FACULTY OF LAW Stockholm University

ARoleforIndividualsintheFormationofCustomaryInternationalLaw-Shouldtheyaffectopiniojurisinthefieldofhumanrights?

VidaTenhunenSalehi

ThesisinInternationalLaw,30HEcreditsExaminer:MarkKlamberg

Stockholm,Autumnterm2017

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Abstract

Thecharacterofthesourcesofinternationallawdiffersfromdomesticlegalsources.In

thisthesisthesourcesintheinternationalcontextthatarebasedonstate-cooperation

andstateconsentarecontrastedwiththepowerthatindividualshaveorshouldbeenti-

tledto.Mostoftheirpowerinternationallyliesinthefieldofhumanrightslaw.Human

rightsapplytoeveryoneuniversallybutinpracticetheyareeasiertosatisfyinademo-

craticenvironment.

Averycontestedsourceofinternationallawiscustomaryinternationallaw,andoneof

itselements,opiniojuris,referstothebeliefofastatethatitshouldactinacertainway

accordingtolaw.Forthereasonthatstatesasentitiescannotthinkorbelieve,i.e.they

intrinsicallylackanystateofmind,thethoughtofwhoisbehindthatbelieftriggeredthe

ideaforthispaper.

Thus, this thesis aims to establishwhat the situation for customary international law,

especiallyopiniojuris,inthehumanrightsfieldis,anditaddresseswhetherindividuals

shouldbegivenamoredistinctroleinit.Bylookingatthediscussioninhumanrights,

customary international law and public international law doctrine aswell as treaties,

case lawandresolutions, thecurrent situation isdescribedandadelegeferenda-dis-

cussionisthenundertaken.

Sovereigntyisanintegralprincipleofinternationallawandthusstatesaretraditionally

thelawmakersofinternationallaw.Consequentlystateshavedominatedcustomaryin-

ternational lawformationandindividualshavebeenleftoutoftheequation. Buteventhoughsovereignty isundoubtedlyan importantprinciple, its influenceseemstohave

changedduringtheyearswiththedevelopmentofhumanrights.

Bothdemocraticlegitimacypurposesaswellashumanrightspurposesthatgohandin

handmotivateastrongerrolefortheindividualwhereheorshecanbeanacceptedpar-

ticipantinhumanrightslaw-formation.

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Abbreviations

ACHR AmericanConventiononHumanRights

ACHPR AfricanCharteronHumanandPeoples’Rights

CAT CommitteeAgainstTorture

CEDAW ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscrimination

AgainstWomen

CIL CustomaryInternationalLaw

ECHR EuropeanConvention for theProtectionofHumanrightsand

FundamentalFreedoms

ECtHR EuropeanCourtofHumanRights

HRC HumanRightsCommittee

ICC InternationalCriminalCourt

ICCStatute RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt

ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights

ICERD ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimi-

nation

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights

IGO IntergovernmentalOrganisation

ICJ InternationalCourtofJustice

ICJStatute StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice

IO InternationalOrganisation

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

PCIJ PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice

UDHR UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights

UNCAT ConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumaneorDe-

gradingPunishment

UNGA UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly

UNCharter CharteroftheUnitedNations

ViennaConvention ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties

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ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................................................1ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................................................................................21Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................4

1.1Background.............................................................................................................................................................................................41.2PurposeandResearchQuestions..................................................................................................................................................61.3Method......................................................................................................................................................................................................71.4Delimitations..........................................................................................................................................................................................91.5Disposition............................................................................................................................................................................................10

2.HumanRightsLaw.................................................................................................................................................112.1Background...........................................................................................................................................................................................11

2.1.1History..........................................................................................................................................................................................112.1.2Naturalvs.positivelaw.........................................................................................................................................................13

2.2CharacteristicsofHumanRightsLaw.......................................................................................................................................142.2.1SourcesofHumanRightsLaw............................................................................................................................................14

2.2.1.1Treaties...............................................................................................................................................................................152.2.2HumanRightsObligations....................................................................................................................................................172.2.3Remedies......................................................................................................................................................................................182.2.4“SpecialCharacter”..................................................................................................................................................................19

2.3TheRelationshipBetweenHumanRightsandDemocracy..............................................................................................202.4Summary................................................................................................................................................................................................22

3.CustomaryInternationalLaw...........................................................................................................................253.1Background...........................................................................................................................................................................................253.2HowCustomaryInternationalLawEmerges.........................................................................................................................26

3.2.1ConsentandCustom...............................................................................................................................................................263.2.2WhereDoWeFindEvidenceofCustomaryInternationalLaw?.........................................................................283.2.3TheCharacterofOpinioJuris...............................................................................................................................................30

3.3CustomaryInternationalHumanRightsLaw?......................................................................................................................343.3.1Doesitexist?...............................................................................................................................................................................343.3.2ErgaOmnesandJusCogens.................................................................................................................................................35

3.3.2.1AnExampleofaCustomaryNormofHumanRights......................................................................................383.3.3CoreRights..................................................................................................................................................................................383.3.4ThePersistentObjector.........................................................................................................................................................40

3.4CustomaryInternationalLawandDemocracy......................................................................................................................403.5Summary................................................................................................................................................................................................41

4.StateDomination?..................................................................................................................................................444.1SovereigntyandTheSubject-ObjectDichotomy..................................................................................................................444.2IndividualsandOtherNon-stateActorsasSubjects...........................................................................................................494.4Summary................................................................................................................................................................................................51

5.FinalConclusion......................................................................................................................................................535.1Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................................................535.2HowIsCustomaryInternationalLawEstablished?HowDoesOpinioJurisDevelop?........................................535.3DoesItDifferintheHumanRightsFieldinContrasttoPublicInternationalLawinGeneral?.......................545.4WhyAreIndividualsCentraltoHumanRightsLawandCanTheirRoleBeAppliedtotheDevelopmentofCustomaryInternationalLaw?............................................................................................................................................................555.5DoestheIndividualHaveaRoleintheDevelopmentofOpinioJurisintheHumanRightsField?................565.6ShouldIndividualsAffectitsCreationinThisParticularField?....................................................................................57

6.Bibliography..............................................................................................................................................................586.1Treaties...................................................................................................................................................................................................586.2Literature...............................................................................................................................................................................................596.3PublishedArticles..............................................................................................................................................................................606.4CourtCases............................................................................................................................................................................................626.5ResolutionsandDeclarationsfromtheUnitedNations....................................................................................................636.6Websites.................................................................................................................................................................................................63

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1Introduction

1.1BackgroundTheworddemocracycomes fromtheGreekword “dēmokratia”which is composedof

“demos”(thepeople)and“kratia”(power,rule).1Itrefersto“governmentbythepeople,

eitherdirectlyorthroughrepresentatives”.2Citizensofdemocraticcountriesdecidevia

majorityvotethosewhoshouldgovernthecountry.3Attheinternational levelthereis

noparliamentthatformsthebasefromwhichsourcesoflawarederived,international

law does not have that law-forming institution. In the international context the law

springsfromothersources,foundinArticle38oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourt

ofJustice(ICJStatute).Customaryinternationallawisoneofthem;itiscodifiedinArti-

cle38(1),alongwiththeothersourcesofinternationallawsuchastreatiesandgeneral

principlesoflaw.4

Unlike treaty-law, customary international law isunwritten andbindingon almost all

statesof theworld(exceptonthepersistentobjector5).Awidespreadandstablestate

practice(usus)andopiniojurissivenecessitatisarethetwoelementsthatmakeupcus-

tomaryinternationallaw.Thelatterreferstothestate’sbeliefthatithastoactacertain

wayaccordingtolawandtheformertotheconductofstates.6Bothcomponentsofcus-

tomary international lawaremuchdiscussed indoctrine foranumberof reasonsand

therearemanyinterestingdilemmastosolve.Forinstance,Thirlwaywritesthatopinio

jurisisacomplicatednotiontobeattributedtoanentitysuchasastate,forthereason

thatitdescribesastateofmind.7Ontheonehand,“astateofmind”means“aperson’s

moodandtheeffectthatmoodhasontheperson’sthinkingandbehaviour”accordingto

theCambridgedictionary.A“person”is“aman,womanorachild”.8Ontheother,astate

1OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordDictionaries,”Democracy”,2017,<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/democracy>,checked9October2017.2Black,HenryCampbell,Garner,BryanA.(ed.),Black’sLawDictionary,8thed.,ThomsonWest,2004.3Goldman,AlvinI,WhatIsDemocracy(andWhatIsItsRaisonD’Etre)?,JournaloftheAmericanPhilosoph-icalAssociation,CambridgeUniversityPress,2015,pp.233–256,at235.4Moeckli,Daniel,Shah,Sangeeta,Sivakumaran,Sandesh&Harris,David(eds.),InternationalHumanRightsLaw,2nded.,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2014,at75.5Seesection1.4.6Chinkin,Christine,“Sources”.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at81.7Cf.Thirlway,Hugh,“TheSourcesofInternationalLaw”.InEvans,MalcolmD.(ed.),InternationalLaw,3rded.,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2010,at103.8CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeDictionary,2017,<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/>,checked8September2017.

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isanentitydefinedbyhavingapopulation,aterritoryandagovernmentthatexercises

poweroversaidterritory.9

Thesourcesofinternationallawandtheircontentderiveultimatelyfromindependent,

sovereign, states that have consented to these being the sources of international law.

Statesarethustheoriginallawmakersofinternationallaw.10Theroleofindividuals(i.e.

thosewhocompriseapopulationand thusoneelement thatmakeupa stateasmen-

tionedabove)iscontested.Oneviewontheindividual’sroleininternationallawisthat

they are subjectswhen it comes to certain areas of international law, such as human

rightslaw.Anotherviewisthattheyareobjectsthatcannotinfluencelawformation.11

InanarticleintheVirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw,ChristianaOchoaquestionsthat

individuals “are not recognized as participants in [customary international law] for-

mation”, although theyhave several roles toplay in theareaof international law. She

callsit“themostwidelyrecognizedfailingsof[customaryinternationallaw]doctrine”,

that individualsarenot recognized in themakingofhumanrightscustomary law.12In

anotherarticlewhereOchoaassumesademocracyperspectiveon theparticipationof

theindividualshewritesthat,inorderto“maximizeitsdemocraticpromise”aswellas

toavoidaleaningtoward“elitismandsecrecy”,thereisaneedformoreresearchonthe

areaoftheindividual’sroleasaparticipantinformationoflaw.Sheargues,“thereisa

connectionbetweenparticipatorydemocracy[whereindividualscanparticipateinlaw-

creation]andparticipatorylawformation”.Herworkadvocatesastrongerparticipatory

roleoftheindividualinthedoctrineontheformationofcustomaryinternationallaw.13

Whenlookingatthelinguisticmeaningofthenotionof“astateofmind”andthenotion

of“state”,itseemssomewhatcontradictorytoattributeopiniojuristoastateinsteadofa

humanbeing.14Itawakensaquestionaboutwhatthestate’sstateofmindisandwhatit

9Bring,Ove,Mahmoudi,Said&Wrange,Pål,FolkrättensGrunder,5thed.,NorstedtsJuridik,2014,at68.10Ibid.,at34.11Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at67.12Ochoa,Christiana,TheIndividualandCustomaryInternationalLawFormation,VirginiaJournalofInter-nationalLaw,vol.48:1,2007-2008,at151.13Ochoa,Christiana,TheRelationshipofParticipatoryDemocracytoParticipatoryLawFormation,IndianaJournalofGlobalLegalStudies,vol.15:1,2008,at5-7.Parenthesisadded.14Cf.Thirlway.InEvans,at103.Thirlwayseemstosuggestthatthewordingof”stateofmind”isdifficulttomergewiththenotionofa”state”.

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shouldbecomprisedof.Forthereasonthatoneoftheelementsofastateisitspopula-

tion,itisrelevanttoponderwheretheindividualresidesinthestateofmindandthere-

forewheretheindividualsfitinthedevelopmentofopiniojuris.Also,thelackofanin-

ternational institution equivalent to a parliament that is law-creating complicates the

understandingofasourceoflawbasedoncomplexnotionssuchasopiniojurisandusus

whenassumingademocracyperspective–shouldthelawbeformedbystatesexclusive-

lyorcouldtherebearoleinlaw-creationfortheindividualaswell?Ifonewouldargue

thatdemocracyisdesirable,whichisthestandingpointinthisthesis,naturallytherole,

rightsanddutiesofindividualsbecomeimportant.Thespecificareaofinternationallaw

thatelevatesthestandingof individualsat the international level ishumanrights law,

whichisanareacentraltothisessay.

1.2PurposeandResearchQuestions

Thepurposeof this thesis is toascertainwhat influence the individual shouldhave in

theestablishmentofcustomarylawintheinternationallegalcontextwhereonenormal-

lyconcentratesonstates.15Inordertodrawconclusionsonwhattheindividual’srole16

shouldbe,thecurrentstatusoftheindividualinthedevelopmentofcustomaryinterna-

tionallawhastobeestablished.ThisIaimtodoapplyingahumanrightsperspective,an

areaofinternationallawwheretherightsofindividualsareinfocus.

ThequestionsIaminterestedinaretherefore:

• Doesthe individualhavearole in thedevelopmentofopiniojurisin thehuman

rightsfield?

• Shouldindividualsaffectitscreationinthisparticularfield?

15Asimilarquestionisasked,butnotansweredinLepard,BrianD.,CustomaryInternationalLaw–ANewTheorywithPracticalApplications,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2010:“Whatroleshouldtheviewsofordinarycitizens–orindeedallindividuals–playintheevaluationofopiniojuris?”,at27.16Cf.Ochoa,TheRelationship,at6.ThedifferencebetweenChristianaOchoasargumenttoincludeindi-vidualsincustomaryinternationallawformationinthisarticleandmyargumentisthatIaskthequestioniftheyshouldinfluenceopiniojurisandsheseemstosearchforanothertypeofrole,outsideofususandopiniojuris.Herprojectoncustomaryinternationallaw“exploresthetraditionaldoctrinalformulationofCILwhich,atleastformally,prescribesthatonlystatepracticeandopiniojurisaretobeconsultedintheprocessbywhichCILismade.”

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In order to examine this, the following sub-questions have to be answered:

• Howiscustomaryinternationallawestablished?

• Doesitdifferinthehumanrightsfieldincontrasttopublicinternationallawin

general?

• Howdoesopiniojurisdevelop?

• Whyareindividualscentraltohumanrightslawandcantheirrolebeappliedto

thedevelopmentofcustomaryinternationallaw?

1.3Method

Theresearchthatismadeinordertoanswertheaforementionedquestionsisconduct-

edbylookingintohowcustomaryinternationallaw,especiallytheopiniojuriselement,

isestablisheddelegelataintheinternationalcommunity.Statepracticeisconsideredto

theextentitisnecessaryfortheunderstandingofopiniojuris.Whenthesituationdelege

lataisestablished,Iamgoingtodrawconclusionsdelegeferendaaboutwhatthesitua-

tionshouldbewhencriticallyexaminingtheestablishmentofopiniojurisandassuming

ademocracyandhuman rightsperspective.Where it is suitable I amgoing to lookat

howthenatureof lawaffectscustomarylaw,humanrightsandtheindividual’srolein

internationallaw.Forthisreasonsomeofmyresearchwillbebasedonideasfromthe

doctrine of Critical Legal Studies, as well as other doctrine relating to the nature of

sources.

