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Copyright © 2003 Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management. All rights reserved.This case was prepared by Professors Michael H. Moffett and Anant K. Sundaram for the purpose of classroom discussiononly, and not to indicate either effective or ineffective management.

A Global Manager’s Guide toCurrency Risk Management

Introduction

Since the advent of the floating exchange rates, any time that a transaction—whether that transaction isin goods, services, people, capital, or technology—has crossed borders, it has been subject to the influ-ence of changes in exchange rates. The basic problem posed by exchange rates on the cross-border firmis that money across borders has no fixed value. Consequently, neither does a transaction undertakenacross borders. In this Note, our purpose is to understand, categorize, and define the specific types ofexchange rate risks that firms face across borders, and to address how managers can plan for, manage,and hedge these risks. Specifically, this Note provides an overview of the risks posed by exchange rates tothe cross-border firm and the major strategies and solutions managers can employ to deal with them.

Why Should Companies Hedge?

Peter Drucker once noted that, “Not to hedge is to speculate. Exchange rates are a cost of productionthat financial executives must manage.”1 But what constitutes hedging and what constitutes specula-tion? What is the purpose of hedging? How, if at all, does hedging create value for shareholders?

An exchange rate hedge is an asset or position whose value changes (∆H) in the opposite directionto that of an exposure (∆X) as a result of a change in the exchange rate. A perfect hedge would be onewhose value changes in an equal and opposite direction, resulting in a net change of zero in the value ofthe combined position:2

∆V = ∆X + ∆H

Hedging therefore protects the owner of the existing asset from loss. It is, however, important tonote that while a hedge protects the firm against an exchange rate loss (relative to being unhedged), itcan also eliminate any gains from an exchange rate change that is favorable.

But this does not really answer the question as to what is to be gained from hedging. The value ofa firm is simply the net present value of all expected future cash flows discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. Hedging reduces the variance in expected cash flows, but does not necessarilyaffect the expected cash flows themselves. Reducing the variance—or what is referred to as “total risk” inthe theory of finance—is not necessarily the same as reducing “risk,” and therefore not necessarily thesame as reducing the discount rate from the standpoint of the investor. From the investors’ standpoint,

1 Keynote Address, Peter Drucker, Business International’s Chief Financial Officers Conference, SanFrancisco, 1990.2 Of course, as we will see, perfect hedges are nearly impossible to come by. To quote a professional colleague,Gunter Dufey (Professor Emeritus at the University of Michigan Business School), “A perfect hedge is onlyfound in a Japanese garden.”

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the risk that matters is that portion of the total risk that cannot be diversified away, often called the“systematic risk.” If currency risk is defined as “unsystematic risk” or “noise” in expected future cashflows arising from exchange rate changes, it has no impact on firm value. According to this argument,all that a manager does is waste the shareholder’s money by such hedging.

That said, proponents cite a number of reasons for why hedging can be valuable to the firm. Theargument most often made is that reduction of variance in future cash flows improves the planningcapability of the firm. If the firm can more accurately predict future cash flows, it may have a greaterincentive to undertake specific investments or activities which it might otherwise not consider. In arelated (and somewhat more subtle) vein, hedging can put a floor on the internally generated cash flowsof the firm, and, by doing so, can obviate the need to source externally generated capital in meeting itsinvestment and growth needs. This can be valuable if external capital is more expensive than internallygenerated capital—and, for a number of reasons such as transactions costs and signaling costs, it turnsout that external capital is, indeed, more expensive than internal capital.3

Reduction of risk in future cash flows reduces the likelihood that the firm’s cash flows will fallbelow the minimum required to make debt-service payments. Hedging can therefore reduce the likeli-hood of financial distress. Yet another reason that is advocated is that management has a comparativeadvantage over the investor in knowing the actual currency risk of the firm.4 Regardless of the level ofdisclosure provided by the firm to the public, management may possess an advantage in knowing thedepth and breadth of the real risks and returns inherent in the firm’s business. Thus, they may be awareof the benefits to a hedge that an investor does not see. Markets can be in disequilibrium because ofstructural and institutional imperfections, as well as external shocks (such as an oil crisis or war). Man-agement is in a better position than stockholders to recognize disequilibrium conditions and to takeadvantage of one-time opportunities to enhance firm value through selective hedging.5 Finally, there arethose who argue that by reducing the variance in cash flows, hedging can smooth the reported netincome, and this may be valuable in a financial market that pays undue attention to quarterly earningsfluctuations rather than focus of the long-term free cash flows.

Opponents of currency hedging make a number of equally persuasive arguments:6 Stockholdersare much more capable of diversifying currency risk than management of the firm. If stockholders donot wish to accept the currency risk of any specific firm, they can diversify their own portfolios ordirectly hedge against such risks. As noted above, reducing currency risk is not necessarily the same asadding value to the firm. In fact, since they are not free, hedging instruments use up precious resourcesof the firm which can lead to a net reduction in value. It is also possible that management conductshedging activity because it benefits them, even if it is at the expense of the stockholder. Deriving fromthe idea of separation of control and ownership, agency theory argues that management (control) isgenerally more risk-averse than stockholders (ownership) because their undiversifiable human capital istied up in the firm. If they bear firm-specific risks that are nondiversifiable, they will have the incentiveto worry about, i.e., want to lower, total risk rather than just systematic risk.

Similarly, many argue that managers cannot outguess the market. If foreign exchange markets arein equilibrium with respect to parity conditions, the expected net present value of hedging is zero—inother words, all hedges will be fairly priced by the market. How would managers know when the market

3 See K. Froot, D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, “A Framework for Risk Management.” Harvard Business Review,72, September-October 1994, 59-71. The set of ideas surrounding the costs of externally generated versusinternally generated capital and its implications for financial decisions is sometimes referred to as the“pecking order theory of capital structure.”4 See Rene M. Stulz, “Optimal Hedging Policies,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 19, No.2, June 1984, p. 127.5 Selective hedging usually refers to the hedging of large, one-time, exceptional exposures, or the occasional useof hedging when management has a definitive expectation on the direction of exchange rates.6 Good overviews of the “why hedge?” debate include Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Levi and Sercu(1991), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), Smith (1998), and Muelbroek (2002).

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is not in equilibrium? Indeed, if they did have such special skills and know that, would they not be ableto create more value for both themselves and their stockholders by speculating in currencies, rather thanproducing and selling goods and services? It is also possible that management’s motivation to reducevariance is sometimes driven by accounting reasons, rather than market value reasons. Managementmay believe it will be criticized more severely for incurring foreign exchange losses in its financialstatements than for incurring similar or even higher cash costs in avoiding the foreign exchange loss byundertaking hedging. However, efficient market theorists believe that investors can see through the“accounting veil” and therefore have already factored the foreign exchange effect into a firm’s marketvaluation.

As is the case with any such debate, the conclusion will vary with the individuals—both stock-holders and managements—involved. If there is any indication of who is winning the “why hedge?”debate, the reality is that more and more firms globally are practicing currency risk management everyday. Hence what follows.

Management of Foreign Exchange Risk

The Management Process

Successful management of foreign exchange risk requires a well-designed and well-implemented riskmanagement program. This requires a five-step process of understanding the motivation, the percep-tion, the identification, the construction, and the implementation of a comprehensive risk managementprogram.

[a] Motivation. Management strives to combine maximum sustainable growth in earnings with ad-equate yet prudently minimized commitments of capital. Some combination of these financialdimensions—the income statement and the balance sheet—give rise to the cash flows which are thetrue sources of value. And value is found by growth of stockholder wealth. If the assumption is thenmade that value arises from the business line(s) of the firm, i.e., the real activities that it undertakes,financial risks such as those posed by exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices can beseen for what they are—risks to the successful pursuit of the business’s value. It is thereforemanagement’s responsibility to organize, structure, and operate the business and its variety of fi-nancial functions to capture as many of the positive characteristics of exchange rate changes aspossible, while minimizing the downsides associated with them. The premise is that stockholdersinvest in a firm’s ability to profit from its line of business, not from its ability to speculate ormaneuver in the world’s currency markets.

[b] Perception. Risks are managed on the basis of how they are perceived. For example, risks may beinterpreted as continuous or discrete. A risk which is continuous can be accepted as inevitable, andgains and losses to the business arising from this risk can be accepted passively. A risk which isperceived as discrete, as foreign exchange risk often is, may be considered as one which occurs onlyperiodically and will perhaps be more actively managed.

[c] Identification. If a risk cannot be measured accurately, it cannot be managed. The most commonerror made by managers with regard to currency risks is to rush into the selection of a financial fixor a derivative which will eliminate a risk which has been only barely identified. Mistakes arecommonly made because inadequate time and effort have been spent in trying to understand thecomplexity of the problem. A comprehensive exposure analysis must include all traditional func-tional dimensions of the business including pricing, marketing, operations, accounting, financeand even compensation.

[d] Construction. Although the subject of most of the literature (particularly sales literature by finan-cial services providers), this is in many respects the easiest part of the problem. Once an exposurehas been properly identified and the firm’s risk management motivations and needs acknowledged,

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the construction of the hedge can be undertaken. This is in many ways one of the simpler aspects ofthe entire decision process.

[e] Implementation. The highly publicized derivative debacles of the 1990s have raised the conscious-ness that risk management programs may themselves constitute a risk to the firm when not identi-fied, constructed, or implemented properly. Lack of front office/back office separation (the organi-zational separation of the traders or dealers taking the positions and the legal and documentary staffrecording and monitoring the positions taken) led to many of the major fiascos, including thecurrency losses of Allied Lyons of the United Kingdom, Procter & Gamble in the United States,and Shell Showa in Japan. Questions such as the following need to be thought through. Whoshould manage and oversee the risk management process? Should it be centralized or decentralized?What are the performance evaluation issues raised by the risk management process for divisions andsubsidiaries? What are the information technology and reporting needs to manage such values atrisk in real time?

