a study of the mādhyamika method of refutation

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THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDiTOR-IN-CHIEF

A . K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS

Heinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz

Universitat Gottingen, FRG UB C, Vancouver, Canada

Lewis Lancaster A lexander W. MacDonald

University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France

B.J. Stavisky A lex Wayman

WN1IR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Stephan Beyer

University of Wisconsin, Ma dison, USA

Volume 3 1980 Number 1



CONTENTS

I . ARTICLES

1. A Study of the Madhyamika Method of Refutation,

Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathdvatthu,

by Shohei Ichimura 7

2 . Prajnaparamita and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient

World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Natureand Middle Path Doctrine, by Aaron K. Koseki 16

3 . A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith:

"&k$ananda's" Redaction to the W ord "Nien,"

by Whalen W. L ai 34

4 . T h e Abhidharmika Not ion o f Vijndna

and its Soteriological Significance, by Braj M. Sinha 54

5. Som e Com men ts on Ts ong kha pa's Lam rim chen mo and

Professor Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning the

Real, by Geshe Sopa 6 8

Alex W ayman Replies to Geshe Sopa 93

G eshe Sopa Replies to Alex Wayman 98

II. SHORT PAPERS

1. Ar cha eolog ical Excavations at Piprahwa and Ganwaria

and the Identification of Kapilavastu, by K. M. Srivastava 103

2 . Notes on the Textcritical Editing of the

Bodhisattvdvaddnakalpalatd, by Frances Wilson 111



III . BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

1. Santideva: Mystique bouddhiste des Vile et VHIe siecles,

by Amalia Pezzali 115

2. On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asariga's

Bodhisattvabhumi, by Janice Dean Willis 117

3. Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in

Mahayana Tradition, by Diana Y. Paul 120

4. Wittgenstein and Buddhism, by Chris Gudmunsen. 122

IV. NOTES AND NEWS

1. A Re po rt on the 2n d Con ference of the IABS 127

2. Report on A Critical Dictionary of Pali 130

Contributors 132



A Study of the M adhyamika Method ofRefutation, Especially of its Affinity to

that of Kathdvatthu

by Shohei Ichimura

- I -

It was a qua rte r of a century ago that Prof. T.R.V. Murti published his

work on the Madhyamika philosophy,1

which has made o ne essential

point of Madhyamika negation thoroughly known to post-war scholarship, i.e., that M adhy amika p hilosoph y is a critique of all philosophical

theses, and that this critique does not imply any thesis of its own but

exclusively reveals an inherent self-contradiction in any and every

philosoph ical thesis. Th is me thod has been called reductio-ad-absurdum

argument after the fashion Stcherbatsky used. My use of the term

Madhyamika Dialectic is also in this pa rticula r sense.

Although Madhyamika dialectic is an age-old subject an d ha s also

been tre ate d in mo de rn scholarship frequend y, I found th at little attention ha s been given to the fact that th ere is an intrinsic affinity between

the Madhyamika and the pre-classical Abhidharmist methods of

refu tatio n. I am especially referring to the meth od which is recorded in

the Kathdvatthu or the Points ofControversy.2

T o demonstrate this affinity

is my prim ary objective in this pap er. In o rd er to accomplish this dem on

stra tio n, first, I will try to show why the pre-classical Bu ddhist deba tors

knew the two basic rules of Syllogistic Inference, namely anvaya and

vyatireha, which I may translate as 'positive and contrapositive instantiations. ' They applied these rules in order to defend their own thesis in

terms of logicality, while refuting the other's in terms of illogicality.

Secon dly, I shall mak e some p oint of affinity clear as to the Madhyamika

m eth od in parallel to that of the Kathdvatthu.

