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Boström, M., Lidskog, R., Uggla, Y. (2017)A reflexive look at reflexivity in environmental sociology.Environmental Sociology, 3(1): 6-16https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2016.1237336

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A reflexive look at reflexivity in environmentalsociology

Magnus Boström, Rolf Lidskog & Ylva Uggla

To cite this article: Magnus Boström, Rolf Lidskog & Ylva Uggla (2017) A reflexivelook at reflexivity in environmental sociology, Environmental Sociology, 3:1, 6-16, DOI:10.1080/23251042.2016.1237336

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A reflexive look at reflexivity in environmental sociology

Magnus Boström *, Rolf Lidskog and Ylva Uggla

School of Humanities, Education, and Social Sciences, Örebro University, Örebro, Sweden

(Received 15 March 2016; accepted 14 September 2016)

Reflexivity is a central concept in environmental sociology, as in environmental social science in general. The concept isoften connected to topics such as modernity, governance, expertise, and consumption. Reflexivity is presented as a meansfor taking constructive steps towards sustainability as it recognizes complexity, uncertainty, dilemmas, and ambivalence.Critical discussion of the conceptual meaning and usage of reflexivity is therefore needed. Is it a useful theoretical conceptfor understanding various sustainability issues? Is ‘more reflexivity’ relevant and useful advice that environmentalsociologists can give in communicating with other disciplines, policymakers, and practitioners? This article explores theconceptual meaning of reflexivity and assesses its relevance for environmental sociology. In particular, it reviews its usagesin three research fields; expertise, governance, and citizen-consumers. The paper furthermore discusses the spatial andtemporal boundaries of reflexivity. It concludes by discussing how the concept can be a useful analytical concept inenvironmental sociology, at the same time as it warns against an exaggerated and unreflexive use of the concept.

Keywords: reflexivity; environmental governance; expertise; citizen; consumer

Introduction

Reflexivity has become a key concept in environmentalsociology, in which it is associated with, for example,Giddens’ and Beck’s work on reflexive modernization(see e.g. Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1995). The concept ofreflexivity is connected to topics such as governance,expertise, and lifestyle. It is furthermore associated withseveral other terms, such as uncertainty, transparency, andparticipation. This paper aims to give a theoretical accountof the concept of reflexivity and its usage in environmentalsociology. More precisely, the paper aims to identify vari-eties of usage of the concept and to assess the theoreticalrelevance of the concept to a sociology of the environ-ment. To this end, the paper considers to what extent‘reflexivity’ is a relevant theoretical concept for under-standing various sustainability issues. Does reflexivityoffer a useful model and concept for critically examiningcurrent practices? Could reflexivity be yet another over-simplified message to researchers, practitioners, and pol-icymakers? Is ‘more reflexivity’ really a relevant anduseful strategy that environmental sociologists can applyin communicating with various academic and otheraudiences?

Although there are good reasons for using ‘reflexivity’as a theoretical and normative concept in environmentalsociology, a self-reflexive examination of this concept andits application is warranted to prevent the call for ‘morereflexivity’ from becoming yet another unreflexive man-agement imperative. This study is based on a review ofprevious literature applying the concept of reflexivity.

After this introduction, the second section will brieflyreview how reflexivity has been introduced and defined inenvironmental sociology. The third section reviews howthe concept has been applied in three research areas inenvironmental sociology: science and expertise, environ-mental governance, and citizen-consumers. The fourthsection analyses how reflexivity can lead to or coexistwith unreflexivity as well as the extent to which reflexivitycan be institutionalized. The fifth and concluding sectiondiscusses the potential role of the concept in environmen-tal sociology both for studying a range of sustainabilityissues and for speaking to practice.

Reflexivity: self-confrontation and reflection

Ulrich Beck’s (1992, 1994, 2009) work on the world risksociety and reflexive modernization is the key source forthe concept of reflexivity in environmental sociology.Beck connects late-modern risks to how institutions (e.g.technology, science, politics, the state, and the economy)operated in ‘simple’ modernity. In simple modernity,problem-solving relies on a cognitive and instrumentalapproach in which uncertainty, complexity, and ambiva-lence are handled through the use of rationality and tech-nology. This approach relies on the view that it is possibleto know the ‘Truth’ on the basis of universal and objectiveknowledge, and that it is possible to control reality basedon such knowledge. Problem-solving is specific andstraightforward, the goal being to maximize the controlof social and economic development. The theory of

*Corresponding author. Email: Magnus.bostrom@oru.se

Environmental Sociology, 2017Vol. 3, No. 1, 6–16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2016.1237336

© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed,or built upon in any way.

reflexive modernization holds that this approach toproblem-solving inevitably leads to unintended and nega-tive consequences. As these side effects multiply and areincreasingly seen as unresolved by traditional instrumentalapproaches, a reflexive turn emerges – in Beck’s terminol-ogy, ‘reflexive modernization’ or the ‘world risk society’.

