a new theory of emotion: moral reasoning and emotion

A N E W T H E O R Y O F E M O T I O N : M O R A L R E A S O N I N G

A N D E M O T I O N "

W I L L I A M WHISNER**

476. We should distinguish between

the object of fear and the cause of fear. Thus a face which inspires fear

or delight (the object of fear or delight), is not on that account its cause, but one might say its target, t

Cognitivism now dominates the philosophical study of emotions. Thought replaced feeling as the principal element

in the general conception of emotion....What interests me is the question of progress. Specifically, has this change (the movement from feeling-centered theories of emotion

to a cognitivist view of the emotions) brought about a

significant improvement in our understanding of emotions? The question, however, is not intended to invite a return to earlier, feeling-centered conceptions. The criticisms of them that propagated the current wave of cognitivist theory were well aimed and wholly successful. The question, rather, is intended to initiate examination of the conversion from these old, now discredited conceptions to the new, now widely favored ones. 2

** See memorial note on the late author, p. 31.

WILLIAM WHISNER

Introduction John Deigh argues that the older feeling-centered theories of emotion

cannot account for the intentionality of emotion or for the fact that

emotions are frequently objects of rational assessment. In this paper, I

pursue this theme and argue that felt emotions are complex felt intentional

states directed toward targets, and that they are objects of rational

assessment. In viewing felt emotions as complex felt intentional states,

I incorporate some of the recent criticisms of the older feeling-centered

theories; however, I reject the contention that feeling does not play a

central role in a theory of emotion, arguing instead that feeling is the

central notion in any adequate theory of emotion.

Since the onset of an emotion often seems to be an involuntary

reaction to a situation - the plane unexpectedly drops 1,000 feet, and fear clutches one's heart - many writers have assumed that reasoning

plays no role in the onset of emotions. Focussing on such cases, may

lead a theorist to fail to acknowledge that we can, and often do, reason

about our dispositions to feel emotions, and that these dispositional

evaluative beliefs can motivate our focused attention on evaluative

features of the situations leading to the emotion. To illustrate this,

consider the following. One reads about a miscarriage of justice which

occurred 100 years ago or in a country distant from one's sphere of

influence, and does not feel anger over the event. However, upon

reflection, one may come to believe that anger is the correct response to

the case, and as a result come to feel angry. Here, reasoning caused the

emotion. Even in cases where reasoning plays no role in the onset of

the emot ion - the turbulent plane ride - reasoned dispositional evaluative

beliefs may result in justifiable evaluative interpretations that cause emotions: sometimes fear of flying is rational.

Earlier feeling-centered theorists and, surprisingly, some cognitive

theorists are misled by their failure to acknowledge the degree to which

felt emotions are cognitive and intentional. Sometimes reason plays no causal role in the formation of our dispositions to feel fear; we may be

unable or unwilling to reason about our fears after their onset. In these

cases we can tell reliable stories about the causal origin of our dispositions

to feel fears and about the origins of our actual fears, stories in which the

A NEW THEORY OF EMOTION: MORAL REASONING AND EMOTION

causal role of judgment and beliefs about the quality of reasons for feeling

the emotion are absent. It is easy to assimilate the causal stories in these

cases to cases in which reason has played a causal role in the origins of

our dispositions to feel fear and in the onset and maintenance of our felt

fears. This may account for the tendency in some theories to deny reason

a causal role in fear.

My theory explains the onset and maintenance of felt emotions. Such

felt emotions are a type of complex intentional feeling. I also explain

how these kinds of emotions differ from dispassionate emotional attitudes

and unconscious emotions that are not felt. I show how reasoning can

function in the explanation and justification of emotions and how we

can use reason to modify and terminate emotions that are not justifiable.

In doing this, I create phenomenologica l , psychological , neuro-

physiological, biological, and social theoretical space for the causal role

of human reasoning in the onset and maintenance of emotion.

I begin by presenting my theory of the felt emotions; I use the analysis of fear to illustrate it. I choose fear as the central topic because it often

seems more intractable and resistant to the powers of reason than other

emotional states. If I can show a role for reason in fear, its role in the

other emotions will follow afortiori. I show how this analysis entails

that reasoning plays an important role in the development of emotions

in humans. Finally, I discuss the causal role of reasoning in the formation

and maintenance of felt emotions; I show the role reliable reasoning

plays in the justification and explanation of a paradigm instance of fear.

I. A New Theory of the Felt Emotion I use the term 'felt occurrent emotion' to refer to a complex felt

intentional state, of which the person is aware, which is directed toward

a target and is constituted by a set of constitutive and causal features.

Felt occurrent emotions have an onset at a specific time when one is

aware of the complex intentional feeling, and a termination point at a later time when one is no longer aware of the feeling. Awareness can

precede identification of an emotion; one may be aware of an emotion

before identifying it as a particular emotion type. For example, one can

be aware of feeling discomfort before one identifies the felt state as fear.

WILLIAM WHISNER

In clear cases, we identify felt occurrent emotions as either positive or

negative, where 'posit ive' and 'negative' are used to denote the feeling

tone and do not reflect anything about whether the felt state is justified

or not. Negative felt states are sometimes justifiable (for example, an

occurrent instance of felt guilt) and positive felt states are not (for

example, an occurrent instance of felt pride).

The following simplified causal schema can be used to generate

descriptions of the relevant causal sequence that explains why a person

begins to experience the complex feeling: a person, P, interacts with the

world; P's relevant dispositional evaluative beliefs and attitudes motivate

a focused attention on evaluative information; this causes P to make

evaluative judgments, which in turn cause emotions. These emotions

are intentional because they are directed toward targets. I f we can

discover the relevant dispositional evaluative belief and attitude, and

the relevant information in the circumstances, we can infer the plausible

causal explanation of the onset of the felt emotion.

Strictly speaking our dispositional evaluative beliefs and attitudes

cause us to attend to certain information, the relevance of which is

determined by these beliefs and attitudes; we then evaluate the

information and begin to experience the complex felt intentional state.

