the literature on specifying guidelines for successfulimplementation, like enterprise systems' experience cycle being linked to recipe-for-success(Markus and Tanis 2000 e.g. table 10.3) best practices for successfully implementing an ERPupgrade (Beatty et al. 2006) and general methodologies, tools and techniques for ESimplementations (Bancroft et al. 1998; O'Leary 2000; Ptak et al. 2003). A related set of literaturepresents lists of critical success factors or risk factors associated with ES implementation-basedcase studies (Sumner 2003), a combination of interviews and reviews of literature with ERPimplementation practitioners (Parr et al. 2003) and literature reviews as the only source (Finneyand Corbett 2007). The literature is concerned with all the issues related to ES implementations,addressing technical aspects, working practices, operating procedures and human competencesincluding the re-engineering of the organization with new structures and procedures. We choseFinney and Corbett's (2007) compilation of CSFs because it is a recent publication and acomprehensive paper based on an examination of 45 articles about CSFs. Finney and Corbett'slist of CSFs includes the following top 5 factors: (1) top management commitment and support,(2) change management, (3) BPR and software configuration, (4) training and job redesign andfmally (5) the project team: the best and brightest.

The social study of enterprise systems - An institutional perspectiveThe term "social study of enterprise systems" is adapted from Pollock and Williams (2009: 8) andembraces studies in which "the social" forms an essential part of the understanding andinterpreting of ES. These studies generally contrast the managerial and technical understandingby focusing on situated and localist explanations of ES, organizations' uniqueness in structureand practices and the wider historical, contextual and processual circumstances. Some of these



studies emphasize the problem with best-practice thinking and ask "best for whom?" (Wagner etal, 2004), indicating that the organizational complexity is often ignored when industry-wide bestpractices are promoted (Chae et al, 2005; Wagner et al, 2005; Wagner and Newell 2004), Oneway to address the social and organizational aspects is to use institutional theory with its ability to"develop a more structural and systemic understanding for how technologies [such as ES] areembedded in complex interdependent social, economic, and political networks, and how they areconsequently shaped by such broader institutional influences" (Orlikowski et al, 2001: 154).

Institutional theory attempts to describe the deeper and more resilient aspects of how institutionsare created, maintained, changed and dissolved (Scott 2004; 2008), and deals with the pervasiveinfluence of institutions on human behavior, including the processes by which structures, e,g.rules, routines and norms, guide social behavior. North (1990: 4-5) uses a game analogy toexplain institutions., and presents an important, although simplifled, distinction betweenorganizations and institutions: institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are theplayers.

Institutional analysis focuses on culture and cognition, where taken-for-granted rules lead toisomorphism in the formal structures of the organization and organizations have to conform tosociety for legitimacy (Meyer et al, 1977; Zucker 1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) "moved"the focus on isomorphism from the society level to the organizational-field level with coercive,normative and cognitive institutional pressures leading to isomorphism, which is nowadays partof many institutional analyses. Isomorphism means "a constraining process that forces one unit ina population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions"(DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149), or is simply expressed as structural similarity, Liang et al,(2007) argue that cognitive, coercive and normative institutional pressures impact on theassimilation of enterprise systems, for instance the normative pressure in an organizational field,where suppliers, customers, consultants and professional associations collectively assess andendorse IS innovations (Swanson et al, 1997), shaping the implementation and assimilation ofenterprise systems by providing institutional norms that guide top managers (Liang, Saraf et al,2007), Other institutional papers focus on the misalignments between ES and organizationalstructures due to country and industry institutional structures (Soh et al, 2004), showing thatwider contextual factors influence local adoption,

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Setting and research approachTo answer our research question, we studied critical success factors (Finney and Corbett 2007)from a managerial perspective and institutional structures (Scott 2008) from a sociologicalperspective to obtain in-depth knowledge about the implementation process in SCANDI (apseudonyiri), SCANDI is a Scandinavian company with more than 10,000 employees. It belongsto the utility industry segment where it produces and sells high-tech services, SCANDI performsprimary activities such as logistics, operations, sales and marketing, and services, as well assupporting activities with respect to administration, human resource management, procurement,information system services, etc. The first company in SCANDI was established in the late1890s, and the company today is the result of a merger between several companies, SCANDI

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undertook a major ES re-implementation project in 2007-2009. As argued in the introduction, theproject could be considered successftil despite the very troublesome implementation process andin this it appears to be a deviant case (Miles and Huberman 1994: 28) compared with the extantliterature on ES implementations.

The research approach we adopted was a contextualized, interpretive one, building on a casestudy (Gordon 2008; Pettigrew 1990; Walsham 2006). Interpretive research attempts tounderstand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Myers et al. 2002), andaccess to reality is through social constructs such as language, consciousness and sharedmeanings (Berger et al. 1966).

Data collectionThe study was designed as longitudinal (from January 2008 to the end of 2009) and was based ona combination of data collection techniques as presented in Table 1 :

Data CollectionMethods

Semi-structuredinterviews- Project participants

- Finance manager

- Finance super user

- Accounts clerks

- Logistic managers

- Purchasers

- Logistic super users

- Ad hoc users

- Consultants

Short unstructuredphone interviews- Across positions

Focus groupinterview- Finance employees

Participantobservations- Project meetings

Numberpersons

4

113

3

3

2

5

3

20

3

Table 1: Data Collection Overview

SCANDI SCANDIProject FinanceGroup

SCANDISupplyChainProcure-ment

of Number of interviews,

4

1

1

6

3 8

1

18

661

9

SCANDI OracleSupplyChainRequester

meetings, etc.

14

3

4

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A Successftal Enterprise System Re-Implementation Against All Odds

Table 1: Data Collection Overview

OracleData CollectionMethods

SCANDIProjectGroup

SCANDIFinance

SCANDISupplyChainProcure-ment

SCANDISupplyChainRequester

Number of Number of interviews, meetings, etc.persons

• Purchase meeting• Super-user meetings

Documents Plans, reports, minutes, presentations; press releases and Internet informationfrom SCANDI; Oracle information (e.g. www.oracle.com): news articles;magazine reports, etc.

