a ritual against the rule - publiziert-libre

7/24/2019 A Ritual Against the Rule - Publiziert-libre

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Edizioni Quasar

Carsten Hjort Lange & Frederik Juliaan Vervaet

THE ROMAN REPUBLICAN TRIUMPHBEYOND THE SPECTACLE


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The Roman Republican TriumphBeyond the Spectacle

EDITED BY

CARSTEN HJORT LANGE & FREDERIK JULIAAN VERVAET

EDIZIONI QUASAR

ROMA MMXIV


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Analecta Romana Instituti Danici Supplementum XLV

Accademia di Danimarca, via Omero, 18, I 00197, Rome

2014 Edizioni Quasar di Severino Tognon srl, Roma

ISBN 978-88-7140-576-6

Published with the support of grants from:

The Carlsberg Foundation

Cover: The Fasti Capitolini, containing the Fasti Consulares and the Fasti Triumphales.

Rome, Musei Capitolini, Palazzo dei Conservatori, Sala della Lupa. Photo: Courtesy of

Archivio Fotografico dei Musei Capitolini.

Print in Italy by LitografTodi - Todi (PG)


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Abstract. No Roman general ever celebrated a triumph for victory in a civil war. This simple message is propagated by var-

ious sources, most prominent among them Valerius Maximus with his treatise on triumphal law. However, as a detailed

analysis of the Late Republican ceremonies demonstrates, each of the protagonists of the civil war era staged their victories

over Roman fellow-citizens in quite distinctive ways. By doing so, they were confronted with a crucial problem: to boast

openly to have conquered Roman citizens could attract overt criticism. Therefore any general who wished to present a victo-

ry over Roman citizens in no uncertain terms had to walk a tightrope, especially so if this representation took the form of a

public triumph. The Late Republican generals thus had to develop various ways to deal with their victories. Sulla, Pompey,

Caesar, and Octavian adopted different strategies to represent their success and to demonstrate that the victory in civil war

gave them power of a new quality.

When Valerius Maximus wrote his Facta ac dicta memorabiliaduring the reign of Emperor Tiberius,

he turned his attention, in the section on the triumph, to a time when the Roman state stood at the

edge of the abyss: although contemporaries were no longer likely to have experienced the period

of the civil wars consciously, the decades of internal Roman conflicts had been burnt deeply into

the collective memory. Whenever Roman armies had left the battlefields victoriously at Pharsalus,

Philippi or Actium, their victories had been won over other Roman armies. This was a fact whichcould not be denied. At least, however, as Valerius Maximus reassured his readership, this did not

result in public triumphs and the consequent desecration of one of the central political rituals of

Rome. Valerius Maximus summarised this in a clearly stated rule:

Verum quamvis quis praeclaras res maximeque utiles rei publicae civili bello gessisset, Imperator tamen eo nomine

appellatus non est, neque ullae supplicationes decretae sunt, neque aut ovans aut curru triumphavit, quia ut neces-

sariae istae, ita lugubres semper existimatae sunt victoriae, utpote non externo sed domestico partae cruore.

No man, however though he might have accomplished great things eminently useful to the Republic in a civil war,

was given the title of general (Imperator) on that account, nor were any thanksgivings decreed, nor did such a one

triumph either in ovation or with chariot, for such victories have ever been accounted grievous, though necessary,

as won by domestic not foreign blood.1

Modern scholarship has generally followed this apparently straightforward premise.2Although the

point is made with regard to isolated cases that certain triumphs can also be connected to a civil war

* The main part of this essay was translated by HelenImhoff and supported by funds made available by theCultural Foundations of Integration Center of Excel-lence at the University of Konstanz, established in theframework of the German Federal and State Initiativefor Excellence. An extended and slightly different ver-sion of this article in German will be published in theproceedings of the conference Performing Civil War,Schloss Reisensburg, Ulm, 6th-8thOctober 2011, edited by

H. Brm, M. Mattheis and J. Wienand. I want to thankall editors for the opportunity to participate in both vol-

umes. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are takenfrom Loeb.

1. Val. Max. 2.8.7 (translation modified, WH).2. Cf., for example, the statement in Beard 2007, 123-124:

The logic was that the triumph was a celebration of victoryover external enemies only; that a triumph in civil war, withRoman citizens dragged along where an exotic barbarianfoe should be, was a contradiction in terms. ConsequentlyDahlheim 2005, 221, states that Caesar celebrated als erst-

er Rmer einen Sieg ber die eigenen Brger in 45 BC; cf.also Maiuro 2008, 27, n. 11, and Weinstock 1971, 198.

A Ritual Against the Rule?

The Representation of Civil War Victory

in the Late Republican Triumph*

by WOLFGANGHAVENER


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166 WOLFGANG HAVENER

victory,3any discussion of the resulting contradiction is usually limited to the statement of this fact

alone, without examining the problem which lies behind it in more detail. Alternatively, reference is

often made to a concurrent external dimension of the conflicts, which was supposedly quite delib-

erately given special emphasis in the victory celebrations in question.4In a nutshell, the consensus

in this area of research is that civil war and triumph were incompatible just as Valerius Maximus

claimed.5

A comprehensive examination of the sources, however, leads to a different conclusion, for Vale-

rius Maximus was by no means the only one to take up the subject of civil war triumphs: contem-

porary authors (Cicero, Livy, the Augustan poets) as well as later ones (Plutarch, Appian, etc.) com-

mented on this problem in normative and also in descriptive texts.6This allows for the conclusion

that the representation of a civil war victory and the potentially problematic consequences involved

was indeed taken up and discussed by the political public (not only in the civil war period itself).

Consequently, this means that civil war triumphs did in fact form part of the political practice of the

Late Republic, contrary to the rule defined by Valerius Maximus. The following contribution will

examine whether and how the protagonists of the civil war period staged their victories over Roman

citizens in the context of the triumphal ritual and whether, in doing so, they had to obey certain ruleswhich were intendeda priorito prevent such a staging.7

The civil war triumph as a political reality

Only a few days after M. Tullius Cicero (cos.63) had stressed in his 14th Philippic that no civil war

had ever been ended with asupplicatioor even a triumph,8the troops of M. Antonius (cos. 44,II 34)

were defeated at Mutina by the army of the Senate, led by C. Iulius Caesar, or, as he is now common-

ly called, Octavian. The events that followed can be gathered from the accounts of Livy and Velleius

Paterculus.9These accounts are in agreement that the Senate accorded a series of honours to its

victorious commanders, that is Octavian, the two consuls of 43 A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa, aswell as D. Iunius Brutus (procos.44/43,cos. design.42), who had been under siege in Mutina: thus,

a solemn burial on the Campus Martius was decreed for the two consuls, who had been killed in the

fighting. Decimus Brutus, however, who had survived the siege of the town and had afterwards pur-

sued the vanquished Antony across the Alps into Gaul, was granted a triumph. Admittedly, Brutus

was not able to celebrate it, as he had been killed in Gaul, but the fact that, contrary to Valerius Max-

imuss apparently so unequivocal statement, a victory celebration for a civil war success was indeed

possible and was evidently also actually agreed upon is in itself telling enough with regard to the

political situation in the Late Republic.10There is every indication that Decimus Brutuss triumph

was not even the subject of any lengthy debates: there is not a single source, whether contemporary

3. Amongst other examples, Caesars triumphs in the years46 and 45 BC are, of course, repeatedly and rightly cited;cf. Beard 2007, 124.