According to Beck (2009, 109ff, 1994, 5ff), suchreflexivity does not necessarily imply more reflection.His analysis reveals that reflexivity can have two different,though related, meanings. The first meaning of reflexivityis what Beck calls self-confrontation. Industrial societygenerates unintended side effects and risks that shake thefoundations of industrial society and its core institutions(e.g. the nation-state) in ways that cannot be ignored andthat force society to take action. A nuclear accident, forexample, must be handled. Furthermore, these ‘megarisks’ are socially explosive, having various social conse-quences: new discourses, movements, politics, and mar-kets. As no one can foresee and estimate how theseprocesses will evolve, the certitude of industrial societyresults in the uncertainties of the risk society that confrontsociety and must be acted upon.

In contrast to this meaning of ‘reflexivity’, Beck usesthe word ‘reflection’ to refer to various forms and con-structions of knowledge. The conceptual meaning is appo-sitely grasped by Giddens (1990, 38), who says that inreflexive modernization, ‘social practices are constantlyexamined and reformed in the light of incoming informa-tion about those very practices, thus constitutively alteringtheir character’, stressing that reflection is constantlyengaged in by both individuals (i.e. laypeople as well asexperts) and organizations. Like Beck, Giddens links thispropensity for reflexivity to historical processes of detra-ditionalization, individualization, and the undermining oftraditional authorities and structures (e.g. the state, church,science, family, and gender roles). Whereas Giddens pri-marily discusses reflection and how it is institutionalizedin late-modern society, Beck focuses on reflexivity. Beck(2009, 119ff) summarizes the differences between reflec-tion and reflexivity by stating that whereas reflection con-cerns knowing and knowledge and the belief that moreknowledge will increase the problem-solving capacity ofinstitutions and society, reflexivity/self-confrontation con-cerns unknowing (i.e. unintended and unknown sideeffects). Due to their interrelatedness, in this article, weuse the term reflexivity for both self-confrontation andreflection. When we specifically refer to only one ofthese aspects, we highlight this by using the terms self-confrontation and reflection.

In relation to the theories of reflexive modernization,scholars have addressed the importance of bringing to lightthe forces of counter-reflexivity (Borne 2009) or anti-reflexivity. McCright and Dunlap (2010) argue that theAmerican conservative movement is an anti-reflexiveforce attempting to protect the industrial capitalist order ofsimple modernization by forcefully challenging the advo-cates of reflexive modernization, that is, the environmentalmovement and environmental impact science. Although it is

important to pay close attention to forces trying to preventthe institutions of the simple modernity, it is an open ques-tion, on an analytical level, if these forces themselvesshould be labelled anti-reflexive. Indeed, the fight againstreflexive modernization might itself require significantreflexivity, including capacity to anticipate others’ actionand capability to intimidate, misrepresent, and manipulateenvironmental scientists and advocates. Reflexivity mightbe needed to keep powerful decision makers misinformedand unreflective. Not only Beck and Giddens but alsoBauman argue that our current crises could very well leadto various narrow perspectives and fundamentalist ideolo-gies including nationalism, xenophobia, and terrorism(Bauman 2006; Beck 2009; Giddens 1994a). When societycan no longer provide certitude, as in the case of industrialsociety, one consequence could be increased reflexivity andanother fundamentalist thinking. Stevenson and Dryzek(2012, 192) suggest that we can distinguish between reflex-ive modernization and reflexive traditionalization. The for-mer notion implies increased awareness of and openness todiscourses other than those into which one has been socia-lized. The latter implies the rejection of alternatives and aretreat into the familiar, while perceiving these alternativediscourses as threatening the familiar. Linking the reflectivecapacity to discourses can thus both enable and constraincommunication and deliberation. From this theoretical over-view, we now turn to the use and debates of the reflexivityconcept in three research fields.

Reflexivity in three research fields: expertise,governance, and citizen-consumers

Reflexivity is a concept with growing usage, and is uti-lized in a number of research areas. In this section, wereview how the concept has been used and debated inthree research fields of certain relevance to environmentalsociology: science and expertise, environmental govern-ance, and citizen-consumers.

Reflexive expertise

In reflexive modernity, scientific expertise, according toboth Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990, 1994a, 1994b), hasa new role. Its capacity to deliver objective truth, deter-mine risk, and suggest ways to control risk is questioned.There is a ‘reflexive scientization’ in which science itselfis deconstructed by means of science. Science is therebyboth internally and externally contested: experts frequentlydisagree and this is known to the wider society.Furthermore, the very specialization of expertise meansthat there can be no meta-experts, that is, experts on allexperts. Claims for the universal legitimacy and applic-ability of science are also more disputed than before.Taken together, this demonopolization of science resultsin a world consisting of multiple and competing epistemicauthorities. Almost every public issue involves a hetero-geneous supply of scientific statements. This heterogeneityin turn creates an open space for the public contestation of

Environmental Sociology 7

science, in which citizens scrutinize science and developcounter-expertise.

This situation does not, however, imply that the expertrole is less important. Beck believes that a reflexivescience, broadly disseminated in society and used bysocial movements and civic networks, can serve to demo-cratize society. He states that ‘only a strong, competentpublic sphere, “armed” with scientific arguments is cap-able of separating the scientific wheat from the chaff’(Beck 2009, 44). Likewise, Giddens (1994a) stresses thatthe advance and spread of scientific knowledge – includ-ing the consequences of its application – imply thattradition-guided action is replaced by more scientificallymediated understandings of the world. Today, according toGiddens, organizations exhibit an institutional reflexivityin which their performance is systematically monitoredand controlled by themselves and/or other organizations.The reflexive appropriation of knowledge is a way toguide action, while this appropriation may simultaneouslyundermine the stability of social structures. Giddens andPierson (1998) exemplify this with the financial market,which through its use of massive information creates newand unforeseen risks. Manufactured uncertainty is there-fore more related to the advance of knowledge than to anylack of it (in contrast to Beck, who sees unknowing and itsimplications as central; see Beck 2009, 126–128).