Types of Exchange Rate Exposure

The cross-border firm is affected by exchange rate changes three different ways. These three types ofexposure (see Figure 1) are: transaction exposure, translation exposure, and economic exposure.

[a] Transaction exposure. A transaction exposure arises whenever the firm commits (or is contractuallyobligated) to make or receive a payment at a future date denominated in a foreign currency. Trans-action exposures can therefore arise from operating and free cash flows, e.g., accounts receivableand payable arising from the conduct of business; commitments to buy or lease capital equipmentor financing cash flows, e.g., debt or equity service obligations arising from the funding of the firm’sbusiness.

[b] Translation exposure. A cross-border firm must periodically remeasure all of its global operationsinto a single currency for reporting purposes. This requires that the balance sheets and income

Figure 1 Conceptual Comparison of Difference between Economic, Transaction,and Translation Foreign Exchange Exposure

Source: Based on D. K. Eiteman, A. I. Stonehill, and M. H. Moffett, Multinational Business Finance,10th edition, Addison-Wesley Longman, 2004.

(Moment in Time When Exchange Rate Changes)

Translation Exposure Economic Exposure

Transaction ExposureImpact of setting outstanding obligations entered into before change

in exchange rates but to be settled after change in exchange rates

Time

Accounting-based changes in consolidated financial statements caused by a change in

exchange rates

Change in expected cash flows arising because of an unexpected

change in exchange rates

(Moment in Time When Exchange Rate Changes)

Translation Exposure Economic Exposure

Transaction ExposureImpact of setting outstanding obligations entered into before change

in exchange rates but to be settled after change in exchange rates

Time

Accounting-based changes in consolidated financial statements caused by a change in

exchange rates

Change in expected cash flows arising because of an unexpected

change in exchange rates

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statements of all affiliate operations worldwide be translated and consolidated into the currency ofthe parent company. Imbalances resulting from translation represent a potential change in the firm’sreported consolidated income, reported capital base, or both.

[c] Economic exposure. Aside from existing obligations of the firm which will be settled in foreigncurrencies at future dates (transaction exposure) and the imbalances resulting from consolidationpractices (translation exposure), the firm’s present value—firm value—will change as the value ofexpected future cash flows (and costs of capital) change as a result of unexpected exchange ratechanges. More precisely, a firm is said to have economic exposure to exchange rates when unantici-pated real (as opposed to nominal, a distinction we will clarify later in the Note) exchange ratechanges have a non-zero effect on its expected future cash flows. People also sometimes use theterms operating exposure, real exposure, and competitive exposure as synonyms for such economicexposure.

Transaction Exposure Management

A transaction exposure of the firm is a singular event, an individual foreign currency-denominated cashflow commitment which exposes the firm to a loss or gain upon settlement of the outstanding obliga-tion. The individual transaction exposure can be measured in a number of different ways. Consider, forexample, a U.S.-based manufacturer of heavy machine tools who accepts an order from a British buyerand agrees to invoice the sale in British pounds. He is exposed to the movement of the U.S. dollar/British pound exchange rate. If the sale is made for £100,000, payment due in 90 days from receipt ofinvoice, the U.S. firm will not know the exact amount in U.S. dollars until actual cash settlement.

When the British buyer first asked for a price quote from the American firm, a transaction expo-sure was implicitly created. Although far from certain at this point—many price quotes are made bysellers without receiving orders—the American firm has committed itself for some specified period oftime to making the sale at the stated foreign currency price. The price is quoted as £100,000, andsuppose the spot exchange rate on that date is $1.6000/£. Seven days later, when the spot rate is $1.6300/£, the order is made. Now this quotation becomes a contractual obligation of the firm, a true transac-tion exposure. But even at this stage, it is an obligation which is largely invisible. This is because al-though the firm has committed itself to the production and shipment of the machine tool, the contractitself is essentially work-in-process and not individually identified among the assets of the firm as aforeign currency-denominated asset. For this reason many firms do not identify the transaction as atransaction exposure at this point in time. It may take an additional few weeks to fill the order and readyfor shipment.

Upon shipment, however, things change. When the firm ships the product, losing physical con-trol over the goods, an accounts receivable is issued and the sale is now entered into the books of thefirm as a foreign currency denominated receivable. Settlement is due in 90 days. The value of thereceivable is then booked in current sales at the spot exchange rate in effect on the posting date. If thespot rate was $1.6200/£ on the shipping date, the sale would be booked as £100,000 x $1.6200/£, or$162,000. At the end of the 90-day period upon settlement of the receivable, the final settlement isrecorded at the spot rate of exchange on that date, $1.6100/£, and any difference between booking andsettlement is categorized as a currency gain or loss.

How are these gains and losses accounted for? In this case, a foreign currency loss of $1,000 isrecorded on the American firm’s books, settlement of $161,000 less a booked amount of $162,000. Thesomewhat counter-intuitive result of accounting practices is seen here, as a loss is recognized on thecompany’s income statement although the transaction’s value is higher at all dates, including settlement,than it was upon the initial quotation! As illustrated it is obvious that although generally acceptedaccounting practices record the transaction and exchange rate at the booking date, internally, the firmitself should be expecting a home currency value at settlement closer to that at which it initially quotedthe potential sale.

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Management Alternatives in Transaction Exposure

Transaction exposures can be managed, or hedged, using either contractual solutions or operationalsolutions. Contractual solutions include forward contracts, foreign currency options, and foreign cur-rency futures. These are financial derivatives, with their values changing over time as the asset underly-ing their value—in this case, a currency—changes. Contractual solutions enter the firm into derivative-based positions which manage the individual transaction exposure, at the end of which they are eitherliquidated or simply expire. Their cost ranges from zero out-of-pocket expense (forward contracts,although the bid-ask spreads represent an implicit transaction cost) to up-front payment (currencyoptions).

Operational solutions include risk-sharing agreements and currency matching. Risk-sharing agree-ments are pricing agreements whereby the buyer and seller of goods or services agree on a formula-based“sharing” of exchange rate changes. Currency matching is the ongoing process of matching cash inflowsand outflows by currency per period of time. Although operational solutions are inherently multi-period, many firms will, as a result of the structure of their continuing business, incur the same basictransaction exposure over and over again. Although many firms do not view operational solutions asrelevant to the individual transaction exposure, they are as relevant a choice for transaction exposuremanagement as are forwards, futures, and options.

Directional Views, Forwards and Options. The selection of the proper hedge is as much about thefirm’s philosophy towards exchange rate risks as it is about the financial theories underlying derivativeinstruments. There are two determinants in the hedge instrument selection process: (1) the willingnessof the firm to take a directional view on the movement of exchange rates over the period of the exposureand (2) the willingness to accept downside risk upon getting the directional view wrong.

A firm which wishes to hedge an individual transaction exposure, such as the £100,000 receivabledescribed previously, could enter into a forward contract with one of its banks to sell pounds at aspecific exchange rate upon receipt in 90 days. This forward contract eliminates the currency risk andthe firm gains the knowledge now of what the foreign currency denominated cash flow’s value will be indomestic currency terms upon settlement. Risk—both downside and upside—has been eliminated.The firm will now know with certainty the dollar revenues to be received and the currency gain or lossto be incurred.7 While the use of the forward contract does not require management to explicitly predictthe movement of exchange rates, it is important to recognize that the firm incurs an opportunity lossassociated with the gain foregone if the foreign currency had moved in the firm’s favor by the end of thelife of the exposure. (In our example, this would be the case if the British pound appreciated instead ofdepreciating.)

The use of currency options, however, requires the firm to form a directional view on the move-ment of the exchange rate over the period in question. If management predicts that the exchange ratewill move against it—in the case of the British pound denominated receivable, this would be for thepound to depreciate from $1.6000/£ toward, say, $1.5500/£—the firm could purchase a put option onBritish pounds. The put option will give it the right, not the obligation, to sell the British pounds at afuture date (maturity) for an agreed-upon exchange rate (the exercise price). The option would bepurchased as insurance against a depreciation of the British pound relative to the exercise price.8 If the

7 Because the forward rate is calculated from the current spot rate and the differential in the two currency’seuro-currency deposit interest rates using a model known as the Covered Interest Parity model, the forwardrate will normally differ from the spot rate. This will result in the firm realizing a currency gain or loss onsettlement; the gain or loss will, however, be known on the date on which the position is taken. For moredetails on Covered Interest Parity and the basics of how currency markets work, see the Thunderbird CaseSeries Note “Currency Markets and Parity Conditions.”8 The option would require an up-front payment for purchase, the premium, which may vary between 1%and 8%, depending on market conditions.

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British pound appreciates, i.e., ends up greater than $1.6000/£, the put option would be allowed toexpire worthless, since the firm can now bring back home more dollars than initially anticipated. If,however, the British pound depreciates to below $1.6000/£, the put option would be exercised toguarantee that the firm receives an exchange rate that is the originally agreed upon exercise price atsettlement. In other words by using a put option to protect its U.S. dollar receivable against the depreciationof the foreign currency, the firm has put a floor on the home currency value of its expected receipts.

In a similar vein, when the firm wishes to hedge a foreign currency payable—or more generallyexpected future payments in the foreign currency—and it has formed the directional view that theforeign currency would appreciate, it will buy a call option on the foreign currency. The call option willgive it the right, not the obligation, to buy the foreign currency at maturity for a certain exercise price.If the foreign currency depreciates, the call option would be allowed to expire worthless, since the firmcan now put out fewer dollars than initially anticipated to meet its foreign currency payment obligation.If, however, the foreign currency appreciates, the call would be exercised to guarantee that the firm paysno more than the exercise price for the exchange rate originally agreed upon. In other words, by using acall option to protect its U.S. dollar payable against the appreciation of the foreign currency, the firm has puta ceiling on the home currency value of its expected payments.