7



- I I -

In the Vigrahavydvartani, and especially in his self-commentary,Nagarjuna frequently equates the term nihsvabhava, or absence of own-

being with that of sunyatd, or emptiness.3

He states, for instance, that

'light' and 'darkn ess ' do not possess their own-being. They have no self-

identifying essence, because they ar e co-relative, mu tually in terdepen

de nt, an d hen ce, una ble to come into existence by themselves. Tr ad i

tionally, this absence of ow n-being, as equated by Nagarjuna with the

concept of sunyatd, has been regard ed as one of the ha rdes t subjects for

rational and intellectual understanding, because the method of itsexposition was and has been exclusively dialectical. In common sense

thinking,we reg ard both the faculty of cognition (pramdna) and its object

iprameya) as two different things, and yet we take their coalescence for

gr an ted for the fact of cognition. This is comp arable to the fact of illumi

na tion in which bo th a cand le light and its object of illumination somehow

partake. As the major objective of the Vigrahavydvartani, Nagarjuna

app lies his dialectic to this particular context. I foun d a n intrinsic affinity

between his dialectical method as applied in this text and that of the

Kathdvatthu.

We know that o ur langu age w orks not only as an instrum ent for

expressing in ner thoughts, but also as an instrum ent for their com mu ni

cation. Because of this, we accept that each and every word o r sentence

has its 'own-being,' or its self-identifying p rinc iple. For, such own-being

constitutes not only the essence of a conception that each expression

signifies, but also of an external existent it refers to. Accordingly, the

above two terms, i.e., light and da rkness, are regard ed as differentiating

thei r resp ective m eanings in ou r consciousness as well as their respective

objects extraneous to us as referents. Nevertheless, Nagarjuna and his

Madhyamika followers state that our very insistence upon the nature

and function of our language convention ipso facto commits us to the

truth of the reciprocal dependence of any two related terms and

sen tenc es, an d tha t we are in fact subscribing ourselves to the tru th of

absence of own -being.4 T he question is: How and why can the M adhya

mika dialectic be said to be the only me thod that is capable of revealing

th e fact of universal reciprocity (paraspardpeksata) and absence of own-being {nih-svabhdvatd}} I believe that the aspect of universal in terd epen

de nc e can be disclosed by logically analysing the M adhyamika m ethod of

refutation.

8



— Ill—

In Ind ian Syllogistic Inference , when two predications are related

causally or tautologically, they constitute a necessary relation which

Buddhist and Hindu logicians called vydpti. Logically, this relation or

pervasion of one predication by an oth er consists of the preceding pred i

cation of Reason (hetu) and of the subsequen t one as Thesis or Conclu

sion (sddhya). As briefly referr ed to, Dignaga (a Bu ddh ist logician of the

5th century) introduced three conditions for the validity of any given

vydpti an d theorized the d ual rules of positive and contrapositive instan

tiations. In order to explain these rules, let me take one of the stock

ex am ple s of the classical logicians, namely an inference of the existence

of fire from th e existence of smoke. In ord er for a person to let oth ers

know a bre ak ou t of a fire on a distant m oun tain, what he must do is to

remind the listener of the commonly-known concomitance between

smoke and fire by pointing at the rising smoke. On the part of the

listener, u po n perceiving a particu lar smoke rising from the slope of the

m ou ntain , his m ind regulates itself into recalling a causal association o f

smo ke and fire. // is this logical process of the mind itself hat actually consists of

the dual instantiations positive and contrapositive. I shall explain this point

briefly.

In or de r than an inference be correct, two logically related predica

tions (hetu and sddhya) must be verified by the substratum intended to be

know n. In o ur ex am ple the substratum, such as a mountain, m ust be able

to be ar sm oke as well as fire simultaneously, because, otherw ise, it may

ha pp en that the m oun tain may bear smoke but not fire, and vice versa. If

this is the case with the substraru m in question, it is obvious tha t no valid

infe ren ce becom es possible. T h e speaker, there fore, is obliged to

dem ons trate wh ether the substratum (a mountain) is a member of the

class wh ose m em bers are invariably able to bea r smoke and fire. Th is is

called positive instantiation , or anvaya. The same speaker, however, is

also obliged to give contrapositive instantiation as to whether the

substra tum in question is clearly outsid e the scope of the contrapositive

class, becau se the latter mem bers are ne ither capable of bearin g fire nor

smoke. This is contrapositive instantiation, or vyatireka, for which the

spe ak er pres ents an instance, such as a lake or a water-dam, etc., where

ne ithe r of th e two predications can be applied. In short, by means of dual

processes of instantiations, the speaker can confirm the demarcation

between posidve and contrapositive classes (sapaksa and vipaksa resp.)

