reason and emotion-fundamental moral

8/4/2019 Reason and Emotion-Fundamental Moral

1/23

FundamentalMoralTheology

StAlphonsusTheologicalandMissionInstitute

TerenceWeeC.Ss.R

Reason and Emotion on Moral Judgement


2/23

FundamentalMoralTheology TERENCEWEE

i|P a g e

TableofContents

Introduction....................................................................................................................................1

ReasononMoralJudgement ......................................................................................................3

EmotiononMoralJudgement ....................................................................................................6

ReasonandEmotions .................................................................................................................9

BeyondReasonandEmotion .......................................................................................................12

ReflectionandConclusion ............................................................................................................13

BIBLIOGRAPHY:.............................................................................................................................16


3/23


1|P a g e

ReasonandEmotiononMoralJudgement

IntroductionHuman life can never be separated from moral judgements. No area of deliberate

human behaviour lacks a moral dimension. In our everyday living, we are constantly

bombardedwithmoralchoiceswhichwehavetomakeandlivewith.Themoralchoicetouches

almosteveryaspectin life,beitsocialrelationship,sex,money,poweroreventhedaytoday

encounter with people or situations. Face with any moral situations, we are challenged to

make a choice between rightandwrong, just and unjust, good and bad.Whatis objectively

knownastherightchoicedependsverymuchonsubjectivebackground(culture,tradition,

believes,etc),andtheabilityforonetomaketheproperandsoundchoicealsodependsvery

much on ones receptiveness to these moral teachings through ones upbringing and the

formationofonesmoralcharacter.

InaCatholiccontext,moralityisdeeplyintertwinedwithourfaith.Therefore,wetalk

aboutMoralTheology,inwhichweformourmoralsbaseonthewordofGodandtothebest

of tradition. It is seen as a ministry to help believers to understand all of Christian life as

specificallymarkedby creativefreedom,fidelityandbygenuineresponsibility. Itisnotonlya

question of howwe live our calling but also how free we actually are to communicate an

understanding ofChristianmoralitythat truly expresses creative libertyandfidelity in loving

responsetotheLordsownlove.1

Moraltheologyinvolvesalmostallaspectsoflives,asshowninAppendixI.Itisahuge

plethoraofinterminglingfactorsthatultimatelyformoneintoatrulymoralperson.Someof

thesefactorsarepresentasis(freedom,revelation,God),whilesome(virtues,Experience,law,

responsibility,etc)requiresthegradualformationandmaturingofapersonbeforeitcanbe

imbibed.

1Bernard Haring,Free andFaithful inChrist:MoralTheologyfor PriestandLaity (Vol I) (Quezon City: Cleretian

Publications,1987),28.


4/23


2|P a g e

Takingastepback,letusaskourselves:whatwouldthemoralgroundofapersonbeif

hehasnotcomeintocontactwithfaith?

Throughouthistory,wehaveseenthatmanycultureshaveindeeddevelopedawholemoral system without the faith aspect. They based their morals on certain life principles,

philosophyorpsychology(Eg:Happiness,knowledge,etc),andtheyareheavilybasedonlogical

reasoningandpracticalapplication.Inthissense,moralityisseenasafoundationofsociety,

andmoralistakentomeanwhatbefitsordoesnotbefitpersonsaspersons. Itrefersto

behaviourthatenhancesandrespectsthevalueofthegoodearth.2

Atthisend,MaguireandFargnoliproposedamodelinunderstandingmoralitybasedon

aquestioning(orhuntingandgathering)phaseandan evaluatingphase.AppendixIIshowsa

graphicalrepresentationofthemodel.Centerwithinthemodelwheelisthequestioningphase

wherequestionsandfactsaregatherstouncovermoralreality,whilethespokesrepresentsthe

evaluationalprocessesandresourcesavailable.

Althoughthereseemstobemanyresourcesforthemoralevaluation,coretoitisthe

reasoning/Analysis process which gathers all information and ultimately produce a moral

judgement. However, strongly connected to the cognitive brain of reasoning is theaffectivity/emotional response, for although reason demonstrates the coherence and

truthfulnessofonespositions,itisinthefeeling/emotionsthattherootsofmoralityarefound

andnourished.

Therehavebeenalongstandingstudyonthelevelofinfluenceofreasonandemotions

onmoraljudgements,withdifferentschoolsfavouringdifferentideas--onesidearguingthat

moraljudgmentfollowsfromemotionalreactions,theotherre-assertingtheroleofconscious

reasoninginarrivingatmoralconclusions.Althougha fullyconclusiveoutcomehavenotbeen

reached,anappreciationofthemoraljudgementbaseonthesetwoaspectswoulddefinitely

2DanielC. Maguire andA.Nicholas Fargnoli,OnMoralGround:The Art/Scienceof Ethics (New York: Crossroad,

1991),8.


