1

A STUDY AND EVALUATION OF TU WEIMING’S

CONTEMPORARY NEW RUIST INTERPRETATION OF THE

RELATIONAL SELF

(For 2nd Young Scholars Conference China Studies)

By

Rev. & D.D.S. Tsung-I Hwang,

Doctoral Candidate at OCMS, Middlesex University

mtsungih@gmail.com

Oxford Centre for Mission Studies

2

A STUDY AND EVALUATION OF TU WEIMING’S

CONTEMPORARY NEW RUIST INTERPRETATION OF THE

RELATIONAL SELF

Abstract

My intention in this paper is to explore and evaluate the interpretation of the relational

self by Tu Weiming, a contemporary New Ruist (Confucianist). 1 Studies from various

fields disclose that the relational self as a very important feature of selfhood are Ru-

based cultural heritage. Such a Ruist relational self is even criticized by some

psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians as a significant factor

contributing to personality disorders. A contemporary New Ruist, Tu Weiming,

unequivocally defines the Ruist self as a centre of relationships. But how does he

interpret this relational self and respond to the criticisms raised about it? The main

purpose of this paper is to answer these questions.

In the first part, I summarize the impact in the development of the relational self

promoted by a Ru-based cultural heritage through secondary literature found in

sociological, psychological, and religious studies. The tendency of an imposed

relational self is summed up as a core issue to represent all the problems raised by

scholars. In the second part, I explore Tu’s interpretation of the relational self in the

context of Modern New-Ruism, mainly based on his Confucian Thought: Selfhood as

Creative Transformation (1985) and his responses in terms of the tendency of dealing

with an imposed relational self. At last, I evaluate how well he responds to the

challenges and worries raised about the tendency of an imposed relational self as it is

developed in a Ru-based cultural heritage.

My conclusion is Tu has not yet successfully in saving Ruist selfhood from the

mire of the tendency of an imposed relational self.

1. INTRODUCTION

Although, a sociologist of religion, Robert Bellah (1991:168; 1982 cited in Tu 1985),

criticized the radical trend of individualism and worried about its potential tendency of

1 In this thesis, Ruist/Ruism and Confucianist/Confucianism are interchangeable in general usage.

Nonetheless, there are some subtle distinct meaning or indication between them because the latter might

sound like they are worshipping the person of the sage, Master Kong (Confucius) (551-479 BC), which

might lead to other kinds of distortions. In post-traditional settings where Ruist-inspired Chinese no long

are worshipping Confucius, Ruist/Ruism might be more pertinent.

3

sabotaging the social structure of ‘American civil religion’ 2 (Tu, Weiming 1985:8), he

was also worried by ‘the centrality of self-cultivation’ (emphasis original) in Tu

Weiming’s ‘characterization of the Mencian line of Confucian thought’ (Tu 1985:7–8).

Therefore he challenged the New-Ruist Tu Weiming 杜維明 with the question ‘What is

the Confucian self?’ (Tu 1985:7) Robert Neville and John Berthrong as founders of

Boston Ruism claim the issue of selfhood is one of the three important issues 3 New-

Ruism should deal with (Cai, Degui 蔡德貴 2004:80). It is obvious that selfhood is a

big issue drawing the attention of contemporary Ruists.

Tu (1985:12, 14, 61, 113f., 125, 127–8, 133) included nine essays in his book

Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation (1985a) in an attempt to

answer Bellah’s challenging question by emphasizing the Ruist self ‘as a centre of

relationships’, namely Ruist self as a relational self. In the first section, I will

summarize the impact in the development of the relational self promoted by a Ru-based

cultural heritage through a review of literature found in sociological, psychological, and

religious studies. Notably, relational self is not unique to Ru-based cultural heritage but

is, relatively speaking, more prominent in this context.

2. THE IMPACT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONAL SELF

PROMOTED BY A RU-BASED CULTURAL HERITAGE

Studies from various fields disclose relational self as a very important feature of

selfhood from Ru-based cultural heritage. Such Ruist relational self is even criticized by

some psychologists, sociologists, historians as a significant factor contributing to

personality disorders. But before introducing their findings or criticisms, we need to

first clarify what kind of Ruism of Ru-based cultural heritage they are talking about

because most of them used to generalize the term Ruism without specifying which kind,

school, or tradition of Ruist influence they engage in. However, most of them deal with

the issues among general persons in the context of contemporary Chinese.

2 Bellah himself defines ‘the American civil religion’ is ‘an understanding of the American experience in

the light of ultimate and universal reality’ (1991:168). It is ‘the subordination of the nation to ethical

principles that transcend it in terms of which it should be judged’ instead of ‘a form of national self-

worship’. (2005:54)

3 These three big issues are: 1. ‘Can Confucianism become an aspect or a constituent in the global

philosophical discussion?’; 2. the issue of the topics for discussion proposed by Ruism and the cultural

foundation of Ruism; and 3. the issue of selfhood, the self as an isolated entity or an centre of relational

nexus. (Cai, Degui 蔡德貴 2004:80)

4

2.1 Clarification on the Scope of Post-Traditional Ru-Inspired Chinese in

this Paper

Liu Shuhsien 劉述先 (1996:92), a contemporary New-Ruist, indicates the ambiguous

meaning of the word ‘Confucianism’ or Ruism prevalently used because even scholars

understand it in different meanings. As we all know that, Ruism had been dominating

China for hundreds of years, (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1) as a ‘cultural determining force’

(Cheng, Stephen K K 1990:510). It has educated the whole nation and dominated

Chinese culture and thinking and has been ‘shaping the Chinese civilization’ (Cheng,

Stephen K K 1990:510) since Wu Emperor of West Han Dynasty established Ruism as

the state ideology (Cheng, Stephen K K 1990:510; Shizuka, Satsuki 2010). However,

for maintaining Ruist dominant role, Ruist learning and teaching ‘changed constantly’

to fulfil the empire’s requirement and survive the challenges from other various schools

of learning, especially the imported ‘Buddhism’ and ‘Western learning’ (xixue 西學).

(Yao, Xinzhong 2013:4) Accordingly, some of teachings in the ancient texts might be

ignored selectively, for example, ‘the employment of remonstrance (jiànzhèng 諫諍)’

(Pfister, Lauren F 2013:3; Suddath, Virginia 2006) or ‘the advocacy of family-based

vengeance’ (Pfister 2011:1) and some emphasized selectively (even over-emphasized),

for example, filial piety (Evasdottir, Erika ES 2005:31–8), ‘legalism’ (Keating, Jerome

F 2004), ‘absolute submission’ (Fu, Zhengyuan 1993:53; Ho, David YF 1994; Zhang,

Hsiaoyang 1996:37; Tu, Weiming 杜維明 1998:13; Slote, Walter H 1998:46; Keating,

Jerome F 2004; Knapp, Keith N 2006:68–9, 71; Wang, Jue 2014:140; Watson, Steve

n.d.), ‘total submission’ (Levenson, Joseph R 1964:67), ‘unquestioned obedience’ (Tu

1985:115), or ‘absolute obedience’ (Knapp 2006:69; Moskowitz, Marc L 2007:168).

Therefore, Fu Zhengyuan indicates that it is not easy to ‘disentangle’ the authentic Ruist

teachings from the ‘misinterpreted and distorted’ ones. (Fu, Zhengyuan 1993:53;

Arcodia, Charles 2003)

Even if Ruist education had never soon or later dominated education and the

national examination after the end of the imperial age and Ruist thinking is no longer an

official ideology, the main ‘ideas and ideals’ of Ruism more or less are still continually

forming the ‘the basics of the way of life’ in modern China and other East Asian

countries as in the history of China. (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:5; Ho, David YF 1994:349;

1995:135; Koh, Byong-ik 1996; Smith, Robert J 1996; Gold, Thomas B 1996:256–8;

Liu, Shuhsien 劉述先 1996:111; Slote, Walter H and De Vos, George A 1998; Tucker,

Mary E 1998; Hwang, Kwang-Kuo 黃光國 1999:178–80; 2006; Lee, Jeong-Kyu 2001;

5

Chong, Terence 2002; Arcodia, Charles 2003; Keating 2004; Evasdottir 2005; Leonard,

George J 2006; Moskowitz, Marc L 2007; Rooney, Sean 2008; Hays, Jeffrey 2008; Lin,

Hong-Hsin 林鴻信 2008:205–7; Universitaet Duisburg Essen 2009; Broadbent, Jeffrey

2010; Lin, Xiaodong 2010; Wang, Charles 2012; Hwang, Grace Hui-Chen and Gove,

Mary 2012:10–12; University of Florida 2012; Hang, Lin 2011; Śleziak, Tomasz 2013)

4 But the questions are what kinds of traditions and interpretations within the Ruist

traditions are actually influencing and being ingrained in contemporary post-traditional

Chinese cultural settings. And following the constantly change of Ruist teachings

throughout the history, there must be a plurality of interpretations of Ruist traditions

that do not follow classical forms (such as found in the Classic of Filial Piety). For the

purpose of differentiation and further discussion, we can name such settings as post-

traditional Ru-inspired Chinese cultural settings.

Therefore, post-traditional Ru-inspired Chinese are those who are inspired

tangibly and intangibly by Ru-based cultural heritage but might not be necessarily

adopting any orthodox or classical version of Ruist teachings for their own expression,

or even claiming or sensing Ruism as the source of such inspiration. They take some

common Ruist value system or worldview for granted, such as relation-based self,

performance-emphasized moral self-cultivation and hierarchical social structure, but

might adopt a post-traditional mode of Ruist expression that is to some extent a twisted

and refractory form of the better Ruist sub-tradition (as found in the Classic of Filial

Piety) without even being really informed about their own more liberal Ruist tradition.

2.2 The Impact in the Development of the Relational Self in the Context of

Post-traditional Ru-Inspired Chinese

Ruism has been contributing in education, establishment of social order through

building fundamental relationships in a society based on ‘social ethic of responsibility’

(Broadbent, Jeffrey 2010:18), nurture of ‘attitude of valuing diligence, integrity’ (Liu,

Shuhsien 劉述先 1996:111), exploration of the value of humanity and the reality of the

self, cultivation of ‘moral greatness’ (Ching, Julia 1993:90), and so on. The

fundamental thoughts of Ruism strongly value ‘humanism’, ‘social relationships’ and

‘reciprocity’. They admittedly contribute to maintaining ‘a warm human feeling

4 The evidences of these literature in summary show: 1. The influence indeed exists although part of it

might weaken due to modernization and westernization, etc; 2. The influence varies because of geography,

ethnography and education, etc.; 3. Some of the features of Chinese culture, for example legalism, might

not be defined by Ruism but supported and strengthened by it.

6

between people’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:374) in a more materialized and individualistic

modern world. (Hang, Lin 2011:443–4; Tu, Weiming 1985:12, 58, 67) Nevertheless on

the other hand, very few foreigners, and even Chinese themselves, would have no

impression of the ‘inscrutable’ Chinese (Cheng, Stephen K K 1990:511), and few

Chinese people would disagree that Chinese people are very sensitive to being viewed

by others. They are especially sensitive about being evaluated by their superiors because

Chinese people are easier to perform well and leave a good self image, like wearing a

mask in front of others, in order to please others. (Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān 張老師月刊

1987) Therefore, this paper is neither to deny the positive contribution of Ru-based

cultural heritage, including the relational self, in Chinese society and nor to compare its

positive and negative influences. Instead, this paper will focus on how a contemporary

New-Ruist responds to the concern about the impact in the development of the

relational self raised by scholars in different disciplines.

Melvin W. Wong (2001:2), a Chinese clinical psychologist, lists five ‘chief

factors’ in showing how a Ru-based cultural heritage impacts the development of the

self: the five cardinal relationships, filial piety, gender-bias, co-dependency, and shame

and guilt complexes. Notably, it is identified as being a complicating factor in

relationship to personality disorders; by promoting the five cardinal relationships,

Ruism not only advocates the practice of filial piety, which is the root source of many

other unequal hierarchical relationships, (Evasdottir 2005:31–8) but also generally

justifies gender-bias, as well as co-dependency, which may lead to severe shame and

guilt complexes. (Slote, Walter H 1998:44) These factors not only enhance the

motivation and obligation of Chinese people to actively engage in obeying

unquestioningly their parents and seniors in the family, as well as the ruling elite (Liu,

Shuhsien 劉述先 1996:111), or at least expressing certain values in order to please or

glorify them, but also tends to make men bear heavier cultural burdens than women.

These attitudes tend toward reinforcing the repression of female creativity and

leadership, so that they consequently contribute to the permanent dominance of parents

over children and of men over women (Ching, Julia 1993:90). Moreover, these factors

more or less prompt persons to wear a mask in order to hide their weaknesses,

inadequacies, and dark side, and pretend to be stronger, nicer, better, and more moral in

the presence of the people with whom they have a relationship (or hide their weakness,

inadequacy, and dark side, and appear stronger, nicer, better, and more moral in various

relationships).

