74TH CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ACT AND PRESENT ECONOMICGROWTH AS CATALYZING AGENT FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Sanjeev VidyarthiPursuring Doctoral Research in Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

I T P IJOURNAL

www.itpindia.org

ITPI JOURNAL1 : 3 (2004) 65-69

ABSTRACTThe author re-examines the deficiencies that prompted enactment of the 74th Constitution Amendment Act (The 74th amendment issingled out as it explicitly focuses on the urban areas, while the 73 rd amendments focus is on the rural areas) and hypothesizes onsome of the probable impediments that have blocked the 74th amendments implementation. The author argues that the presentsystem has failed to implement the 74th amendment and this failure is more deep-rooted than the commonly perceived proceduralproblems and administrative apathy. The article hypothesizes that the present spectacular growth of the Indian economy and theensuing economic development and the 74th CAA has far more potentials to influence and catalyze the processes of urbanimprovement / development.1.0 INTRODUCTIONIt is about 12 years, since the 73rd and the 74th CAAto the constitution of India were passed by theparliament. The bills were perceived as path breakingin nature and the then Prime Minister of India RajeevGandhi during the ensuing debate in the parliamenton 15th May 19891 said the single greatest event inthe evolution of democracy in India was the enactmentof the constitution which established democracy inparliament and the state legislatures. This historicalrevolutionary bill takes it place alongside that greatevent as the enshrinement in the constitution ofdemocracy at the grassroots.

Many of us would remember the spate of laudatoryarticles these bills generated, especially in thearchitecture/planning literature. It seemed as ifPaeans are being sung and the planning professionis brimming over with a deep sense of long awaiteddeliverance. Indeed yet another reading of the 74th

CAA might still succeed in giving goose pimples tosome of us - the very first three items in the TwelfthSchedule 2 (Article 243 W) referred respectively toUrban Planning including Town Planning, Regulationof Land-use and constitution of buildings and Planningfor economic and social development.

The author re-examines the deficiencies thatprompted enactment of the 74th CAA (The 74th CAAis singled out as it explicitly focuses on the urbanareas, while the 73rd CAA focus is on the rural areas)

and hypothesizes on some of the probableimpediments that have blocked the 74 th CAAimplementation. The author argues that the presentsystem has failed to implement the 74th CAA andthis failure is more deep-rooted than the commonlyperceived procedural problems and administrativeapathy. Despite the legislatures will to devolve thepower to grassroots, the 74th CAA by its very attemptto devolve power finds potent and pernicious enemiesthat have ensured that it is not implemented. Firstlythe amendment threatens the Patrimonial-Bureaucratic culture of governance in the country.Secondly the amendment goes against the long-heldview that decision making, especially involvingtechnical matters requires specialization, expertiseand a chain of command. This makes the concept ofpopular participation (exactly what the 74th CAAaspires to do) not only unrealistic but also apersistently revolutionary idea and finally since theconstitution of India is rooted in the western liberalthought which in itself is build on the schism betweenthe individual and the state, the intermediaries (inthis case the city) become and remain weak.

The article hypothesizes that the present spectaculargrowth of the Indian economy and the ensuingeconomic development has far more potential toinfluence and catalyze the processes of urbanimprovement rather than the mere wish of thelegislature and concludes that the current growth ofIndian economy augurs particularly well for the urbansector, if harnessed properly.

1 The bills (as 64th and 65th amendment) though passed by the lower house (Lok Sabha) in 1989 could not be adopted in the

upper house (Rajya Sabha) and were reintroduced by Narsimha Rao government in 1992.2 In the wake of the 74th amendment, Twelfth Schedule has been inserted in the constitution that contains a list of fields over

which the local bodies may have autonomy.

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2.0 BACKDROP OF 74th CAAThe euphoria in the wake of the 74th amendment wasat least related in part to the fact the constitution ofIndia, though the longest written constitution in theworld had not elucidated the role of local self-governingbodies. In fact the constitution was almost silentexcept but for the article 40 which sanctioned theestablishment of village Panchayats. This tooprobably was to accommodate the long standing wish(articulated in his frequent musings about the VillageRepublics) of the Father of the nation. The article40, however, was noticeably silent about theorganization of town governments. Hence after 1950the only hope for the local bodies in both the ruraland urban areas was the state governments. Thestate governments in order to lighten their own burdencreated the local bodies in their jurisdictions andfinally the Balwant Rai Mehta committee (1957)institutionalized Panchayati Raj.