4. Cf., amongst others, Bastien 2007, 228-229.5. Approaches do, by all means, exist by now which, start-

ing with the passage by Valerius Maximus cited above,pose the question of whether this rule really was validwithout exception, especially in the Late Republic (thus,for example Lundgreen 2011, 223; Lange 2009, 150 whorefers to Munda and Mutina also takes a critical view ofthe rule reported by Valerius Maximus). Nevertheless, asystematic examination of the phenomenon of the civilwar triumphs has, so far, only been attempted very rare-ly. Notable exceptions are the contributions by Lange2013 and Sumi 2005. In the relevant monographs onthe triumph (cf. amongst others stenberg 2009; Beard

2007; Itgenhorst 2005; Knzl 1988 and Versnel 1970)discussion of the civil war is either omitted altogether

or is only very brief. For civil war and triumph, see alsostenberg in this volume.

6. In most cases, however, the fundamental question ofwhether a civil war triumph was possible, or ratherimpossible, is not discussed in a systematic way (cf.amongst others Flor. 2.10.9 on Pompeys victory over Ser-torius and also Plut. Caes. 56.7-8 and Cass. Dio 42.18.1on Caesars triumphs); see Havener (in press) for a moredetailed treatment of Cicero).

7. Ritual-theoretic questions cannot be discussed in any de-tail in the context of this contribution; on this matter, cf.,however, Havener (in press).

8. Cf. Cic. Phil. 14.22-23.9. Livy Per. 119; Vell. Pat. 2.62.4-5 Cf. also Cass. Dio

46.38.1-2.10. Lange 2013, 78-80 also explicitly refers to Decimus Bru-

tuss triumph as an example of a victory celebrationwhich was decreed exclusively for a civil war success.


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A RITUAL AGAINST THE RULE? 167

or not, that mentions any such discussions, which are reported in great detail in other contexts, par-

ticularly by Livy.11This finding is at least in need of explanation when one considers the stipulation

that a civil war triumph was impossible on principle. The sources do not actually question the fact

that a triumph was apparently clearly decreed for a victory over Roman citizens, and the problems

associated with this fact are not alluded to at all.12

Nevertheless, it must be noted that there is not a single entry in the Fasti Triumphaleswhich ex-

plicitly records a triumph over Roman citizens. This finding illustrates one of the main problems

which faced the generals of the Late Republic: it was a balancing act for a victor to present his suc-

cess to the audience in the capital, a fact of which both participants and audience were aware. For,

as will be shown in what follows, although it was possible in principle to instrumentalise a civil war

victory and although such a success could, in practice, serve as justification for a power base, civil

war anddiscordiaalways had clear negative connotations.13Thus, on the one hand the utilisation of

power gained through a victory in the civil war could represent an effective means of consolidating

ones own position. On the other hand this also meant by necessity that new weak points developed

on the level of political discourse, and these needed to be neutralised in some way.14

The reason for this is obvious: the victor may have gained power through his success, but he alsoneeded to consolidate this power afterwards and to thus convert an ephemeral moment into a per-

manent structure.15In order to achieve this aim, it was essential for the victorious general to cooper-

ate with the upper class and for the new circumstances to be accepted a fact which the example of

Octavian, or rather, the future Augustus illustrates impressively.16Overly clear reference to the fact

that this power had been secured spilling the blood of Roman citizens, of course, had its limitations

as a suitable way of promoting this acceptance. Again, this is illustrated by a glance at Augustus,

who, during his entire reign, had to deal with his role during the civil wars and who, in doing so, was

always subject to criticism.17For this reason I will now in the following examine the strategies which

individual commanders developed in order to survive this balancing act.

Sullas triumph over Mithridates and the Marians

Already in the context of the first great conflict of the civil war period the issue of victory over

Roman citizens was broached as part of the triumphal ritual. When L. Cornelius Sulla (cos. 88,dict.

r.p.c. 82-79,cos. II 80) celebrated his success in 81 BC,18he made use of different parameters of the

ritual in order to illustrate more clearly that his triumph was by no means only concerned with the

victory over Mithridates VI. In this context, one of the most important elements of the Roman trium-

phal ritual, the spoils of war obtained during the campaign, played a central role.19In hisNaturalis

Historiae, Pliny the Elder gives an account of the weight of the precious metals which formed part

of Sullas triumphal procession.20In this regard the distinction made by the author is of interest:

11. For a survey of triumph debates in Livys account of Re-publican history cf. Pittenger 2008.

12. The fact that Antony and his followers were declaredhostes populi Romaniby the Senate after his defeat atMutina could be used as an argument against this view.However, an in-depth analysis of the term hostis in theLate Republic raises doubts about the assumption that a

hostis was no longer perceived of as a Roman, even if helacked the necessary prerequisites from a technical, legalpoint of view. The main purpose of a hostisdeclarationwas not to turn a political opponent into a non-Romanenemy but to deprive him of the protection offered by hisstatus as Roman citizen; for a detailed discussion of thissubject, cf. Havener (in press).

13. Cf. Gotter 2011, 61 as well as Wiseman 2010 and Bat-

stone 2010.14. Cf. Breed, Damon & Rossi 2010, 4, where civil war is

rightly characterised as a constant element of Romanpolitical culture. Flower 2010, 74 considers civil warsto be central markers and moments of political change.Amongst other things, assigning blame took on a centralrole in this context, but new problems could in turn de-

velop from this; cf. Gotter 2011, 61-62.15. Cf. Hlscher 2006, 27-28.16. Cf. the essential contribution by Flaig 1992.17. This aspect forms one of the central aspects of my dis-

sertation (Havener [in preparation]). On the Nachlebenof this criticism of Octavians role in the civil war, cf. alsoGotter 2011, 64-68.