There are, however, complexities. Given the increasing sophistication of derivative securities likecurrency options, it is easy for management to lose sight of the significance of the individual transactionwithin the context of management’s general financial responsibilities. A firm which only occasionallyincurs foreign currency denominated transactions may be comfortable using only the simplest in finan-cial derivatives, for example, forward contracts, whereas firms which denominate large proportions oftheir cash flows in foreign currencies may develop a more aggressive approach. Often the resourcesemployed by firms to monitor markets and form directional views do not justify the resulting occa-sional gains and losses arising from a directional view-based hedging program. In most firms, currencygains above some benchmark such as the forward rate do not justify the losses incurred when directionalviewpoints prove off the mark.

A second complexity is that of derivative accounting and hedge accounting. Hedge accountingpractices, as outlined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),9 allows that gains andlosses on hedging instruments be recognized in earnings at the same time as the effects of changes in thevalue of the items being hedged are recognized, assuming certain criteria are met. If a forward contractwas purchased as a hedge of the British pound receivable noted previously, changes in the value of theforward contract would only be recognized in firm income when the changes in the value of the receiv-able were recognized, typically on settlement.

This would seem obvious except for the possibility that the 90-day receivable was created duringone year, but would be settled in the following year, e.g., after December 31, the firm’s end-of-yearbalance sheet date. Under traditional accounting practices, the firm would have to value the forwardcontract and the receivable on December 31 at the spot exchange rate on that date, and recognize thosevaluation impacts in current income.10 This alters reported current income even though no cash flowshave occurred. Many firms legitimately feel that such a practice defeats the purpose of hedging. Thecriteria set forth by FASB for hedge accounting sometimes create a difficulty. According to FAS 52,paragraph 21:

9 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is the authority in the U.S. that determines accountingpolicy for U.S. firms and certified public accountants. FAS Statement No. 52, applying to fiscal yearsbeginning on or after December 15, 1982, contains the primary provisions and practices to be used in thefinancial reporting related to foreign currency. FAS Statement No. 133, applying to fiscal years beginning onor after June 15, 2000, altered some of the primary terminology related to the use of financial derivatives usedin foreign currency accounting and reporting, but largely left the reporting treatments for foreign currencyestablished under Statement No. 52 unchanged (and as amended by FAS No. 138).10 Accounting practices would simply require the firm to value the forward contract and the receivableindependently and at current market value (marked-to-market). This is the procedure followed for allfinancial contracts or speculative instruments which any or all firms may enter into.

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A foreign currency transaction shall be considered a hedge of an identifiable foreign currencycommitment provided both of the following are met:

1. the foreign currency transaction is designated as, and is effective as, a hedge of a foreigncurrency commitment.

2. the foreign currency commitment is firm.

The first condition focuses on the ability of the forward contract to act effectively as a hedge, itsvalue moving in the opposite direction to that of the exposure given a spot exchange rate change. Thiscondition is typically met. The second condition is controversial. For a commitment to be considered“firm,” the exposure must have some type of financial certainty of occurring. For example, if a companyhas sold merchandise to a foreign buyer, a contract exists and the buyer can be expected to actually payas agreed. If, however, the receivable resulted from the sale of merchandise to an affiliate of the samefirm, there must be some basis for expecting the payment to occur in the amount and on the datedesignated. This is a difficult requirement for most multinational firms to meet since most intra-firmsales and transactions do not have explicit contracts or penalties for nonperformance.

Translation Exposure Management

Translation exposure arises because financial statements of foreign affiliates must be restated in theparent’s currency in order to consolidate financial statements. Foreign affiliates of U.S. companies mustrestate local currency statements into U.S. dollars so the foreign values can be added to the parent’sbalance sheet and income statement. Although the main purpose of translation is to prepare consoli-dated statements, they are also often used by management to assess the performance of foreign affiliates.Such restatement of all affiliate statements into the single common denominator of one currency facili-tates management comparison. Translation or accounting exposure results from change in the parent’snet worth, assets, liabilities, and reported net income caused by a change in exchange rates since the lasttranslation.

According to FAS Statement No. 52, the motivation for consolidation procedures is the follow-ing:

Financial statements are intended to present information in financial terms about the perfor-mance, financial position, and cash flows of an enterprise. For this purpose, the financial state-ments of separate entities within an enterprise, which may exist and operate in different eco-nomic and currency environments, are consolidated and presented as though they were thefinancial statements of a single enterprise. Because it is not possible to combine, add, or subtractmeasurements expressed in different currencies, it is necessary to translate into a single reportingcurrency those assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, gains and losses that are measured or de-nominated in a foreign currency.11

The objectives of translation according to FAS No. 52 are: (1) to provide information that isgenerally compatible with the expected economic effects of a rate change on an enterprise’s cash flowsand equity and (2) to reflect in consolidated statements the financial results and relationships of theindividual consolidated entities as measured in their functional currencies in conformity with U.S.generally accepted accounting principles.

Functional Versus Reporting Currency. FAS Statement #52 uses what is termed the “functional”currency approach. According to the FASB: “An entity’s functional currency is the currency of theprimary economic environment in which the entity operates; normally, that is the currency of theenvironment in which an entity primarily generates and expends cash.”12 The selection of the functionalcurrency for the remeasurement of the financial statements of a foreign operation has two primary

11 FAS No. 52, paragraph 4.12 Statement of FAS No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, FASB, December 1981, paragraph 5.

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effects: (1) it determines the procedures to be used in the measurement—in home currency terms—ofits financial position and operational results and (2) whether the exchange gains and losses resultingfrom remeasurement are to be included in the consolidated net income of the firm or reported as aseparate component of the consolidated stockholders’ equity.

The problem is that a foreign affiliate’s functional currency can differ from its reporting currency.A reporting currency is the currency used by the parent to present its own financial statements and thusnormally its home currency. The determination of functional currency is left up to management. Man-agement must evaluate the nature and purpose of its foreign operations to decide on the appropriatefunctional currency for each. The core principle behind functional currency determination is the iden-tification of which currency cash flow is the driving force of the affiliate’s business. The choice offunctional currency, in turn, determines the method—the “current rate” method or the “temporal”method—that is used to restate the financial statements of the foreign affiliate. A proper understandingof the differences between these restatement procedures depends on a number of very specific defini-tions of how certain assets, liabilities, and cash flows do or do not change with exchange rate move-ments.

Methods Used To Restate Financial Statements. When the foreign affiliate’s functional currency isthe same as the currency of its books, the appropriate procedure is referred to as “translation” by FASNo. 52. Translation requires that all elements of the affiliate’s balance sheet be restated into U.S. dollarsusing the exchange rate that prevails on the translation date and income statement items be translated atthe actual exchange rate at which transactions occurred, or some weighted average exchange rate. Anyresulting gains or losses resulting from the translation of the foreign affiliate’s financial statements arereported as adjustments to stockholder’s equity and are termed translation adjustments or cumulativetranslation adjustments (CTAs). Income statement items are translated as the actual exchange ratesprevailing on the date of transaction (or some weighted average). This method is often referred to as the“current rate” method.

When the foreign affiliate’s functional currency is the U.S. dollar then the appropriate procedureis referred to as “remeasurement.” Remeasurement, as described by FAS No. 52, requires that bothhistorical and current exchange rates be used in the restatement of the foreign affiliate’s financial state-ments into U.S. dollars. All monetary assets and liabilities are restated at current exchange rates, whileall non-monetary assets and liabilities are restated at the historical exchange rates. Monetary assets andliabilities are those balance sheet items whose amounts are fixed in currency units. For example, theaccounts receivable of the German subsidiary which are denominated in euro are fixed in the quantityof euro which are to be received on a specific future date. Because the exchange rate on that future dateis not now known, the receivable is valued at the spot exchange rate on the date of restatement. Non-monetary assets and liabilities are those balance sheet items whose amounts change with market prices.Any gains or losses resulting from the remeasurement of the foreign affiliate’s financial statements areincluded in consolidated income. This method is often referred to as the “temporal” method.

Figure 2 demonstrates the current rate method and the temporal method for the translation of thebalance sheet of a Mexican subsidiary of a U.S.-based company. Note that the current rate methodresults in translation adjustment loss (which would go to consolidated equity), whereas the temporalmethod results in a translation gain (which would go to consolidated income). The primary issue frommanagement’s viewpoint is where the translation gains (losses) are reflected. Since the temporal methodviews the currency of economic consequence of the subsidiary to be the same as the parent’s, any gains(losses) arising from remeasurement are reflected in consolidated income. For a subsidiary whose func-tional currency is that of the local market, however, gains (losses) resulting from its translation will bereflected in consolidated equity, not in current income.

Management of translation exposure continues to be a topic of substantial debate. On the onehand, the accounting method itself produces no underlying cash flow changes. On the other hand,under the “remeasurement” procedures of the temporal method, consolidated income could be affecteddramatically.