Some scholars question this assumption of increasingreflexivity in society (Alexander 1996; Dean 1999; Lash2000). In the field of science and technology studies(STS), the (un)reflexivity of expertise is a recurrenttheme. Several empirical studies have found that scientificexpertise is rarely reflexive concerning its own activityand underlying assumptions (Irwin 1995; Wynne 1992).Scientific experts’ belief in their own capacity to findcorrect and true answers has made them unresponsive tothe public’s actually valid and reflected worries andclaims, or they listen to but dismiss these concerns asmanifesting non-knowledge (Wynne 2005). Experts oftenfail to consider that laypeople may be reflexive beingswho do not naïvely believe their own knowledge to betrue and others’ false, but instead often evaluate their ownand others’ knowledge claims. The relevance and validityof the public evaluation of issues is therefore often deniedby experts (Irwin and Wynne 2003; Wickson and Wynne2012; Wynne 1992), and in cases when public engagementhas been welcomed, this may occur without any deeperreflexivity in terms of the public being invited to criticallyexamine scientific assumptions and normative frameworks(Chilvers 2012).

This unreflexivity is reinforced by the circumstancethat many technical issues are framed in a technocraticway (Jasanoff 1990; 2005; 2011; Wynne 2005, 2010), atthe expense of broader political, social, or cultural con-siderations. Such narrow framing places scientific exper-tise at the centre, involves questionable models of nature(with excessive reduction of complexities), and naïvemodels of how society works. Issues of, for example,genetically modified crops, nuclear power, and synthetic

food products require not only scientific knowledge suchas technical risk analysis but also insight into how societyworks, how activities are regulated, and how power isexerted. Such technical framing is often taken for granted,implying the preemption of political discussion and limit-ing the capacity to discover, understand, and internalizechallenges that arise outside a particular frame. To bereflexive, experts must be aware not only of their ownassumptions but also of the framing of the issue at stake.

However, research has found that expertise can bereflexive in another way. Scientists and experts often actstrategically in order to maintain and strengthen their cred-ibility and epistemic authority. Drawing on Goffman’s dra-maturgical view of society, Hilgartner (2000) uses the ‘stagemanagement’ concept to capture science’s deliberative andreflexive work to become an authoritative reference fordetermining what should be done. Front-stage performanceencompasses activities that are believed to strengthenexperts’ authority and are therefore deliberately shown tothe public. For example, scientific results are presented ascertain and objective, produced at a distance from andindependently of political and normative considerations(cf. Latour 1998). Backstage, remote from public visibility,the process of knowledge production and synthesis may becharacterized by uncertainty, controversies, and normativebiases. By considering stakeholders’ views, experts candeliberately choose what to make public (front stage) andwhat to conceal (backstage) in order to deliver trustedknowledge and to facilitate action. Expertise can be reflex-ive in the sense of anticipating how other actors may under-stand and evaluate its messages, and therefore strategicallystage its activities to maximize authority and influence.

Although many STS researchers criticize science fornot being reflexive, contesting the claim that society hasmoved from simple to reflexive modernization, they stillbelieve in knowledge, learning, and reflexivity. All knowl-edge – including scientific knowledge – derives fromparticular social and cultural contexts. Knowledge pro-cesses should be open to many voices, they argue, includ-ing explicit negotiations and critical discussions amongvarious discourses. This proposal presupposes an institu-tionalized reflexivity, that is, that organizations shoulddevelop a self-critical ability to review their own assump-tions and commitments and expose them to critical andpublic contestation. Nonetheless, there is always a risk thatscientists (as well as governance actors; see Section 3.2)may embrace reflexivity and participation in a shallowsense in which they welcome a choir of supporting voiceswithout opening themselves to critical evaluation of theirown assumptions and definitions of issues (Chilvers 2012;Irwin 2006).

To sum up, while disagreeing on several matters, scho-lars such as Beck, Giddens, Irwin, and Wynne demonstratethat ‘reflexivity’ has a role to play when approachingexpertise. What is problematic, however, is when it isassumed that science has indeed become more reflexive inBeck’s sense. A crucial empirical question for environmen-tal sociology is whether scientific institutions and scientists

8 M. Boström et al.

are endorsing and practicing the explicit questioning of theirown assumptions, opening themselves to external view-points. STS demonstrate that reflexive expertise oftenappears as a more desired option than empirical reality. Ifthe social and normative contexts and assumptions ofscience are not critically discussed and debated, the currentrhetoric on transparency, reflexivity, and inclusion mayreproduce unreflexive scientific practices and expert advice.Reflexive expertise would require considerable self-criticism and openness to multiple actors to be able toraise novel questions and to critically evaluate and contestscientific propositions and expert recommendations.