7

Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510), a Chinese senior social worker, also directly

indicates the problem of lack of ‘personality’, ‘principled moral thinking’, and

‘assertiveness’ among people in the Ruist context, common in East Asia, caused by

Ruist teaching and related to the relational self. The three behaviour traits he (Cheng

1990:510, emphasis original) lists are as follows:

First, the East Asian's lack of personality is traced to the Confucian social institution of Li

(禮 [rites])… Second, the East Asian's lack of principled moral thinking is linked to the

dyadic, relation-based character of the Confucian ethic, its lack of hypothetical reasoning

and its hierarchical view of human relationships. Third, the East Asian's lack of

assertiveness is rooted in the Confucian ideal of man as a reflection of harmony in the

cosmos and the Confucian ideal of society as based on the fulfilment of duties rather than

the assertion of rights. 5

The relational self and its tendency discussed in the context of Ruism is observed

and understood from psychological perspective because it involves its interaction with

others. (Spitzmuller, Matthias and Ilies, Remus 2010:306–8). The findings of my

exploration of the correlation of Ru-based Cultural heritage 6 and Chinese’s relational

selfhood can be summarized as follows:

1. In a hierarchy-emphasized social structure, especially its family structure, 7 the

presence of an imposed relational self would lead to the tendencies of ‘[zìwǒ de]

tuìsuō’ (‘[自我的]退縮’) (Li, Lukyan 李耀全 & Kwok, Hung Biu 郭鴻標, 2005:18f.)

(shrinking back or withdrawal of the self), ‘hěnnán … huóchū zhēnshí de wǒ’(很

難 … 活出真實的我) (Li, Lukyan 李耀全 & Kwok, Hung Biu 郭鴻標, 2005:18f.,

emphasis original) (very hard … to live out the true I), the ‘loss’ of the self

(Rosemont, Henry Jr 2012), ‘méiyǒu zìwǒ’ (‘沒有自我’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基

2004:178, emphasis original; Zheng, Zhengbo 鄭正博 1990; Bai 2007:31), namely

‘having no self’ (Doi, Takeo 1981:137–8) or ‘there is no self’ (Smith, Huston

2009:180), ‘[gè]rén bèi zhēngfādiào’ (‘[個]人 … 被蒸發掉’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆

5 Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511) describes the lack of personality as lack of ‘a conscious sense of being

an individual person’, lack of ‘any individual personality at all’, lack of ‘central core of personality’, and

‘encasing the personality of the individual within the parameters of his prescribed roles, to the extent that

his individuality is hardly differentiated from these roles’.

6 Most of the literature I investigated which are relevant to such issues among Chinese Ruism are not

dealt with toward a geographically and generationally specific Chinese people group. Therefore, in this

paper, I am discussing the selfhood generally among the Chinese people immerged in the influence of

Ruism instead of a geographically and generationally specific people group.

7 The hierarchical social structure includes both the public and private social structures. Although both of

the structures have been becoming simpler and weaker in hierarchy amongst general Chinese people, the

concept of it is still manifested, especially in family social structure, which influences the ethical value

system, upbringing, education and family relationship and interpersonal relationship in Chinese society.

8

基 2004:12) (the [individual] person evaporates). In other words, such a self, in the

five-cardinal relationships in Ruist ethics, tends to be undistinctive ‘móhúhuà’ (‘模糊

化’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 2004:3 of the preface of the revised ed., emphasis

original), ‘[bèi] yāzhì xiǎowǒ’ (‘[被 ]壓制 ’) (Lin, Hong-Hsin 林鴻信 2008:57)

(suppressed), 8 ‘[bèi] biǎnyì zìjǐ’ (‘[被]貶抑’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 2004:17)

(demeaned), ‘[bèi] yāyì zìwǒ’ (‘[被]壓抑’) (oppressed) (Hwang Kwang-Kuo 黃光

國 2006:174) , ‘bèi hūluè’ (‘被忽略’) (Yang, Jienlong 楊劍龍 2012:372, 386)

(ignored), ‘zāo mòshā’ (‘遭抹殺 ’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 2004:35, emphasis

original) (obliterated), ‘bèi xiāomǐ’ (‘被消弭’) (Yang, Jienlong 楊劍龍 2012:372)

(eliminated), and so on. Under this Ru-inspired culture imposing on the priority of

relationality, people tends to ‘chéngwéi wěijun1zǐ’ (‘成為偽君子’) (Dong, Fangyuan

董芳苑 1995:298; Young, Stephen B 1998:142; Lin, Hong-Hsin 林鴻信 2008:205–7)

(becom a hypocrite), ‘shīqù zìwǒ’ (‘失去自我’) (Yum, June Ock 1988:374–5; Miller,

Joan G Miller 1994:15f., 31; Xie, Wenyu 謝文郁 1998; Gong, Jianping 龔建平 2004;

Lin Liyun 林麗雲 1987:2) (lose the self), ‘lack of personality’ (Cheng, Stephen K K

1990:510, emphasis original), ‘be the absence of self’ (Doi, Takeo 1981:137–8),

‘niǔqǔ yuánlái de wǒ’ (‘扭曲原來的我’) (Lin Liyun 林麗雲 1987:2) (distort the

original I), ‘[shǐ] zìwǒ … yǐnérbúzhāng’ (‘[使]自我 … 隱而不彰’) (Lin Liyun 林麗

雲 1987:2, emphasis original) (make the self implicit and unclear), ‘dài … miànjù’

(‘戴…面具’) (Lin Liyun 林麗雲 1987:6; Zhuang, Huiqiu 莊慧秋 1987:172, 187)

(wear a mask), and so on.

2. In a culture of moral self-cultivation (xiūshēn 修身) that highly emphasizes being

human (zuòrén ‘做人’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 2004:22) or ‘being somebody’

(Fleming, Jess 2002:183), and so demands one (Lin, Xiaodong 2010:259–60) to

perform to the satisfaction of others, (Tu, Weiming 1985:47, 55) especially the

seniors, the problem of the relational self becomes worse. This is especially the case

for men who live in such a society. Consequentially, having experienced the ‘loss’ of

such a self (Cole, J Preston 1971:6, 19f.), or a ‘loss of identity’ (Fleming, Jess

8 ‘Xīshēng xiǎowǒ, wánchéng dàwǒ’ (‘犧牲小我，完成大我’) (To sacrifice the small self for the good of

the great self) is highly valued in the Ruist context, (Broadbent 2010:18) the small self (xiǎowǒ 小我)

means the individual person in contrast to the great self (dàwǒ 大我), or the social self, referring to the

collective group the individual person belongs to.

9

2002:183), then the ‘persona’ (‘role performance as a mask’) (McGrath, Alister E &

McGrath, Joanna C 1992:37–8, emphasis original) endures a compression of the self

‘zìwǒ yāsuō’ (‘自我壓縮’) (Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 2004:22–3, emphasis original;

Lin Liyun 林麗雲 1987:6). Ultimately, then, a performance-oriented culture tends to

suggest a utilitarian form of reinforces tendencies of ‘hypocrisy’ (Dong, Fangyuan

董芳苑 1995:298).

3. Observations in studies among Chinese strongly present the problem of ‘loss of self’

or ‘shīqù zìwǒ’ (‘失去自我’) (Gong, Jianping 龔建平 2004), ‘lack of personality’

(Cheng, Stephen K K 1990:510, emphasis original), or tendency to lose the self

(Yum, June Ock 1988:374–5; Miller, Joan G 1994:15f., 31; Xie, Wenyu 謝文郁

1998) in cultures and societies influenced more by Ruism than other forms of life.

Psychologists, sociologists, and scholars in religious studies are concerned with

the ‘situational[-]determinism’-oriented tendency of the relational self in Ru-based

cultural heritage (Yang, Guoshu 楊國樞 2002:88–9). It will lead ‘the tendency to obey

authority blindly’ (Liu, Shuhsien 劉述先 1996:111), alienation between ‘the public self’

and ‘the private self’ (Yang, Guoshu 楊國樞 2002:102), the unbalance between the

regarding with ‘primary group’ and the disregarding with ‘secondary group’, public

affairs, and social morality or righteousness (Zheng, Zhengbo 鄭正博 1990:169–70), 9

and the inconsistency of the expressions and acts of the self in different situation, i.e.

personal inconsistency or self inconsistency (Yang, Guoshu 楊國樞 2002:88–9), 10 the

obscurity of the boundary between self and other, the lacking of self-consciousness of

individual self, self-existence, uniqueness, sense of direction, object and willingness

(He, Youhui 何 友 暉 et al. 1989:62) and thus of ‘consciousness with respect to

protecting human rights and exploring new frontiers’ (Liu, Shuhsien 劉述先 1996:111).

Even if such tendencies might not definitely result in psychological problem or

9 The typical example of such unbalance in Ruist teaching is the passage in the Analects 13:18, ‘子路：

葉公語孔子曰：「吾黨有直躬者，其父攘羊，而子證之。」孔子曰：「吾黨之直者異於是。父為

子隱，子為父隱，直在其中矣。」’ (Zi Lu: The Duke of She informed Confucius, saying, ‘Among us

here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, they

will bear witness to the fact.’ Confucius said, ‘Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright

are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the

misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.’) (translated by James Legge)

10 The opposite to personal consistency or self consistency is social consistency or role consistency. Yang,

Guoshu 楊 國 樞 (2002:88–9), a Chinese psychologist, indicates that Ru-based cultural heritage

emphasizes more on social consistency rather than personal consistency because Ru-inspired Chinese is

‘situational[-]determinism’-oriented.

10

personality disorder, they surely cause the complexity of interpersonal relationships,

communication and unnecessary hurts from relationships and also the economic

ineffectiveness of social operation (Zheng, Zhengbo 鄭正博 1990:172). But the worst

possible pathological effect of the suppressed self cannot be even treated lightly. 11

In order to evaluate Tu Weiming’s interpretation of Ruist selfhood and how well

responds to the challenges and worries raised about these problems tied to the relational

self in our discussion, the tendency of an imposed relational self in Ru-based cultural

heritage can be summed up as a core issue to represent all the above problems

challenged and worried by scholars.

3. TU WEIMING’S CONTEMPORARY NEW-RUIST INTERPRETATION OF THE

RELATIONAL SELF

Not many Ruists explore the issue or problem of selfhood. Tu Weiming, a

Contemporary New-Ruist,12 adherent of Mencius 孟子 (372-289 BC) line and Wang

Yangming 王陽明(1472-1529) School, (Tu 1985:13) a leader of Boston Ruism, and a

retired professor at Harvard University, is one of the few (if not the only one) Ruists

who explores and delves into the issue of selfhood, mainly in his book Confucian

Thought: Selfhood as creative transformation (1985), rather deeply within a post-

traditional Ruist context. He is recognized as the ‘foremost exponent of Confucian

thought in the United States today’ (Barrett, T.H. 1986:319) and ‘a kind of missionary

for an understanding of Confucianism as (at least potentially) a world religion for today’

(Berger, Peter 2012). Besides, he ‘does not consider Confucianism as a perfect and

complete system, and prefers to reform and modernize Confucianism in order to fit the

11 Donald Winnicott (1965:133), a psycho-analytic psychiatrist, indicated that the possible pathological

problem caused by the false self (resulted from social ‘compliance’) ‘exploited and treated’ as real is ‘a

growing sense in the individual of futility and despair’. And the worst case of its abnormality when ‘the

false self can easily get itself mistaken for real’ is the ‘annihilation’ of the real self and ‘suicide’ as a way

to reassert the true self.

12 A revival of various strands of Ruist philosophy and political culture that began in the middle of the 9th

Century and reached new levels of intellectual and social creativity in the 11th Century in the Northern

Song Dynasty is commonly named as ‘Neo-Confucianism’, namely Neo-Ruism (Berthrong, John

2005b:993) . In the 20th Century, another revival movement based on Neo-Ruism was now known as

‘New Confucianism’ namely New-Ruism, ‘Contemporary New Confucianism’ namely Contemporary

New Ruism, (Berthrong 2005a:995) ‘Modern New Confucianism’ namely Modern New Ruism (Yao,

Xinzhong 2013:8, 10f.). It is also deeply engaged in dialogue with Western philosophy. Therefore, New

Ruist moral cultivation will be the meaningful and significant up-to-date one to be researched. Notably,

Tu Weiming (1940-) is referred as the ‘third generation (1980-)’ of Modern New Ruists all of who, for

example, Liu Shuhsien 劉述先, Cheng Chungying 成中英, etc., are still alive. (Bresciani, Umberto

2001:11–31) Therefore, Contemporary New Ruists are specifically referred to this third generation in this

thesis in differentiating from the previous two generations of Modern New Ruists.

11

present era’s challenge.’ He also accepts the option that contemporary Ruism and

Chinese culture should learn from Christianity, being influenced in this regard also by

another contemporary Ruist, Liu Shuhsien 劉述先 (Huang, Paulos 黃保羅, also as

Huáng Bǎoluó 2006:26). Furthermore, the Boston Ruists he is leading are ‘perhaps best

understood as Protestant successors to Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit missionary, who some

400 years ago maintained that Confucianism could be combined with Christianity’

(Berger 2012).