5/23


3|P a g e

helponetounderstandandinternalizemoralitybetter.Therefore,itistheinterestofthispaper

tostudythesetwomajoraspectsofmoraljudgement,reasonandemotion.Wewouldstudyits

basis,itsstrength,itsrelationship,andultimatelyitslimitation.

ReasononMoralJudgement

Foralongwhileuptotheearly90s,theabilitytoreasonwasseenasthesupremepath

todistinguishingrightfromwrong.Rationalistsinmoralpsychologystressthepowerofapriori

reasontograspsubstantialtruthsabouttheworld.3FamouspsychologistsuchasEmmanuel

Kant,JeanPiagetandLawrenceKohlberghaveallresearchedandarguedforthesupremacyof

reasoninginmoraljudgement.Theyadvocatedthatmoralknowledgeandmoraljudgmentare

reached primarilyby a processof reasoning andreflection. A reasonersearchesforrelevant

evidence,weighsevidence,coordinatesevidencewiththeories,andreachesa decision.Some

of these steps may be performed unconsciously, and any of the steps may be subjected to

biasesanderrors,butakeypartofthedefinitionofreasoningisthatithassteps,atleastafew

ofwhichareperformedconsciously.

For example, in Kohlbergs view, moral judgment develops as a function of the

developingcognitiveabilitiesofthechildasreasondevelops,somoralbeliefsmature.Most

modernrationalistsholdreasontobeatthehelmofthoughtandbehaviour,eveniftheimpact

ofreasoningonjudgmentismediatedthroughemotionalmechanisms.

Itisnotdifficulttounderstandthelogicbehindtheclaimforreasonasthemaindrive

behindmoraljudgement,asinplaincommonsenseitdoesseemtruetofact.Humansareseen

verymuchasrationalbeings,thuseveninthecaseofmorals,webuiltupasystemofreasoning

andunderstandingandmakejudgementsfromasetofmoralrules.Aswematureanddevelop,

oursetofrulesbecomemorecompleteandwhole.

Reasonisalsoexpectedtotakeonandreflectthenatureofmoralexperience:

3BWilliams,Rationalismin TheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,Vol.7&8,P.Edwards,ed.(NewYork,Macmillian

1967),69.


6/23


4|P a g e

Throughreason,we find andcompareethicallymeaningfulempiricaldata;we search

fortheunaskedquestions,wecopewiththeinevitablepartialityofourknowledge;we

breakthestrangleandholdofhabituation,wecheckourmythsand otherfilters,and

wesolvetheconflictsbetweenandamongprinciples,reformulatingandcorrectingthe

principlesinviewofnewexperience. 4

Avastnumberofmoralreasoningsystemshavebeendevelopedandstudiedthrough

the ages, some of these systems were pivotal in the psychological understanding of moral

reasoning upto the present.One of the more influential moral systems would be from the

Greeks, who founded the concept of hedonism (morality based on happiness) and

intellectualism (morality based on knowledge/intellect and virtue). Many Christian morality

concepts also stemmed from these strings of thoughts as the early Christian faith was very

muchintertwinedwithGreekcultureandphilosophy.Ourgreatsaints,AugustineandThomas

Aquinas,whocontributedgreatlytotheChristianunderstandingofmorality,alsodrewmuchof

theirconceptsfromGreekmoralsystem.

ThomasAquinas,inoneofhisgreatestopus,SummaTheologica,outlinedafullmoral

system which served very much as the future basis of moral philosophy and theology (see

Appendix III). In it was the systematic reasoning development of the determination of the

humanact.

ItwaspresentedinSummaTheologica5BookIIquestion18thatagood/badactcanbe

determinedthroughthreeconditions,namelyi) theObject(FinisOperis),ii)theCircumstances

andiii)theIntention(FinisOperantis).Foranacttobeconsideredgood,alltheabovethree

conditionmustmeetthecriteriaofbeinggood.

Withsuchreasoningandunderstanding,itissimpleforapersontoguidehisactionsand

decisionsmorally,asallmoralissuescanbejudgedthroughasystematicway.However,inreallife,manysituationsthatoccurarecomplicatedandrequireagreaterlevelofreflectionand

4DanielMaguire,TheMoralChoice(NewYork,Doubleday&Company,1978),263.