Reflexive governance

The concept of reflexivity is sometimes referred to instudies of environmental governance and risk govern-ance (e.g. Van Asselt and van Bree 2011; Van Asseltand Renn 2011; Aven and Renn 2009). In these studies,reflexivity is associated with other concepts and norms,such as openness, transparency, and participation. Ageneral idea is that experts, decision makers, and otherparticipants should be open to questioning assumptionsin a given situation, should not conceal issues of uncer-tainty and the pluralism of values, and should be recep-tive of the input and participation of other stakeholders.Reflexivity is also treated as the core analytical conceptin some of such studies (e.g. Boström, Grönholm, andHassler, 2016; Brousseau, Dedeurwaerdere, andSiebenhüner 2012; Hassler, Boström, and Grönholm2013; Schutter and Lenoble 2010; Voss, Bauknecht etal. 2006; Voss and Bornemann 2011). Reflexive govern-ance hence refers to governance that is concerned withitself by means of the self-critical scrutiny of currentgovernance, including its achievements and unintendednegative effects. Jan-Peter Voss, Bauknecht et al. (2006)have made a substantial contribution here, by buildingon the work of Ulrich Beck. They argue:

Reflexive governance puts itself up to probing. Itacknowledges that governing activities are entangled inwider societal feedback loops and are partly shaped bythe (side) effects of its own working. It incorporates suchfeedback by opening problem-handling processes fordiverse knowledge, values and resources of influence inorder to learn about appropriate problem definitions, tar-gets and strategies of governance for sustainable develop-ment. (xv–xvi)

Reflexive governance hence includes the double meaningsof reflexivity: the self-confrontation that Beck speaksabout and reflection that particularly Giddens emphasizes.

A key question is how existing discourses and socialarrangements reproduce the generation of problems.Another question is whether certain governance structuresand processes could facilitate reflexive learning.

Reflexive governance scholars recognize that globaland local sustainability problems are complex, uncertain,and ambivalent and need to be treated as such (Kemp and

Martens 2007). Problems cannot be solved in a once-for-all manner because new problems, trade-offs, and ambiv-alences are likely to appear after decisions are made. Thisstream of literature, thus, emphasizes that governanceactors must develop the potential to respond continuouslyto unexpected outcomes.

Accordingly, reflexive governance is geared towards con-tinuous learning ‘in the course of modulating ongoing devel-opments, rather than towards complete knowledge andmaximisation of control’ (Voss and Kemp 2006, 7).Governance actors must be forward looking and adaptive,allow for trial-and-error learning, and permit experimentingwith new innovations (Grin 2006; Kemp and Loorbach2006); they must also be backward looking, make use ofexperience, and critically evaluate earlier mistakes(Siebenhüner 2011). In being subjected to scrutiny, govern-ance actors must be confronted with witnesses of how exist-ing governance contributes to reproducing problems. Thereflexive governance perspective accordingly pays closeattention to the importance of public debate and the monitor-ing role of the media, civil society organizations, and otheractors. Cross-sector and multi-actor approaches are thereforecalled for (Boström, Grönholm, and Hassler, 2016; Hassler,Boström, and Grönholm 2013; Voss, Bauknecht et al 2006).

With regard to this research scholars have also raisedissues for debate. In a review of the scholarship on reflex-ive governance, Walker and Shove (2007) welcome itsserious consideration of ambivalence, while they argue itstill provides an insufficient analysis on how politics andpower produce ambivalence. Another problem debated byreflexive governance scholars themselves is the ‘efficacyparadox’ (Voss, Kemp et al. 2006), that is, the tensionbetween ‘opening up’ for the inclusion of more actorsand ‘closing down’ for decision-making. The more actorsthat become involved, the trickier the decision-makingprocess is likely to be. Yet another problem is path depen-dency. Due to various kinds of institutional and organiza-tional inertia, reflexive learning and continuous reformwill be challenging. Unless institutions are not self-confronted by the side effects of their own operationsand thus forced to change, various external and internalfactors tend to reproduce existing institutional structures(e.g. existing rules, discourses, vested interests, and habits;Bos and Grin 2008; Grin 2006). Theorists of reflexivegovernance engage with this issue of (intended/unin-tended) change versus inertia, and underscore the impor-tance of taking path dependency seriously and suggeststep-by-step transformation (Grin 2006; Kemp andLoorbach 2006) rather than seeking unrealistic utopianpolicies.

What are the lessons from empirical studies of envir-onmental governance and management that apply the con-cept of reflexivity? We have found studies demonstratingprogress towards reflexive governance as well as studiesdemonstrating the opposite: the absence of reflexivity.

Hassler, Boström, and Grönholm (2013) found manyforces that prevent reflexivity in intergovernmental orga-nizations; they also found positive developments,

Environmental Sociology 9

particularly in the International Council for theExploration of the Sea (ICES). Through conscious effortsover several years, ICES has achieved significant organi-zational and cognitive restructuring to facilitate moreinclusive and holistic approaches to producing policy-relevant advice on fishery issues (see also Wilson 2009).However, it is arguably easier to achieve change withinorganizations than throughout sectors. In a study of var-ious marine risks connected to environmental governanceof the Baltic Sea, Boström, Grönholm, and Hassler (2016)noticed the rarity of cross-sectoral learning, for example,between the agriculture and fishery sectors. Hence, animportant prerequisite for reflexivity was lacking.