It is the evaluative interpretation of the information that is the proximate

cause of the emotion. The felt emotion would not occur in the

circumstances if the evaluative interpretation did not occur. The structure

of P's evaluative belief attitude is also necessary to the explanation; the

evaluative interpretation would not occur i fP did not hold these evaluative

beliefs and attitudes, and did not interact with these circumstances in

actualizing the evaluative disposition, which is constituted by the evaluative belief and attitude. 3

Felt emotions are always directed toward some target; this constitutes

their intentionality. The words used to formulate the content of the

evaluative interpretation are also used to identify the target under an

evaluative description. A simple case illustrates this. Carrie believes

that rattle snakes are undesirable and threatening. She has read about

different kinds of snakes, and is able to distinguish dangerous from

innocuous snakes. She sees a rattler in her tent and begins to feel

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discomfort. Her discomfort is a complex intentional feeling which

includes her belief about the target - the rattler as threatening object.

Her belief that the rattler is undesirable and threatening is a constitutive

feature of her felt negative fear state, which is directed toward that target.

We use the same words "the undesirable and threatening rattler" to refer

both to the content of her belief (that the undesirable and threatening

rattler is in the comer of the tent) and to the target of her belief (the

rattler in the comer), though they are different ontological items.

The evaluative interpretations which cause emotions have an intensity

that is absent in evaluative judgments that cause dispassionate evaluative

beliefs and do not result in felt emotions. This intensity reflects the

person's background beliefs about the relative personal importance of

the target situation. In the case at hand, Carrie holds strong beliefs about the undesirability of being poisoned by a snake.

Cases such as this one, however useful for a broad picture of what is

going on in the case of cognitively motivated emotions, don't reveal

their full complexity. A more elaborate case will help here.

Jill is defending her Ph.D. dissertation in her oral exam. A member

of her committee, Professor McMacken, tries to force her to accept and

defend an obvious misconstrual of one of her central theses. Whenever

Jill tries to reject his interpretation, he interrupts and repeats his question.

Jill's advisor, Professor Thompson, begins to feel discomfort about McMacken's tactics and the humiliation Jill is experiencing. He becomes

more and more uneasy as McMacken continues to dominate the exam,

and tries to force Jill to accept claims she has argued against in her

dissertation. Thompson begins to feel fear about the possibility that Jill

will be distressed and harmed by McMacken's behavior at the exam (FF1).

Thompson came to the exam holding the evaluative belief that it is

undesirable and threatening for others to undergo undeserved distress

which he may be able to prevent or alleviate (EB 1) He also believes that

it is wrong to cause someone undeserved distress if you are able to refrain

from doing so (EB2). Because of these beliefs he is disposed to focus

on McMacken's remarks and their effects on Jill; he makes the factual

judgment that Jill's distress is undesirable and threatening, and that she

WILLIAM WHISNER

is it is likely to undergo further distress if McMacken persists (FB 1).

EB 1, EB2 and FB 1 are constitutive of his feeling of fear (i.e., he holds these beliefs while aware of the discomfort and would not experience

this particular discomfort if he did not hold them). This evaluative

interpretation causes the onset of Thompson's complex felt intentional state of fear, FF1, which is directed toward the undesirable (because undeserved) and threatening distress that Jill is experiencing.

After reducing Jill and the committee to an icy silence, McMacken focuses on trivial issues in her dissertation, with the intention of making her look foolish. No one knows why, but it seems that McMacken is out to get Jill, and is willing to do anything to "expose her" to the audience.

As the interrogation continues, Thompson 's discomfort is further intensified because he now believes that it is wrong for him not to intervene and come to Jill's defense (EB3), based at least in part on

EB 1. However, Thompson also believes that McMacken will take his vengeance at tenure time should he be crossed (FB2). Thompson recognizes that he is is afraid of what McMacken will do to him at tenure

time (FF2). He now feels a guilty discomfort that overlays his fear (FG I); he feels two types of discomfort simultaneously. As he focuses attention on McMacken, he also becomes aware of feeling anger toward him (FA 1).

This anger overlays his guilt and fear to create a multiply overdetermined discomfort.

To summarize. Thompson came into the exam holding certain dispositonal evaluative beliefs, EB l( insofar as possible prevent undeserved distress) and EB2 (insofar as possible, do not cause

undeserved distress). He also has the factual beliefs that McMacken's actions are causing Jill distress, FB 1, and that McMacken will harm him at his tenure decision should Thompson challenge him (FB2). Taken together, these produce Thompson's fear for Jill (FF 1), his fear for himself (FF2), guilt (FG 1 ) and anger at McMacken (FA 1).4

This account provides a causal explanation of why Thompson is aware of a complex felt intentional feeling and why, as he begins to reflect on

this feeling, he is motivated to focus attention on the target toward which the felt state is directed. But this all needn't happen at once. Often we are aware of our complex feelings before we connect them with their


targets, and before we identify the token felt state as a particular type emotion. Failure to analyze the phenomenology of becoming aware of

our token feelings as feelings that exhibit a particular type emotion has had unfortunate consequences for the theory of emotion. Some

psychologists and philosophers have mistakenly used these uninterpreted

feelings as evidence for the view that emotions are neither cognitive nor intentional. Some psychologists have argued that emotions are simple non-cognitive feelings, and that feelings always precede cognitions. These

views fall under what Deigh rightly calls the "discredited older feeling theories. '"

Some times we are aware of our feeling and this activates a desire to

begin to direct our attention to the emotion's target, as for example when an awareness of a vague discomfort leads one to recognize that one did something wrong. In other cases we are already focusing on the target

when we begin to see the connection between the target and our feeling, as for example in the presence of a threatening tornado one connects her feeling of discomfort with the presence of the tornado.

The inference from target to emotion, or the reverse, is not always

immediate or easy. Granting that once the target of an emotion has been correctly identified one can infer what the emotion is, however, has two

interesting consequences. First, it collapses the supposed distinction between first- and third-person access to emotions. It is common knowledge that there are cases in which a person's felt emotion is identified by others before the person herself makes the identification. For example, someone may not recognize that she is feeling enormous

sadness and grief caused by the death of a childhood friend whom she

hasn't seen in decades until it's pointed out to her that her irritable and erratic behavior of the past weeks can be accounted for by this death, and that in fact the span of the behavior in question exactly coincides

with her learning of the death. That is, she is aware of the 'target' but not of the emotion itself. The reverse is also the case, I may be aware that I am sad but fail entirely to identify the target.