5ThomasAquinas.TheSummaTheologicaofStThomasAquinas. TranslatedbyFathersoftheEnglishDominican

Province.Vol.II.(NewYork:BenzigerBrothers,1948).670.


7/23


5|P a g e

thoughtprocessbeforeamorallysoundjudgementcouldbeattained.Owingtothis,further

schoolsofreasoningflourishedsothatpersonscouldhaveanevenbettergraspatrealityand

situation,thusallowingclearerjudgement.Oneexampleofthefieldsofreasoningwouldbethe

studyoflogic,inwhichwelearnindepthdiversereasoningmethods,andtheintricateways

to spot flaws in the various complicated situations and statements. Appendix IV shows a

summarylistoflogicsystemwhereoneusestobetterunderstandsituationsandmeanings.

Besidesthat,moralreasoningtriestountanglesomeverycomplexmoralsituationsand

suggestasystemizedmannertodealwiththeserealities.Forexample,Aquinasalsotriedto

reasonifthereweresituationswhensomethingthatwasinherentlyseentobeabadactcould

infactbejustifiedasagoodactbecauseofthesituation(circumstances)andintention.Takinga

specificcase:isiteverpossibleforustojustifystealingasagoodact?

AquinasconferredanexceptiontothegeneralruleofhumanactinBookIIquestion18

article10.Itstatesthattherearecertaincircumstancesthat couldchangethespeciesofthe

object. Taking stealing as an example, the object (to steal), and the end (to obtain others

goods)arebad,andeitheroneoftheseelementswoulddeemtheacttobebad.However,ina

specialcaseinwhichonestealspurelyinordertosustainoneslife,thentheend(tosustain

life)andthecircumstances(lifesituationmakingthistheonlyoption)couldinfactchangethe

speciesoftheact(stealing)fromgenerallybadtogood.Thisisshowninasimplisticexplanatory

forminAppendixV.

In his treatment of homicidal self-defence (Book II 2nd

part question 64 article 7),

Aquinas also introduced thePrincipleofDouble Effect6, which is a set of ethical criteria for

evaluating the permissibility of acting when one's otherwise legitimate act (for example,

relievingaterminallyillpatient'spain)willalsocauseaneffectonewouldnormallybeobliged

to avoid (for example, the patient's death.) This set of criteria states that an action having

foreseen harmful effects practically inseparable from the good effect is justifiable if upon

6Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (June 2009),

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect(accessedFebruary23,2010).


8/23


6|P a g e

satisfactionofthefollowing:a)thenatureoftheactisitselfgood,oratleastmorallyneutral;b)

theagentintendsthegoodeffectandnotthebadeitherasameanstothegoodorasanend

itself;c)thegoodeffectoutweighsthebadeffectin circumstancessufficientlygravetojustify

causingthebadeffectandtheagentexercisesduediligencetominimizetheharm.

Beyondthis,thereweremanymoremoraljudgementstudybasedonreasoninorderto

further deal with difficult moral issues. The study of moral dilemmas- a tension between

conflictingmoralclaimshas dominated thepsychological literatureasresearcherssearched

forthebetterunderstandingofhowonewouldreasonoutadilemma.7Forexample,howcould

adoctordecidewhethertokilladyingpatientwhoisaskingforanendtohersuffering?Orhow

wouldamarinecaptaindecidebetweenorderingamantogoonafatalmission,enablinghim

to lead the rest of his men to safety, and sacrificing himself, leaving his men to their own

device?Orhowwouldamandecidewhetherheshouldbreakintoadruggistsshoptosteala

drugthatmaysavethelifeofhisdyingwife?

This study has proved extremely helpful in exploring the cognition involved in moral

decision making in particularly complex situations, and have helped in identifying reliable

thought processes and arguments which would aid one in resolving moral issues in a more

systematicandlogicalmanner.

Althoughreasonhasbeensignificantlyshowntoplayamajorroleinmoralreasoning,

substantialamountofresearchareindicatingthatthereareotherfactorsthatarejustas,ifnot

even more, important than reasoning. We shall now move on to study one of the major

contenders:Emotion.

EmotiononMoralJudgement

The main thrust of the proponents of moral judgement through emotions were not

tryingtodiscredittheroleofreasoning,rather,theyweretryingtopointoutthatreasoningis

7SeeBenoitMonin,DavidPizarro,andJenniferBeer,DecidingVersusReacting:ConceptionsofMoralJudgement

andtheReason-AffectDebate,ReviewofGeneralPsychology11,no.2,(2007).101.