18. Degrassi 1947, 563 as well as Itgenshorst 2005, cat. no. 243.19. On the significance of spoils of war in the triumphal ritu-

al, cf. in general stenberg 2009, 19-127 as well as Beard

2007, 143-186, who takes a critical view.20. Plin.HN33.16.


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Sullas triumph spanned two days. From Plinys report it is clear that on the first day the spoils from

the war against Mithridates were presented. On the second day, however, the gold which C. Marius

(cos. 82), the son of Sullas great opponent,had stolen from the treasury and taken to Praeneste was

ceremonially transported through the city. Special signs, which were carried ahead of the procession

of spoils, showed the amount which was returned to the Roman people in this way.

Consequently, in the context of this triumph an unambiguous distinction was made between the

spoils won in the East through the victory over Mithridates and his Greek allies and the riches which

fell into Sullas hands after the defeat of the younger Marius at Praeneste. 21In this context, it is of

crucial importance that the latter were put on show in the same way as the ordinary spoils of war. In

this way the formal requirements of the triumphal ritual were satisfied on the one hand whereas, on

the other, it was made clear that Sulla had vanquished not only the King of Pontus but that Romans

were also amongst those who had been defeated.22However, by stressing the fact that the spoils

were part of the Roman treasury, the edge was taken off the unambiguous reference to a victory over

Roman citizens which was connected with this. Thus, potential problems which might have resulted

from the presentation of the treasury as part of the triumphal procession were counteracted. The

message was that the money which another person and in fact a Roman had illegally appropri-ated had been returned by Sulla to its rightful owner, the Roman people. In this way the civil war

victory could, on the one hand, be represented as what it actually was, but at the same time it could

also be reinterpreted and thus be made somewhat more acceptable, along with the position of power

which resulted from this victory.

This strategy becomes even clearer if another episode is also considered. In his biography of Sulla,

Plutarch23reports that it was not the treasures seized from Mithridates that made the triumph stand

out, but the fact that recognised and influential citizens took part in the victory celebrations not

as spectators but as part of the procession. These citizens called Sulla their saviour and their father

as he had enabled them and their families to return to their home town. It is easy to see that these

people are likely to have been members of the upper class, who had had to flee Rome during the rule

of C. Marius (cos. 107,II104,III103,IV 102, V101, VI100, VII86) and L. Cornelius Cinna (cos.87,II86,III85,IV84).24Thus, Sulla took advantage of another element of the triumphal ritual in

addition to the presentation of the spoils of war but he did this in a way which was by all means in-

novative: for one thing, it was not uncommon to include prisoners of war who had been freed in the

triumphal procession.25Even if the senators mentioned by Plutarch had, of course, not been freed

from any kind of captivity, Sullas victory did at least allow them to return from exile. In the context

of the presentation of this victory, this made them, practically by necessity, an important part of the

legitimation strategy.26

Furthermore, it seems to me that we are also dealing with a reference to a further central element

of the ritual: in addition to images and captured riches, prisoners, prominent individuals as well as

lesser known people, were also always presented as part of a triumphal procession. 27If achieving

21. Cf. also Behr 1993, 136. Sumi 2005, 32 argues againstsuch a distinction. Although Lange 2013, 73 rightlycomes out against Sumis theory of a deliberate disguis-ing of the civil war triumph, he, at the same time, seesevidence here for the idea that the blurring between civ-il and foreign war is already visible at this early stage ofthe civil wars. However, this conclusion has to be ques-tioned when one considers the deliberations presentedhere: even if the triumph was officially granted for the

victory over Mithridates, the external victory and the civ-il war victory were explicitly separated from each otheron theperformativelevel. Sulla did not just make use ofhis triumph in order to make references to the civil warbut he also presented his victory over Roman opponentsas his own independent achievement.

22. Behr 1993, 137 assumes that the Romans who were de-feated were converted into Samnites.

23. Plut. Sull. 34.1-2.24. Sumi 2005, 32 also, correctly, considers this element to

be an overt reminder of the civil war.25. Cf. Sumi 2005, 32. Plutarch reports for example that the

returning prisoners were one of the central elements ofFlamininus triumph in 194 (Plut. Flam.13).

26. Thus, one of Sullas most important strategies of legiti-misation, which can be discerned in different contexts,was taken up in the triumph: the conflict with Mariusand his followers was necessary in order to restore orderin the Roman state, and the regained treasury and thecitizens who had returned were to be considered sym-bolic of this order; on this matter, cf. Behr 1993, 89-100as well as Lange 2013, 74.

27. On this matter, cf. stenberg 2009, 128-167 as well as

Beard 2007, 107-142.


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some sort of acceptable connection between two statements was the aim of this display, then one

may justifiably assume that this group can also be seen as parallel to the prisoners who formed part

of the procession. As it would apparently not have been opportune to include Roman prisoners of

war in the procession, the returning exiles were also able to take their place. In this way, there is a

subtle shift in the emphasis of the statement. While captured kings, nobles or army leaders served

above all to lend a face to the defeated enemy, we are here dealing with a case of the display of freed

prisoners. Thus, in turn, the Roman citizens who walked across the city as part of the triumph,

thanking Sulla for their salvation, illustrate two things: on the one hand, they too make it clear that

a civil war victory is being celebrated, as it is only Sullas success in the conflict with his Roman en-

emies that allows them to return to the city the victory over Mithridates did not directly determine

their fate. On the other hand, it should probably be read as an attempt to interpret the victory as

such in a positive way and thus to make the victor less vulnerable to attack.28

A passage in which Appian gives an account of reactions to the victory celebration shows that the

triumph did by all means offer the opportunity to express criticism of Sulla and his course of ac-

tion: even as the procession was making its way through the city some people had described Sullas

government as kingship in disguise.29Others, in view of his deeds, had said in their turn that thetyrant had now already revealed himself as such. Thus, the passage shows very clearly the potential

for criticism that was inherent in a civil war triumph, even if it was, on principle, possible for it to

be carried out. Consequently, it was necessary for a commander to consider whether the benefit of

exhibiting his victory over Roman adversaries outweighed the potentially detrimental consequences.

Thus, Sullas triumph has already illustrated some of the most significant parameters which were

at the victorious commanders disposal in the context of the ritual: the exhibition of prisoners and

the display of the spoils of war. Additionally, however, in every triumphal procession both the pro-

cession itself and all the rites connected with it had one undeniable focal point: the figure of the

triumphator.