Accordingly, Tu is probably the one Ruist who is friendliest towards other

religions, including Christianity, while still being an influential promoter of Ruism in

Anglophone circles of intellectuals; because of these factors, he expects less numbers of

conflicts between other religions and Ruism, and recently promoted the reality of

Ruified Christians, Ruified Muslim in the contemporary world as one major expression

of contemporary Ruism (stated in public lectures both in Beijing at the Fourth World

Congress of Sinology, 6 September 2014 and in Oxford at Oxford University JinLong

Philosophy Society, 18 October 2014). Therefore, Tu is academically a post-traditional

Ruist scholar. His interpretation of the relational self in the context of post-traditional

New-Ruism are worth studying for explore how well a contemporary post-traditional

New-Ruist responds to the challenges and worries raised about these problems tied to

the relational self as it is developed in Ru-based cultural heritage. In this section, the

focus of my examination is only on Tu Weiming’s interpretation of the relational self,

mainly based on his book Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation

(1985a).

3.1 The Relational Self of Chinese Persons

In the beginning of this book, Tu (1985:8) explains his intention as looking into ‘the

authentic possibility of a new vision of the self’. Evidently, his interpretation of the

Ruist self is not only limited in disclosing the traditional Ruist concept of selfhood. He

(1985:113) does not mince the fact that to generalize it is an inhibited task because of

the ‘elasticity’ of Ruism and its ‘vicissitudes’ of decades of centuries. And he does not

believe there is a ‘trans-temporal coherent’ and consensus concept of it that ‘once

revealed, would remain essentially the same’. (Tu 1985:13) But he (1979; 1985:113,

172) still tries to summary it as two assumptions on which his definition of Ruist

sagehood as ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’ is based, namely attaining

‘the highest moral excellence in the human community’ in Mencian definition. These

two ‘interrelated assumptions’ are: 1. ‘the self as a centre of relationships’, instead of an

12

‘isolable individuality’, and 2. ‘the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development’.

(Tu 1985:113, 176) Since the self is a centre of relationships and the so-called ultimate

self-transformation is a communal act, the Confucain self is basically a relational self

and therefore an ‘open system’, in opposition to the ‘privatized ego’, namely that the

manifestation of the ultimate self-transformation can be seen through the ‘existence’ of

the self as a centre of relationships. (Tu 1985:8, 127) In order to study profoundly Tu’s

interpretation of Ruist relational self, we will examine these two assumptions

respectively and the second first although they are interrelated.

3.2 Assumption 2: The Self as a Dynamic Process of Spiritual Development

As the goal of the self as a dynamic process of spiritual development, what does the

ultimate self-transformation mean? And what is this process? This process is what

Confucius defined as ‘learning for the sake of the self’ 為己之學 wéijǐ zhīxué. 13 Tu

(1985:8, 15) emphasizes continually that everybody is equipped with ‘inherent’ self-

sufficient ‘internal resources’ so that everyone is able to ‘become a sage’ by way of

‘self-effort’. In terms of this, Tu (1985:8) views Ruist ‘sage’ 聖人 shèngrén as same as

Buddhist ‘budda’ 佛 fó and Taoist ‘true person’ 真人 zhēnrén. He (1985:10, 15)

explains the Ruist ‘sagehood’ as ‘the complete realization of the self’, the ‘full

actualization’ of perfect human nature, ‘the most genuine and authentic manifestation of

humanity’, or, in Neo-Ruist terminology, ‘truly understand[ing] my human nature

and … know Heaven’. These abstract terms can be embodied a little bit by the saying in

Dàxué Wèn 《大學問》by Wang Yangming 王陽明, ‘forming one body with Heaven

and Earth and the myriad things’ 以天地萬物為一體 yǐ tiāndì wànwù wéi yītǐ

(Translation by Wing-tsit Chan 陳榮捷 1963 cited in Tu 1985:10, emphasis original),

that Tu (1985:46, 63, 137, 153, 180) names as a ‘trinity’ of heaven, earth, and man and

thus defines as ‘self-transcendence’ (1985:10). In order to understand the ultimate self-

transformation and its assumed process, only Assumption 2 is not enough. There need

definitely some other subsidiary assumptions which are also interrelated.

13 Analects 14:24: ‘The Master said, “In ancient times, men learned with a view to their own

improvement. Nowadays, men learn with a view to the approbation of others.”’ (translated by James

Legge「子曰：『古之學者為己，今之學者為人。』」「zǐyuē ：『gǔ zhī xuézhě wéi jǐ ，jīn zhī

xuézhě wéi rén 。』」)

13

3.2.1 Assumption 2.1: Human Nature Is Perfectible through Self-Cultivation

Tu (1985:15, 24–5, 27, 82, 117, 135, 173, 176, 178, ) shares the same ‘faith’ with

Mencius or ‘belief’ with the other Ruists in the ‘perfectibility of human nature’, namely

that its perfection can be attained through learning and ‘self-effort’ or ‘self-cultivation’

because the ‘ultimate reason’ for its perfection is human’s ‘own inner strength’. This

perfection of self-transformation is stressed repeatedly as ‘a ceaseless process’. (Tu

1985:19, 22, 31, 39, 52, 63, 67, 74, 94, 113, 131, 177) The term ceaseless negates the

perfectibility of human nature because there is an end or attainment if it is perfectible.

Although he (1985:24–5, 27, emphasis original) admits it as an ‘ontological postulate’

that cannot be ‘empirically’ proved and recognizes the reality that even Confucius

cannot ‘claim to be a sage’, he still justifies this faith by two arguments: 1. A logical

comprehension: the human perfectibility is a ‘rational’ mode in understanding the being

as a human that is the ‘common’ basis for the selfhood in all ‘Three Teachings’ in East

Asia, 14 or even in the so-called ‘Moral Universal’ he presents. 2. An ‘experiential

assertion’: ‘one’s own germinations and seeds can eventually be brought to fruition’ by

the actual path of self-cultivation. But does this experiential assertion is not what he and

every Ruists experienced because of the aforementioned imperfectability of Confucius

himself and conflict between perfectability and ceaseless process? Based on this belief,

Tu (1985:135) extended the ‘transformative potential’ of this perfectibility of the self to

‘the family, the state, and the world’. But in order to insist upon Assumption 2.1: human

nature is perfectible through self-cultivation, another assumption is consequentially

added as its basis.

3.2.2 Assumption 2.2: Human Nature Is Good Intrinsically

As it is well-known, the core value of Mencian line of Ruism is that human nature is

good is. This assumed and asserted Ruist doctrine of intrinsic goodness of human nature

(Tu 1985:24) becomes the basis for all the other related discussions about self-

cultivation. But why self-realization is needed since human nature is good intrinsically?

Tu’s explanation is as follows:

[t]he intrinsic goodness in our nature is often in a latent state: only through long and

strenuous effort can it be realized as an experienced reality. In a deeper sense, however, a

14 Tu (1985:19, 26) scopes the Three Teachings in East Asia discussed in this book to the ‘Mencian line

of Confucianism, the Chuang Tzu [莊子 Zhuāng Zǐ (ca. 369-286 BC)] tradition of Taoism [Daoism], and

the Ch’an (Zen) [or chán 禪] interpretation of Buddhism’ and asserts a common assumption shared by all

of them that ‘moral and spiritual self-development involves not only a convergence of stages to be

perfected but also a multiplicity of ways to be pursued’, namely in this sense that all roads lead to Rome

條條道路通羅馬 tiáotiáo dàolù tōng Luómǎ.

14

distinction between ontological assertion and existential realization must be made. Self-

realization is an existential idea, specifying a way of bringing into existence the ontological

assertion that human nature is good. Precisely because human nature is good, the ultimate

basis for self-realization and the actual process of initiating self-cultivation are both located

in the structure of the self. (Tu 1985:126)

Although he recognizes the circular argument implied by this explanation, he argues

that this circularity can be accepted as long as the differentiation between ontological

assertion and existential realization can be viewed as ‘a dialectic relationship’.

(1985:126) Is this argument sustained for defending the circularity? We will discuss it

later. But Assumption 2.2: Human nature is good intrinsically is also based on the other

assumption that human’s original and inherent nature is bestowed by Heaven. (Tu

1985:24–5, 126)

3.2.3 Assumption 2.3: Human Nature Is Endowed with the Humanity of The Heart

for Self-Realization by Heaven

Based on Chan Wing-tsit’s indirect interpretation of Zhōngyōng (Doctrine of the Mean)

《中庸》(or Chung-yung)15 and the ‘postulate’ of Zhāng Zǎi 張載 (also as Chang Tsai)

(1020-1077), Tu (1985:14, 23, 30, 71, 73–4, 125, 127, 131–2, 136–7, 160f., 163, 171–3)

believes that human’s original nature is ‘endowed by Heaven’. This ‘Heaven-endowed’

human nature is defined by Tu (1985:23, 30, 74, 127, 131–2, 163, 171–3, emphasis

original) as ‘conscience’, ‘the reality known as the principle (li) [理]’, the original inner

ability and wisdom to ‘know and experience ultimate reality in its all-embracing

fullness’, the assumptive ‘ability of intellectual intuition (chih te chih-chüeh) [智的直覺

zhì de zhíjué]’ as the ‘Chinese mode of thinking’ by Móu Zōngsān 牟宗三 (also as

Mou Tsungsan) (1909-1995), ‘the germinations of morality or seeds of enlightenment’,

Mencian moral ‘sensibility of the hsin [or xīn 心]’, ‘the humanity of the heart for self-

realization’, ‘the irreducibility of the vital energy and raw stuff for personal growth’,

and so on. Tu does not think himself and also Mencius as a ‘romantic advocacy of

human perfectibility’. The ‘theory’ of Heaven-endowed human nature is for directing us

to appeal to ‘our internal resources for spiritual growth’. (Tu 1985:12) Does he mean by

this that the whole idea about this theory that all of the resources human being needs for

ultimate perfect spiritual transformation is endowed by Heaven is assumed for this

purpose? In this sense, because there are no any external resources that Ruist selfhood

15 Based on Zhèng Xuán 鄭玄 (also as Cheng Hsüan) (127-200), Zhōngyōng Zhù (Commentary on the

Doctrine of the Mean) 《中庸注》(or Chung-yung chu). (Chan, Wing-tsit 1969:98)

15

can rely on, can the assumption 2.1 about human perfectibility be a coined beautiful

ideal as an incentive for appealing to our internal resources, too? But since it is believed

that human nature is endowed by Heaven, why is it also our internal resources? The

assumption about Heaven in Ruism cannot be ignored.

3.2.4 Assumption 2.4: Heaven is the Full Realization of One’s Selfhood Precisely

It seems that Tu assumes Heaven as a self-evident concept in the context of East Aisa.

Only in one place Tu (1985:73) defines Heaven as ‘the ultimate reality’ and in another

place equates it with Way as ‘the ultimacy’, (1985:125) but he (1985:27, 73) hesitates

to recognize it as ‘a transcendent reality’. In the context of the legendary Sage-King

Shun 聖王舜 Shèng-Wáng Shùn (ca. 2294-2184) as exemplifying the case of ‘reaching

Heaven’, Tu (1985:127) defines Heaven as ‘fully realizing [one’s] selfhood precisely’.

According to this definition, Heaven must be based on Assumption 2.1: Human nature

is perfectible through self-cultivation. Therefore, these two assumptions (2.1 and 2.4)

fall in circularity.