We collected data from four parts of SCANDI, including the project group that managed the RE-ES project, the finance department and the supply chain area, involving two user groups (thepurchasing department for "supply chain procurement" and a large cross-functional user groupfor "supply chain requester"). We made use of the data sources presented in Table 1 to obtain anoverall understanding of SCANDI. Furthermore, we studied Oracle as a supplier mainly throughpublicly available documents. The interviews, in which the informants talked about theirexperiences with the ES implementation, varied in length from 15 minutes to 2 hours. The type ofengagement with the interviewees ranged from in-depth semi-structured interviews to shortunstructured phone interviews. All the in-depth interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim,while the short unstructured phone interviews were transcribed from handwritten notes.Participant observations also played an important role in gaining insight into discussions,decisions, plans, politics, conflict and motives. The participant observations ranged from 2- to 4-hour meetings and a few all-day meetings. Finally, some events in SCANDI took place beforeJanuary 2008 and they are from necessity historical reconstructions from documents andrecollections from interviews.

The data collection process is further described in the appendix (excerpt from the interview guideand timing of the data collection activities).

Data analysisThe data analysis followed the interpretive tradition (Walsham 2006) using hermeneutics(Gadamer 1976; Myers 2009), in which critical success factors and institutional theory are usedas theoretical lenses to guide the coding and analysis process (Myers 2009: 110-111).

The data analysis can be divided into two phases. The first phase took place before this paper wasconsidered. The empirical data (Table I) stems from a larger research process describedelsewhere (Svejvig 2010). Several institutional analyses were conducted from October 2008 tothe end of 2009 (by one or two coders depending on the specific analysis). The coding processwas performed in NVivo (Bazeley 2007), sometimes as coding categories like coercive,normative and cognitive institutional forces, to apply a more deductive approach. In othersituations theory was used to analyze patterns or accounts in the data, starting with inductive



analysis followed by a more deductive approach using institutional theory and other theories assensitizing devices (Klein et al. 1999: 75-76; Patton 2002: 452-462). Two important issues for thispaper emerged from this process: (1) the RE-ES project can be described as a success (as arguedin the introduction); and (2) an important reason for the success appears to be a few peoplecarrying out an impressive job (to be elaborated in the analysis section).

The second phase was undertaken in December 2010, starting with the CSF analysis, which usedpredetermined codes following a deductive approach. The predefined codes were the ten most-cited CSFs from Finney and Corbett's (2007) literature review. The coding process for theinstitutional analysis began by reusing the relevant codes from the first phase (copy of the NVivodatabase). This was continued by a more inductive approach considering other reasons forsuccess related to institutional structures. The coding was carried out by one coder and NVivosupported the data management and the coding process, although some analyzing activities werecompleted outside NVivo (e.g. some CSFs were coded in NVivo based on the interviewtranscripts while others were evaluated according to data not available in NVivo). In fact, muchof the understanding and interpretation were made in the first phase, laying the foundation for thispaper, but were first reframed to the specific research question in the second phase.

Finally, this paper is case-based research with the understanding that it is possible to generalizefrom a single case study (Gordon 2008) following Walsham (1995; 2006). Generalizing to othersettings from a particular case is referred to as analytic generalization (Schwandt 2007: 5), whichWalsham (2002: 110) explains as "tendencies, which are valuable in explanations of past data butare not wholly predictive for future situations."

THE SCANDI CASE STUDYThis section describes the empirical case study as a time-ordered process (Miles and Huberman1994; Newman et al. 1992). The section starts off by examining SCANDI from a historicalperspective, and this is followed by an account of the implementation and use of Oracle E-Business Suite (OEBS) in a multisourcing environment at SCANDI. We then describe the re-implementation project that took place from 2007 to 2009 and finally present the post-implementation period.

The SCANDI organization from a historical perspectiveSCANDI and its predecessors operated for many years as territorial companies in a highlyregulated context, meaning that customers were only allowed to buy utility services from them.This monopoly situation changed in the 1990s when the Scandinavian countries decided toderegulate and liberalize the utility market. SCANDI then faced a higher level of competition,although only from a few strong competitors.The low level of competition marks SCANDI's internal context of structure and culture(Pettigrew 1987). A consultant describes SCANDI as: "... a supertanker that does not have all thenecessary engines to react promptly enough or all the engines are not started simultaneously ... orsaid more directly you cannot lay off more than a [certain] number of employees and SCANDIhas a huge backlog." This statement indicates one of the business challenges that SCANDI faces:a truce between trade unions and SCANDI limits its maneuvering. SCANDI's CEO, however,responds to this by stating that: "[he] declines to ... comment whether he expects to keep the



earlier agreement between SCANDI ... and the employees about the maximum yearlydownsizing of 5-7 percent of the workforce" (newspaper article, February 2009). At the sametime the company benefits from its many years of monopoly by having a large market share andowning a considerable part of the utility infrastructure in the present market, so the shift frommonopoly to competition implies both opportunities and challenges.

The current situation for SCANDI is that it is operating in a recessive or stagnated marketbecause the services it sells have reached saturation point, thus limiting the acquisition of newcustomers, and in addition some of its older services are declining. The global economic crisishas also hit SCANDI, and new players are entering the utility industry, so the market conditionsare very tough and highly competitive for SCANDI. This keeps a high level of pressure onSCANDI's executive management to optimize the organization and they are employing severalmethods to maintain a healthy company. First, they are selling shares in associated companies tofocus on the Scandinavian home market and to reduce their debt (newspaper article, November2009). Second, business process outsourcing and IT outsourcing are being heavily used, becausethey make SCANDI more flexible and are anticipated to reduce costs - at least in the longer term.Finally, they have been making employees redundant in order to reduce their operating costs:more than 2,500 employees have left the company during the last couple of years. All theseinitiatives obviously create an uncertain and nervous atmosphere for SCANDI employees, andthey are left asking themselves the question "will it be me next time?" (Purchaser #1).

