a comparative reconstruction of moral relativism mary i. bockover professor humboldt state...

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A Comparative A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Relativism Mary I. Bockover Mary I. Bockover Professor Professor Humboldt State University Humboldt State University Arcata, California Arcata, California United States of America United States of America Revised 6-06 Revised 6-06

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Page 1: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

A Comparative Reconstruction of A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Moral Relativism

Mary I. BockoverMary I. Bockover

ProfessorProfessor

Humboldt State UniversityHumboldt State University

Arcata, CaliforniaArcata, California

United States of AmericaUnited States of AmericaRevised 6-06Revised 6-06

Page 2: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Overall SectionsOverall Sections

Moral RelativismMoral Relativism Incommensurable ConflictIncommensurable Conflict American Involvement in the War in IraqAmerican Involvement in the War in Iraq

Page 3: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Relativism[& The Philosophy of Mind]

“Moral relativism” is the view that there isno objective “universal” moral standard todecide the truth of moral judgments, or toresolve conflicts between them.

Page 4: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

Page 5: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

the philosophical counterpart to a debate in the social sciences that contrasted “nature” and “nurture” in the same mutually exclusive way

Page 6: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

the philosophical counterpart to a debate in the social sciences that contrasted “nature” and “nurture” in the same mutually exclusive way

the distinction between the “universal” and the “diverse” in ethics is a false dichotomy; morality can be both universal and diverse

Page 7: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

the philosophical counterpart to a debate in the social sciences that contrasted “nature” and “nurture” in the same mutually exclusive way

the distinction between the “universal” and the “diverse” in ethics is a false dichotomy; morality can be both universal and diverse

moral consciousness, the normative “ground” from which moral judgment grows is universal

Page 8: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

the philosophical counterpart to a debate in the social sciences that contrasted “nature” and “nurture” in the same mutually exclusive way

the distinction between the “universal” and the “diverse” in ethics is a false dichotomy; morality can be both universal and diverse

moral consciousness, the normative “ground” from which moral judgment grows is universal

moral judgment is relative despite this common ground, or will depend on what is valued (even within the same cultural context this can vary dramatically)

Page 9: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

“Moral Relativism” traditionally resulted from a debate that took the universal and the diverse to be mutually exclusive – i.e., either morality is universal or it is (culturally) relative, but not both.

the philosophical counterpart to a debate in the social sciences that contrasted “nature” and “nurture” in the same mutually exclusive way

the distinction between the “universal” and the “diverse” in ethics is a false dichotomy; morality can be both universal and diverse

moral consciousness, the normative “ground” from which moral judgment grows is universal

moral judgment is relative despite this common ground, or will depend on what is valued (even within the same cultural context this can vary dramatically)

Moral consciousness is too general to resolve conflict.

Page 10: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

More generally, distinctions can be madewithin the range of human consciousness: indifferent “ways” – rational, moral, aesthetic,spiritual – that we can experience ourselvesand the world around us.

My “believing” X is wrong is not sufficientto capture the kind of conscious appraisalthat goes into my moral judgment that it iswrong: my judgment entails an even morebasic moral value that is experienced as agood-in-itself.

Page 11: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth

Page 12: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments

Page 13: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments Moral judgment deems that some value Moral judgment deems that some value shouldshould be put into be put into

practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is based on some other competing valuebased on some other competing value

Page 14: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments Moral judgment deems that some value Moral judgment deems that some value shouldshould be put into be put into

practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is based on some other competing value based on some other competing value

Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified and defined; the work of (second-order) and defined; the work of (second-order) ethicsethics

Page 15: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments Moral judgment deems that some value Moral judgment deems that some value shouldshould be put into be put into

practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is based on some other competing value based on some other competing value

Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified and defined; the work of (second-order) and defined; the work of (second-order) ethicsethics

A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a “first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory“first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory

Page 16: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments Moral judgment deems that some value Moral judgment deems that some value shouldshould be put into be put into

practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is based on some other competing value based on some other competing value

Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified and defined; the work of (second-order) and defined; the work of (second-order) ethicsethics

A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a “first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory“first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory

A “first principle” articulates the A “first principle” articulates the most fundamentalmost fundamental value of a value of a particular view, e.g., “happiness”, “freedom”, “benevolence”particular view, e.g., “happiness”, “freedom”, “benevolence”