9/23


7|P a g e

moreofanaftereffectofamoraljudgement.Itisinfacttheemotionthatguidesapersons

directjudgementinamoralsituation.

Researchers of this field have argued that people have a built-in moral sense whichcreatespleasurablefeelingsofapprovaltowardsbenevolentactsandcorrespondingfeelingsof

disapproval towards evil and vice8

. A very strong and famous advocator, David Hume, in

particular,proposedthatmoraljudgmentsaresimilarinformtoaestheticjudgments:theyare

derivedfromsentiment,notreason,andweattainmoralknowledgebyanimmediatefeeling

andfinerinternalsense,notbyachainofargumentandinduction.

Someoftheexamplesputforwardtosuggestthisschoolofthoughtinclude:

i) afamilysdog was killed byacar infrontof theirhouse.They had heardthat dogmeat was delicious, so they cut up the dogs body and cooked it and ate it for

dinner.Whatdoyouthinkaboutthis?

ii) Isitoktosellyourdaughtertochildpornographers?iii) Isitoktohireastrangertorapeyourownwife?

Theanswertothesequestionscouldeasilybereachedthroughreason,butthetheorists

favouring emotions would like to emphasize that with the immediate emotional impact oftheseexamples,thereisaquickanddirectemotionalreactionslikedisgustorcontemptwhen

decidingwhethersomethingismoralornot,andthesesocialemotionsshouldundoubtedlybe

partofthemoralpicture.

Manycurrentevidencesdofavourtheconclusionthatordinarymoraljudgementsare

emotional in nature. Jesse Prinz, in his study, defended 3 major theses of the relationship

between emotion and moral judgement9: a) emotions co-occurwithmoral judgements (this

pieceofintrospectivepsychologyhasbeenconfirmnumerouslyinstudiesofwhatdoesonin

thebrain),b)emotionsinfluencemoraljudgements (althoughstillopentodebate,therehave

8JonathanHaidt, TheEmotionalDogand itsRationalTail:A SocialIntuitionistApproach toMoralJudgement,

PsychologicalReview108,(2001),817.9SeeJessePrinz,TheEmotionalBasisofMoralJudgements,Philosophicalexploration9,no2,(March2006).


10/23


8|P a g e

been strong evidence in supporting that negative emotions can be sufficient for making

negative moral judgements even when wehave noother reason to thinkthat a situation is

wrong.Inthissense,emotionsaresufficientformoralappraisal.)c) emotionsarenecessaryfor

moral judgements (although itis difficult tohaveempirical test tosupportthisclaim, strong

evidence has been found to support this thesis through the research on psychopaths.

Argumenthasalsobeenbasedonanthropologicalperspective:ifmoraljudgementswerebased

on something other than emotionssomething like reason or observationthen we would

expectmoremoralconvergencecross-culturally).

Whatthen,istheconsequencesshouldweagreetotheargumentthatemotionplaya

strongpartinmoraljudgement?Belowaresomeoutcomesthroughthisunderstanding:

i) Explainingthelinkbetweenemotionandmotivation10-iftheunderstandingoftheroleofemotiononmoraljudgementistrue,thinkingthatanactioniswrongdisposesonetohaving

negative emotions towards it, and negative emotions are inhibitory, they promote

avoidance,ceasing,intervention,withdrawal,andwhenanticipated,preventativemeasures.

Beliefsaboutwrongnesscarrythemotivationalforcethatweexperienceasbeingunderan

obligation.Consequently,moraljudgementsvieforcontrolofthewill.Whentheyoccur,we

aretherebymotivatedtoact.

ii) Aidinthedistinctionbetweenmoralandconventionrule11-Thisisbestexplainedthroughanexample.Howwouldachilddistinguishthatitisoktotalkwithoutraisinghishandwhenateachersaysso,anditisnotoktohitthechildnexttohimevenwhentheteachersaysso?

How can a youngchilddraw a distinctioneven ata youngage? The answer may bethat

moralrulesaredirectlygroundedintheemotions.Whenwethinkabouthitting,itmakesus

feelbad,andwecannotsimplyturnthatfeelingoff.Ontheotherhand,raisingofhands

beforetalking,beingaconventionalrule,donotsummonthesameemotionalreactions.

iii)Indicating theself-evidentofmoral judgement Emotionally grounded moral judgementshaveakindofperception-likeimmediacythatdoesnotseemtorequirefurthersupport.For

example: we can feel that killing is wrong. This is self-justifying because killing elicits the

negative sentiment expressed by that judgement and having the power to elicit suchnegativesentimentisconstitutiveofbeingwrong.