Second, it shows that, despite the separability of target and emotion in awareness, emotions are cognitive and intentional. One need not be aware that the feeling is cognitive for it to be cognitive. Emotions are

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WILLIAM WHISNER

directed toward targets even when one is not aware of the target or of

one's beliefs about it. The fact that I can be brought to identify the

emotion or its target shows that they are amenable to cognitive processes.

Of course, these identifications are fallible. The present analysis o f the

phenomenology of awareness of felt emotions makes clear that one can

be aware of complex feelings that are emotions and not be aware that

the feeling is complex or that it is an emotion of a given type. It would

be a mistake to infer from such cases that emotions are not cognitive and

intentional. To deny either of these two consequences leaves us with the

implausible view that we cannot be mistaken about the targets of our

emotions and that we cannot misidentify our complex intentional feelings.

These points may seem too obvious to bear repeating, but it is surprising

the deg ree to w h i c h some recen t ana lyses o f e m o t i o n s have

presuppositions that are inconsistent with these points.

We can identify a feeling as intentional because of its relation to a

target, and because of our attitudes, beliefs, and desires directed toward

the target. For a moment Thompson might be unaware of what his mild

discomfort is about. He might focus on his feeling and then direct his

attention toward Jill or he might focus on Jill and then connect Jill with

his feeling. Thompson might be immediately aware of a mild discomfort

about Jill which grows in intensity as the situation unfolds; he might

realize immediately that his discomfort is a fear for her welfare.

Thompson might also shift attention from both the feeling and from Jill

to avoid the problem and thus begin a process of self-deception. In such

cases the desire to focus on the target and the desire to reduce his discomfort conflict and the latter becomes the dominant motivation.

Thompson's discomfort motivates him to take some action to avoid

possible harm to Jill; such action has as a by-product a reduction in his

discomfort. We see how complex negative felt intentional states can

motivate us to act in ways that have as a by-product the termination or

reduction in intensity of the negative state; likewise, positive felt

intentional states can motivate action that has as a by-product the

maintenance or intensification o f the positive state. This does not mean

that the desire to act has as its goal the reduction or termination of discomfort or the maintenance or intensification of the positive felt state.

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If we feel strong affection toward a person we may form the desire to

engage in actions with the person that have as a by-product the

maintenance or intensification of the positive feelings toward the person

even though the goal of the action is not to increase our own pleasure.

Thompson's reaction to Jill's situation is a complex felt evaluative

reaction which includes both his evaluative belief about Jill and his factual

beliefs about what McMacken is doing to her. Let us assume that

Thompson is aware that he has made an interpretation of the situation,

even if he was not conscious of making it at the moment when he began

to feel discomfort. From a third-person perspective, we can infer that

Thompson had to make an evaluative interpretation in order to begin to

feel mild discomfort about Jill. From a first-person perspective, when

he identifies the felt state as a state of fear about Jill's undeserved distress

(FF1), he is aware of his negative evaluative belief about Jill; he infers

that he has judged that Jill will be further harmed. This inference makes

sense since the complex discomfort includes his evaluative belief about

Jill; such beliefs do not occur de novo, they must result from evaluative

thoughts. These evaluative thoughts are caused by the evaluative beliefs which structure his evaluative attention, and they constitute the evaluative

interpretations which cause the onset of the intentional feelings. Such

evaluative thoughts are occurrent mental acts or events that have a target

(Jill's undeserved distress) which is, if not identical to, closely related to

the evaluative belief (that Jill is undergoing undeserved distress) which

it causes . R e c e n t f ind ings about the w a y s in which one ' s

phenomenological experience can lag behind the cognitive activity of

the brain show that Thompson need not be aware of these evaluative

judgments or interpretations,

Thompson's dispositional evaluative belief focuses his attention on

the relevant evaluative facts and results in an evaluative interpretation

which causes the onset of the complex intentional feeling. This shows

how the beliefs (evaluative and factual) and attitudes that we bring to a

situation motivate our modes of attention on relevant evaluative

information and result in evaluative interpretations that cause the onset

of complex felt intentional states. We see how our feelings reflect our values and can function as a mirror for understanding what we take to be

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WILLIAM WHISNER

important in a given situation. Sometimes a deeper examination of our

emotions tells us that we hold values which we prefer to disavow - giving

us a new understanding that unsettles and falls under what, in a different

connection, Bernard Harrison calls "dangerous knowledge ." We

sometimes avoid reflection about our emotions because of the possibility

that we might achieve an understanding that we would prefer to avo id :

We might go on to ask for a longer causal story about how Thompson

came to form the strong dispositional attitude to disapprove of persons

causing other persons undeserved harm. For example, that he was raised

in a cooperative supportive environment in which he formed a strong

desire to care for and support others, and that because of his positive

interactions with others he has a strong sympathetic desire to support

and identify with others, and so on. The theory of emotion as cognitive

which I have argued for allows us to explain why and how the effects of

such stories and our reasoning about them can make a causal difference

to what we feel. It can also explain why some felt emotions can interfere

with, inhibit, and make us less willing, less able and, in some cases unable

to reason about our dispositions to feel emotions and the resulting

emotions. Frequently we are able to reflect on and reason about our

emotions after their onset. We are also able to reason about the

dispositional evaluative beliefs, factual beliefs and attitudes we bring to

the situation and which result in evaluative interpretations. We can use

reason to correct and change these dispositions and, in doing so, change

our dispositions to feel emotions.

This theory explains how we can change our emotions by changing

our beliefs and desires about the target; it also explains why the intensity

of the complex felt state can make it difficult or impossible to exercise

one's ability to reason. It also explains why some of our dispositions to

feel emotions are less amenable to the causal powers of reason as a result

of the causes which explain their formation and maintenance (e.g., paranoid or phobic dispositional tendencies).

The theory enables us to make inferences about the causal origin of

our dispositional evaluative beliefs and attitudes to feel emotions. These

dispositions to focus on and evaluate the relevant evaluative information

are sometimes formed and maintained because of reasons; sometimes

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they aren't. We can tell many causal stories about our dispositional

tendencies to feel emotions. The causal role of reasoning and judgment

might be absent in some of these reliable causal stories. Reasoning might

be absent because of the person's failure to choose to reason when she

was able to do so or because she was unable to reason. This is significant

in the area of moral assessment. For example, if reason could not play

some causal role in the formation and actualization of the evaluative

disposition then the person is not responsible for his or her failure to

reason in forming and actualizing the disposition. But a discussion of

this is beyond the scope of the present paper.