For the substantive content,humanrights, customary international lawandpublic in-

ternationallawdoctrineisused,aswellascourtcasesandinternationalstatutes.Exam-

plesofdoctrinethatisusedareCustomaryInternationalLaw–ANewTheorywithPrac-

ticalApplicationsbyBrianD.Lepard,InternationalHumanRightsLaweditedbyMoeckli

etal., and InternationalLaw byMalcolmEvans.BrendanTobin’sbook IndigenousPeo-

ples,CustomaryLawandHumanRightsfocusesonpeoples’customsinrelationtohuman

rights.WhileTobindrawsconclusionsontheimpactonindigenouspeoples,Idrawcon-

clusionson the impactof individuals, i.e. awider rangeof individuals,not just indige-

nouspeoples.Thisbookismostlyusedtoaccountforthebackgroundofcustomaryin-

ternationallaw.

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Thus,bothdoctrineandcaselawisusedinagreatscalefortheresearchinthispaper.

AccordingtoArticle38(d)oftheICJStatutetheInternationalCourtofJustice(theICJ)

”shallapply:[…]subjecttotheprovisionsofArticle59, judicialdecisionsandtheteach-

ingsofthemosthighlyqualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnations,assubsidiarymeans for

the determination of rules of law.”17Article 59 stipulates that the ICJ’s decisions only

bindthepartiesinthatparticularcase.ThecaselawoftheICJisthusnotlegallybinding,

and neither is doctrine. Nevertheless, doctrine and case law does influence the for-

mationof law throughopinio juris.The reason forwhichwegrant the ICJ Statute this

statusisthattheICJisthe“[…]principaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations”asstated

inArticle92oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations(UNCharter).18Forthesereasons,the-

seinstrumentsareusedtohelpinterpretthequestionsathand.

Non-binding instruments, i.e. soft law,areused in this thesis. Inrelation tocustomary

internationallaw,theirimportanceliesinbeingapartofthedevelopmentofbothstate

practiceandopiniojuris.19Withregardtoopiniojuris,“thecontextwithinwhichsoftlaw

instrumentsarenegotiatedandtheaccompanyingstatementsofdelegationswillalsobe

relevant”,aswellashowmuchsupporttheinstrumentshas.Iffewstatesobject,butthe-

sestatesaremostaffected, the instrumentcannotcreate law.20TheUniversalDeclara-

tionofHumanRights (UDHR)21startedoff as anon-bindingGeneralAssembly resolu-

tion.Althoughthecharacteroftheinstrumentisnon-binding,ithasanimportanthistor-

icalpositioninthedevelopmentofhumanrightslawandseveralprovisionshavedevel-

oped into customary international law. Hannum Hurst calls the UDHR “the primary

sourceof theglobal consensusonhumanrights”and“theonlycommongroundwhen

manystatesdiscusshumanrights”.22

17Emphasisadded.18Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at27-32.19Cf.Shelton,CommitmentandCompliance:TheRoleofNon-bindingNormsintheInternationalLegalSys-tem,OxfordScholarshipOnline,Oxford,2003,at2.20Boyle,Alan,”SoftLawinInternationalLaw-Making”.InEvans,at135.21UNGeneralAssembly,UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,Paris,10December1948,217A(III).22SeeHurst,Hannum,TheStatusoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsinNationalandInternation-alLaw,GeorgiaJournalofInternationalandComparaticeLaw,vol.25,issues1&2,287-398.Citationat353.

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1.4Delimitations

Thereareseveralissuesrelatedtothecharacterofcustomaryinternationallaw,howev-

erthisessaywillonlydealwithsomeofthem.Thisessaydoesnotseektoaccountforall

elements that could affect the connection between individuals, customary law for-

mation,democracyandhumanrights,forexampleitdoesnotproblematizewhydemoc-

racy should be desirable and how non-democratic systems could work in preserving

humanrights.Iwillonlythoroughlyexamineoneofthetwoelementsofcustomaryin-

ternationallaw,namelyopiniojuris.Iwillnotconcentrateontheconceptofstateprac-

ticemorethanisnecessaryinordertogenerallyunderstandthecharacterofcustomary

internationallaw.However,itisimportanttobearinmindthatstatepracticeandopinio

jurisaretightlyconnected;theyareafteralltwopartsthataremeanttoformawhole.

ThereasonIchoosetoconcentrateonopiniojuris isthat itswordingsuggestahuman

notionthatcouldbemoreeasilyappliedtoindividualsthanususcould.

Furthermore,thisessaywillbelimitedtotheareaofhumanrightssinceitisthenatural

domainofindividuals,incontrasttointernationallawingeneral.Thepersistentobjec-

tor system is interesting to account forwhen examining customary international law,

howeveritdoesnotapplytotheareaofhumanrightstoagreatextentandistherefore

not researched in depth.23The book Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human

Rightsisusedtoillustratethedevelopmentofcustomarylaw.However,nogeneralcon-

clusionsaredrawnfromindigenouspeoples’specialuseofcustom,sinceitexceedsthe

scopeofthisthesis.

EvenifgeneralprinciplesoflawareasourceoflawenumeratedinArticle38oftheICJ

Statute, theywillnotbe furtherexamined in thispaper, for the reason that theyhave

hadlimitedsignificanceinpractice.Also,theseprinciplesarelesslikelytoconstitutea

sourceforhumanrightslaw.Onthecontrary,itismoreprobablethathumanrightsare

“appliedasgeneralprinciples”(Chinkin).24Aquestionrelatedtothenatureofcustom-

aryinternationallawistheoneofhowitdiffersfromgeneralprinciplesoflaw.Although

interestingandcontroversial,itexceedstheaimofthispaper.25

23Seesection3.3.4aboutthepersistentobjector.24Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at85.25Seee.g.Lepard,at28-29.

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1.5Disposition

InChapter2Iamgoingtopresentthecharacterofhumanrightslawsoastounderstand

whatconsiderationsgrantindividualstheirrole,inordertobeabletodrawconclusions

astowhethertheseconsiderationsalsoareimportant inthecreationofcustomaryin-

ternationallaw.Inordertobetterunderstandtheindividual’sroleintherealmofinter-

nationallaw,thephilosophicalandhistoricalbasisofhumanrightslawisimportantto

grasp. It is important to understand especially two theories about thenature of law -

legalpositivismandthebeliefinanaturallaw.Thus,thehistoryandthecharacteristics

ofhumanrightslawaredescribedsoastounderstandthecontext.Theformalsources

ofhumanrightslawarepresentedaswellastheroleoftreaties.Thereasonforwhich

treatiesaresingledout in thissection is that they forman importantbasis forhuman

rightslawandtheyareagoodexampleofhowthecharacterofhumanrightshaveinflu-

enced a source of law. Customary international law is not presented at this point; in-

steadtheentireChapter3isdedicatedtoit.ThelastpartofChapter2describestherela-

tionshipbetweenhumanrightsanddemocracy.

InChapter3,Iwillintroducethebasisofcustomaryinternationallaw;stateconsent.A

descriptionofopiniojurisaspartofcustomary international lawisgivenaswellasan

accountforthedifferentviewsonit.Iwillfurtherexaminehowitiscreatedinthearea

ofhumanrightsandwhattheconnectionofcustomarylawtodemocracyis.Iwillalso

examine thearguableexistenceofacustomary internationalhumanrights law, in this

contextIwillshortlyaccountforthepersistentobjectorsystem.InChapter4theindi-

vidualasaninternationallegalsubject,aswellassomeothernon-statesubjects,ispre-

sentedaswellashowstatesovereigntyplaysapartinthestate-individualrelationship.

InChapter5,afinalconclusionwillbepresented.

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2.HumanRightsLaw

2.1Background

2.1.1History

Historically,humanrightshavedevelopedonthedomesticlevelinmanydifferentcoun-

triesanditisdifficulttodecideexactlywheretheevolutionstarted.26Similarideashave

arisenindifferentlocationsthroughouttheworldandinthemindsofdifferentpeople.

However, tosaythateverysocietythroughouthistoryhashad joinedfundamentalbe-

liefs isunnuanced.Neither is thereone formof thinkingthat is thepredecessorof the

humanrightsmovement. Insteadtheformhasvariedfromtheseideasbeingreactions

toinjusticeorthefocusofreligiousorphilosophicalcontemplation.Nevertheless,these

differentformsofhumanrightsideashavesomethingimportantincommon-thepro-

tectionoftheindividualinrelationtothesovereign.27

Whenlookingatwhenlimitationsfirstwhereimposedonthesovereign’spowerandthe

individual’spositionwasstrengthened,historyleadsto1215andtheMagnaCarta.28In

England, at a timewhen lawwas thought of as natural, feudal barons questioned the

king’sregime.Theirdemandwasforruleoflawandthusthattheking’spowershould

be limited.Thisprinciplewas expressed in theMagnaCarta, its legal text stating that

“even royal government had limits, and certain liberties must be guaranteed” (Lau-

ren).29

Inthe1600s,thewritingsofJohnLockeandThomasHobbesdealtwiththeideaoflimit-

ingstatepower.30Lockewas interested in therightsanddutiesof thepeoplevis-à-vis

therightsanddutiesoftherulers.31Hobbeswroteabouttheconceptofsocialcontract

26Bates,Ed,“History”.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18.27Lauren,PaulGordon,“TheFoundationsofJusticeandHumanRightsinEarlyLegalTextsandThought”.InShelton,Dinah,(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofInternationalHumanRightsLaw,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2013,at164-165.28Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18.29Lauren.InShelton,at177-178.30Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18.31Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at212.

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inLeviathan.Itis“theideathatpowertogovernistosomeextentderivedfromthecon-

sentofthegoverned”(Bates).AlthoughLeviathandidnotgrantmanynaturalrightsto

individualsandconsideredmassdisorderaworsescenariothanacertainabuseofpow-

erbytherulertowardshissubjects,itputresponsibilityontherulertousehisauthority

with care. Locke had a stronger stance for natural rights, as well as some inchoate

thoughtsaboutdemocracy.32His ideasaboutrightsshowed in the1689EnglishBillof

Rights.33TheBillofRightsstatedthefundamentalideathatabsolutestatepowerought

tobelimitedsoastoprotectindividualswithinthestate.AsBatesputsit“[i]tdeserves

specialemphasissinceitisarguablythefoundationuponwhichallprogressinthefield

ofhumanrightshasbeenbuilt”.34AfoundingbasefortheEnglishBillofRightswasthat

individuals were bearers of natural rights and that these rights needed protection

throughtheruleoflaw.35

Also the European Enlightenment thinkers developed the thoughts about the state-

individual relationship.36During the Enlightenment periodMontesquieuwrote that in

order to protect fundamental human rights and political freedom, the government’s

powerhadtobesplitintodifferentbranches(alsoLockehadhadsimilarideas37).Rous-

seauarguedthepromotionandprotectionofjusticeandindividualrightsthroughlegal

institutionsand laws.38However,hedidnot think that thesenatural rightscame from

thehumanbeinginhisorhercapacityofbeinghuman,butbecauseofthepositionasa

memberofsocietyheorshehad.39

TheEnlightenmentthinkerswantedanexpansionofliberty.Theystressedthatindivid-

uals should not be subjected to torture, slavery, exploitation and that they should be

abletofreelyexpressthemselvesaswellastochoosetheirreligion,theyshouldbeenti-

tledtotheprotectionthatcomeswithruleof law,andto justice,etc.40Also inthe18th

century, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 12 June 1776 took form in the United

32Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18.33Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at212.34Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18..35Lauren.InShelton,at184.36Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at16-18.37Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,213.38Lauren.InShelton,at185-186.39Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at213.40Lauren.InShelton,at185-186.

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States;many have called it the “first proper bill of rights”. It enshrined the idea that

power isderived fromthepeopleaswellas the ideaof separationofpowers.41In the

internationalcontext,itwasnotbeforethe1900sthattheideaofinternationalcoopera-

tioninordertoprotecttheindividualgainedinfluence.42

2.1.2Naturalvs.positivelaw

Theideaofnaturallawwasthatitscontentandlegitimacysprungfromaneternaland

universalsuprahumanlegalorder.43Anexampleofoneofthephilosopherswhodevel-

opedthoughtsaboutnaturallawisThomasAquinas(13thcentury).Hestatedthatnatu-

rallawhadanimportantrelationshiptopositivelawandthatthepositivelawwastobe

measuredbynatural lawstandards;hencelawswerebindingiftheywerejust.44How-

ever,asaresponsetotheoftheoryofnaturallawanewonehaditsbreakthroughinthe

19thcenturyEuropeandnaturallawhadtomakewayforthetheoryoflegalpositivism

accordingtowhichlawwashuman-made.Legalpositivismhasthepurposeofexplain-

ingwhat the law isandwhat itcouldbe. Itscharacterdoesnotallowfor it toguidea

judgewhenheorsheistosolveatroublesomecase.45

Alreadyintheendofthe18thcenturythepositivistcritiquehaditsbeginningwithJere-

myBenthamandDavidHume.WithHumeandBenthamcameempiricalandutilitarian

ideasofthelawaccordingtowhichthelawwaspoliticallydeterminedandvariedgeo-

graphically. Even if the natural law thinking hadbeendiscarded, it actually remerged

much later in history after the SecondWorldWar. TheNuremberg laws thatwere in

forceduringtheHolocaustindicatedtheneedforagreaterprotectionofindividualsin

relationtotheirstateaswellasnormsbearingahigherstatusthandomesticlaws.46The

positivist view on law could not be accepted in defence of the events that had taken

place.47

41Bates.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at19.42Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at216-217.43Korling,Fredric&Zamboni,Mauro,JuridiskMetodlära,Studentlitteratur,Lund,2013,at54.44Lauren.InShelton,at178-179.45Korling&Zamboni,at54.46Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at33-34.47Ibid.,at217.

14

Even if we view the law as positivistic today, it is certain that the idea of individual

rights spring from natural law.48However, the notions of human rights and natural

rightscannotbeusedsynonymouslyeveniftheyhavemuchincommon.49Insummary,

naturalrightsandnaturallawformedthebasisfortheevolutionofhumanrightsonthe

international level. The idea that human rights are inherent in human beings was

formedupuntilthelate18thcentury.Itisanideathatflowsthroughamuch-citeddoc-

ument, the UDHR.50According toWacks “[t]he conceptmakes little sense unless it is

understoodasfundamentalandinalienable,whetherornotsuchrightsarelegallyrec-

ognizedandregardlessofwhethertheyemanatefroma‘higher’naturallaw”.51

2.2CharacteristicsofHumanRightsLaw

2.2.1SourcesofHumanRightsLaw

Theforminwhichthesourcesinthefieldofhumanrightslawcomearethesameasin

otherfieldsofinternationallawandthusfoundinArticle38(1)oftheICJStatute,which

reads:

“Article38

1.TheCourt,whosefunctionistodecideinaccordancewithinternationallawsuchdisputesas

aresubmittedtoit,shallapply:

a. international conventions,whethergeneral orparticular, establishing rules expressly rec-

ognizedbythecontestingstates;

b.internationalcustom,asevidenceofageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw;

c.thegeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations;

d.subjecttotheprovisionsofArticle59,judicialdecisionsandtheteachingsofthemosthighly

qualifiedpublicistsofthevariousnations,assubsidiarymeansforthedeterminationofrulesof

law.”

48Cf.Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at33-34.49Wacks,Raymond,UnderstandingJurisprudence,4thed.,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2015,at285.50Cf.Lauren.InShelton,at193.51Wacks,at279.