and thereby determine the particular substratum as a member of the

positive one .5

9



As to the que stion o f why appeal has to be m ade no t only to positive

instan tiation bu t also to the contrapo sitive o ne , I believe it will become

self-evident in my subse quent dem on stratio n. H ere it suffices to say that

positive instantiation alone cannot fully differentiate those class

m em be rs which are either "capable of bearing smoke but not fire," or

"capable of bea ring fire but n ot smoke." Suppo se when, knowingall this,

som eone en counters an oppo nent in the arena of debate. How should he

conduct his argument? He has to explore every possible error in his

opponent's logic. Sometimes, he may even try to deliberately induce

logical errors in his opponent. Nevertheless, he is obliged to abide in

accordance with the basic rules of logic, such as dual instantiations. Ibelieve that th e debato rs of the Kathdvatthu applied such method an d in

following their step N agarjuna innovated his Madhyamika method of

refutation.

- I V -

T h e re is clear evidence for th e fact that the pre-classical Bu ddhistde ba to rs w ere fully aware of the dual ru les of logical instantiation, a nd

applied these as a me thod of refutation. T he proced ure of argum ent in

the text is so repetitive in form that I shall have to take up only the

initial refutation. The controversy here is concerned with the status of

pudgala. The orthodox Theravadin who rejects the reality of pudgala

faces the challenge by the P udgalavadin in the aren a of debate. Formally,

th e refu tation consists of five consecu tive sessions. First, the Theravadin

presents (1) Refutation against the Pudgalavadin, which is followed by

the latter's (2) Rejoinder, (3) R efutation, (4) Application, and (5) Conclu

sion.*' Their arguments invariably include the dual demonstrations

being applied positively and contrapositively.

No. I

Tw o related predications cum substratum

"P": (Pudgala) "is known in th e sense of a genuinely real th ing"(puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamatthendti)

"Q": (Pudgala) "is known in th e same way a genuinely real thing isknown" (yo saccikattho paramattho tato so puggalo upalabbhatisaccikatthaparamatthendti)

10



T h e two pred ica t ion s , which I qu ot ed f rom M rs . Rhys Davids ' t rans la

t ion , can b e t ran scr ib ed as "P " an d "Q " respective ly . A nota t ion "P " is

g iven to t he p red ica t ion : kpudgala "is kn ow n in the sense of a gen uine ly

rea l t h ing , " an d an o th e r n o ta t ion " Q " to : A pudgala "is known in the

same way a genuinely rea l th ing i s known."

No. 2

Positive (anvaya) and Cont rapos i t i ve (vyatireka) Ins tant ia t ions :

T h er av ad in : "P an d Q " is assum ed to be ver if ied by subs t ra tum(sapaksa) such as dharmas, while "-Q and -P" is to be falsified by

s u b s t r a t u m (vipaksa) such as pudgalas.

Pu dg ala va din : "Q an d P" is assum ed to be ver if ied by sub s t ra tum ,

such as pudgalas as well as dharmas, while "-P and -Q" is to be

ver i f ied by a l l those remaining.

I n No. 2,1 specify tw o m utua l ly con trar y con com itance s as well as

the i r r e spec t ive con t r apos i t i ons , which the Theravad in and theP u d g a l a v a d i n a p p l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e ir d e m o n s t r a t i o n . It is also in tended

to show th e w ork ings of pos it ive and cont rapo s i t ive ins tant ia t ions w hich

respect ive ly de termine the pos i t ive and cont rapos i t ive c lasses (sapaksa

a n d vipaksa). F o r t h e T h e r a v a d i n , dharmas alone are rea l , and hence ,

they con s t i tu te t he pos i tive c lass. Accordingly , the pos i t ion "P an d Q "

an d i ts co ntra po si t ion "-Q an d -P" shou ld respectively serve as cr i ter ia to

dist inguish whatever is real like a dha rma (sapaksa) and whatever is un real like

an empirical person (vipaksa). For the Pudga lavad in , however , app ly ingthe same concomi tance as tha t of the Theravadin i s obvious ly

d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s . T h e r e f o r e , h e i n t r o d u c e s a n e x a c d y c o n t r a r y c o n

com i t ance to r e fu t e t he The rav ad in , nam ely , "Q and P" an d its con t r a

pos i t ion, "-P an d -Q ". Bu t the Th era va din logical st rategy, and especially

the Pu dga lavad in ' s , can no t be un de r s too d fu lly wi thou t he lp from the

Western form of logica l impl ica t ion, which I prepare in No. 3.