II. A Developmental Understanding of Fear and Reason There are two accounts of the emergence of a fear response in

children: (a) that it is a learned response and (b) that it is innate or hard

wired. According to most accounts, from a developmental perspective

children acquire dispositions to feel fear at eight months. This is when the tendency to fear strangers emerges. 6 For the purposes of this paper, it

doesn't matter which account one accepts. I argue that on either account,

reasoning plays a crucial role in the development of fear.

Around the same time that a child begins to judge that the absence of

the primary caregiver is threatening, she also begins to experience

discomfort when the caregiver leaves and is unavailable for support and

focused attention (i.e., she feels separation anxiety). The child feels

distress when the caretaker is unavailable and forms the disposition to

fear the departure of the caretaker. There is a distinction between forming

the disposition to feel discomfort about the absence of the caregiver, and

feeling discomfort because one fears that the caregiver will leave. The

first disposition must emerge before the second disposition since the

child must remember the distress caused by the caregiver's absence before

he or she can form the disposition to fear this absence. This is the case

in which the child experiences distress, remembers the distress producing

situation and generalizes to target situations which are similar to it and

forms a disposition to judge that these situations are threatening.

Up to a certain point in the child's development, we can give a causal

account of the origin of her dispositions to feel various types of fear in

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WILLIAM WHISNER

which the capacity to reason has not emerged and does not play any

causal role in forming such dispositions. For purposes of this paper I

start at the developmental transition where the child begins to reason

about her fears, and this reasoning plays a causal role in the explanation

o f her dispositions to feel fears. In these cases the child forms the

disposition to feel fear because she has reasons for thinking that the

situation is actually dangerous. When the child is aware that she is

disposed to fear some situation because it caused her distress in the past,

she has a reason for why the situation is threatening.

At some developmental transition point the child learns about the

kinds of situations that are dangerous, and is able to reason about them.

The child discovers that some of her fears are mistaken (not all dogs

bite), and that some that aren't (fire always bums). What one takes to be threatening, and what is really dangerous need not be the same. The

child learns how to distinguish what really is dangerous from what merely

seems dangerous. At this point the child has reasons for why she fears

some situations, These may be roughly classified as 'situations that bring about distress.'

I use the term 'dangerous' to include situations which (a) actually

cause distress and might result in further distress, (b) are likely to result

in distress regardless of what one does, and (c) could cause distress unless

one takes action to reduce one's vulnerabilities with respect to the danger.

This use allows us to distinguish situations that are really dangerous

from situations we mistakenly think are dangerous. In felt fear reactions or with dispassionate judgments or beliefs that a situation is dangerous

one believes that the situation has one o f the three characteristics listed

above. It is only situations that in fact have one of these features that are objectively dangerous.

Ideally, we would like an appropriate fit between a judgment about

the threat or danger, and the objective danger. For example, if one judges

that the a virus is undesirable and threatening because if acquired it is

likely to result in death, it is ideal if the virus actually have this feature.

In such cases, we say that the judgment and the danger have an appropriate

fit. In cases where the judgment lacks this feature, we say that it does not fit the target.

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Sometimes we are caused to make judgments about undesirable threats that are not grounded in reasons about why the situation is

dangerous (e.g., phobias, paranoid reactions). We find this in situations in which one over generalizes from distress producing situations and

forms a disposition to fear a new situation that is not really dangerous. For example, one might be bitten by a dog, generalize to all dogs as a

causal source of distress and thus form a disposition to fear both dangerous and non-dangerous dogs. If one is unable to correct this

dispositional belief with information about the kinds of dogs that are dangerous and the kinds that are not dangerous, such a disposition might

be phobic and not amenable to correction in light of reasons about the

kinds of dogs that are dangerous and non-dangerous. Situations are threatening in my sense because persons judge that they are threatening; on the other hand, situations are dangerous only if they have one of the features (a)-(c).

On this use of 'dangerous' and 'threatening', believing a possibility to be dangerous is not sufficient for showing that one feels fear about it.

One must also make a negative evaluation of the target before it is judged threatening. This is an important point since many philosophers

have thought that we can identify and describe a fear state by identifying

the person's belief that some situation is dangerous, coupled with the desire to avoid danger. 7 If my analysis of felt fear is correct, we cannot

identify felt fears in this way. One needs to make a negative evaluation

of the dangerous possibility before one will begin to feel fear. I am stipulating that this negative evaluative judgment about the dangerous possibility is a negative evaluative judgment that the dangerous possibility

is personally threatening. I also use the phrase 'undesirable and threatening' because one usually finds the threatening, dangerous possibility undesirable in some sense other than its being a threat to one's well being or the well being of others. In most cases one finds the

threatening, dangerous possibility 'bad' or 'undesirable' in some further sense.

Believing some possibility is threatening generally presupposes that one believes it is dangerous, 8 but believing some target is dangerous

does not entail that one believes it is threatening. Beliefs about what is

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WILLIAM WHISNER

dangerous are true or false depending on whether the target situation is really dangerous, regardless of whether or not one views it as threatening. Beliefs about what is undesirable and threatening are true or false depending on whether the dangerous target is actual or possible, whether

one can reduce one's vulnerability or the vulnerability of others, whether

one is justified in judging that the dangerous possibility is bad for oneself or some other person, and on whether the evaluation of the threatening dangerous possibility is undesirable in some other sense (for example,

morally bad or wrong). The distinction between non-threatening dangerous possibilities and threatening dangerous possibilities allows us to distinguish dispassionate fears 9 from felt fears. Felt fears must

include the negative evaluative belief that the dangerous possibility or actuality is undesirable and threatening; dispassionate fears do not.

I argue that thinking that the dangerous possibility is bad for me is equivalent to believing that the dangerous possibility is threatening. In

feeling fear one feels threatened by the undesirable and threatening dangerous possibility. This reflects and manifests the belief that the

dangerous possibility is both undesirable and threatening. According to the most reductionist version of behaviorism, aversive

conditioners are environmental events that tend to produce pain and thus

function to increase the probability of escape or avoidance responses. Unlike the early forms of behaviorism, we now recognize that such aversive conditioners will not function unless they are accompanied by a negative evaluative interpretation. Two persons might react differently to the same stimulus resulting in one's fleeing, while the other stays put.

