(a). cureton, adam (2013). from self-respect ti respect for others. ppq

8/11/2019 (a). Cureton, Adam (2013). From Self-Respect Ti Respect for Others. PPQ.

1/22

FROM SELF-RESPECT

TO RESPECT FOROTHERS

ADAM CURETON

Abstract: The leading accounts of respect for others usually assume that

persons have a rational nature, which is a marvelous thing, so they should be

respected like other objects of awesome value. Kants views about the value

of humanity, which have inspired contemporary discussions of respect, have

been interpreted in this way. I propose an alternative interpretation in which

Kant proceeds from our own rational self-regard, through our willingness to

reciprocate with others, to duties of respect for others. This strategy, which

shares some similarities with moral contractualism, offers a way to justify

other-regarding moral requirements from self-regarding rational dispositions.

The leading accounts of why we should respect others and what it takes

to do so tend to assume the following picture: Persons have a rational

nature, which is a marvelous thing, so they should be respected like other

objects of awesome value, and accordingly cherished, treasured, pro-

tected, exhibited, honored and so on. It is commonplace to take Kant as

the deep inspiration, if not an outright adherent, of this kind of view,

which emphasizes his exceedingly compelling and widely influential claims

about the objective, unconditional, incomparable, and absolute

worth of persons, whose dignity is above all price, without equivalent,and places severe constraints on how we may be treated (G4:4346;MM

6:4356).1 These famous remarks are taken by Allen Wood and Alan

Donagan to articulate a special kind of metaphysical, agent-neutral and

intrinsic value or status that all persons are thought to share in virtue of

their rational nature.2 This value is distinctive because it gives everyone

sufficient reason to respect, not just promote or maximize, the dignity of

all. We respect ourselves and others by, for example, choosing not to

violate or sacrifice dignity in exchange for things that we merely desire or

find useful, by refusing to weigh and balance or trade-off amounts of

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2013) 166187 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01450.x

2012 The Author

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd & University of Southern California.

166


2/22

dignity, and by exemplifying, appreciating and protecting this value in

everyone.3

Against this backdrop, disagreement persists over what, more specifi-

cally, it takes to respect persons as persons. Stephen Darwall, Ronald

Dworkin, along with Donagan and Wood, argue that to respect persons aspersons is to treat them in all the ways that they ought to be treated;

Joseph Raz claims that we respect others by believing they are intrinsically

valuable and protecting them from harm or damage; Harry Frankfurt,

Bernard Williams and Robin Dillon contend that to respect others as

persons is to take proper account of their individuality; Joel Feinberg

thinks of respect for persons in terms of respecting their rights, and Sara

Buss suggests that respecting others in this way involves acknowledging

their dignity in our practical deliberations.4

There is much to admire in this awesome conception of respect, whichregards persons as having an intrinsic, absolute and objective worth that

must always be respected and never sacrificed or violated. It opposes

purely consequentialist thinking; it refuses to compare or aggregate rela-

tive amounts of dignity; it rejects the idea of negative responsibility that

we are just as responsible for what we fail to prevent as what we do

ourselves; it insists on agent-centered restrictions that disallow, for

example, murdering one person to prevent five murders; it emphasizes

honoring, cherishing, exhibiting and other ways of responding to value

that are not just promoting or protecting it; and it is able to generate,in a direct and compelling way, more specific moral requirements about

coercion, deception, murder, slavery, discrimination, rape, ridicule and

humiliation.

While Kant is appropriately acknowledged as the catalyst for much of

the contemporary interest in respect for persons, some have worried that

neither contemporary moral philosophers nor Kant himself should accept

the traditional picture. First, that account assumes, as an apparently

ungrounded starting point, that persons have a metaphysical, intrinsic

value that merits respect, without offering a deeper justification or ground-ing of this value.5 Second, while the ideal of respecting the dignity of

persons can generate importantpresumptiveprohibitions on murder, rape,

torture, etc., the traditional picture seems to lack the structure and spe-

cificity to produce a determinate, consistent, and coherent systemof moral

requirements.6

These concerns have led some of Kants commentators, including

ONeill, Engstrom, Singer and Sensen, to attribute to him a radically

different conception of basic respect for persons.7 Their strategy is to

downplay the passages where Kant seems to endorse the awesome con-ception and reinterpret them in light of the assumption that the Formula

of Universal Law (FUL) Act only on that maxim by which you can at

the same time will that it should become a universal law (G4:421) is

FROM SELF-RESPECT TO RESPECT FOR OTHERS 167

2012 The Author



3/22

Kants most fundamental moral principle and the foundation for all his

other moral requirements. On this view, the Humanity Formula (FH)

Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in

any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a

means (G4:429) is taken to be essentially equivalent to FUL by prohib-iting maxims that others could not possibly share, rather than as com-

manding us to respect an awesome value we find in ourselves and others.8

Similarly, Kants vivid claims about the absolute and incomparable

dignity of persons are read in a deflationary way, as saying that to have

dignity just is to be free and among the set of people who must be able to

will maxims as universal laws, which means that respecting the dignity of

persons is to refuse to act on maxims, in the form of universal laws, to

which they could not possibly consent.9

According to its proponents, this universalizability picture of respectprovides the determinacy and structure Kant favors without appealing

to an antecedent substantive value, but it faces its own set of criticisms.

The reading it gives of the Doctrine of Virtue and Groundworkpassages

about dignity seems strained; there are longstanding questions about

whether so much emphasis should be placed on the lying promise

example when interpreting the Humanity Formula as a whole;10 and it is

difficult to see how this picture can generate the more particular duties

of respect to oneself and others in the specific way that Kant derives

them in the Doctrine of Virtue, which is most evidently by appeal to avalue or worth that should not be thrown away, disavowed, belittled,

defiled, etc. In addition, from a commonsense perspective, the correct

moral explanation for not ridiculing or humiliating others seems more a

matter of refusing to violate or dishonor their dignity rather than avoid-

ing maxims that, if they were universal laws, others could not possibly

agree to.

I aim to explore whether there is a new and different interpretation of

Kants views about basic respect for persons that (1) does not appeal to an

ungrounded metaphysical value, (2) is suitably structured and determi-nate, but also (3) captures the ideas about the incomparable and absolute

value of persons that so many of us find important and inspiring.11

My reconstruction of Kants argument for respecting others as persons

is of interest to moral philosophers and Kants commentators alike. It

provides a richer understanding of his well-known texts regarding respect

in the Doctrine of Virtue and his less familiar discussions of respect in

Lectures on Ethics; it uncovers some wonderful ideas that commentators

and readers of Kant may have missed aboutwhywe should respect others;

it challenges some commonsense moral views about how, in particular, torespect others; and it reveals a deep justificatory priority in Kants moral

framework for rational self-regard, which is, I claim, what ultimately

justifies and grounds other-regarding moral requirements when combined

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY168

2012 The Author



4/22

with our rational dispositions to universalize our maxims and reciprocate

with others. This kind of derivation is what we would expect from Kant in

light of his remarks that duties to oneself are in some sense the foundation

of duties to others (MM6:417).