10Ibid.36.

11Ibid.36-37.


11/23


9|P a g e

These understanding of emotion being the primal force of moral judgement have indeed

shed new perspective on the understanding of morals. However, it would be a simplistic

attemptforonetojustadheretosolelyonetrainofthoughtandignoretheother.Uponthe

understandingofboththeargumentsbehindtheroleofreasonandemotionbehindmoral

judgements, a wise step forward would probably be to study both aspects side by side,

analyzingboththeirdivergentandconvergentpoints.

ReasonandEmotions

Thecontentionbetweenreasonandemotioninmoraljudgementhasexistedinthe

philosophical and psychological field for centuries. Perhaps the most well known debate

between these fields was that of philosophers David Hume [1711-1776] (who favoured the

emotionapproach)andImmanuelKant[1724-1804](whofavouredthereasonapproach).

Hume made a most radical statement on his position by saying that Reason is, and

oughtonlytobetheslaveofthepassions,andcanneverpretendtoanyotherofficethanto

serveand obey them.12

The thrust of Humes attack on rationalism was that reason alone

cannotaccomplishthefullroleofmoraljudgement;itcanonlybeusedasatoolbythemindto

obtainandprocessinformationabouteventsintheworld,oraboutrelationsamongobjects.

Reasoncanletusinferthataparticularactionwillleadtothedeathofmanyinnocentpeople,

butunlesswecareaboutthosepeople,unlesswehavesomesentimentthatvalueshumanlife,

reason alone cannot advise against taking the action. Hume argued that a person in full

possessionofreasonyetlackingmoralsentimentwouldhavedifficultychoosinganyendsor

goalstopursue,andwouldlooklikewhatwenowcallapsychopath.

Kant,ontheotherhand,cameoutwiththerationalistethicaltheoryasanattemptto

refuteHume.Kantarguedthatalthoughemotionalfactorsoftendoinfluenceourconduct,we

12JonathanHaidt,TheEmotionalDoganditsRationalTail:ASocialIntuitionistApproachtoMoralJudgement,

PsychologicalReview108,(2001),816.


12/23


10|P a g e

should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead,truemoral action is motivatedonlyby

reasonwhenitisfreefromemotionsanddesires.13

Beyond philosophy, psychologist such as Lawrence Kohlberg started to use morescientific manner to study the drive of moral judgement. He formulated a model of moral

progressionofapersoninvariousstagesoftheirlives,mainlythroughtheaccountofreason.

Heclaimedthatmoralforceinpersonalityiscognitive.Affectiveforcesareinvolvedinmoral

decisions,butaffectisneithermoralnorimmoral.Whentheaffectivearousalischannelledinto

moral directions, it is moral, when it is not so channelled, it is not. Themoral channelling

mechanismthemselvesarecognitive.14

Although Kohlberg has a huge pool of supporters who followed suit in his research

direction, another group came out questioning the stance of reason. They try to ask the

question:whileitisundeniablethatpeopleengageinmoralreason,doestheevidencereally

show that such reasoning is the cause of moral judgement, or is it just the consequence?

Psychologist such as Jonathan Haidt started field testing peoples moral reactions in

emotionallychargedsituation(eg:eatingofonesdeadpetdog,cleaningonestoiletwiththe

national flag, etc) and he found that affective reactions were in fact good predictors of

judgement.Healsofoundthatparticipantswereoftenmorallydumbfounded,thatis,they

wouldstutter,laughandexpresssurpriseattheirinabilitytofindsupportingreasons,yetthey

would not change their initial judgements of condemnation. It seems that for affectively

charged events, such as incest and other taboo violations, an intuitionist model (emotional

based)maybemoreplausiblethanarationalistmodel(reasonbased).15

13

See Matt McCormick, Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (June 2005),

http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/(accessedFebruary28,2010).14

LawrenceKohlberg,FromIstoOught:HowtoCommittheNaturalisticFallacyandGetAwayWithItintheStudy

of Moral DevelopmentinCognitiveDevelopment and Epistimology, T Mischel, ed.(New York, Academic Press,

1971),230.15

JonathanHaidt,SKoller&MDias,Affect,Culture,andMorality,orIsItWrongtoEatYourDog?Journalof

PersonalityandSocialPsychology65,(1993),613-628.


13/23


11|P a g e

Withhisfindings,Haidtcameoutwithasocialintuitionistmodel,whichexplainsthat

emotionalcapacitiesinvolvingaffectandintuitiondoalmostalloftheworkingeneratingmoral

judgements.Reasonontheotherhandisrelegatedtotheroleofalawyerorpublicrelations

agent,whosejobitistoofferpublicpost-hocjustificationforjudgementsaftertheyhavebeen

made16

.AppendixVIshowsasimplifieddepictionofthismodel.