The different evaluative interpretations lead to the stimulus's having

different meanings for these two individuals. We now understand that even in simple stimulus-response situations we assign meaning to the stimulus by making cognitive evaluative interpretations. Because fear

reactions are grounded in evaluative beliefs which are caused by evaluative judgments or interpretations, we can conclude that emotional reactions primarily have a world-to-mind fit rather than a mind-to-world fit. 10

As extreme behaviorism and logical positivism have given way to internalist, mentalist and/or neural theories, a cognitivist view of the

16


emotions has reemerged in philosophy and psychology. These theories, along with the one developed in this paper, are cognitive because according to them, emotions are caused by cognitive evaluative judgments or interpretations and are constituted, in part, by cognitive

evaluative beliefs.

The case of Jill's oral defense illustrates how fear can function as a moral emotion, motivating both action on behalf of others (Thompson's

inclination to intervene in Jill's defense) and action in defense of oneself

(Thompson's inclination to remain silent). It also shows how one can feel simultaneous emotions in a case of overdetermined discomfort. Thompson's fear for Jill, FF1, conflicts with is fear for himself, FF2. This results in a thwarting of his motivation to act in Jill's defense. Cases

of non-ambivalent overdetermined discomfort, by contrast, generally create a strengthened inclination to act.

This case also exhibits the distinction between occurrent emotions and dispositions to feel the same emotions. Occurrent felt states can become dispositions to feel the states when one shifts one's attention to

other matters and is no longer aware of the feeling. One forms a target- specific dispositional evaluative tendency to make interpretations that result in the same emotion when one thinks about the target again. One forms a dispositional evaluative belief about a specific target and is disposed to form a complex felt reaction to the target. Our evaluative

beliefs can also function as non-target-specific dispositional evaluative

tendencies to make evaluative interpretations which cause the onset of emotions in particular circumstances. These are dispositional tendencies that motivate one to discover targets and respond to these targets (what A. Rorty calls a"magnetic disposition"). These dispositions function in

motivating one's modes of attention in discovering situations one takes to be important from a moral or non-moral evaluative perspective.

For example Thompson has a tendency to discover and respond to persons in distress. In our example he is disposed to focus on McMacken's intimidation tactics and their effects on Jill. Once he begins to experience FF1, he forms a target-specific disposition to react with fear whenever he thinks about Jill's situation or about McMacken's tactics

Dispositional tendencies can be target-specific (as here) or non-target-

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WILLIAM WHISNER

specific (as would be the case if Thompson developed a fear for all the graduate students - present and future - who might fall victim to McMacken's intimidation).

Thompson disapproves of the likelihood that Jill will be further

harmed. The reasons (moral and factual) which justify his evaluative

belief also justify his attitude of disapproval toward this possibility (i.e., the target under this evaluative description). I f there are good reasons

for his evaluative belief then there are good reasons for his disposition

to disapprove of the target. When attitudes are functioning as constitutive features of complex intentional feelings the disposition to approve or disapprove of the target is always related to and grounded in our evaluative beliefs about the target. On my view, these attitudes are grounded in the evaluative belief about the target. Thus, when the evaluative belief is caused by our evaluation of reasons, our attitude is

also caused by the evaluation of reasons. Of course if the belief has causes other than reason, the attitudes will also be grounded in these other causes. The question of whether reasons function causally in the formation and maintenance of a belief is independent of the normative issue. It is also independent of questions about the grounds a person has

for believing that the reasons are good or poor. Many philosophers and

psychologists have failed to acknowledge the causal role that reasons can play in our emotional understanding; this explains why these last two questions have not been discussed in the literature on the emotions.

I l l . Moods and Emotions

After the exam Thompson goes to his office; he continues to think

about the oral. His ruminations result in a negative mood that constitutes a nagging discomfort. He begins working on a paper due the following Friday; by focusing on the paper, he can avoid paying attention to his

negative mood. This negative felt mood is not directed toward a particular target although it might, from time to time, activate his target-specific d isposi t ional eva lua t ive bel iefs to make negat ive eva lua t ive

interpretations directed toward gill, McMacken or himself. This shows that in some cases moods can cause evaluative interpretations that cause emotions.

18


Moods and occurrent felt emotions are different kinds of feelings;

typically they are not directed toward targets. We are aware of feeling

moods and we find ourselves in some mood, but the mood is not about

anything. There are interesting causal interactions between moods and

complex felt intentional states. Some philosophers and psychologists

fail to mark this distinction, resulting in the assimilation of the two feeling

types; this can lead to mistaken inferences about one of both of them.

While in this negative mood, Thompson focuses only on the

inadequacies of his paper, from here his thoughts turn to the problems in

his marriage. His fearful negative mood is not directed toward a particular

target in the way that his fear for Jill and anger toward McMacken are.

Negative and positive moods are background feelings that are not directed toward particular targets; hence, they are usually not cognitive or

intentional. These moods can cause us to make evaluative interpretations

that cause emotions. In these cases the mood results in an emotional reaction that takes a target. Feeling terms such as 'depression,' 'anxiety,'

' r esentment ' and ' ange r ' sometimes function as mood terms and

sometimes as emotion terms when the felt state is directed toward a

target.

Negative occurrent emotional states can, though they need not always

do so, result in negative moods. Thompson's overdetermined felt discomfort might cause him to feel depressed; after its onset, the

depression may come to have a life of it own. There are causal

connections between moods and emotions so that negative moods may

result in negative occurrent emotions. Thompson's generalized anxiety

might cause him to feel unjustifiable anger more often than usual. For

example his generalized anxiety may cause him to make a negative

evaluative interpretation that causes the onset of anger toward some

colleague over a trivial matter that would normally go unremarked.

There is evidence suggesting that negative emotional states occur more

frequently when persons are in negative moods. This evidence also

suggests that ofttimes occurrent negative emotional states can result in a

negative mood. Persons are more likely to feel occurrent fear, anger,

guilt, shame, envy, or jealousy when they are in a negative mood than when they are in a positive mood." After experiencing anger and fear,

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WILLIAM WHISNER

Thompson began to feel worse even though he is not thinking about Jill

or McMacken.

These negative moods can be maintained, in part, by an unconscious

fear state Unconscious fears can function causally in maintaining

negative mood states that are often overdetermined by other causal

factors. Such moods may come to have a life of their own as they are

severed from the emotional reaction that initially triggered them. In

some cases, these emotional states may be transformed into moods that

are no longer causally connected with the originating emotion.