Briefly, here is a deep and pervasive argumentative strategy, whichshares certain similarities with modern-day contractualist thinking, that

Kant employs to argue for the duties of respect for others and for the

duty of beneficence as well. Kant begins by assuming that, as rational

persons, we have several substantive and self-regarding dispositions of

reason that are part of our rational nature, including ones to avoid ser-

vility, to be free, to perfect ourselves and even to promote our own hap-

piness (although we have no duty to do so). We also have deep moral

predispositions to reciprocate with others and, more generally, to act

only on maxims that all fully rational people, if they were rational, couldwill as universal laws. Our self-regarding rational dispositions provide

standards of rational willingthat determine what each of us could will as

universal law a fully rational person would not rationally will to sac-

rifice her basic needs, take up servility, become a slave or abandon all

opportunities for self-development. Other-regarding moral requirements

are therefore those that each one of us could will as universal laws in light

of our various substantive and self-regarding rational dispositions.

Because of our rational interests in our own happiness and self-respect,

we all would rationally will other-regarding duties of beneficence andrespect if we were fully rational.

My plan is first to review some basic points about the content, structure

and place of the duties of respect toward oneself and others in Kants

normative ethical theory. Second, I develop and illustrate this argumen-

tative strategy by showing how it adds a new twist to the usual way of

interpreting Kants account of the nature and grounds of the duty of

beneficence. Third, I argue that, according to Kant, we are rationally

disposed to respect ourselves, which means our reason drives us to value

ourselves in a special sort of agent-relative way, as having a dignity that isabove any price and inalienable, without relying on an antecedent meta-

physical value or yet implying that others must value us in that way as well.

Fourth, I note some subtle and important observations Kant makes about

how susceptible we are to basing our sense of our own worth on the low

opinions of those who have an inflated sense of their own value. Kant

thinks, in particular, that when others place a low value on us or outright

demand that we lose respect for ourselves, this has a tendency to under-

mine our own self-respect. Fifth, I claim that, according to Kant, if we

were fully rational we would all insist on duties of respect for others thatafford us the moral freedom to respect ourselves, and, sixth, I conclude by

suggesting that my interpretation resolves several puzzles about those

other-regarding duties of respect.


2012 The Author



5/22

1. Universal and particular respect

Kant rejects the widespread view, which is common among adherents of

the awesome picture of respect, that to respect others is to treat them in

all the ways persons ought to be treated. In addition to our duties ofrespect toward ourselves and others, Kant thinks we have duties of other

kinds as well. We have duties oflove, which are wide rather than narrow

(MM6:449); when duties of love are satisfied, they generate corresponding

obligations in others (such as duties of gratitude) whereas fulfilling duties

of respect need not do so (MM6:448); and failing to satisfy them is mere

lack of virtue (except in cases of principled refusal) whereas failing to fulfill

duties of respect is vice (MM6:464). Kant thinks we are also subject to

legally enforceable rules and rights that regulate and protect our external

freedom, which are matters ofright andjustice rather than respect. And,Kant says that we have imperfect and positive duties of self-perfection,

whereas our duties of self-respect are characterized as perfect and negative

(MM6:419; 421; 467).

Aristotle famously distinguishes universal justice, which is virtue in its

entirety, from the particular justice, which is a specific virtue, having to do

with paying debts and fulfilling promises, that stands alongside courage,

temperance, and generosity.12 Similarly for Kant, perhaps the Categorical

Imperative may be described as a principle of respect in a thin and formal

sense, but Kant thinks there are mid-level duties of respect in a thickersense that follow from the supreme moral principle and forbid the more

specific wrongs of humiliating, ridiculing and debasing others. We disre-

spect someone in this more familiar way when we mock him for his

religious convictions, degrade him by forcing him to engage in compro-

mising acts, embarrass him by making him prostrate himself before us,

and address him with racist epithets that tell him that he is a despised

animal in our eyes. More specifically, Kant claims we have duties of

respect against arrogance, not to demand that others think little of them-

selves in comparison with us (MM6:465), defamation, not to to bringinto the open something prejudicial to respect for others with no particu-

lar aim in view (MM 6:466), and ridicule, not to engage in [w]anton

faultfindingand mockery (MM6:465).

Respect is a separate moral category, for Kant, because he thinks we can

demean, debase, humiliate or otherwise disrespect someone by actions that

are not immoral in other ways, such as ridiculing them with otherwise

innocuous words and gestures, snickering at them behind their backs,

calling attention to publicly accessible but embarrassing information

about them (e.g. choices they have made, relationships they have), etc. OnKants view, we may also use actions that are already immoral as ways of

disrespecting others. You may disrespect me by continually showing up

late or not at all to our scheduled meetings even though you promised to


2012 The Author



6/22

be on time, for example, or stealing my books in plain view of others may

be your way of humiliating me.

It is also worth noting that Kant has in effect two concepts of respect.

One of them is respect as a feeling that is forced from us by the moral law

and by those who exemplify it in their actions (MM6:394; MM6:402;CPrR 5:7280).13 No one can have a duty to acquire this feeling, but we

should all make ourselves worthy of it. The other is respect as valuing

ourselves and others as persons with dignity. As I see it, Kant assumes that

we have a duty to respect ourselves in this second sense and arguesfrom

this that everyone has a duty to respect others in this sense as well.

2. Beneficence

It is tempting, as many do, to interpret Kant as offering very different

justifications for the duty of beneficence and the duties of respect for

others, one emphasizing the Formula of Universal Law it would be

self-defeating to will a maxim of non-beneficence as a universal law14 and

the other emphasizing the Formula of Humanity demeaning or ridicul-

ing someone violates their dignity and so fails to treat their rational nature

as an end in itself as ends in themselves.15

As I read Kant, however, his conception of the nature and grounds of

beneficence is deeply analogous to his account of the nature and groundsof respect for others, so a reexamination of the former will shed new light

on the latter. The isomorphism I see is not achieved by subordinating one

of the Formulas of the Categorical Imperative to the other; rather, it

retains essential features of both FUL and FHE.

