a look beyond the crisis - perry piazza

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A Look Beyond the Crisis

Perry PiazzaDirector of Investment StrategyContango Capital Advisors, Inc.

December 2, 2010

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Part 1: Crisis Review, Deleveraging Update & Economic Forecast

Part 2: Our Fiscal Mess – Is There Hope?

Part 3: How to Invest in 2011

2

Setting the Scene

A debt bubble began to form in the mid 1990s and continued into the last decade. It was exacerbated by:

– Abnormally low interest rates.– A strong rally in the price of an easily leveragable asset – housing– A fundamental switch, from cash-flow based underwriting standards to asset-

based underwriting standards.– Fast growth in computer power and the ensuing ability to securitize all manner of

assets.– A miscalculation of risk by the ratings agencies.– Abdication of regulatory responsibility.

The debt bubble began to burst in 2007 when housing prices cracked and finally gave way fully in 2008 when Lehman Brothers failed.

3

The Debt Bubble in Hundred-Year Perspective

4

Quarterly Data 12/31/1922 - 6/30/2010 (Log Scale)

(E501A)

375.44

6/30/2010 Debt = $52.054 Trillion6/30/2010 GDP = $14.575 Trillion

= 357.1%

Annual interpolated GDP (including estimates prior to 1929) used prior to 1946. Domestic Nonfinancial Debt used prior to 1946. As of December, 1946 Domestic Nonfinancial Debt represented 99.4% of Total Credit Market Debt. 130

135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360 365 370 375

130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360 365 370 375

1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Total Credit Market Debt as a % of GDP

Copyright 2010 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved. . www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/ . For data vendor disclaimers refer to www.ndr.com/copyright.htmlSee NDR Disclaimer at

TOTAL DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP IN THE USA

Includes Government + Household + Corporate Debt

Source: Ned Davis Research

A large debt bubble burst in the 30s …

… and probably again in 2008

What Happens After a Debt Bubble Bursts?

Typical aftermath: Deeper than normal recession and a muted recovery Deleveraging by the biggest culprits (consumers, in this case) Austerity & reduced confidence to spend and invest A flirt with deflation Untested policy responses & political “tide-shifting” Large fiscal response Asset market(s) most affected (e.g., housing)

usually fall for years A shifting of relative economic strength to less indebted

countries. A transfer of risk from the private sector to the public sector Periodic “aftershock” crises..

2007 – 2009 was the first severe credit recession since the 30s.

Recommended Reading

5

Deeper Than Normal Recession

6

QUARTERLY GDP GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES

The amplitude of economic activity has moderated greatly in recent decades

Source: Bloomberg, LP

Muted & Well-Below-Par Recovery

7

Corp. E

arnings

Shipmen

ts

Housing S

tarts

Retail S

ales

New Homes

Existi

ng Home S

ales

Industrial

Prod.

Non-Res. Constr

uction

Real G

DP

Orders

Nonfarm Pay

rolls

-

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0 What’s Normal

Average increase in above economic variables, 34 Months after the start of a recession

(includes last 8 recessions with the exception of the truncated 1980 recession)


Real G

DP

Retail S

ales

Nonfarm Pay

rolls

Industrial

Prod.

Corp. E

arnings

Shipmen

ts

Existi

ng Home S

ales

Orders

Non-Res. Constr

uction

Housing S

tarts

New Homes

-60.0

-50.0

-40.0

-30.0

-20.0

-10.0

0.0What’s Not

Current “Recovery”

(E0026)

Monthly Data 6/30/2007 - 10/31/2011

*Dates used for determining economic expansionsare those designated by the National Bureau ofEconomic Research. The data has been adjustedfor ease of comparison with the current cycle.Expansion starting dates used: November 1970, March 1975, July 1980, November 1982, March 1991, and November 2001.

Recession ended in June 2009.

Current Expansion ( )

Average of Last Six Post World War II Expansions*

( )

100.0 100.2 100.4 100.6 100.8 101.0 101.2 101.4 101.6 101.8 102.0 102.2 102.4 102.6 102.8 103.0 103.2 103.4 103.6 103.8 104.0 104.2 104.4 104.6 104.8 105.0 105.2 105.4 105.6 105.8 106.0 106.2 106.4 106.6 106.8 107.0 107.2 107.4 107.6 107.8

100.0 100.2 100.4 100.6 100.8 101.0 101.2 101.4 101.6 101.8 102.0 102.2 102.4 102.6 102.8 103.0 103.2 103.4 103.6 103.8 104.0 104.2 104.4 104.6 104.8 105.0 105.2 105.4 105.6 105.8 106.0 106.2 106.4 106.6 106.8 107.0 107.2 107.4 107.6 107.8