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Figure 2 Balance Sheet Translation of a Mexican Subsidiary of a U.S.-Based Company: A Comparisonof the Current Rate Method and Temporal Method

Panel A: Current Rate Method (Mexican peso is functional currency)

Mexican U.S. U.S.Assets pesos Ps/$ dollars Ps/$ dollarsCash 1,000,000 3.20 312,500 5.50 181,818Accounts receivable 7,500,000 3.20 2,343,750 5.50 1,363,636Inventory 13,000,000 3.20 4,062,500 5.50 2,363,636Net plant and equipment 18,500,000 3.20 5,781,250 5.50 3,363,636

Total assets 40,000,000 12,500,000 7,272,727

Liabilities & Net WorthAccounts payable 2,500,000 3.20 781,250 5.50 454,545Short-term bank debt 3,000,000 3.20 937,500 5.50 545,455Long-term debt 15,000,000 3.20 4,687,500 5.50 2,727,273Equity capitala 15,000,000 3.00 5,000,000 3.00 5,000,000Retained earnings 4,500,000 3.10 1,451,613 3.10 1,451,613

Total liabilities & net worth 40,000,000 12,857,863 10,178,886

Cumulative TranslationAdjustment (CTA)b (357,863) (2,906,158)

Panel B: Temporal Method (U.S. dollar is functional currency)

Mexican U.S. U.S.Assets pesos Ps/$ dollars Ps/$ dollarsCash 1,000,000 3.20 312,500 5.50 181,818Accounts receivable 7,500,000 3.20 2,343,750 5.50 1,363,636Inventory 13,000,000 3.10 4,193,548 3.10 4,193,548Net plant and equipment 18,500,000 3.00 6,166,667 3.00 6,166,667

Total assets 40,000,000 13,016,465 11,905,670

Liabilities & Net WorthAccounts payable 2,500,000 3.20 781,250 5.50 454,545Short-term bank debt 3,000,000 3.20 937,500 5.50 545,455Long-term debt 15,000,000 3.20 4,687,500 5.50 2,727,273Equity capitala 15,000,000 3.00 5,000,000 3.00 5,000,000Retained earnings 4,500,000 3.10 1,451,613 3.10 1,451,613

Total liabilities & net worth 40,000,000 12,857,863 10,178,886

Translation gain (loss)b 158,602 1,726,784

a Equity capital was injected when the exchange rate was Ps3.00/$, and retained earnings reflect avintage of exchange rates and earnings as retained.b Translation adjustments and gains (losses) are in essence a plug value which maintains the balanceof the entire translated balance sheet.

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Management Alternatives in Translation Exposure

There are a number of motivations for active management of translation exposure and not all of themare justifiable. The first is in the event of subsidiary liquidation. If a subsidiary has created CTAs, thesegains and losses will be realized in current income upon liquidation. A firm planning such a liquidationcould hedge against those in the period prior to liquidation.

A second motivation is to preserve the integrity of balance sheet ratios, particularly in light ofcovenants or other restrictions by creditors. A firm experiencing continual translation losses which areaccumulating in its equity accounts may see deteriorating ratios. To the extent that this leads to anincrease in the firm’s cost of debt financing and, hence, its cost of capital, it could have an impact on thevalue of the firm.

A third motivation for the management of translation is managerial compensation. Managementcompensation is frequently based on post-translation financials. During periods of appreciation of theconsolidation currency, management of subsidiary operations may feel that they are being unfairly heldto account for the movement of currencies, rather than for their ability to manage and grow the subsid-iary.

The fourth situation in which translation exposure may deserve active management is when asubsidiary is operating in an economic environment in which the currency is rapidly depreciating.Although accounting standards refer to this as “hyper-inflation,” the problem is currency depreciation,not necessarily inflation. (The linkage between prices and exchange rates is explored in the followingsection in detail.) For example, according to FAS No. 52, a subsidiary operating in an economic envi-ronment with a cumulative inflation rate of 100% or more over a three-year period must use the tempo-ral method and pass all remeasurement losses through current income. This could obviously result in asubstantial impact on consolidated income, something that the parent may wish to manage.

The final instance in which management or hedging of translation exposure has become signifi-cant is in the protection of consolidated reporting earnings. In recent years a number of major multina-tional firms have discovered that they can protect the reported U.S. dollar value of foreign earnings byhedging them. For example, in the third and fourth quarters of 2000, a number of major U.S. multina-tionals grew increasingly concerned over the depreciation of the euro (see Figure 3). Given the signifi-cant contribution of profits earned in euros to total profits, the depreciation of the euro resulted indeterioration of reported earnings per share. Some, like the Coca Cola Company which hedged thedollar value of its projected euro earnings, showed little material declines in consolidated earnings.Others, like Goodyear and Caterpillar, saw double-digit percentage reductions in consolidated earningsas a result of their unhedged euro earnings.

Actual management of translation exposure is difficult and potentially costly. Currency gains(losses) associated with liquidation may be covered with something as simple as a forward contract.CTA losses which are accumulating over time in the parent’s consolidated equity, however, are muchmore difficult to deal with. The basic balance sheet of the subsidiary must be altered by currency of

Figure 3 The Impact of the Depreciating Euro on Selected U.S. Multinationals

3Q/2000 Operating Reduction becauseIncome($ m) of Euro Depreciation

Goodyear $ 68 30.0%Caterpillar $294 12.0%McDonald’s $910 5.0%Kimberly-Clark $667 2.5%

Source: “Business Won’t Hedge the Euro Away,” Business Week, December 4, 2000.

12 B06-03-0006

denomination in order to reduce “exposed assets” without simultaneously reducing “exposed liabili-ties.” For example, if the Mexican subsidiary were to acquire additional debt and hold the proceeds innon-peso denominated assets of some kind—say, U.S. dollars—it could effectively reduce its exposureto losses arising from translation. This can, however, have a real cash flow impact in terms of differencesin interest rates either paid or received when altering assets and liabilities purely for translation pur-poses.

Management of Economic Exposure

On June 21, 1994, John F. Welch, then-Chairman and CEO of General Electric, wrote an op-ed articlein the Wall Street Journal arguing that “Global competitors [of U.S. firms] are taking actions that couldpush U.S. manufacturers from the deceptive tranquility of the eye back into the turbulence of a hurri-cane, a hurricane that this time will come with a ferocity that could be intensified should the currencygo the wrong way.” He went on to say, “If the Japanese are preparing to compete at 90 yen [to the U.S.dollar], the U.S. must be ready to compete at 130. Until we are, we delude ourselves if we think we arein control of our own fate.”

What was Mr. Welch talking about?

As it turns out, he was addressing an important issue concerning the impact of exchange rates onthe competitive position of U.S. multinationals, or a type of exchange rate exposure referred to as“economic exposure to exchange rates.” It is an issue that many CFOs—let alone General Managers andCEOs—do not actively think about for a number of reasons. One, it deals with the effects of exchangerates that have not happened yet, but could happen. Unfortunately it is inherent in the nature of manyincentive systems that managers get rewarded for their ability to deal with problems that have arisen inthe past rather than their ability to avoid problems of the future by careful anticipation. Two, it dealswith the effects of exchange rates that are sometimes difficult to pin down and measure; since informa-tion systems have a bias toward focusing attention on those things that can be measured, this issue oftengets overlooked. Three, understanding economic exposures requires us to understand a subtle distinc-tion between nominal and real exchange rates, a distinction that managers often do not worry about.

Economic exposure to exchange rate says that the only exchange rate change that matters for thevalue of cross-border cash flows is an unexpected real change in the value of a firm’s home currencyagainst the currencies in which a firm is conducting its business; a purely nominal change in the ex-change rate does not matter. Unlike the cases of translation and transaction exposures which can bemanaged using appropriate tools of risk management, economic exposure often requires resolutionthrough longer-term operational and strategic decisions made by the firm. Financial risk managementtools may not only be ineffective in managing economic exposure to exchange rates, but they mayactually be counterproductive.

The Intuition Behind Real and Nominal Changes in Currency Values

Analogous to concerns with the effects of inflation in the domestic setting on nominal versus real pricelevels, the effects of relative inflation rates between the home economy and the foreign economy matterfor the exchange rate between the two countries.

Taking the purely domestic case, when inflation rates are higher, goods and services cost more inan economy. But does that mean that purchasing power has eroded in that economy? Not necessarily.Whether or not purchasing power has eroded depends on what happens to incomes in the domesticeconomy. If incomes go up by exactly the same percentage as the rate of inflation in prices, nothinghappens to the real value of purchasing power in the economy. More precisely, there has been a nominalincrease in price levels, but real purchasing power has remained the same.

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An analogous idea holds in the international setting. When the foreign inflation rate is higher—and the domestic inflation rate does not change—the foreign country currency would be expected todepreciate against the domestic currency. In other words, the foreign currency costs less to buy usingdomestic currency. But that does not necessarily mean that the real value of our purchases of goods andservices across borders has become cheaper. Why? Since inflation rates are higher abroad than at home,if the increase in foreign prices for goods and services has exactly offset the decline in the value of theforeign currency, then purchasing power would remain the same. Just as in the domestic case, while theforeign currency has undergone a nominal depreciation, it has not undergone a real depreciation.13

Thus, what matters for purchasing power across any two countries is the change in the nominalvalue of a currency after adjustment for the changes in the relative inflation rates between the twocountries. This change, i.e., the change in nominal currency value between two countries over andabove that which would be predicted by the relative inflation rates between the two countries, is calledthe real exchange rate change. When a currency appreciates in real terms, its purchasing power abroadhas increased; when it depreciates in real terms, its purchasing power abroad has eroded.

Currencies and Purchasing Power Parity

Assume the United States (U.S.) is the home country and the dollar ($) the home currency, and theEuropean Union (EU), with its currency the euro (€), is the foreign country. Define the $/€ exchangerate—that is, the number of U.S. dollars it takes to buy each euro—as e.14 Suppose the $/€ exchangerate one month ago was $0.80/€, but the exchange rate is now $0.90/€—in other words, e has gone upby 10¢. But since it costs ¢10 more to buy the euro than it did one month ago, the dollar has depreci-ated by ¢10 against the euro (or equivalently, the euro has appreciated by ¢10 against the dollar).Suppose we denote the percentage change in the value of the dollar against the euro as ∆e. Then duringthe past month, ∆e = (0.90 – 0.80)/(0.80) = 12.50% or, the euro has appreciated by 12.50% against theU.S. dollar. Note that this is a positive number, that is, ∆e > 0. What if e had moved down to $0.70/€?In this case, the euro has become ¢10 cheaper during the past month, and ∆e = (0.70 – 0.80)/(0.80) =–12.50% or the euro has depreciated nominally by 12.50% against the U.S. dollar. Note that this is anegative number, that is, ∆e < 0.