Moreover, although Heaven seems to him (1985:180) in one place a personal

being who is ‘omnipresent and may be omniscient’ but ‘is certainly not omnipotent’ and

‘do not speak’, Tu (1985:22, 27, 38, 61, 116, 126, 132) unequivocally differentiates the

Ruist Heaven (including the similar concept in other two East Asian Teachings: Daoism

and Buddhism) from ‘a transcendent personal God’, ‘an external supreme being’ as

‘source of authority’, ‘a wholly other’, ‘an isolated individual and God’, an higher

‘intelligence’, or ‘an almighty creator’, and thus recognizes these Three Teachings as

atheism in religious sense. In discussing ‘the transcendence of Heaven’, he (1985:125)

recognizes the significant difference between it and ‘the transcendence of God’. Based

on his Mencian thesis, he (1985:125) defines it as ‘understanding of Heaven’ and

appreciating totally ‘the subtle meanings of the Mandate of Heaven’. This

transcendence can be reached only after ‘a full realization of our minds’ and then ‘a

comprehension of our nature’. Therefore, the ‘transcendent dimension’ of Ruist

selfhood is that ‘Heaven resides in it, works through it and … is also revealed by it’ and

‘selfhood so conceived maintains a tacit communication with Heaven’. (Tu 1985:125–6)

The fully realization of the self, namely the ‘highest transcendence’ or ‘the complete

unity between humanity and Heaven’ 天人合一 tiānrén héyī (or a trinity of the unity

between Heaven, Earth and man 天地人三合一 tiāndìrén sānhéyī, or ‘forming one body

with the universe’ metaphorically) can be embodied ‘within its own reality’ without any

‘external help’. (Tu 1985:45–6, 60f., 126) Although Tu (1976:9; 1985:63, 73, 132, 137)

16

denies Heaven as a ‘creator’ or any other external being, he emphasizes that in an

ultimate sense Heaven and man form a relationship of ‘mutual fidelity’ and humans

‘serve Heaven’ and also defines the ‘religiosity’ of Neo-Ruism by the ‘mut[u]ality of

Heaven and man’. He (1985:47) also mentions ‘the spirit of Heaven and Earth’ in

discussing the relationship between human and nature. How do the meanings of the

terms of mutual fidelity, communication, and mutuality make sense if Heaven is not a

being? Does he personate Heaven and Earth or nature or express such in a metaphorical

way since he repeatedly stresses the impersonality and internality of Heaven? Although

on the one hand he also emphasized consistently human nature is endowed by Heaven,

one the other had he (1985:9, 15, 46, 61, 63, 73, 125–6) explains Heaven is revealed by

selfhood, or the ‘whole universe’ can be embodied by human beings, and fully realizing

and understanding selfhood are the ‘preconditions’ for knowing Heaven. Is Heaven

defined by selfhood? Is the term Heaven borrowed to indicate metaphorically only the

transcendence of selfhood in moral excellence in the human community? He seems not

to clarify these ambiguities directly. However, he (1985:46) quotes the sayings of

Chéng Hào 程灝 (also as Ch’eng Hao) (1032-1085) ‘Man and heaven and earth are one

thing’ (n.d. cited in Tu 1985:46) to equate a trinity of the unity between Heaven, Earth

and man 天地人三合一 with ‘forming one body with the myriad things’ 與萬物為一體

yǔ wànwù wéiyītǐ and takes out ‘the subject-object dichotomy’ of the relationship

between human and nature. From his interpretation of Zhōngyōng 《中庸》, he (1976:9;

1985:73) also emphasizes that human cannot be ‘alienated from Heaven in any essential

way’. Following Mencian tradition, Tu (1985:132) insists that ‘Heaven sees as the

people see and Heaven hears as the people hear’ 天視自我民視，天聽自我民聽

tiānshì zì wǒmín shì ， tiāntīng zì wǒmín tīng. 16 Do they sound like metaphorical

expressions? If man and heaven and earth are one thing or Heaven depends on human,

does Heaven-endowment metaphorically mean mere inborn inherence? Since

transcendence or transcendent is always used by Tu to define or explain the above

assumptions, it is necessary to know his definition of transcendence.

3.2.5 Definition of Transcendence

As mentioned above, Tu (1985:125–6) recognizes the significant difference between the

transcendence of Heaven and the transcendence of God and asserts the ‘transcendent

dimension’ of Ruist selfhood as that ‘Heaven resides in it, works through it and … is

16 James Legge’s translation from Mencius 《孟子》, 5A:5 (Tu 1985:146, n.11)

17

also revealed by it’ and ‘selfhood so conceived maintains a tacit communication with

Heaven’. Most of time, it seems to Tu that transcendence and Heaven (including Earth,

nature, and university) as indescribable self-evident terms are interchangeable in terms

of ultimacy that Man and heaven and earth are one thing. He tends to define one by the

other and vice versa.

However, Tu indeed explains concretely the meaning of transcendence in few

places. Since the Ruist self is as a centre of relationships, it is an open system instead of

a close system. In terms of human-relatedness, self-cultivation in Ruism involves the

establishment and enlargement of an ‘ever-expanding circle’ of relationships,

developing from ‘the structures of the self’ towards ‘the family, the country, and the

world’. Therefore, in this sense, ultimate self-transformation as a communal act must

‘transcend beyond ‘culturalism’, ‘egoism, regulation of the family, … racism’,

‘nepotism, parochialism, ethnocentrism, … chauvinistic nationalism’, and

‘anthropocentrism’. (Tu 1985:10, 14, 176, 178–80) Then, the transcendence means

mere self-transcendence (Tu 1985:10, 126). Whether it is transcendent is defined by the

extent of self-realization, namely how far the self goes ‘beyond what it existentially is

so that it can become what it ought to be’. (Tu 1985:126, 136–7) Tu (1985:125) admits

that Heaven or Way is not ‘a transcendent reference point (such as God)’ and asserts

Ruist selfhood itself as a transcendent reference point. He underlies this assertion on all

the above assumptions and argues that selfhood is ‘divine in its all-embracing fullness’

and ‘both immanent and transcendent’ because ‘it is intrinsic to us; at the same time, it

belongs to Heaven’. In spite of the significant difference of the meanings of

transcendence between of Ruist Heaven and Christian God, Tu (1985:125) analogized

Ruist ‘original human nature’ to ‘God’s image in man’ in ‘Christian idea of humanity as

divinity circumscribed’. Does the term divine in Ruist context mean the same thing in

Christian context? Where Tu (1985:152, emphasis original) explains the moral

metaphysical ontology of the sage, he quotes Mencian sayings;

The desirable is called good. To have it in oneself is called true. To possess it fully in

oneself is called beautiful, but to shine forth with this full possession is called great. To be

great and be transformed by this greatness is called sage; to be sage and to transcend the

understanding is called divine [spiritual]. 可欲之謂善，有諸己之謂信。充實之謂美，

充實而有光輝之謂大，大而化之之謂聖，聖而不可知之之謂神。17

The term divine here therefore, namely spiritual, is defined by Mencius as to be sage

and to transcend the understanding. Furthermore, Tu (1985:152, emphasis original),

17 D. C. Lau’s translation from Mencius 《孟子》, 7B:25 (Tu 1985:166, n.14)

18

following the interpretation of Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130-1200), denies any possibility of ‘a

spiritual being (shen-jen) [or shénrén 神人] … above the sage’ indicated here by the

term either divine or spiritual. It means that ‘the transforming power of the sage is

beyond ordinary human comprehension’. In other place, he (1985:27) asserts that the

‘perfected self’ in East Asian thinking does not absolutely assume ‘a superhuman

quality’. In his other book, he (1993:29) states that the sage is assumed as ‘a godlike

stature in the pantheon of the virtuous’ which is widely exalted among both ancient and

modern Chinese. Since any external transcendent God is rejected by Ruism, therefore, it

seems evidently that in Ruist context Heaven, transcendence, and divine are used to

indicate metaphorically the unfathomable and thus indescribable extent of self-

realization of human beings without transcending beyond the plane of themselves. In

this sense, would the term ‘surpassing’ give more proper meaning than ‘transcendent’?

Although on the one hand Tu exalts the incomprehensibility of the sage, Heaven,

transcendence, and ultimate self-transformation, on the other hand he (1985:36, 136)

rejects the possibility of a transcendent God because he is ‘unknowable’ or

incomprehensible. When selfhood itself as a transcendent reference point, will the

concept of self-transcendence be an imagined idealism because of the

incomprehensibility of selfhood and self-transcendence? Will Tu and Ruists not be able

to transcend their concept of selfhood? Or will Ruist selfhood not be able to transcend

its real transformation because of all the above assumptions and of all their rejections of

any possibility beyond these assumptions? Although Tu repeatedly stress Ruist selfhood

and also cosmos as an open system, could all the above assumptions Ruists convict and

defend make Ruism or Ruist selfhood an enclosed system? Let us move onto

Assumption 1: the self as a centre of relationship

3.3 Assumption 1: The Self as a Centre of Relationships

As mentioned above, Ruist self as a centre of relationships is an open system instead of

a close system. In terms of human-relatedness, self-cultivation in Ruism involves the

establishment and enlargement of an ever-expanding circle of relationships, developing

from ‘the structures of the self’ towards ‘the family, the country, and the world’.

Therefore, in this sense, ultimate self-transformation as a communal act must transcend

beyond culturalism, egoism, regulation of the family, racism, nepotism, parochialism,

ethnocentrism, chauvinistic nationalism, and anthropocentrism. (Tu 1985:10, 14, 176,

178–80) And in the classical Ruist context, self as a centre of relationships assumes ‘a

communal quality which was never conceived of as an isolated or isolable entity’. (Tu

19

1985:54) Tu (1985:54) further emphasizes the meaning of self with such communal

quality in Ruism is completely differentiated from the meaning of it in the modern

Western context. In this sense, the Ruist self evidently has communal quality which the

Western one lacks but might reasonably miss something that the Western one has.

Would that be the very essence leading to the tendency of an imposed relational self in

Ru-based cultural heritage? Moreover, ultimate self-transformation as a communal act

is based on this Assumption 1: the self as a centre of relationships. But in one place Tu

(1985:137) states that self-transformation ‘assumes the form of mastering the self’

which includes realizing one’s ‘original nature’, transforming one’s ‘self-centred

structure’, and thus ‘requires an unceasing struggle’ to removing ‘selfish and egoistic

desires’. In this sense, ultimate self-transformation seems to be the assumption for the

self as a centre of relationships. Or are they assumed for each other? And it seems that

the self must be consistently suppressed by the communal ideology, even if not directly

but as least indirectly. We will examine some of related concepts of relational self in the

Ruist context.

3.3.1 Assumption 1.1: All Things Are My Companions

Besides ‘human-relatedness’ and ordinary daily existence, the other characteristic

related to ultimate spiritual transformation is the ‘continuity of being’ in the context of

Chinese cosmology. (Tu 1985:10, 15, emphasis original) Tu (1985:36, 38, 40) believes

in, as many other Chinese do, the assumptive continuity of being as a self-evident truth

and admits the unknown puzzle whether the assumptive ‘continuity of being’

(‘epistemology’) is informed by Chinese Cosmology (ontology) or vice versa. In

Chinese Cosmology, the cosmos is viewed as a continuous ‘spontaneously self-

generating life process’ without ‘temporal beginning’ and end, in which ‘inner

connectedness and interdependence’ are inherent. (Tu 1985:9, emphasis original)

Although there is still ‘differentiation’ in it, ‘all modalities of being are organically

connected’ as ‘integral parts’ of such a ‘cosmic transformation’ process. It is in this

‘metaphysical sense’ that Zhāng Zǎi 張載 expresses his faith in and explains his

ontology of human beings in the following statement quoted by Tu several times: (Tu

1985:44)

Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small being as I finds an

intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the universe I regard as my body

and that which directs the universe I regard as my nature. All people are my brothers and

sisters, and all things are my companions. 乾稱父，坤稱母；予茲藐焉，乃混然中處。

20

故天地之塞，吾其體；天地之帥，吾其性。民，吾同胞；物，吾與也。18 (n.d. cited

in Tu 1985:44, 137, 157)

Therefore, since that is the core of relational self in the cosmological sense of the

assumptive continuity of being, we assign it as Assumption 1.1: All things are my

companions for the purpose of discussion. Based on Assumption 1.1, the dichotomous

differences between self and society, creator and creature, body and mind, and so on,

are no more important. What matters in Chinese cosmology is stressed on ‘part/whole,

inner/outer, surface/depth, root/branches, substance/function, and Heaven/man’.

Accordingly, discussions on ‘subtle relationships, internal resonance, dialogical

interplay, and mutual influence’ such wholeness-related and dynamism-related issues

are relevant in Chinese cosmology but not ‘static, mechanistic, analytical distinctions’.

(Tu 1985:8–9, 38) However, Tu (1985:15), based on Mencian suggestion that ultimate

self-transformation is a communal act other than ‘a lonely quest for one’s inner

spirituality’, denies that ‘total submission to the prescribed social roles’ would be a

corollary of taking the given ‘situatedness’ in the Ruist five cardinal relationships. He

asserts it as ‘a recognition of the most immediate and fruitful way of initiating and

completing one’s task of learning to be human’ because the ultimacy of life is tied to

human’s ‘ordinary daily existence’ instead of ‘a radical otherness’. In this sense,

Assumption 1.1: All things are my companion is also the premise of Assumption 2.4:

Heaven is fully realization of one’s selfhood precisely.