S D 2008

M J S D 2009

M J S D 2010

M J S D 2011

M J S

Performance of Coincident Indicators vs Average of Last Six Expansions


Performance of Coincident Indicators vs. Average of Last Six Expansions

Consumer Deleveraging

(E516)


Index of Coincident Economic Indicators

Source: The Conference Board

Shaded areas representNational Bureau of

Economic Research recessions. 262932364146515764728090

101

262932364146515764728090

101

Falling = Consumers Decreasing Debt Rising = Consumers Increasing Debt

Household Debt as a % of Disposable Personal Income

Household Debt Includes: Home Mortgage Consumer Credit

6/30/2010 = 118.7%

66.6 68.4

83.2

130.2

58.563.3

81.8

Data Subject To Revisions By The Federal Reserve Board

58.5 -Year Mean = 75.1%

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

Household Debtas a % of Disposable Personal Income

(Year-to-Year Point Change)

6/30/2010 = -5.3% -6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

-6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Household Debt as a % of Disposable Personal Income


8

HOUSEHOLD DEBT / DISPOSABLE INCOME


Austerity

To repair their net worth, individuals (representing 70% of our economy) save more and spend less. Confidence is eroded, leading to fewer purchases of “big ticket items (homes & cars, for example).

Source: Bloomberg

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

123 Decades of the U.S. Personal Savings Rate

?

19851987

19891990

19921994

19951997

19992000

20022004

20052007

200910,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000Cumulative Net Worth in Trillions of All US Households

Individuals Feel Poorer So they save more

Compounding the problem, the baby boomers are now quickly approaching retirement.

9

10

Performance of Private Nonfarm Payrolls

Reduced Business Confidence + Structural Problems = Weak Hiring


Why? Outsourcing Machines

replacing people Failures of

education system

1991 “Jobless

Recove

ry”Average of L

ast 6 Expansio

ns

2001 “Jobless Recovery”

Mill

ions

of E

mpl

oyed

Am

eric

ans

Flirt with Deflation

(E707B)

Monthly Data 1/31/1960 - 9/30/2010

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Core Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index

9/30/2010 = 1.2%( )

Inflation Too Low

Inflation Too High

Fed's Preferred Range 1995 thru 2007

0.9

1.2

1.5

1.8

2.1

2.4

2.7

3.0

3.3

3.6

3.9

4.2

4.5

4.8

5.1

5.4

5.7

6.0

6.3

6.6

6.9

7.2

7.5

7.8

8.1

8.4

8.7

9.0

9.3

9.6

9.9

10.2

0.9

1.2

1.5

1.8

2.1

2.4

2.7

3.0

3.3

3.6

3.9

4.2

4.5

4.8

5.1

5.4

5.7

6.0

6.3

6.6

6.9

7.2

7.5

7.8

8.1

8.4

8.7

9.0

9.3

9.6

9.9

10.2

Core PCE Price Index (Year-to-Year Change)


11

Inflation (core personal consumption expenditure “PCE” y/y change)


Fed’s Target Range 1995 thru 2007

Untested Policy Response

12

As a Result of Unconventional Monetary Policy, Fed’s Balance Sheet Has Increased Substantially

13

Weekly Data 1/05/2007 - 10/29/2010 (Log Scale)

(E0595C)

$ BillionsTotal Reserve Bank Credit

10/29/2010 = 2282.7 ( )

865 913 963

1016107211321194126013301403148115621649174018361937204421572276

865 913 963

1016107211321194126013301403148115621649174018361937204421572276

Securities Held Outright ( ) 2043. 9 Mortgage-Backed Securities ( ) 1059. 4 Treasury Securities ( ) 834. 3 Agency Securities ( ) 150. 2

In $ Billions QE IBegins

QE IExpanded

End Tsy Buys

End ofQE I

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

10001100120013001400150016001700180019002000

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

10001100120013001400150016001700180019002000

F M A M J J A S O N D J 2008



F M A M J J A S O

Federal Reserve Bank Credit

Securities Held By The Federal Reserve

Data reflects Wednesday posting


Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

Black Dotted Line = GSE (Fannie & Freddie) Debt

Red Dotted Line = MBS

Blue Line = Treasuries

Green Line = Total Securities Held

QE1 Begins

QE1 Expanded

End Treasury

Buys

End QE1

QE2 Begins

QE2

Securities Held by the Fed


The Fed’s Actions Have Effectively Engineered Lower Rates

14

30-Year Fixed Mortgage Rate 2-Year New Car Loan Rate

Sources: Haver Analytics and Gluskin Sheff & Associates

But Demand Hasn’t Significantly Picked Up for Housing

15

Mortgage Bankers Association: Mortgage Loan Application for Purchase (seasonally adjusted)