Although there is disagreement over how to interpret the argument

Kant gives for the duty of beneficence in the Doctrine of Virtue (MM

6:393), his commentators tend to agree on this basic picture: In order for

any of us in our world to be happy, we need the help of others, so we could

not will a universal law allowing us to refuse to help others, at leastsometimes and to some extent.16 The trouble, as Barbara Herman points

out, is that even if no one could ever play Mozarts Sonatas, strike it rich,

or taste a fine whiskey without significant help from others, these contin-

gent and prudential facts about the ends we may happen to set and our

need for assistance in attaining them are not the sorts of considerations

that, for Kant, could ground amoral dutyto set the happiness of others as

one of our ends.17 A common strategy in response to this puzzle is to argue

that rational agents necessarily will the satisfaction of their basic needs,

which explains why it matters morally that we all need the help of othersto protect our rational capacities.18 This proposed solution, however,

leaves unexplained why we have a duty to make thehappinessof others one

of our ends, rather than just provide them with mutual aid when they are


2012 The Author



7/22

in dire need. Once my basic needs are provided for, it would certainly be

nice for others to further my non-moral plans and projects, but why does

Kant think they are morally required to go on and promote my wellbeing

beyond bare subsistence, at least sometimes and to some extent? Advo-

cates of the awesome conception, such as Wood, can appeal to theagent-neutral value of humanity in this connection, but lets see whether

there is a different way of understanding Kants argument for the duty of

beneficence.19

Kants key assumption, I contend, is that our pursuit of happiness is not

just a contingent feature of us, something we happen to go for, but is

instead a necessary part of our rational nature.20 As rational persons, we

arerationallydisposed, not merely driven by external forces or contingent

inclinations, to will our own happiness (within otherwise permissible con-

straints).21 Although Kant seems to shift among various conceptions ofhappiness, if happiness is understood as the satisfaction of ones (permis-

sible) ends (CPrR5:431) then it would be impossible and so irrational for

someone to have particular ends but refuse to will that they be satisfied, for

to have an end, according to Kant, is to will its object. 22 If, however, a

specific end or all the necessary means to that end are immoral then, for

Kant, we are rationally required to give up the end and so revise our

conception of happiness. But otherwise, as rational persons we necessarily

seek the satisfaction of our own (permissible) ends (G4:415, 430; MM

6:391; CPrR 5:25; 34; R 6:6, 47; An 7:326). Imperatives, however, areconstraints on our wills; they tell us what we must do even though we

might not (G4:413). It follows that there can be nodutyto pursue our own

happiness (MM6:386388, 451;CPrR5:93; R 6:6), because we necessarily

do so anyway without needing to be commanded. Even so, Kant thinks it

is rationally necessary for us to try to be happy (without the added element

of constraint that would be part of a duty of self-love). Kant thinks we

are rationally disposed and have good reason to make ourselves happy

our pursuit of happiness is described, for example, as good (R 6:58)

and necessarily the demand of every rational but finite being (CPrR5:25).23

With the assumption that it is part of our rational nature to pursue our

happiness in hand, we can reinterpret Kants argument for the duty of

beneficence as follows: (1) It is rationally necessary for us to will our own

happiness, so we all are rationally disposed to pursue our own set of

permissible ends and protect our ability to do so this is part of what it is

to be a rational person, according to Kant. (2) We live in a world, however,

in which pursuing these self-regarding rational dispositions requires the

help of others. (3) The Hypothetical Imperative requires that we will thenecessary means to our ends or give up the ends. (4) Help from others,

according to Kant, is a necessary means to our own happiness, which we

are rationally required to will, so we are all also rationally disposed to seek


2012 The Author



8/22

and insist on help from others. (5) The Formula of Universal Law requires

us to act only on maxims that we could rationally will as universal law. (6)

Each one of us, if fully rational, would necessarily will the help of others

in pursuing our own happiness. Therefore, (7) we would all, if fully

rational, will as universal law a minimal duty of beneficence to set thehappiness of others as one of our ends. In doing so, we are securing our

own ability to further our aims and projects while ensuring that everyone

else can pursue their own happiness as well.

FUL has long been charged with being an empty formalism, in part

because it does not, as traditionally interpreted, specify standards that

determine what maxims could be willed as universal laws and so leaves

open the possibility that people could or could not will maxims as univer-

sal laws on the basis of ignorance, short-sightedness, contingent wants and

desires, and other irrational or non-rational considerations. As I interpretFUL, however, our rational nature, including our rational predisposition

to pursue our own happiness, determines what we could willas universal

laws, so that principle is Kants way of bridging the gap between

substantive and thick rational self-regard and other-regarding moral

requirements.24

There is a close connection between this argumentative structure and

contemporary discussions about the nature of reasons and rationality.

Assuming that John Broome is correct in understanding the Hypothetical

Imperative as having a wide-scope (we are supposed to make it the casethat [we pursue the believed necessary means to our ends or give them up])

then that principle by itself cannot generate unconditional reasons for us

to take any believed necessary means in particular cases because we can

also satisfy that rational requirement by abandoning the relevant end.25 If,

as Broome thinks, rationality only consists of formal principles that have

to do with consistency and coherence among our mental states then ration-

ality cannot by itself generate unconditional reasons just because we

happen to set our basic needs as an end, this cannot be combined with the

Hypothetical Imperative to generate any reasons for us to do what isnecessary to satisfy our basic needs, for as a wide-scope requirement we

always have the option of abandoning that end. What is needed for the

Hypothetical Imperative to generate unconditional reasons of the kind

that are needed for Kants argument to succeed is that it is not merely a

contingent feature of us that we happen to set our own basic needs as ends

but that we are rationally requiredto seek our own happiness. If Kant is

correct that we are rationally required to do so then the Hypothetical

Imperative can generate unconditional reasons for us to take the necessary

means to our happiness, and, if the rest of the argument is to be believed,reasons to agree to a duty of beneficence.

This interpretation of Kants argument for the duty of beneficence has

the added advantage that it provides a more compelling explanation for


2012 The Author



9/22

why that duty has the content that it does. A duty requiring extreme

self-sacrifice from some people to satisfy the champagne tastes of others,

or one requiring us always to help others except when we are fulfilling a

duty to do otherwise arguably could not be rationally willed by everyone

as a universal law because those who stand to lose under either schemewould be significantly diminished in their ability to fulfill their rational

disposition to seek their own happiness.26 A more modest duty, such as

Hills proposal that we should give mutual aid and help one another

sometimes and to some extent, seems better suited to protect the ability of

all to pursue their own happiness.27

Further support for this reading comes from a later passage where Kant

elaborates on his discussion of beneficence and explicitly draws an analogy

between it and the duties of respect for others:

Moderationin ones demands generally, that is, willing restriction of ones self-love in view of

the self-love of others, is calledmodesty. Lackof such moderation(lack of modesty) as regards

ones worthiness to be lovedby others is called egotism (philautia) (MM6:462).