But, according to the above modes of Chinese Ruist thinking, it is still

understandable that in Tu’s view moral self-cultivation is emphasized as ‘a precondition

for harmonizing human relations’ (Tu 1985:55), ‘the aesthetic experience of mutuality

and immediacy with nature’ (1985:47), and the realization of the ‘ultimacy’ as ‘persons’

to ‘form a trinity with Heaven and Earth’ (1985:137). It is also not surprising to find

that Tu (1985:14, emphasis original), with Mencian terminology, summarizes the

feature of the self in this sense ‘as the manifestation of the great self [大我 dàwǒ] and

the concom[m]itant dissolution of the small self [小我 xiǎowǒ]’. 19

3.3.2 The Precondition for the Self as a Centre of Relationships

18 Western Inscription 《西銘》(xī míng)

19Mencius 《孟子》, 6A:15 孟子曰：「從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。」Mèngzǐ yuē ：「cóng qí

dàtǐ wéi dàrén ，cóng qí xiǎotǐ wéi xiǎorén 。」

21

Although, in the definition of Ruist selfhood, namely ultimate self-transformation as a

communal act, it seems that human–relatedness is valued more than one’s inner

spirituality and the great self than the small self, one’s ‘own inner transformation’ is still

never stressed too much not just because of Ruist learning for the sake of the self,

explained above, but of the whole concept of ultimate self-transformation. But

preparing oneself ‘worthy of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self as a

centre of relationships. (Tu 1985:9, 47) Again, this precondition must be based on

Assumption 2.1: Human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation. Notably, the

precondition of worthiness is not only for relationship with other human beings but also

for forming one body with the Heaven, Earth, nature and the universe. (Tu 1985:9, 47)

Since Man and heaven and earth are one thing and human beings are ‘consanguineous

with nature’ (Tu 1985:9, 47), why there is a need for self-cultivation in order to be

worthy of being one thing with all of them? Can the precondition of worthiness also be

assumed as an incentive for appealing to our internal resources because there are no any

external resources that Ruist selfhood can rely on?

As for the practical aspect, how does one evaluate one’s worthiness of a

relationship? According to ‘socially recognized forms’. This is the only way through

which one can ‘establish the communication necessary for self-cultivation’. (Tu

1985:22). Moreover, Tu (1985:52) emphasizes that ‘character formation’ is the primary

in self-cultivation and is ‘defined in ethical terms’. Even if he asserts self-realization as

‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’, the former is evaluated by the

performance in the latter. (Tu 1985:55)

Since ethics is all about relationships and thus Ruist ethics is mainly a social or

relational ethics, the Ruist ultimate self-transformation is inevitably defined by

relationships or society. In other words, the precondition for the self as a centre of

relationships is to win social recognition. Even if, besides ‘social approval’, Tu

(1985:89) also indicates ‘personal integrity’ as the other more important judgment for

one’s maturity, namely one’s worthiness of a relationship in this context, the problem of

being imposed by social recognition is still there. Where does the standard for defining

personal integrity come from? When its standard conflicts with social standard, which

one should one follow? Therefore, in the context of gaining social recognition, I can

understand why Tu (1985:25, emphasis original) especially emphasizes that ‘morality or

spirituality is not internalized by but expressed through learning’, even if he asserts ‘the

mutual nourishment of inner morality and social norms’ in the Mencian tradition in

order to deny the problem of ‘the imposition of external values upon the self’. But, the

22

outer appearance and expression of morality is inevitably far more important than the

internalized reality of morality in this process of self-transformation with such a

precondition.

3.3.3 A Sense of Community for Moral and Spiritual Self-Development

On the one hand, Tu (1985:26) emphasizes cautiously that preventing from imposing on

others with the ways of not their own is a basic respect for their integrities since no one

can fully understand the other. On the other hand, he never stresses the absolute

essentiality of ‘a sense of community’ too much ‘for moral and spiritual self-

development’ because other people are always ‘an integral part of one's own quest’ for

it. Accordingly, the self as a centre of relationships viewed as ‘a sharable commonality’

open to others but never as ‘an isolated and enclosed individual’. (Tu 1985:26)

Although he (1985:26) asserts that individual diversities other than ‘sameness’ is

assumed in such commonality even with the case of the commonly shared concept of all

roads lead to Rome 條條道路通羅馬 tiáotiáo dàolù tōng Luómǎ in East Asian thought,

in which exclusivism is rejected, he (1985:26) does not deny that fact that Ruism is the

only one among the Three Teachings in East Asia unequivocally asserting ‘society’ as

both the necessity and the intrinsic value for ultimate self-transformation. Since the

lived world is always inevitable to face in all the Three Teachings, Tu’s differentiation

among them in this sense seems to indicate that human-relatedness is primary for

ultimate self-transformation in Ruism but secondary in Buddhism and Daoism. In spite

of such significant difference in this sense, Tu (1985:27) supposes that ‘to eradicate the

alleged fallacy of individualism’ is the commonality among the Three Teachings

through against ‘the falsehood of self-centeredness’ (Ruism) and egoism (Ch’an)

[(chán)], and pro self-forgetfulness (Daoism). Moreover, why he feels strongly ‘the

necessity of going beyond the private in order to participate in a shared vision’ is not

just because of the relatedness of human beings but also because of a Ruist ‘collective

judgment’ that ‘the survival and continuation of their civilization is not a given reality

but a communal attainment’. Such a judgment comes from ‘a fundamental faith in the

transformability and perfectibility of the human condition through communal self-

effort’. (Tu 1985:173, 84) According to Tu’s interpretation, self-cultivation in Ruism is

obviously a communal business and also judged by society. Since there is no external

supreme being as source of authority, it is understandable that collective judgment

based on ‘a strong sense of sharability and commonality’ is the only source of authority

in Ruism since one of Ruist core values is to eradicate the alleged fallacy of

23

individualism and thus does not want to ‘give any particular individual privileged access

to truth’ (Tu 1985:23).

But in Assumption 2.1: Human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation, the

perfection of self-cultivation is assumed to be attained by one’s own inner strength or

self-effort without any external help. Here the assumption is the transformability and

perfectibility of the human condition through communal self-effort. If this modified

assumption 2.1 does not conflict with the original Assumption 2.1, then the communal

self-effort equates with self-effort. Therefore, there is no personal or individual self

allowed in Ruist ultimate self-transformation as a communal act. This understanding

can be also confirmed by Tu’s phrase in another place that ‘intent on underscoring the

commonality, communicability, and community of the human situation, the rhetoric of

assent affirms … the perfectibility of undivided selves through group sharing and

mutual exhortation’. (Tu 1985:82) For the convenience of discussion, we set the

modified assumption 2.1: Human nature is perfectible through communal self-effort.

Notably, in order to make assumption 2.1 sustained, Assumption 1: The self as a centre

of relationship must be its premise.

The worry about the tendency of an imposed relational self in such Ruist

commonality seems still not to be eliminated. In discussing human-relatedness, the issue

of a hierarchical society must not be missed. We are now going to examine Tu’s

interpretation of Rusist relational self in term of it.

3.3.4 Rusist Relational Self in a Hierarchical Structure of Social Roles

Tu (1985:139, 143–5; 1989:66) himself neither denies a hierarchical structure of society

as the product of Ruism, especially, of the five cardinal dyadic relationships 五倫 wǔlún,

and nor denies despotism, gerontocracy, and ‘male-oriented society’ as the product of

Neo-Ruism in pre-modern Chinese history, and even he criticizes these above to some

extent. But in order to correct some common misunderstandings about Ruism, he

(1985:138) clarifies that ‘father-son dyad’ is not assumed ‘as a model’ for the others

because each dyadic relationship is unique and will never ‘subsumed’ under the other.

Provided that he (1985:140) admits the occurrence of ‘obvious asymmetry’ in the

dyadic relationships, he (1985:139) also disputes the ‘asymmetry’ or ‘one-dimensional

dependency’ of the inferior on the superior in all the dyads and argues for ‘reciprocity’

rather than dependency as the underlying value of them. In emphasizing the centrality of

self-cultivation, he (1985:55–8) never asserts to much the independency and autonomy

of the Ruist self. Therefore, it seems that Tu (1985:139–40) tries to correct the

24

unbalanced reality of such relationships by underlying the reciprocity of all the other

four dyadic relationships on the friend-friend dyad as the model of his ideal ‘fiduciary

community’ for the other four. Therefore, it is surprising that Tu (1985:13) attributes to

mere an ‘assumption’ the common phenomenon, disclosed and discussed by many

scholars, that the Ruist self is ‘inevitably submerged in the group’ in order to fulfil its

‘multivalent’ (Hall, David L and Ames, Roger T 1998:25) roles in a hierarchical dyadic

relationships. Does he indicate that all of the studies disclosing such problems impute

mistakenly them to Ruism? Or does he recognize the necessity of modification in the

teachings related to human-relatedness in Ruism and thus present his correct

interpretations? Or does he just present his ‘new vision’ (1985:8) or ideal, as he himself

expects, of Ruist selfhood? Tu (1985:10, 78, 179–80) indeed recognizes the different

problems caused by individualism (such as self-centredness, egoism, isolatedness,

exclusiveness, enclosedness, lost of relatedness, and so on) and collectivism (such as

social-roles-assigned self, lost of individual subjectivity and autonomy, and so on) and

thus presents a synthesis to escape both of them. His basic thesis (1985:27) is ‘equality

without uniformity’. Tu indeed focuses on the key to the problem of social imposition

or ‘coercion’ (Tu 1989:22, 40, 114, 116, 134, 145). But how does equality be sustained

in Ruist relational selfhood? Before we move on to the last section, an issue of cultural

design is deserved to be considered.

3.3.5 Ruist Cultural Design: the privatized self or the small self is debased

Zhèng Zhèngbó 鄭正博 (1990:169–70), a Chinese psychologist, uses the term ‘cultural

design’ 文 化 設 計 wénhuà shèjì to explain the observed unbalance between the

regarding with ‘primary group’ and the disregarding with ‘secondary group’, public

affairs, and social morality or righteousness in Ru-based cultural heritage, which is a

phenomenon of the tendency of an imposed relational self. Hall and Ames use

‘preestablished social patterns’ (1998:24), and R. Randle Edwards’ uses ‘preordained

pattern’ (1986:44) to explain the similar features as Zhèng Zhèngbó 鄭正博 does by the

concept of cultural design. In other words, when the Ruist ideology and virtue such as

that ‘harmony and unity’ must outweigh ‘individual liberty’ and defines ‘Chineseness’

(Suddath, Virginia 2006:239, emphasis original) is a cultural design or preordained

social pattern, it is evidently a promoted and pursued ideal but never a problem to be

prevented from.

25

Can we find the similar concept of cultural design in Tu’s interpretation of Ruist

relational self. Although Tu does not use this term, he manifests that the tendency of an

imposed relational self is actually a cultural design by Ruism. He (1985:57) states:

It is not at all surprising then that, despite the centrality of self-cultivation in Confucian

learning, autobiographic literature exhibiting secret thoughts, private feelings, and

innermost desires and drives is extremely rare in the Confucian tradition. Obviously, the

cultivated self is not private property that we carefully guard against intrusion from outside.

The ego that has to be protected against submersion in the waves of social demand is what

the Confucians refer to as ssu [or sī 私] (the privatized self, the small self, the self that is a

closed system). The true self, on the contrary, is public-spirited, and the great self is the self

that is an open system. As an open system, the self in the genuine sense of the word is

expansive and always receptive to the world at large. Self-cultivation can very well be

understood as the broadening of the self to embody an ever-expanding circle of human

relatedness.

Besides, Hall and Ames (1998:42) also implies such a cultural design while they

explain the similar concept Tu (1985:8–9) also presents that the dichotomous

differences between self and society are not important in Chinese or Ruist thinking, as

follows:

[i]n the classical Chinese language, there is no distinction between the first person singular,

I, and the first person plural, we. An I is always a we. Equally significant, if we can take

Mead's language one step further, is the absence, at least in the early corpus, of any explicit

and consistent distinction between the subjective I/we and the objective me/us. The I/we is

embedded in the me/us.

Moreover, when Tu (1985:14, emphasis original), with Mencian terminology,

summarizes the feature of the self ‘as the manifestation of the great self [大我 dàwǒ]

and the concom[m]itant dissolution of the small self [小我 xiǎowǒ]’, it also indicates a

typical example of such a cultural design.

Although Tu (1985:58, 131) emphasizes repeatedly the similar argument as that

self-transformation is ‘a deliberate communal act’ but ‘not reducible to its social roles’,

the basic cultural design for the Ruist relational self is indeed not allowed to refuse

freely the social demand. In another place, Tu (1985:83, emphasis original) even

explains through his interpretation of the Analects 論語 that, according to assumption 1:

The self as a centre of relationships, ‘man as an ultimately autonomous being is

unthinkable, and the manifestation of the authentic self is impossible except in matrices

of human converse’. This can be also viewed as a cultural design for the tendency of an

imposed relational self. Even if he (1985:131) emphasizes unequivocally that:

One learns to be human not to please others or to conform to an external standard of

conduct. Indeed, learning to be human (hsüeh tso-jen) [or xué zuòrén 學做人 ] is a

spontaneous, autonomous, fully conscious, and totally committed intentional act, an act of

self-realization. It gives its own direction and generates its own form and creates its own

content.

26

such description can only be viewed at most as an idealism. Logically, the statement

conflicts itself. If one is as perfect as described, why does one need to learn to be human?

If one is not at all as described and needs to learn to be human, how can one afford to

escape from being imposed by social demand? We now move to evaluate Tu Weiming’s

interpretation of Ruist selfhood and how well responds to the challenges and worries

raised about the tendency of an imposed relational self by scholars.