Conference Board: Consumer Confidence Survey: Plan to Buy a Home Within Six Months

Sources: Gluskin Sheff & Associates, Mortgage Bankers Association, Conference Board

And Prices Keep Falling

16


(E534E)

9/30/2010 = 87.4

FHFA Purchase-Only House Price Index

Prior to Q1 1991, Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index For Purchase Transactions

Trendline Growth = 0.5% per annum ( )

+16.4%+19.4%

+50.5%

-17.5%

-7.5%

64.566.468.570.672.775.077.379.682.184.687.289.892.695.498.3

101.4 104.5 107.7 111.0

64.566.468.570.672.775.077.379.682.184.687.289.892.695.498.3

101.4 104.5 107.7 111.0

Real Home Prices Rising

Real Home Prices Falling

9/30/2010 = -4.3% Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency-12 -11 -10

-9-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

-12 -11 -10

-9-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Real FHFA House Prices

Real FHFA House Prices (Year-to-Year Changes) Copyright 2010 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved.

. www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/ . For data vendor disclaimers refer to www.ndr.com/copyright.htmlSee NDR Disclaimer at

FHFA HOUSE PRICE INDEX


We’ve Also Had a Big Fiscal Response

I’m Back

17

With Spending Far Exceeding Tax Receipts

Monthly Data 12/31/1964 - 10/31/2010 (Log Scale)

(E0300)

Federal Outlays 10/31/2010 = 3430.7

( )

Federal Receipts10/31/2010 = 2172.4

( )

$ Billions

144

225

324

441

576

729

900

1089

1296

1521

1764

2025

2304

2601

2916

3249

144

225

324

441

576

729

900

1089

1296

1521

1764

2025

2304

2601

2916

3249

Federal Outlays 10/31/2010 = -2.3%

( )

Federal Receipts10/31/2010 = 4.7%

( )

-15 -12

-9-6-30 3 6 9

12151821242730333639

-15 -12

-9-6-30 3 6 9

12151821242730333639

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Federal Outlays and Receipts (12-Month Totals)

Federal Outlays and Receipts (Year-to-Year Changes) Copyright 2010 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved.


18

Federal OutlaysFederal Receipts


During massive stimulus programs (like the New Deal), outlays widely outstrip receipts. ‘Ammunition’ for the next battle becomes dangerously low.

And Federal Debt Rises

19


(E0507A)

Debt Measure Ratio

Gross Federal + State&Local + GSE* Debt ( ) 156. 8%Gross Federal + GSE Debt ( ) 136. 0%Gross Federal Debt ( ) 90. 6%Publicly Held Federal Debt ( ) 59. 7%

*GSE = Government Sponsored Enterprises e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac**Q1 2010 spike due to FAS 166/167

24

26

28

30

33

36

39

43

47

51

56

61

66

72

78

85

93

101

110

120

131

143

156

24

26

28

30

33

36

39

43

47

51

56

61

66

72

78

85

93

101

110

120

131

143

156

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Government Debt (Federal, State, Local) + GSE Debt as a % of GDP


U.S. Government Debt as a Percentage of Our GDP (post war period)

State and Local Government Debt

GSE (Fannie & Freddie) Debt

Treasury Bonds Outstanding

Treasury Bonds Held by the Public

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009


So We’re Getting Some Political Tide-Shifting

20

Economic Strength Is Shifting

21

BRICs - Brazil, Russia, India, China – (in billions of dollars)

Point: Emerging economies are growing and becoming more and more important

Sources: JP Morgan & Emerging Markets Management, Inc.

And Emerging Markets Have Outperformed

22

Source: MSCI

Performance of International Markets Since E/M Bottom

E/M Strength Has Also Been Driving Up Commodity Prices

23


(E780)

Weekly Data 6/05/1981 - 11/19/2010 (Log Scale)

Reuters Continuous Commodity Index (CCI)(Equal-Weighted)

Scale Right

Source: Commodity Research Bureau, www.crbtrader.com

191 206 222 240 258 278 300 323 349 376 405 436 470 507 547 589

Reuters/Jefferies-CRB Index (Equal-Weighted)

Scale Left

Source: Thomson Reuters/Jefferies Financial Products, LLC

122 131 142 154 166 179 194 209 226 244 264 286 309 333 360 389 421 455

CRB Spot Raw Industrials Index (Equal-Weighted)

Scale Right

Source: Commodity Research Bureau, www.crbtrader.com 219 232 245 260 275 291 308 327 346 366 388 411 435 461 488 517 547

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Commodity Indexes I (Reuters-CCI)


A Bright Spot Has Been Large U.S. Corporations

24

Quarterly Data 9/30/1955 - 9/30/2010

(S0670)

Four-Quarter Total SalesYear-to-Year Change

9/30/2010 Est. = 7.7%

-12

-9-6

-30

3

6

9

12

15

18

-12

-9-6

-30

3

6

9

12

15

18

Four-Quarter Trailing Reported (GAAP) EarningsYear-to-Year Change

9/30/2010 Est. = 146.9%

Shaded areas representNational Bureau of

Economic Research recessions.