SCANDI has used IS/IT in all the parts of its business for many years, both as business supportsystems (e.g. ERP systems, CRM systems or other kinds of ES) and as operations supportsystems (that is, IS/IT systems for controlling and managing the utility infrastructure). The IS/ITstrategy is marked by the market conditions for SCANDI to reduce its overall costs including theIT cost, but also by the fact that SCANDI has a wealth of legacy systems, some of them morethan 25 years old. A large-scale and ambitious enterprise architecture program (EA program) waslaunched át the end of 2007 to settle the old jumble of more than 450 IT systems connected in alldirections and to replace it with a well-structured 3-layered model over a 4-year period. ASCANDI executive states that "the goal is to reduce development time of new products by twothirds and to increase the overall productivity by between 20 and 30 percent" (newspaper article,October 2007). The IS/IT strategy was turned completely upside down with the EA program.Instead of building IT systems from scratch, matching SCANDI's needs, SCANDI must nowconform to the standard systems that are already on the market, which means that the employeesmust abide by the functionality provided by these standard systems. SCANDI's consolidation ofits IT systems meant that many old and small systems were being scrapped and replaced by fewerstandard systems. However, this "revolutionary" EA program was abandoned in August 2008 dueto the cost being too high, and was maybe also "close to mission impossible" (independent ITjournalist). The program was replaced by an "evolutionary" case-by-case investment plan, stillaimed at the same strategic goals, such as using standard systems as the "default choice" insteadof tailor-made systems, but with a greatly reduced ambition level, financially as well astechnically.

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A Successftal Enterprise System Re-Implementation Against All Odds

Enterprise system implementation and use in a multisourcing environmentSCANDI decided in 1996 to implement the Oracle E-Business Suite (OEBS), also known asOracle Financiáis (James et al, 1999), Figure 1 shows the timeline for the implementation and useof the enterprise system at SCANDI and five related outsourcing events (numbered 01-05):

1996

2002

2004

2007

January 1996: Financial System implemented

Summer 2002: Supply Chain System launched

Spring 2004: Major conversion of legacy system

Outsourcing event 01

Summer 2007: Re-implementationstarted

2009 1 January 2009: Go Live





Figure 1: Enterprise system implementation time line

The financial system (FinSys) was the first part of the enterprise system to be launched inSCANDI in 1996, based on one of the earliest international versions of OEBS, This was carriedout in order to have an up-to-date and common system in the merged SCANDI, FinSys coversfinancial management including the general ledger, fixed assets, receivables and payables, etc,and has around 40 frequent users. Discussions with finance users indicate that FinSys is wellinstitutionalized at SCANDI, as one user explains: "We are used to working with [FinSys] andthis is part of one's working day ,,, it becomes a habit to use the system" (accounts clerk),

SCANDI took the decision in 1999 to enhance its use of packaged software to include the supplychain. According to the IT development manager: "the development in the IT domain is so fastthat we have to buy standard software packages, and then highly tailor our business processes tothe package. We will therefore not prepare a detailed requirement specification, but insteadcooperate with Oracle, where we have confidence that they will contribute to develop the rightsolution" (newspaper article, December 1999), Subsequently the supply chain system (̂ SCS) wasintroduced and became operational from 2002; it was used by more than 100 users forpurchasing, inventory and other logistics functionalities. Another 3,000 employees used the SCSon an ad hoc basis, much like an online shopping cart solution, to register purchase orderrequisitions.



Both FinSys and the SCS were upgraded in 2003 to OEBS Release Hi. FinSys and the SCS weretechnically implemented as two separate enterprise systems based on the same standard softwarepackage OEBS. A major extension to the SCS was implemented in spring 2004, and this releasewas operational for several years. The SCS seems to be less institutionalized than FinSys, andsome users express concerns about the user-friendliness of the SCS, e.g. "there are doublebusiness processes for creation of supplier records" (Purchaser #2), so it is necessary to key in thesame information twice, which is neither user-friendly nor efficient.

The period from the major extension of the SCS in spring 2004 until summer 2007 could becharacterized as a period mainly of operation with only a few IT development activities like bugfixing and the implementation of minor enhancements.

FinSys and the SCS were integrated with more than 40 other systems via middleware integrationor simple batch-oriented integration, which meant that they were part of a fairly complextechnical information infrastructure.

As stated earlier, SCANDI has heavily used outsourcing as an instrument and Table 2 belowdetails the five outsourcing events from Figure 1, which are related to specific ES tasks such as ITdevelopment, IT operation, etc.

No.

Ol

Q2

Q3

Q4

Time

Summer 2005

Spring 2007

Spring 2008

August 2008

Table 2: Specifícation of outsourcing events

Scope of outsourcing event

IT development of the ES was outsourced to OutsourcingVendor A. About 100 employees were transferred ñ-omSCANDI to the vendor.

IT operation of the ES was outsourced to OutsourcingVendor B; and about 150 employees were relocated toVendor B. This was only 3 months before starting the RE-ES project.

More than 200 employees were outsourced to OutsourcingVendor B to take care of "project management" and"other project tasks" (e.g. testing).

The RE-ES project was swallowed up by a larger EAprogram. This program was managed by OutsourcingVendor C, which took over the responsibility for projectmanagement.

Number ofpartners involved

in ES tasks

2

3

3

4

05 December 2008 A final and very controversial change in outsourcingpartners was conducted very late in 2008, in which theresponsibility for IT development was changed fromOutsourcing Vendor A to Outsourcing Vendor C, just 1—2months before the launch ofthe RE-ES.