15

WhatisasourceoflawsuchastheonesenumeratedinArticle38(1)?Themostcommon

viewisthattheyareobligationsthatarelegally-andnotpolitically,morallyorsocially-

binding. The sources explain how rules are created, repealed and abrogated. Interna-

tionallawdiffersfromdomesticlegalsystemsinthesensethatthereisnocentrallegis-

lativebody,noexecutiveandnocourtwithmandatoryjurisdiction.Thusitspringsfrom

different sources - i.e. treaties, customary international law and general principles of

law.52Thetheoryof lawaspositivistic istodayunderstoodquitebroadlyandrefersto

thatthelawcanbeidentifiedobjectivelyandthatitspringsfromhumanpower(incon-

trast to natural law that springs from a higher power, see section 2.1.2). This under-

standingofpositivismcomportswellwithArticle38.53

2.2.1.1Treaties

Mostof thehumanrightsprovisionsderive fromtreatiesandconventionssuchas the

UNCharter,whichstatesinArticle1(3)thattheUN’spurposeis,interalia,“[t]oachieve

internationalco-operationinsolvinginternationalproblemsofaneconomic,social,cul-

turalorhumanitariancharacter,andinpromotingandencouragingrespectforhuman

rightsandforfundamentalfreedomsforallwithoutdistinctionastorace,sex,language,

orreligion”.54

TheUDHRwasdevelopedin1948,whicheventuallyledtotheadoptionoftheInterna-

tionalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenanton

Economic,SocialandCulturalRights (ICESCR).Together thesearecalled the “Interna-

tionalBillofRights”.Inadditiontherearemanymorehumanrightstreaties,suchasthe

ConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW),

the Convention against Torture andOther Cruel, Inhumane orDegrading Punishment

(UNCAT), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

52Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at75.53Bring,Wrange&Mahmoudi,at34.54SeealsoArticle55(c)”Withaviewtothecreationofconditionsofstabilityandwell-beingwhicharenecessaryforpeacefulandfriendlyrelationsamongnationsbasedonrespectfortheprincipleofequalrightsandself-determinationofpeoples,theUnitedNationsshallpromote:[…](c)universalrespectfor,andobservanceof,humanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsforallwithoutdistinctionastorace,sex,language,orreligion.”;Article56”AllMemberspledgethemselvestotakejointandseparateactioninco-operationwiththeOrganizationfortheachievementofthepurposessetforthinArticle55.”

16

(ICERD),etc.55Hereitmaybepointedoutthatthemanyhumanrightsinstrumentsdeal

withdifferentissues,buteventhoughtheareaislackingsystematization,anattemptto

createacomprehensivecodificationcouldbeproblematic forpoliticalreasons;parties

mightwanttorenegotiateprominentprovisions.56

Internationallawspringsfromstateconsent-thecommonconsentofallstates.Thisis

the reason forwhich international agreementswereacknowledgedasa sourceof law

and the doctrine that supports Article 38 of the ICJ Statute started evolving.57Hence,

stateconsentandpositivistlawarethebasisofhumanrightslawaswell.Therelevant

participantsinthesphereofinternationallawadoptmethodsbywhichthelawismade.

For example, when adopting a treaty, states express consent.58In customary interna-

tionallaw,“generalassent”isneeded.59

However,ashasbeentoucheduponinsection2.1.2,whentalkingabouttheareaofhu-

manrights,thereisaconnectiontonaturallawthinking.Schultzexploresthisconnec-

tion. He suggests that the kinds of arguments that are used in connection to human

rights are higher in hierarchy andweighmore than those that emanate from regular

law.Theserightsarenotdependentonhavingapositivisticbasebutareoftenregarded

asbindingevenifthereisnopositivelawinsupportofthem.Sohumanrightsnormsare

legalnormsbuttheyarealsosomethingelsesincetheyexistbeyondthehuman-made

law.Atthesametimeitispossibletoaccessthenormsandpronounceuponthem.60

Schultzanalysiscomportswellwiththeunderstandingthat,whenitcomestotreaties,

the human rights ones have a content of high normative value,which transcends the

states’ consent of being bound. It is part of the so-called special character of human

rightsthattheobligationentailedbytheserightsandimposedonstatesdonotseemto

bedependentonconsentandthat,whenastatehasagreedtobebound,theobligations

“havealifeoftheirown”(Mégret).61Thus,itisnotsurprisingthathumanrightsconven-

55Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at77-78.56Ramcharan,BertrandG,“TheLaw-MakingProcess:FromDeclarationtoTreatytoCustomtoPreven-tion”.InShelton,at508.57Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at34.58Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at76-77.59Seesection3.2.1.60Schultz,Mårten,“Naturrätt”.InKorling&Zamboni,at98-100.61Mégret,Frédéric,“NatureofObligations”.Moecklietal.(eds.),at96-100.

17

tions have a different character than conventions in other fields of international law.

Theydonotprovideanequalexchangeofdutiesandrightsbetweenthestatesthatad-

heretothetreaties,insteadthehumanrightstreatiesrestricthowstatescantreatindi-

vidualswithin their jurisdiction.62Mégretwrites that “[i]ndeed, human rights treaties

createrightsspecificallyfor individualswhoarenotnormallysubjectsof international

lawgenerallyortreatiesspecifically”.63

Eventhoughmanystatesarepartiestohumanrightstreaties,customarylawisanim-

portantsourceaswellforthereasonthatstatesneednottohaveratifiedatreatyinor-

dertobebound.Thisisanimportantfactoralsowhenastatemakesareservationtoa

particularprovision.64InChapter3customaryinternationallawisthoroughlypresent-

ed.

2.2.2HumanRightsObligations

WhentheUNcameintobeingtheviewwasthatitdidnothavetheauthoritytomonitor

howstates compliedwithhuman rights for the reason that itwas seenas adomestic

matter.ThisviewwasderivedfromthewordingofArticle2(7)oftheUNCharter.This

haschangedandtodaythereisamonitoringsystem.65Therespectforstatesovereignty

hasremainedstrongerinotherareasofinternationallaw-thewayinwhichstatesare

supposedtofulfiltheirobligationsarenotspecifiedandthusthecourseofactionisup

tothespecificstatetodecide.66

Intheareaofinternationalhumanrightsitisspecifiedhowstateshavetobeabletose-

curetheserights.Inthisregard,therearepositiveobligationsthatrequirethatastate

act inordertoensurethathumanrightsareprotected,aswellasnegativeobligations

thatrequire thestate to takeastepbackso that individualscanexercise theirhuman

rights.67Theseobligationsaredividedintothedutytorespect,protectandfulfil(ashas

beendefinedinpracticebytheUNhumanrightstreatybodies).Anexampleofapositive62Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at76-77.63Mégret.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at99.64Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at83.65Rodley,NigelS.,”TheRoleandImpactofTreatyBodies”.InShelton,at622-624.66Cf.Mégret,InMoecklietal.(eds.),at102-103.67Shelton,Dinah&Gould,Ariel,”PositiveandNegativeObligations”.InShelton,at563-564.

18

obligationisthedutytofulfil.Forexample,theprohibitionoftortureincludesapositive

obligation toprecludeand create sanctionsagainst torture.Thisdutyalsomeans that

stateshavetoadoptlawssoastoensureimplementationofwhattheyhaveagreedtoin

the international arena, that other propermeasures such as administrative, educative

andjudicialhavetobeadoptedandthatstateshavetoprovidearemedyifhumanright

violationshaveoccurred.68

Thedutytoprotectisalsoapositiveobligationmeaningthatstateshavetoprotectindi-

viduals located in their jurisdiction from third partieswho could violate their human

rights.Iftheviolationcaninsomewaybeconnectedtoashortcomingofthestatethat

enabledaprivateactortoviolatetherightsofotherindividuals,thestateisliable.Lastly,

theobligationtorespect isanegativeone. Inorderforstatestorespecthumanrights,

theycannottakemeasuresthatintheendviolateaspecifichumanright.69

2.2.3Remedies

Ifastateviolatesitsobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslaw,itispossiblefora

state tomakea complaintat the ICJ against another state.Anothermechanism that is

supposedtostrengthentheenforcementofthehumanrightsobligationsiswheninter-

nationalcommitteesrequireperiodicreportsfromstatesexplainingtheircomplianceto

humanrights.However,whatisextraordinaryinthisspecificareaofinternationallawis

that individuals can complain internationally if their state has violated their human

rights.70

Hence,thehumanrightsregimegivesindividualsthepossibilitytoenforcetheirrights.

ThereisforexampleanOptionalProtocollinkedtotheICCPR,thatmakesitpossiblefor

individualstomakeacomplaintagainsttheirownstate(aslongasthestateispartyto

theProtocol).71TheICCPRhas169StatepartiesandtheProtocolhas116.72TheHuman

RightsCommittee’s(HRC)decisionontheallegedviolationofaprovisionintheICCPR

68Mégret.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at102-103.69Ibid.70Ibid.,at116-117.71Steiner.InEvans,at795.72UnitedNationsTreatyCollection,ChapterIV:HumanRights,UnitedNations,2017,<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en>,checked13Octobre2017.

19

is,accordingtotheCommitteeitself,atleastmorallybinding.73AlsotheCERDCommit-

tee,theCommitteeAgainstTorture(CAT)andtheCEDAWCommitteecanreceivecom-

plaints.74Theregionalinstrumentsthatgrantindividualstherighttofileacomplaintare

the European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Free-

doms(ECHR),theAmericanConventiononHumanRights(ACHR),andtheAfricanChar-

teronHumanandPeoples’Rights(ACHPR).75

2.2.4“SpecialCharacter”

Asalreadystated, the lawofhumanrightsputsemphasisonprotecting the individual

againstthestate.Thefactthatrespectforstatesovereigntyhasbeenveryimportantin

thedevelopmentofinternationallawnaturallyleadstotensionswiththeareaofhuman

rightsthathasbeenstretchingthenotionofsovereignty.Thereareevidentchallengesin

protectingastate’ssovereigntywhileatthesametimeforcefullyshieldingcitizensfrom

that state.Thesedifferencesand tensions lead tohumanrightsoftenbeingdefinedas

havinga“specialcharacter”.76Soeventhoughpublicinternationallawencapsulatesin-

ternationalhumanrightslaw,itisnotalwayscompatiblewiththismorespecializedre-

gime.77

Lookingatbothbindingandnon-binding instrumentsofhumanrights, importantcon-

cepts such as “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable rights”78as well as the

statement “that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”79

emerge. Also the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, expressed con-

cepts suchasuniversalism, interdependence, interrelationandhumandignity.The5th

paragraphstatesthat“[a]llhumanrightsareuniversal, indivisibleand interdependent

and interrelated”and theymustbe treated inanequalwayall around theworld.The

73Steiner.InEvans,at795.74Article14oftheCERD;Article22oftheUNCAT:Article2oftheOptionalProtocoloftheCEDAW.75Articles34-35oftheECHR;Article44oftheACHR;Articles55-56oftheACHPR.76Mégret.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at96-98.77Ibid.,at96-97.78Preamble,para.1oftheUDHR,preamble,para.1oftheICCPRandpreamble,para.1oftheICESCR.79Preamble,para.2oftheICCPR;Preamble,para.2oftheICESCR.

20

declarationwasadoptedinViennaby171statesanditaimedtostrengthenthehuman

rightsregime.80

Anotherspecialfeatureofhumanrightslaw(bothcustomandtreaty)isthatthereisno

needforanexternalelement inordertoestablishaviolation. Inotherwords, interna-

tional lawgrants individuals rightsvis-à-vis their stateeven if theeffectsof theviola-

tionsareonlyinternal.Itisunlikelythatotherstatesprotestagainsttheviolationsthat

onlyaffectthose livingintheparticularstatewhereviolationshaveoccurred.Theydo

nothaveanyinterestindoingso.Steinerarguesthatthishighlightstheneedforinterna-

tionalorganisations–“[e]lsevictimswouldbeclosetowheretheywerewhenthehu-

manrightsmovementbegan,withlittlechoiceotherthancontinuinganinternalstrug-

gleforchangewithoutbenefitofmeaningfulinternationalsupport.”81

However,Steinerproblematizesifitis“necessaryorevenusefultocreateintergovern-

mentalhumanrightsorganizations(IGOs)todebate, interpret,developandapplycus-

tomaryandtreatylaw?”incontrasttoletprotectionandimplementationbeaninternal

matter.ThereasonforwhichIGOscanbeentrustedthesetasksisthedifferenceinobli-

gations between thehuman rights field andother fields of international law. In other

areasofinternationallaw,treatyobligationsarebuiltonreciprocity,andwhiletheissue

athandisimportanttothestate, itseldomevokesconstitutionalprinciples,asisoften

the case in human rights law.82 The role of IGOs is further viewed in Chapter 4.

2.3TheRelationshipBetweenHumanRightsandDemocracy

Humanrightsneedaclimatewheretheycanthrive.Converselytheycanhaveasubstan-

tialinfluenceonsocietywhentheyareintroduced.83Democracyisintertwinedwiththe

protectionofhumanrightsasisreaffirmedinseveralhumanrightsdocuments,suchas

in thepreamblesof theECHRand theACHR,aswell as inArticle21 (3)of theUDHR

“[t]hewillofthepeopleshallbethebasisoftheauthorityofgovernment;thiswillshall

80TheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerofHumanRights,OHCHR,<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx>checked18August2017;UNGeneralAs-sembly,WorldConferenceonHumanRights,UNDoc.,A/CONF.157/23,Vienna,25June1993.81Steiner,HenryJ.,“InternationalProtectionofHumanRights”.InEvans,at800-801.82Ibid.,at786.83Tomuschat.InShelton,at470.

21

be expressed inperiodic and genuine electionswhich shall bebyuniversal and equal

suffrageandshallbeheldbysecretvoteorbyequivalentfreevotingprocedures.”

Similarly,Article25(a-b)oftheICCPRstatesthatcitizensareentitledtotheright“[t]o

take part in the conduct of public affairs,directlyor through freelychosenrepresenta-

tives”and“[t]ovoteandtobeelectedatgenuineperiodicelectionswhichshallbebyuni-

versalandequalsuffrageandshallbeheldbysecretballot,guaranteeingthefreeexpres-

sionofthewilloftheelectors”84. Inotherwords,citizenshavetheequalright todemo-

cratic participation, either directly or through representatives.85Also the limitation

clausesoftheICCPR86,theICESCR87andtheUDHR88mentiondemocracy.Inthisregard,

Tomuschatnotes that theUNdoesnot repelanystates, thusonecannot interpret the

ICCPR (and its limitation clausesmentioning ademocratic society) to imply that non-

democratic governments areautomatically in conflictwith international law;notwith-

standing,democracyisstillthoughtofas“theonlytrulylegitimateformofgovernment.”

89

Despitetheconnectionbetweendemocracyandhumanrights,democracymaynotau-

tomatically include rights and freedoms.Goldmanwrites that democracy canbe com-

paredtootherformsofrulesuchasautocracy,oligarchyormonarchy,whereasliberal-

ism,whichcomeswithrightsandfreedoms,hasdevelopedmuchlaterinhistory.Hefur-

84Emphasisadded.85SeealsoTomuschat.InShelton,at474-475.Cf.section3.4aboutparticipatoryandrepresentativede-mocracy.86E.g.Article21mentionsademocraticsociety:”Therightofpeacefulassemblyshallberecognized.Norestrictionsmaybeplacedontheexerciseofthisrightotherthanthoseimposedinconformitywiththelawandwhicharenecessaryinademocraticsocietyintheinterestsofnationalsecurityorpublicsafety,publicorder(ordrepublic),theprotectionofpublichealthormoralsortheprotectionoftherightsandfreedomsofothers.”87E.g.Article4mentionsademocraticsociety:“TheStatesPartiestothepresentCovenantrecognizethat,intheenjoymentofthoserightsprovidedbytheStateinconformitywiththepresentCovenant,theStatemaysubjectsuchrightsonlytosuchlimitationsasaredeterminedbylawonlyinsofarasthismaybecompatiblewiththenatureoftheserightsandsolelyforthepurposeofpromotingthegeneralwelfareinademocraticsociety.”88E.g.Article29para2mentionsademocraticsociety:“Intheexerciseofhisrightsandfreedoms,every-oneshallbesubjectonlytosuchlimitationsasaredeterminedbylawsolelyforthepurposeofsecuringduerecognitionandrespectfortherightsandfreedomsofothersandofmeetingthejustrequirementsofmorality,publicorderandthegeneralwelfareinademocraticsociety.”89Tomuschat.InShelton,at490.