Pompeys elephants

The third triumph of Cn. Pompeius Magnus (cos. 70, II 55, III 52), in which he entered the city

cloaked in Alexander the Greats mantle and included in the procession a portrait of himself made

entirely of pearls, shows clearly that Pompey knew how to play the part of the triumphant general

and that he liked to make use of it.30For the context discussed here, however, a different incident

is of greater significance: on March 12theither in the year of 81, 80 or 79 Pompey, who at that time

was neither a senator nor had reached the minimum age for public office, celebrated his first tri-

umphex Africa.31This was unprecedented in itself but Pompey went a step further. According to

Pliny the Elder and Plutarch, he did not intend to enter the city with the usual quadriga of horses

but instead with a quadriga of elephants.32This was doubtlessly intended as a reference to the place

28. Thus, a detailed examination of Sullas triumph by nomeans results in the conclusion that he wanted to disguisehis civil war victory by equating the younger Marius withMithridates and thus treating his Roman opponents in thesame way as external enemies (a view found, however, inSumi 2005, 31-32). Exactly the opposite was the case: byundertaking a clear performative separation between the

victory over the younger Marius and that over Mithridates,the exceptional nature of this dispute was highlightedeven more. If one accepts this argument, contradictionssuch as can be discerned in Behr 1993, 136-137 can alsobe resolved: on the one hand, he correctly states that Sullacreated gleichermaen bewusst Assoziationen zu seinem

Sieg im Brgerkrieg but on the other hand, he continuesto attempt to uphold the overall concept of the forbidden

civil war triumph: Den Waffengang mitcives RomanihatSulla jedoch nicht in den Mittelpunkt gestellt.

29. App.B Civ. 1.101.30. On the third triumph, cf. Beard 2007, 7-41. In a similar

way as with Sulla, the first of Pompeys triumphs is farless prominent compared to the third in most biograph-ical and systematic works; cf. amongst others the briefremarks in Gelzer 1959, 40 or Christ 2004, 36-37 as wellas Dingmann 2007.

31. Degrassi 1947, 564; Itgenshorst 2005, 335, no. 246 whoboth indicate 79 as the year of the triumph. Badian 1955argued for 81 instead and is followed by Christoph Lund-green and Frederik Vervaet in their contributions to this

volume.32. Cf. Plin.HN8.4; Plut. Pomp. 14.4.


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of his victory,Africa.33But the interpretation of this event should not stop here. Pompey had not

only gained a victory over the Numidian king in northern Africa but had also beaten the remnants

of Mariuss faction, and thus Roman opponents.34He obviously intended to make use of this victory

in order to enhance his power basis. Pompey wanted to be seen as a victor, a successful general and

a new force in the political game, also vis--vis his patron, Sulla.35Consequently, in order to send

out an unambiguous signal, he made use of the ritual presentation of the victory a victory also

over Romans and intended to exalt his own person by means of the elephant quadriga. It is not

without reason that in Plutarch the triumphator says to Sulla, who allegedly wanted to refuse him

permission to hold the triumph, that more people worshipped the rising than the setting sun.36Sul-

la had himself demonstrated that it was by all means possible to refer to a civil war victory and the

resulting position of political power in the context of the triumph. Pompey, however, went a crucial

step further by wanting to make use of the victory ritual as a deliberate provocation, expressed in

the elephant quadriga, and not, like Sulla, as a means of presenting himself as the saviour of the

community.37

Plutarch continues his account, however, by reporting that the procession, the centrepiece of

which was supposed to be the oversized quadriga, ended no sooner than it had begun. As the portatriumphalisturned out to be impassable for the elephants, Pompey had to leave them behind and

enter the city with the usual quadriga of horses. Of course, it is possible to believe that Pompeys am-

bitious plan simply went wrong and that he himself failed because of his exaggerated pretensions.38

However, if one considers the quadriga to be a case of a deliberate provocation, another reading is

possible: failure was part of the plan from the beginning. It seems very unlikely that Pompey was

surprised by the size of the well-known porta triumphalis. Instead it is conceivable that Pompey

staged the incident in order to convey a particular message. While, on the one hand, the victor made

his claims unmistakably clear, claims which after all he could not base on his office or his social

status and for which he could only refer to his military success against Roman citizens, the fact that

he forewent entering the city with the quadriga of elephants, showed, on the other hand, that he was

by all means prepared to cooperate with the senatorial lite.39

Depicting violence: Caesars presentation of his defeated opponents

Both Pompey and Sulla before him shied away from representing Roman citizens as defeated. This

was a step which was left to C. Iulius Caesar (cos. 59,II 48,III 46,IV45, V 44,dict.49,II48-47,III

46-45,IV45-44,dict. perpet.44), as Appian details in his account of the dictators quadruple triumph

in the year 46 BC.40Caesar, it is true, forewent an official triumph for a success over Roman citizens,

as the fourth victory celebration was not held for the victory over Pompey and the members of the

senatorial aristocracy but for vanquishing the Numidian king Juba, who was allied with them.41Never-

theless, the defeat of Caesars Roman opponents was brought home to the spectators in an impressive

way: Caesar made use of another element of the ritual, the representation of the events of the war and

33. Furthermore, in the scholarship on the matter, the epi-sode has repeatedly been assigned a place in the imitatio

Alexandri; cf. the overview of the relevant literature inMader 2005, 397, n. 2. Likewise, connections to Venus orDionysos have been brought into play; for an overview ofthe different approaches, cf. Rosivach 2009.

34. Lange 2013, 75 correctly states that the sources do notmention references to the civil war.

35. Cf. Mader 2005, 398.36. Plut. Pomp. 14.3.37. According to Hlscher 2004, 83-84 this act of Pompeys

can be placed within the context of the scheme of ac-

tion of Late Republican politics that was characterisedby a conscious transgression of norms and the testing of

boundaries.38. Cf., for example, Beard 2007, 17 and Frederik Vervaets

contribution in this volume.39. According to Hlscher 2004, 88, allowance was always

made for a certain degree of failure with such actionsand this kind of failure did not even necessarily have anegative impact on the position of the person who hadsuffered the failure. The argument made in the presentcontribution means that Hlschers thesis can be ex-tended by a significant point: in the process of constantcommunication and competition, calculated failure alsoopened up new areas of action and negotiation.