Table 2 indicates the complexity involved in having the multisourcing arrangement with three oreven four inter-organizational partners taking care of various tasks related to the management,implementation and use of the ES. It is fairly easy to imagine that the outsourcing events mayhave seriously hampered the RE-ES project. The five outsourcing events are described in thefollowing sections and related to the project course.

The IT development of the ES was outsourced to Outsourcing Vendor A in summer 2005 (01) aspart of a more comprehensive outsourcing agreement covering many applications; the ES wassuddenly managed by two parties. One of the reasons for this outsourcing was that "the ERP-areais not business critical for SCANDI and therefore suitable for outsourcing" (newspaper article,June 2005). More than 100 employees from SCANDI were relocated to Outsourcing Vendor A.This transfer ensured a quick knowledge transfer. However, it also caused a challenge because theties between SCANDI and its former SCANDI employees were strong: "It has been a challenge... to work with employees that we have taken over because the ties are so strong between themand their former colleagues ... they accept change requests too easily" (Consultant #1,Outsourcing Vendor A). The transition was even more demanding in relation to the setting up ofthe arrangements that facilitated cooperation between SCANDI and Outsourcing Vendor A and tothe establishment of a joint project methodology framework. Cooperation between the two partiesbecame increasingly institutionalized during 2005 to 2007, and was established before enteringthe RE-ES project in summer 2007 (cf. next section).

The IT operation of the ES was further outsourced in spring 2007 to Outsourcing Vendor B (02),and about 150 employees were relocated to Vendor B (press release, March 2007). Outsourcingevent 02 was completed 3 months before starting the RE-ES project.

The situation in spring 2007 was that three organizations had to work together on thedevelopment, implementation and operation of the ES. The cooperation between SCANDI andOutsourcing Vendor B was not stabilized, let alone the necessary working practices between thetwo outsourcing vendors, which were not stabilized either before starting the RE-ES project.

The re-implementation of the enterprise system (2007-2009)The enterprise system (FinSys and SCS) has evolved into a customized standard system since itsfirst implementation in 1996. About 400 customizations were made throughout the years ofimplementation, leading to difficulties in upgrading the system even for small bug-fixing patches.Furthermore, Release Hi was not supported by Oracle from July 2006, which meant thatqualified support was not available and bugs could not be fixed by patches. SCANDI was thuslocked into an old ES architecture.

This was an untenable situation that had to be changed. Consequently, a re-implementationproject (RE-ES project) started in the summer of 2007 covering both FinSys and SCSfunctionality. One important objective of the project was to have "one finance and supply chain"supporting a strategy for a coherent ES platform merging the two technical independent ESplatforms into one platform with FinSys and SCS functionality. Another objective was to supportSCANDI's strategic goal of "one company," as SCANDI wanted to reduce from eight to twolegal entities (in any case, designated "one company").



The purpose of the project was: (1) to reduce the number of customizations from 400 to about150; (2) to implement standard Release 12 functionality; (3) to optimize standard businessprocesses; (4) to improve the use of standard flinctionality; (5) to modernize the applicationarchitecture; and (6) to reduce the IT cost by approximately 40% (this last point is the financialjustification for the project). The RE-ES project was considered a technical re-implementationproject with very few benefits for the business. It was a one-to-one implementation that did notallow new functionality although Release 12 offered a number of possibilities. Theimplementation approach of the RE-ES project was halfway between a "complete replacement ofa legacy system" and "a technical upgrade" (see also Parr et al. 2000) and implied for instancecomprehensive data conversion.

The RE-ES project organization consisted of a steering committee, project management, threeproject groups and staff functions. SCANDI and Outsourcing Vendor A were represented in allthe project groups, including management, while Outsourcing Vendor B was only involved in thetechnical infrastructure project group and not at the management level. Outsourcing Vendor B didhave a vendor project coordinator assigned to the RE-ES project at the beginning of 2008, but thiswas late in relation to the establishment of smooth co-operational working amongst the threeinter-organizational partners.

The project continued with these arrangements, and the rapport between SCANDI andOutsourcing Vendor A can be characterized as good. The same cannot not be said of SCANDI'srelationship with Outsourcing Vendor B; this is expressed as "[they are] not really part of theproject" (Supply Chain Manager). A consultant also says: "the cooperation has been vecyproblematic and [they] lack competences related to this project" (Consultant #1). This was alsoexperienced during the participant observation in project meetings.

SCANDI took another outsourcing step in spring 2008 (03) by outsourcing more than 200employees to Outsourcing Vendor B. This meant that "project management" and "other projecttasks" (e.g. testing) were transferred to Outsourcing Vendor B, thus reducing the number ofSCANDI employees further. This made the situation even more unclear, since OutsourcingVendor B was offering many resources to the RE-ES project, but was still not represented at thesteering committee level.

The RE-ES project was swallowed up by the EA program in June 2008, because the project fittedwell with the EA program (standard system, reduce customizations, etc.). The RE-ES project wasamong the very few projects that survived when the EA program was abandoned — for instance,the fiagship project "CRM" was closed down with few tangible results. A political angle to thecourse is that the "RE-ES project became subject to the EA program, as it provides anopportunity for the EA program to deliver something [tangible business results] and the RE-ESproject was an obvious candidate" (Consultant #2). The EA program was managed byOutsourcing Vendor C, who also took over the responsibility for project management of the RE-ES project, and became responsible for the whole project. The transfer of project managementresponsibilities was achieved in a rush during August 2008 (04).



Four inter-organizational partners were now "playing the RE-ES project game," which hadbecome a very complex situation in terms of implementation, incorporating possible built-inconflicts and different political interests.

A final and very controversial change in outsourcing partners was conducted in December 2008(05), when the responsibility for IT development was changed from Outsourcing Vendor A toOutsourcing Vendor C, Just one to two months before the launch of the RE-ES. This caused manypolitical problems and made the launch preparation very risky.