22

thernotesthattheGreekdemocracyincluded“equalityofcitizensbeforethelaw”,how-

ever,thiswasnotsynonymouswiththerightsandfreedomsoftoday.90

Inthe3rdparagraphofthepreambleoftheUDHRitisstated“[whereas]itisessential,if

manisnottobecompelledtohaverecourse,asalastresort,torebellionagainsttyranny

andoppression,thathumanrightsshouldbeprotectedbytheruleoflaw”.Thereexists

noofficialdefinitionofdemocracy,oroftheruleoflaw.Insteadtheseconceptsareper-

petually inmotion.Nevertheless it is thought thatdemocracyrulesout theconcentra-

tionofpowertooneruleroracertaingroupandbelievedthatthegovernmentinade-

mocracyisareflectionofitspeopleandtheirwishes.Democracyisnotaguaranteefor

theenjoymentofequalrightsforallbutthehumanrightsregimecanhelppreventabuse

ofpower.91Whenboth theruleof lawanddemocracy iscombined itcanhelp“ensure

therationalityofthelaw”(Tomuschat)byenablingtransparency.Importantfactorsare

a democratic process preceding lawmakingwhere future laws undergo public scruti-

ny.92

2.4SummaryHumanrightsdonothaveaspecificstartingpoint inhistory.Thediscoursedeveloped

over thecourseof centuriesandeventuallynatural rightsbecamehumanrights.Even

todayhumanrightshaveaspecialrelationshipwithideasofnaturallaw.Featuressuch

as that that these rights are regarded as inherent in human beings, that they have a

highernormativevalueandthat theyarenotentirelydependentonstateconsent,are

veryclosetothethoughtsofnaturallawthinkers.Consequently,thepowerofstatescan

belimitedtoaquitefar-reachingextent.

Whenlookingatthefoundationofhumanrights,therenaissanceofnaturallawthinking

aftertheatrocitiesoftheSecondWorldWarisnotsurprising.Atthesametime,today’s

internationallawsarehuman-madeandwedonotconsiderthattheirvaliditydescends

fromapowerbeyondourreach.Whencitizensstartedtoquestiontheruler’sabsolute

authorityandeventuallydemandedruleoflaw,alsothethoughtoflawascomingfroma

90Goldman,at234.91Tomuschat.InShelton,at483-484.92Ibid.,at489.

23

higherpowerweakened.Still, thoughtsliketheoneofpowerderivingfromthepeople

putstheindividualinfocus–maybenotonlyfromademocraticpointofviewbutalso

fromahumanrightspointofview.

One can say that the individual’s role in international law has a natural aura. The

strengthoftheindividualintheserightscomesfromhisorherinherentpowerandnot

from human-made law. Nevertheless, todaywe firmly reject that law is natural, even

thoughintheparticularareaofhumanrightslawitissomewhatdifficulttodenyitsin-

fluence.Conceptslike“inherentdignity”,“inalienablerights”and“universal”arefounda-

tionalinthehumanrightsmovementandpromotingtheindividual,whichleadstofun-

damental differences in character between the human rights area and other areas of

internationallaw.

Thenatural“aura”ofhumanrights isdifficulttoconsolidatewithourpositivisticview

onlaw,whichdemonstratesinthedifficultythatexistscombiningrespectforstatesov-

ereigntywithastronghumanrightsprotection.Thespecialcharacterofhumanrights

haveledtomorespecificobligationsthaninotherfieldsofinternationallaw.Itissimply

notleftentirelytothestatestoactinaccordancewiththeirobligations,insteadthein-

ternational community demands that they respect, protectand fulfil their obligations.

Thisincreasesthehumanrightsprotectionatthesametimeasitreducesstates’discre-

tion.Theprincipleofsovereigntymakesitdifficulttoimposethekindofobligationsthat

existinhumanrightsonstatesinotherareasofinternationallaw.

Itisalsoremarkablethathumanrightsareaconcernforallstates,inawaythatviola-

tionswithinacountryareenforceableandrelevant internationally.This isalsoaclear

symptomofweakeningsovereigntyandjurisdiction.Individualsaremoreactiveinthis

areaofinternationallaw:theycanenforcetheirrights.Thisislogicalforthereasonthat

humanrightsstemfromthem,areborninthem.

Democracy and human rights are separate concepts but can depend on one another.

Democracydependsonhumanrightsinordertoguaranteethatmisuseofpowerdoes

notoccurandhumanrightsdependontheenvironmentdemocracycreates.Thatpower

derivesfromthepeople,fromindividuals,isthegroundonwhichdemocracyandhuman

24

rightsarebuilt.However,incustomaryinternationallawindividualsseemtobepower-

less.

25

3.CustomaryInternationalLaw

3.1Background

Custom springs from the interactionbetweenhumanbeings and the need to regulate

mattersinorderforcommunitiestofunction.TheancientGreeksrecognizedcustomary

lawasalegalsourceandconsideredtheconnectionbetweennaturallawandcustomary

lawtobeanintimateone.Aristotlethoughtthatcustomarylawrankedhigherthanposi-

tivelawforthereasonthatheregardeditasanexpressionofnatural law.Custombe-

comeslawwhenitstartstoimposeobligations.FindingsupportintheMiddleAgesTo-

binnotesthatthedeterminationofcustomarylawhastobelinkedtothereality,i.e.liv-

ingcustom.93Ithashadabigrole in thebirthofmany legal traditions. Ithasplayeda

greatpart forEnglishcommonlaw,but ithasalsoaffectedtheShari’a lawsystemand

theHindulawsystem.94

AccordingtotheCambridgedictionarytheword“custom”means“awayofbehavingor

abeliefthathasbeenestablishedforalongtime”or“somethingyouusuallydo”.95The

interactionbetweenpeoplecanleadtodevelopmentofusageorcommonpractice,cus-

tomorinthecasesthecustomhasbecomecompulsory,tocustomarylaw.96Theseno-

tionsare fluent inaway thatmakes their limitsand thepointswhere they transform

into one of the other notions varying.97Usage/common practice and custom can by

somedefinitionsmeanthesamething, i.e.repeatedactswithinapeoplethatarecom-

mon.AnotherpointofviewofthedefinitionistheoneOchoauseswherethewordcus-

tom is used synonymously with customary law, since the difference is only palpable

procedurally. Ochoa explains customary law as meaning practice that has reached a

normativedegreetowhichacourtwouldacceptitasbeinglaw,andcustomaspractice

acceptedaslawwithinapeople.98

93Tobin,Brendan,Indigenouspeoples,CustomarylawandHumanrights,Routledge,Oxon,2014,at14-16.94Ibid.,at2-395CambridgeDictionary,”Custom”,CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/custom>,checked14October2017.96Ochoa,TheIndividual,at125.97Cf.Ibid.,at126-127.98Ibid.,at126-128.

26

Bothininternationallawanddomesticlaw,theviewoncustomasalegalsourceisthe

same.Acommonusageturnsintoanobligation.Internationally,whentheideaofnatu-

ral lawhad faded, legalobligationswere instead found in the “legitimateexpectations

created in others by conduct” (Thirlway).99Tobin argues that “[c]ustomary law is not

generallywellunderstoodorwellliked”onereasonbeingthatstatesdonotenjoythatit

challengesstatutelaw.Hefurtherarguesthatthisisnottrue;customarylawstrength-

ensandbindscommunitieswhereasstatute lawoftenistheresultofstate interest in-

steadofnecessityandusefulness.100Incontrast to this,however,Kellyargues that the

historyofcustomaryinternationallawshowsthatthishasbeenthecaseforcustomary

lawaswell.Powerfulstatesalongwithpublicistshavepushedthroughcustomaryrules

inaccordancewiththeirowninterestsandregardlessofususandopiniojuris.101

Today, international law can be divided into general international law and particular

international law.102Customary international law is general international law, from

which it is possible toderogateby entering into treaties (except in the caseof jusco-

gens).Treaties,i.e.particularinternationallaw,supplementcustomaryinternationallaw

andareinterestinglyenoughbindingasaresultofacustomaryrule,pactasuntservan-

da.103Traditionally customary international lawhas had a primary role,which canbe

comparedtotodaywhentreatieshaveagreaterroleinpractice.104

3.2HowCustomaryInternationalLawEmerges

3.2.1ConsentandCustom

When it comes tocustomary international law, there isnoconsistentviewofwhat its

basisis.Somebelieveitisbasedonconsent,fromwhichfollowsthatinorderforastate

to be bound by customary rules it has to consent to them. Thiswouldmean that the

formation of customary international law is not based onmajority rule. However the99Thirlway.InEvans,at101.100Tobin,at1.101Lepard,BrianD.(ed.),Reexaminingcustomaryinternationallaw,UniversityofNebraskaCollegeofLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,2017,at47.102Kelsen,Hans,PrinciplesofInternationalLaw,ClarkN.J.,TheLawbookExchange,2003,(firstpublishedin1952byHolt,RinehartandWinston,NewYork),at188.103Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at16.104Ibid.,at30.

27

moreacceptedstance,thatcustomarynormsformwhenthereisgeneralassentamong

states, involvesacertainelementofdemocracyinthesensethatsomestates“agreeto

follow a particular practice” (Lepard) which creates a customary norm authoritative

also forthosestatesnot followingthesamepractice(withtheexceptionof thepersis-

tentobjectorpractice).105

Thepositionthatstateshavetoconsentinorderforcustomaryinternationallawtobe

createdispositivistic.Anotherargument in linewiththisviewisthattheformationof

customary international law should be separated from ethical principles. The general

beliefamonglegaltheoristsisthatcustomarynormsdifferfrommoralnorms,butexact-

lyhowethicalandmoralprinciplesaffectthecharacterandcontentofcustomaryinter-

nationallawisunclear.Thisisbecauseitiscomplicatedtoidentifytheethicalprinciples

thatcustomarynormsshouldbeweighedagainstandalsoforthereasonthatthereisno

consistentviewofthedefinitionoflawcomparedtothedefinitionofmorals.106

IntheLotuscasethePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice(thePCIJ),theprecursor

oftheICJ,expressedthat international lawisbasedonvoluntarism.Statesbothcreate

international lawandare theones that the lawaddresses.107In thiscase thePCIJpro-

nounced:

“[i]nternational law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding

uponStatesthereforeemanatefromtheirownfreewillasexpressedinconventionsorbyusag-

es generally accepted as expressingprinciples of lawand established in order to regulate the

relationsbetweentheseco-existingindependentcommunitiesorwithaviewtotheachievement

ofcommonaims.”108

Thepositivistandnaturalistargumentsthathaveexistedalongtimearestillaliveinthe

discussionabout international legal sources.ThePCIJs viewon the international legal

sourcesassomethingcreatedoutofstateconsentisclearlypositivistic.109

105Lepard,at25-26.106Ibid.107ProsperWeil,TowardsRelativeNormativityinInternationalLaw?,TheAmericanJournalofInterna-tionalLaw,vol.77:3,1983,at420.108TheCaseoftheS.S.Lotus,PCIJ,SeriesA,No.10,1927,at18.109SeeHollis,Duncan,WhyStateConsentStillMatters–Non-StateActors,Treaties,andtheChangingSourcesofInternationalLaw,BerkeleyJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.23:1,2005,pp.137-174,at140.

28

However,itisnotenoughthatthereisamajorityofstatesthatagreeonthesameissue

foracustomaryruletoemerge.Althoughamajorityofstatessupportedtheexistenceof

acustomaryruleonprohibitionofnuclearweaponsintheLegalityoftheThreatorUse

ofNuclearWeaponscase,thereweresomenuclearstatesthatopposedthatkindofrule.

ThereforetheICJreasonedthattherewasnocustomaryruleofthekind.TheICJlooked

atthefactthateveryyearUNGeneralAssemblyresolutionswereadopted,whichcon-

tainedarequestthataconventionthatprohibitsuseofnuclearweaponsshouldbecon-

cluded,andsawitasanindicationofmoststateswantingtotakethisstep.Howeverthe

ICJstatedthat“[t]heemergence,aslexlata,ofacustomaryrulespecificallyprohibiting

theuseofnuclearweaponsassuchishamperedbythecontinuingtensionsbetweenthe

nascentopinio juris on the onehand, and the still strong adherence to thepractice of

deterrenceontheother.”110

3.2.2WhereDoWeFindEvidenceofCustomaryInternationalLaw?

Nowadaysnotonlystatescaninfluencethecreationofcustomaryinternationallaw,also

multilateralforumssuchastheUNGeneralAssemblyaswellastheUNSecurityCouncil

andinternationalandregionalorganisationsareactiveinthisarea.Whenreports,trea-

ties, resolutions,protocolsandproposalsarediscussed the international lawdevelops

dependingonhowauthoritativethesedebatesare–averyimportantelementthereofis

howmuch support the discussed rule is given by the participants. This process that

takesplaceinthesemultilateralforumsisaccordingtosomescholarseitherevidenceof

opiniojurisorstatepractice.AccordingtoCharney:

“[t]heclearerthenormdebated,theclearertheintentiontopromoteanormofgenerallyappli-

cableinternationallaw,andthestrongertheconsensusinfavorofthenorm,thelessneedthere

willbeforevidencefromoutsidetheforum.Similarattentionoveraperiodoftimebythesame

orotherforumsmayfurtherstrengthenthecaseforthenorm.”

AndHollis,Duncan,TheCaseofEnricaLexie:LotusRedux?,OpinioJuris,2012,<http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/17/the-case-of-enrica-lexie-lotus-redux/>,checked19August2017.110SeeEvans,at108andLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,ICJReports126,1996,para73.

29

If these signalsarenotenough toestablishanorm, thenormcan findvalidationwith

declarationsmadebystatesthatdonotparticipateintheforuminquestion,aswellasin

evidenceof statepractice andopinio juristhat exist beyond the forum.111At the same

timethisdoesnotmeanthattheseforumsandtheirendproductshavetheauthorityto

independentlymakelaw,insteadthey“advanceandformalizetheinternationallawmak-

ing process” (Charney). This kind of development of customary international law ac-

ceptsotherconcernedgroupsandnotonlystatestoparticipate.Charneyconcludesthat

“[w]hileitispossiblethattheprocessmaybeabused,itislessopentoabuseandmis-

communicationthanclassicalcustomarylawmaking”.112

Howdohuman rights rules found in conventionsanddeclarationsbecomecustomary

internationallaw?TheICJhasbothacknowledgedthatconventionsanddeclarationscan

helpdevelopcustomary international lawandstated thatUDHRnormscan transform

into customary international law.113It can be both global and regional and is in both

casesdividedintotwocomponents,oneofwhichisstatepractice(usus)andtheother

the state’s conviction that the practice in question is actually required by law (opinio

juris).Itisdifficulttoselectwhichstateactivitiesthatareevidenceofstatepractice.114

From states being the principal actors of international law, follows that the practice

amongthemorwithregardtoIGOs(intheircapacityofarecognizedactorintheinter-

nationalcommunity),isthekindofpracticethatisrequiredfortheestablishmentofcus-

tomarylaw.Article2(7)oftheUNCharterreads:

”[n]othing contained in thepresentCharter shall authorize theUnitedNations to intervene in

matterswhichareessentiallywithinthedomestic jurisdictionofanystateorshallrequirethe

Members to submit suchmatters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle

shallnotprejudicetheapplicationofenforcementmeasuresunderChapterVll.”