Eventhoughthecontentionsandargumentsontheroleofreasonandemotionon

moral judgement would probably continue for a long time to come, some new studies are

startingthe attempt infinding a middle ground, ora kind ofsynergizingofthe role ofboth

reasonandemotioninmorality.Somearestartingtostatethatthedebatesurroundingthe

causes of moral judgement may be unnecessary if we acknowledge that each of the

prototypicalmoralsituationsinvolvedifferentprocesses.

In the study of reactions towards moral dilemma, Joshua Greene discovered that

personal moral dilemmas trigger emotion systems, which then play a major causal role in

producingamoraljudgement.However,impersonalmoraldilemmasleavethejudgementto

reasoningsystem.Theroleofreasoninginpersonaldilemmasiseitherdiminishedorentirely

absent.17

Appendix VII is a depiction of Greenes Model of processes underlying moral

judgement.

March Hauser, on the other hand, proposed that humans possess an innate, tacit

capacity for moral judgement that is in many ways parallel to our capacity for language.18

Hauser argues that humans are endowed with an innate moral grammar, as in language

development, this innate moral grammar provides information regarding core principles

commontoallmoralsystems.Inaddition,likethelinguisticfaculty,theinnatemoralfaculty

operatesunconsciously,quicklyandautomatically.Heformulatedamodelofmoraljudgement

16JenniferNado,DanielKellyandStephenStich,MoralJudgement,inRoutledgeCompaniontothePhilosophyof

Psychology,JohnSymons&PacoCalvoed.(LondonandNewYork,RoutledgeTaylor&FrancisGroup,2006),627.17

Ibid.629.18

Ibid.630.


14/23


12|P a g e

inwhichfirstly,theperceptionofamorallysignificanteventtriggersananalysisoftheactions

involved. That analysis, though fast and unconscious, is a complex cognitive process. (In a

sense, it is a reasoning process, albeit not a conscious one.) The conventionally known

emotion and reason would then equally happen after the judgement, where emotions

would come to play in controlling our behavioural response to the perceived act, while

consciousreasoningwouldcomeaftertheinitialintuitivejudgementtoprovideunderstanding

andlogicalinterpretation.AppendixVIIIdepictsHausersmodelofmoraljudgement.

BeyondReasonandEmotion

Thusfarthematerialsabovehavepresentedalongseriesofdiscussionontheroleof

reasonandemotiononmoraljudgement.Weseethatevenaftercenturiesofdebatesand

studies,we are still trying tograsp the intricate workingsof moraljudgement.Evenwithout

comingtoadefinitiveconclusion,onethingisverysure:theworkingsofmoraljudgementisa

verycomplicatedaffairandrequiresacriticalandopenmindedattitudeforonetobeableto

fullyappreciateitfromallangles.

Itisnodoubtthatregardlessoftheexactfunctionofreasonandemotion,theydo

playveryimportantrolesinmorals.However,faithperspectiveleadsustobelievethatthese

cannotbethesolefactorsunderlyingthemoralintegrityofaperson.Infact,ourmoralvalues

andjudgements areintricately tiedup to ourrelationship toGodandthereforeare strongly

formedanddevelopedwithinthefaithaspectofourlives.

OurChristianfaithleadsustobelievethatweareformedintheimageofGod(Imago

Dei),andtherefore,ourthoughts,wordsanddeedsshouldbeaclearreflectionofthisgreat

dignityofours.Beyondtherealmofreasonandemotion,corewithinus,drivingourvaluesof

lifeandourmoralperspectives,isalsoourworldviewandintegratedperceptionoflifethrough

ourdeepconnectednesstoGod.

Oneofthecentralaspectsinthisrelationshipwouldbethebuddingofourconscience,

whichisourmoralfaculty,ourinnercorewhenwecometoknowourselvesinconfrontation


15/23


13|P a g e

withGodandourfellowman19

.Itwouldbeanaspectboringdeeperbeyondourreasonand

emotionasitbecomespartofouressenceduetoourbondwithGod.Itbecomesthesecond

nature,thenewfacetofaperson.Ourconsciencethenbecomestheguidingpoleofourmoral

judgement.