The theory of PPP, perhaps one of the most influential ideas in all of economics, establishes a linkbetween prices in any two countries and their exchange rate. Suppose the domestic price level is P, theforeign price level is P*, and the exchange rate (direct quote from the standpoint of the domestic coun-try) is e. Then a version of PPP theory called Absolute PPP (APPP for short) would argue that thedomestic price level must equal the exchange rate-adjusted foreign price level, or:

(1) P = eP*

Consider a simple example. Suppose a BMW automobile costs €60,000 in France and the $/€exchange rate is $1/€. Then APPP (using the formula above) says that a similar BMW should cost$60,000 in the U.S. If not, the argument goes, there would be an arbitrage opportunity to buy in thecountry where the exchange rate-adjusted price is cheaper and sell in the country where it is moreexpensive. The very process of a free goods market undertaking such transactions would eliminate suchan arbitrage opportunity, with the result that APPP will become true in equilibrium.

13 The idea that currencies will be expected to depreciate in nominal terms when their inflation rates areexpected to be relatively higher is one of the most basic ideas in the theory of international finance, and iscalled the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP). The theory is developed more precisely in the next section.For a more substantial development of the ideas in this section, see the Thunderbird Case Series Note,“Currency Markets and Parity Conditions.”14 Such a definition of exchange rates––the number of units of domestic currency it takes to buy each unit ofthe foreign currency––is called the direct (or American) quote. The reverse quotation—the number of unitsof the foreign currency its takes to buy one unit of the domestic currency—is called the indirect (or European)quote. All of the following discussion will use direct quotes.

14 B06-03-0006

Suppose, for instance, the BMW costs only $50,000 in the U.S. At the current $/€ exchange rate,this works out to €50,000. French traders would have the incentive to start buying their BMWs in theU.S. by paying $50,000 and selling in France for €60,000, thereby making an arbitrage profit of €10,000.However, this happy situation will not last long. The demand for BMWs in the U.S. would go up, andthereby start to increase the U.S. price; likewise, the excess supply of BMWs in France would start tolower the euro price. Moreover, in the process of paying for their BMWs in the U.S., the French traderswould be supplying euros and demanding dollars in the foreign exchange markets; this would, in turn,depreciate the value of the euro and appreciate the value of the dollar (in other words e, defined from thedollar viewpoint, will start to decrease). More generally, going back to our APPP definition, P wouldstart to rise and both e and P* would start to fall, until such time that the prices for BMWs would be thesame in the two countries. In other words P (the U.S. dollar price) would be equal to eP* (the euro priceadjusted for the exchange rate).

This insight can then be used across a wide range of traded goods and services between any twocountries (or even a country and all of its trading partners). The result is the idea of PPP holding at thenational level (with respect to some aggregate measure of prices such as the producer or consumer priceindex) and with respect to the exchange rate between the two countries.

But note something important from the example above. Since prices were higher in France, theultimate result of this disequilibrium was to depreciate the euro against the U.S. dollar, so as to bringthings back into equilibrium. More generally, we might say that when inflation rates are higher inFrance relative to the U.S., we would expect the euro to undergo a nominal depreciation against theU.S. dollar. This idea can be made more precise, and it provides us with the most commonly used andunderstood version of PPP (it is, sometimes, also called Relative PPP). If we call ∆P the expecteddomestic inflation rate, ∆P* the expected foreign inflation rate, and ∆e is the expected change in thevalue of the U.S. dollar against the €, then the precise definition of relative PPP, or RPPP, says that:

1 + ∆P = (1 + ∆e)(1 + ∆P*)

This can be rearranged to form a simple expression for predicting the expected exchange ratechange given expected inflation rates between the two countries:

1*)1()1( −

∆+∆+=∆PPe

Note that when the domestic inflation rate is higher than the foreign inflation rate (that is, ∆P isgreater than ∆P*), ∆e will be a positive number, and hence, the foreign currency would be expected toappreciate. When the reverse it true, ∆e would be a negative number and the foreign currency would beexpected to depreciate.

For example, if the expected inflation rate in France is 10% and the expected inflation rate in theU.S. is 5%, then PPP would predict that ∆e = [(1.05)/(1.10)] – 1 = –4.55% meaning the euro would beexpected to depreciate by 4.55% against the U.S. dollar. Given the initial exchange rate of $1/€, the newpredicted exchange rate (eNew) would be:

eNew = 1 x (1 – .0455) = $0.9545/€

Now we are ready to tackle the idea of changes in the real exchange rate. Once we have done so, itbecomes possible to precisely define economic exposure to exchange rates and to explore the managerialimplications. In the example above, we saw that if PPP held, then given our inflation assumptions, wewould expect the euro to depreciate by 4.55% against the U.S. dollar. Suppose, however, that the actualdepreciation—or the nominal depreciation—turned out to be, say, only 2.5%. In other words, as eventsactually turned out, the euro depreciated by less than was predicted by PPP (by 2.05% less).

B06-03-0006 15

This difference of 2.05% is the real exchange rate change. In this particular case, although theeuro has undergone a nominal depreciation of 2.5%, the French franc has undergone a real appreciationof 2.05%! Why? Inflation differentials, i.e., RPPP, would have predicted a 4.55% depreciation; instead,the actual (or nominal) depreciation was only 2.5%. The euro ended up depreciating by less thanpredicted, and hence in real terms, this is tantamount to an appreciation.

More generally, if we define the real exchange rate as s, and the change in the real exchange rateas ∆s, then the real exchange rate change is defined as:

(4) ∆s = {Actual exchange rate change} minus {PPP-predicted exchange rate change}

= {∆eActual

} –

−∆+∆+ 1

*)1()1(

PP

In the example above, the PPP-predicted change was –4.55%, and the actual (or nominal) changewas –2.5% (recalling that appreciation will have a negative sign when using direct quotes). The value ofthe actual minus the PPP-predicted change is –2.5% – (–4.55%) = +2.05%, and since we are usingdirect quotes and the change is a positive number, it is a real appreciation of the euro.

Definition and Sources of Economic Exposure

A firm is said to have economic exposure to exchange rates when unanticipated changes in real exchangerates have a non-zero effect on its expected future cash flows.15 (People also sometimes use the termsoperating exposure, real exposure, and competitive exposure as rough synonyms for such economicexposure.) In the previous section we argued that what matters for economic exposure is real, and notnominal, exchange rate changes.

Let us now see why through a simple example. Suppose a U.S. firm is competing against a Japa-nese firm (in Japan) by exporting its products from the U.S. Its products are priced in yen (¥), but itscosts are incurred in the US$. Assume that the initial exchange rate is ¥100/US$ (the direct quote fromthe Japanese standpoint). Assume further that: (1) Initially, price per unit and average costs are the samefor the U.S. and the Japanese firm (they both are equally competitive); (2) They both sell the samenumber of units, in fact, just one each of the product; and (3) The price per unit is, say ¥100 (= $1 at thecurrent exchange rate) and cost per unit is, say, ¥80 (= $0.80 at the current exchange rate). All of theseare simplifying assumptions. The initial profit margin for both firms is, therefore, 20%.

Panel A of Figure 4 summarizes the initial competitive situation for the two firms.

Suppose the U.S. inflation rate goes up to 10%, while there is no price inflation in Japan (that is,the Japanese inflation rate is 0%). Using the RPPP formula (and treating Japan as the home country),we can calculate what would be expected to happen to the ¥/$ exchange rate:

1*)1()1( −

∆+∆+=∆PPe = (1/1.1) – 1 = –9.1%

15 As an aside, economists would define it as follows: A firms is said to have economic exposure to exchangerates when ∂π∂s is greater than or less than zero (where π is the firm’s cash flows, s is the real exchange rate,∂ can be interpreted as the “change in.” Thus, “∂π∂s” captures the idea of the “change in the firm’s cash flowswith respect to a change in the real exchange rate.”

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Thus, RPPP would predict that, given the 10% higher inflation rate in the U.S. compared toJapan, the U.S. dollar will depreciate by 9.1% against the Japanese yen. Therefore the new predictedexchange rate would be:

eNew = (¥100/$) x (1 – 0.091) = ¥90.9/$.

Suppose the exchange rate moves exactly as predicted by PPP—in other words, all of the exchangerate change is purely nominal. What would happen to the competitive position of the U.S. firm againstthe Japanese firm? Panel B of Figure 4 examines this. First, note that nothing happens to the Japanesefirm (since there is no inflation in Japan): its still sells its product for ¥100, incurs a cost per unit of ¥80,and makes a profit of ¥20 for a profit margin of 20%. What about the U.S. firm? Given the 10%inflation in the U.S., its costs have gone up by 10%, to 88 cents for each unit produced and sold.However, its revenues have also gone up by 10%. This is because, at the new exchange rate of ¥90.9/$,its Japanese sales of ¥100 are translated to $1.10 back in the U.S. Its profit is now 22 cents and its profitmargin is the same 20% as before. In other words, because PPP held, all the change in the exchange ratewas purely nominal, and nothing happens to the competitive position of either firm.16

Figure 4 Real Currency Changes and Economic Exposure:Initial Situation (Panel A) and PPP Holds (Panel B)

Panel A: Initial Situation

Exchange rate = ¥100/$ U.S. Exporter Japanese CompetitorRevenue $1.00 ¥100Costs $0.80 ¥ 80Profits $0.20 ¥ 20

Profit Margin 20% 20%

Panel B: PPP Holds (10% U.S. inflation; 0% Japanese inflation)

Exchange rate = ¥90.9/$* U.S. Exporter Japanese CompetitorRevenue $1.10 ¥100Costs $0.88 ¥ 80Profits $0.22 ¥ 20

Profit Margin 20% 20%

* The new exchange rate is derived by applying PPP formula to obtain ∆e,and then multiplying (1 + ∆e) by the initial exchange rate of ¥100/$.