But not all moods are precipitated by emotions in this way. In cases

in which the emotion precipitates the mood state, the person might not

even remember when or how she began to feel better or worse.

Thompson's negative mood state was not directed toward a particular

target even though his fear for Jill spilled over into the negative mood

state. It may be that the negative mood is now maintained in part by

other negative thoughts not related to the oral exam - his paper, his

marriage. Even a decrease in his serotonin levels may function to

intensify the mood.

Moods are frequently felt background states; they can, however, come

to the fore as their intensity increases. They run the continuum from

extreme dysphoria to extreme euphoria, with all the gray, green, and

orange states in between. You wake up feeling down or up and wonder

why; mild discomfort can become anxiety or depression, especially if it

leads to many negative thoughts and emotions, which in turn intensify

the mood. This is similar to Heidegger 's view that moods provide the

background for our interactions with the world. We find ourselves

situated in a world, and "situatedness is always related to some mood or another. ''~2 From this perspective our higher order cognitive activities

emerge from felt moods that are the ontological prerequisites for them.

Our moods influence our modes of attention to the world and ourselves;

sometimes we can change our world-mood relation by consciously

deciding to control our modes of attention. Felt emotional states always

presuppose moods as the background conditions for the occurrent

emotions. This does not mean that the mood causes the evaluative

20


interpretation that causes the emotion. Our moods can alter the intensity

of dispositional evaluative beliefs and attitudes that result in emotions.

The claim that an occurrent evaluative interpretation causes the onset

of the felt fear is an inference to the best explanation of Thompson's

feeling as he does. Since his felt state includes his evaluative belief

about the undesirable, threatening probability, he is aware that he has

made an evaluative interpretation of the situation, even if he was not

aware of making the interpretation at the moment it occurred. From our

third-person perspective we see that he had to make an interpretation in

order to form the evaluative belief about the situation. I f his evaluat ive

belief were to end, the fear arising from it would also end. If the fear

does not and we have not misidentified the type of the feeling, then we

have reason to believe that his discomfort is under the control of another

evaluative belief or that it reflects a negative mood.

I have argued that the felt discomfort can be constituted by more

than one simultaneous occurrent emotion. In such a case, one of the

emotions might cease while the felt discomfort persists as a result of

one 's holding another evaluative bel ief which also works to maintains

the discomfort. For example, suppose that Thompson decides to confront

McMacken and criticize him for his unjustifiable treatment of Jill. After

deciding to act, Thompson's guilt might subside, though he continues to

feel the fear and anger. His discomfort persists as he initiates a series of

actions to deal with the problem. There is a co-variation between the

evaluative belief and the felt discomfort if the evaluative belief is the

only belief that maintains the state of discomfort; if the discomfort is

overdetermined, there is no co-variation.

Several writers argue that an evaluative thought cannot cause the

onset of an emotion because we cannot identify the thought independently

of the felt occurrent emotion. ~3 If this is so, then we have no criterion for

distinguishing between the cause and the effect. The view defended in

this paper is not subject to this criticism. On my view, we identify the

thought that causes the onse t o f the fel t occur ren t fear wi thout

presupposing the felt occurrent emotion, even if one experiences the

same thought (i.e., occurrent thought that has the same content) while

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WILLIAM WHISNER

undergoing the felt state. We can use the sentences 'It is morally

undesirable that Jill has been harmed by McMacken' and 'It is morally

undesirable and threatening that she might undergo further undeserved

harm' to refer to the occurrent thoughts that cause the onset of the

emotions; in doing so we identify Thompson's occurrent thoughts

independently of his felt anger and fear.

We can also identify Thompson's complex felt fear and anger, along

with their constitutive features, even though his occurrent evaluative

belief is one of the central features of his complex felt intentional state.

Occurrent thoughts differ ontologically from the belief states that they

manifest; of course some occurrent thoughts do not manifest prior beliefs

or existing beliefs at all. The occurrent thought does provide a criterion

for identifying the belief state in particular contexts but it differs

ontologically from the belief. Occurrent thoughts are not beliefs even if

they provide evidence for what persons believe. Brain McLaughlin agrees with this point.

One can, of course, believe that p at t without thinking that

p at t. What relation does thinking that p bear to believing that p? Thinking that p is a mental event. Beliefs recall are

states. Beliefs have characteristic manifestations in thought

of the belief that p in thinking that p. The characteristic

manifestation in speech of the belief that p is sincerely saying

that p. These characteristic manifestation, unlike other

manifestations, express the belief. Thinking that p is a

manifestation of the belief that p, and so is a causal consequence of the belief. But it also expresses the belief. 14

The occurrent thought that causes the onset of the felt occurrent fear

also occurs before one's awareness of the felt state. Similarly, behavior that characteristically manifests beliefs is not identical with the beliefs

that the behavior manifests. Consider cases in which you are aware of

feeling fear and of having occurrent thoughts while in the state of fear.

Such thoughts are not identical with the feeling of fear; the evaluative

thoughts can come and go while you are aware of the feeling of fear;

you can identify both the felt fear and the thoughts that you have while

22


feeling the fear. This may be so even if the thoughts are those that manifest

the belief that maintains the felt fear.

A number of philosophers have advanced accounts of emotional states

and their thought dependence which deny this; these accounts entail that

we cannot identify the thoughts without at the same time identifying the

emotion. Such accounts are subject to the criticism that the cause cannot

be distinguished from the effect. This is not the case on my account.

According to it, we can identify the occurrent evaluative thought that

causes the felt emotion independently of the felt emotion, as well as the

occurrent thought that manifests the evaluative belief that maintains the

felt emotion, apart from the occurrent dispositional belief state that causes

and is manifested in the occurrent thought.

By now it should be apparent that understanding one's dispositions to feel emotions involves understanding, one's character and personality.

This point is eloquently argued by Michael Stocker and Elizabeth

Hedgemen in Valuing Emotions. I have argued that one's non-target-

specific dispositional evaluative beliefs are dispositions to focus attention

on and evaluate oneself, other persons, and the social and natural world.