Kant has already argued that, because we are rationally disposed to

make ourselves happy and we need some help from others to do so,

we could all will a universal law to make the happiness of others one of

our ends. Kant now makes the further claim that although we are

rationally disposed to pursue our happiness, it is possible that we can doso too fervently, in ways that interfere with the ability of others to

pursue their own non-moral ends. This potential for mutual interference

and conflict is not merely due to limited space and resources but also

results from a further tendency. Kant thinks we tend to regard our own

happiness as more important than others and to demand that they go

beyond the basic requirements of morality and sacrifice their own plans

and projects in order to help us pursue our ends (R 6:27; A 7:128). Not

only does our rational pursuit of our own happiness mean that we can

each will a duty of beneficence requiring active support from others,argues Kant, it also means that we can will a universal law of modesty

that protects us from excessive demands for our help and so makes us

better able to pursue our own set of permissible ends. We are being

unjustifiably egotistical, therefore, when we demand that others labor

away at our ends, beyond what beneficence or justice require, at the

expense of their own plans and projects, although we are still free to

graciously invite others to help us and fairly compensate them for their

efforts.

When we turn back to consider the duties of respect for others, wefind the same argumentative structure at work, one that Kant uses to

explain why we have duties to respect others and what it takes for us to

do so.


2012 The Author



10/22

3. Self-respect

Kants argument for the duties of respect toward others, as I interpret him,

relies on a thick and substantive conception of what it takes to respect

ourselves. As in the case of beneficence, Kant aims to argue from theself-regarding rational dispositions that persons have in virtue of their

rational nature to other-regarding moral requirements about how to treat

other persons who possess the same rational self-concern.

If we are to understand Kants account of how and why we must

respect others, we must first look to his account of the perfect duties to

oneself, which Kant characterizes as the highest duties of all (V27:604).

The perfect duties to oneself are most naturally read as a set of rational

requirements about how to value ourselves in a special sort of way,

as having a dignity that is above any price, without equivalent andinalienable (MM 6:435; 6:465).28 When we mutilate ourselves, give over

to lust, or prostrate before others, for example, Kant thinks we value

ourselves in a lesser and inferior way, as we value things with a price or

equivalent.

The awesome conception assumes that we must avoid defiling, debas-

ing or otherwise disrespecting ourselves because we have an agent-

neutral, intrinsic value that we must be respected by everyone. A different

way of interpreting the perfect duties to oneself, however, is as a set of

substantive and self-regarding rational requirements that merely tell ushow we are to value ourselves (what attitudes to have about ourselves,

what self-regarding actions to take, etc.) without presupposing that we

have an antecedent intrinsic worth that must be respected by others as

well. The substantive and self-regarding rational principles of self-respect,

on this view, only generate reasons for a person to treatherselfin certain

kinds of ways, but they do not necessarily generate reasons for others to

do so as well just because we are rationally required to value ourselves

in this way does not entail that others must value us in that way. The

awesome conception, in other words, correctly specifies what it takesto respect ourselves properly, but Kant sees the need for further

argument to explain how people, who are rationally disposed to respect

themselves in this way, should treat one another. Here are a few points of

clarification.

First, consider, by analogy, three possible views about the value of

someones happiness. (1) She is rationally required to pursue her happiness

becausethe non-moral ends she sets for herself are antecedently and objec-

tively valuable. (2) By setting some non-moral ends, she thereby confers

objective value on them and so generates agent-neutral reasons for herselfand others to further her ends.29 (3) Setting non-moral ends merely makes

them valuableto herby generating agent-relative reasonsfor herto satisfy

them without necessarily doing so for others as well, so a further moral


2012 The Author



11/22

principle like the duty of beneficence is needed to explain what reasons

others have to help her pursue those ends (Hill, 1992a, 2002b).30 My

proposal regarding self-respect is like (3) the perfect duties to oneself are

not justified by an antecedent value we all share; valuing ourselves as

persons with dignity does not by itself confer an agent-neutral value onourselves that must be respected by others; instead, when we value our-

selves appropriately, this gives us reasons to treat ourselves with dignity

and leaves as an open question how others are to treat us.

Second, Kant thinks that it is part of the nature of a rational agent to

value himself by a low as well as by a high standard ( MM 6:435)

although our reason drives us to attribute ourselves insignificance as a

human animal, we are alsorationally disposedto ascribe ourselves dignity

as arational human being and refuse to disavow the moral self-esteem of

such a being (MM 6:435). As rational persons, we do not value ourrational nature because it is antecedently valuable; rather, our own

rational nature is valuableto usbecause we are rationally disposed to value

it (MM6:436).

Third, according to Kants theory of value, to value myself as a person

with dignity is to recognize, accept and follow acluster of rational prescrip-

tionsabout how to treat myself, including the self-regarding duties against

suicide, lying, servility, etc. Treating ourselves with respect therefore

involves satisfying substantive requirements of reason against defiling,

debasing, dishonoring or otherwise disrespecting ourselves.Finally, if we abandon any objective values that are antecedent to

principles of reason, we need some kind of explanation for why these

substantive and self-regarding rational dispositions, to avoid defiling,

debasing or dishonoring ourselves, are part of the nature of a person with

reason. Unfortunately, Kant does not attempt a deeper justification of

these self-regarding duties of respect in theDoctrine of Virtue, and perhaps

he would merely point to the fact of reason (CPrR5:1512; 1556). One

proposal, which I cannot develop here, is that across his works Kant is

trying to characterize a conception of what it is to be a person of reasonthat is radically different from the Humean or rational choice conception

and is closer to our commonsense understanding of a reasonable person.

As Kant portrays her, an ideally rational person has strong interests in

fulfilling her rational dispositions not only to live, be free, be happy,

perfect herself and respect herself but also to protect the physical struc-

tures that underlie these dispositions and bring about the social conditions

that are needed for her to exercise them well.

If we take for granted that rational persons are disposed to value them-

selves as persons with dignity, but only in a way that generates reasons forher to treat herself accordingly, we are a step closer to understanding

Kants powerful argument for why self-regarding rational agents must

respect others as well.31


2012 The Author



12/22

4. Self-respect out of bounds

The perfect duties to oneself are a cluster of self-regarding requirements of

reason that are meant to keep us from affording too little respect to

ourselves we must not, for example, debase, dishonor or prostrate our-selves. As rational persons, we are rationally disposed to satisfy these

requirements and so to afford ourselves adequate respect.

Recall that the next step in Kants argument for the duty of beneficence,

once he established that we are rationally disposed to pursue our own

happiness, was that we can do so only with the positive help of others.

Self-respect is different, however, because Kant thinks that each of us is

capable of achieving an adequate sense of our own worth without the

appreciation, admiration, reverence, or positive high esteem of other

people (MM 6:467). This explains a puzzling feature of the duties ofrespect toward others, which is why they are only negative duties enjoining

us to avoid interfering with others (MM6:459). John Rawls has plausibly

argued that in our world we can achieve proper self-respect only when we

are part of a community that affirms, appreciates and values us.32 For

Kant, however, there is no need to fawn over, flatter or otherwise help

others to respect themselves, as there is a positive duty to help them pursue

their own happiness.