40. App.B Civ. 2.101.41 Degrassi 1947, 567; Itgenshorst 2005, 371-373, no. 265.


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similar matters on large format paintings and images.42According to Appian, these showed Q. Caeci-

lius Metellus Scipio (cos.52), who fell first on his sword and then into the sea, M. Petreius (pr.64?),

who committed suicide at the feast, and finally M. Porcius Cato ( tr. pl. 62), torn open by himself like

a wild beast. Thus, the actual fighting between Romans was not depicted, but its consequences were:

Caesars victory over his Roman adversaries, symbolised by their unequivocal admission of defeat.43

According to Appians account, only Pompeys death was not documented, since the latter was

still greatly regretted by all. Thus, Caesar refrained from presenting his main opponent in a nega-

tive way. This aspect is especially significant given the defeated leaders function, already referred

to, in the triumphal procession: defeated kings, tribal leaders or military commanders served above

all to lend a human face to the opponent. In the triumphal procession, the leader personified the de-

feated enemy and the defeat was focused on him. He thus represented a parallel to the triumphator,

the glorious victor faced the defeated opponent. Even if Caesar did go further than his predecessors

when it came to presenting his civil war victory as part of his triumph, he did not take the step of in-

cluding Pompey (not even as an image) as a defeated leader in the triumph.44Instead he made use of

precisely this aspect of the triumph in order to counter possible criticism. His triumph was included

in the Fasti Triumphalesasex Africa de rege Iuba, the kings son was included in the procession andwas presented separately.

Thus, in Caesars African triumph the combination and variation of different elements of the ritu-

al served to make a provocative message explicit: the Roman people were shown a civil war victory

as part of the triumphal ritual more drastically than ever before. Appians account shows that this

could, however, also provide a basis for potential criticism: while the spectators were amused by the

death of the Egyptian eunuch Potheinos and the flight of Pharnaces, they very clearly expressed their

displeasure and worries with regard to the representations of Scipio and Cato. Whether one believes

Appians statements or not, the passage does illustrate the risks which were inherent in Caesars

decision to present Roman aristocrats in the triumphal procession not as individuals who had been

saved but as people who had been defeated.45Of course, when viewed against this background the

strategy of focussing officially on the Numidian king, or rather his son, is extremely transparent. Ap-parently Caesar consciously accepted this as a provocation: in his account Appian explicitly stresses

the fact that the Numidian kings son was still a child at the time of the victory celebration. Although

the display of a defeated kings offspring in the triumphal ritual occurred quite often during the Re-

public,46the young Numidian prince can, therefore, hardly have been regarded as an enemy leader

comparable with the triumphator.47Thus, Caesars aim with regard to the spectacle of the quadruple

triumph was not just to present himself as a successful general, but to draw the Roman publics at-

tention to the fact that Caesar had prevailed against his Roman adversaries as impressively as he had

against the Gauls, Egyptians or Pharnaces of Pontus. His position of power, which was expressed in

the four victory celebrations, was not just based on his victories over external enemies but also on

the fact that he had overcome his internal political rivals.48

42. On this, cf. in general stenberg 2009, 189-261, esp. 190-192 with a discussion of the term triumphal painting.

43. Thus, the function which the representation of CaesarsRoman opponents as part of the triumph served far ex-ceeded the long-held scholarly view that the victor in-tended, above all, to humiliate his adversaries on a per-sonal level in this way; for an overview of the relevantolder secondary literature and for a critical stance, cf.Voisin 1983, 15-16 and 22.

44. It is true that there is no indication in the sources thatthere was a reference to the victory at Pharsalus. This hasled scholars to conclude wrongly, in my view that Cae-sar wanted to counteract the impression that he was cele-brating a victory over Roman citizens; cf. amongst others,Will 2009, 172. Lange 2013, 76 connects the omission of

Pharsalus with Caesars principal strategy of legitimation,namely to have ended a civil war started by his opponents.

45. Against this background, the explanation given in Meier2004, 522 that the audiences reactions can be attributedto the fact that Caesar must have referred to his Romanopponents implizit oder explizit [] als Sklaven des Nu-mider-Knigs Juba in this context, proves to be unsatis-factory.

46. Cf. Beard 2007, 120-121.47. Consequently, the focus on the Numidian king was not

necessarily due to the necessity of externalising the vic-tory, as Lange 2013, 77 assumes on the contrary: con-trasting the Roman opponent with the Numidian royalson directed the audiences attention all the more strong-ly to the transgressive aspect of the ceremony.

48. This is an aspect which Weinstock 1971, 60-79, for ex-ample, ignores completely in his analysis of the quad-

ruple triumph; the same is still done by Dahlheim 2005,206-208. The idea that the display of the suicides was


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If Caesar in his triumphex Africa had thus already exceeded the boundaries of what was consid-

ered opportune in the context of the triumphal ritual up to that point, a year later he abandoned en-

tirely even the, at least superficial, restraint shown in the African triumph: following his victory over

Pompeys sons at Munda he celebrated another triumph ex Hispania.49Unfortunately, our sources

do not provide any detailed information on this celebration, information from which one might de-

termine how opponents were presented and whether and how it dealt with the civil-war character of

the war in Spain. Nevertheless, it must be noted that an external enemy such as King Juba even if

used as a pretext would have been difficult to find in this instance, and this may not have been the

victors intention anyway.50A statement found in Cassius Dio and supported by the relevant entries

in the Fasti Triumphalesis significant: it was not only Caesar himself who held a triumph for the

victory in Spain, but two of his subordinate commanders were also granted a triumphex Hispania,

although this mainly caused amusement in Rome.51However, there was more to Caesars actions in

this case, too, than Cassius Dios rather humorous account suggests: Caesar took the provocation,

which the civil war triumph as such already represented, to an extreme. He succeeded in getting

the Senate to grant a triumph not just to him but also to his lieutenant-generals. It was possible to

interpret the events in the following way: the Senate had sanctioned Caesars actions and his victoryafter the event by not only granting a triumph to the victor himself but also to two senatorial office

holders of whom one had only just taken up the consulship and who thus stood, at least formally,

at the head of the political hierarchy. In truth, however, the events represented above all a further

demonstration of power by the new potentate towards the Senate, which was made to look foolish in

its role as the decision-making authority. Thus, the amusement which Cassius Dio reports may not

have been caused by Caesar and his triumphant lieutenant-generals but by the powerlessness of the

Senate, which could no longer grant triumphs as it saw fit but instead had to comply with Caesars

wishes.

By affronting the senatorial aristocracy in this way, the new potentate was taking something of a

risk, for an incident transmitted by Suetonius showed that it was the triumphal ritual itself that was

particularly well-suited to expressing criticism of the new circumstances and Caesars power: whenCaesars triumphal chariot was passing the seats of the tribunes of the plebs during one of his victory

celebrations, one of the tribunes refused to show the victor his respect. According to Suetonius, this

led Caesar to exclaim: Repete ergo a me Aquila rem publicam tribunus! [Come then, Aquila, take

back the republic from me, you tribune.]52Although it is difficult to say anything conclusive about this

episodes historicity, it does serve as an example of the potential for criticism that could be inherent in

the triumphal ritual, and it illustrates once again that the victor had to weigh up the risk of providing

potential opportunities for attack on the one hand and the powerful effect which the ritual could have

on the other. This does not mean, however, that it would have been impossible, in principle, to carry out

such a triumph. Caesars triumphs thus demonstrate abundantly clearly where the boundaries could

lie in dealing with a civil war victory as part of the triumphal ritual. As in so many other areas, Caesar

consciously tested these limits and accepted that this could trigger criticism of his innovations. It is

likely that the events examined here also contributed to the re-forming of the opposition to the dictator.