However as far as the question of constitutionalprotection was concerned the cities remained weakand can be called mere creatures of the state3. Tomake matters worse for the cities, the stategovernments legislated the formation of DevelopmentAuthorities and Improvement trusts in the cities(Through the 70s and 80s) as it was felt that theexisting municipalities are and increasingly becomingincapable of looking after ever burgeoning needs ofthe city. These new institutions were entrusted withdevelopment activities while the responsibilities ofthe municipalities were relegated to maintenancerelated measures. Since both the developmentauthorities and the Improvement trust were directlyresponsible to the state government (being theircreations) and were staffed by career bureaucrats /technocrats (mostly on deputation to maintain atighter leash) the state government began to play amuch bigger role in the city affairs than the popularlyelected local bodies.

The 74th amendment was created against thisbackdrop to provide greater constitutional status tothe local bodies in urban areas. It must be notedthat the idea, however, was not to bring any

substantial change in the pattern of local governmentadministration but to provide them notableconstitutional protection4. Further since the subjectof local governments continues to be in the statelist, hence, the 74 th amendment was to beimplemented by the respective state governmentsin their jurisdictions (This becomes very conspicuousby the use of word may instead of shall in theapproved bill.)3.0 THE POTENT AND PERNICIOUS FORCES

IN OPPOSITION OF 74th CAAThe foremost and the most noticeable stumblingblock, the 74th amendment faces is the contemporaryover reliance on the generalist bureaucratic systemof governance. The author would like to argue thatcontrary to popular belief the present mess has deeperroots than generally recognized. And the point ofinterest for the purpose of this study is the historicalcultural and social moorings of the present daysgeneralist dominated bureaucracy.

Though Lord Cornwallis (1843-1892) is recognizedas the father of the modern Indian bureaucracy, apredecessor to the colonial bureaucracy existedduring the Mughal period. It was a bureaucracycentered on the ruler who in turn used it to extendhis own private domain to the entire state. It was amutually beneficial relationship and the king and thebureaucrats enjoyed what is called a patron-clientrelationship. This Mughal model was also widelyreplicated by other smaller kingdoms and becamethe de facto mode of governance.

This patrimonial-bureaucratic 5 model was basedon the fundamental premise that the ruler was thecenter of the state (and metaphorically also of theuniverse) and the bureaucrat (subedars in MughalIndia, thikanedars in Rajasthan, etc.) were inactuality an extension of the King in their owndomains. This can also be understood as the partbeing an equally important constituent of the wholeas the whole is of the part. The only glue that keptthis patron-client relationship together was a senseof personal loyalty, albeit it may be argued that thenit was stronger at the clients end.

3 Gerald E Frug uses this term in his seminal piece City as a legal Concept, Harvard Law review, Vol. 93, April 1980, Number 6

4 Amareswar Mishra in Constitutional Status of Local Governments in India page 311, paper published in Constitution andConstitutionalism in India, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1999.5 A detailed study by Prof Stephen P. Blake Shahjahanabad: The sovereign city in Mughal India, 1639-1739, Cambridge Universitypress, 1991 coins and elucidates the patrimonial-bureaucratic model in exhaustive detail.

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The colonial bureaucratic model that sought to reformthe Mughal bureaucratic model succeeded inimproving only some functional aspects while thebulk of the attributes that were socio-cultural innature have remained till the present day. Forexample the British model sought to redirect thebureaucrats loyalty from the person to the office.However, the author argues that the contemporaryIndian bureaucracy still exhibits the social-culturaltrait of loyalty that is rooted in the patrimonial-bureaucratic model of Mughal administration. Thecolonial efforts have made the feature of loyalty simplyassume one more layer that of loyalty towardsoffice rather than a person and in reality the loyaltynow works diabolically at two levels- loyalty to apatron as long as he is in office and then loyalty tothe office once the patron is not in that office.

As a direct corollary to the above postulate the patronand the client (For example Chief Minister and thebureaucrat) feel more comfortable with each other ifthey share a sense of mutual loyalty (that could bebased on caste and creed affinities, reciprocatedgratification or monetary considerations) and viceversa. In such a setting the bureaucrat sees his officeas an extension of the goodwill he enjoys with hispatron. In other words it can also be understood asthe privileges of power enjoyed by the office of thebureaucrat as the largesse of his client relationshipwith his patron and the patron in turn being gratifiedby the bureaucrat either by doing his bidding and / orensuring quick delivering of even the undeliverable(s).