111JonathanI.Charney,”UniversalInternationalLaw”,AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.87:4,1993,at543-546.112Ibid.,at547-548.113Ramcharan.InShelton,at515-517;UnitedStatesDiplomaticandConsularStaffinTehran,Judgment,ICJReports,1980,para91;NorthSeaContinentalShelfCases,ICJReports,1969,para71;MilitaryParamil-itaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua,Merits,Judgment,ICJReports,1986,para186. 114Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at81-89.

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FromthisThirlwayconcludes thathowastateacts towards itspeople “is inprinciple

without significance” for the emergence of the practice element of customary law.He

alsopointsoutthestrainthiscausesinrelationtohumanrightslaw,whichchallenges

state sovereignty andhencenarrows state freedom.The reason for the existenceof a

considerablenumberofconventionsregardinghumanrightslawisthedifficultytocre-

atecustomarylawbasedonpractice.Nearlyallstateshaveratifiedalargenumberofthe

humanrightsconventionsandmanysupporttheviewthatthecontentbindsalsothose

thatarenotparties.Thisargumentisbasedonapresumedexistenceofahumanrights

customarylaw.115

TheICJhaspronouncedthatastateactingincontradictionwitharuleofcustomarylaw

doesnotper se recognizeanewcustomary rule,however theCourt alsonoted that a

newrulecanbedistinguishedthisway.Maybethestateisoftheopinionthatthewayit

acts shouldbeuniversalizedand thecustomaryrulemodified.However, thestatewill

notactasaconsequenceofitbelievingthattherulelegitimizingitsactionalreadyexists.

Hereweseetheparadoxicalnatureofopiniojuris.116

3.2.3TheCharacterofOpinioJuris

Inthe1968NorthSeaContinentalShelfcase,theICJpronouncedontherequirementof

opiniojuris.Thecourtstatedthatitis:

“evidenceof abelief that thispractice is renderedobligatoryby theexistenceof a ruleof law

requiring it. […] The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what

amountstoalegalobligation.Thefrequencyorevenhabitualcharacteroftheactsisnotinitself

enough.”

TheICJcontinuedbyexemplifyingactsthatarenotperformedbecausetheyarethought

ofaslegalobligations,“[t]herearemanyinternationalacts,e.g.,inthefieldofceremony

andprotocol,whichareperformedalmostinvariably,butwhicharemotivatedonlyby

considerationsofcourtesy,convenienceortradition,andnotbyanysenseof legaldu-

115Thirlway.InEvans,at104-105.Seealsosection3.2.2concerningtheexistenceofahumanrightscus-tomarylaw.116Ibid.,at104-106.

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ty.”117EventhoughtheICJ’selaborationconcernedhowatreatyregulationcouldbring

forthacustomaryrule,itsreasoningisalsorelevantforthedevelopmentofcustomary

lawingeneral.118

The ICJ refers toopiniojuris as the subjectiveelementof customary law.119Oneof the

problemswithopiniojurisisitsparadoxicalnature,whichhasnotbeenforcefullysolved

tothisday.Theparadoxliesinthatopiniojurispresupposesastate’sbeliefofacustom-

aryrule’sexistence,beforeitactuallyexists,forittoemerge.120Norhasitbeenresolved

ifitisenoughforstatestoinitiallywronglybelievethattheyhavetoactaccordingtoa

ruleandthattheydoso(communiserrorfacitjus).121

Althoughopiniojurisisacceptedasanelementofcustomaryinternationallaw,theviews

on how it is determined differwidely.122Some scholars grant opinio jurismuchmore

weightthanusus,andviceversa.Forsome,ususisforemostawayofprovingtheexist-

enceofopiniojuris.Thisviewwouldallowacustomaryruletoemergeevenif thereis

verylittleornostatepractice.ForexamplethisargumentisusedwhenclaimingthatUN

GeneralAssemblyresolutionscreatelaw.Itisalsopossibletoregardthenatureofcus-

tomaspracticeandthestatesbeliefasonlyawaytodifferentiatecustomfrompractices

stemmingfromtreatyobligationsorcourtesy.123Thestandingpointofususprovingthe

existenceofopiniojurishasbeenmorepopularinthefieldofhumanrightslaw.Thecri-

tiquetowardsgrantingopiniojuristhismuchweight is that it“destroysthecustomary

character”.124Amiddleway is taking the position thatwhenusus isweaker, stronger

opiniojuriscancompensateandtheotherwayaround.125

Astateofmindlikeopiniojurisisdifficulttoattributetoaconstructedentitysuchasa

state;theactionsandpronouncementsofstateshavetoactasthebasisofopiniojuris.If

themotiveofthestatetoactacertainwaydoesnothaveanythingtodowithitsbeliefof

117NorthSeaContinentalShelfCases,Judgment,ICJReports1969,para.77.118Evans,at102.119NorthSeaContinentalShelfCases,para.77.120Lepard,at21-23.121Thirlway.InEvans,at102-103.122Lepard,at20-22.123Thirlway.InEvans,at103.124Lepard,at24-25.125Ibid.,at24-25.

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theexistenceofarulecompelling it toactthatway,opiniojurisis lacking.126However,

Mendelsonthinksthattheimpossibilityofattributingastateofmindtoanabstraction

suchasastateshouldnotbeexaggerated;itissometimespossibletodiscovertheirbe-

liefsthroughtheirgovernmentsandlegaladviserswhoseviewsarepublished.127

Evidenceofopiniojuriscanbe found in, interalia,diplomaticcorrespondenceanddo-

mesticjudicialdecisions.Alsomultilateralandbilateralconventionsandresolutionsby

theUnitedNationsmightconstitutesuchevidence.However,whatweighteachsource

carries in relation to another andwhy isnot clear.128Opiniojuriscan find its strength

fromthestatementsofcourtsandsomescholars,althoughtheirstatementswouldnot

constituteasourceoflaw.AccordingtoArticle38(1)oftheICJStatute"judicialdecisions

and the teachings of themost highly qualified publicists of the various nations” are a

“subsidiarymeansforthedeterminationofrulesoflaw”.Thuscaselawisnotlawmak-

ing,howeveritdevelopsthelaw.It“carriesgreatweightthroughtheexpositionofthe

lawandacceleratestheformationofcustomaryinternationallaw”(Chinkin).129

Indoctrine jurists canargue that there is evidenceof anewcustomary legal rule and

hencetrytodevelopinternationalhumanrightslaw.130AlsoUNresolutionscanbeevi-

denceofopiniojuris.131InMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua

aswellasinLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,theICJhasregardedUN

GeneralAssemblyresolutionsasevidenceofopiniojuris.

IntheNicaraguacasetheICJwasof theopinionthatopiniojuris“may, thoughwithall

duecaution,bededuced from, interalia, theattitudeof thePartiesandtheattitudeof

States towards certain General Assembly resolutions”. 132

Thus,theevidenceofopiniojurisofthecontentthattherewasacustomaryruleonnon-

interventionandnon-useof force found support inGeneralAssembly resolutions and

126Thirlway.InEvans,at103.127Mendelson,Maurice,TheSubjectiveElementinCustomaryInternationalLaw,BritishYearbookofInter-nationalLaw,vol.66:1,1996,pp.177-208,at195.128Lepard,at30.129Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at86.130Ibid.,at88-89.131Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at32.132NicaraguaCase,para188.

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even though state practice on armed conflict pointed in the other direction, thiswas

enoughtorecognizearuleofcustomaryinternationallaw.133

InthesamecasetheICJ,whendeterminingtheexistenceofthiscustomaryrule,stated

that “[t]heCourtdoesnotconsider that, forarule tobeestablishedascustomary, the

corresponding practicemust be in absolutely rigorous conformitywith the rule” and

that“theconductofStatesshould,ingeneral,beconsistentwithsuchrules,andthatin-

stancesofStateconductinconsistentwithagivenruleshouldgenerallyhavebeentreat-

edasbreachesofthatrule,notasindicationsoftherecognitionofanewrule”.134

IntheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeaponscase,thecourtregardedGeneral

Assemblyresolutionsaspossibleevidenceofopiniojuris:“[t]heCourtnotesthatGeneral

Assemblyresolutions,eveniftheyarenotbinding,maysometimeshavenormativeval-

ue.Theycan,incertaincircumstances,provideevidenceimportantforestablishingthe

existenceofaruleortheemergenceofanopiniojuris”.

Inordertoknowifsucharesolutionisindeedevidenceofopiniojuris,“itisnecessaryto

lookatitscontentandtheconditionsofitsadoption”,accordingtothecourt.135Howev-

er,heretheresultwasdifferentthanintheNicaraguacase.Thecourtfoundtherehad

beenaconsiderableamountofabstentionsaswellasnegativevoteswhenlookingatthe

entiretyofresolutionsthatthecourtconsideredinthecaseandthereforetherewasnot

enoughevidence to supportanexistenceof anopiniojurisstating theunlawfulnessof

theuseofnuclearweapons.136

However,italsoaddedthattheGeneralAssemblyadoptedresolutionsbymajorityevery

year, requesting that “aconventionprohibiting theuseofnuclearweapons inanycir-

cumstance” shouldbe concluded.The courtnoted that it “reveals thedesireof a very

largesectionoftheinternationalcommunitytotake,byaspecificandexpressprohibi-

tionoftheuseofnuclearweapons,asignificantstepforwardalongtheroadtocomplete

nuclear disarmament”. Even if this was the case, there were tensions between the

133Ibid.,para186-190.AlsoChinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at83.134NicaraguaCase,para186.135LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,AdvisoryOpinion,ICJReports,1996,para70.136Ibid.,para71.

34

emergingopiniojurisandthe“strongadherencetothepracticeofdeterrence”thatstill

hinderedacustomaryruleofthekind.137

Thegrowthof the legalpersonalityof internationalorganisations (seeChapter4)has

affectedlawmaking,notleasttheformationofcustomaryinternationallaw.Ithasbeen

possibletodistinguishthebeliefofstatesofwhatthelawisinresolutionsoftheseenti-

ties,i.e.opiniojuris.138Inthedevelopmentofopiniojurisoftheinternationalcommunity

asawhole(opiniojuriscommunisoropiniojurisgentium139)NGOsandindividualshave

amoreandmorerelevantrole.Both“actors”haveeitherparticipated inor influenced

travauxpréparatoirestotreaties.Alongwithcivilsociety,theyareactiveinformingand

applyinglaw.Augusto&Trindadenote“[t]hisissymptomaticofthedemocratizationof

internationalrelations,paralleltoagrowingconscientizationofthemultiplesubjectsof

lawoperatingatinternationallevelinpursuanceofuniversalvalues.”140

3.3CustomaryInternationalHumanRightsLaw?

3.3.1Doesitexist?

Customary international law is an important source of international human rights

law.141However,atthesametimeitcanbearguedthatthereisnosuchthingasacus-

tomary international human rights law, for the reason that themajority of rights are

based on international declarations and treaty commitments. Nevertheless, several

scholarsareoftheopinionthatcustom-basedhumanrightsexist.Thirlwaywritesthat

they are “seen as somehowderiving from an adaptation of international instruments,

rather than as having emerged from the interchange of state relations that normally

constitutes thematerial elementof custom”.142Someprovisionsof theUDHRare con-

137Ibid.,para73.138SeeAugusto,Antônio&Trindade,Cançado,InternationalLawforHumankind:TowardsaNewJusGen-tium,BrillMartinusNijhoffPublishers,Leiden,2013,at191-192.139Fellmeth,AaronX.&Horwitz,Maurice,GuidetoLatininInternationalLaw,”Opinioiurisgentium”,Ox-fordUniversityPress,Oxford,2011.140Augusto&Trindade,at222-223.141Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at83.142Thirlway,Hugh,HumanRightsInCustomaryLaw:AnAttempttoDefineSomeoftheIssues,LeidenJour-nalofInternationalLaw,vol.28:3,2015,at497-499.

35

sideredcustomary international law143,however theprocessbywhich they transform

intocustomaryrulesisunclear.144

Thirlwaynotesthedifferencebetweencustomarylawandhumanrightslawinthatcus-

tomarylawismorebasedonstate-to-statereciprocityandhumanrightslawisfocused

onthestate-individualrelationship.Hearguesthattheobligationofthestatetorespect

humanrightsexistsasaconsequenceofthenationallawofthecountrythat“isapplica-

blenot(ornotdirectly)asamatterofinternationallaw”.Ifonewouldassumethatthere

arecustomaryrulesofhumanrightslaw,theserulesaresuchastogiverisetoergaom-

nesobligations.145Anothertypeofcustomarynormsofimportancetothehumanrights

regimeisjuscogensnorms.146

3.3.2ErgaOmnesandJusCogens

The ICJ developed the idea of erga omnesobligations in the Barcelona Traction Case

whereitstatedthat:

“[i]nparticular,anessentialdistinctionshouldbedrawnbetweentheobligationsofaStateto-

wardstheinternationalcommunityasawhole,andthosearisingvis-à-visanotherState inthe

fieldofdiplomaticprotection.By theirverynature the formerare theconcernofallStates. In

viewof the importanceof therights involved,allStatescanbeheld tohavea legal interest in

theirprotection;theyareobligationsergaomnes.”147

Examplesofergaomnesobligationsaretheprohibitionofracialdiscrimination,slavery,

aggressionandgenocide.148Thoughsimilar,thisisnotthesameconceptasjuscogens.149

Juscogensnormsarecustomarylawofaspecialcharacterinthesensethattheycannot

143Wolfrum,Rüdiger(ed.),MaxPlanckEncyclopediaofInternationalLaw,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2008,sub”HumanRights”,”Sources,FoundationsandPrinciplesofInternationalLaw”and”CustomaryInternationalLaw”,Buergenthal,Thomas,‘HumanRights’,atpara.9.144Lepard,at239-240.145Thirlway,Hugh,HumanRightsInCustomaryLaw,at497-499.146Cf.DeWet.InSheltonat543-544.147BarcelonaTraction,LightandPowerCompany,Limited(BelgiumvSpain),ICJReports,(NewApplica-tion:1962),1970,para33.148Ibid.,para34.149DeWet,Erika,“JusCogensandObligationsErgaOmnes”.InShelton,at555-556.

36

bederogated fromdue to their content.150Thesenormshave an intimate relationship

withhumanrights.Peremptoryastheyare, juscogensnormsoverridetheneedforan

individual state’s consent.151The unlawfulness of genocide, torture, slavery aswell as

slave trade, crimes against humanity, piracy, racial discrimination anda state’s useof

force(non-defensive)againstanotherstatearesuchnorms.152

In Article 53 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties presents a definition and

regulates the relationship between jus cogens, i.e. peremptory norms, and conflicting

norms:

“Atreaty isvoid if,at thetimeof itsconclusion, itconflictswithaperemptorynormofgeneral interna-

tional law.For thepurposesof thepresentConvention,aperemptorynormofgeneral interna-

tional law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a

wholeasanormfromwhichnoderogation ispermittedandwhichcanbemodifiedonlybya

subsequentnormofgeneralinternationallawhavingthesamecharacter.”

Also in case of conflicting normsArticle 64 declares “[i]f a newperemptory normof

general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that

normbecomesvoidandterminates.”

