1. QUIAO V. QUIAO ; G.R. No 176556,  [July 04, 2012]

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolutionof conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the ConjugalPartnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husbandand wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugalproperties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnershipof gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of thepartnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or

merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

2. ELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRER

FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany on September 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by the parents of respondent. In 1992, the spouses decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the house of his parents which he sold. The proceeds of the sale were used to purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of the house (P528,000 and P2,300,000 respectively). The Antipolo property was registered under the name of Elena Murrer. Due to incompatibilities and respondent‟s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed for a separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon city. On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the spouses Muller. The court also decreed the separation of properties between the spouses and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country excluding those acquired by gratuitous title. Helmut Muller said that he is not praying for the transfer of ownership of the property but of the reimbursement of his personal funds.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to the reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?

HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is not entitled to the reimbursement of the funds used to purchase the Antipolo property. The Constitution prohibits alien from acquiring private lands in the Philippines for the conservation of the national patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner‟s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent‟s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to

recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent‟s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he purchased the property despite constitutional prohibition. Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2 006.html

3. VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN FACTS: Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful married life. They were blessed to have one son. Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour. Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on 2001. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. Partial settlements are as follows: - P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties; - The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall be for te defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof. - The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant; - The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof; - The house and lot shall be to the common child. The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the said agreement. The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner said that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code. To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the

law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. These arguments are specious. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident. Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/15540 9.htm

4. BEUMER V. AMORESG.R. 195670 December 3, 2012Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J

FACTS:Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondent’s marriage was nullified by basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.

ISSUE:Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?

HELD:The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.  

An Alien Cannot Seek Reimbursement On The Ground Of Equity Where It Is Clear That He Willingly And Knowingly Bought The Property Despite The Prohibition Against Foreign Ownership Of Land

The Facts:Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980.  Their marriage was declared a nullity by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.  Among the properties included in the inventory were several lots and residential house, described below:

1. a Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.

2. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.

3. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.

4. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.

During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of Avelina, but it was purchased using funds he received from the Dutch government as disability benefit, and Avelina had no sufficient income to purchase the properties.  On the other hand, Avelina alleged that except for the two residential houses and Lots 1 and 2142, all the other lots were her paraphernal properties and acquired thru her funds.

After trial the RTC disposed of the properties as follows:  It awarded to Willem several personal properties (tools and equipments), the two houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 were declared as co-owned by Willem and Avelina as there was no prohibition on aliens owning buildings and houses and were acquired during the marital union.  On the other hand, all the lots covered by several TCTs were declared paraphernal properties , though acquired during the marriages, in view of the constitutional prohibition against aliens owning real property in the Philippines.   On appeal to the CA, Willem asserted that all the money for the purchase of the lots came from his funds, and were registered only in the name of Avelina because of the constitutional prohibition, hence he prayed for reimbursement of one half of the value of the lots.  The CA disagreed, ruling that he cannot invoke equity when he very well knew the constitutional prohibition on aliens owning real property in the Philippines.  Thus, Willem elevated his case to the Supreme Court to assail the RTC and CA decision.

The Issue/s:Whether or not Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the purchase price of the lots subject of the case.

The Court’s ruling:The petition lacks merit.

The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller1  the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of land2  enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:Section 7.  Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he “is well aware of the [above-cited] constitutional prohibition”3  and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name.  Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.4   

In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,5  he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly6. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.7  Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,8   petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.9  Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment10.  As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:Futile, too, is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.”11  (Citations omitted)Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship12. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony13  and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 195670, December 03, 2012, WILLEM BEUMER, PETITIONER, VS. AVELINA AMORES, RESPONDENT.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

5. Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289

Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC since the marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes. Upon Leticia’s appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.

Issues: 1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved 2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper

Held: 1.No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be

authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: xxxx (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decisioc because, the trial Court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

6. Valdes vs. RTC, 260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the FC, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained

through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Valdez vs RTCFacts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before

the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).

7. Buenaventura vs. CA

Facts: Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN.  (Note: So there are two sets of children here.) Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. The plaintiffs in this case sought for the declaration of nullity of the six deeds of sale and certificates of title in favor of the defendants.  They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio because they are simulated. They said that: a. Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the properties in litis; b. Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein; c. Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees); and d. Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime. Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal basis. RTC ruled in favor of the defendants (respondents in this case) and dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA upheld RTC’s ruling.

Issues: 1. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration. NO2. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price. NO

Held:

1st issue: There was a consideration.

If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment.  If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.

It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.   Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract.  Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration.  The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible.  

Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacity to buy the questioned lots. On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold.  Not only did respondents’ minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale.  As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent father.

2nd issue: The general rule is that inadequacy of consideration shall not invalidate a contract.

Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states: Art. 1355.  Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.  (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:Art. 1470.  Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.  (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale.  All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave.

Ruling: In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.

8. John abing vs Juliet WaeyanFacts: 

In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In 1992, their house was renovated and to it was annex a structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1994, Juliet returned. 

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They executed a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum of

P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment. 

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru the money he borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his name. 

Issue: 

Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?

Held: 

No. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. 

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." 

Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. Juliet's failure to pay

John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment. (John Abing vs Juliet Waeyan, G.R. NO. 146294, July 31, 2006) http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/05/abing-vs-waeyan-digest.html#sthash.UgnOJnAx.dpuf

9. Agapay vs. PalangGR No. 116668, July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949.  He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding.  Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950.  The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.  When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.  2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan.  A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased.  On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.  In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.  2 years later, Miguel died.  Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner.  They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.  The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.  However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina.  Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions.  It is required that there be an actual contribution.  If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store.  However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected riceland.  When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government.  Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share.  Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same.  Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia.  Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.  The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old.  The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was

made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.  Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,  for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

ERLINDA AGAPAY VS CARLINA PALANGPosted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 116668 July 28 1997

FACTS;

Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.

Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the riceland and house and lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.

RULING:

No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.

The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.  The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.  The

marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.  If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.  Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.  Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old.  The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.  Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in favor of their daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the

marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

10. MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 [Article 148-Property Regime of Bigamous Marriage]

FACTS:Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely  out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

Both with subsisting marriage

During union had properties and businesses

Due to irreconcilable differences separated

Castillo filed for co ownership

Mallilin contended that coownership cannot apply

Each exclusive property shall be divided and not shared Article 148

actual joint contribution of money, property or industry ISSUE:Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,

property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

11. JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY

October 25, 2012 §   Leave a comment

FACTS:

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met

and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their

9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal

Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of

these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the

construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:

it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former

was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property

regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,

adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and

woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this

regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of

money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective

contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was

intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.

The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous

relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the

acquisition of the property.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private

respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.

However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the

record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,

however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article

148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their

share shall be presumed to be equal.

12. Property Relationship In A Void Marriage

In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention correct? Explain.

 Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. (Cariño v. Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).

            As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).

             Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).

             The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.

             It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner.

             The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.

             True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner’s evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court’s finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.

13. G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR, respondent.

FACTS: 

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner

for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner thereof.

RULINGS:1.

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owne

14.