16 But you may be asking, “Isn’t the U.S. firm making 22 cents now compared to 20 cents before?” The answeris, “Of course!” but the 22 cents today is worth only yesterday’s 20 cents in terms of purchasing power, sincethere is a 10% inflation rate in the U.S.!

Figure 5 Real Currency Changes and Economic Exposure: PPP Does Not Hold

Exchange rate = ¥100/$* U.S. Exporter Japanese CompetitorRevenue $1.00 ¥100Costs $0.88 ¥ 80Profits $0.12 ¥ 20

Profit Margin 12% 20%

* Assumes 10% U.S. inflation rate, 0% Japanese inflation rate, but exchangerate does not change from the initial level of ¥100/$ as shown in Panel A ofFigure 4.

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Now let us see what happens if PPP fails to hold. Despite the 10% inflation rate in the U.S.,suppose the ¥/$ exchange rate stayed the same as before, at ¥100/$. This would imply that, instead ofdepreciating by the expected 9.1% as predicted by PPP, the US$ stayed put, and therefore, it actuallyappreciated in real terms by 9.1%. Figure 5 addresses what happens to the competitive positions of thetwo firms:

Again, we see that nothing happens to the Japanese firm: its domestic revenues stay at ¥100, itscost at ¥80, profit at ¥20, and its profit margin is the same 20% as before. But the U.S. firm is now introuble—since there is 10% inflation in the U.S., its costs have still gone up, 88 cents. However, its yenrevenue of ¥100, when translated into US$, brings in only $1.00 at the still prevailing exchange rate of¥100/$. The U.S. firm’s profit shrinks to 12 cents, and its profit margin to 12%. (And the manager ofthis firm might be asking, “What is going on here?” given that the exchange rate hasn’t even changed.)

In fact, this is a relatively benign scenario. A worse competitive situation would be one where theJapanese competitor, knowing this, was to start lowering his yen prices and thereby start to take awaymarket share. This would put pressure on the U.S. firm to either reduce its profit margins further (bymatching the competitor’s pricing move in order to keep market share) or lose share and lower totalprofits.

We can take away a number of important insights from this seemingly simple example:

• Purely nominal changes in currency values are irrelevant for economic exposure to exchangerates. What matters is a real appreciation or a real depreciation.

• A real appreciation of the home currency is bad news for those whose costs are incurred in thehome currency and revenues are incurred in the foreign currency. This is typically the case withexport-intensive firms, or firms that have sales subsidiaries abroad that are financed in thehome currency, or firms that rely on income sources such as royalty payments from abroad. Areal depreciation, on the other hand, is good news for such firms.

• A real depreciation of the home currency is bad news for those whose revenues are incurred inthe home currency and costs are incurred in the foreign currency. This is typically the case withimport-intensive firms, or firms that have subsidiaries abroad that supply to the parent com-pany, or firms that have to make royalty payments in the foreign currency. A real appreciation,on the other hand, is good news for such firms.

• If your costs are denominated in the home currency and your competitor’s costs in the foreigncurrency, then a real appreciation will make you less competitive. The reverse is true with a realdepreciation.

Management Alternatives for Economic Exposure

The simple example above suggests that there are three categories of exchange rates that matter in orderto figure out whether (and how much) a firm or division has economic exposure: (1) The currency ofdenomination of the firm’s revenues; (2) The currency of denomination of the firm’s costs; and (3) Thecurrency of denomination of the firm’s competitors’ revenues and costs. A firm is likely to have eco-nomic exposure to exchange rates whenever the currency of denomination of its revenues is differentfrom the currency of denomination of its costs, i.e., when (1) and (2) are in different currencies, orwhen the currency of denomination of its revenues and costs are different from that of its competitors,i.e., even if (1) and (2) are in the same currency, when they are different from (3).

Thus, the first set of questions that a manager needs to ask concerning the possible existence ofeconomic exposure are the following:

• What is the currency of denomination of my costs versus that of my revenues? Are they differ-ent?

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• What is the currency of denomination of my costs and revenues versus those of my competitor?Are they different?

If the answer to either question is “yes,” then a firm (or a division) is likely to have economicexposure to exchange rates.

An Example: The Case of Jaguar plc. Towards the end of 1984, Jaguar plc, a U.K.-based manufac-turer of luxury high-priced automobiles, was assessing its economic exposure to exchange rates. In theirLondon offices, CFO John Edwards was getting advice from his economic advisors and he himself wasconvinced that the sustained real appreciation of the U.S. dollar had begun to run out of steam, and thecurrency value was about to reverse course. To the extent that price changes took place in this market,one firm usually played the role of price leader—in the U.S. market, Daimler Benz plays this role.

Jaguar sold over 50% of its cars in the U.S., and its production costs and factories are U.K.-based;further, labor accounts for a significant portion of the cost base for luxury cars. In the recent past, Jaguarhas performed extremely well in the U.S. market, thanks in large part to the substantial real apprecia-tion of the U.S. dollar against all European currencies. While the strong dollar gave Jaguar the opportu-nity to cut its prices, it had not done so (nor had its competition). Mr. Edwards knew that the projecteddepreciation of the U.S. dollar would seriously cut into his profitability, and some upward revision ofprices would be required if the depreciation did happen. For starters he had to make a broad assessmentof the nature of Jaguar’s economic exposure to exchange rates.

The first question confronting Mr. Edwards was, which are the main currencies that he shouldworry about vis-à-vis his economic exposure to exchange rates? The U.S. dollar only, the U.K. poundonly, or the Deutsche mark only, or all three? The answer is, all three.

His exposure to the US$ and UK£ is fairly obvious. First, since a substantial part of his revenuesare denominated in the US$, he should worry about the US$ as the currency of denomination of hisrevenues. Second, since most of his costs are U.K.-based, the currency of denomination of costs is theUK£. Given the mismatch between the two, the $/£ exchange rate is a crucial (and direct) determinantof his economic exposure. Any real appreciation of the UK£ (and thus a real depreciation of the US$)will have the immediate effect of lowering his revenues in UK£ terms (or increasing his costs in US$terms). If he were to increase his US$ prices of cars to keep his profit margins constant at the pre-U.S.dollar depreciation level, demand would drop and he would sell fewer cars. If he kept his US$ price thesame, his profit margins would be squeezed, and hence possibly the company’s share price as well.

On top of these considerations, he also must worry about the indirect, competitive exposure tothe DM, since that is the currency of denomination of the costs of his major competitor, Daimler Benz.Daimler Benz’s ability to price its products in the U.S. (and hence create competitive pressure for Jaguarsales in the U.S.) will depend on what happens to the $/DM exchange rate, and since that, in turn, willautomatically imply an exchange rate between the UK£ and the DM, Mr. Edwards must closely moni-tor developments in the UK£/DM exchange rate as well.

Assuming that a real depreciation of the U.S. dollar is a very strong likelihood, what would be theideal scenario of exchange rate changes that Jaguar could hope for, in order to at least mitigate theimpact of the dollar depreciation? His only hope from a competitive standpoint is that the US$ depre-ciates by a greater percentage against the DM than it does against the UK£. That would squeeze hiscompetitor’s margins worse than his own, and perhaps force Daimler Benz to raise its US$ prices,thereby providing Jaguar the cover for a price increase of its own.

Sources of Economic Exposure: Any time that a firm undertakes a transaction across borders—whether that transaction is in goods, services, capital, people, or technology—it puts itself into a situa-tion where there is the likelihood of direct economic exposure to exchange rates. In addition, as we haveseen, even a firm (or division) that considers itself purely domestic (in other words it both sources andsells locally) is not necessarily immune to economic exposure: If the source of its competition is from

B06-03-0006 19

abroad, it faces competitive exposure to exchange rates. Thus, economic exposures arise from the opera-tional and strategic decisions that a firm makes. Any time that a market is chosen, a sale is made, aproduct or raw material is purchased, financing is taken on, royalty payments received, or a new plantis located in a foreign country, the firm faces the likelihood of economic exposure to exchange rates. Inaddition, any time that a foreign competitor enters the competitive picture, there is possibly competi-tive exposure as well.

Thus, it is important to recognize that exposures are created continuously, at the frontlines ofcorporate activity. More often than not, economic exposures are actually created by the marketingmanager, the production manager, and the purchasing manager. While this may seem obvious after thefact, it is nonetheless an important point to make—non-financial managers often simply assume thatexchange rates are something to “just let the Treasury worry about.” Indeed, the office of the CFO hasa relatively limited role in creating economic exposure. It does so only if it makes financing decisions incurrencies that are different from the currency of denomination of its assets. Given the fact that thesource of economic exposure is the operational and strategic decisions made by a firm, the solutions alsolargely lie in the operational and strategic arena. Unlike the case of the other two types of exposure, theCFO’s role is more limited (although, as we will see, the CFO’s office can also perform a role in limitingeconomic exposures)—management of economic exposures is the task of a General Manager more thanit is a task of the CFO.