Both the CEO and the CIO left SCANDI at the end of 2008 and an unsuccessful IT strategyseems to have been a major reason for their resignations, especially for the CIO (press release,November 2008). The many outsourcing events were partly a result of this unsuccessful ITstrategy, and there was a growing understanding at SCANDI that the outsourcing strategy hadgone too far.

The project was finally launched in January 2009 after eight months' delay!

The post-implementation period (January 2009 to autumn 2009)The post-implementation phase was a struggling phase, and a logistics manager expresses thesituation like this:

We have outsourced to [outsourcing vendor C] who does not know ourbusiness, and the transfer process has not been managed very well, and thenecessary agreements have not been settled ... we are handling a lot of manualtransactions between SCS and the Warehouse Management System, and thistakes a lot of time.

Several informal discussions with stakeholders describe the severe problems after the launch, andthey refer to the very late outsourcing event in December 2008 (05) as a main cause of theproblematic situation. The project was evaluated in May 2009 after the dust had settled, and thefollowing is an excerpt from the evaluation review report:



Evaluation Review Report for RE-ES project

Time, The meeting took place on 7* May 2009

Successes, The following successes of the project were mentioned:

• It succeeded in creating a good and productive team for go live weekend [the launch]• In the post-implementation phase, we built a great and productive dialogue with [Outsourcing

Vendor C]Problems. The following problems associated with the project were mentioned:

• Many and changing suppliers and project managers meant that knowledge and experience were lost• There was not a solution architect with an overview of the entire solution• There were too many errors in the solutionCurrent situation. The operation runs normally at April 2009

Improvement initiatives. For the future project cycle:

• Assign a solution architect to [ES], in cooperation with the module responsible and power users sothey can embrace the solution across [FinSys] and [SCS] and assign more modules responsible for[SCS] modules

• Appoint a project manager with knowledge of the business that will use the solution, and exploitbusiness experience in project planning

• Implement turnkey setup, thus reducing the number of contracts, but ensure that a main supplier isaccountable for the success and progress towards the project steering committee

• Maintain knowledge and overview when reorganizations affect a project and do not change supplierin the middle of the project

• Ensure that project participants are updated on [SCANDI's] commitment to implement the projectso that the project does not lose energy owing to uncertainty

• Implement better estimation principles that systematically draw on experience from previousprojects, which can lead to better budgets and fewer problems for future projects

• Allow more time to review design documents, so that the business can vouch for this solution

Closing the commissioning period. Commissioning considered completed April 2009

The status described in the review report was not necessarily agreed with by all the stakeholders,especially the statement that "operation runs normally" as of April 2009, Anyway, the interviewswith users in the finance, logistics and purchasing departments indicate that they perceived the re-implemented ES to be "in normal operation" in the autumn of 2009, which means that the systemwas recognized as being stabilized (Silva and Backhouse 1997), although it still had some bugsand open issues.

However, the overall situation is captured very well by a user of the SCS system (Purchaser #2,September 2009):

,,, there is a wave through SCANDI now, where you can see that you didsomething stupid by outsourcing so much. But it will always be broken, becausewe will never get the same competences back as we had before. But I hope it willbe better!



Despite the opinion about the troublesome implementation process and the problematicoutsourcing shifts, the ES is mentioned in positive terms by end-users as well as otherstakeholders, affirming the successful implementation against all odds.

ANALYSISThis section aims to answer the research question about why the re-implementation ofthe ES atSCANDI was successful despite the major troubles encountered during the project, as presentedin the case study. The analysis is divided into the two perspectives described in the theory section,which are the managerial approach with critical success factors (CFSs) and the sociologicalapproach with institutional analysis.

Critical success factor analysisThe CSF analysis is based on Finney and Corbett's (2007) compiled list of CSFs. They explainthe CSFs in ERP implementation as "those conditions that must be met in order for theimplementation process to occur successfully" (Finney and Corbett 2007: 330), and as the RE-ESproject can be considered successful, at least from a management perspective, it makes sense toevaluate the project with respect to these CSFs. We have selected the ten most-cited CSFs fromtheir literature review, which will be used in our analyses as presented in Table 3 below (adaptedfrom Finney and Corbett 2007: 340):



Table 3: Critical success factor analysis

No. CSF category Number ofinstancescited inliterature

CSFfulfilled

Evaluation summary of the SCANDI case study

1 Topmanagementcommitmentand support

25 Partially There has been some turbulence in the composition ofthe steering committee, reducing top managementsupport, but some commitment and support werepresent.

2 Changemanagement

25 No No explicit change management approach /organization were deñned as part of the RE-ESproject.

3 BPR andsoftwareconfiguration

23 Yes BPR activities are the main ingredients in the projectas the target is to move from 400 to 150customizations and this requires reengineering of thebusiness processes.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Training andjob design

Project team:the best andbrightest

Implementationstrategy andtime frame

Consultantselection andrelationship

Visioning andplanning

Balanced team

Projectchampion

23

23

21

16

15

12

10

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Partially

Partially

Training programs were planned and undertaken. Theaffected stakeholders generally indicate a positiveattitude concerning training and support.

The multisourcing arrangements and the dynamicsduring the project course have moved considerablyaway from an optimal project team.

The implementation strategy was considered well aspreparation for the RE-ES project, and was followedin the project course.

Many consultants have been involved, but knowledgetransfer strategies were lacking and there was a poorrelationship between inter-organizational partners.

The RE-ES project had a clear vision, and this visionwas fulfilled.

There was a balanced team with business and ITskills, but the utilization of business resources mighthave been better.

This role was not fulfilled by a single person as oftencited in the literature but instead comprised "a projectchampion team" unofficially taking this role.

Table 3 summarizes the evaluation of the case study compared with the recommended CSFs, andthis will be elaborated subsequently.

Top management commitment and support. The RE-ES project received much top managementsupport because it was seen as an important project with respect to being both an IT cost-



reduction driver and especially a platform for future business (enabling insourcing of a high-techservice in order to reduce logistics costs). However, the steering committee for the project waschanged many times and it would be wrong to state that there was continuous stable support fromsteering committee members, although a few key executive managers from the finance andlogistic organizations supported the project all along.