4. EVALUTION ON TU WEIMING’S INTERPRETATION OF RUIST SELFHOOD

AND RESPONSES TO SCHOLARS’ CONCERN IN TERMS OF THE TENDENCY

OF AN IMPOSED RELATIONAL SELF

As disclosed and discussed above, Tu (1985:78, 179–80) indeed recognizes

comprehensively the different problems caused by individualism and collectivism and

thus tries to presents Ruist selfhood as a synthesis to escape both of them through his

meticulous interpretations and arguments. Undoubtedly, he pictures a quite circumspect

and ideal blueprint for a healthy transformation project of self and community. Can it

successfully relieve scholars’ worry about the tendency of an imposed relational self?

His basic thesis (1985:27) is ‘equality without uniformity’. Tu indeed focuses on the

key to the problem of social imposition. But how does equality be sustained in Ruist

relational selfhood? We are going to evaluate, in terms of the tendency of an imposed

relational self, all the related responses and interpretations of Ruist selfhood by Tu.

4.1 How Does Tu Response to the Challenges and Worries Raised by the

Scholars about the Tendency of an Imposed Relational Self?

Tu recognizes the related the problems of social imposition existing in the pre-modern

Chinese history and criticizes to some extent some teachings and applications of Neo-

Ruists. Although he clearly senses and understands the challenges and worries raised by

the contemporary scholars about the tendency of an imposed relational self in Ru-based

cultural heritage in post-traditional time, he (1985:13, 114, 116, 134, 141) seems to

ascribe all of these criticisms to misunderstanding of Ruism and misleading assumption

that such problems are related to Ruism. Since post-traditional Ru-inspired Chinese are

those who are inspired tangibly and intangibly by the post-traditional Ru-based cultural

heritage but might not be necessarily adopting any orthodox or classical version of

Ruist teachings for their own expression, or even claiming or sensing Ruism as the

source of such inspiration, we might not be able to make sure what part and how much

of Ruism is distorted. Ruism might be perhaps just a scapegoat in this situation.

27

4.2 How Does Tu Dispute the Tendency of an Imposed Relational Self in

Ru-Based Cultural Heritage?

Besides clarifying the proper interpretation of Ruist selfhood, which will be evaluated

later, Tu always uses dichotomous terms such as open/enclosed or isolated,

shared/private or self-centred, inclusiveness/exclusiveness, relatedness/individualism or

egoism and so on, to dispute the tendency of an imposed relational self in Ruist

relational self. On the one hand, Tu (1985:12, 22, 114, 116, 134, 137, 145) repeatedly

clarifies and justifies Ruist relatedness in order to prevent it from being mistaken for the

extreme case characterized by the problem of social imposition, namely arguing that the

problem of social imposition is extreme case and Ruist relatedness is never so extreme.

(Tu 1985:22) Notably Hall and Ames (1998:24) seems to take the same strategy as Tu’s

to defend for Ruist selfhood. On the other hand, he justifies the rightness of it by the

antithesis of the extreme case of egoism or absolute self-centredness. Notably, in his

other book, he (1976:53; 1989:40) asserts a total alienation from sociality and its value

can only happen in ‘an extreme display of individualism’. But, I think he would not

disagree, these are neither issues of either or or nor issues of none or all. These issues

are related to the tendency of social imposition and most cases are not extreme ones in

either side. We cannot deny the existence of the tendency of social imposition even

individuality and autonomy are not totally destroyed. For example, Marc L Moskowitz

(2007) uses a coined term ‘quiet individualism’ to indicate the women’s struggling for

individuality under their abusing husbands who justifies their hierarchical superiority

based on Ru-based culture heritage. Erika Evasdottir (2005) uses the other coined term

‘obedient autonomy’ to describe the special phenomenon of Ru-based hierarchical

relationships mainly between teachers and students in her case study on Chinese

Intellectual archaeologists.

Besides, individualism and egoism might not mean the same thing. Private and

self-centred, or individualism (or private) and exclusion (isolated), either. For example,

the equality in Western individualism emphasizes that ‘all individuals are equal before

the law, loci of human rights, and entitled to equal opportunities; each is one of God’s

children’ (Hall & Ames 1998:25), especially in the group made up by them. Fèi

Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1992:67), a Chinese anthropologist, indicates that individualism

pursues the ‘balance’ between individuals and their whole group and thus yields two

fruits: 1. Equality: One individual is not allowed to ‘encroach on’ the others; 2.

Constitutionality: their whole group is not allowed to ‘deny the rights of an individual’

except ‘the partial rights they have willingly handed over’. In this sense, individualism

28

is opposite to egoism or ‘egocentrism’. Fèi Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1992:67) criticizes Ruist

selfhood as ‘egocentrism’ because of the self as a centre of relationships, namely

Assumption 1 presupposed by Tu. Notably, the individuality in the context of traditional

Ruist selfhood might tend to mean uniqueness rather than autonomy. In terms of this

definition, ‘equality can only mean parity’ because the individual is defined, recognized,

and distinguished by how well or how much one can achieve the quality of one’s roles

to ‘multivalent relationships’ through ‘communal deference’ to the quality of character

required by Rusist social ethics. (Hall & Ames 1998:25, emphasis original) But since

Tu (1985:27) supposes, as described above, that to eradicate the alleged fallacy of

individualism is the commonality among the Three Teachings and Ruism is against the

falsehood of self-centeredness in this context, does he, in terms of Fèi Xiàotōng’s

definition of individualism, really mistakenly equate individualism with egoism? And

does he recognize that egocentrism can be resulted from Ruist selfhood, as Fèi Xiàotōng

criticizes?

Since the extreme of egoism is not relevant to the tendency of social imposition

caused by Ruist relational self and thus beyond the scope of this paper, the

differentiations about the other terminology will not be dealt with here.

4.3 Does Tu practically treat the challenges and worries about the

tendency of an imposed relational self in Ru-based cultural heritage?

Tu tends to argue his case theoretically. His argument sounds like that there will not

appear the tendency to have an illegitimately imposed relational self since proper Ruist

teachings do not teach so. Although he emphasizes repeatedly that Ruist selfhood is

about a ceaseless process of self-cultivation, he seems to assume that every Ruism

follower have been a sage while he argue his case theoretically. Only if the perfection in

reality has not yet been reached, his theoretically arguments cannot be sustained.

4.4 Does Tu’s Interpretations and Arguments Make a Good Case for

Ruism?

There are several weak points in Tu’s interpretations and arguments as follows:

1. The whole concept of Ruist selfhood is based on many interrelated assumptions

some of which sometimes assumes each other in circularity, discussed as above.

Only if one of assumptions is not sustained, the related arguments are corrupted. For

example, the perfectibility is negated by the term ceaseless self-cultivation. He put

all his faith in human so as to reject any other possibility that his faith can be put in.

Although he not only once denies it as a romantic utopia, it is very hard not to view it

29

as just an imaged idealism in the sense of imperfect human beings. Even if Tu

(1985:126) admits the concept of the self as ‘an implicit circularity’: ‘human nature

is good so that there is an authentic possibility for dynamic spiritual development and

vice versa, he does not see it as a ‘vicious one’, as mentioned above. Leaving alone

his reason for it, even this circularity is not sustained logically. For the former can be

premise but not the latter. The latter cannot be sustained without the former as its

premise. Therefore the latter cannot be the premise of the former. However, there is

not only this circularity he admits in his whole concept of Ruist selfhood (sagehood).

Diagram 1 sums up all aforementioned assumptions and their interrelated relations

and discloses at least five circles.

A1.1 All things

are my

companions

A2 The self as a dynamic process

of spiritual developmen

A2.3 Heaven-

Endowment

‘Ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’

Sagehood (selfhood)

A2.4 Heaven as

the full self-

realization

A1 The self as a

centre of

relationships

A2.2 Intrinsic

Goodness?

A2.1 Perfectibility

through

communal effort

Diagram 1. The interrelated assumptions and their relations in Tu’s interpretation of Ruist selfhood

(sagehood). (A2.1 is the modified one. The direction of arrow is from the premised side to the predicated

side.

2. Although human nature is endowed by Heaven, everything is defined by human

being because Heaven is not an external being or creator let alone Earth, nature and

university. Therefore, human can define cosmology, the continuity of being, and that

Man and heaven and earth are one thing, and so on. Even transcendence is highly

valued, this transcendence means properly surpassing in the plane of human beings.

In reality, there is no any higher being above human beings. In the sense of selfhood,

30

the self can only be defined by either itself or the other self (including the other

collective selves). In the former case, the self tends to develop into an egoist, which

Ruism tries to eradicate. In the latter case, the self tends to be imposed by the other

collective selves because the other individual self is not allowed to do it in Ruist

ideology. Ruism belongs to the latter case. Therefore, the tendency of an imposed

relational self is hard to evade.

3. In Tu’s emphasis on the importance of communal self-effort and communal

attainment in ultimate self-transformation as a communal act, the tendency of an

imposing relational self becomes a corollary, let alone his interpretation manifests

Ruist cultural design that the privatized self or the small self is debased, even if Tu

tries very hard to prevent it theoretically as described above.

4.5 How Can Equality Be Sustained by a Ruist Relational Selfhood?

About Tu’s basic thesis (1985:27), ‘equality without uniformity’, I believe that

uniformity can be prevented because it will appear only in the extreme collectivistic

situation. In the context of Ruist relational selfhood, equality might at most refer to

egalitarian between two selves only if the so-called reciprocity between the dyadic

relationships can be practically and actually predominate in place of a prioritized

asymmetry relational pattern, but not between self and society because of the Ruist

cultural design. Or more properly speaking, according to the definition of individualism

by Fèi Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1992:67), the Ruist cultural design lacks of the concept

constitutionality so that the rights of an individual will not be protected by the whole

group. Therefore, only if the perfection in reality has not yet been reached, the self tends

to be imposed by social demand because of Ruist cultural design that the privatized self

or the small self is debased and of a hierarchical social structure as product of Ruism as

discussed above.

5. CONCLUSION

The highly industrialized and materialized Chinese social development that has

concerned all over the world in the past decade prompts new questions among us. A

need is recognized by sources for a new synthesis to be developed between

individualism and collectivism, while we have all witnessed problems connected to both

of these ethical orientations. Tu Weiming’s interpretations of Ruist selfhood aim to

change the collectivistic image of Ruism in the past. Although he pictures a quite

circumspect and ideal blueprint for a healthy transformative project involving self and

31

community, and argues theoretically for his case, I am afraid that he has not yet

successfully in saving Ruism from the mire of collectivism.

The tendency of imposing a relational view of self within human community is

indeed the main feature and issue of collectivism discussed by most scholars. Tu is not

ignorant of the criticisms on collectivism, instead, his book is a self-conscious defence

of collectivism in response to 提 His defences show us that he either denies the

existence of the tendency of there being an imposed relational self, or he disputes the

blame imputed on Ruism as an incorrect assumption or a misunderstanding of it in the

context of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. We will agree that it is not easy

in fact to make sure what part and how much Ruism has been distorted among post-

traditional Ru-inspired Chinese. The answers vary, depending on different individuals,

families, societies, and locations in a post-traditional pluralized age. But could Ruism be

just a scapegoat in this situation? Further field research which surveys the post-

traditional Ru-inspired Chinese extensively and comprehensively might be helpful to

verify the answer to this question more objectively. For example, the case studies of

Moskowitz (2007) and Evasdottir (2005) mentioned above point toward this direction.

However, can we find we find a comprehensive resolution of these problems through

Tu’s interpretation of Ruist selfhood?

Because Tu has notices the problems of both individualism and collectivism and

aims to present in his book a synthesis having both of their strengths, but without all of

their weaknesses, his interpretations of Ruist selfhood not only includes related

discussions, but also defends repeatedly some specific elements of collectivism. His

strategy in defending Ruist selfhood is to prevent it from falling into the extreme

collectivistic case characterized and criticized by the problem of the imposition

mentioned above while disputing the problems of individualism by always referring to

its extreme case. We would agree that there are no adequately justified reasons

supporting these claims within either individualism or collectivism, except special

individual cases, in any post-traditional pluralized age. The possible remaining problem

which causes scholarly concern is the tendency of an imposed relational self. In the way

Tu Weiming interprets these matters, it is as if there will be no problem of this sort at all

in perfected Ruist selfhood, although he claims repeatedly the process of self-cultivation

is a ceaseless process. Is what is presented prone like an imagined theoretical ideal in

dealing with Ruist selfhood, something presented as the ultimate goal of his synthesis?

Tu (2007:153), some twenty years later, eventually unequivocally admits the

32

imperfectiblity in reality and but still sticks on this assumptive theory to guide Ruist

practice by stating as follows:

Human nature … is endowed by Heaven. Yet the uniqueness of being human is our inner

ability to learn to follow the Way. We are capable of educating ourselves to become worthy

partners of the cosmic process. This is predicated on the assumptive reason that we are

empowered to apprehend Heaven through our self-knowledge. As Mencius avowed, if we

can realize the full measure of our heart-and-mind, we will know our nature; if we know

our nature, we will know Heaven. Surely existentially we cannot fully realize our heart-

and-mind, thus, in practical terms, it is unlikely that we will ever know our nature in itself

and, by inference, it is unlikely we will ever know Heaven in its entirety. But, in theory and,

to a certain extent in practice, we can be attuned to the Way of Heaven.