These dispositions reflect one's evaluative identity and perspective. To

the extent that one is disposed to approve of oneself, one will be motivated

to maintain and actualize one's evaluative dispositions as a part of the

maintenance of self-esteem and self-respect. Even one's dispositions to

feel guilt and shame can function indirectly to protect and preserve one's

self-esteem and self-respect. Guilt and shame can result in the disposition

to fear situations which elicit these emotions; these fears motivate the avoidance of situations which work against self-esteem and self-respect.

I take the distinction between unreflective emotions and reflective

emotions to be one of degree (parallels to Dewey are quite intentional). One begins by becoming aware of what the emotion is about, and moves

through various degrees of reflectiveness to the point at which one is

aware of and reliably evaluates the reasons for one's evaluative belief

which is directed toward the target. One experiences an unreflective

emotion when aware of the intentional feeling but unaware of the target.

As one becomes more reflective, one gains awareness of the target, one's

evaluative and factual beliefs about he target, and one's desire to act.

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WILLIAM WHISNER

When one has moral reasons for these evaluative beliefs, one becomes

even more reflective as one begins to examine and evaluate the reasons,

and consequently comes to hold the evaluative beliefs because of this

evaluation. Finally, one is fully reflective and holds a warranted emotion

when the evaluation of the moral reasons is grounded in a correct

judgment (i.e., a reliable appraisal) that the argument and evidence

establish the conclusion, in the circumstances, and holds the evaluative

belief because of this reliable appraisal.

The example of the oral exam shows the causal role of beliefs in

one's feelings. Thompson came into the exam with certain evaluative

beliefs - viz., that it is undesirable and threatening for people to undergo

undeserved distress, and that it is wrong to cause others undeserved

distress if one can avoid it. Underlying these beliefs, is the further

evaluative belief that the welfare of others is important. As the exam

unfolds, these are applied to Jill and McMacken, resulting in Thompson's

believing that it is undesirable for Jill to undergo further distress and

humiliation at the hands of McMacken. Without the evaluative beliefs

he brings to the room, Thompson would not feel fear for Jill; instead, he might have what Gordon calls"fearing that," a fear without the feeling

of fear or the evaluative belief that the situation is dangerous. Thompson

believes that McMacken's behavior will cause Jill further distress if it is

not checked, and this, with his evaluative beliefs, causes him to

disapprove of McMacken's behavior and to form the belief that he,

Thompson, should act to mitigate this possibility. This in turn is

complicated by Thompson's concerns with his own tenure and his beliefs

about McMacken's behavior toward him. The resulting fears and anger,

along with the evaluative and factual beliefs all work together causally

to maintain Thompson's awareness of his complex felt state.

I have used this as a paradigmatic idealized example of a fully

reflective, warranted, justifiable fear. If Thompson didn't believe that

Jill's welfare was important, then his fear, while justifiable, would be

unreflective, because he would not feel the emotion because of the

reasons. His belief that McMacken has harmed Jill provides evidence

of why the possibility of further harm to Jill is likely; given the circumstances of the exam, his belief that Jill's welfare is important

24


provides a good and sufficient moral reason for why the further harm is

morally undesirable.

Although my description of the fear state differs from Robert

Gordon's, it does include a central feature of his account. Gordon

correctly notes that the motivational feature of fear is the desire to reduce

one's vulnerability with respect to the undesirable possibility; this does

not, however, fit cases in which one's fear is for others. I have extended

Gordon's notion of the motivation to reduce one's vulnerability with

respect to a threat to account for cases in which one fears for others.

Fear can motivate us to reduce our own vulnerability; it can also motivate

us to reduce another person's vulnerability as well, as is the case with

Thompson and Jill.

IV. Moral Reasons

The view defended here is a form of objectivism which assumes that there is a paradigmatic class of good moral reasons that provide criteria

for identifying the morally relevant facts in particular circumstances and

that these facts guide the agent's reflection and deliberation about what

we ought to feel, believe, and do. Such reasons guide us in determining

the morally relevant facts; as we identify these facts, the reasons become

sufficient for feelings, beliefs and actions.

My view is sympathetic to the work of Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna

Putnam, and the type of objectivism grounded in pragmatism which they

defend. Hilary Putnam emphasizes the primacy of moral practice and

extends Quine's indispensability argument to the moral domain and its

discourse in asking "what is the function of moral discourse?" In

developing this perspective further, I ask what role moral reasons play in determining how we should relate to and treat other persons and

ourselves in our efforts to live together as well as we are able.

Good moral reasons guide interpersonal actions which establish

interpersonal trust and the kind of interpersonal concern in which we

respond to the distress of others and promote their good, as well as our

own good. Starting with moral practices in which moral reasons fulfill

these purposes, we can engage in a democratized dialogue with the participants advancing arguments and offering evidence to decide how

25

WILLIAM WHISNER

the reasons should be applied in particular circumstances and how we

should resolve conflicts between reasons. The class of good moral

reasons which emerges from this dialogue will stand the test of reflective criticism in which all moral agents have the right to participate and be taken seriously. Good moral reasons have this status not because they

are accepted, but because they satisfy the standard of reflection defended above. The claim that a moral reason is a good reason is always fallible. While some of these reasons will continue to stand the test of criticism

because of the role they play in guiding interpersonal concern, respect, and cooperation, there are no foundational principles or natural facts from which we can infer the class of good moral reasons. This does not,

however, impugn their objectivity: objectivity lies in the standards of reflection and evaluation argued for in this paper.

The sorts of reasons that emerge from this dialogue as good moral

reasons are such things as that one ought to keep one's promises, tell the truth, prevent and alleviate undeserved physical and psychological distress, foster institutions and social practices that produce just distributions of benefits and burdens in public policy issues, maximize moral goods and minimize moral harms in public policy decisions,

promote an equal right to the best life possible (Frankena's principle), promote the good of others compatible with the exercise of one's own rights and the rights of others as persons with dignity. Each of these has a defeasibility condition that one should follow these reasons in the

morally relevant circumstances unless one can justify or excuse the choice not to act in light of overriding reasons and relevant facts. Such overriding facts are determined by moral reasons which are part of the same class

of moral reasons (e.g., reasons like saving a life is more important than keeping a promise).

With respect to this issue of normative objectivity and moral reasoning, Hilary Putnam writes.

