a casual observers guide to the greek economy
TRANSCRIPT
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A Casual Observer’s Guide to
the Greek Economy
May 2015
Bloomberg Page:
Ilias Lekkos [email protected] Staggel [email protected] Aggelopoulou [email protected] Gavalas [email protected]
Piraeus Bank4 Amerikis Street, 105 64, Athens, Greece Tel: (+30) 210 328 8187, Fax: (+30) 210 328 8605
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A casual observer of the Greek political discourse should be excused for feeling completely confused by
the cacophony created by a litany of the comments regarding the issue of Greek sovereign debt
sustainability, re-negotiation, alleviation or even repudiation. While these comments reflect the
importance of these issues for the future of the Greek economy, the way this dialogue is conducted
obscures rather than clarifies the true nature of the problems that need to be addressed.
In what follows, we focus on some of the “hot topics” relevant to the Greek economy:
• What has been the course of events since 2010.
• Where we stand now regarding the business cycle.
• What is the cyclical position of the Greek economy.
• What is the “state of affairs” regarding the Greek debt.
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GDP (€ mn, constant prices) Gross Fixed Capital Formation (€ mn, constant prices)
Private Consumption (€ mn, constant prices) Public Consumption (€ mn, constant prices)
150,000
170,000
190,000
210,000
230,000
250,000
270,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
GDP
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
110,000
120,000
130,000
140,000
150,000
160,000
170,000
180,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Private Consumption
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Public Consumption
Source: ELSTAT, Piraeus Bank Research
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Imports of goods & services
(€ mn, constant prices)
Source: ELSTAT, Piraeus Bank Research
Exports of goods & services
(€ mn, constant prices)
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
55,000
60,000
65,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Exports of Goods & Services
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
Imports of Goods & Servic es
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Source: European Commission DG ECFIN, Eurostat, Piraeus Bank Research
Economic Climate Tracer
Based on our two complementary methodologies of accessing the phase of the business cycle the
following picture emerges:
Since the middle of 2012 the Greek economy entered in an improving trajectory that culminated in a brief
period of GDP growth.
The recent rise of political uncertainty and instability is threatening to push back the Greek economy to a
recessionary phase.
5
Pro-cyclical and Non-cyclical components
of GDP (ΥοΥ% change)
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
2 0 0 0 Q 1
2 0 0 0 Q 4
2 0 0 1 Q 3
2 0 0 2 Q 2
2 0 0 3 Q 1
2 0 0 3 Q 4
2 0 0 4 Q 3
2 0 0 5 Q 2
2 0 0 6 Q 1
2 0 0 6 Q 4
2 0 0 7 Q 3
2 0 0 8 Q 2
2 0 0 9 Q 1
2 0 0 9 Q 4
2 0 1 0 Q 3
2 0 1 1 Q 2
2 0 1 2 Q 1
2 0 1 2 Q 4
2 0 1 3 Q 3
2 0 1 4 Q 2
Pro - Cyclical (YoY% change), LHS Non - Cyclical (YoY % change), RHS
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
-0.25 -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.15
l e v e l
mom change
downswing expansion
contraction upswing
Feb.'15
Jan.'06
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Source: EL.STAT., Piraeus Bank Research6
Real GDP (YoY% change) Nominal GDP (YoY% change)
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
carry - over effect growth dynamics within the year total % change
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
carr y - ove r ef fec t g rowth dynam ics withi n the year total % cha ng e
The downward revision of Q4-2014 real GDP growth rate to -0.4% QoQ minimized the momentum of the
Greek economy, drastically reducing the carry – over effect to just 0.1% forcing us to revise our forecast for
real GDP to 0.8% and for nominal GDP to -0.9%.
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Source: European Commission DG ECFIN, EL.STAT., Eurostat, Piraeus Bank Research7
Inflation & Output Gap Headline Inflation (CPI) vs GDP deflator
Given the substantial negative output gap in the Greek economy and taking into account the global
lowflationary environment, we expect the Greek economy to remain in a deflationary mode with inflation
at -1.2%.