Stronglyrelatingtothiswouldalsobethegrowthofourvirtueswhichisstronglytiedto

ourrelationshipwithGodandtoourconscience.ThroughtheloveofGod,thereexistaninner

growthandtransformationwhichallowsourcoretoimbibevirtueswhichflowoutwithinour

directnature.Thetheologicalvirtuesoffaith,hopeandloveallowustolivewithinamorality

which serves for the attainment of our ultimate goal of salvation and union with God. The

ethicalvirtuesofdiligence,wisdom,patience,justice,truthfulnessandmanymorefuseswith

ourmoraljudgementandthereforeallowingustoliveinaccordancetothecommongoodand

actanddecideinwaysaligningtothewillofGod.

Alltheseaspects,alongwiththedefinitiveguidingprinciplescomingfromscriptureand

ourchurchtradition,willultimatelyformtheunderlyingfoundationofourmorality.Eachwill

playtheirrole,nurturingthesoil,providingwater,sunshineandtheoptimumconditions,for

thegrowthofmoralswithinaperson.Itisthroughtheappreciationandintegrationofallthese

aspects into ones moral life (either conscious orunconsciousness) could one beseen tobe

personwhofullylivedtheirdignityaschildrenofGodwhomtheFatherultimatelycalltobein

unionwithhim.

ReflectionandConclusion

Core within our human life is our interactions with the people and the environment

surroundingus. And within these interactions, wecannot avoidthe constantneed for usto

makechoicesbetweengoodandbad,rightandwrong.Thesechoicesandjudgements,imbibed

19BarnardHaring.ChristianRenewalinaChangingWorld.(NewYork:TheMercierPress,1966).92.


16/23


14|P a g e

withinapartofourhumanessencewhichwecometotermasmorality,isacrucial,necessary

anddefinitepartofusasbeinghumanandbeingchildrenofGod.

Therearemanyfactorsaffectingtheformationandgrowthofapersonsmorality.FromaChristianperspective,weseethehandsofGodandtheeffectsoftherelationshipwithGod

within our lives as deterministic factors of moral formation. However, more fundamental to

that,thereexistthephilosophicalandpsychologicalaspectsofmoralformationwhichismore

easilyidentifiableamongpersonsofallracesandreligionsintheworld.

Withinthisrealm,manysub-factorscanalsobedeterminedintheformationofmorals;

however,verybasictoallistheunderstandingofmoralformationthroughonesreason.This

view seems logical as it is through our cognitive capacity that we learnt and grow in most

aspectsofourlives.Philosophers,psychologistandtheologiansalikehadtriedtounderstand

the role of reason in moral judgement through various methods, and came out with many

models and structures explaining how the mind come to address a moral issue through a

systematicanalysisofsituationleadingtoadecision.Thankstotheunderstandingofreason,

we are provided with sets of criteria to judge good or bad act, and to find ways in solving

complicatedmoralissuesthroughmethodicalapproach.

However, beyond reason, we also see that emotion do play a part in ones moral

judgement.Somestudieshaveindicatedthatemotionisinfacttheprimaryfactorinamoral

judgement,evenbefore reason come toplayin making senseof the situation.The intuitive,

sensingdriveofemotionwhichleadstoadirectjudgementduringmoralassessmenthasled

researcherstoconcludethatitisavaluableandnecessarypartofonesmoralformation. Itis

an innate drive within oneself which ultimately helpsone todifferentiate rightfrom wrong,

good from bad, and help in the a gradual formation of ones motivation and nature, thus

reactingsystematicallytotheperceivedgoodandbadintheoutsideworld.

Regardlessofhowwelltheargumentsfrombothperspectivesare,wewouldultimately

realize that reason and emotion mutually share their unique and specific roles in a moral


17/23


15|P a g e

judgement.Theargumentscangoonbutcoretothepointisthatmoraljudgementisindeed

complexandisconsistingofmanyfactors,evenbeyondthatofreasonandemotion.

Drawing from these aspects, a most important point to keep in mind always is thecomplexityandthemulti-dimensionalfacetsofmoraljudgements.Weshouldnotsimplistically

lookatmoralityassomethingthatcanbeeasilyformedorcontrolled.Itdrivesfromalmostall

aspectsoflifeandthereforeaffectsallaspectsoflife.

Thatbeingsaid,theappreciationofthisunderstandingdoesprovideabetterroadmap

foronetogrowandnurtureonesmorality.Beingpeopleoffaith,webelievethatthecomplex

realmofmoralityincludestheimportantaspectsoffaith,suchasconscienceandtheformation

ofourChristianvalues.Withintheseunderstanding,ourappreciationoftheroleof reasonand

emotion in moral judgement would also aid in our internalization of conscience and values.