Change management (CM) is often mentioned as a key driver of failure, although a cleardefinition of the term is missing (Finney and Corbett 2007), which sometimes makes it "a catch-all" failure explanation. CM in this paper refers to a formally prepared change managementapproach and the structured implementation of this approach with CM activities such as training,retraining, professional development and generally user/stakeholder involvement (inspired byNah et al. 2001). There was no explicit CM approach defined when the RE-ES project was startedin summer 2007, and this continued until summer 2008 when the RE-ES project was swallowedup by the EA program. The EA program had a defined CM approach brought in by OutsourcingVendor C, but this was not applied to the RE-ES project. However, interestingly enough, the lackof structured CM activities has not been put forward as a major issue by stakeholders in the RE-ES project; this might be because SCANDI has been operating the ES for many years and has awell-defined support organization, super users and other employees who by default carry outmore or less routinized CM activities.

BPR and software configuration. The need to conduct BPR and software configuration changes isa major issue for this project as one of the primary objectives was to reduce from 400 to 150customizations. This "un-customize customization" exercise (Beatty and Williams 2006: 108)might be very problematic because the accustomed functionality is removed, but discussions withfinance and logistic users indicate a fairly smooth transition, at least after the stabilization periodwas concluded.

Training and job design. Several plans during the RE-ES project demonstrate the focus onstructured training, and the final end-user training was undertaken from December 2008 toJanuary 2009 (steering committee presentation, October 2008). Discussions with end-usersindicate a general positive stance towards the training and support. The job design was notchanged substantially for most of the employees, although exceptions were found such as one ofthe interviewees in the finance department who was made redundant due to the redesigning ofjobs.

Project team: the best and brightest. This is clearly a CSF that is difficult to evaluate. Themultisourcing arrangements and the dynamics during the project course moved considerablyaway from an optimal project team (e.g. review report. May 2009). A project participant explainsthat the first implementation of the SCS in 2001/2002 was a bigger challenge but was undertakenwith a core project group of 15 people, which is much smaller than the number of peopleinvolved in this project. The interpretation is thus that this CSF was not met.

Implementation strategy and time frame. Outsourcing Vendor A was asked to conduct a pre-analysis at the beginning of 2007 and more implementation options were considered, such as "atechnical upgrade" and two re-implementation scenarios (attachment #3, project description,



October 2007). A re-implementation scenario was selected (including existing functionality andvery limited "need to" new functionality), and the implementation approach was big-bang(Davenport 2000), which caused problems after the launch. However, many of the problems canbe ascribed to the multisourcing situation, and especially the last outsourcing event 05 (see Table2) in December 2008, instead of the big-bang approach itself

Consultant selection and relationship. Consultants were heavily involved in the project, asoutlined in the case study, but there was a problem with a lack of knowledge transfer betweenSCANDI and its outsourcing vendors and between vendors, so this area is problematic.Furthermore, the relationship between the many partners could be marked as poor and as notfertilizing the ground for successful implementation.

Visioning and planning. The vision for the RE-ES project was very clear, such as the strategicgoal of "one company" (see also the objectives and purpose of the project in the case studysections), and the implementation of the RE-ES project fulfilled the expectations.

Balanced team. This CSF describes the need for having business and IT skills in the project in abalanced way (Finney and Corbett 2007). The CSF was partially fulfilled as the projectorganization includes members from business (finance, supply chain and other departments) andIT (mainly consultants from outsourcing vendors), but the utilization of business resources in theproject might have been better (e.g. involvement in project planning) (review report. May 2009).

Project champion. It is not possible to point to one individual serving as a project champion, but abetter view might be "a project champion team" consisting of managers from business and keyimplementation staff This team acted unofficially, maybe even unconsciously, as the projectchampion. A warehouse management super user explains that she is more than committed to theSCS, much like a mother taking care of her baby, and she works day and night to ensure that thesystem is working properly for the users; she is probably one of the real project champions!

Summarizing the fulfillment of the ten CSFs shows an equivocal result: four fulfilled, threepartially fulfilled and three not fulfilled. It is especially interesting that the top two CSFs areeither not fulfilled or only partially fulfilled. The CSF analysis does not appear to give an entireexplanation for the successful implementation and it might be useful to consider other ways toexplain the case study, which is the objective of the institutional analysis below.

Institutional analysisThe literature on CSFs makes the implicit assumption that they apply generally to all kinds of ESimplementations and they do not take specific historical, contextual and processual circumstancesinto account, which may be one of the weaknesses of CSF guidelines. Institutional analysis takesthe opposite stance, focusing on situated and localist explanations as presented below.

The few heroes acting as glue in a conflicting multisourcing environment. Probably more than100 project members have been assigned over time to the RE-ES project and one of the reasonsfor the high number is the many outsourcing events. However, when asking people on the floorwhy the project succeeded, the most common answer is due to one or two specific key employees



employed by SCANDI (e.g. super user in warehouse management, module responsible for aspecific SCS module, etc), and all these key employees add up to a handful or a few more. Theyare the heroes and they have acted as the glue tying together all the pieces, which were splitbetween the many inter-organizational partners. They are strong institutional entrepreneurs bothtransforming and maintaining the "ES institution" (Hardy et al. 2008: 198),

The institutional structures of SCANDI produce the actors' identity and the heroes' identity,which are closely related to the ES practices and the success of these practices. The ES is theirchild, to use a metaphor, and they will go through fire and water to ensure the success of themajor ES events and keep the ES bandwagon going. They work long hours, including atweekends, sometimes doing the dirty work in order to see the child grow up. The dialogue belowfrom an interview (super user for warehouse management. May 2009) supports the claim:

Researcher: What do you think is the main reason that the project succeeded inthis [multisourcing environment]?

Super user: Well, it's because there are people like Oliver, Jack, Emily [allpseudonyms] and me and many others in the organization who are passionateabout it!

