1488 Americarc Anthropologist [68, 19661

1965a A transformational analysis of Comanche kinship terminology. American Anthro-

1965b An algorithm for Crow-Omaha solutions. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt.

196% Introduction. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2:1-8. LAMB, SYDNEY M.

1965 Kinship terminology and linguistic structure. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2i37-64.

1956 A semantic analysis of the Pawnee kinship usage. Language 32: 158-194. 1964a A formal account of the Crow- and Omaha-type kinship terminologies. In Explora-

tions in cultural anthropology: W. H. Goodenough, ed. New York, McGraw-Hill. 1964b The structural analysis of kinship semantics. I n Proceedings of the Ninth Inter-

national Congress of Linguistics. Horace G. Lunt, ed. The Hague, Mouton and Co.

1965 Kalmuk Mongol and the classification of lineal kinship terminologies. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2:127-141.

1964 Cognitive aspects of English kin terms. American Anthropologist 66, no. 3, pt. 2:146-170.

pologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2:65-105.

2:11&126.

LOUNBBURY, F L ~ M G.

ROMNEY, A. KIMBAU

ROYNEY, A. KIMBAU, AND ROY G. D’ANDRADE

A NOTE ON POSPISIL’S “CORRELATES” In the recent special publication of the AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST en-

titled “The Ethnography of Law” Pospisil presents an analysis of Kapauku rules of inheritance modeled after the componential-analysis method of kin- ship analysts (Pospisil 1965b). This note is not concerned with the substantive part of Pospisil’s lucid analysis but proposes to raise certain questions about the conceptual framework within which Pospisil presents his analysis. In par- ticular, I wish to take issue with Pospisil’s claim that he is dealing with “cor- relates” of a matrix (domain) rather than with “components,” and to assert that the logical relation of Pospisil’s “correlates” to his matrix is not different from the relation of genealogically based components to the lexical items of n. domain of kin terms.

In comparing his analysis to the traditional componential analysis of kin terms, Pospisil states that kin terms are genealogically defined and that genea- logically based components are “intrinsic” to the meaning of kin terms. But in the realm of legal rules, Pospisil says, a number of possibilities are available to the analyst with respect to the choice of a matrix and the components that pertain to that matrix (1965b3167-168). Although Pospisil may be of the opinion that kin terms are genealogically defined, there is by no means uni- versal agreement that genealogically based components are the most relevant ones in the analysis of a matrix of kin terms (Hammel1965:7). Other analysts might opt for sociological criteria-rules of residence, etc.-when attempting to elucidate the structure of a kin-term domain. I do not believe that one type of component is more “intrinsic” than the other.

The view that kin terms are intrinsically genealogical may be seen, in part, as a confusion of sociological and biological kinship. I t may be true, as Pospisil

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asserts, that in every kinship system there must be a term for (biological) father’s brother, but i t is not true that we have to account for all the same kin- types in any investigated universe (196533: 167). Although anthropologists, since the Torres Straits expedition, have become accustomed to plotting kin terms on a genealogical chart, there may be other aspects of kin terms that are just as “intrinsic,” in a particular culture, as the biological ties that form the basis of a genealogy.

A case could be made, I believe, that an analysis of “property classes” (Pospisil 1965b: 169 ff.) in terms of inheritance rules is just as “intrinsic” as an analysis of a kinship domain in terms of genealogical components. Such an argument might run: (1) in all societies there are items of material culture that are the object of cultural rules pertaining to personal property; (2) in all so- cieties people die; (3) all cultures must deal with the problem of the disposition of the deceased’s property; (4) ergo, an analysis of property classes in terms of rules of inheritance is an analysis that is based on components that are “in- trinsic” to the domain being analyzed. A more adequate statement, however, would run as follows: just as biological kinship (genealogical connections) is highly relevant to the analysis of kin terms (and to sociological kinship in gen- eral) but not “intrinsic” to it, so inheritance rules are relevant to personal property (given the biological fact of death) but not “intrinsic” to it.

When an anthropologist analyzes a set of kin terms by employing genealog- ically based components, he is selecting one set of components out of a number of possible sets, just as Pospisil might have analyzed inheritance rules in a num- ber of different ways (1965b: 168). Genealogically based components are not logically more “intrinsic” to kin terms than anv other type of components. The type of components that one selects to apply in one’s analysis of kin terms is a function of the question being asked about the kinship system (Hammel 1965: 7).