Managing Economic Exposure on the Revenues’ Side. In managing economic exposure on therevenues’ side, the fundamental issue comes down to that of finding the appropriate mix between theprice at which the product is sold abroad and the volume sold. In turn, there are at least eight factors toconsider:

(i) the demand elasticity;(ii) the nature of returns to scale;(iii) whether the currency change is expected to be temporary or permanent;(iv) whether the firm can create entry barriers;(v) whether the product is differentiated;(vi) how distribution channels and consumers will react to price cuts;(vii) the currency invoicing strategies used;(viii) and finally, whether competitors will react passively or aggressively to any pricing moves.

Suppose, for specificity, that we are considering a U.S. exporter selling a product in Japan, incur-ring most of its costs in the U.S., competing against Japanese firms. Also, suppose the Japanese yen hasundergone a real appreciation against the dollar. The firm is now faced with an interesting choice: (1)maintain the yen price at the pre-depreciation level, let the dollar price rise thereby yielding extra dollarprofits on each unit sold and maintain market share; or (2) lower the yen price, maintain the dollar priceat the previous level, maintain per-unit profitability at least at previous levels, thereby gaining extramarket share from the increased Japanese demand resulting from lowered yen prices. How should theexporter respond to this situation?

The price elasticity of demand for its product would determine the extent of increase in de-mand—the higher the elasticity, the better off the firm in terms of increasing its market share in Japanfrom a price cut. It is possible that the firm may have scale economies resulting from the increasedvolume, e.g., because it may have excess capacity, or it might be able to take advantage of the learningcurve by producing extra units, or there may be cost savings through access to fixed distribution andtransportation costs, etc. Such scale economies would actually increase the dollar per-unit profit margin(compared to previous levels).

Next, the firm has to form a judgment on whether the depreciation is expected to be a temporaryphenomenon. For example, what if, a few months later, the yen depreciated back to its original level? Ifthis happened the exporter might have to raise its yen prices in order to return to its original level of

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profitability. Whether or not it can do so will depend on a number of factors, including its ability tocreate entry barriers (e.g., is the product differentiated and does the firm have blocking access to distri-bution channels?); whether and how consumers will react to price fluctuations (e.g., are consumerslikely to be alienated by the uncertainty at the point of purchase resulting from price changes that occurevery time exchange rates fluctuate?); the competitive structure of the product-market (e.g., does thefirm compete in a market with “aggressive” competitors or “passive” competitors?).

Moreover, the firm has to consider whether the distribution channels in Japan would simply soakup the yen price cut, so that the consumer does not see any significant price reduction at the point ofpurchase. If this happened, then the firm would see no benefits from cutting yen prices. Invoicingstrategies also matter. If the exporting firm invoices in its home country currency (in this case, thedollar), then the appreciation automatically translates, by default, to the market share-increasing deci-sion, i.e., maintain the dollar price, thereby lower the yen price by the full extent of the depreciation. If,on the other hand, the exporting firm invoices in the foreign currency (in this case, the yen), its deci-sion, by default, is to maintain the yen price, thereby automatically increasing the dollar price andmaintaining market share.

The main thing to note from the discussion above—we are in the realm of operational and strate-gic decisions that would have to be made by a marketing manager or a general manager, rather thanfinancial risk management decisions by a CFO!

Managing Economic Exposure on the Cost Side. Most import-based firms, particularly those thatrely on natural resources such as petroleum and minerals (e.g., firms in oil, steel, and commodities) andfirms in food processing and textiles as well as firms that tend to outsource their component and partssupplies from abroad (e.g., firms in computers, commercial aircraft, and automobiles), are often equallyaffected by real currency movements on the cost side as they are on the revenues side.

In many ways, cost management strategies in the face of a real currency movement are the reverseof those related to revenue strategies, in that a similar underlying set of variables affect strategic choices.First, note that currency movements matter for the firm’s costs only in situations where the firm sourcessome or all of its inputs, e.g., raw material, intermediate products, labor, technology, from abroad. If thefirm buys its inputs solely in the domestic markets, any direct currency effects are unlikely. If the firm’shome currency appreciates against the supplier’s currency, cost management is less of a problem, andindeed, becomes more of an opportunity for managing additional profits arising from cost reduction.The reason is that, under an appreciation, the firm has to pay fewer units of its home currency to buythe same amount of inputs in the foreign currency. There is, however, the issue of whether the firmshould pass on any of the currency-related savings to its input suppliers.

The difficult cost management issue arises from a depreciation of the home currency againstsupplier currencies and is as follows: given that most firms have input sourced from abroad, how muchof the home currency depreciation can be (i) passed-through to the suppliers of these inputs; (ii) in theevent that pass-through of costs to suppliers is difficult, how much can be passed-through to consumersthrough price increases; (iii) in the event that both (i) and (ii) are difficult to accomplish, what are theoptions available to diversify into new sourcing alternatives from more favorable currency areas? Theanswers to these questions depend on (a) the buyer power that the firm exercises over its suppliers; (b)the nature of the contracting relationship between the supplier and the firm; (c) the currency invoicingstrategies used; (d) the availability of alternate suppliers of inputs and (e) the permanence of currencymovements.

Clearly, the firm’s ability to pass-through the impact of a depreciation to suppliers will depend onthe power it has over its suppliers, as well as the nature of contracting with its suppliers. The higher thebuyer power of the firm, the greater its ability to insulate its costs from the impact of currency move-ments. However, the more formal and long-term the contracting between the firm and its suppliers, thelower its ability to insulate its costs from the impact of currency movements. Similarly, if the firm

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invoices its supplies in its home currency, it obviates the problem and lowers the impact of currencymovements. On the other hand, if it invoices its supplies in the seller’s currency, any currency move-ment impacts are passed-through directly to the firm’s costs.

What if a firm has little power over its suppliers, or is unable to undertake spot contracting withits suppliers, or operates in a supplier market in which the invoicing is done in the seller’s currency? Thefirst option is to examine whether the impact of the cost increase resulting from the currency deprecia-tion can be passed-through to customers. Decision variables in this case revert to those we discussedunder pricing and revenue strategies in the previous section. A more stable—and longer term—optionis for the firm to diversify its supplier base across at least two or three major currency areas, e.g., the U.S.dollar, euro, and Japanese yen currency blocs. This sourcing flexibility is particularly crucial if thecurrency movement can be expected to be more than temporary—say, expected to last two or threeyears, not an unusual scenario if the events of the past decade are any guide. Again note, the appropriateresponses to economic exposure requires operational and strategic, rather than financial decisions. Thatsaid, it turns out that the CFO’s office can help.

Managing Economic Exposure Through Financial Decisions. Financing decisions can play a role,too, in hedging economic exposures. However, these opportunities present themselves primarily in themanagement of revenue-based economic exposure rather than cost-based or competition-based eco-nomic exposure. When the firm has revenues denominated in a currency other than its home currency,what it has, in essence, is an asset denominated in the foreign currency. This can be managed by creatingan appropriate liability (that is, financing) in the foreign currency. If the foreign asset is long-lived, thatis, the firm foresees the possibility that such foreign currency revenues will be an integral part of its long-term global strategy, then it would be appropriate to take on long-term financing in that currency.

There are two broad choices: issue foreign currency debt, or issue equity by listing its stock in theforeign country. It is beyond the scope of this Note to go into the ramifications of the debt versus equitydecision, except to point out that if debt is chosen as the source of long-term foreign currency financing,the firm may wish to consider whether there are opportunities to undertake foreign currency swaps. Inmany instances, the market for foreign currency swaps are more liquid (and go out to longer maturities)than the markets for straight debt issues. Moreover, it may be possible for the firm to profitably swapsome of its existing home currency long-term liabilities rather than issue new debt.

Consider the case of Walt Disney Company in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s, Disney set up TokyoDisneyland as a franchise from which it was expecting substantial (and fast-growing) yen revenues wellinto the foreseeable future—thus it had a substantial yen asset on its books. Soon thereafter Disneyundertook a number of foreign currency swaps worldwide. It issued debt in many different currencies,e.g., Swiss francs, French francs, and so forth, and swapped them back to yen to create a yen liability,with a counterparty that was interested in getting rid of its yen liability and taking on the liability in thecurrency in which Disney was issuing its debt. Disney, however, refrained from issuing equity in Japan,perhaps because a royalty stream is a relatively steady, senior, and nonresidual cash flow to Disney, andhence there was no need to back it with an equity-type financial instrument. As a result of such financ-ing decisions, by the early 1990s, Disney was able to hedge away a major portion of its economicexposure to yen.

An Example of Economic Exposure Management by Japanese Firms. The period 1994 to early1995 was a rough one for many Japanese exporters. During this period the yen appreciated by 33% inreal terms against the dollar (from about ¥120/$ to ¥80/$). The earnings of many well-known firms inJapan were quite substantially hurt and many of them reported record losses because of this sudden andsevere appreciation of the yen against the dollar. How did Japanese firms cope with this appreciation?

Japanese firms undertook aggressive cost-cutting. Specifically: (1) they focused on continuouscost improvement, by cutting production costs and by laying off later entrants into the workforce; (2)they altered sourcing strategies, by moving production abroad, especially to low-to-middle income

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Asian countries such as the Philippines and Thailand and by aggressively squeezing their second-tierand third-tier suppliers; (3) they altered their pricing strategies, by cutting profit margins rather thanincreasing the dollar price of their exports.

As a result, by mid-1995, many Japanese firms were leaner and more cost-competitive (measuredpurely in the domestic currency) than they were prior to the yen appreciation. The results of this cost-cutting were strikingly evident in an annual survey conducted by the Economic Planning Agency ofJapan on the breakeven yen per dollar exchange rate at which major Japanese exporters would cease tobe profitable. The survey results, for the years 1994-96 are shown in Figure 6:

In 1994 about 50% of Japanese firms said that they would remain profitable if the yen appreciatedto less than ¥120/$—in other words, it would require a yen-dollar exchange rate of ¥120/$ and abovefor nearly half the Japanese firms to continue to make a profit. Indeed, fewer than 1% of firms surveyedindicated that they would be profitable if the yen were to appreciate to less than ¥100/$.