The justification Kant gives for the duties of respect toward others is

analogous to the other argument I mentioned, the one against makingexcessive demands on others to sacrifice their non-moral ends for the sake

of our happiness. Kant emphasizes that, in our world, having too much

respect for ourselves, valuing ourselves too highly, has a tendency to

undermine the self-respect of others. Its not that we require positive help

from others in order to have self-respect; nor do we need their good wishes,

beliefs, or feelings to do so. What we need is for others to refrain from

infringing on, interfering with or undermining the respect we must have

for ourselves, which they do by placing too high a value on themselves and

a corresponding low value on us.According to Kant, we are very susceptible to arrogance and to basing

our own worth on the opinions of others (R6:267;C27:349;H27:41;H

27:44). Just as placing too much importance on our own happiness at the

expense of others can interfere with the ability of others to pursue their

plans and projects, so self-conceit on the part of others can and often does

interfere with the respect we have for ourselves. For example, we should

not, according to Kant, disrespect ourselves by needing and asking for

others beneficence because in doing so we place ourselves in the inferior

position of a dependent in relation to his protector and so violate our realself-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in ones own person) (MM

6:459). Kant also warns against any appearance of intending to bind the

other by acts of beneficence, he favors practicing such acts in complete


2012 The Author



13/22

secrecy, and he enjoins us not to try to make others happy in accordance

withmyconcepts of happiness (MM6:454).

Lets consider in more detail why Kant thinks self-conceit on the part of

others is so pervasive and troubling for our own self-worth. He says:

Self-conceit and timorousness are the two rocks a man runs into, if he departs, in one

direction or the other, from the moral law (C27:351).

Egotism, we saw, is defined as making excessive demands on others to

improve ones own happiness. Self-conceit or arrogantia is analogously

defined as lack of modesty in ones claims to be respected by others ( MM

6:462) and an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others

(R 6:27; cf. MM6:434, 464; CPrR 5:116; C 27:349350; V27:620). One

element of Kants conception of arrogance or self-conceit is that of valuingourselves too highly, either with regard to others (MM 6:465) or to the

moral law (CPrR5:73). The other element is that by harboring an inflated

opinion of our own worth, we thereby regard ourselves as superior to

others, which disposes us try to dominate others and to demand that

others value themselves less than they should (MM6:462; MM6:465).33

Self-conceit, in Kants sense, is thus distinct from more commonsense

notions of puffed up posturing or inflated evaluations of ones talents.

Even though we are rationally disposed to value ourselves as persons

with dignity in virtue of having a rational nature, Kant thinks we alsohave certain natural tendencies that lead us to self-conceit, arrogance or

what he sometimes calls unsocial sociability (I8:20). First, we are very

much inclined to take others as the measure of their own moral worth

(C27:349; H 27:41; R 6:27; MM6:466). We tend to value ourselves on

the basis of our popularity or fame and conclude that having them

makes us better than those who do not. Second, we are inclined to look

for preeminence in trifles such as smart clothes, a fine carriage, titles,

positions, appearing genteel and other externals, so we tend to base

our self-worth on our success in collecting these things of no accountand come to regard ourselves as having precedence over those if we have

more things of price than they do (C27:4578; cf. H27:41MM6:4367;

R 6:27). Third, every person has a natural propensity to think himself

morally good by tinker[ing] with the moral law, till he has fashioned it

to suit his inclinations and convenience (C27:465; cf. CPrR 5:734; R

6:29) or refusing to compare [his moral worth] with the law (MM

6:435). Once we convince ourselves that we are morally good people, and

value ourselves on that basis, we tend to regard ourselves as superior to

others (MM6:460).To settle on an inflated opinion of ourselves, due to our popularity,

external possessions or supposed moral purity, is in part, according to

Kant, to acquire certain dispositions of thought and action. When we


2012 The Author



14/22

value ourselves more highly than others, we are disposed to treat ourselves

better than we treat them, to express how we evaluate them relative to

ourselves, to tell them and others how we think they should evaluate

themselves, to claim that others should value us as their superiors, and

even to demand that a supposed inferior think little of themselves incomparison with him (MM6:466).

When those who are not arrogant in Kants sense encounter self-

conceited people, we are very susceptible to their opinions about our

supposed inferior status relative to them. We tend to accept their low

evaluations of us, and adjust our sense of our own worth accordingly, in

spite of our rational predisposition to find our self-respect rooted in

morality; not in calculating on the opinion of other people (H27:44).

While we may not require active help from others in order to assign

ourselves an incomparable, absolute worth in virtue of possessing arational nature, Kant thinks that the natural propensity to self-conceit in

others tends to undermine the respect we are rationally disposed to have

for ourselves.

The deeper point, however, is that even if someone were to manage

stoicism in the face of arrogant people and remain unshaken by their low

opinions of him, Kant is still concerned with self-conceited people who

solicit(MM6:465), makeclaim(MM6:462) ordemandthat others think

little of themselves in comparison with him (MM6:466), throw himself

away in order to slave for my end (MM6:450), concern themselves withones importance (MM6:465), or give us a respect that we deny them

(MM 6:465). Rational people are predisposed to value themselves as

persons with dignity, so they are rationally disposed to insist on and

protect a prerogative to value themselves in this special way.

Even when the opinions, intonations or suggestions of others roll off my

back, theirdemandsthat I lose respect for myself are incompatible with my

rational dispositions to respect myself and to have and exercise a preroga-

tive to do so.34 When we make demands on others to lose self-respect,

according to Kant, we claim that they owe it to us to think less of them-selves. But in light of their rational disposition to value themselves as a

person with dignity, they could not accept any principle that required them

to do so. Moreover, demanding that others lose their self-respect, or even

demanding that they acquire it, conflicts with their rational disposition to

insist on and protect their own freedom to respect themselves properly. I

am rationally disposed to regard it as my responsibility, not anyone elses,

to value myself as a person with dignity, according to Kant, so I cannot

accept a principle that says I owe it to anyone other than myself to acquire

self-respect.35

To clarify this point, Kant draws an analogy between property rights

and duties of respect for others (MM 6:464). In the Doctrine of Right,

Kant says that if there is a justified system of property rights then I can


2012 The Author



15/22

legitimately demand that you return what you borrowed from me (MM

6:299); a minimally decent government can make demands on its people

for the continued preservation and functioning of the state; (MM6:322);

the police in such a system can demand to view the charter of a club or

association within its borders (MM6:325); our innate natural freedom andequality allow us to demand that others treat us accordingly as members of

society (MM6:315); and if I am in grave danger and you can save my life

at little cost to yourself then the duty of mutual aid (presumably) justifies

me in demanding that you do so. But if I demand something of yours

without having the right or freedom to do so, for example, or demand

government reform (rather than asking for it) or demand that others do

me some small favor, I would be infringing on your property rights,

violating the rights of the government, and infringing on your freedom to

be beneficent as you see fit. There may be no chance that anyone couldbreak into my fortress to steal my jewels, but nevertheless it is still wrong

for you to demand them from me, for your doing so is inconsistent with

my rights to them. Similarly, according to Kant, all rational people have a

sort of right to respect themselves, so whether or not anyone can actually

lead me to lose respect for myself, having the ability to demand or claim

that I lose respect for myself is inconsistent with my prerogative to afford

myself proper respect.