Stevenson and Dryzek (2012) note the potentially reflex-ive capacity of the plurality of transnational climate changediscourses. However, this potential can only be realized ifthese discourses communicate with each other. They studiedfour non-state summits held just before the 2009 CopenhagenClimate Summit. These non-state summits appeared to bediscrete events dominated by particular discourses. Abusiness-dominated ‘Mainstream Sustainability’ summit anda social movement-dominated ‘Green Radicalism’ summit didnot communicate with each other. The groups thus failed tolearn from each other, amplifying established views and ideol-ogies and consequently failing to foster reflexivity. Gale andCadman (2014) present another example of how networkswith divergent discourses fail to speak to each other. Theyhighlight the lack of reflexive policymaking in their study ofthe development of an economistic international SustainableForestry Management (SFM) norm (i.e. the MontrealProcess). The norm developed very rapidly within a closedand clientelistic policy network in Canada that ignored aconcurrent eco-social SFM norm-development process (forother studies with similar themes, see Wales and Mythen2002; Marsden 2012; Friedland, Ransom, and Wolf 2010).Several studies illustrate how reflexive elements initially con-tribute to the inspiration and design of policy or innovationprocesses, but often vanish during the processes themselves.The economic and normative power of an existing socio-technological regime and institutional context can be a strongforce preventing structural change. Examples include studiesof efforts to develop a sustainable energy supply system in theNetherlands (Kemp and Martens 2007) and of an innovationproject to develop a sustainable husbandry system for pigs inthe Netherlands (Bos and Grin 2008). In sum, though theabove studies are varied, they demonstrate that reflexivityconcepts have been applied in studies of governance, policy-making, innovation, and management at least as much toidentify missed elements or opportunities as to explain whatactually happens in governance. The review thus shows thatthe concept has both normative and analytical usages. Bos andGrin (2008) indeed argue that it is a feature of studies ofreflexive modernization from the Beck tradition highlightingthe tension between simple and reflexive modernization.Existing governance structures and processes reveal tensionsbetween reflexive and unreflexive forces, and studies in thefield alternate between analysing what actually happens andwhat ought to happen.

Reflexive citizen-consumers?

Since the late 1980s, policy, public debate, media, civilsociety, and the social sciences have addressed the conductof private actors (e.g. organizations, households, and indi-viduals) regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions andother environmental issues. Contrary to the expert under-standing of the public as ignorant and unreflexive, asdescribed in Section 3.1, this emphasis on people’s every-day conduct relies largely on the notion of reflexivecitizens-consumers. Beck (2009, 95) uses the concept ofsub-politics to describe how reflexive modernization andindividualization entail the ‘de-coupling of politics fromgovernment’, implying the self-organization of a variety ofnon-state actors. Drawing on Sartre, Beck (1997) con-cludes that people are condemned to individualization,implying that ‘the standard biography becomes a chosenbiography’ (p. 96, italics in original; see also Beck andBeck-Gernsheim 2002). Similarly, Giddens (1991) con-cludes that the emancipatory politics of modernity was apolitics of life chances, whereas the life politics of latemodernity is a politics of choice.

The notions of chosen biography and reflexive identitycomprise a broad range of issues, including family life,gender, and sexuality. In environmental studies, the conceptof reflexivity has been focused on green identities and life-styles, everyday practices, and activism. For example,Boström and Klintman (2008) argue that there is a broadpotential for reflective trust in eco-labels on the part ofcitizens, instead of the blind trust that the labelling systemstend to spur. Their argument is based on findings that it iswell-educated and politically interested citizens who expressinterest in green and political consumerism (see also Stolleand Micheletti 2013). In studying social responses to climatechange, Davidson (2012) focuses on ‘meta-reflexives’ whoappear engaged and resourceful. These individuals are cap-able of grasping the complexity of climate change, spend ‘agreat deal of energy on inner dialogue’ (p. 620), are valueoriented, and tend towards activism. Other studies examinethe process of lifestyle change as one of moral identityformation (Lorenzen 2012; Sandlin 2009; Shepherd 2002).

Although several studies draw in various ways on theconcept of individual reflexivity, the thesis of the reflexiveindividual has also been debated and met with criticism. Ina review of literature critiquing the individualization the-sis, which is contained in the theory of reflexive moder-nization, Dawson (2012) distinguishes between critiquesfrom the modernist, interactionist, and discourse perspec-tives. This distinction captures well the debate, which issummarized in the following paragraphs.

The main critique articulated by the modernist researchstrand concerns the weak or absent empirical basis for theindividualization thesis, resulting in an ahistorical accountof individualization. The criticism is that ‘individualiza-tion, to the extent it exists, is not in any way “new”’(Dawson 2012, 308–309), and that it broadly reflects theliberal, middle-class values of its proponents, who back uptheir thesis by randomly chosen illustrative examples.