Octavian and the victory over Antony

In the civil war triumph as in many other areas, Caesars example showed the way for his successor:

when Octavian entered Rome in triumph three times following the victory over Antony and Cleo-

intended to allude to Caesars clementia (thus Voisin1983, 26-27), only does limited justice to this message ofthe ritual: Caesarsclementia, too, could only result from

his position as victor.49. Degrassi 1947, 567; Itgenshorst 2005, 374, no. 266.

50. Thus also Lange 2013, 77.51. Cass. Dio 43.42.1-2. Cf. also Degrassi 1947, 567;

Itgenshorst 2005, 376-378, no. 267 and 268.

52. Suet.Iul. 78.


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patra, he had defeated all his rivals for power in bloody battles and had become the new master of

Rome. The victory celebrations of the year 29 BC were suited like no other event to provide for the

Roman public an impressive display of his power, based primarily on this military success. Octavian,

too, made use of the triumphal ritual in order to disseminate a particular message: the civil wars had

been brought to an end once and for all and the focus now had to move to the re-establishment of

order and security.53However, this message was inextricably linked to a second one, which frequent-

ly does not receive sufficient scholarly attention: the civil wars had been brought to an end once and

for all and Octavian had emerged as the victor.54This bestowed almost unlimited power on him,

the fundamental pillar of which was, and would always remain, the military. But even Octavian

shied away from explicitly calling his triumph a civil war triumph. Compared to his predecessors,

however, he had the advantage of being able to make use of an entire reservoir of tried and tested

means of dealing with a victory over Roman citizens. At the same time, his adoptive fathers fate

showed him where the limits of provocation lay.

Much scholarly effort has been put into showing that Octavian deliberately glossed over the civil

war victory in his triumph and tried to address it as little as possible.55Thus, R. Gurval, in a very

influential study, insists that the triumphs for the victories at Actium and Alexandria should be seenas a unit, in which the victory in the civil war was deliberately not addressed and in which the focus

was instead on the victory in the great war against Cleopatra and the conflict between the West and

the East.56Many others have accepted this assessment.57However, this theory inevitably brings with

it the question of what the additional value of the triumph for the victory at Actium would have been:

why should Octavian have celebrated two triumphs for onlyoneostensible victory, as postulated by

Gurval, especially given that the victory celebration for the capture of Alexandria would have been

better suited by far as a means of displaying the victory over Cleopatra and the East?

In order to make it clear as to how the second days triumph, for the victory at Actium, was to

be interpreted, Octavian had recourse to a strategy of Caesars, which, however, he varied in one

crucial point. The victor distinguished clearly between the three triumphs; each of the celebrations

stood initially by itself.58

In doing so, Octavian made use of the well-known technique of personal-ising the opponent. Cassius Dio reports that, on the third day, an effigy of Cleopatra was included

in the triumphal procession for the victory at Alexandria, as well as the queen's two children from

the marriage to Antony.59In doing so, Octavian adhered to the traditional scheme of focussing the

defeat on the relevant opposing leaders, just as he had had the captured leaders of the defeated

Dalmatians and Pannonians paraded through the city on the first day. The situation was different,

however, with regard to the triumph for the victory at Actium. None of the sources refer to a defeat-

ed leader of the opposition as having been included in this procession.60Who could it have been, in

53. Degrassi 1947, 570; Itgenshorst 2005, 410-418, no. 287-289. Cf., for example, Dahlheim 2010, 158-159 and 395-396; Bleicken 2010, 297-302 as well as Bringmann 2007,105-107 and Lange 2009, 18-26.

54. It is not possible to adequately summarise here the cur-rent state of the vast amount of research on the relation-ship between victory and peace with regard to Augus-tus, on the concept of pax Augusta and on the specialrole that the civil war had in this construction, nor is itpossible to treat these subjects in any detail; for a morein-depth discussion of this subject cf. Gruen 1985; Rich2003 and Havener (in preparation).

55 For an overview of the relevant secondary literature, cf.Lange 2009, 79, n. 30, who quite rightly and repeatedlystresses the fact that Octavian by no means concealedthe civil-war character of the conflict; cf. also Brm &Havener 2012, 210-211. Woodman 1983, 211-213 andPelling 1996, 54 are among the few who have taken acritical stance in this regard.

56. Cf. Gurval 1995, 33. One of Gurvals central (and ex-tremely questionable) arguments with regard to this is

that the triumph for the victory at Actium took place onthe middle day and that, for this reason, it was consid-ered less important than the others. Lange 2009, 148-156has rightly been critical of Gurvals theses.

57. Cf., amongst others, stenberg 2009, 142-143; Sumi2005, 215; Balbuza 1999, 277.

58. Cf. also Lange 2009, 152, who does not, however, go sofar as to consider this also as a conceptual distinctionbetween civil war and external war. It is, of course, en-tirely appropriate for the celebration of the victory overCleopatra and the presentation of Octavian as conquerorto be considered one of the central messages of the tripletriumph. However, it is not enough to declare this to betheonlypurpose of the ceremony.

59. Cass. Dio 51.21.5-9.60. Gurval surmises that two of Antonys allies took his place

in the procession: the Galatian tetrarch Adiatorix and KingAlexander of Emesa (cf. Gurval 1995, 29). A look at the rel-evant sources, however, shows that this hypothesis can by

no means be proven as unambiguously as Gurval suggests(for a detailed discussion of this, cf. Havener [in press]).


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any case, given that Cleopatra embodied the victory over Egypt in the procession of the third day?

The implicit message must have been obvious: the second days triumph did not represent a triumph

over Cleopatra nor over anyone who could have easily been named. The defeated opponent, who

could not be named, was to all appearances Antony. This must have been clear to every observer.