Page 17: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Values, Judgments, Principles & TruthMoral Values, Judgments, Principles & Truth A moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgmentsA moral value is entailed in more specific moral judgments Moral judgment deems that some value Moral judgment deems that some value shouldshould be put into be put into

practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is practice, or some practice stopped that is in violation of it or is based on some other competing value based on some other competing value

Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified Ordinarily what we value the most is not reflectively identified and defined; the work of (second-order) and defined; the work of (second-order) ethicsethics

A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a A moral value can be reflectively articulated so to constitute a “first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory“first principle”, e.g., of an ethical theory

A “first principle” articulates the A “first principle” articulates the most fundamentalmost fundamental value of a value of a particular view, e.g., “happiness”, “freedom”, “benevolence”particular view, e.g., “happiness”, “freedom”, “benevolence”

Moral judgments are value-judgments, and are relative because Moral judgments are value-judgments, and are relative because there is no independent, objective standard that can determine there is no independent, objective standard that can determine their truth or resolve conflicts between them their truth or resolve conflicts between them

Page 18: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Moral Relativism&

Incommensurable Conflict

An adequate account of moral relativism canbest be given in light of incommensurableconflict: a conflict between moral judgments.

On this level (entailed) moral values havecome to be mutually exclusive in a certaincontext, that is, where one value can only beheld at the expense of the other.

Page 19: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Why a Moral Conflict Becomes IncommensurableWhy a Moral Conflict Becomes Incommensurable

Page 20: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Why a Moral Conflict Becomes IncommensurableWhy a Moral Conflict Becomes Incommensurable

First, there are so many values that can be the First, there are so many values that can be the mostmost fundamental (first) principle for those who believe in them fundamental (first) principle for those who believe in them

Page 21: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Why a Moral Conflict Becomes IncommensurableWhy a Moral Conflict Becomes Incommensurable

First, there are so many values that can be the First, there are so many values that can be the mostmost fundamental (first) fundamental (first) principle for those who believe in them principle for those who believe in them

Second, circumstances are such that one of these values is judged to have Second, circumstances are such that one of these values is judged to have moral priority by one person, group, or culture, etc., and this conflicts with moral priority by one person, group, or culture, etc., and this conflicts with another value judged to have moral priority by another person, group, or another value judged to have moral priority by another person, group, or culture culture

Page 22: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Why a Moral Conflict Becomes IncommensurableWhy a Moral Conflict Becomes Incommensurable

First, there are so many values that can be the First, there are so many values that can be the mostmost fundamental (first) fundamental (first) principle for those who believe in them principle for those who believe in them

Second, circumstances are such that one of these values is judged to have Second, circumstances are such that one of these values is judged to have moral priority by one person, group, or culture, etc., and this conflicts with moral priority by one person, group, or culture, etc., and this conflicts with another value judged to have moral priority by another person, group, or another value judged to have moral priority by another person, group, or culture culture

And third, the normative nature of moral judgment is such that deciding And third, the normative nature of moral judgment is such that deciding which value is superior can only appeal back to what is valued instead of a which value is superior can only appeal back to what is valued instead of a common standard which could objectively determine their truthcommon standard which could objectively determine their truth

Page 23: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The Problem of Moral IncommensurabilityThe Problem of Moral Incommensurability

Page 24: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The Problem of Moral IncommensurabilityThe Problem of Moral Incommensurability

• Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral difference, even incommensurable conflict, takes rootdifference, even incommensurable conflict, takes root

Page 25: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The Problem of Moral IncommensurabilityThe Problem of Moral Incommensurability

• Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral difference, even incommensurable conflict, takes rootdifference, even incommensurable conflict, takes root

• There is no way to get outside of one’s own “values system” to judge There is no way to get outside of one’s own “values system” to judge which view is which view is ultimatelyultimately right or wrong, better or worse, without begging right or wrong, better or worse, without begging the question of what should be valued the mostthe question of what should be valued the most

Page 26: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The Problem of Moral IncommensurabilityThe Problem of Moral Incommensurability

• Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value Moral consciousness is the universal ground from which moral value grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral grows; but paradoxically also supplies the ground from which moral difference, even incommensurable conflict, takes rootdifference, even incommensurable conflict, takes root

• There is no way to get outside of one’s own “values system” to judge There is no way to get outside of one’s own “values system” to judge which view is which view is ultimatelyultimately right or wrong, better or worse, without begging right or wrong, better or worse, without begging the question of what should be valued the mostthe question of what should be valued the most

• Objective arguments can Objective arguments can onlyonly be made based on whether the reasons used be made based on whether the reasons used to justify putting some value into practice are consistent, or whether the to justify putting some value into practice are consistent, or whether the supporting facts are soundsupporting facts are sound

Page 27: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The Conflict in Iraq

People of good will can hold differing, andeven incommensurable views on thissubject.