However, since the patron (the elected politician) doesnot enjoy permanence of tenure anymore in thedemocratic setup, which ironically is now the privilegeof the bureaucrat hence it may be argued that thebureaucracys dice is more loaded. In simpler wordssince the 74th CAA, to begin with would haveobliterated the powers of the development authoritiesand the Improvement trusts (headed by the careerbureaucrats) and enhanced those of themunicipalities (headed by elected but generallyminnow and small time politicians) the bureaucracyholds it out by putting spanners in work. In this thebureaucracy is aided by two very disparate butsurprisingly converging phenomenons. The first isthe widely held societal belief that any decisionmaking requires great technical skills and the mattersespecially involving technical issues requirespecialization, expertise and a chain of command.

The apparatuses (specialized technocrats headedby a bureaucrat both having vast field experiences)of the development authorities / improvement trustshence are perceived more competent than themunicipalities (that are headed by a politician who isperceived as inexperienced in urban administrativeand planning matters). Secondly using the previouslydescribed Mughal bureaucracys analogy the presentbureaucrats succeed in depicting their offices as amere extension of the office of their patron (The Chiefminister or the minister). This is more often than notis demonstrated by quickly ensuring that the wishesof the patron are fulfilled. Where as the popularlyelected mayor could probably belong to theopposition or may have his own quirks (even if she /he is from the same political party), the bureaucratsoffice generally ensures a quick, confidential and theleast troublesome mode of implementation.

Further the office of Mayor is perceived as parochial(a phenomenon as old as Plato - Power appeals tothe worst instincts of the individual and leads to adespotism of ignorance and prejudice) and to usethe frequently used (abused) Indian term of havingvested interests. This is at best paradoxical and isa doubly loaded argument as the Mayor is the firstcitizen of the city and supposedly represents thecity as its duly elected constitutional representativebut the underpinning societal trust in the scientisticand the technocratic urban development authoritiesand improvement trusts that supposedly function withmore checks and balances has constantlyundermined the Mayors position. No better exampleof this could be found than the centrally sponsoredScheme for Infrastructure development in MegaCities. This scheme was announced in the year 1993-94 (almost immediately after the 74th CAA in 1992)and its purpose was to undertake infrastructuredevelopment projects of city-wide/regionalsignificance covering a wide range of componentslike water supply, sewerage, roads, bridges and solidwaste management, etc. The scheme envisagedsetting up of Revolving Fund by nodal agenciesdesignated by State Governments for infrastructuredevelopment on a sustainable basis with appropriatedirect and indirect cost recovery measures. Insteadof empowering the Municipal Corporations of theMega cities (more remarkable because the MunicipalCorporations of the Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbaiare the oldest in the sub-continent and arguably themost experienced in managing urban affairs) the

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following scientistic and the technocraticorganizations (off course headed by a generalistbureaucrat) were designated by the respective stategovernments: Mumbai Metropolitan RegionDevelopment Authority (MMRDA) for Mumbai. KolkataMetropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) forKolkata. Tamil Nadu Urban Finance and InfrastructureDevelopment Corporation (TUFIDCO) for Chennai.Andhra Pradesh Urban Infrastructure and FinanceDevelopment Corporation (APUIFDC) for Hyderabadand Karnataka Urban Infrastructure DevelopmentFinance Corporation (KUIDFC) for Bangalore. Theirony of a communist government in West Bengalthat is theoretically underpinned by a long historyaccompanying the slogan power to people preferringa bureaucratic organization over Kolkata MunicipalCorporation (where incidentally the communists were/ are in power as well) is not lost.

The detractors may like to argue that since theinfrastructure development in Mega Cities was to befunded by the Central and State Governments asgrant in the 25:25 ratio and the balance 50% was tobe mobilized by the nodal agency from financialinstitutions and capital market and hence thespecialized agencies were preferred over municipalcorporations that are overburdened and hencedeemed incapable for this task. For one this is aself-defeatist stance that goes against the very spiritof the 74th CAA and secondly there have beenrepeated examples of Municipalities (beginning withAhemedabad Municipal Corporation in 1995) raisingmoney, without government guarantee, from themarket to finance infrastructure projects.

This brings us to the fundamental phenomenon ofthe powerlessness of the cities in the presentscheme of things. The debate about the apparentpowerlessness of the cities is in fact not new andcan be traced to as early as the nineteenth centurywhen the question about the public / private distinctionfor the corporations arose. This was necessitated todetermine the relationships between the corporationsand the legislature. Cities were placed in the sphereof the state while the corporations in the sphere ofthe individual in the society. It means that thecorporate executives are private individuals and thecity executives are public individuals. Marx suggestsin his essay On the Jewish question to label theindividual in a civil society private and the cityemployee as public is to divide those who can lead

an earthly life of economic gain from those who mustregard themselves a communal beings and act inheavenly fashion. This vision still retains a powerfulinfluence on our thinking and has produced thecontemporary bizarre situation where theintermediaries between the individual and the stateare weak (for example cities) and a expertdominated bureaucracy is more trustable than thepopular participation.