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
-3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
H I C P c o n s t a n t t a x y o y % c
h a n g e
Output Gap
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
GDP deflator Inflation
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8
Economic Growth vs
Unemployment rate
Hiring Intentions (normalized data, sa, 3m moving
average) vs Employment (YoY% change, sa data)
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-12.0
-10.0
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
J a n - 0 5
M a y - 0 5
S e p - 0 5
J a n - 0 6
M a y - 0 6
S e p - 0 6
J a n - 0 7
M a y - 0 7
S e p - 0 7
J a n - 0 8
M a y - 0 8
S e p - 0 8
J a n - 0 9
M a y - 0 9
S e p - 0 9
J a n - 1 0
M a y - 1 0
S e p - 1 0
J a n - 1 1
M a y - 1 1
S e p - 1 1
J a n - 1 2
M a y - 1 2
S e p - 1 2
J a n - 1 3
M a y - 1 3
S e p - 1 3
J a n - 1 4
M a y - 1 4
S e p - 1 4
J a n - 1 5
Εmployed (YoY % change, sa), LHS Hiring Intention (3m ma), RHS
Job creation schemes have supported employment in recent times but uncertainty is beginning to spill overto the labour market.
y = -0.3998x + 1.0887R² = 0.6553
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
-15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0
Y e a r l y c
h a n g e % u
n e m p l o y m e n t
Real GDP (YoY % change)
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Source: EL.STAT., Eurostat, Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank Research9
Total Credit Total Credit (% of GDP)
-3 0 0 0 . 0
-2 0 0 0 . 0
-1 0 0 0 . 0
0.0
1 0 0 0 . 0
2 0 0 0 . 0
3 0 0 0 . 0
4 0 0 0 . 0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0. 0
5. 0
1 0 . 0
1 5 . 0
2 0 . 0
J a n - 0 9
M a r - 0 9
M a y - 0 9
J u l - 0 9
S e p - 0 9
N o v - 0 9
J a n - 1 0
M a r - 1 0
M a y - 1 0
J u l - 1 0
S e p - 1 0
N o v - 1 0
J a n - 1 1
M a r - 1 1
M a y - 1 1
J u l - 1 1
S e p - 1 1
N o v - 1 1
J a n - 1 2
M a r - 1 2
M a y - 1 2
J u l - 1 2
S e p - 1 2
N o v - 1 2
J a n - 1 3
M a r - 1 3
M a y - 1 3
J u l - 1 3
S e p - 1 3
N o v - 1 3
J a n - 1 4
M a r - 1 4
M a y - 1 4
J u l - 1 4
S e p - 1 4
N o v - 1 4
J a n - 1 5
n e t f l o w, m n € -RH S Yo Y% ch an g e - LF S
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
220,000
240,000
260,000
280,000
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
120.0
125.0
Q 1 / 0 9
Q 2 / 0 9
Q 3 / 0 9
Q 4 / 0 9
Q 1 / 1 0
Q 2 / 1 0
Q 3 / 1 0
Q 4 / 1 0
Q 1 / 1 1
Q 2 / 1 1
Q 3 / 1 1
Q 4 / 1 1
Q 1 / 1 2
Q 2 / 1 2
Q 3 / 1 2
Q 4 / 1 2
Q 1 / 1 3
Q 2 / 1 3
Q 3 / 1 3
Q 4 / 1 3
Q 1 / 1 4
Q 2 / 1 4
Q 3 / 1 4
Q 4 / 1 4
Outstanding amount (mn €), RHS Greece (% of GDP) , L HS Euro area (% of GDP) , L HS
The recent outflow of deposits and the dependency of Greek bank to the Eurosystem funding to theturn of €104bn will have an adverse impact to the total credit formation, leading total loans growth
to -2.5%.
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Piraeus Bank Greek Corporate Bond
Index – Weighted Average Yield
Average Real Interest Rate on New bank loans
(
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GDP and banknotes in circulation
growth (€ bn)
Banknotes in circulation
(% of nominal GDP)
Source: BoG, ELSTAT, ECB, Eurostat, Piraeus Bank Research
One of the negative consequences of the increased uncertainty regarding the course of the Greek
economy is the trend (which occurs since early 2010) to hoard cash (ie banknotes) on the part of
Greek households.