10 M. Boström et al.

The interactionist critique mainly concerns the notion ofreflexivity as an inner process. Scholars in this strand call forthe reintroduction of the social when discussing individuali-zation, emphasizing that reflexive awareness is in fact aculturally embedded process (Dawson 2012, 310). Thenotion of an autonomous, critical, and well-informedindividual1 who makes ‘free choices’ based on the bestavailable information is based on a simplified view of theindividual and a false distinction between the individual aseither reflexive or traditional (Klintman 2012; Shove 2010).Studies have illustrated how the individualization of envir-onmental responsibility entails ambivalence, uncertainty,contradiction, hypocrisy, and dissent when people try tomake sense of the ascribed responsibility relative to othernorms and values, such as cleanliness, freedom, mobility,and care for children (e.g. Blühdorn 2013; Borne 2009;Cherrier 2009; Connolly and Prothero 2008). Other studieselucidate the importance of group solidarity and collectiveaction (e.g. Cherrier 2009; Pentina and Amos 2011;Portwood-Stacer 2012), highlighting ‘the intertwinement ofcollective identity and the individual’s struggle to perform inaccordance with certain values and group norms’ (Sonerydand Uggla 2015). Likewise, studies drawing on practicetheory emphasize that behavioural practices must be under-stood as socially embedded and that the elements of socialpractice (e.g. clothing, housing, food, and travel), rather thanthe individual as a relatively isolated entity, should be at thecore of the analysis (Halkier 2009; Hargreaves 2011;Spaargaren 2003; Warde 2005). Yet other studies of citizen-consumers reveal that the distinction between reflexivity andunreflexivity is not clear-cut. For example, as Halkier (2001)puts it, ‘social life is neither entirely coincidental nor entirelydetermined’ but evinces a mixture of routine and reflexivity(see also Klintman 2012; Shove 2010).

Moreover, the modernist and interactionist researchstrands share the critique concerning the concept of socio-logical ‘zombie categories’ introduced by Beck, conclud-ing that the empirical foundation for the assumption thatconcepts such as class and gender have become obsolete isfairly weak (Dawson 2012).

The third strand of critique concerns individualizationas discourse. From this perspective, the thesis of thereflexive individual is seen as a cornerstone of neo-liberalism (Dawson 2012). Drawing on Foucault’s govern-mentality concept, this research focuses critically on thetechniques of the self (e.g. information and educationcampaigns) employed in governing people’s conduct, con-tributing to a narrow view of agency. For example, theindividual is addressed primarily as a consumer (Akenji2014; Kent 2009; Maniates 2001) or a carbon calculatorand energy saver (Paterson and Stripple 2010; Uggla andUggla 2016), and this type of individualized responsibilitysuggests that we can engage and feel content with minorchanges in everyday routines. Rather than gathering ascitizens and finding political solutions to institutional chal-lenges, we are supposed to believe that green consumptionalone can bring sustainability (Kent 2009; Maniates 2001,37). However, reflexivity does not necessarily imply

compliance with a hegemonic discourse (Soneryd andUggla 2015), and it could well lead to resistance to thewhole idea of green consumption.

To sum up, the fact that the notions of individualiza-tion and the reflexive individual have become predominantin late modernity and the circumstance that people areincreasingly individualized do not necessarily imply thatthis constitutes a lived reality for people. Rather, scholar-ship of (un)reflexive citizens tend to highlight the sociallyembedded citizen or embedded individualization (Dawson2012). In this account, sociological concepts of stratifica-tion, including class and gender, are all but obsolete, andfurther research ought to keep focus on how various dis-courses, social practices, social movements, governancetools, and information campaigns empower or constraincitizens to become more or less reflexive.

Boundaries of reflexivity

In this section, we draw on ideas from the referred litera-tures above and add relevant concepts in order to theorizehow reflexivity and its inverses are intertwined. This ana-lysis will further an understanding of the spatial and tem-poral boundaries of reflexivity. We find it illuminating to,first, use the spatial metaphor of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ todiscuss certain possibilities and limitations. That is, heigh-tened reflexivity may be achieved ‘inside’ the boundariesof a setting, frame, expertise (Section 3.1), discourse, orsocial arena, or governance sector (Section 3.2) but to theexpense of lost reflexivity ‘outside’ that boundary. Second,we find it warranted to address a temporal notion (orparadox) in that efforts to achieve reflexivity on a contin-uous basis, may imply the institutionalization and routini-zation of it, which in turn may lead to its dissolution.

Reflexivity within, unreflexivity outside

Framing theory provides useful analytical tools for studyinghow reflexivity ‘within’ one setting can be heightened at thesame time as unreflexivity ‘outside’ this setting remains.Indeed, various scholars have addressed how ‘reflection’ canbe facilitated by frames or discourses (Stevenson and Dryzek2012; Fischer 2003). Boström and Klintman (2008) distin-guish between reflection within a frame (i.e. intraframe reflec-tion) and reflection across frames (i.e. interframe reflection).Intraframe reflection concerns how actors use cognitive toolsto reflect on practices. Frames such as ‘precaution’, ‘biodiver-sity’, ‘cleanliness’, ‘critical loads’, and ‘climate friendliness’may enable actors to perceive, reflect on, and understandthings in novel ways and, through such reflection, changepractices. It is equally important to ask how attention tosome aspects may result in less attention paid to other aspects.An important insight from framing theory is that frames setboundaries: a frame helps us see what is within the frame butexcludes things that fall outside it. Focusing on certain aspectsof an activity simultaneously means less attention (i.e. lessreflexivity) paid to other aspects that fall outside the frame.