The present status of urban affairs amplydemonstrates the effects of many such interestinglayers (the ones described here are at best a relativelysmall sampling) that the present Indian system haseither inherited or have been forced upon it. Forstarters, on one hand we have the loyalty feature ofthe patrimonial-bureaucratic model and then we havepowerless cities because of the liberal westernthought (the legitimate parent of our constitution, withno historical, social and cultural connection with theIndian context) that is rooted in the schism betweenthe individual and the state (remember the recurrentthought in the French and the American Revolution)on the other. And no prizes, at this point in guessing,why the cities in South Asia are, what they are!

Finally assuming that the cities are powerless andwould continue to remain so, if the above reasoningis indeed true, then can anything be done about theplanners elementary pre-occupation with urbanimprovement? The author would like to hypothesizethat the present spectacular growth of the Indianeconomy and the ensuing economic developmentindeed has the potential to catalyze the processesof urban improvements.

For one there are several historical precedents thatsupport this hypothesis. Let me use an analogy toexplain this. We know that any particularphenomenon is triggered off (quite like a laboratoryreaction) when the right chemistry happens. The twomost important ingredients for the issue in questionare the present degraded urban status that is at itsnadir and the author takes the liberty to assume thatit is extremely difficult to make it any worse andsecondly some of our cities, whether we like it ornot, are becoming part of a global network of cities.Apart from other things it means that such citieshave become sort of a showcase for the country.The global visitors for one and the new money thatfinds its way in the local economies of such cities

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will provide the incentive, if not force, for thegovernments to act. Remember the Victorian reformsin London and Haussmans urban improvements inParis were both triggered off by economic growthaccompanied by the globalization of those cities.Secondly the trickle down effect of the increasedpurchasing power will ensure that an increasingnumber of residents, with more money in theirpockets, will demand and get better urbanenvironments.

4.0 CONCLUSIONSThis is not to say that it is entirely a rosy picture,currently it is just the presence of the right chemicals.For any chemical reaction to be rightly successfulcontrolled conditions are equally important and thisis where the planners come in. If the right conditionsare not provided then the Indian cities may not beable to use the constructive power of this chemicalreaction. Planners by the virtue of training andunderstanding of the power play can contribute, ifwilling and empowered.

Otherwise the most obvious pitfall is that of anincreasing fragmentation (where the smaller parts ofthe cities continue to turn into enclaves of richnesssurrounded by vast stretches of poverty) of such citiesand the growing disparity between the citiesthemselves in the same state, for example Bangaloreand Belgaum, Jaipur and Jaisalmer etc.

This is the primary task, the author believes, thatconfronts and will continue to do so the Indian

planners in the coming years. Sadly this makesreminiscing about the 74th CAA more painful as itindeed was and remains the most powerful attemptyet to empower not only the grassroots but also theplanners.

References1) AG Krishna Menon Imagining the Indian City, paper

presented at Theatres of Decolonization Conference,Chandigarh; January 6-10, 1999

2) Blake, Stephen P. Shahjahanabad: The sovereign city inMughal India 1639-1739, Cambridge University press,Cambridge, UK,1991

3) Desouza, Alfred. The Indian City Manohar Publishers,New Delhi, 1983 (1995)

4) Friedmann, John. The World City Hypothesis.Development and Change, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1986,pp. 69-83.

5) Frug, Gerald E City as a legal Concept, Harvard Lawreview, Vol. 93, April 1980, Number 6

6) Gooptu, Nandini. The politics of the urban poor in earlyTwentieth-Century India. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, UK, 2001.

7) Jha, Gangadhar. The seventy-fourth ConstitutionalAmendment and the empowerment of MunicipalGovernment A Critique in The 74 th ConstitutionalAmendment- Power to the People, National Institute ofUrban Affairs, New Delhi, 1994

8) Mohanty, Dushmanta Kumar Grassroots Democracy inIndia in the context of 73rd and the 74th Amendments inConstitution and Constitutionalism in India, APH PublishingCorporation, New Delhi, 1999

9) Mishra, Amareswar Constitutional Status of LocalGovernments in India in Constitution and Constitutionalismin India, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1999

10) Mukharji, Nirmal. Self Government and itsInstrumentalities in The 74th Constitutional Amendment-Power to the People, National Institute of Urban Affairs,New Delhi, 1994

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