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

After Tax Profit Margin

9/30/2010 Est. = 7.6%

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

7.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

7.0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Standard & Poor's Industrials Sales, Earnings, and Profit Margin


S&P Sales Growth, Earnings Growth, & Profit Margins


Why Are Large U.S. Corporations Doing So Well?

The “blue chips” are selling globally and have tapped into the best growth areas well. Have extracted huge productivity gains in recent years Labor outsourcing has helped improve margins; global supply chain reduces costs and improves

quality. They’re benefiting from ultra-low borrowing costs right now. They have captured market share from small business and failed competitors.

25

Apple Store - Beijing McDonalds - Shanghai

Conclusions: Part 1 Consumer deleveraging is ongoing and will continue to crimp growth. The crisis has generated deflationary tendencies, which are being fought aggressively

with monetary and fiscal stimulus. Government demand has partially substituted for private demand, but the recovery

remains subpar by historical standards. With a super-high debt level, the government has few “bullets” left. In any case, the

Tea Party crowd will probably fight any new stimulus. Active policy cycle means policy mistakes are a key risk:

•Too easy too long = inflation and asset bubbles.•Not easy enough = deflation and a dragged out Japan-style purgatory•Too much fiscal response = possible Greek/Irish-style debt crisis

There are two bright spots: both blue chip corporations and most emerging market countries are posting very decent growth.

26

Part 2: The Fiscal Mess: Can We Overcome our Debt Burden?

Federal Debt to GDP at a New High

(E0501)


Gross Federal Debt______________GDP

= $13201.8 billion___________ $14575.0 billion

= 90.6%

35.1

67.0

31.6 31.6

55.6

32

35

38

41

44

48

52

56

61

66

71

77

84

91

32

35

38

41

44

48

52

56

61

66

71

77

84

91

27.2

49.0

23.124.5

32.0

Publicly Held Federal Debt___________________ GDP

= $8706.6 billion ___________ $14575.0 billion

= 59.7%

2426283032343638404244464850525456586062

2426283032343638404244464850525456586062

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Federal Debt as a % of GDP

Publicly Held Federal Debt as a % of GDP Copyright 2010 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved.


28

US Treasury Debt Relative to GDP (postwar period)


Is it possible to crawl out from under such a debt burden?

U.S.

U.K.

It Is Possible

29

US and U.K. Post War Debt Burdens (Debt to GDP)

Source: Niall Ferguson

But … Demographics were much more

favorable in the ‘50s– 16 workers per retiree in 1950– 3 workers per retiree today

We were in our China-like growth phase.

Fewer built-up entitlements. WW2 had destroyed the

competitiveness of much of the rest of world.

The UK did a lot of the work with inflation.

High Debt Has Led to A Crisis in Europe

30

PIGS = PORTUGAL

IRELANDGREECESPAIN

Yield Spread Over Treasuries


But It’s Not That Much Worse in the PIGS?

31

Source: IMF

Government Debt to GDP (mid-2010)

Harvard economist Niall Ferguson has coined the phrase the PIGS ‘R US.

Unlike Japan, We Don’t Buy Our Own Debt

32

Source: Fusion IQ

33

Source: Fusion IQ

We Can Do It if We … Change the tax system and expenditures to foster growth. Accept that you cannot have a universal provision of social benefits. Eliminate debt via some inflation. Encourage a rebalancing of the economy away from consumption and toward

investment.

34

If We Don’t Get Smart

35

=

We’re Doomed to This Outcome

Japan Has Been in a Slow-Motion Depression for 2 Decades

36

Source: Gluskin Sheff & Associates

Similarities

37


Similarities

38


Similarities

39


Part 3: Contango’s Investment Themes for 2011

How to Invest in 2011

In a slow-growth low-yield world, growth and income should carry a premium.– Invest in growing global franchises with cross-border brand appeal.– Invest in companies with strong free cash flow – especially ones that pay decent

and fair dividends.– Avoid companies with high commodity input costs.– Emerging market assets are OK for now but a bubble may be developing.