No. 3

Hypothet ica l Syl logism based upon "P then Q" and "Q then P" :

I f "P th en Q ," an d "P , " t he re fore " Q . " (modus ponendo ponens)

11



I f "P th e n Q , " a n d " -Q , " t h e re fo re " -P . " (modusponendo tollens)

I f " Q th e n P , " a n d " Q , " th e re fo re " P . "I f " Q th e n P , " a n d " -P , " t h e re fo re " -Q . "

The one obv ious reason fo r the use fu lness o f wes te rn fo rms i s

ev ide nt in the chart given in No. 4, i.e., the antecedent statement always binds

to the consequent, and this conditional implication can best be expressed in the

hypothetical syllogism of the West.

No. 4

Five Refuta t ional Sessions betwe en Th era va din an d P udga lavadin:

ITheravadin Refutation

Pud ga lav ad in thes is "P . -Q " isfalse, because P

DQ ;

"P.-Q" is false,because -Q => -P ;

T h e r e f o r e , P u d g a l a v a d i nthesis "P.-Q" is false.

I l lPudgalavadin Refutation

T h e ra v a d in th es is " -P . Q " c a n

be re fu te d , b ecause

-P ^ - Q ;" -P .Q " can be re fu ted ,

because Q3

P;T h e r e f o r e , T h e r a v a d i n t h e s i s

" -P . Q " can be re fu ted .

IIPudgalavadin RejoinderTh era va d in thes is " -P .Q" is

false, bec aus e -P => - Q ;" -P .Q" is false,

because Q => P;T h e re fo re , T h e ra v a d in th e s i s

"-P.Q" is false.

IV

Pudgalavadin Application

Our thesis "P.-Q" is not falsified, and

Yo ur refuta t ion "-(P. -Q)" isnot acceptable , becauseP o Q , an d -Q => P

There fo re , your re fu ta tion"-(P.-Q)" is not acceptable.

Pudgalavadin Conclusion

O u r thes is "P . -Q " is no t re fu ted ,because "P .Q" i s no t compel led ;

Y our refu ta t ion "-(P. -Q)" is not convin cing,because " -Q . -P" is no t com pel led ;

Because "P.Q " and "-Q.-P" are not com pelled,

o u r thesis "P . -Q " is not refute d.

No. 4 show s my trans crip tion of the five consecutive sessions of ar gu

m e n t s . 6 I consis tent ly rep lace the form of Ind ian logical conc om itance

with t ha t of W est ern logical imp licat ion. As a resul t , the char t shows not

only the dynamism of the sess ions but a lso the logical context in which

12



i nde t e rminancy ensued . There seem to be two bas i c r easons fo r t he

in de ter m in at io n of the con t rovers y: (1) both pa r t ies v iola ted the logica l

b o u n d a ry o f pos i t ive an d co nt rapos i t ive c lasses , an d (2) th is in tu rn

a l lowed the Pu dga lavad in to app ly the con t r a ry impl ica t ion .

F i rst , for the The rav ad in , both predica t ions "P" and "Q " shou ld be

ver i f i ed by the subs t r a tum of dharmas, i.e., a dharma "is known in the

sen se of a genu inely re a l th ing " (= "P ") , an d " is kno wn in the same way a

gen u in e ly r ea l t h in g is kno w n" (="Q ") . Th ere for e , h e uses t h is impl ica

t ion as a cr i te r ion to defend the rea l i ty of dharmas an d to refute the

Pudga lavad in he resy tha tpudgalas ar e also real . Bu t h e faces a p ro ble m

he re , becau se , he cann o t r e jec t "Q " abou t pudgalas t h o u g h n o p r o b l e mto do so wi th "P ." Th is me ans tha t the Th era va din viola ted the logical

b o u n d a r y ofsapaksa a n d vipaksa in applyin g "Q " not only to dharmas b u t

also to pudgalas.

T h is logical am biva lence is in fact de r ive d from do ctr ina l reaso ns.