When slave-owners, for example, demanded that their slaves view them-

selves as inferior to whites, they were not just expressing their opinion thatthe slaves lacked dignity or trying to persuade or give reasons for them to

adjust their self-conceptions. They were also claiming that slaves owed it

to whites to regard themselves as inferior and they were taking themselves

to have the freedom to place such claims on the slaves, whereas Kant

thinks no slaves could accept moral principles implying either of these

possibilities. Even those abolitionists who demanded that slaves respect

themselves as persons with dignity were attempting to pressure, coax and

coerce the slaves by violating prerogative that the slaves were rationally

disposed to protect in themselves.36

Arrogant people, in Kants sense, not only pose a threat because of their

potential to lead us to lose respect for ourselves, but their demands that we

do so conflict with our predispositions of self-respect. What we need,

according to Kant, are universally acceptable moral principles that protect

us from arrogance and self-conceit by affording everyone the moral

freedom to respect ourselves in the ways we are rationally disposed to do

and requiring each of us not to violate this freedom in others. This,

according to Kant, is what it is to respect one another as persons, which

requires us to [limit] our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in anotherperson, keep myself within my own bounds, refrain from exalting

oneself above others and refuse to demand that another throw himself

away in order to slave for my end (MM6:44950).


2012 The Author



16/22

5. Kants argument for the duties of respect toward others

Kants argument for why we should respect others in these ways is con-

tained in the following quote:

But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of

self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as

human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity

of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the

respect that must be shown to every other human being (MM6:462).

Pulling the various threads together with some of Kants background

assumptions, we can now state Kants argument for the duties of respect

toward others as follows. (1) According to the conception of what it is to be arational person that Kant describes, such persons are rationally disposed to

respect themselves, that is, to value themselves as persons with an absolute,

incomparable dignity that is above all price and without equivalents. We do

not perceive within ourselves a metaphysical, intrinsic value; instead we are

predisposed to recognize and accept a cluster of rational prescriptions about

how to act with regard to ourselves, including ones against debasing, defiling

or prostrating ourselves, without yet requiring others to do so as well. (2) Our

rational disposition to respect ourselves tends to be thwarted and undermined

by those who regard themselves as more valuable than we are, which we allunfortunately have a natural propensity to do. Not only do the low opinions

of others prompt us to value ourselves less than we should, but their demands

that we lose respect for ourselves are incompatible with our rational disposi-

tions to respect ourselves and the corresponding rational disposition to have

and exercise the freedom to do so. (3) We are rationally required to will the

necessary means to our ends or give them up. (4) Therefore, we are rationally

required to will that others refrain from expressing low opinions about our

worth, demanding that we lose respect for ourselves, and any other acts that

threaten to undermine our self-respect. (5) The Formula of Universal Law,which we are rationally disposed to accept, requires us to act only on maxims

that we could will as universal laws. (6) What each of us could rationally will

as universal laws depends on our substantive and self-regarding rational

dispositions. (7) Therefore, each of us, could will universal laws forbidding

others from acting in certain ways that undermine our self-respect, that is, we

would all rationally will Kants duties of respect toward others if we were fully

rational.

The duties of respect toward others depend on the conjunction of the

rational self-regarding disposition to respect ourselves and the rationaldisposition to universalize, reciprocate and grant the same to others, which

is a very different from the way ONeill and others typically understand

and use FUL. As they see it, FUL prohibits us from acting on maxims


2012 The Author



17/22

that, if they were made into universal laws of nature, no one could possibly

consent to as laws of permission or requirement. By contrast, I understand

FUL as a principle of reciprocity that relies on independent standards of

rational self-regard that determine what we and others could rationally

will as universal law. All rational people are disposed, in virtue of theirrational nature, to will their own freedom, self-respect, life, ability to think

for themselves and much else, so it would be irrational for a person not to

protect her own life or her self-respect. But rational people are also dis-

posed to afford protections and opportunities to others if they are willing

to do the same in return. The duties of beneficence and respect for others

are justified on these grounds we are rationally disposed to pursue our

own happiness and respect ourselves, but also to give the same help and

respect to others in return for their help and respect, so duties of benefi-

cence and respect for one another are justifiable to everyone in virtue ofour self-regarding rational concerns.

6. Conclusion

This argument captures much of what is inspiring about the awesome

conception of respect regarding the specific ways in which we must respect

others, and it does so by emphasizing and reinterpreting a central aspect of

the universalizability conception of respect, which is that the duties ofrespect toward others arejustifiedon the basis of what we could rationally

will as universal law.

I end by noting how this interpretation of Kants argument for the

duties of respect toward others helps to resolve three longstanding puzzles.

First, Kant often uses the language of rights when discussing our duties of

respect toward others. He calls the act of demanding that others lose respect

for themselves unjust (MM6:465), and says that doing so infringes upon

ones lawful claim (MM 6:464), violates a right to which he cannot

renounce his claim (MM6:464), and constitutes an attempt to deprive himof what he deserves (MM6:467; cf. MM6:449). Kant recognizes clear

differences between what we own, which belongs to rightand is defined by

legally enforceable principles of property that govern our external freedom

without taking account of motives, and the principles that regulate and

protect our self-respect from others, which belong to ethics and so are

unenforceable principles for personal motivation and deliberation. As I

have tried to explain, his suggestion is that we have something like an ethical

right to respect ourselves properly by regarding ourselves as persons with

dignity. This right is not enforceable by law or protected by a court, but likeother rights, it is strict, it is more or less determinate, and violations of it are

clear enough (at least to our conscience) when they occur and are strictly

forbidden.


2012 The Author



18/22

Second, Kant insists that the duties of respect toward others are only

negative, which makes more sense if we understand them as protections

from the ways others can interfere with and undermine the respect we have

for ourselves. Those who aim to go beyond Kants own views might

employ a similar argument for the conclusion that we do have positiveduties to affirm and appreciate the value of others because, contrary to

Kants own view, Rawls may be correct that we need public affirmation in

order to maintain an adequate sense of our own worth.