TheICJhasimplicitly,alsointheBarcelonaTractioncase,statedthatobligationsofjus

cogenscould have an “ergaomneseffect” since its examples ofwhich norms could be

erga omnes encompassed the unlawfulness of genocide, slavery, racial discrimination

andone-sideduseofforce.Sincethesenormsalsoareregardedasjuscogensnorms,it

wouldmeanthat,“whenanobligationisrecognizedasonefromwhichnoderogationis

permittedduetoits fundamentalnature,allstates(andothersubjectsof international

law)havealegalinterestinitsprotection”(DeWet).Nevertheless,thisdoesnotinevita-

blymeanthateveryexistingergaomnesnormisaperemptorynormofjuscogens.Itcan

bearguedthatnormsofhumanrightstreatiesthathavebeenacknowledgedaspartof

customarylawareergaomnesnorms; i.e. theseobligationsareowedcollectivelytoall

states.Althoughthecompliancetothesenormsisof interesttothe internationalcom-

150Thirlway.InEvans,at120.151Chinkin.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at86.152Lepard,at7.

37

munityasawholetheydonotautomaticallyalsohavejuscogenseffect-forexample,the

unlawfulness of genocide is a jus cogensnorm for the reason that a large number of

stateshaverecognizedittobeone.153

AnexampleofanotherergaomnesobligationwaspresentedintheICJ’sAdvisoryOpin-

ionontheLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinian

Territory.ThecourtstatedthatIsraelhadviolatedanergaomnesobligationreferringto

“theobligation to respect the right of thePalestinianpeople to self-determination”.154

Therighttoself-determinationcouldbeanexampleofarightthatdoesnothavejusco-

genseffect,whilebeingowedtotheinternationalcommunityasawhole.However,the

opinionsonthematterdiffer.155Anexampleofwhenajuscogensnormdoesnothavean

ergaomnescharactercouldbearegionalcustomarynormthatisjuscogens.Naturallyit

wouldnotbeowedtotheentireinternationalcommunityandthuswouldnotbeanerga

omnesnorm.156

Article53oftheViennaConventiondoesnotmentionanyspecificjuscogensnorms;itis

uptotheinternationalcommunitytocollectivelydeterminethem.Thedeterminationof

a juscogensnormrequires two steps - essentially the international communityhas to

agreeonanormscustomarylawstatusandinaddition,forittohave juscogenseffect,

agree that it isnon-derogative.157Lepardnotes that thesekindsofperemptorynorms

“requirehighdegree of consensus for their recognition”.158However, all states donot

havetoagreeontheirexistence.159Thirlwaywritesthatitwouldbenormaltoexpect“a

sort of superioropinio juris” in order for a rule tobecome juscogens, i.e. a belief that

derogationscouldnotbeallowed.160

153DeWet.InShelton,at555-556.154ICJReports,AdvisoryOpinionof9July2004ontheLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritorypara155,at199.155Summers,JamesJ.,Thestatusofself-determinationininternationallaw:aquestionoflegalsignificanceorpoliticalimportance,FinnishYearbookofInternationalLaw,vol.14,2003,at283.156Lepard,at268-269.157DeWet.InShelton,at543.158Lepard,at7.159DeWet.InShelton,at544.160Thirlway.InEvans,at120.

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3.3.2.1AnExampleofaCustomaryNormofHumanRights

In theGenocideConventioncase the ICJ stated that “[it] is,of course,well established

thattheConventionenshrinesprinciplesthatalsoformspartofcustomaryinternational

law”. In this regard the Court referred to its advisory opinion on Reservations to the

ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocidein1951.161In-

terestingly enough the ICJ referred to “moral law” in this advisory opinion:

“TheoriginsoftheConventionshowthatitwastheintentionoftheUnitedNationstocondemn

andpunishgenocideas"acrimeunderinternationallaw"involvingadenialoftherightofexist-

enceof entirehumangroups, adenialwhich shocks the conscienceofmankindand results in

great losses tohumanity,andwhich iscontrary tomoral lawandto thespiritandaimsof the

United Nations (Resolution 96 (1) of the General Assembly, December 11th 1946).”

Lepardpointsoutthelackofexplicitreasoningbasedonopiniojurisandususinboththe

2015GenocideCaseand theadvisoryopinionof1951. Instead theexistenceof a cus-

tomarynormprohibitinggenocideissupportedbyethicalandmoralprinciples.162Fur-

ther the ICJstated, “theprinciplesunderlying theConventionareprincipleswhichare

recognizedbycivilizednationsasbindingonStates,evenwithoutanyconventionalob-

ligation” and that the conventionwas “intended by the General Assembly and by the

contractingpartiestobedefinitelyuniversalinscope.”163“Evenwithoutanyconvention-

alobligation”seemstorefertocustomaryinternational law.164TheCourtalsoputem-

phasisontheparties’intentioninregardtouniversality.

3.3.3CoreRights

Inthisregard,another interestingfeature inhumanrights lawis thedivisionofrights

intosocalledcorerightsandotherrights.Corerightsare thoughtofasencapsulating

themostprominentmoralvalueswecanfind inthehumanrightsregime,anexample161ApplicationoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(Croatiav.Serbia),Judgment,I.C.J.Reports2015,para87. 162ReservationstotheConventiononGenocide,AdvisoryOpinion,ICJReports,1951,at23;Lepard(ed.),Reexamining,”TowardsaNewTheoryofCustomaryInternationalHumanRightsLaw”,at240-242.163ReservationstotheConventiononGenocide,at23164Lepard,Reexamining,at242.

39

beingtheprohibitionoftorture.Noderogationcanbemadefromthem,andotherrights

haveamissionofprotectingtheserights.165

TreatiessuchastheECHRandtheICCPRacknowledgesuchcorerightsfromwhichex-

emptionscannotbemadeevenwhenthere isapublicemergency.166According tovan

Bovenitseemsthat“violationsoftheserightsentailaspecialandimperativeresponsi-

bilitytoprevent,toprotect,andtoremedy.”Thenon-derogablerightsarenotautomati-

callyjuscogensnorms,althoughtheprohibitionoftortureandtherighttolifeareexam-

plesthatfitbothcategories.InthewordsofvanBoven,“basicsubsistencerightswhich

determinethelife,thedignity,andthewell-beingofindividualsandpeoplesshouldbe

consideredascorerights”.167

However,thiskindofhierarchyconflictswiththepositivelawthatemphasizesthathu-

manrightsareequal.168Thiskindofargumentcanalsobemadeinconnectiontoerga

omnes;Augusto& Trindadewrite that “[i]n fact, nothing could bemore incompatible

with the very existence of the erga omnes obligations than the positivist-voluntarist

conceptionof InternationalLawandtheemphasisontheStateconsentasbasisof the

exercise of international jurisdiction.”169When it comes to core rights, the states’ re-

sponsibilitiesseemevenmorespecifiedthangenerallyinthehumanrightsarea.Except

makingsurethereareeffectiveremediesincaseofaviolationofahumanright,thereis

the additional responsibility to fight impunity as well as to make reparations. In the

practice of regional human rights courts and theHumanRights Committee it appears

thatrightsthatfallwithinthecategoryofcorerightsrequire“urgentpreventiveaction

byway of provisional or interimmeasures […] in order to avoid irreparable harm to

persons”(Boven).170

165Scheinin,Martin,“CoreRightsandObligations”.InShelton,at528-529.166Boven,Theovan,“CategoriesofRights”.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at150;ECHRArticle15,ICCPRArticle4(2).167Boven.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at150-151.168Scheinin.InShelton,at528-529.169Cf.Augusto&Trindade,at314.170Boven.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at151.

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3.3.4ThePersistentObjector

Anelementthatexistsintherealmofcustomaryinternationallawbutishardtomould

intotheformofhumanrightsisthepersistentobjectordoctrine.Apersistentobjectoris

astatethathasobjectedtoarulefromthestart,i.e.fromthetimewhenitstartedtode-

velopintoalegalobligation.Asaconsequencethepersistentobjectorcancontinuenot

beingboundbyitatthetimeitreachesthestatusofcustomaryinternationallaw.171

However,statepracticeinsupportofthepersistentobjectordoctrineisscarceandifthe

doctrine existed itwould itself be customary international law.172This doctrine is not

verycompatiblewiththeareaofinternationalhumanrightslawthatischaracterizedby

universalism.Perse, theuniversalist approachdoesnot allow for exceptions from the

lawofhuman rights.Whenusing thepersistentobjectordoctrine, state consent is re-

tained.This isoneof thepurposes forwhich it is argued that thedoctrine shouldnot

carrymuchweightintheareaofhumanrights.173Forexample,thecharacterof jusco-

gensnormsasnon-derogableexcludesthepossibilityofastatetopersistentlyobjectto

them.174Withreferencetotheautonomyofstatesaswellastothebeliefofstatesthatit

shouldpersist,Lepardarguesinfavourforthisdoctrineasacontinued,althoughcondi-

tioned,partofcustomaryinternationallaw.175

3.4CustomaryInternationalLawandDemocracy

Ochoacontrastsparticipatorydemocracyandrepresentativedemocracyagainstpartici-

patorylaw-formation.176Incountrieswherethegovernmentisbasedonrepresentative

democracy theparticipationof the citizens is expressedby themvoting for their pre-

ferred representative who is supposed to represent them in, inter alia, enactment of

laws.Therepresentativesdoderivetheirpowerfromthevoters,howevertheydonot

needtheirdirectconsentpriortopoliticaldecision-making.Byvoting,thecitizenshave

alreadyacquiesced to the representativesactingon theirbehalf. Internationally states171Thirlway.InEvans,at108.172Ibid.173Holning,Lau,RethinkingthePersistentObjectorDoctrineinInternationalHumanRightsLaw,ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.6:1,summer2005,pp.495-510,at501.174Cf.Lepard,at235-236.175Lepard,at229-230.176SeeOchoa,TheRelationshipofParticipatoryDemocracytoParticipatoryLawFormation.

41

represent theircitizens in international institutionswhere treatiesandpoliciesare is-

sued.Thisapplies irrespectiveof thestatebeingdemocraticornot.177Therearesome

legitimacy problems at the international level, one ofwhich being the difficulty to, in

Kumm’s words, domestically hold states “that are deeply embedded in transnational

networks”democraticallyaccountable.178

Ochoa argues, “the inclusion of individuals in the [customary international law] for-

mation process would increase democratic participation in law-making”. She further

illustratively states “the philosophical underpinnings of [customary international law]

doctrine,soboundedinWestphaliannotionsofstatesovereignty,havebeencorrodedto

such extents that, at least in the area of human rights, excluding the individual from

[customaryinternationallaw]formationrenders[customaryinternationallaw]doctrine

somewhatincoherent.”179

3.5Summary

Whenthebeliefinlawasderivingfromahigherpowerhadfaded,anewwaytoestab-

lishwhatthelawiswastoobservehowpeoplebehavedtowardseachother.Thusitis

builtonhumanrelationsand it isanearlyexampleofhow legal rulesweremade. In-

steadof findingcustomary lawasareplacement fornatural law,Aristotle thoughcus-

tomarylawwasanexpressionofnatural law.Anadditionalwayofseeingcustomwas

theoneoftheancientromansthatonlyregardedthelawmaker’scustomimportant.So

customisperdefinitiontheinteractionbetweenhumanbeingsthathaspersistedfora

longtime.

Asdohumanrights law,customary international lawcanchallenge thesovereigntyof

statesintheregardthatitchallengesstatutelawthatisbasedonstateconsent.Never-

theless,itcanalsobearguedthatbothcustomaryinternationallawandstatutelawcan

beusedbystatesastoolstogettheirwillthrough.Therelationshipbetweencustomary

international lawandhumanrights lawisnotuncomplicated;customary international

177Ibid.,at9.178Cf.Ochoa,TheRelationship,at9-10andKumm,Mattias,TheLegitimacyofInternationalLaw:AConsti-tutionalistFrameworkofAnalysis,TheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.15:5,2004,at915-916.179Ochoa,TheIndividual,at150-151

42

lawismoreorlesscompatiblewithinternationalhumanrightslawdependingonwhich

partofitonelooksat.Ifonelooksat juscogensnorms,ergaomnesobligationsandthe

viewthattherearecertaincorerights, it istheinherentvalueoftheserightsthatgive

thesenotions their value -which isnot supportedbypositive law.However, theyare

wellalignedwiththeprotectionofindividualsthatisatthecoreofhumanrights.

Thegeneralviewoncustomaryinternationallawisthatitsfoundationisstateconsent–

theconsentofthemajoritybindstheminorityaswell,exceptinthecaseofthepersis-

tentobjector.Sothere issomedemocraticelement inthe formationofcustomary law.

The persistent objector doctrine is however somewhat incompatible with the human

rightregime,sinceitmakesitpossibleforsomestatestoescapetheuniversalismofhu-

manrights.Atthesametimecustomarynormsaresaidtodifferfrommoralnormseven

iftheinterrelationisunclearforthereasonthatthereisnoexactdefinitionontherela-

tionshipbetweenlawandmorals.InthisregarditisinterestingtonotethattheICJre-

ferredtomorallawsintheGenocideConventioncasewhendeterminingtheexistenceof

a customary rule on the prohibition of genocide. It seems that, in the area of human

rights,theCourtacceptsmoralityasalegitimatefoundationonwhichcustomaryinter-

nationalnormscanbebased.

Theoretically customary international law is a stepping-stone for international law in

generalandtreatiescanbeconcludedinordertoderogatefromcustomarylaw.Inprac-

ticetreatieshaveamoreprominentrole,perhapsforthereasonthattheyaremorecon-

creteanddonotseemtohaveasmuchpracticalandtheoreticalissuesleftunresolvedas

customaryinternational lawdoes.Neverthelessit isclearthatcustomaryinternational

lawisanimportantsourceofinternationallaw.Whatisnotasclearisifthereexistsa

customaryinternationallawofhumanrightsfortheexactreasonthatmuchofthehu-

manrightsdoctrineisbasedontreaties.

However, various provisions of UDHR have become customary international law and

somescholarsarguethattherecanbesuchaconceptascustomaryinternationalhuman

rights law. Yet, customary law is based on state-to-state reciprocity whereas human

rightsarebasedonaverticalrelationshipbetweenthestateandtheindividual.Ifthere

43

existssucharegime,therulescontainedinitwouldbeofergaomnescharacter,thusthe

concernofallstates.

Thisistobekeptseparatefrom juscogensthatiscustomarylawofaspecialcharacter

thatdoesnotallowderogationsduetothecontentoftherights.Theweightofjuscogens

revealsitselfalsointhefactthattreatiesconflictingwiththesenormsbecomevoid.This

isaclearoverridingofstatesovereigntysincenewtreatiescannotoverride juscogens.

The non-derogable character of jus cogens iswhat overrides state consent. Due to its

character theseperemptorynormsrequirea “highdegreeof consensus”anda special

opiniojuris.

Anothertypeofrightthat ishighinhierarchyisacoreright.Theserightsencapsulate

ourmostprominentmoralvaluesandarenon-derogableaswellasprotectedbyother

rights. Nevertheless they are not automatically jus cogens. This kind of hierarchical

placementofrightsconflictswithpositivelawaccordingtowhichlegalnormsshouldbe

equal.Anotherconflictliesinthestrongerpositivismofthepersistentobjectordoctrine

thatasaconsequenceconflictswiththehumanrightsregime.

Theway inwhichwe can find norms of customary international law that are human

rightsistolookatopiniojurisandusus.Actsofcourtesyarenotthoughtofasevidenceof

opiniojuris,forthereasonthatthestatemustbelievethatthewayitactsisbecauseofa

legal obligation. Resolutions, conventions and diplomatic correspondence can be evi-

denceofopiniojuris.Itcanalsofindstrengthfromdoctrineandfromcaselaw.