Pragmat i sm anticipated an idea that has become a commonplace in contemporary moral philosophy, the idea

that disagreement in individual conceptions of the good need not make it impossible to approximate [even if we never

26


finally arrive at] agreement on just procedures and even

agreement on such abstract and formal vales as respect for

one another's autonomy, non-instrumentalization of other

persons, and such regulative ideas as the idea that in all our

institutions we should strive to replace relations of hierarchy

and dependence by relations of "symmetric reciprocity." ~5

If this is correct, then an ethical community - a community which

wants to know what is right and good - should organize itself in

accordance with democratic standards and ideals not only because they

are good in themselves, but because they are the prerequisites for the

application of intelligence to the inquiry. Hierarchy stunts the intellectual

growth of the oppressed, and forces the privi leged to construct rationalizations to justify their position. But this is to say that hierarchical

societies do not, in these respects, produce solutions to value disputes that are rationally acceptable. ~6

Non-cognitivists, anti-realists, and some skeptics will reject my

normative views about the objective criteria for distinguishing good moral

reasoning from poor moral reasoning. Even if these philosophers are

correct, I have still shown that moral reasons can make a causal difference

to the onset, maintenance, and change of emotions. Moral reasons can

make a causal difference to what we feel, why we feel it, and how we maintain or change our feelings.

This is a significant point. Many philosophers and psychologists

have denied this conclusion; others have offered an explanatory account

of the emotions which presupposes that this conclusion is false. Even if

some version of non-cognitvism or skepticism were true about reason

and emotion, its truth would have to apply to reasoning about issues of

moral value in general and is not due to specific issues related to the alleged incompatibility between moral reasoning and the emotions.

If my arguments are successful, they suggest the optimistic note that

progress in normative meta-ethics will contribute to progress in our

normative assessments of moral reasoning as it relates to the emotions.

I have argued that as it related to emotions, moral reasoning is no different

in kind from moral reasoning about other types of subject matters (e.g.,

27

WILLIAM WHISNER

judgments , beliefs, desires, attitudes, decisions, choices, purposes,

judgments, prescriptions and proscriptions, etc.). This entails that moral

reasoning about the emotions is compatible with and should be informed

by our best thinking about normative theory, t7

U N I V E R S I T Y OF UTAH

SALT L A K E CITY, UTAH 84112

USA

NOTES

* William Whisner was working on revisions of this paper for publication in this journal at the time of his death on 29 December 1999. I have tried to retain as much of the character of his work as possible while shortening the paper by more than half; I hope I have neither distorted his arguments nor diluted his contribution to the literature. Patricia Hanna, University of Utah, 21 December 2001. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1958), p. 135.

2 J. Deigh, "Cognitivism in The Theory of Emotions," Ethics, 104, (July 1994), pp. 824-825.

3 In discussing the distinction between the causal role of the person's evaluative belief attitude structure that functions in the person's evaluative interaction with the environment and the causal role of the evaluative interpretation which results from the disposition I am making a distinction similar to Fred Dretske's distinction between structural causes and triggering causes. See E Dretske, "Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior," in John Heii and Alfred Mele, eds., Mental Causation (New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford Press, 1993), pp. 121-137.

4 Editor's note: In the original paper, Whisner increased the complexity of the case by bringing into play Thompson's status as an untenured faculty with a family to support and McMacken's reputation for retaliation at tenure decisions; this produced more layers of fear, guilt and anger directed at various targets. While this discussion fit well with the larger project Whisner was working on at the time of his death, in my judgment, it ~as not necessary for a journal paper - PH

5 The distinction between unreflective intentional feelings which we do not identify as emotion types and intentional feelings is necessary to show that

28


individuals sometimes fail to identify the emotions they feel. It has been suggested by Robert Levy that an entire culture may fail to identify certain unreflective intentional feelings as emotion types. He claims that in Tahitian culture guilt and sadness are hypocognized (i.e., are maintained unreflectively) in order to promote harmony and avoid disruption. Even if we are doubt this claim, the above distinction explains how this could occur and helps us identify cases in which emotions are hypocognized. See R. Levy, "Emotion, Knowing, and Culture," in eds. R. Shweder and R. Levine, Culture Theory: Mind, Self, and Emotion (New York: New York; Cambridge Press, 1986), pp. 214-238.

6 m. Homer, The Wish for Power and the Fear of Having It (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc,), p. 36; also see chapt. 3 in Michael Lewis, Shame: The Exposed Self(New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 36-59. Developmental psychologists disagree about when these emotional dispositions emerge, and we may find that the typical times will need to be adjusted depending on further empirical evidence.

7 See Valuing Emotions, Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hedgemen for an interesting analysis of the distinction between dangerous and seemingly dangerous which is compatible with mine in its broad outlines.

8 There are circumstances in which a phobic might acknowledge that what he takes to be threatening is not really dangerous. Phobic Jim feels afraid of the garter snake even though he knows it is not dangerous.

9 In The Structure of Emotion: Investigation in Cognitive Psychology (Cambridge Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Robert Gordon calls these "fearings that."

J0 I say primarily because justifiable felt fears will include the correct world- mind fit and mind-world fit; justifiable fears include justifiable evaluative beliefs and tree factual beliefs.

" L. Berkowitz, "On the Formation and Regulation of Anger and Aggression: A Cognitive Neo-associationist Analysis," in American Psychologist, April, 1980. Berkowitz shows how negative affect can activate angry feelings. From my perspective this kind of data shows how moods can sometimes cause one to make negative evaluative judgments that result in negative emotions.

12 Guignon's, "Moods in Heidegger's Being and Time," in R. Solomon and Cheshire Calhoun, What is Emotion: Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, eds., R. Solomon and Cheshire Calhoun (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 235.

13 See for example, Irving Thalberg, "Emotion and Thought," in American

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WILLIAM WHISNER

Philosophical Quarterly, I, reprinted in Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Hampshire (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 201-225. In appendices (a) and (b) of Emotion, Thought, and Therapy (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), Jerome Neu discusses this sort of view. This discussion is compatible with the view defended in this paper. B. McLaughlin, "Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief," in Perspectives on Self-Deception, A. Rorty, and B. McLaughlin (eds.) (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 29-63. H. Putnam, "Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity," in Words and Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 155. Ibid., p. 175 I would like to thank Donald Gustafson, Bernard Harrison, Patricia Hanna, Mary Reddick, Greg Smith, Alf Seig and Nick White for valuable suggestions regarding this paper.

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a new theory of emotion: moral reasoning and emotion

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