Thus, Octavian made use of the same element of the ritual as Caesar. However, instead of using the

focus on an external opponent in order to actually conceal the victory over Roman citizens (even if

this strategy was obvious), he deliberately created a conspicuous empty space which spoke volumes

when taken together with the focus on Cleopatra which followed on the third day:61instead of mix-

ing the external and internal dimensions of the war, as C. Lange has recently suggested,62there was

once again (as with Sullas triumph) a clear distinction between civil war and external war, which

was manifested by the very absence of an opposing leader in the triumph for Actium. The victory at

Actium was specifically assigned to the civil war, the war with Antony, and it was not just partly a

civil war victory. In no way did Octavian attempt to mix this war with an external one in the context

of the presentation of the victory.63Evidence for this is found in an entry from the fasti Amiterni-

ni, which has received little scholarly attention so far and which even names Antony explicitly as

Octavians opponent in the naval battle at Actium and does not mention Cleopatra.64Such an entryin a document published immediately after the victory celebrations can only be explained if it is

understood as a reaction to the triumph: of course, the inscription is a document deriving not from

Rome but from a local context. But nevertheless it took its lead from the messages which were to be

conveyed in the context of the ritual and which connected Actium unambiguously and exclusively

with the civil war against Antony. In this way, the gap which Octavian had created in the context of

the ritual was re-filled in the reception of events.

In addition, Octavian made use of another, central element of the triumphal ritual: in the same

way as Sulla, he utilised the representation of the spoils of war in order to set specific emphases. 65

Propertius tells us in the second book of his elegies that ships beaks (rostra) were transported along

the Via Sacra in the context of Octavians triumph. These beaks came from the opposing fleet at Ac-

tium and thus were a reminder of Octavians success.66

Therostraprovided Octavian with a symbolwhich could be used in place of the defeated enemy and which was connected specifically to Actium.

The victory memorial at Actium was also decorated with capturedrostrafrom Antonys fleet and it

is possible that its decoration referred to the triple triumph.67Starting with the great series of coins

which were minted in the years before and after the triumph and in which the reference to Actium

is displayed prominently, the symbol of therostra and thus, by necessity, the memory of the victory

in the civil war took on a central role in Augustan imagery.68The introduction of therostra-symbol

in the context of the triumphal ritual provided the starting point for this.

61. Gurval 1995, 28, too, states: Antony and the Romanswho supported his cause were found nowhere in Octavi-ans triumphs. However, against the background of theconsiderations presented here, it is at least problematicto draw the conclusion from this that Octavian made adeliberate attempt to disguise the civil war victory.

62. Lange 2009, 79-90 and 156-157. This does, of course,apply with regard to the legitimation strategies in therun-up to the war (on this, cf., already Wallmann 1989,296-333). However, a distinction must be made betweenthese and the presentation of the victory.

63. Cf. also Beard 2007, 303, who considers the victory at Ac-tium as a victory in civil war, without even a euphemis-tic foreign label. However, her analysis of the presenta-tion of this victory does not go beyond this statement.

64. CIL IX, 4190: [] bellum Actie(n)s(e) class[iar(ium)] /cum M(arco) Antonio []. On this, cf. Alfldy 1991.

65. Gurval 1995, 29 also takes Cass. Dios statement that all

three triumphs were equipped with spoils of war fromEgypt as indicating that the triumph over Cleopatra was

the focus of events and not the victory at Actium. How-ever, in doing so, he ignores therostra, which point in adifferent direction.

66. Prop. 2.1.31-34.67. On this subject, cf. Murray & Petsas 1989 and Zachos

2003. Although the context of the victory memorial atActium is, of course, fundamentally different to that ofthe monuments in Rome itself, there are a number ofindications to suggest that the members of the Romanupper class were also intended as the potential address-ees; on this subject, cf. Lange 2009, 106-123, especially116-117 and Gurval 1995, 83, who takes an opposing

view.68. Cf. Zanker 2003, 90. Dart &Vervaet 2011, 279-280 there-

fore link the Actian triumph to the Republican traditionof the naval triumph and state: [...] it would have beenan original way both to revive and conclude a gloriousrepublican tradition, established some 230 years ago on

behalf of C. Duilius, and to herald in a golden new age ofpeace and prosperity.


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Finally, Octavian also borrowed from Pompey. He placed his own person, that of the victorious

triumphator, at the centre of attention in a special way. Cassius Dio reports that during his entry into

the city the Roman magistrates did not precede the quadriga, as was otherwise usual, but followed

the triumphator through theporta triumphalis. This procedure illustrated the new organisation of

the state: the magistrates now no longer led the successful commander back into the city, thus re-in-

tegrating him into society. Instead, the triumphator Octavian had moved on beyond the traditional

order. The magistrates were assigned their place in the new order.69In this connection and this is a

point that is rarely taken into account in the scholarship they occupied the same place as the army

of the civil war victor did when entering the city. In this way Octavian not only showed that he stood

outside the Republican social order and was able to reshape it.70Rather, he showed clearly what he

considered to be the basis of his power: the army and the particularly close relationship with his

soldiers. The provocation which was part of this subtle change to the ritual was thus much less ex-

plicit than Pompeys quadriga of elephants, but this does not mean that it was less comprehensive.

The civil wars had been brought to an end once and for all, Octavian had emerged from them as the

all-powerful victor potens rerum omnium. And in the same way his triple triumph represented at

the same time the culmination and the endpoint of the development of the civil war triumph in theLate Republic.

The civil war triumph as an artificial taboo

At the end of this contribution, Valerius Maximuss remarks, which claim to be virtually normative,

should be considered once more: they convey the impression that the presentation of a victory over

Roman citizens in the context of the triumphal ritual represented the breaking of a taboo, an almost

obscene act which questioned the basic values of Roman society and which broke established and

incontestable rules. An examination of events in the Late Republic, however, has shown that the civil

war triumph was a significantly more complex problem than it ostensibly seemed to be. The key forunderstanding and analysing this problem is to distinguish three stages in the process of presenting

civil war victory to a Roman audience.

The award of a triumph was a prerogative of the Senate which had to grant any request of a

victorious commander. However, recent contributions to the debate on the Roman triumph have

questioned the assumption that the process of decreeing such a ceremony was subject to certain

explicit rules as found in the text of Valerius Maximus.71Therefore, instead of looking for any fixed

regulations which predetermined the question if a general could hope for a triumph or not, it is

important to focus on the individual cases and the particular debates. It was essential for any com-

mander to gain the approval of the members of the Senate, and this fact influenced the strategies of

justification that the would-be triumphators developed in order to achieve their aims. Given the neg-

ative attitude towards civil war anddiscordia it would have been detrimental to a generals chances

of success if he openly stated that he intended to celebrate a victory won against other Roman

citizens. Therefore it is not surprising that Sulla or, in the year 46 BC, Caesar officially focused on

their successes against external enemies in order to justify their request for a triumph and to en-

sure the approval of their peers. When Caesar requested a triumph for his victory at Munda, which

obviously lacked any external enemy who could have been used as a pretext, this has to be seen as

an open provocation and as a transgressive act which defied the norms of the senatorial code of

69. On this subject, cf. amongst others Dahlheim 2010, 158;Bleicken 2010, 301-302; Lange 2009, 155.

70. Cf. Sumi 2005, 216-217 as well as Reinhold 1988, 158:The deference to Octavian is patent. For a different view,

see Tarpin 2009, 140-141, who sees the order of proces-sion as a reference to the oath of allegiance which Augus-

tus mentions in theRes Gestae(25). Vervaet 2011, likewisereferring to the oath of allegiance, considers the senatorsor rather the magistrates themselves as having initiatedthe change in the order of the triumphal procession.