T h e r e p u d i a t i o n o f a n e m p i r i c a l p e r s o n (pudgala) const i tutes the core

of B ud dh i s t do c t r ine . T h e Th erav ad in is ob l iged to a s ser t "Q " because

the unrea l i t y of pudgalas is kno wa ble only th ro u gh the way the real i ty of

psycho-phys i ca l e l ement s (dharmas) is kno wn . T o fur the r com pl ica tethe mat ter , the Pudgalavadin a l so shows a s imi lar logica l ambivalence

d u e to s imi lar doct r ina l reason s . He asser ts "P " abo ut pudgalas but fails

to asser t " Q ," becau se i f he do es so, he is ipso facto completely identifying

pudgala with dharma, which is heresy for the Pudgalavadin as wel l .

Logical ly, he also violates the boundary between the classes of dharmas

arid pudgalas in app lying " P" to the m equal ly .

Seco nd, th e s t rike of ingenui ty on the pa r t of the Pudg alavadin i s the

use of co nt ra ry impl ica tion as a we apon to dem on st ra te the logical vulner abi li ty of h i s o pp o n en t . Th is possibil ity m ust have been in tui ted f rom the

fact th a t th e two contes tants s tood in an exact cont rar ie ty , i .e ., " - P . Q " by

th e Th er av ad in a nd "P . -Q " by the Pudga lavad in . T he i r fo rces o f

a r g u m en t , a s shown in t he cha r t , com e to an equa l ba l ance . T h e Th era

va din a rg ue s : I f you Pu dg alava din asser t the rea l ity of pudgala "P," you

a re also obl ige d to asser t its know abil ity in th e sam e way as dharmas a re

kn ow n " Q ." B ut you d o not , i .e ., " -Q ." I f you d o no t asser t " Q , " you a re

also obl ig ed logical ly no t to asser t "P," i .e., "-Q 3 -P ." Bu t you asser t "P ."T h e re fo re , y ou r cla im "P . -Q " is fa lse . Now , th e Pud galav adin rep l ies : I f

you Theravad in a s se r t t he knowabi l i t y o f pudgala in the same way

dharmas ar e k no w n "Q ," you shou ld a l so asser t i ts rea li ty "P . " But you d o

no t , i . e. , " -P ." S ince you d o n ot asser t "P," you are also obliged logically

no t t o a s se r t4Q , " i. e., " - P ^ - Q . " B u t yo u a ss e rt " Q . " T h e r e f o r e , y o u r

claim "-P.Q" is false.

13



- V -

My f inding a bo ut the M adhy am ika m eth od as para l le l to tha t of theKathdvatthu is rath er a simple on e, nam ely th at i t seeks to create a discon

nec t ive re l a t ionsh ip be tween co ncep tua l t e rms , p red ica t ions , o r p ro po

si t ions in the forms of " P . - Q " an d "- P.Q ." If on e speaks of a m otio n, for

ins tance , we can match h is s ta tement wi th another about i t s agent as

rega rds to the i r r e l a t ionsh ip . 7 In the Vigrahavydvartani, Nagar juna

crea tes th is par t icu la r contex t by the me tap ho r of ' ligh t ' and 'darkn ess . '

H e re m in ds us tha t ou r cogni t ion a lways involves cognizer and cognized

ju st as the fact of i l lum ina t ion . H e ass igns predica t ions to the i lum ininga n d th e i l lum ine d respectively as "is capab le of i l luminin g" ("P") and "is

capa ble of da rk en in g" ("Q") . By apply ing both predica t ions to ' ligh t' and

'da rk nes s , ' he ob ta ins the fo rmula s o f "P . -Q " and " -P .Q ." H e a rgues :

W he re ve r th er e is a l igh t i l lumining , there sho uld be no darkn ess ("P.-

Q " ) a n d vice versa ("-P .Q") , which m eans tha t the two never can me et . 8

T h e sta te of affa irs is precisely paral le l to tha t of the Kathdvatthu

c o n t r o v e r sy .