Researcher: These are some key resources that have burned to get it to work?That is the main reason? And otherwise it was not successful? [Super user joinsin].

Super user: Well, I know that Emily and Jack have used incredibly long hours. IfI had not spent 90 hours each week for the first 3-4 weeks, so we had not hadpurchase orders available for processing. So had we not been running.

Researcher: So it has required an incredible commitment from you?

Super user: I think it's exciting. But 90 hours a week is just over! I am sure thatJack has spent just as many ...

Researcher: Yes, so you could say you pick up the pieces, because, otherwise itwas dropped from each other?

Super user: Yes. I've been out here at night when I've had Jack on the phone sothe system could be running the next morning! There are many examples that wefight well beyond office hours ,,, But it is also a victory to get it to work, Apersonal victory as well.

The dialogue expresses very well the practices on the floor and how they tie things together. Itcould furthermore be stated that there is a loose coupling between the management practices (e,g,the outsourcing events) and the practices enacted on the floor, where people keep things goingagainst all odds,



Resilience towards ES implementations is created over many years. When SCANDI started to useFinSys in 1996 several outcomes were possible, such as the system working seamlessly, thesystem needing "repairing" or at the other extreme end ofthe spectrum closing down the system,which indeed happened recently for Marin County's $30 million investment in SAP software(Krigsman 2010). However, FinSys stabilized and survived the first year and SCANDI continuedto upgrade, enhance and re-implement OEBS over the next decade. At each major ES event it wasnot possible to predict the outcome (each event could in principle range from minor issues to theextreme of closing down the system). Nevertheless, the system also survived in the longer termand became more and more institutionalized (Silva et al. 2003). Many practices becameroutinized during this institutionalization process, which implies a move from a choice situationto a non-choice situation, or at least it narrows our scope of choices (Berger and Luckmann 1966)as "we do as we usually do." One of the benefits of institutionalized habits is that they reduceefforts in decision making for managers and employees and release energy for other purposes inan organization (Silva et al. 1997), but also that resilience is created in the organization towardsfuture ES implementations.

This is comparable with secondary socialization, which is defined as "the internalization ofinstitutional-based sub-worlds" (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 158); employees internalizedpractices relating to the management, implementation and use of the ES in SCANDI. Thesocialization process requires the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies, structuring routineinterpretations and conduct in institutional settings. Secondary socialization is a long-termprocess, e.g. acquiring a second language takes several years during which one continues toretranslate into the original language, and then it slowly becomes possible to manage withoutretranslation when the second language is sufficiently internalized (Berger and Luckmann 1966).We posit that the same kind of social processes apply when individuals internalize ES practicesand take them for granted.

The following will detail how these institutionalized practices have had a positive influence onthe RE-ES project:

• SCANDI has a well-established support organization with very comprehensive knowledgeabout FinSys and the SCS. Even if some support staff are outsourced they continue to bevaluable to SCANDI, and it appears that some of the employees are more loyal to SCANDIthan to the outsourcing vendors. Moreover, there are decentralized support staff who are closeto the end-user and who have long experience with the ES.

• Many end-users have 10, 15 or more years of service behind them, which means thatpractices are institutionalized both at the individual level and at the organizational level, so itis manageable for them to cope with changes in the ES and associated working proceduresand in the implementation in general.

• Major ES events such as upgrades are "routinized events" for business and IT personnel, soeven the stormy stabilization period, often referred to in the literature (e.g. Markus and Tanis2000), is taken with some coolness, as one user expresses the shift as "much more painless asI had expected. Fortunately, it is because I have been through system shifts before, wherethere have been a lot of unexpected things that have cost blood, sweat and tears. And of



course, there have been some slight glitches here, but not in the same way I thought"(Purchaser #1).

This finalizes the analysis from the two perspectives and the next section will finally discuss thewider implications of the analysis.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONThe purpose of this study was to investigate the reasons behind the successful re-implementationof SCANDI's ES despite the many troublesome shifts in outsourcing partners. To address thetopic, we used critical successful factor (CSF) analysis combined with an investigation into theinstitutional structures at play. We presented several reasons for the successful implementation,such as a few heroes acting as glue in a conflicting multisourcing environment and resiliencetowards ES implementations created over many years. Based on the analysis, we argue that CSFsare insufficient to explain successes and failures and it is beneficial to take the wider historical,contextual and processual circumstances into account. This relationship between CSFs andinstitutional factors is illustrated in Figure 2 below:

Managerial and Technical View (Rational View)

Critical Success Factors(CSF)

SuccessfulEnterprise Systems

Implementations

Institutional Factors

Figure 2: Combining CSFs and institutional factors

A large amount of literature presents CSFs as contextual factors that guarantee successful ESimplementations. This assumes a causal connection between following the guidelines in theplanning and management of ES implementations and achieving success (adapted fromNandhakumar et al. 2005) as shown as the managerial and technical view (rational view) inFigure 2. However, as this study shows, it makes sense to include situated and localistexplanations of ES implementations taking the organizations' uniqueness in structure andpractices into account - this is shown as institutional factors in Figure 2. The relevance ofunderstanding these wider contextual influences on ES design, implementation, use andevaluation is well supported in the literature (e.g. Howcroft, Newell et al. 2004; Wagner,Howcroft et al. 2005).



We anticipate that the insight offered by this study will prove useful to scholars and practitionersinvolved in the implementation of ES. As the study shows, it might be insufficient to rely onCSFs both to guide successful implementation (planning and management of ES) and toanalyze/evaluate successful implementations. This study underlines the care we have to take withgeneralizing to other settings, as the CSFs are put forward as more or less universal withoutconsidering historical, contextual and processual circumstances, and this may be inadequateguidance for practitioners and too simple a discourse for scholars regarding ES implementations.So, an important implication from this study is to be critical of CSFs; future research mightdevelop more balanced CSFs, which are moderated by understanding the local context for ESimplementations.