0%
5%
10 %
15 %
20 %
25 %
Q 1 / 0 2
Q 3 / 0 2
Q 1 / 0 3
Q 3 / 0 3
Q 1 / 0 4
Q 3 / 0 4
Q 1 / 0 5
Q 3 / 0 5
Q 1 / 0 6
Q 3 / 0 6
Q 1 / 0 7
Q 3 / 0 7
Q 1 / 0 8
Q 3 / 0 8
Q 1 / 0 9
Q 3 / 0 9
Q 1 / 1 0
Q 3 / 1 0
Q 1 / 1 1
Q 3 / 1 1
Q 1 / 1 2
Q 3 / 1 2
Q 1 / 1 3
Q 3 / 1 3
Q 1 / 1 4
Q 3 / 1 4
Gree ce -bank notes in c i rculat ion
Gree ce -ne t l iabi l i ties re lated to the a l locat ion of euro banknotes w ithin the Eurosystem
Eu r ozone
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Q 1 / 0 2
Q 3 / 0 2
Q 1 / 0 3
Q 3 / 0 3
Q 1 / 0 4
Q 3 / 0 4
Q 1 / 0 5
Q 3 / 0 5
Q 1 / 0 6
Q 3 / 0 6
Q 1 / 0 7
Q 3 / 0 7
Q 1 / 0 8
Q 3 / 0 8
Q 1 / 0 9
Q 3 / 0 9
Q 1 / 1 0
Q 3 / 1 0
Q 1 / 1 1
Q 3 / 1 1
Q 1 / 1 2
Q 3 / 1 2
Q 1 / 1 3
Q 3 / 1 3
Q 1 / 1 4
Q 3 / 1 4
Q 1 / 1 5
b a nk not es i n c i r c u l a ti on ( € b n)
Net l iabi l i ties related to the al locat ion of euro bankno tes within the Eurosystem (€ bn)
qu a r t er l y GD P_c u r r ent pr ic es_sa ( € b n)
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Last time that the issue of the sustainability of Greek debt was seriously addressed by the institutions
was during the November 2012 Eurogroup meeting. The outcome of that meeting was very favourable
for the Greek economy. Yet Eurogroup had to satisfy two important, politically imposed, constraints:
• Debt had to appear to be sustainable (based on IMF’s sustainability analysis)
• Estimated funding needs could not exceed the amount of €245 bn originally allocated to Greece,
i.e. no new money.
These constraints are satisfied under a unique set of conditions that maybe achievable in a physics lab
(or more appropriately in an Excel spreadsheet) but not in the real world. More specifically, debt
sustainability requires a specific trajectory for growth, inflation, Euribor rates, fiscal surpluses and
privatization revenues. At the same time the lack of new financing means that all fiscal surpluses, ANFA
& SMP profits and privatizations revenues have to be directed towards repaying Greece’s external
debt.
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-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2
0 0 9
2
0 1 0
2
0 1 1
2
0 1 2
2
0 1 3
2
0 1 4
2
0 1 5
2
0 1 6
2
0 1 7
2
0 1 8
2
0 1 9
2
0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)
June. 2013 (b/2,3) July. 2013 (b/4)
Primary Balance (% GDP)
The key feature of the IMF estimates are the overoptimistic projections of the initial reports (May 2010-July
2011) regarding deficits in 2010 and 2011, as well as the very high primary surpluses particularly between
2014 and 2020. A significant rationalization is recorded over time. The main feature is that the last three
reports (January 2013, June 2013 and July 2013) contain a much more realistic profile for 2013, 2014 and
2015, which progressively becomes less realistic from 2016 onwards.
Source: IMF, Piraeus Bank Research
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The profile of the price level evolution - as expressed by the GDP deflator - was also very “aggressive” for
2010 and 2011, while there was no provision for negative inflation rates in 2012, 2013 and probably 2014.
The actual inflation rate is well below what was expected in the initial reports and it certainly has an
aggravating effect on the intertemporal de-escalation of the debt as a % of GDP. As regards the period 2015-
2020, the latest reports predict a gradual convergence of inflation with the targets of the ECB, namely just
below 2%.GDP Deflator
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
2 0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)Ju ne . 2 01 3 ( b/2 ,3 ) J uly . 2 01 3 (b /4)
Source: IMF, Piraeus Bank Research
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
2 0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)
June . 2 01 3 (b /2 ,3 ) Ju ly. 20 13 (b /4 )
(a/1)
(a)
(a/5)
(a/2)
(a/3)
(b)
(a/4)
(b/2,3)
(b/4)
(b/1)
The interest rate profile in the 5 first reports (May 2010 to July 2011) ranged from 5% to 7%, which was
clearly unrealistic and unsustainable. On the contrary the 3 last reports (January 2013 to July 2013) reflect
both the decisions to reduce rates which were taken in February and November 2012 and the pragmatic
admittance that public debt can enter a de-escalation path only if financed at low cost. However, it is
interesting that, even in the latest reports, the borrowing cost of the Greek state stands at about 3% which
leaves room for further reductions.
Interest Rates
Source: IMF, Piraeus Bank Research
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The IMF predictions regarding the evolution of the privatization program may be the most striking example of
how the assumptions of the IMF methodology can be “adjusted” so that the conclusions converge on a more
desirable debt evolution.
The initial reports (May, September 2010) comprise a highly conservative estimate on the course of
privatization. Conversely, the subsequent reports have revised upwards the ability to raise revenue from the
sale of assets.
The extreme example is the report of July 2011 which predicted revenues of €50 billion for the period 2011-
2015. In subsequent reports, the amount of privatization revenue has been limited; however it is possible
that these estimates may also prove to be overoptimistic.
Finally, for the correct valuation of the estimates - particularly in the initial reports - one must take into
account the fact that they did not include revenue from the sale of the HFSF bank shares and warrants given
the fact they had been drafted before the PSI and the recapitalization of the 4 systemic banks.