By 1996, after two years of cost-cutting, things had changed quite a bit. Over 90% of Japanesefirms indicated that they would be profitable if the yen were to stay at a level of ¥120/$ or above. Moststriking of all, compared to less than 1% of all firms in 1994, nearly one-quarter of the surveyed Japa-nese firms indicated that they would remain profitable even if the yen were to appreciate to less than¥100/$. No wonder Mr. Welch was worried!17

Overall Guidelines on Currency Exposure Management

It should be obvious by now that active management of economic exposure requires a firm-wide responseand one that should be the concern of a General Manager rather than just the CFO. One, the first stepis to ask the two key questions raised earlier regarding the currency of denomination of a firm’s revenuesand costs and the currency of its competitors’ revenues and costs. In making this assessment, it is notnecessary for the firm to expend its resources to track every exposure by every single currency; rather, itmakes sense to use an 80/20 approach, i.e., 80% of what is relevant is often to be found in just 20% ofthe detail. Usually, two or three currencies tend to account for a large portion of direct economicexposures, just as competitors from just one or two major currency areas often account for a majorportion of competitive exposures. It is imperative that General Managers of multinational firms knowwhat these currencies are.

Two, the firm must set up a currency reporting system to track exposures as they develop. Such asystem should encompass exposures by currency, by maturity, and by operating unit. It is necessary tomake operating divisions responsible for reporting their exposures at least monthly, so that the firm cankeep track of developments before real currency values stray too far.

17 The survey also found that if the exchange rate stabilized to around ¥110/$, Japanese car manufacturerswould, on average, more than double their profits (relative to ¥80/$). As of the time of writing, the exchangerate had stabilized around ¥118/$.

Figure 6 Breakeven Exchange Rates: Percentage of Japanese Firms PlacingOwn Breakeven Rates in the Range Indicated

1994 1995 1996Less than ¥100/$ Neg 13.7% 22.9%¥100/$ to ¥110/$ 14.1% 37.3% 41.4%¥110/$ to ¥120/$ 36.9% 30.1% 25.4%¥120/$ to ¥130/$ 37.7% 14.2% 8.5%More than ¥130/$ 10.8% 4.7% 1.8%

Source: Economic Planning Agency of Japan.

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Three, it is necessary to involve Treasury at early stages of major sales or purchase decisions thatinvolve a currency other than the firm’s home currency. This does not mean that the Treasury must havea say in the choice of currency (let alone the structure of the deal), but it does mean that line managersmust take on the responsibility of alerting Treasurers at an early enough stage so that any potentialproblems that might arise further down the road can be anticipated and managed better. MoreoverTreasury is often the source of information concerning natural currency offsets or operational hedgesthat may be available elsewhere in the firm and may also be able to mitigate exposures by makingsmarter financing choices early on.

Four—and perhaps most important—it is necessary to inculcate a clear sense among line manag-ers that they are the ones that actually create the exposures and they are also the ones that can be mosteffective in managing the risks. Too many line managers in too many organizations have the tendency todismiss currency-related issues with the view that “it’s Treasury’s problem.”

Finally, all of these suggestions presume that incentive systems in organizations are, at least tosome reasonable degree, geared toward rewarding managers for their skills of anticipation (i.e., dealingbefore-the-fact with major problems that could have arisen, but didn’t), rather than solving problems(i.e., dealing after-the-fact with problems that do arise).

Setting Up a Risk Management Program

Evidence of foreign exchange risk management provides some insight into how firms today are address-ing and managing their currency exposures.

Figure 7 provides some results from a recent survey conducted by Bank of America. Whereas only54% of surveyed firms actually identify their economic exposures, 70% identified transaction exposureand a full 80% identified translation exposure. As might be predicted, firms continue to be quite activein the hedging of transaction exposures (80% hedge them), but few are hedging their translation expo-sure at this time (30% hedge translation). Due to the inherent complexity of identification and manage-ment, only 5% of the firms surveyed are actively hedging their economic exposure.

The continuing challenges lie within the realm of economic exposure management.

There are a number of additional practical concerns which will need to be addressed before thefirm can operationalize a truly effective risk management program and although they are beyond thescope of this Note, they are worth mentioning:

Figure 7 Bank of America Corporate FX Risk Management Survey Results, 1996

Percentage of Firms Surveyed Who:

Do Not Fully PartiallyCurrency Exposure Identify Hedge Hedge Hedge HedgeTranslation 80% 30% 70% 15% 15%Transaction 60% 80% 20% 30% 55%Anticipated 70% 57% 43% 2% 55%Contingent 52% 15% 85% 4% 11%Economic 54% 5% 95% 5% NegBalance Sheet 30% 22% 78% 6% 15%Income Statement 44% 39% 61% 6% 33%

Source: “Corporate America: FX Risk Management 1996,” Global Capital MarketsGroup, Bank of America, Monograph 78, Winter 1996/97, pp. 1-3.

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a. Should risk management be centralized or decentralized?

b. What are the managerial compensation issues, and multinational control issues raised by thefirm’s risk management policies?

c. Are there operational and control issues related to conflicts between currency exposures andinterest rate exposures?

d. What is the process of confirmation and settlement of contractual commitments involvingfinancial derivatives?

e. What are the information technology needs for real-time value-at-risk analysis of the multitudeof exposures and positions which the firm deals with in a cross-border setting?

Many of the well-known currency-related losses suffered by non-financial firms in the past decadehave arisen either from lack of exposure planning and identification, or from inadequate controls im-posed over commitments of the firm, or from inadequate real-time monitoring of derivative valuesassociated with positions outstanding. These losses are the failures of management, not failures inherentto the financial derivatives utilized. A risk management program is no better or worse than the skills ofthose who construct, operate, and monitor it. Perhaps most importantly, unless the motivations behindsuch risk management are clearly thought out and well-articulated, the risk management tools them-selves can take the firm only so far.

Suggested Readings

Bodnar, G. M., S. H. Gregory, and R. C. Marston, “1998 Wharton Survey of Financial Risk Manage-ment by U.S. Non-financial Firms,” Financial Management, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1998.

Dornbusch, R., “Exchange Rates and Prices,” American Economic Review, 77, 1987.Dufey, G., “Corporate Finance and Exchange Rate Variations,” Financial Management, Summer 1972,

pp. 51-57.Eiteman, D. K., A. I. Stonehill, and M. H. Moffett, Multinational Business Finance, 9th edition, Addison-

Wesley Longman, 2001.Fisher, E., “A Model of Exchange Rate Pass-Through,” Journal of International Economics, 26, 1989.Froot, K., and P. D. Klemperer, “Exchange Rate Pass Through When Market Share Matters,” American

Economic Review, 80, 1990.Froot, K., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein, “A Framework for Risk Management.” Harvard Business Review,

72, September-October 1994, 59-71.Froot, K., J. Stein, and D. Scharfstein, “Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and

Financing Policies,” NBER Working Paper No. 4084, 1992.Jorion, P., “The Exchange Rate Exposure of U.S. Multinationals,” The Journal of Business, 63, 1990.Knetter, M, “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic Litera-

ture, September 1997.Krugman, P., “Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes,” NBER Working Paper No. 1926,

1986.Lessard, D., and E. Flood, “On the Measurement of Operating Exposure to Exchange Rates: A Concep-

tual Approach,” Financial Management, Spring 1986.Lessard, D., and J. B. Lightstone, “Volatile Exchange Rates Can Put International Operations at Risk,”

Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1986.Levi, M. D., and P. Sercu, “Erroneous and Valid Reasons for Hedging Foreign Exchange Rate Expo-

sure,” Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1991, pp. 19-28.Luehrman, T., “The Exchange Rate Exposure of a Global Competitor,” Journal of International Business

Studies, 21, 1990.

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Meulbroek, L., “Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager’s Guide,” Harvard Busi-ness School Working Paper No. 02-046, 2002.

Moffett, M. H., and D. J. Skinner, “Issues in Foreign Exchange Hedge Accounting,” Journal of AppliedCorporate Finance, 8, No. 3, Fall 1995.

Moffett, M. H., and J. K. Karlsen, “Managing Foreign Exchange Rate Economic Exposure,” Journal ofInternational Financial Management and Accounting, 5, No. 2, June 1994.

Smith, C. W., and R. M. Stulz, “The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies,” Journal of Financialand Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 1985, pp. 390-405.

Smith C. W., C. W. Smithson, and D. S. Wilford, “Why Hedge?” Intermarket, July 1989, pp. 12-16.Smith, C. W., “Corporate Risk Management: Theory and Practice,” Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 2, No.

4, 1998Stulz, R. M., “Optimal Hedging Policies,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 19, No.

2, June 1984, pp. 127-140.Stulz, R. M., “Rethinking Risk Management,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, Fall 1996.Sundaram, A., and J. S. Black, “The Environment and Internal Organization of Multinational Enter-

prises,” Academy of Management Review, October 1992.Sundaram, A., and J. S. Black, The International Business Environment: Text and Cases, Prentice-Hall:

NJ, 1995 (see Chapters 3 to 5).Sundaram, A., and V. Mishra, “Currency Movements and Corporate Pricing Strategies,” Recent Devel-

opments in International Banking and Finance, S. Khoury (ed.), Volume IV-V, Elsevier, 1991.Sundaram, A., and V. Mishra, “Economic Exposure to Exchange Rates: A Review,” Tuck School Working

Paper, March 1990.