UN general assembly resolutions, such as the UDHR, can be evidence of a belief that

thereexistsacertainnormofcustomaryhumanrightslaw.Itistheauthoritativenessof

theprocessinthedifferentmultilateralforumsthatdecidesifthereisevidenceofacus-

tomary rule.That thewaya stateacts towards itpeoplewouldbemeaningless in the

formation of customary international law puts a strain on human rights law. Even

thoughthishasledtoagreatamountofhumanrightstreaties,manyconsidernon-state

partiesboundaswell.

Today,notonlystatescaninfluencethisprocessofcustomaryinternationallawmaking.

44

However, there remain several issues in connection to the subjective element of cus-

tomary law, its paradoxical nature and the uncertainty on how it should beweighed

againstususbeingsuchissues.

4.StateDomination?

4.1SovereigntyandTheSubject-ObjectDichotomy

StatesovereigntyhasalreadybeentoucheduponinChapter2incontrasttotheareaof

internationalhumanrightslawthatchallengesit.Hereitiscontrastedtotheindividual’s

role.

Historically in the development of international law, the role of individual has been

morenaturallyinherentinthediscussionthantoday–e.g. intheworksofGrotiusand

Suárez.Thisshiftedwhenlegalpositivismgainedinimportance.180Whenthisnewview

onthenatureoflawappearedthestatebecamepersonifiedinthesensethatitwasre-

gardedhaving itsownwill.181Sosourcesof international lawgaveonly rise toobliga-

tionsbetweenstates,which,asMégretputsit,madeindividuals“mereobjectsofinter-

national law,atbestunintendedandcollateralbeneficiariesofobligationsundertaken

bysovereigns”.182“Sovereignty”isawordmeaning“supremepowerorauthority”,“the

authorityofastatetogovernitselforanotherstate”and“aself-governingstate”accord-

ingtotheOxfordDictionary.183Intheinternationalcontextitmeansthatstatesarein-

dependentandhavetheexclusiverighttoregulatetheirinternalaffairswithoutoutside

interference.184 State sovereignty has long been central in international law; Mégret

writes,“[i]nternationallawwas,inasense,dedicatedtoensuringthatstatesovereignty

andstatevoluntarismwouldnotbeundermined.”185

180SeeAugusto&Trindade,ChapterIX”TheLegalPersonalityoftheIndividualasSubjectofInternationalLaw”.181Augusto&Trindade,at217.182Mégret.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at96-98.183OxfordUniveristyPress,OxfordDictionaries,“Sovereignty”,2017,<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sovereignty>,checked28August2017.184VanderVyer,Johan,”Sovereignty”.InShelton,at384.Garner,BryanA.,Black’sLawDictionary,8thed.,ThomsonWest,2004.185Mégret.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at97.

45

Thustheopinionwasthatthereexistednoindependentroleforindividualsinthearena

of international law.However, according to some scholars, individuals arenotmerely

that.McCorquodaleclaimstheyarenotcompletelyatthemercyofthestatebuthiscon-

clusion is that thedegree inwhich theyparticipate in international lawvaries.As the

human rights regime has developed, the role of the individual has gained in im-

portance.186

After the SecondWorldWar and particularly the Nuremberg trials when individuals

wererecognizedtobeboundbythepowerofinternationallaw,individualsstartedtobe

seenmoreassubjects.Todayindividualsininternationallawcanbebothrightholders

anddutybearers.187Theyenjoyhumanrightsbutdoalsohavetorespectthem;forex-

ampletheycannowadaysbesubjecttointernationalcriminalresponsibility.188Theycan

alsomakecomplaints.189Excepttheregionalbodies,alsotheHumanRightsCommittee,

theCommitteeontheEliminationofDiscriminationAgainstWomen,theCommitteeon

theEliminationofRacialDiscrimination,theCommitteeAgainstTortureandtheInter-

national Criminal Court engage individuals. Individuals can submit complaints at the

HRC,theCATandthecommitteesofCERD,CEDAW.190AttheICCvictimscanparticipate

in proceedings.191With regard to reparations and protective measures they can also

initiateproceedings.192

VanderVyverclaimsthat“statesovereigntyis[…]nolongeranabsoluterightandthat

itsimplementationhasbecomesubordinatetothevaluesimbeddedinthehumanrights

doctrine.”193AnexampleofwhenhumanrightsoverridesovereigntyistheResponsibil-

itytoProtect-doctrine.Thedoctrinefulfilsthecustomarylawelementofopiniojurisbut

doesnotyethaveenoughstatepractice;nevertheless,whatitexpressesisthatcoreval-

uescanoverrulenationalsovereignty“insituationswherenationalauthoritiesarefail-

186McCorquodale.InEvans,at284-286.187Ochoa,TheIndividual,at153-157.188Cf,Cryer,Robert,Friman,Håkan,Robinson,Darryl&Wilmshurst,Elizabeth,InternationalCriminalLaw,3rded.,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2014,at22-23.189Seesection2.2.3.190Article14oftheCERD;Article22oftheUNCAT;theOptionalProtocoloftheCEDAW;theOptionalProtocoltotheICCPR.191Articles15(3),19(3)and68(3)oftheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICCStatute).192Cryer,at488;Article75ICCStatute;Articles87,94oftheICCRulesofProcedureandEvidence.193VanderVyer.InShelton,at380.

46

ingtorespecttheserightsandvalues“(Boven).194Anotherexamplealreadymentioned

istheprimacyofjuscogens,ergaomnesandcorerights.195Inthestates’exerciseoftheir

sovereignty is includedtheprimaluseof it, forexamplewhenstatesconcludetreaties

andbecomeboundbytheirconsent,butalsoconcessionofit,i.e.becausethecontentof

theagreementslimitthestatesdiscretion.Thus,thereisadualnaturetotheexerciseof

sovereignty.196

In InternationalLawedited byMalcolmD. Evans, there is a chapter entitled “What is

InternationalLawfor?”writtenbyMarttiKoskenniemi.InafootnoteKoskenniemirefers

toHenkinwhoarguesthattheinternationallegalsystemisconcentratedon“Stateval-

ues”incontrastto“humanvalues”.AccordingtoKoskenniemi“[t]hispolemicalcontrast

undermines the degree to which States […] find their moral justification in late-

eighteenthcenturyliberalindividualismandtheidealofnationalself-rule:‘Statevalues’

persistbecausetheychannel‘humanvalues’withinapoliticalcommunity.”197

WithsupportfromWestlake,Koskenniemiaccountsforthequestionofwhystateobjec-

tivesshouldbetheonlyobjectivesthataretakenintoaccount.Thefactthattheinterna-

tionalsystemiscentredonstateshasbeenquestionedformanyyears. Ithasbeenar-

guedthatindividualsasopposedtostatesare,inWestlake’swords“theultimatemem-

bersof[theinternational]society”,aswellasothergroupssuchasminoritiesandinter-

nationalorganisations.198AugustoandTrindadeemphasizethe importancethatpower

be divided between different legal subjects in order to prevent abuse.199Also Steiner

problematizeswhyitisnotpossibletorelysolelyonstatestohonourhumanrights.He

takesthegenocideinRwandaaswellastheoneinCambodiaasanexampleoftheunre-

liabilityof stateswhen it comes to them forcefully reactingagainst atrocitiesorother

violationscommittedinothercountries.Steinerappliesthisargumenttowhyintergov-

ernmentalorganisationsareneeded.200

194Boven.InMoecklietal.(eds.),at151-152.195Seesection3.3.2and3.3.3.196Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at22-24.197Koskenniemi.InEvans,at33.198Koskenniemi.InEvans,at36;Westlake,John,InternationalLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cam-bridge,1910,at16:”Theconsentoftheinternationalsocietytotherulesprevailinginitistheconsentofthemenwhoaretheultimatemembersofthatsociety.”Parenthesisadded.199Augusto&Trindade,at206.200Steiner.InEvans,at787-788.

47

Thestatecentrism isapparent in treatiesandcase law. InArticle2of theUNCharter

sovereigntyisemphasizedbystatingthat“[t]heOrganizationisbasedontheprincipleof

sovereignequalityofallitsMembers”(para.1)andthat“[n]othingcontainedinthepre-

sentChartershallauthorizetheUnitedNationstointerveneinmatterswhichareessen-

tiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanystate[…]”howevernotingthatthiscanbe

overridden if theUN decides to takemeasures in accordancewith Chapter VII of the

charter(para.7).TyingthisprovisionandallotherprovisionsoftheUNChartertothe

protection of human rights, the 1st paragraph of the preamble of the ICCPR and the

ICESCR refers to the UN charter stating that “in accordance with the principles pro-

claimedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations,recognitionoftheinherentdignityandof

theequalandinalienablerightsofallmembersofthehumanfamilyisthefoundationof

freedom,justiceandpeaceintheworld”.

TheICJhasreinforcedthecentralroleofthestate.TheLegalityoftheThreatorUseof

NuclearWeaponscasewasinitiatedbytheUNGeneralAssemblythathadfiledarequest

totheICJinordertogetanadvisoryopiniononthelegalityofnuclearweapons.201The

ICJcametotheconclusionthattheuseofnuclearweaponscouldpossiblybelawful“in

an extreme circumstance of self-defence”.202It stated that every state has the right to

survival and therefore also self-defence “in accordancewithArticle 51of theCharter,

when its survival is at stake”.203From this Koskenniemi draws the conclusion that

“’[benefits]totheStatesandStatesurvivalremainthehighestobjectivesofthesystem”,

whichalsocanbeseeninthemarginofappreciationandthederogationsthattheECtHR

grantsstates.204

KoskenniemiispartoftheCriticalLegalStudiesmovementthatquestionstheabilityof

international law to be practically functional and points out the difficulties that arise

fromtryingtomatchstatesovereigntywithinternationallegalnormsthatseektobind

thesestates.AccordingtoKoskenniemiinternationallawexistsonascalereachingfrom

201TheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,at6.TheICJhadtoanswerthequestion“Isthethreatoruseofnuclearweaponsinanycircumstancepermittedunderinternationallaw?”202Ibid.,para97.203Ibid.,para96.204Koskenniemi.InEvans,at37.

48

positivismtonaturalismandthatiteitherbecomesapologeticorutopian.205DavidKen-

nedyhasclaimedthatontheonehandtheeffectofthebeliefinhighernormsseparates

the international law fromstatepractice (which iswhatmakes the lawutopianusing

MarttiKoskenniemi’s logic).On theother, ifweacceptstatesovereignty, international

lawismergedwithstatepractice(andbecomesapologeticinKoskenniemi’swords).206

In the view of Koskenniemi “there is reason to defend a legal ‘formalism’ against a

‘pragmatism’ thatviews international lawonly in termsof the immediateobjectives it

serves.”207Pragmatismmeaningviewingthe law in itscontextandthus lookingat the

effectiveoutcomeoftheapplicationofarule208andformalismmeaningviewinglawas

science;judgesuselogicaldeductiontofindrules.209Ontheonehandhiscriticagainsta

pragmatic-instrumentalist standing point (i.e. seeing law as something that makes it

possibleto“reachvaluablehumanpurposes”,insteadofworshipingitswordingandits

objectivesperse)isthat:

“[a] legal technique that reachesdirectly to law’spurposes iseithercompelled to think that it

canaccesstherightpurposeinsomepolitics-independentfashion–inwhichcaseitwouldstand

todefenditsimplicitmoralnaturalism–orittransformsitselftoalicenceforthosepowersina

positiontorealizetheirownpurposestodopreciselythat.”

Ontheotherhandwhendiscussingthenotionofpragmatism,Koskennieminotes,“for-

malsovereigntyshouldnotbeabarforhumanitarianinterventionagainstatyrannical

regime”.Inotherwords,ifastateoppressesitscitizensitconsequentlyunderminesits

own sovereignty. Fromsovereignty flows the self-ruleofpeople, but if thepeople are

oppressed“itwouldseemnonsensicaltoallowformalsovereigntytoconstituteabarto

interventioninsupportofthepeople”.210InthewordsofAugustoandTrindade:“[i]tis

205Bring,Mahmoudi&Wrange,at40.206Cf.Ibid.207Koskenniemi.InEvansat37-40.208SeeWacks,at331and365;Fieser,James&Dowden,Bradley(eds.),”LegalPragmatism”,byButler,BrianEdgar,InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,<http://www.iep.utm.edu/leglprag/>,checked25Sep-tember2017.209SeeWacks,at364.210Koskenniemi.InEvans,at37-40.

49

not to be forgotten that, as originally conceived, States exist for human beings (who

composethem),andnotvice-versa.”211

4.2IndividualsandOtherNon-stateActorsasSubjects

AugustoandTrindadewritethat“[a]lthoughStateskeeponplayingapredominantrole

at the international level, contemporary InternationalLawhasbeenenrichedwith the

overcoming of the old inter-State dimension and the contributions of other subjects,

such as international organisations, individuals and humankind”. They point out that

state-centrismhaspreviouslygivenrisetopowerabuseandthatawiderviewoninter-

nationalpersonalityworksagainst suchabuse.212That individualswhohavehad their

humanrightsviolatedcanbeawardedcompensationandmakeclaimsaboutthealleged

violationsandthe fact that theynowadaysalsocanbeheldresponsible forownviola-

tionsofhumanitarianorhumanrights lawareindicativeofthemhavingasubjectsta-

tus.213Aninterestingremarkwithregardtothedefinitionofasubjectisthatallcitizens

donotparticipateinnationallegislationandnevertheless,theyarestill“subjects(titu-

laires)ofrights,[…]boundbytheduties,emanatedfromsuchnorms”(Augusto&Trin-

dade).214Adifferentperspectivethantheblackandwhitesubject-objectapproach,isto

viewinternational lawasconsistingofdifferentparticipants,oneparticipantbeingthe

individual.215

Internationalorganisationsaresingledout forthereasonthattheyareanentityother

thanastatethathasgainedsubjectstatus.216Theyhavegreatlyaffectedtheinternation-

al legalorderinmanyways:not least intheiracquisitionof legalpersonality.217Inthe

1949AdvisoryOpiniononReparationsforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnited

NationstheICJstated:

211Augusto&Trindade,at179.212Ibid.,at177-178.213Ochoa,TheIndividual,at123.214Augusto&Trindade,at221.215RosalynHiggins,ConceptualThinkingAbouttheIndividualinInternationalLaw,BritishJournalofIn-ternationalStudies,vol.4:1,1978,pp.1-19,at5.216InterpretationoftheAgreementof1951betweentheWHOandEgypt,AdvisoryOpinion,ICJReports,1980,para37.217SeeAugusto&Trindade,at182.