Environmental Sociology 11

For example, eco-labelling can foster consumer reflex-ivity in relation to particular product segments, while thisnarrowed reflexivity may run in parallel to, or even facil-itate, ignorance of other product segments or of overallconsumption practices and levels (Boström and Klintman2008). Eco-labelling can also be used in routinized waysor implicitly cited to excuse polluting activities in otherdomains. Likewise, though the system of offsets to com-pensate for GHG emissions from flying may raise aware-ness and prompt reflection on travelling and mobility, itcould also be used in a routinized unreflexive way or as ameans to justify one’s travel habits. The frame of greenconsumption and individual responsibility can therebynarrow the view of what constitutes environmentallyresponsible behaviour and of who the ‘polluter’ is. Inthis sense, eco-labelling and other means of responsibili-zation entail a narrow view of both environmental degra-dation and environmental protection. By the frame,reflexivity is limited, implying less reflection on structuraland political issues, which is exactly what the critics ofindividualization as discourse point out.

The notion of intraframe reflection implies that reflex-ivity (within the frame) and unreflexivity (outside theframe) can proceed simultaneously. Reflection acrossframes (e.g. ‘sustainable development’ vs. ‘economicgrowth’ or ‘natural’ vs. ‘artificial’) has more potential interms of learning and transformation. Arguably, any struc-tural change in society (at least a democratic one) has toinvolve elements of interframe reflection or, as Stevensonand Dryzek (2012) put it, communication between dis-courses. Interframe reflection concerns the capability toscrutinize both one’s own frame that underpins an activityand another actor’s frame, for example, that of anopponent:

The process of frame-reflection depends in particular onthe orientations of the participants: their relative distancefrom their objects under consideration, their willingness tolook at things from other perspectives, their propensitytoward ‘cognitive risk taking’ coupled with their opennessto the uncertainty associated with frame conflict. (Fischer2003, 146)

In a governance process, such productive frame reflection islikely to be quite demanding for participants. Adding atemporal dimension, not least how actions based on reflex-ivity over time often become routinized and institutionalized,the challenges become even more accentuated.

Institutionalized reflexivity – an oxymoron?

Institutional reflexivity is defined by Giddens as ‘the reg-ularized use of knowledge about circumstances of sociallife as a constitutive element in its organization and trans-formation’ (1991, 20). However, a reflexivity that overtime becomes institutionalized, in this Giddens’ sense(not to be confused as institutional reflexivity in terms ofself-confrontation), appears as an oxymoron. Can reflex-ivity be routinized? The notion of reflexive governance

implies precisely this: that a self-critical questioning ofone’s practices should be routine. The reflexive look atpractices should not be a one-time happening but, if notconstantly, at least occur during repeated discrete events(e.g. scheduling ‘reflection’ once a month).

As mentioned earlier, theorists of reflexive govern-ance do acknowledge organizational inertias and pathdependencies in policy development and the critique ofthe individualization thesis addresses that citizens areconstrained by socially embedded practices. This isrealistic: governance and practices cannot be inces-santly reviewed and altered. Such never-ending review-ing would end up in paralysis and a loss of ability toact. People have to use tacit, embodied, and practicalknowledge in their actions and practices, and routini-zation facilitates our everyday practices. Organizationrelies on stable structures (rules, division of labour,control mechanisms), and this stability is a conditionfor action capacity (Ahrne 1994). Yet, theories ofreflexive governance, science, and citizens often fallshort in problematizing the intertwinement of reflexiv-ity and routine, that is, how a practice initially basedon self-critical reflexivity over time can turn into unre-flexive routines and habits. If governance structuresand everyday life practices are institutionalized, thenthe frames that underpin these structures and practicestend to become cemented. If reflexivity requires alter-native yardsticks, or frames, with which to assesspractices (i.e. interframe reflection), fixed framingswill prevent reflexive learning. Organizational and cog-nitive inertia go together.

Kemp and Loorbach (2006) argue that an incremental-ist approach to policy reform, acknowledging the rigidityof institutional structures, does not have to be blind. Evenin such approaches, careful forward-looking efforts toavoid and escape lock-in effects are possible. Voss andKemp emphasize ‘the importance of shaping new technol-ogies, social practices and institutional arrangements at anearly stage of their development while they are still malle-able’ (2006, 13). Theorists of reflexive governance seemto suggest the importance of identifying formativemoments when different pathways are still imaginableand feasible. This does not solve the theoretical problem,however. If reflexivity entails the incessant possibility thatthe current system is fallible and may need to be changedbased on new information (Giddens 1990, 1991), reflex-ivity cannot be restricted to only the formative moments ofa particular practice. Though formative moments are veryimportant, there might well be a need for openness toongoing, new formative moments.

Though not impossible, institutionalized reflexivityappears very demanding. It is one thing to facilitate reflex-ivity at one point in time or during a limited formativeperiod when alternative paths are imaginable and open fordiscussion and for interframe reflection. It is quite anotherthing to keep this reflexivity going incessantly, and if it isfeasible it could easily lead to paralysis and loss of actioncapacity.

12 M. Boström et al.

Conclusion: is reflexivity a useful concept forenvironmental sociology?