Finally, Kant has been criticized for his apparent failure to discuss in

much detail prohibitions on profound moral wrongs such as rape, torture,

bullying, holding people in prolonged captivity and racial and sexual

discrimination. These types of acts are wrong on many of grounds, and a

number of them, I suspect, can be captured by Kants ethical theory, but

Kants discussion of respect for others highlights a particularly egregiouselement of these acts that should figure into an overall moral explanation

for why they are wrong. In addition to the pain and suffering that these

acts typically involve, part of what is so heinous about raping, torturing or

discriminating against someone is that the assailant is attempting to influ-

ence the victim to lose respect for herself, to become servile, to seek his

approval, to doubt herself, to feel worthless and insignificant, to see herself

as an object for his enjoyment or benefit.37 And, what may be worse, the

attacker is by his deedsdemandingthat the victim cease to value herself as

a rational person with dignity and so, on Kants view, profoundly disre-specting his victims.38

Department of Philosophy

University of Tennessee

NOTES

1 This way of describing and labeling the awesome conception of respect comes from,

but is not endorsed by, Thomas E. Hill (2000).2 See Wood, 2008 and Donagan, 1977.3 I will refer to Kants texts with the following abbreviations followed by the Academy

volume and page number:GGroundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals(Kant, 2002);CPrR

Critique of Practical Reason(Kant, 2007a);MMThe Metaphysics of Morals(Kant, 1996);

RReligion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason(Kant, 1998);A Anthropology from a

Pragmatic Point of View (Kant, 2007b); C Moral Philosophy: Collinss Lecture Notes

(Kant, 2001c); H Kants Practical Philosophy: Herders Lecture Notes (Kant, 2001b);

I Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective (Kant, 2006); and V

Kant on the Metaphysics of Morals: Vigilantiuss Lecture Notes (Kant, 2001a).4

While each of these authors may not be committed to viewing human dignity as ametaphysical value or status of a kind that makes him or her a rational intuitionist, part of

my aim is to raise the issue of how to understand and explain this value. See Darwall, 1977;

Dworkin, 2000; Donagan, 1977; Wood, 2008; Raz, 2001; Frankfurt, 1999; Williams, 1973;

Dillon, 1992; Feinberg, 1970; and Buss, 1999.


2012 The Author



19/22

5 Allen Wood (2008, pp. 5460), for example, reads Kants argument for the Formula of

Humanity in GW2 where Kant says that because we each recognize our own rational nature

as an end in itself, we must recognize all persons as ends in themselves, as revealing or

uncoveringto us an antecedent objective value we and others already possess rather than as

an argument that justifies or grounds that objective value itself. Christine Korsgaards

influential rendering of this argument is different but nonetheless depends crucially on an

assumption I hope to avoid, that when rational agents will ends they thereby make those ends

valuable in an agent-neutral sense. (See Korsgaard, 1996.) I develop a different reading that

follows the same basic strategy. I apply here in Cureton, forthcoming.6 See Rawls, 1999 and Hill, 2000.7 ONeill, 1975, 1990; Engstrom, 2009; Singer, 1961; and Sensen, 2011.8 Korsgaard (1996), Barbara Herman (Herman, 1993a) and Onora ONeill (1975, 1990)

agree on this much although they diverge about the precise relationship between FUL and FH.9 Sensen, 2009.10 See Wood, 2008; Hill, 1992b, 2000, 2002a.11 A different and interesting attempt to avoid the awesome conception of respect

without reducing FHE to FUL can be found in Dean, 2006 and 2009.12 In theNicomachean EthicsV.12 (1129b-1130b5) Aristotle distinguishes between these

two forms of justice (Aristotle, 2000).13 John Atwell (1982) argues that this is the only notion of respect, for Kant, and that the

particular duties of respect for others derive from it.14 See Korsgaard, 1996; ONeill, 1985, 1990; Singer, 1961; and Herman, 1993b.15 See especially Wood, 2008 and Donagan, 1977.16 See Baron, Pettit and Slote, 1997; Hill, 2002c; and ONeill, 1975, 1985, 1990.17 Herman, 1993b, p. 45.

18 Hill, 2002c; ONeill, 1985; and Herman, 1993b.19 Wood, 2008, pp. 2323.20 See Hill, 2002b and Engstrom, 2009.21 Kants claim that certain dispositions are part of our rational nature seems quite radical

to us in part because many of us are used to thinking of rationality as a formal matter of

consistency and coherence among our mental states a fully rational person is one whose

mental states are in good order (she does not have contradictory beliefs, she intends the

believed necessary means to her ends or gives them up, and satisfies other of Broomes

requirements of rationality), while a rational person in general is one who has the potential

to be fully rational but perhaps no drive to do so. Kants idea of rationality, on the other

hand, includes substantive dispositions, to think for oneself, to seek the condition of theunconditioned to give morality preference over self-interest, to express our autonomy in

action and also, I claim, to pursue our own happiness and respect ourselves these disposi-

tions are fully realized in a fully rational person while a rational person in general has them

but may not be exercising them fully. Reason, for Kant, has its own motivational elements,

which he thinks drive us to make ourselves happy and respect ourselves. Someone who lacked

any disposition at all to do these things would not be a rational person, according to Kant,

but his own view was that virtually every person is in fact rational in this sense even though

we might want to question that faith.22 Hill (2002c) makes this point to explain the asymmetry between our duty to promote the

happiness of others and having no duty to pursue our own happiness. Another point is that

the words happiness and wellbeing are often used in different ways, but if, as some do, we

use them to refer to the same idea of what makes a life go well, then Kants account of

happiness as satisfaction of ones permissible ends may be understood more easily. Rawls

(1999, ch. 7) may have endorsed a view along these lines.


2012 The Author



20/22

23 See also CPrR 5:61; 5:110; G4:41516 andR 6:6.24 ONeill (1990) raises questions about moral theories that rely on hypothetical consent,

but I think her challenges can be met.25 Broome, 2010. See also Kolodny, 2005; Parfit, 2001; Schroeder, 2004, 2009; and South-

wood, 2008.26 See Baron, 1995 and Cummiskey, 1996.27 See Hill, 1992b, 2002c. A further possibility, which is closer to the views of Baron and

Cummiskey than to Hills regarding the latitude allowed by the duty of beneficence, is to say

that we are required to help others unless there are strong moral reasons to do otherwise,

where these reasons can be provided by our own happiness.28 See Wood, 2008; Hill, 1991; Dillon, 1992, 2007; Denis, 2010; and Potter, 2010.29 See Korsgaard, 1996.30 See Hill, 1992b, 2002c.31 These kinds of reasons are sometimes called agent-relative because they involve an

ineliminable back-reference to the person for whom they are reasons agent-neutral

reasons do not involve such a back-reference (see Petit, 1987). That some action is in my

interest or will helpmy children are agent-relative reasons for me to do it but not necessarily

a reason for anyone else to act that way, whereas that an act will promote general utility is,

according to some, a reason for anyone to do it.32 See Rawls, 1999.33 Robin Dillon (2004) calls this interpersonal arrogance and nicely points out ways in

which being arrogant is itself a way of failing to have proper respect for oneself.34 For a different but related discussion of the interconnected family of concepts that

includes demands, claims, rights, authority and respect see Darwall, 2004, 2006.35 For a related discussion of the connections between self-respect and arrogance in Kant

see Dillon, 2007.36 See Douglass, 1962, 1987.37 For a wonderful discussion in this same spirit see Sussman, 2005.38 For their generous feedback on earlier drafts of this article, I am grateful to Susan Wolf,

Geoff Sayre-McCord, Bernard Boxill, Richard Dean, Jon Garthoff, David Sussman, Oliver

Sensen, Sam Kerstein, Sarah Holtman, Kimberley Brownlee, Macalester Bell, Jan Boxill, two

reviewers for this journal, and especially Tom Hill.