Therefore, His arguments become invalid because the tendency toward social

imposition is never part of the ideal situation in his synthesis, so that his case for Ruist

selfhood appears always as a future goal that actually never exists. This includes

Confucius himself, if we read Tu’s claims in this strict manner. Nevertheless, we cannot

deny the existence of this tendency to impose a relational self into Chinese communal

settings, so that even if individuality and autonomy are not totally destroyed, it is still

left unresolved. Similarly, even if Ru-based cultural heritage does not follow the

complete proper teachings of orthodox Ruism, the tendency still will be found to exist. I

think it will be very hard to prevent this tendency of the imposition of a relational self

when there is only an unreached ideal hovering above all these concrete cultural settings.

Although Tu admits the imperfection of human beings in reality and yet denies

that Ruist selfhood is merely a romantic utopia, I argue that the concept of self-

transcendence tends to be based on an idealism because it is ultimately

incomprehensible. If any externally transcendent God is rejected by Ruism which

appears to be this position in this work, then Ruist selfhood itself becomes the

transcendent reference point. This being the case, will Tu and other post-traditional

Ruists be able to transcend their concept of selfhood? Or will Ruist selfhood not be able

to transcend its real transformation, because it has not fully dealt with the unrealistic

assumptions found above, and at the same time has rejected other metaphysical

alternatives? Although Tu repeatedly stresses that Ruist selfhood and also the cosmos

are open systems, it seems that all the above assumptions tend to make his form of post-

traditional Ruism or Ruist selfhood an enclosed system. I argue that Ruist selfhood

should be seen as an enclosed system in terms of having no external supreme being as

the source for all human cultivation and the legitimization of its authority. If Tu and

33

other post-traditional Ruists are not open to any other possibilities, it seems that they are

ultimately unable to move beyond this enclosed system assumed by them. 20

The perfectibility and intrinsic goodness of human nature as a Heaven-endowed

nature, along with the complete unity between humanity and Heaven as the form of

ultimate self-transformation, are linked together in Tu’s interpretations by means of

circular arguments. For example, if one is as perfect as described, why does one need to

learn to be human? If one is not at all as described and needs to learn to be human, how

can one afford to escape from a relational self imposed by prevailing social demands?

Although there must be always some unproved assumptions, premises, or

presuppositions as the basis of any belief system or philosophy, the more circular

arguments there are in a system, the less open it is to criticism, and so the weaker it is.

Even if there are at least five circles demonstrated in Diagram 1 in Tu’s interpretation of

Ruist concept selfhood, he shows his strong faith in those assumptions as mutually

reinforcing premises and rejects any possibilities outside them. It is understandable that

those assumptions must be based on each other, since within his system in his work

there is no external transcendent being which serves as their foundation. Since Heaven,

Earth, nature, and the universe are not personal beings in the post-traditional Ruism

promoted by Tu, it seems evident that in that Ruist context Heaven, transcendence, and

the divine are used to indicate metaphorically the unfathomable and indescribable extent

of self-realization of human beings. This is a form of self-realization that moves toward

perfection, but does so without transcending beyond the plane of human self-realization.

Because of this, I have suggested that the term surpassing when applied to self-

transcending realizations would be a more proper account of this claim, rather than the

term transcendence as it applies to in the context of Ruist selfhood. 這也可由他的中文

版翻譯來支持。P.5 中文翻成超越，而不是超驗

Nevertheless, the main reason for Tu’s failure to save Ruism from the mire of

collectivism is the verification of the tendency of an imposed relational self as a cultural

design, namely that the privatized self or the small self is debased in this post-traditional

Ruism. Some scholars, for example R. Randle Edwards (1986:44) and Donald J. Munro

(1979 cited in Hall & Ames 1998:24), view such a cultural design as a traditional

collectivistic ‘Chinese ideal’ (Hall & Ames 1998:24). Since Tu’s ideal synthesis is

neither individualistic nor collectivistic, his interpretation of this part conflicts with his

20 Although Tu (2007:150, 152) finally accepted the idea of Christian God as lived reality twenty years

later, he still do not think it as Ruists’ alternative.

34

arguments distinguishing his claims from collectivism. In this context, it is very hard for

Tu to eliminate the problem of the tendency to impose a Ruist relational selfhood by

mere denying that it happens. In addition, a specific post-traditional Ruist cultural

design is consequently enhanced by Tu’s repeated emphases on the importance of

communal self-effort and communal attainment in an ultimate self-transformation as a

communal act. In the end, it seems that the only way one can define the self is through

one’s relationships with other collective selves.

Therefore, Tu’s interpretations of Ruist selfhood do not convince one that Ruism

is just a scapegoat when it is blamed for imposing an relational self on persons.

Although Tu emphasizes within his thesis that there would be equality without

uniformity, the meaning of equality in this context of a post-traditional Ruist relational

selfhood might only refer to some possible state between two particular selves, but

cannot be realized between one self and the larger communal society. Put another way,

according to the definition of individualism, promoted by Fèi Xiàotōng 費 孝 通

(1992:67), the traditional Ruist cultural design lacks a concept of constitutionality so

that the rights of an individual will not be protected by the whole group. Therefore, it

would be worth considering for Tu and other post-traditional Ruists to check whether

egocentrism, what they generally oppose, can still be found as a facet of Ruist selfhood,

as Fèi Xiàotōng himself critically asserts. Speaking summarily, then, whenever self-

realization in reality has not yet been reached, the Ruist self tends to be imposed by

social demands because of the Ruist cultural design which debases the privatized self or

the small self and supports a hierarchical social structure as promoted in both traditional

and post-traditional Ruism.

Do these results lead us to the conclusions that Ruism needs to be interpreted and

justified in better ways? Do these indicate that some assumptions of post-traditional

Ruism should be modified? Do these also reveal that traditional Ruism or post-

traditional Ruist selfhood becomes an enclosed system because of some unchangeable

assumptions? Do they suggest that there would be some other possible good

interpretative options which Ruism might find outside its own traditional resources?

These are the questions which deserve to be explored by post-traditional Ruists and Ru-

inspired Chinese intellectuals.

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arcodia, Charles 2003 'Confucian Values and Their Implications for the Tourism

Industry' in 2003 Annual CAUTHE Conference Coffs Harbour

35

Bai, Chongliang 白崇亮, also as Bái Chóngliàng 2007 Yǒngyú Zhēnshí : Àoměi Jítuán

Dǒngshìzhǎng Bái Chóngliàng de Nàzài Shìjiè 《勇於真實: 奧美集團董事長白崇亮的內在視界》 Taipei: Tiānxià Yuǎnjiàn (天下遠見)

Barrett, TH 1986 'Review of Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation.

By Tu Wei-Ming 1985' Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (New Series)

118/02:319

Bellah, Robert N 1991 Beyond Belief: Essays on religion in a post-traditionalist world

Berkeley: University of California

Bellah, Robert N 2005 'Civil Religion in America' Daedalus 134/4:40–55

Berger, Peter 2012 'Is Confucianism a Religion? | Religion and Other Curiosities

[Online] (Updated 15 Feb 2012)' Peter Berger’s Blog Available at:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/berger/2012/02/15/is-confucianism-a-

religion/ Accessed 4.4.2012

Berthrong, John 2005a 'Review of Confucianism for the Modern World Edited by

Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong 2003' The Journal of Asian Studies

64/4:994–6

Berthrong, John 2005b 'Review of Human Rights and Chinese Thought by Stephen C

Angle 2002' The Journal of Asian Studies 64/4:993–4

Bresciani, Umberto 2001 Reinventing Confucianism : The New Confucian movement

Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies

Broadbent, Jeffrey 2010 'Introduction: East Asian social movements' in J Broadbent &

V Brockman eds. 2010 East Asian Social Movements: Power, Protest, and

Change in a Dynamic Region New York: Springer pp. 1–29

Cai, Degui 蔡德貴, also as Cài Déguì 2004 'On American Confucianism 《試論美國儒

家學派》' Journal of Renmin University of China /5:79–85

Chan, Wingtsit 1969 A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy Princeton: Princeton

University

Cheng, Stephen KK 1990 'Understanding the Culture and Behaviour of East Asians —

A Confucian Perspective' Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry

24/4:510–15

Ching, Julia 1993 'II. Confucianism: Ethical humanism as religion? 1. Julia Ching:

Chinese perspectives' in Ching, Julia & Küng, Hans 1993 Christianity and

Chinese Religions London: SCM pp. 61–92

Chong, Terence 2002 'Asian values and Confucian ethics: Malay Singaporeans’

dilemma' Journal of Contemporary Asia. 32/3

Cole, J Preston 1971 The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud New Haven ;

London: Yale University

Doi, Takeo 1981 The Anatomy of Dependence New edn Tokyo: Kodansha International

36

Dong, Fangyuan 董芳苑, also as Dǒng Fāngyuàn 1995 Zōngjiāo yǔ Wénhuà 《宗教與文化》 Tainan: Rénguāng (人光)

Edwards, Edwards 1986 'Civil and Social Rights: Theory and practice in Chinese law

today' in RR Edwards, L Henkin, & AJ Nathan, 1986 Human Rights in

Contemporary China New York: Columbia University pp. 41–76

Evasdottir, Erika ES 2005 Obedient Autonomy: Chinese intellectuals and the

achievement of orderly life Honolulu: University of Hawaii

Fei, Xiaotong 1992 From the Soil, the Foundations of Chinese Society: A translation of

Fei Xiaotong’s Xiangtu Zhongguo [Xiāngtǔ Zhōngguó 鄉土中國] Berkeley:

University of California

Fleming, Jess 2002 'Self and (In)finitude: Embodiment and the other' Journal of

Chinese Philosophy 29/2:171–91

Fu, Zhengyuan 1993 Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics Cambridge England;

New York: Cambridge University

Gold, Thomas B 1996 'Civil Society in Taiwan: The Confucian dimension' in W Tu ed.

1996 Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and

Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Ch.12

Gong, Jianping 龔 建 平 , also as Gōng Jiànpíng 2004 'Lùn Rújiā Réngé Xīnlǐ

Gòuchéng ——Chǐrǔgǎn de xiàndài zhuǎnhuàn jí yìyì 〈論儒家人格心理構

成——恥辱感的現代轉換及意義〉' Rénwén Zázhì 《人文雜誌》 /1

Hall, David L & Ames, Roger T 1998 Thinking from the Han: Self, truth, and

transcendence in Chinese and Western culture State University of New York

Hang, Lin 2011 'Traditional Confucianism and its Contemporary Relevance' Asian

Philosophy 21/4:437–45

Hays, Jeffrey 2008 'Chinese Society Confucianism, Crowds and Villages' Facts And

Details [Online] (Updated February 2011) Available at:

http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat11/sub70/item159.html Accessed 15.10.2012

He, Youhui 何友暉, also as Hé Yǒuhuī; Chen, Shujuan 陳淑娟, also as Chén Shūjuān

& Zhao, Zhiyu 趙志裕 , also as Zhào Zhìyù 1989 'Guānxì Qǔxiàng : Wéi

zhōngguó shèhuì xīnlǐ fāngfǎlùn qiú dáàn 〈關係取向: 為中國社會心理方法論

求答案〉' in also as YG Yang, Guoshu 楊國樞 & also as HG Hwang, Kwang-

Kuo 黃光國 eds. 1989 Zhōngguórén de Xīnlǐ yǔ Xíngwéi 《中國人的心理與行為》 Taipei: Guìguàn (桂冠) pp. 49–66

Ho, David YF 1994 'Filial piety, authoritarian moralism, and cognitive conservatism in

Chinese societies' Genetic, social, and general psychology monographs

120/3:349–65

37

Ho, David YF 1995 'Selfhood and Identity in Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and

Hinduism Contrasts with the West' Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

25/2:115–39

Huang, Grace Hui-Chen & Gove, Mary 2012 'Confucianism and Chinese Families:

Values and Practices in Education' International Journal of Humanities and

Social Science 2/3:10–14

Huang, Paulos 黃 保 羅 , also as Huáng Bǎoluó 2006 Confronting Confucian

Understandings of the Christian Doctrine of Salvation Helsinki: BRILL

Hwang, Kwang-Kuo 黃光國, also as Huáng Guāngguó 1999 'Filial Piety and Loyalty:

Two types of social identification in Confucianism' Asian Journal of Social

Psychology 2:163–83

Hwang Kwang-Kuo 黃光國, also as Huáng Guāngguó 2006 Rújiā Guānxì Zhǔyì:

Wénhuà fǎnsī yǔ diǎnfàn zhòngjiàn 《儒家關係主義：文化反思與典範重建》 Beijing: Běijīng Dàxué (北京大學)