Ho w d id Na garju na try to solve this logical absurdity? As I u nd ers tan d,

he ge nera l ly tak es two ap pro ach es . F i rst , in accordan ce wi th con vent ion ,

w hich as sum es bo th ' l ight ' an d 'dark ne ss ' for the fact of i l lum ination, h e

po in ts o ut tha t th e only way to make th is posit ive concomitance "P .Q "

poss ible is to re pu di at e the conce pt of ow n-be ing (self- identifying prin

ciple) from the se enti t ies, so as to accept l ight an d da rkn ess in ter m s of

the i r rec iproca l exchangeabi l i ty . Second, in accordance to t rans-con

ven t ion , he re pud ia te s bo th "P . -Q " and " -P .Q ," wh ich he mus t have

just i f ied in re fe ren ce to two con tra ry impl ica tions "P o Q " a n d " Q 3 P" in

para l le l to the Kathdvatthu controversy . H er e may I poin t ou t the fac t tha t

" P D Q " an d " Q ^ P" tog e th er expre ss logical rec iproci ty .

In co nc l ud ing m y pap er , I am obl iged to s ta te two poin t s : (I) As evi

d en t in my dem on st r a t io n , th e logical concom itance of two predica t ions

dif fer en tia te d fo ur dif fere nt c lasses of variables. I bel ieve tha t the

B ud dh is t fou rfo ld logica l ca tegory such as catuskoti has its relev ant basis

in th is log ic of conco m itance . (2) O u r concep tua l and logica l t rea tm en t

of re l igious insight in general has i ts own l imita t ion. To deal with the

s ta tements tha t re fe r to the d ia lec t ica l d imension which br idges the

em pir ica l an d t he tran s-em pirica l in term s of logical rules is i tse lf to be g

fu rt h er qu est ion . In this sense , I ca nn ot go along with th e idea to identify

rel igious truth with the logical formula of reciproci ty such as

"P r)Q.Qr> P." Nevertheless, I am convinced that this kind of analysis

14



helps us to understand better as to how the same problem was

app roac hed by the ancients.

N O T E S

1. The Central Conception o) Buddhism, L ondon : 1960 .

2 . Kathdvatthu ed . by A.C. Taylo r , PTS : 1894-7; t r . by S.Z . Aun g and Mrs . Rhys

Davids , PT S: 1915 .

3. T h e R oman ized t ex t , ed . by Joh ns ton and Kuns t , MCB IX (1951) , Ap pend ix .

sarvatra svabhdvo n o vidyata iti krtvd sunydh sarvabhdvd iti/. . . .

yasmdn nihsvabhdvas tasmdc chunyahl ( C o m m e n t o n kdrikd 1; loc. cit., p. 10)T h e p a t t e r n o f a rgu m ent : "wha t eve r is devo id of oxvn-being is e m p t y , " r e c u rs t h r o u g h o u t

the work .

4. Loc. cit., p . 52 : kdrikd 7 0 :

prabhavati ca Sunyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvdrthdh/

prabhavati na tasya kirn cinna prabhavati iunyatd yasya/i

5. S a n k r a s v a m i n f o r m u l a t e d D i g n a g s trairupya theory in his Nydyapravesaka-

sutram very concisely as follows: (COS Vol. 33, 1930, p. 1):

paksadharmatvam sapakse sattvam vipakse cdsattvam iti//

T h e p roces s i nvo lved i n anvaya a n d vyatireka is threefold: (1) to de term ine in a drstdnta th e

class of sapaksa, of a ll of whose me m be rs the two re la ted pred ica t ions are cor rec t separa te ly

an d jo int ly ; (2) to de te rm ine in a cont rapos i t ive drstdnta the class of vipaksa, of all of w hos e

members those two predica t ions are not cor rec t in the same way; and (3) to apply th i s

concomi tance of those predica t ions to a par t icular c lass member in ques t ion.

6. Respect ively, Anuloma, Patikamma, Niggaha, Upanayana, a n d Niggamana.

7. Madhyamikakdrikd, C hp. 2 , kdrikd 10:

pakso gantd gacchattti yasya tasya prasajyatel

gamanena vind gantd gantur gamanam icchatahi/

8. Vigraha., kdrikd 37 {loc. cit., p. 34):

ndsti tamas ca jvalane yatra ca tisthati pardtmani jvalanah!kurute katham prakdsam sa hi prakdio 'ndhakdravadhahlI

15

a study of the mādhyamika method of refutation

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