REFERENCES

Aristotle (2000). Nicomachean Ethics, R. Crisp ed. and trans. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Atwell, J. (1982). Kants Notion of Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy 31,

pp. 1730.

Baron, M., Pettit, P. and Slote, M. A. (1997). Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate. Oxford:

Blackwell.

Baron, M. (1995). Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press.

Broome, J. (2010). Rationality, in T. OConnor and C. Sandis (eds) A Companion to the

Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 285292.

Buss, S. (1999). Respect for Persons,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29(4), pp. 517550.Cummiskey, D. (1996). Kantian Consequentialism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cureton, A. (forthcoming). A Contractualist Reading of Kants Proof of the Formula of

Humanity,Kantian Review.

Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect,Ethics 88, pp. 3649.


2012 The Author



21/22

Darwall, S. (2004). Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint, Proceedings and Addresses

of the American Philosophical Association 78(2), pp. 4359.

Darwall, S. (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

Dean, R. (2006).The Value of Humanity in Kants Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Dean, R. (2009). The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, in T. Hill (ed.) The

Blackwell Guide to Kants Ethics. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 83101.

Denis, L. (2010). Freedom, Primacy, and Perfect Duties to Oneself, in L. Denis (ed.)

Kants Metaphysics of Morals : A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

pp. 170191.

Dillon, R. (1992). How to Lose Your Self-Respect, American Philosophical Quarterly29(2),

pp. 125139.

Dillon, R. (2004). Kant on Arrogance and Self-Respect, in C. Calhoun (ed.) Setting the Moral

Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 191216.

Dillon, R. (2007). Arrogance, Self-Respect and Personhood, Journal of Consciousness

Studies14(56), pp. 101126.

Donagan, A. (1977). The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Douglass, F. (1962). Life and Times of Frederick Douglass. New York: Collier Books.

Douglass, F. (1987)My Bondage and My Freedom, W. Andrews, ed. Urbana, IL: University

of Illinois Press.

Dworkin, R. (2000). Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Engstrom, S. (2009).The Form of Practical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.

Feinberg, J. (1970). The Nature and Value of Rights, Journal of Value Inquiry 4, pp.

263267.Frankfurt, H. (1999). Equality and Respect, in H. Frankfurt (ed.)Necessity, Volition, and

Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 146155.

Herman, B. (1993a). Murder and Mayhem, in B. Herman (ed.) The Practice of Moral

Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 113131.

Herman, B. (1993b). Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons, in B. Herman (ed.) The Practice

of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 4572.

Hill, T. E. (1991). Pains and Projects, in his Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, pp. 173188.

Hill, T. E. (1992a). Humanity as an End in Itself, in his Dignity and Practical Reason in

Kants Moral Theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3857.Hill, T. E. (1992b). Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, in his Dignity and Practical

Reason in Kants Moral Theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 147175.

Hill, T. E. (2000). Must Respect Be Earned? in T. Hill (ed.)Respect, Pluralism, and Justice:

Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87118.

Hill, T. E. (2002a). Beneficence and Self Love, in his Human Welfare and Moral Worth:

Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 99124.

Hill, T. E. (2002b). Editors Introduction, in I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of

Morals, T. Hill and A. Zweig, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1991.

Hill, T. E. (2002c). Happiness and Human Flourishing, in his Human Welfare and Moral

Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 164200.

Kant, I. (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals, M. J. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Kant, I. (1998). Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, A. Wood, and G. Di

Giovanni, ed. and trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


2012 The Author



22/22

Kant, I. (2001a). Kant on the Metaphysics of Morals: Vigilantiuss Lecture Notes in

Lectures on Ethics, P. L. Heath, ed. and trans. and J. B. Schneewind, ed. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, pp. 249452.

Kant, I. (2001b). Kants Practical Philosophy: Herders Lecture Notes inLectures on Ethics,

P. L. Heath, ed. and trans. and J. B. Schneewind, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, pp. 136.

Kant, I. (2001c). Moral philosophy: Collinss Lecture notes in Lectures on Ethics, P. L.

Heath, ed. and trans. and J. B. Schneewind, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

pp. 37222.

Kant, I. (2002). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, T. Hill and A. Zweig, eds.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (2006). Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, inToward

Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, P. Kleingeld, ed. and

D. L. Colclasure, trans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 316.

Kant, I. (2007a). Critique of Practical Reason, M. J. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Kant, I. (2007b). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View inAnthropology, History,

and Education, G. Zller, and R. B. Louden, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

pp. 227429.

Kolodny, N. (2005). Why Be Rational?,Mind114, pp. 509563.

Korsgaard, C. (1996). Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ONeill, O. (1975). Acting on Principle. New York: Columbia University Press.

ONeill, O. (1985). Kants Formula of Universal Law, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66,

pp. 2447.

ONeill, O. (1990).Constructions of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Parfit, D. (2001). Rationality and Reasons, in D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Peterson and T.Rnnow-Rasmussen (eds)Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values. Alder-

shot: Ashgate, pp. 1739.

Petit, P. (1987). Universality Without Utilitarianism, Mind72, pp. 7482.

Potter, N. (2010). Duties to Oneself, Motivational Internalism, and Self-Deception in Kants

Ethics, in M. Timmons (ed.)Kants Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, pp. 371390.

Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press.

Raz, J. (2001).Value, Respect, and Attachment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schroeder, M. (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason, Philosophical Perspectives 18,pp. 337364.

Schroeder, M. (2009). Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons, Philo-

sophical Studies 43(2), pp. 223248.

Sensen, O. (2009). Kants Conception of Human Dignity, Kant-Studien 100. 2009);

pp. 309331.

Sensen, O. (2011). Kant on Duties Toward Others From Respect (3744), in A. Tram-

pota, O. Sensen, and J. Timmermann (eds) Kants Tugendlehre: A Commentary. Berlin:

Walter de Gruyter.

Singer, M. G. (1961). Generalization in Ethics. New York: Knopf.

Southwood, N. (2008). Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,Ethics119(1), pp. 930.

Sussman, D. (2005). Whats Wrong with Torture?, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, pp.133.

Williams, B. (1973). The Idea of Equality, in B. Williams (ed.) Problems of the Self.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 230249.

Wood, A. W. (2008).Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


2012 The Author


(a). cureton, adam (2013). from self-respect ti respect for others. ppq

Documents