The standoff in the American case this timestarted after President Bush announced in2003 that the U.S.A. would take almostunilateral responsibility for protecting itselfand the world against Iraq’s continuedmanufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

Page 28: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Page 29: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Clear proof that WMD Clear proof that WMD hadhad been manufactured been manufactured

Page 30: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Clear proof that WMD Clear proof that WMD hadhad been manufactured been manufactured Clear proof that Iraq Clear proof that Iraq hadhad capacity to deliver them capacity to deliver them

Page 31: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Clear proof that WMD Clear proof that WMD hadhad been manufactured been manufactured Clear proof that Iraq Clear proof that Iraq hadhad capacity to deliver them capacity to deliver them A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq

(under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, (under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, Sr.)Sr.)

Page 32: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Clear proof that WMD Clear proof that WMD hadhad been manufactured been manufactured Clear proof that Iraq Clear proof that Iraq hadhad capacity to deliver them capacity to deliver them A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq

(under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, (under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, Sr.)Sr.)

Iraq’s contempt for the United NationsIraq’s contempt for the United Nations

Page 33: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons for the WarSome Reasons for the War“Support our Troops”“Support our Troops”

Clear proof that WMD Clear proof that WMD hadhad been manufactured been manufactured Clear proof that Iraq Clear proof that Iraq hadhad capacity to deliver them capacity to deliver them A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq A dramatically conflicted relationship between Iraq

(under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, (under Hussein) and the U.S.A. (since George Bush, Sr.)Sr.)

Iraq’s contempt for the United NationsIraq’s contempt for the United Nations Evidence gathered by the Security Council of Iraqi Evidence gathered by the Security Council of Iraqi

terrorist cellsterrorist cells

Page 34: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Evidence (here lacking) of WMD productionalone does not legally justify invadinganother country: there are many countrieswith WMD and the clear capacity to deliverthem, but we do not invade them in thename of national defense.

This capacity must pose a clear and directthreat to the invading country in order for itto be justified, and our fear – legitimate ornot – was critical to our feeling threatened.

Page 35: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons against the WarSome Reasons against the War“Peace is Patriotic”“Peace is Patriotic”

Page 36: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons against the WarSome Reasons against the War“Peace is Patriotic”“Peace is Patriotic”

On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who intentionally does even worseintentionally does even worse

Page 37: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons against the WarSome Reasons against the War“Peace is Patriotic”“Peace is Patriotic”

On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who intentionally does even worse intentionally does even worse

Like the French and Germans, many Americans also thought Like the French and Germans, many Americans also thought there was not enough evidence that WMD were still being there was not enough evidence that WMD were still being produced to make the national defense argument succeedproduced to make the national defense argument succeed

Page 38: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Some Reasons against the WarSome Reasons against the War“Peace is Patriotic”“Peace is Patriotic”

On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the On principle or on religious grounds, believing that the inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – inevitable loss of innocent life – though not intentional – cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who cannot be justified even if the goal is to remove a despot who intentionally does even worse intentionally does even worse

Like the French and Germans, many Americans also thought Like the French and Germans, many Americans also thought there was not enough evidence that WMD were still being there was not enough evidence that WMD were still being produced to make the national defense argument succeedproduced to make the national defense argument succeed

Still others held that even if there were, war was not justified Still others held that even if there were, war was not justified at the timeat the time because of the lack of international support because of the lack of international support

Page 39: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Page 40: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Failure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMDFailure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMD

Page 41: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Failure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMDFailure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMD Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by

the warthe war

Page 42: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Failure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMDFailure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMD Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by

the warthe war Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of

political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human rightright derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, including much of Iraq, does not obviously shareincluding much of Iraq, does not obviously share