71. Cf. for example Beard 2007, 211-212 and Pittenger 2008,especially 25-31.


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behaviour. The fact that the Senate granted his request points to the extremely one-sided balance of

power after the dictator had eliminated the last remnants of the Pompeian and Republican forces.

In contrast, the triumph decreed for Decimus Brutus can be understood as part of Ciceros strategy

against Antony: he wanted the Senate to appear united in the fight against the enemy of Roman (and

that meant: senatorial) liberty. When the Republic was at risk, so the message went, the members of

the senatorial elite could settle their differences and acknowledge political realities.72Nevertheless,

if a general had to face potential senatorial opposition and did not want to act as provocatively as

Caesar, it could be convenient to make use of a victory over an external enemy in order to avoid un-

necessary discussions and to secure the chances of success.

The next stage in the process of presenting military victory to the Roman public was the trium-

phal ritual itself. As soon as such a ceremony was decreed, the mechanisms that characterized the

preceding debates in the Senate were obviously pushed to the background: control over the ritual

shifted from the Senate to the individual general.73This enabled the triumphator to set individual

priorities and to lay emphasis on particular elements of the ritual. Thus M. Claudius Marcellus (cos.

222,II 216,III214,IV 210, V208) dedicated the spolia opima, T. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 198)

extended his ceremony from one day to three days, and Pompey (as noted above) entered the citydressed in the cloak of Alexander the Great. Although all of these acts were clearly designed as prov-

ocations (symbolising the generals claims to unprecedented military success), the Senate obviously

did not have the possibility to thwart them. The same can be said of the civil war triumphs of the

Late Republic. As has been shown in the previous sections, it was absolutely possible for a success

over Roman citizens to be celebrated by means of the ritual form of the triumphal procession with-

out the presence of an external enemy being a mandatory requirement: even if the triumph as such

had been decreed for a victory over external enemies, the victory over Roman opponents could be

presented as an independent achievement in the context of the ritual, an achievement which was

clearly distinguished from the victories over external opponents. If Caesar decided to put his Roman

opponents on display in a most drastic way, nobody could keep him from parading a large-scale

painting depicting Catos suicide through the streets. It is thus of decisive importance to distinguishbetween possible formalprerequisitesfor a triumph being decreed, strategies of justificationwhich

had to be developed in order to ensure the cooperation of the generals senatorial peers, and the ac-

tualrepresentationof the victories.74However, such a course of action also always presented the op-

portunity to criticise the victors and the new power structures. Thus, every commander saw himself

confronted with the question of whether and to what extent hewantedto (notcould) carry out such

an offensive triumph as well as with the challenge of weighing up the advantages and risks of his

actions. The present contribution has presented different strategies which protagonists of the civil

war period implemented in order to successfully master this balancing act. All of them made use of

the possibility of individual influence provided by the triumphal ritual in order to convey specific

messages. They did that by means of the variation and the implementation of the rituals different

elements which were tailored to the particular political circumstances. At this point, it should be

noted that the civil war triumph in the Late Republic proved to be a means of presenting claims topolitical power to a wide public.

Having said this, the fact that none of these civil war triumphs was included as such in the Fasti

Triumphales cannot be denied. There are two reasons to account for this absence. Firstly, every tri-

72. Cf. Gotter 1996, 129-130 and 169-172.73. Flaig 2003 and 2004, 32-48 has demonstrated this with

regard to the booty: the victorious general alone decidedwhich part of the booty was to be presented during theprocession.

74. Cf. Lange 2013, 86: Importantly, apart from a few ex-ceptions perhaps mainly justified by declaring Romans

public enemies a general could not expect to triumphafter a victory in an exclusively civil war, only for a civ-

il war that could also be represented as a foreign war;it was by nature of their external character that theyqualified for a triumph. This statement is doubtlesslyappropriate with regard to the process of the grantingof a triumph with its specific strategies of justification.However, as it has been possible to show in this contri-bution, it can be questioned whether and to what extent

this principle actually presented a binding stipulation inthe carrying out of the ritual.


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umphal procession was a unique and unrepeatable event. Thus the last stage of representing military

success in Rome was its perpetuation. The opportunities for provocation provided by the ritual nec-

essarily made the question of how to make a victory part of public historical memory a delicate one,

especially with regard to civil war. A generals opportunity to convey his particular messages during

the triumphal ceremony was mainly due to the ephemeral character of the ritual. But in order to en-

sure that his success was remembered favourably, a triumphator always had to consider the conven-

tions and norms of the public discourse. It is hard to imagine that the Senate would have consented

to a permanent reference to civil war victory and thus to a never-ending provocation. Against this

background, the entries of the Fasti Triumphaleshave to be understood as results of another process

of negotiation between the victorious generals and their peers.

Secondly, if one considers the Fasti Triumphales Capitoliniin particular, the key to the question

why they do not mention any civil war triumphs can be found in their Augustan context: the civil

wars form the crucial background to theprincepss definition and legitimation of his rule. In theRes

Gestae, the termination of the internal Roman conflicts represents the point of departure for the

establishment of the Principate.75Octavian had emerged as the sole winner from these conflicts a

fact which he stressed again and again during his entire rule and on which his position of power wasultimately based. In order to maintain this position, it was of vital importance to the person who had

now become Augustus that his actions could not be repeated: he drew his power from the civil war

victory and from the prestige of a military success which had been gained over Roman citizens and

which was symbolised by the triumph. After the end of the civil wars, it was important to secure this

power and to monopolise the possibility of making military successes the basis of political power,

successes especially against an external enemy, but even more in internal Roman wars. Turning the

civil war triumph into a taboo was one element of this monopolisation: Octavians triumph was nec-

essary in order for Augustus to be able to guarantee that such a ceremony never had to take place

again.76The promise that he would not allow any further bella civiliawas a crucial building block in

the justification of his sole rule. An unsavoury aftertaste remained, however: in his elegies, Properti-

us laments Romes fate, so oft beset on every hand by her own triumphs.77

75. RG34.1.

76. For a detailed treatment of this subject, cf. Havener (inpreparation).

77. Prop. 2.15.45-46: nec totiens propriis circum oppugnata

triumphis / lassa foret crinis solvere Roma suos (trans-lation modified, WH).


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