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
2 0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)
Ju ne . 2013 (b /2 ,3 ) Ju ly . 2013 (b /4)
Privatization Revenue (in billions of €)
Source: IMF,Piraeus Bank Research
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18
The following Chart depicts the successive revisions of the real GDP predictions by the troika and vividlyillustrates the inability of the IMF to predict with any degree of accuracy the recessionary effects of the two
economic adjustment programs on the Greek economy.
For example, it must be mentioned that according to initial estimates, the recession in 2011 would be limited
to -2.6% (against what was ultimately a recession of -7.1%), in 2012 it predicted growth of 1.1% (against an
actual recession of -7.0%) and in 2013 growth of 2.1% (against an actual recession of -3.9%).
It is particularly interesting that in September 2010 the IMF economists predicted an “explosion” of growth of
4.7% for only one year in 2016 and then a retreat to previous levels of 2.7%.
This prediction does not include any significant insight from the IMF staff on the causes of this important
growth of the Greek economy in this particular year. On the contrary, this prediction was necessary in order
to change the dynamics of debt in this September 2010 report.
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19
GDP (constant 2005 prices, % of change)
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
2 0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)
June. 2013 (b/2 ,3 ) July . 2013 (b/4)
Source: IMF, Piraeus Bank Research
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Based on the initial amount of Greek debt and the intertemporal evolution of all variables we have discussedso far, the evolution of the debt as a % of GDP becomes clear. According to the first report of May 2010 and
particularly of September 2010, the sustainability of the General Government debt was a matter of minor
importance. Starting from the level of 115%, it would peak in 2013 at 144% and then the combination of high
growth, inflation and primary surpluses would lead to a decrease to 111% in 2020.
The defining moment, which raises the issue of sustainability as a key issue in the Greek programme and
which ultimately determines all subsequent developments, is the revision of the 2009 debt by Eurostat at the
end of 2010 from 115% to 127%. From that moment on Greek debt becomes problematic and despite the
significant reduction of the private sector debt (through the PSI process) in the latest reports it is predicted
that it will peak in 2013 at 176% and then rapidly fall to 124% in 2020.
In the last available assessment review of the European Commission (Fourth Review, April 2014, Occasional
Paper 192) the public debt is expected to reach its highest value in 2014 at 177.2% of GDP and it shall bedeclining from 2015 onwards.
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21
Public Debt (% GDP)
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
18 0
2 0 0 9
2 0 1 0
2 0 1 1
2 0 1 2
2 0 1 3
2 0 1 4
2 0 1 5
2 0 1 6
2 0 1 7
2 0 1 8
2 0 1 9
2 0 2 0
May 2010 (a) Sep. 2010 (a/1) Dec. 2010 (a/2) Mar. 2011 (a/3)
July. 2011 (a/4) Dec. 2011 (a/5) Mar. 2012 (b) Jan. 2013 (b/1)
Ju ne. 2013 (b/2,3) July. 2013 (b/4)
(a/1)
(a)
(a/5)
(a/2)
(a/3)
(b)
(a/4)(b/2,3)
(b/4)
(b/1)
Source: IMF, Piraeus Bank Research
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22
From the mere presentation of the revision of the IMF forecasts regarding the development of the
public debt we can draw a number of conclusions:
i. The valuation of debt sustainability is not a pure statistical modelling exercise.
ii. On the contrary, it is the product of projections and subjective assumptions on a number of
variables over a long period of time.
iii. Consequently, these projections involve a significant margin of error.
iv. It is natural that the margin of error as well as non-realistic (namely overoptimistic) estimations,
are larger for projections regarding the distant future. As the time horizon of the predictions
shrinks, the predictions are (unavoidably) revised towards more realistic levels.
v. In the first two reports of the IMF (May 2010 and September 2010) the debt dynamics were
problematic, but in no way could the General Government debt be treated as non-sustainable.
vi. The revision by Eurostat of the total amount of the 2009 public debt by 12% of GDP (from 115%
to 127%) at the end of 2010 was critical. From this point onwards, the trajectory of Greek debt
enters non-viable levels and decisions to reduce interest rates in the formal sector and for the
debt haircut through PSI became inevitable.
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The point that we are trying to make is that debt is one of the variables in that system of equations but
it is the end- rather the starting-point. Rather than starting a negotiation on the level of debt we
should start from a reasonable set of macro assumptions, allowing for achievable primary surpluses
that can be recycled into the Greek economy in the form of infrastructure spending and keeping
debt/GDP as a “free” variable which will be determined at the end.
If t hat exercise leads to unrealist ic levels of sovereign i ndebt ness at the end-horizon of t he simulat ion
then corrective action should be taken to reduce the debt accordingly.
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