The question of the problem of “intrinsicity” may be approached by ex- amining Pospisil’s useof the concept “correlates” (1965b: 173 ff.). Pospisil chose the term “correlates” to convey the sense that inheritance rules are “extrinsic” to property classes and that analysis of the latter in terms of the former is a type of “correlation.” This use of the term “correlation,” however, does not conform to the usual sense of the word. I n order to correlate two variables, x and y, one must first define them independently and then observe the nature and degree of association between them. After going through these steps, one may make a statement about the relationship of x and y. The most general form of this statement is that y is a function of x, or

In the case of Pospisil’s second analysis (1965b: 177-183), this statement could take the form

P=f(x1, x2 . . * xg) (2)

1490 American Anthropologist [68, 19661

where P is the variable of “property class” and XI through xs are the five “cor- relates,” “dimensions,” or variables. However the association of P (property class) with the five variables was not determined by observation of indepen- dently defined phenomena but by Pospisil’s definition of the property classes in terms of the other five variables. At least this is what seems to be the mean- ing of “Kapauku rules of inheritance classify the various items of a deceased person’s property into 17 categories” (1965b: 169). The association of the legal “correlates” or “components” with the matrix of property classes was not de- termined by a process of correlation in the usual sense, but by the application of the Rapauku rules of inheritance to the domain of items that come under the purview of those rules. Surely this procedure has yielded a more or less “in- trinsic” association of the legal “correlates” to the matrix of property classes.

In order to have a “true” correlation it would be necessary to correlate some independently defined aspects of Kapauku culture with the variable of property class. If this could be accomplished, it would mean that Pospisil’s particular structuring of the domain of personal property had relevance for other areas of Kapauku culture aside from the realm of inheritance rules. If, for example, the Kapauku language were to classify items of personal property in a way that is similar to Pospisil’s classification, then we would have a correla- tion between personal-property terms and inheritance rules. In an earlier paper Pospisil presented a correlative analysis demonstrating the association be- tween rules of land tenure and terrain terms (Pospisil 1965a). In this case the two sets of variables were independently defined and operationalized.

Pospisil’s strategy is, in a sense, the opposite of that taken by kinship ana- lysts who strive for a psychologically real structuring of n domain of kin terms. Pospisil begins with a set of components, the inheritance rules, which may be said, unequivocally, to exist in the minds of the Kapauku Papuans (196513: 168). He does not demonstrate, nor does he claim to demonstrate, that his structuring of the domain of personal property is psychologically (cognitively) real to the Rapauku natives (1965b: 168). Kinship analysts begin with a do- main that is psychologically real in so far that kin terms are elicited from na- tive informants, but are hard put to demonstrate that their particular analysis is psychologically real to the members of the society in question. If it is pos- sible to define and operationally measure the components of a domain of kin terms independently of the original eliciting of kin terms (e.g., Romney and D’Andrade 1964; Wallace 1965), then it may be said that one has correlated the components with the lexical items constituting the domain.

In summary, then, i t appears to me that, logically speaking, there is no dif- ference between the relationship of Pospisil’s “correlates” to his matrix of personal property categories and the relationship of genealogically based com- ponents to a domain of kin terms. Both are equally “intrinsic” or “extrinsic,” however one chooses to look a t it. One should state, however, whether the relationship between components and domain has been inferred by the analyst or whether he has demonstrated the empirical correlation of two independently defined sets of variables. Correlation, from this point of view, is a more, rather

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than a less, ambitious task than analysis in terms of components (cf. Gardin 1965:20).

HARVEY GOLDBERG University of Iowa

REFERENCES CITED

GABDIN, J.-C. 1965 On a possible interpretation of componential analysis in archeology. American

Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2:9-22. H ~ L , E. A.

1965 Introduction. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2: 1-8. POSPISIL, L.

1965a A formal analysis of substantive law: Kapauku Papuan laws of land tenure.

1965b A formal analysis of substantive law: Kapauku Papuan laws of inheritance. Arneri- American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2: 186-214.

can Anthropologist 67, no. 6, pt. 2: 166-185.

1964 Cognitive aspects of English kin terms. American Anthropologist 66, no. 3, pt. 2:146-170.

WALLACE, A. F. C. 1965 The problem of the psychological validity of componential analyses. American

Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2:229-248.

ROMNEY, A. K,, AND R. G. D’ANDRADE

A NOTE ON GOLDBERG’S NOTE In the introductory paragraph to his “Note” to the Editor, Goldberg pro-

poses “to raise certain questions about the conceptual framework” within which I presented my analysis of the Kapauku rules of inheritance. As I shall show below, most of the “questions” raised and discussed by Goldberg are based on statements and terms wrongly attributed to me. They are a result of either his misreading of what I have said, or his conscious substituting of his own terminology for mine. These “questions” will be answered very briefly by simply comparing Goldberg’s with my own actual quotations and pointing out the inaccuracies. However, Goldberg does raise one theoretical question, which appears to constitute the core of his argument, that I would like to discuss prior to my editorial comments.

Goldberg asserts that “the logical relation of Pospisil’s ‘correlates’ to his matrix is not d8erent from the relation of genealogically based components to the lexical items of a domain of kin terms.” More specifically he states: “I do not believe that one type of component is more ‘intrinsic’ than the other.’) First, there seems to be a semantic disagreement between us concerning the meaning of the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic.” What I understand by these terms I stated as follows: the components responsible for the structuring of the classes of a deceased Kapauku’s property, namely, the types of disposition of that property or the various degrees of freedom of the testator “are not in- herent (implicit) in that matrix but are derived from another one and are con- sequently extrinsic. One cannot extrapolate them from the analyzed property matrix as one can extrapolate genealogical features from classified kin types provided with kinship terms” (Pospisil 1965a: 168).