Some inflation is a goal of the Fed – keep a real asset allocation except at exuberant extremes (TIPS, commodities, real estate, infrastructure, MLPs)

Avoid long-duration fixed-income assets when inflation is a Fed goal. Push cash (zero-duration paper) into 2-year corporate paper – the Fed is on hold for at

least 18 months. Avoid the detritus of the last bubble (domestic real estate and financials) for 5-10

years (tech stocks are finally rallying after crashing 10 years ago and look good). Stock markets will grind higher but we’re past the best part of the rally and …

– Multiples (P/E ratios) remain in a bear market.– Sideways patterns last for 15 or 20 years.– In this environment be tactical – not a buy-and-hold investor.

Use valuation measures to avoid extreme bubbles but allow for some momentum.

41

100 Years of the Dow Highlights a Few Secular Bear Markets

42

Dow Jones Industrial Average (log scale)

Secular bear markets last an average of 15 years.


Don’t “Buy and Hold” During Secular Bear Markets …

43

Offer Big Trading Ranges – Just Don’t Be a Buy-and-Hold Investor


Part 4: Conclusions

In Review

The debt bubble had many causes and ultimately burst in late 2008. “Soggy” growth to continue in the U.S. on the back of an ongoing consumer

deleveraging cycle. Across the globe, the bursting of the debt bubble has shifted risk from the private to

the public sector. Bond investors have become vigilantes against the worst offenders and are picking off

the Euro peripherals. But the peripherals are not in that much worse shape than the reserve countries. The emerging world is growing at a good clip but asset prices are getting frothy. Corporations are doing well and have tapped into pockets of growth around the world. Equities have rebounded from their lows but remain in a secular bear market.

45

Common Sense Advice for CEOs & Directors

Try and tap into rapid growth in the emerging world (especially the BRICs).– Establish overseas sales channels in the BRICs.– Look for and try and sell to companies that have “cracked the code” and are

doing well in the emerging markets.– Some employees should be bilingual (Chinese, Spanish, Korean are important

languages).– Work on developing your brand.– Everyone’s online now – improve your non-US-facing web presence if you’re

looking to sell to the emerging markets. Geo-economic risks have made the currency markets quite volatile. Keep an eye on

the foreign exchange markets. Commodities remain in a long-term bull market. If you manufacture, watch all of your

commodity markets closely and consider hedging. Government customers will be much more frugal than in the past. Consumers will look for price points on the value side of the spectrum.

46

47

This presentation is based on assumptions and market conditions known to Contango at the time this presentation material was prepared. Unless otherwise noted, all examples provided herein are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. Assumptions and market conditions are subject to change, which may affect Contango’s final recommendation after an Investment Policy Statement has been developed with the client.

Unless the investment is a deposit of a bank and insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or other government agency, investments used in portfolios created by Contango are subject to losses.

Return information provided is hypothetical unless otherwise indicated. Additionally, return information represents the opinion of Contango. Information provided is not intended to provide specific advice, nor to be construed as a recommendation with regard to any particular investment or to provide any guarantee of results. The information contained herein employs proprietary projections of expected returns. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

When constructing portfolios, Contango may use certain components that are subject to quarterly, semi-annual or annual redemption provisions. This may affect the liquidity of the portfolio and availability of funds.

Contango is not responsible for any clerical, computational or other errors that may occur as a result of using data from outside sources, such as pricing information obtained from standard quotation services.

All dividends and distributions are reinvested in the asset classes indicated for each portfolio consistent with the weighting for that asset class.

If included in this presentation, model results do not represent actual trading and may not reflect the impact that material economic and market factors might have if Contango were actually managing your portfolio.

If performance figures are provided, they are gross of Contango’s investment advisory fees and do not reflect costs and expenses associated with portfolio transactions or taxes. Actual portfolio returns would be reduced by Contango’s investment advisory fees and other expenses incurred in the management of its investment advisory account. For example, if Contango were to manage a $1 million portfolio from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009, an 8.00% annual return figure would be reduced by a management fee of approximately 1.38%. Contango's management fees differ according to size and nature of the specific investment portfolio. Please see Contango's Form ADV for full details.

Disclosures

IMPORTANT NOTE: Investment products and services offered through Contango Capital Advisors, Inc., a registered investment adviser and a nonbank subsidiary of Zions Bancorporation, are not insured by the FDIC or any federal or state governmental agency, are not deposits or other obligations of, or guaranteed by, Zions Bancorporation or its affiliates, and may be subject to investment risks, including the possible loss of principal value of amount invested.

a look beyond the crisis - perry piazza

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