Social theories, such as institutional theory (Currie 2009; Scott 2008), Gidden's structurationtheory (Giddens 1984; Jones et al. 2008) and others, are well suited to facilitating the broadercontext-aware perspective. In this paper we use a multi-theory approach and one of the strengthsof institutional theory is its ability to combine well with other theories (Greenwood et al. 2008:28). CSF guidelines represent a rational view suitable for the planning and management of ESwhile institutional theory complements it with an understanding of contextual factors, whichinfluences the planning and management process. Both views are relevant in understanding andexplaining complex social systems that consist of interdependent rational and non-rationalelements (Scott 2008: 217-218). We expect that this approach can be used in other settings usingthe specific theories in this paper (CSF guidelines and institutional theories) or othercombinations of rational theories and social theories.

There are also several practical implications. First, as a natural continuation from the above, listsof CSFs is useful for practitioners, but they have to be used intelligently and with common sense;ES implementations are not equal even within the same organization. The "meta learning" is thatwe cannot make a one-to-one copy from one organization to another as we have to adapt thelearning to the local circumstances. Second, resilience appears to be built up in organizationsaccumulating many years of experience of the implementation and use of ES. This resiliencemight be a useful driving force for future ES implementations, and organizations can benefit fromanalyzing and understanding the accumulated organizational knowledge as part of initiatingmajor ES events. Finally, the literature informs us about the need to have a project champion forES implementation, and this is most likely appropriate advice, but this study indicates that inaddition we need to focus on the key resources described as heroes in this study. Organizationsmight identify the local heroes and consider how to cultivate and support these heroes as theyappear to be important for successful implementations.



APPENDIXThis appendix provides more details about the data collection and consists of an "excerpt fromthe interview guide" and the "timing of data collection activities."

Excerpt from the interview guideSeveral interview guides were used in the research process, which developed as an iterativeprocess in connection with interviewing. Some of the interview guides were drawn from theliterature (e.g. enterprise systems research) while others targeted specific events, decisions,findings, etc. The interview guides were designed to enable semi-structured interviews in order tofocus on specific themes that are neither too tightly nor too loosely controlled (Kvale 2007).Below is an excerpt from an interview guide for an interview carried out before the launch of there-implemented ES:

1. Personal dataa. Name, sex and estimated ageb. Work experience (number of years)c. Employment at SCANDI (number of years)d. Worked with Oracle E-Business Suite (OEBS) (number of years)e. Other background information (education, work experience, etc.)

2. Work tasks at SCANDIa. Which tasks do you carry out?b. Which tasks do you carry out in OEBS?c. Discuss specific work tasks

3. Organizational performancea. How effectively does OEBS function in your daily work?b. How much of your working time directly involves the use of OEBS?c. How satisfied are you with OEBS in your daily work?d. How user-friendly do you find OEBS?e. How good is the information quality in the system?f. How good is the quality of the system?g. How good is the service of the system?h. Description of the process and specification of who is talking to whom

4. Institutional structuresa. Imagine that a new employee becomes a member of your group - please answer the

following questions: (1) What would the new employee notice? (2) What should thenew employee learn? (3) What would the new employee consider as special to thisnew work setting?

b. Interpretation of the process: (1) How is the process interpreted? (2) Could you haveacted differently? (3) Would you have acted differently if you were to decide?

c. What procedures (rules) do you have to follow when you use OEBS? (1) To whatextent are those procedures formal or informal? (2) How does the company follow upon the use of the procedures? (3) What happens if you do not follow the procedures?

d. What attitudes, values and norms characterize your work in the department?e. Do you share these norms with the entire group? Or do differences exist?



f. Does OEBS influence attitudes, norms and values - and how?g. How would you describe the culture?h. How would you describe your work situation? (Metaphors, analogies, stories,

anecdotes, plays),i. How would you describe your work with ES? (Metaphors, analogies, stories,

anecdotes, plays),5, Expectations of the re-implementation project

a. What are your expectations of the new Release 12?b. How do you think that the new Release 12 will affect your work (in the first three

months and in the long run)?6, Open questions

a. Are there other conditions that you would like to mention in connection with our talktoday?

b. Are there questions or topics that you would have liked me to ask or talk about?c Could it be useful for me to discuss with other persons the topics that we have

already discussed?

Timing of data collection activitiesThe graph below summarizes the data collection activities with a histogram of the frequencydistribution of semi-structured interviews, short unstructured phone interviews and participantobservations:



12

10I Semi-structured interviews

O Short unstructured phoneinterviews

a Participantobservations

IL.

Figure 3: Frequency distribution of data collection activities

The graph indicates that some data collection activities were more intense in some periods thanothers, and the fieldwork can be divided into major phases:

Jan. '08 to May '08: Before-launch semi-structured interviews

May '08: Planned launch of system (but delayed several times)

Jun. '08 to Dec. '08: Following the project (participant observations)

Jan. '09: Actual launch ofthe re-implemented system

Jan. '09 to Apr. '09: Stabilization ofthe system after launch (short interviews)

Jun. '09 to Sep. '09: After-launch semi-structured interviews

Oct. '09: Oracle semi-structured interviews



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTThe author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, the associate editor and SuprateekSarker, the Editor-in-Chief, for their constructive and insightftii comments and suggestions,

ABOUT THE AUTHORPer Svejvig is Assistant Professor at the Department of Business Administration, Business andSocial Sciences, Aarhus University, His research interests are in the area of implementation anduse of enterprise systems, managing IT-enabled change, interplay between technology andorganizations, and IT project management. He has amongst other published in Journal ofInformation Technology and International Journal of Enterprise Information Systems, He holds amaster degree in IT and received his PhD in Enterprise Systems from Aarhus University. Heentered academia in 2007 after more than 25 years of business experience as a manager, projectmanager, and consultant. He is a Certified Senior Project Manager (IPMA level B),


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