The literature on reflexivity connected to topics such asexpertise, governance, and consumer-citizens advancesour understanding of some of the preconditions and chal-lenges of individual and institutional movement towardssustainable development. Our review shows that reflexiv-ity can be a useful analytical concept in environmentalsociology, but we advise against an exaggerated and unre-flexive use of the concept. Reflexivity needs be used withcaution, put in context, and with a firm systematic look atits boundaries and opposites. Likewise, if reflexivity isused to speak to practice, it is relevant to ask whetherthe call for ‘more reflexivity’ really is helpful for decisionmakers and practitioners. They may develop reflexivity inthat they become aware of how their own managementapproaches and social practices continue to reproduceproblems and risks, while they remain locked in organiza-tional inertia and paralysed by current approaches. In thesecases, which are likely to be many, ‘more reflexivity’ doesnot suffice. As an analytical concept for environmentalsociology and as a way to speak to practice, we suggestinstead to address reflexivity in five other ways.

First, it is necessary to bring to attention that theconcept of reflexivity may not always predict very wellhow institutions and behaviour develop. We have shownthat theories of reflexivity are not only used in describing,understanding, and explaining what happens in environ-mental governance, scientific practice, and among citizensbut are also often used for critically exploring what is nothappening and what ought to happen. Environmentalsociologists tend to use the concept as a normative yard-stick in critiquing and providing constructive commentson practice. The concept of reflexivity equips scholarswith sub-concepts and perspectives enabling them to seewhat should be present in science, governance, and amongcitizens reflecting on their practices. In this way, the con-cept helps to direct attention towards what is missing anddraws attention to inertia, instrumental learning, and theintertwinement of reflexivity and routine in everyday lifepractices. On the other hand, the concept has also beenused to examine processes of ‘going green’, includingenvironmental activism, green identities, and lifestyles, aswell as the development of more responsible organizationsand governance that facilitate reflexivity. In doing so, theconcept has helped elucidate the deliberation and learningthat such processes involve. These two sides of the con-cept – used in discussing both what is present and absentin practices as well as both progress and backsliding – canbe interpreted as a strength if they are reflexively applied;that is, not as a simple call for ‘more reflexivity’.

Second, the spatial and temporal boundaries of reflex-ivity need to be recognized, as we discussed in the fourthsection. Heightened reflexivity in one setting (or within aparticular frame or discourse) or at one point in time maybe accompanied by less reflexivity outside that setting orin a later phase. If organizations and people are called to

increase their reflexivity regarding something, there is aneed keep a firm analytical eye on whether this causesomething else to be neglected.

Third, if environmental sociology is to provide con-structive critique to practice, it has more potential if itaddresses the embedded nature of and the conditionsneeded for reflexivity rather than simply recommending‘more reflexivity’ as such. Environmental sociology couldexplore, critically examine, and suggest feasible structuresand practices with the potential to facilitate reflexivity.Indeed, theories and literature of reflexivity provide usefulideas about what these conditions could be. A centralinsight, gained from the three research areas reviewed inthis article, is the importance of developing meeting points,social arenas, and organizational forms that enable time andspace for deliberations between various groups, sectors, andnetworks, which can in turn facilitate interframe reflexivityand mutual learning. What is needed is to enable sensitivityand learning about various structural and cultural forces atmultiple levels that routinize behaviour, cement discourses,and prevent change of institutions and practices.

Fourth, as well as being a tool for change, reflexivity isalso a target of anti-reflexivity forces that aim to preventchange. It is therefore also crucial to address the powerfulforces that deliberately and strategically counteract reflex-ivity, which many times are the same forces that createenvironmental destruction. While some obvious forces arepolitical and business elites with the power to dupe peopleand organizations with misinformation spread via anti-environmental campaigns, we must not forget thosebroad layers of citizens inclined to celebrate their sup-posed ‘green identity’ although their actions do not justifysuch a label. The sociological scholarship on reflexivityhence must thus keep a firm eye on its opposite.

Finally, reflexivity is a point of departure rather thanan end in itself. It is questionable whether reflexivity issufficient in itself as a principle to guide practice towardsmore sustainability. We argue, as in the case of relatedconcepts such as precaution, deliberation and responsibil-ity, that the concept of reflexivity could serve as a startingpoint. Like many other concepts, it needs to be contextua-lized and specified. It is an opening for dialogue andaction rather than a point of closure. It begs questionssuch as: What path dependencies are confronting us? Dowe have to develop new understandings, roles, and guide-lines to avoid reproducing problems? How do our currentnorms, ways of communicating, and routines prevent ourimaginations from seeking and finding better practices?Yes, reflexivity is a useful concept for environmentalsociology, if not used in an unreflexive way.

AcknowledgmentA first draft of the article was presented at the internationalworkshop “Core Concepts in Environmental Sociology” atÖrebro University, 23–25 September 2015. We are grateful forthe constructive comments from workshop participants, as wellas from two anonymous reviewers.

Environmental Sociology 13

Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes1. This notion is commonly not only associated with rational

choice but has also been associated with theories of reflex-ivity. Theories of reflexivity, however, are more prone tobeing consistent with the notion of socially and culturallyembedded individuals, as argued below.

Notes on contributorsMagnus Boström is a professor in Sociology with a researchfocus on environmental sociology.

Rolf Lidskog is professor in Sociology with research interest inenvironmental policy and politics, especially the role of expertisein environmental politics.

Ylva Uggla is a professor in Sociology, with a research focus onenvironmental sociology.

ORCIDMagnus Boström http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7215-2623Rolf Lidskog http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6735-0011

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