Howdowedothat?

Reasoncouldhelponeinclarifyingandsystematizingtheunderstandingofconscience

anditsinterplaywithinoneself.ItwouldalsoaidapersoninappreciatingthevariousChristian

valuesandbemoreawareoftheminreallifesituations.Emotionsontheotherhand,could

help in imprinting these conscience and values deeper within our hearts through positivereinforcementsandformationofonesmotivation.

In conclusion, weseethatbothreason andemotion playapart in moraljudgement.

Howitisspecificallymightstillbeaquestiontobeanswered,buttheappreciationofitwould

helponeunderstandbetterthecomplexityofmorality.Withitwecouldalsoutilizebothreason

and emotion to aid in the formation of morality through other perspective, especially that

comingfromourfaith.

WithdeeploveofGod,agreatsenseofsurrenderingtothemovementofthespirit,an

opennessto growth,andfinally couplingwith theappreciationandutilization of reason and

emotion,oneisdefinitelyonherwaytowardsgreatermoralstanding.


18/23


16|P a g e

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Aquinas, Thomas. The Summa Theologica of St Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Fathers of the English

DominicanProvince.Vol.II.NewYork:BenzigerBrothers,1948.

Haidt,Jonathan.TheEmotionalDoganditsRationalTail:ASocialIntuitionistApproachtoMoralJudgment.PsychologicalReview,no.108(2001):814-834.

Haidt,Jonathan,SKoller,andMDias.Affect,Culture,andMorality,orIsItWrongtoEatYourDog?Journal

ofPersonalityandSocialPsychology65(1993):613-628.

Haring,Bernard.ChristianRenewalinaChangingWorld.NewYork:TheMercierPress,1966.

.FreeandFaithfulinChrist:MoralTheologyforPriestandLaity. Vol.I.QuezonCity:ClaretiansPublications,

1987.

Kohlberg,Lawrence.FromIstoOught:HowtoCommittheNaturalisticFallacyandGetAwayWithItinthe

StudyofMoralDevelopment.InCognitiveDevelopmentandEpistemology,editedbyTMischel,230-

231.NewYork:AcademicPress,1971.

Maguire,DanielC.TheMoralChoice.NewYork:Doubleday&CompanyInc,1978.

Maguire, Daniel C, and A Nicholas Fargnoli. On Moral Grounds: The Art/Schience of Ethics. New York:

Crossroad,1991.

McCormick, Matt. Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 30 June, 2005.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/(accessed28February,2010).

McCormick,RichardA,andPaulRamsey,. DoingEviltoAchieveGood:MoralChoicesinConflictSituations.

London:LoyolaUniversityPress,1985.

McIntyre, Alison. Doctrine of Double Effect. Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 29 June, 2009.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect(accessed23February,2010).

Monin,Benot.ReasonandEmotioninMoralJudgment:DifferentPrototypesLeadtoDifferentTheories.In

DoEmotionshelporhurtdecisionmaking?:Ahedgefoxianperspective,byKDVohs,RFBaumeister

andGBaumeister.NewYork:RusselSageFoundation,2004.

Monin, Benoit, David A Pizarro, and Beer S Jennifer. deciding Versus reacting: Conceptions of Moral

JudgementandtheReason-Affectdebate. ReviewofGenreralPsychology11,no.2(2007):99-111.

Nado, Jennifer, Daniel Kelly, and Stephen Stich. Moral Judgement. In Routledge Companion to the

Philosophyof Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, 621-633. London & New York:

RoutledgeTaylorandFrancisGroup,2006.

Prinz,Jesse.TheEmotionalBasisofMoralJudgements. Philosophicalexplorations 9,no.1(March2006):

29-43.

William,B.Rationalism.Vol.7&8,inTheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,editedbyPEdwards,69-75.NewYork:

Macmillan,1967.


19/23


17|P a g e

AppendixI:TheManyFacetsthatAffectMoralTheology

AppendixII:TheHubofMoralReality


20/23


18|P a g e

AppendixIII:

BriefgraphicalinterpretationofEthics/MoralPhilosophyaccordingtoSummaTheologica


21/23


19|P a g e

AppendixIV:

SummaryListofLogicSystem


22/23


20|P a g e

AppendixV:

CircumstancesthatChangetheSpeciesoftheObject

AppendixVI:

HaidtsSocialIntuitionistModel


23/23


21|P a g e

AppendixVII:

GreenesModeloftheProcessesUnderlyingMoralJudgement

AppendixVIII:

HausersModelofMoralJudgement

reason and emotion-fundamental moral

Documents