Keating, Jerome F 2004 'The Dark Side of Confucianism' Available at:

http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~iltc/EnglishPages/PublicAffair/confucius.pdf

Accessed 7.11.2012

Knapp, Keith N 2006 'Creeping Absolutism: Parental authority as seen in early

medieval tales of filial offspring' in PD Hershock & RT Ames eds. 2006

Confucian Cultures of Authority Albany: State Univ of New York pp. 65–91

Koh, Byong-ik 1996 'Confucianism in Contemporary Korea' in W Tu ed. 1996

Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Education and economic culture in Japan and the four Mini-Dragons Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ch.9

Lee, Jeong-Kyu 2001 'Confucian Thought Affecting Leadership and Organizational

Culture of Korean Higher Education' Radical Pedagogy 3/3

Leonard, George J 2006 'Confucius and the Confucian Family System' George J

Leonard, Ph.D. Available at: http://www.georgeleonard.com/articles/confucius-

and-the-confucian-family-system.htm Accessed 15.10.2012

Levenson, Joseph R 1964 Confucian China and its Modern Fate: Volume two The

problem of monarchical Decay Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California

Li, Lukyan 李耀全 & Kwok, Hung Biu 郭鴻標, also as Lǐ Yàoquán &Guō Hóngbiāo

2005 'Duìtán “Zhēnshí de Zìwǒ” 〈對談「真實的自我」〉' in Yuen, Tatchi 袁

達志 also as YD (Translator), Li, Lukyan 李耀全 ed. 2005 Zhēnwǒ /Jiǎwǒ :

Wéi zhēnshí língxìng gèngxīn ér shè de lùntán 《真我/假我：為真實靈性更新而設的論壇》 (Chinese Version of Conversations, Volume 2 Fall 2003 : True

Self /False Self: Are you stuck? ) Translated from English by TC Yuen 袁 & YY

To 陶 Hong Kong: Tiendao pp. 17–28

Lin, Honghsin 林鴻信, also as Lín Hóngxìn 2008 Luòyè Suífēng  : Lùn wàngwǒ 《落葉隨風 : 論忘我》 Hong Kong: Dàofēng Shūshè (道風書社)

38

Lin, Xiaodong 2010 'Rural Men in Urban China: Masculinity and identity formation of

male peasant workers' Ph.D Thesis, Birmingham: University of Birmingham

Liu, Shuhsien 劉述先 1996 'Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical review of

contemporary Neo-Confucian thought' in W Tu ed. 1996 Confucian Traditions

in East Asian Modernity: Education and economic culture in Japan and the four Mini-Dragons Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ch.4

Lin Liyun 林麗雲, also as Lín Lìyún 1987 'Xúnzhǎo Shèngkāi de Zìjǐ：Zhōngguórén

de zìwǒ gàiniàn 〈尋找盛開的自己：中國人的自我概念〉' in Zhanglaoshi

Yuekan 張老師月刊 ed. 1987 Zhōngguórén de Miànjù Xìnggé: Rénqíng yǔ

miànzǐ 《 中國人的面具性格: 人情與面子》 Taipei: Zhānglǎoshī (張老師) pp.

2–13

McGrath, Joanna Collicutt & McGrath, Alister E 1992 The Dilemma of Self-Esteem :

The Cross and Christian Confidence Wheaton, IL; Cambridge: Crossway Books

Miller, Joan G 1994 'Cultural Diversity in the Morality of Caring: Individually Oriented

Versus Duty-Based Interpersonal Moral Codes' Cross-Cultural Research

28/1:3–39

Moskowitz, Marc L 2007 'Failed families and quiet individualism: domestic abuse and

women’s strategies of resistance in urban Taiwan' Journal of archaeology and

anthropology 67:157–84

Pfister, Lauren F 2011 'Ruist Traditions of Revenge in Tension with Justice and

Reconciliation' in 2011 The International Conference on “The Power to Heal:

Ways and Obstacles to Collective Reconciliation in Eastern and Western

Traditions” [unpublished] The University of Hong Kong

Pfister, Lauren F 2013 'Confirming and Challenging Ancient Ruist Understandings of

Filial Piety Based on the Writings of the German Missionary-Scholar, Ernst

Faber 花之安 (1839-1899) and the Chinese Pastor-Scholar, Princeton Hsü 徐松

石 (1900-1999)' in 2013 The International Conference on “Comparative Jewish

and Chinese Ethics” [unpublished] The Center for Judaic and Inter-Religious

Studies, Shandong University

Rooney, Sean 2008 'The Complexity of Confucian Chinese Family Relationship' Yahoo!

Contributor Network [Online] (Updated 23 Jan, 2008) Available at:

http://voices.yahoo.com/the-complexity-confucian-chinese-family-relationship-

819619.html Accessed 15.10.2012

Rosemont, Henry Jr 2012 Confucian Role Ethics: A challenge to the ideology of

individualism [Lecture] Oxford University Oxford May 24 2012

Shizuka, Satsuki 2010 'Rethinking the Hanfu Movement, November 2010 (Pt.2)'

Toronto Guqin Society [Online] Available at:

http://torguqin.wordpress.com/2010/12/04/rethinking-the-hanfu-movement-nov-

2010-pt2/ Accessed 12.7.2011

Śleziak, Tomasz 2013 'The Role of Confucianism in Contemporary South Korean

Society' Rocznik Orientalistyczny 66/1:27–46

39

Slote, Walter H 1998 'Psychocultural Dynamics within the Confucian Family' in WH

Slote & GA De Vos eds. 1998 Confucianism and the Family Albany: State

University of New York Ch.2

Slote, Walter H & De Vos, George A eds. 1998 Confucianism and the Family Albany:

State University of New York

Smith, Huston 2009 The World’s Religions New York: HarperOne

Smith, Robert J 1996 'The Japanese (Confucian) Family: The tradition from the bottoem

up' in W Tu ed. 1996 Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Education

and economic culture in Japan and the four Mini-Dragons Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Ch.7

Spitzmuller, Matthias & Ilies, Remus 2010 'Do they all see my true self? Leader’s

relational authenticity and followers’ assessments of transformational leadership'

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 19/3:304–32

Suddath, Virginia 2006 'Ought We Throw the Confucian Baby Out with the

Authoritarian Bathwater?: A critical inquiry into Lu Xun’s anti-Confucian

identity' in PD Hershock & RT Ames eds. 2006 Confucian Cultures of Authority

Albany: State Univ of New York pp. 215–45

Sun, Lung-Kee 孫隆基 , also as Sun Lóngjī 2004 Zhōngguó Wénhuà de Shēncéng

Jiégòu《中國文化的深層結構》 Guilin: Guǎngxī Shīfàn Dàxué (廣西師範大

學)

Tucker, Mary Evelyn 1998 'Introduction to Confucianism: Confucianism and Ecology:

Potential and Limits' Forum on Religion and Ecology Available at:

http://fore.research.yale.edu/religion/confucianism/ Accessed 15.10.2012

Tu, Weiming 1976 Centrality and Commonality: An essay on Chung-yung Hawaii: The

University Press of Hawaii

Tu, Weiming 1979 'Ultimate Self‐Transformation as a Communal Act: Comments on

modes of self‐cultivation in traditional China' Journal of Chinese Philosophy

6/2:237–46

Tu, Weiming 1985 Confucian Thought: Selfhood as creative transformation Albany,

NY: State Univ of New York

Tu, Weiming 1989 Centrality and Commonality: An essay on Confucian religiousness

Revised and Enlarged edn Albany: State Univ of New York

Tu, Weiming 1993 Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian intellectual

Albany: State University of New York

Tu, Weiming 2007 'Sociality, Individuality and Anthropocosmic Vision in Confucian

Humanism' in M Chandler & R Littlejohn eds. 2007 Polishing the Chinese

Mirror: Essays in honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr. New York: Global Scholarly

Publications pp. 146–59

40

Tu, Weiming 杜維明, also as Dù Wéimíng 1998 'Confucius and Confucianism' in WH

Slote & GA De Vos eds. 1998 Confucianism and the Family Albany: State

University of New York Ch.1

Universitaet Duisburg Essen 2009 'Chinese Business Values of the Past – Confucian

Influence and the Modern Business Values' Available at: http://ti.uni-

due.de/ti/de/education/teaching/ss09/managecultureEastAsia/studentischeArbeit

en/12.Reading%20notes.Chinese%20Business%20Value%20past%20&%20pres

ent.pdf Accessed 15.10.2012

University of Florida 2012 'Chinese Business - Confucian Business Ethics - Hierarchy'

China Business: Business Culture And Traditions For Successful Interactions [Online] (Updated 7 November, 2012) Available at:

http://secondchina.com/Learning_Modules/BUS_web/content/BUS_confucian_e

thics_hierarchy.html Accessed 15.10.2012

Wang, Charles 2012 'Confucian Chinese Family Relationship and the Obama Family'

Info of the Course Information Organization and Retrieval (202 F12) at University of California, Berkeley Available at:

http://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i202/f12/node/662 Accessed 15.10.2012

Wang, Jue 2014 'The Common Good and Filial Piety: A Confucian perspective' in D

Solomon & PC Lo eds. 2014 The Common Good: Chinese and American

perspectives Dordrecht: Heidelberg: New York: London: Springer

Sciencc+Business Media Dordrecht Ch.7

Watson, Steve n.d. 'Classic Confucianism' Chinese Philosophy Available at:

http://stevewatson.info/courses/ChinesePhilosophy/lectures/2.classic_confuciani

sm/classic_confucianism.htm Accessed 6.11.2014

Winnicott, Donald W 1965 Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment:

Studies in the theory of emotional development London: The Hogarth Press and

the Institute of Psycho-Analysis

Wong, Melvin W 2001 'Chinese Culture and Psychological Disorders in Pastoral

Ministry: An Introduction to the Core Issues [Class handouts] December 2001

Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist Theological Seminary' Available at:

http://freedownload.is/doc/chinese-culture-and-psychology-2472662.html

Accessed 4.6.2012

Xie, Wenyu 謝文郁, also as Xiè Wényù 1998 'Lùn Zhōngguó Wénhuà Zhōng De Fènliè

Zìwǒ Jí Qí Zhěnghé 〈論中國文化中的分裂自我及其整合〉 (On the Divided

Self and its Integration in Chinese Culture)' Wéizhēn Xuékān 《维真學刊》

VI/1 Available at: http://www.regentcsp.org/wzxk_list.asp?id=501 Accessed

30.5.2012

Yang, Guoshu 楊國樞, also as Yáng Guóshū 2002 Huárén Xīnlǐ de Běntǔhuà Yánjiū

《華人心理的本土化研究》 Taipei: Guìguàn (桂冠)

Yang, Jienlong 楊 劍 龍 , also as Yáng Jiànlóng 2012 Jīdūjiāo Wénhuà Duì Wǔsì

Xīnwénxué De Yǐngxiǎng 《基督教文化對五四新文學的影響》 Taipei:

Xiùwēi Zīxùn Kējì (秀威資訊科技)

41

Yao, Xinzhong 2013 'Confucianism' in X Yao ed. 2013 Routledgecurzon Encyclopedia

of Confucianism London: Routledge pp. 1–11

Young, Stephen B 1998 'The Orthodox Chinese Confucian Social Paradigm versus

Vietnamese Individualism' in WH Slote & GA De Vos eds. 1998 Confucianism

and the Family Albany: State University of New York Ch.8

Yum, June Ock 1988 'The Impact of Confucianism on Interpersonal Relationships and

Communication Patterns in East Asia' Communication Monographs 55/4:374–

88

Zhang, Hsiaoyang 1996 Shakespeare in China: A comparative study of two traditions

and cultures Cranbury: London; Ontario: Associated University Presses

Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān 張老師月刊 ed. 1987 Zhōngguórén de Miànjù Xìnggé: Rénqíng yǔ

miànzǐ 《 中國人的面具性格: 人情與面子》 Taipei: Zhānglǎoshī (張老師)

Zheng, Zhengbo 鄭 正 博 , also as Zhèng Zhèngbó 1990 'Zhōngguórén Dāngrán

Búshēngqì 〈中國人當然不生氣〉' in also as ZY Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 張老師

月刊 ed. 1990 Zhōngguórén de Shìjiān Yóuxì: Rénqíng yǔ shìgù 《中國人的世間遊戲: 人情與世故》 Taipei: Zhānglǎoshī (張老師) pp. 167–76

Zhuang, Huiqiu 莊慧秋, also as Zhuāng Huìqiū 1987 'Zhōngguórén de Miànjù Xìnggé:

Zìwǒ xíngxiàng de zhěngshì 〈中國人的面具性格 : 自我形象的整飾〉' in

Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 張老師月刊 ed. 1987 Zhōngguórén de Miànjù Xìnggé:

Rénqíng yǔ miànzǐ 《 中國人的面具性格: 人情與面子》 Taipei: Zhānglǎoshī

(張老師) pp. 171–97