50

“[o]n this point, the Court's opinion is that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the

membersoftheinternationalcommunity,hadthepower,inconformitywithinternationallaw,

tobringintobeinganentitypossessingobjectiveinternationalpersonality,andnotmerelyper-

sonalityrecognizedbythemalone,togetherwithcapacitytobringinternationalclaims.”218

Theway inwhich the ICJ interpreted the roleof theUNwas that it had tokeep itself

within“itspurposesandfunctions”asshowedin itsstatement“[w]hereasaStatepos-

sessesthetotalityofinternationalrightsanddutiesrecognizedbyinternationallaw,the

rightsanddutiesofanentitysuchastheOrganizationmustdependuponitspurposes

and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in

practice.”219TheseimpliedpowersallowedtheUNtoadapttochangedcircumstancesin

theinternationalarena.220IntheICJ,AdvisoryOpinionof1980onInterpretationofthe

Agreementof1951betweentheWHOandEgypt, thecourtstatedthat“[i]nternational

organizations are subjectsof international lawand, as such, areboundby anyobliga-

tionsincumbentuponthemundergeneralrulesofinternationallaw,undertheirconsti-

tutionsorunderinternationalagreementstowhichtheyareparties.”221

However,astheyhavegainedinlegalpersonality,alsotheirresponsibilityhaswidened,

whichhasledtothedraftingoftheDraftArticlesontheResponsibilityofInternational

Organizations.222Furtheraccording to the ICJ legal subjectscandiffer fromeachother

whenitcomestothescopeofrightsaswellastheirnature.223

Individuals canaffect treatymaking throughNon-GovernmentalOrganisations (NGOs)

andmakeclaimsabouttheirhumanrightsbeingviolated.Ochoaputs it thisway:“(…)

especiallyintheareaofhumanrightstreatymaking,individualshavehadaformal,ac-

tive,anddirectroleinstandardsettingandlawmaking.Somemayarguethishasbeen

thecasefromtheoutset.”Shefurthertiesittowhatshecalls“theessenceofcustomary

law”i.e.thatthebeliefsandtheconductoftheonescustomaryinternationallawbinds,

218ReparationsforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations,AdvisoryOpinion,ICJReports,1949,at185.219Ibid.,at180.220Augusto&Trindade,at186.221InterpretationoftheAgreementof1951betweentheWHOandEgypt,para37.222SeeAugusto&Trindade,at187-189.223ReparationsforInjuriesSufferedintheServiceoftheUnitedNations,at178.

51

iswhatformsit.224ShereferstotheArticle71oftheUNCharterforevidencethatcivil

societycanhaveasayintheprocess(sheseemstoincludeindividualsinthenotionof

civilsociety).

“TheEconomicandSocialCouncilmaymakesuitablearrangementsforconsultationwithnon-

governmentalorganizationswhichareconcernedwithmatterswithinitscompetence.Suchar-

rangementsmaybemadewithinternationalorganizationsand,whereappropriate,withnation-

alorganizationsafterconsultationwiththeMemberoftheUnitedNationsconcerned.”225

SheaddsaclarificationtothisargumentsayingthatshedoesnotarguethatNGOs“actu-

allymaketreaties,northatNGOsareaperfectmechanismfortheinvolvementofindi-

vidualsininternationalgovernance”.Herpointisthat,currently,thereisaroleforindi-

viduals in the process of lawmaking, in this case treatymaking, although indirect via

NGOs.226

AlsoAugustoandTrindadearguethattoday,individualshavetheroleofsubjects.227An

activeparticipationofindividualsintreatymakinginhumanrightslawislogicalaccord-

ingtoOchoa,forthereasonthatitis“adoctrinethatisdesigned,inlargepart,toprotect

individuals from human rights violations that their own states may commit.” States

commithumanrightsviolationsandconsidering this sheclaims that “it isoddatbest

that stateswould be leftwith the sole and exclusive domain over the creation of the

[customaryinternationallaw]ofhumanrights.”228

4.4Summary

Themeaningoftheword“sovereignty”thatisusedinrelationtostatesindicatesitself

thatthehighestauthoritybelongstostates.Thishaslongbeenaprerequisiteforinter-

national interaction.Even though themainactorsof the international community still

are states, an opposing force has loosened up their power. Interestingly enough, the

statesalso limit theirownsovereigntywhileusing it,whenconcludingtreaties.Sover-224Ochoa,TheIndividual,at153-157.225CharteroftheUnitedNationsandOchoa,TheIndividual,at155-156.226Ochoa,TheIndividual,at157-158227Augusto&Trindade,at213.228Ochoa,TheIndividual,at158-159.

52

eigntyisnolongeranabsoluterightforthereasonthathumanrightshavegainedinim-

portanceinthelastdecades.Evenifsovereigntyisgivenconsiderableweightintreaties

suchas theUNCharterandeven indirectly in the ICCPRand ICESCRaswell as in the

caselawoftheICJ,thisdoesnotmeanthatit iswithoutexception;ratheritshowsthe

basiccharacterofacommunityconsistingofstates.Butbehindeverystatearethepeo-

ple.

Before theemergenceof legalpositivismandthepersonificationof thestate, the indi-

vidualbelongedininternationallawinanotherway.Withtheinfluenceoflegalpositiv-

ism,sourcesofinternationallawgaverisetoobligationsonlybetweenstatesandgave

nospacetoindividuals.Todayindividualsdoparticipateindifferentdegrees,notablyin

humanrightslawwheretheyareevidentrightholdersbutalsodutybearers.Individu-

alscanmakeclaims,beheldresponsible,theycanalreadyinfluencetreatymakingand

theycanact throughNGOsandas constituentsof civil society. Internationalorganisa-

tionssuchastheUNhaveacquireda,bytheinternationalcommunitywellaccepted,le-

gal personality and started to affect treatymaking aswell as customary international

lawwhichhaswidenedtheperceptionofaninternationallegalsubject.

When looking at themoral justificationof human rights, the international community

doesnotseemtograntthehumanvaluesthatwerethestartingpointofthisregimeas

muchvalueastheyoughtto.Itcanbearguedthatindividualsarenotgrantedtherole

thatisrightfullytheirsalsoforthereasonthatthenatureofcustomisthattheyshould

participateinformingit.Afterall,customarylawbindsindividualsandnotonlystates.

Statesdoviolatehumanrights,donot react sufficiently toother states’violationsand

arenottheoneswhoaredirectlyaffectedbyviolationsasindividualsare.Theymaynot

alwayshavethesameinterestorfeelthattherulesareasimportantastheyaretoindi-

viduals,whichisdemonstratedbylackofactionwhenatrocitiesarecommittedaswell

asinthefactthatstateshavestrongpoliticalinterests.Thisisalsoareasonforindividu-

als to be grantedmore space in developing customary rules of human rights. Thus, a

widerviewoninternationalpersonalityworksagainstpowerabuse.

53

5.FinalConclusion

5.1Introduction

Hereitisusefultorepeattheresearchquestionsofthisthesisandgothroughthemsys-

tematically,startingwiththesub-questionsinordertoreachthemainquestions.

Themainquestionsare:

1. Doesthe individualhavearole in thedevelopmentofopiniojurisin thehuman

rightsfield?

2. Shouldindividualsaffectitscreationinthisparticularfield?

Sub-questions:

1. Howiscustomaryinternationallawestablished?Howdoesopiniojurisdevelop?

2. Doesitdifferinthehumanrightsfieldincontrasttopublicinternationallaw?

3. Whyareindividualscentraltohumanrightslawandcantheirrolebeappliedto

thedevelopmentofcustomaryinternationallaw?

5.2HowIsCustomaryInternationalLawEstablished?HowDoesOpinioJurisDevel-op?Customary international law isestablishedthroughstatepracticeandopiniojuris.It is

notentirelyclearwhichcomponentdeservesmoreemphasis,andtherearearguments

rangingfromtotalexclusionofoneofthemtoamoreinteractivesolutionwherestrong-

eropiniojuriscancompensateforweakerususandviceversa.Thissystemisbasedon

consent–thusitslegitimacyisderivedfromstates–clearlyapositivisticviewonlaw.

Opiniojuris,whichisofmaininterestinthisthesis,hasaclearconnectiontothehuman

mindwhenlookingatitswording.Nevertheless,itisthoughtthatitisstatesthatformit.

However, thewidening of legal personality to encapsulate international organisations

54

hasledtotheminfluencingtheformationofcustomaryinternationallawaswell.Intheir

resolutionstheopiniojurisofstateshasbeendistinguished.Regardingthemoregeneral

opinio juris, that of the entirety of the international community, both individuals and

NGOshavebeenpartof travauxpréparatoires influencing customary law formation.It

indicatesthatthereisahigherlevelofparticipationofindividualsunderway.

5.3DoesItDifferintheHumanRightsFieldinContrasttoPublicInternationalLawinGeneral?Thesourcesarethesameinboththeareaofinternationalhumanrightslawandinpub-

licinternationallaw,thelatterencapsulatingtheformer.Formallytheydonotdifferbut

naturallytheinternationallegalareainwhichtheyareformedaffectsthem.Theareaof

humanrightshasamuchmoreindividualorientedapproachthantheinternationallaw

ingeneral,forhistoricreasons.Wheredohumanrightsoriginate?Evenifthelawishu-

man-made(orintheinternationalcontext,state-made)andthuspositivistic,thephilos-

ophyandideaofthenotionisthatitexistsinhumanbeingsfrombirth.Theserightsare

inherentanditisdifficulttograspwheretheyreallydocomefrom.Howcanthesepre-

existinthiswayifwebelieveinhuman-madelaw?

Thetouchofnaturalismisevidentandalsoaffectsthelawinpractice.Thecharacterof

humanrightsenablesakindofhierarchythatisinoppositionwithpositivism,ithasre-

sultedinjuscogens,ergaomnesandcorerightsthatcantrumpotherrights.Hence,they

areseenasmoreimportantthanother“ordinary”rights.Thefactthatsovereigntyhas

hadtoyieldfortheprotectionoftheindividualisacharacteristicthataffectscustomary

normsofhumanrights.Forexample, juscogensobligationsarea typeofsuperiorcus-

tomarynormsandif thereexistsacustomaryinternationalhumanrights lawitwould

consistofergaomnesobligations.

However,itisdoubtfulifthereexistsaregimeofcustomaryinternationallawofhuman

rights for thereasonthat thehumanrights lawmostlyoriginates fromtreaties.At the

sametimeitisclearthathumanrightsareanimportantpartofcustomaryinternational

law.Forexample,astatethathasnotratifiedatreatyorhasmadereservationstocer-

55

tainprovisionscanstillbeboundduetotheexistenceofacustomarynorm.Thisisim-

portantinordertoreachahigherlevelofprotectionintheareaofhumanrights.

Also, the fact thatcustomary international lawbindsalso those thatdonotagree to it

(exceptaccordingtothedoctrineofthepersistentobjectorthatdoesnotfittheareaof

human rights) comports well with the naturalistic character of human rights. In this

case,customaryinternationallawenforcestheuniversalityofhumanrightsnorms.Con-

sequently,evenifthesourcesarethesameinbothhumanrightslawandotherareasof

internationallaw,theirenvironmentdiffers.Thepointsofcontactbetweenthecharacter

ofcustomaryinternationallawandthecharacterofinternationalhumanrightslawfacil-

itatetheformertofunctionintheareaofthelatter.

5.4WhyAreIndividualsCentraltoHumanRightsLawandCanTheirRoleBeAppliedtotheDevelopmentofCustomaryInternationalLaw?

I havenoted that there are similar characteristics in customary international lawand

humanrightslaw,eveniftheformerisasourceoflawandthelatterdescribestheactual

content of the sources. However, they are still fundamentally different for the reason

thattheindividual’sroleinhumanrightscomesfrominherentnaturalpowerwhereas

customarylawisstatedominated–althoughwithsomenaturalistictouches,e.g.jusco-

gens.Juscogensdoeshoweverderivefromhumanrights,whichmeansthatcustomary

internationallaw,aswellasothersourcesoflaw,hasmadewayfortheindividual.

Humanrightshaveacloseconnectiontomorals.Asasourceoflawcustomaryinterna-

tionallawshoulddifferfrommoralnorms,butitisnotquiteclearhow.Inaddition,the

ICJhasbasedtherecognitionofacustomarynormonmoralprinciples,whichconflicts

withthisview.Whatisclearisthatwhenitscontentishumanrights,someformofmo-

ralityisinherent.The“natural”characterofhumanrightsshinesthrough.Notwithstand-

inghumanrightstodayarehuman-madeinthesensethattheyarecodifiedintreatiesor

states have by practice and opinio juris recognized, consented to, them as customary

internationallaw.

56

Theindividual’srolehaswidenedbytherecognitionofhisorherinherentrightsaswell

astherecognitionofindividualresponsibilityininternationalcriminallaw.Additionally

non-stateentitieshavepavedtheroad forawiderviewonthenotionof international

legalsubject.Throughtheseotherentitiesindividualshaveagreaterpossibilitytoinflu-

encethelaw,whichdoesalreadyhappen.However,thisisnotthesameastheinterna-

tionalcommunityrecognizingastrongerroleforindividualsincustomaryinternational

lawmaking.

Sincethecontentoflaw(humanrights)andthesourceoflaw(customaryinternational

law)existondifferent levels it isdifficult todirectlytransplantthe individual’srole in

humanrightstocustomaryinternationallaw.However,thecentralroleoftheindividual

inhumanrightsisanargumentforamorecentralroleinlawmakinginthesamearea.

5.5DoestheIndividualHaveaRoleintheDevelopmentofOpinioJurisintheHumanRightsField?Anexpectedfindinginthisthesisisthat,inthedevelopmentofcustomarylaw,statesare

theprincipalactors,aswellasgenerally in international law.However, themoremar-

ginalizedroleofindividualshaslongbeenquestioned,eventhoughthestrongerroleof

states has remained stable. The emergence of human rights has strengthened and

fuelledthediscussionabouttheroleoftheindividual.Inthelightofthestepsindividuals

havemadethroughcenturiestowardagreaterrole,itisinterestingthatithasnotforce-

fullyaffectedtheemergenceofsources.

However, in a limited indirect scale individuals do affectopinio juris, it has happened

throughotherorgans.Nevertheless,statesdominatetheinternationallegalorderforthe

reasonthatitisbuiltonstateconsent,statesovereigntyandlegalpositivism.Individuals

donothaveaformalroleasparticipantsinlawmaking.Accordingtolegalpositivismlaw

originates fromhumanpower– it is in this regard interesting tonote that there isno

formalroleforindividualsinthemakingofopiniojuris.

57

5.6ShouldIndividualsAffectitsCreationinThisParticularField? It is inthenatureofcustomary international lawthat thosewhoitbindsshould influ-

enceit,anditdoesbindindividualsthroughtheirstates;itcanevenimposeinternation-

alcriminalresponsibilityonthem.ThroughNGOsitisalreadypossibleforindividualsto

influencethelaw.Theycouldtakepartinthedevelopmentofresolutionswerethegoal

is that it shouldconstituteevidenceofopiniojuris.At thesametime, this isnot tosay

thateverypersoninasocietycandirectlyinfluencelawmakinginternationally,butifthe

international community were more open to that those who want can participate, it

wouldcreateamorelegitimateopiniojurisfromademocracyperspective.

Reciprocityisnotthebasisonwhichthehumanrightsregimeisbuilt.Theverticalrela-

tionshipbetweenstatesandcitizensisanargumenttoinvolveindividualsinallaspects

ofhumanrightslaw–alsoinitsmaking.Thereisnoapparentcontradictioninanindi-

vidual influenced customary international law, however there are difficulties arising

fromstate-centrism.Itisnaturalthathumanrightsconsiderationsshouldbeimportant

intheformationofcustomaryinternationallawwhenitcomestocustomaryrulesthat

arehumanrightsnorms.

The role of the individual is already on the slow development towards becoming a

strongersubject.Asfornow,theydonothavethestrongsubjectstatus,asdointerna-

tional organisations or states, nevertheless theyhave rights andduties and in limited

scaletheycaninfluenceandparticipateinlawmaking.Itseemspossibletofitindividuals

intotheopiniojuriselementofcustomaryinternationallaw;theyhavebeenabletocon-

tributetoitsdevelopmentinpractice.

Theprotectionthatdemocracyoffershumanrightspointstothat it isneeded insome

formalsointhecreationofcustomaryinternationallawinthefieldofhumanrights.A

moredemocraticwayofitsformationwouldbetoincludetheindividualandtherefore

minimizetheriskofstates’powerabuse.

58

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64

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