Page 43: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Failure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMDFailure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMD Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by

the warthe war Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of

political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human rightright derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, including much of Iraq, does not obviously shareincluding much of Iraq, does not obviously share

Failure to have a clear exit strategy (and this administration has said that U.S. Failure to have a clear exit strategy (and this administration has said that U.S. armed forces will likely remain in Iraq for at least a decade) armed forces will likely remain in Iraq for at least a decade)

Page 44: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Critique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqCritique Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Failure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMDFailure to get greater U.N. support and to find evidence of WMD Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by Failure to provide adequate support for the many innocent Iraqis harmed by

the warthe war Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of Critical differences in value between Iraqi culture and ours, e.g, the value of

political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human political freedom that we take to be an “inalienable” and “universal” human rightright derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, derives from a Western concept of person that most of the world, including much of Iraq, does not obviously shareincluding much of Iraq, does not obviously share

Failure to have a clear exit strategy (and this administration has said that U.S. Failure to have a clear exit strategy (and this administration has said that U.S. armed forces will likely remain in Iraq for at least a decade) armed forces will likely remain in Iraq for at least a decade)

Iraq is the second largest untapped oil source in the world, and that the Iraq is the second largest untapped oil source in the world, and that the American way of life has made no great strides to become less dependent on American way of life has made no great strides to become less dependent on fossil fuel (fossil fuel (oil factoroil factor argument) argument)

Page 45: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Page 46: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also be deemed moral or even obligatory on different groundsbe deemed moral or even obligatory on different grounds

Page 47: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also be deemed moral or even obligatory on different groundsbe deemed moral or even obligatory on different grounds

One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one

Page 48: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also be deemed moral or even obligatory on different groundsbe deemed moral or even obligatory on different grounds

One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one

So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as innocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do itinnocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do it

Page 49: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also be deemed moral or even obligatory on different groundsbe deemed moral or even obligatory on different grounds

One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one

So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as innocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do itinnocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do it

Americans often can afford to take the idealistic perspective of judging peace Americans often can afford to take the idealistic perspective of judging peace to have moral priority over freedom (the political freedom of Iraqi people) to have moral priority over freedom (the political freedom of Iraqi people) since since theirtheir freedom is not directly at stake, while (military) American life is freedom is not directly at stake, while (military) American life is

Page 50: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

Support Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of IraqSupport Abroad of U.S.A.’s Invasion of Iraq

Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. Given that legal and moral justifications are related, but distinct, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also invasion of Iraq in 2003 could, after the fact, be deemed illegal but could also be deemed moral or even obligatory on different groundsbe deemed moral or even obligatory on different grounds

One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like One reason the U.N. was established after WWII was to keep despots like Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world Hitler and Stalin from coming to power and reeking havoc on the world again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one again; no longer a legal justification for war but still could be a moral one

So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as So it was argued that removing Hussein was morally justified, as long as innocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do itinnocent civilian life was not intentionally sacrificed to do it

Americans often can afford to take the idealistic perspective of judging peace Americans often can afford to take the idealistic perspective of judging peace to have moral priority over freedom (the political freedom of Iraqi people) to have moral priority over freedom (the political freedom of Iraqi people) since since theirtheir freedom is not directly at stake, while (military) American life is freedom is not directly at stake, while (military) American life is

It is important for Americans to remember the lessons of WWI and WWII, It is important for Americans to remember the lessons of WWI and WWII, especially from the perspective of those who required the help of others to especially from the perspective of those who required the help of others to preserve their own freedom and did not get it (or did not get it in time) preserve their own freedom and did not get it (or did not get it in time)

Page 51: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

I have described the moral scenario in Iraq in terms of anincommensurable conflict of values – between maintaining worldpeace and protecting political freedom – that could not besimultaneously held at the time the war was declared.

What has been shown is that people of good will can come tohave conflicting, even incommensurable values in such a context,and can also change their minds along with changes incircumstance.

This shift in moral priority occurs when a different valuebecomes the most important, and we have seen this is contextdependent, for example, depending upon whether the “facts”supporting the value are true or really facts.

As moral agents concerned with the world we live in, wedevelop our values through learning the facts, and also throughlearning about the values of others, even those who are verydifferent from us. That is all we have, but it is no smallaccomplishment.

Page 52: A Comparative Reconstruction of Moral Relativism Mary I. Bockover Professor Humboldt State University Arcata, California United States of America Revised

The EndThe End