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Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): R. K. RamazaniReviewed work(s):Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 549-559Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330062 .

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Ideology and Pragmatism nIran'sForeignPolicy

R.K. Ramazani

Thisessay hypothesizesthatthetension between religious ideology and pragmatismhas persisted throughout Iranian history. The Iranian Revolution simply put iton graphic display in the contemporary period. The essay also suggests that thedynamic processes of cultural maturation seem to be shifting the balance ofinfluence increasingly away from religious ideology towardpragmatic calculationof the national interest in the making and implementation of foreign policydecisions. Theobvious implications of all thisfor US-Iran relations are mentioned.

he balance of ideology and pragmatism in the making of Iranian foreign policydecisions has been one of the most persistent, intricate and difficult issues in allIranian history, from the sixth century BC, when the Iranian state was born, to thepresent time. For example, in assessing the decisions of Cyrus the Great for maintain-ing peace in the Iranian "world state," Adda B. Bozeman suggests that pragmatismrather than ideology dictated Cyrus's decisions. ' In my own works over the past halfa century I have tried to hypothesize that the conundrumof the relationship betweenideology and state interest has challenged Iranianpolicymakers ever since the estab-lishment of the Safavid dynasty in 1501.Here, however, I would like to ask questions about the ideology-pragmatismchallenge by drawing concrete examples from the pre-Islamic as well as Islamic peri-ods of Iranianforeign policy. Richard N. Frye's seminal works on ancient Iraninspire

The author s the EdwardR. StettiniusProfessorEmeritus f Politics at the Universityof Virginia.Thisessay is adapted rom his remarks t a conferenceheld at ColumbiaUniversityon December 19, 2003in honorof RichardNelson Frye. This essay as well as his writing or and co-editingof The FutureofLiberalDemocracy:ThomasJeffersonand the ContemporarvWorld Palgrave/Macmillan,004) markthe fiftiethanniversary f the author'spublications.1. See Adda B. Bozeman,Politics and Culture n InternationalHistory (Princeton:PrincetonUni-versityPress, irstedition, 1960) pp. 43-56. For a detailedcomparison f Cyrus'sprudent tatecraftwiththetyranny f otherancient eaders,see MortezaRavandi,Tarikh-e jtemaai,Eqtesadi,Siyasi,Honari-e Iran vaBozorgtarinMellal-e BastaniAz Aghaz ta Zohour-eNehzat-eEslami [TheSocial, Economic,Political and CulturalHistoryof Iran and the Birth of the LargestStatesof theAncient WorldUntil theRiseof the IslamicMovement],Vol.1 (Tehran,Amir KabirPublications,1970), pp.381-390.

MIDDLEEASTJOURNAL VOLUME 8, NO.4, AUTUMN2004

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550* MIDDLE AST OURNALme to do so.2Within helimitedscopeof anessay,of course,evenraisingquestionsnthebroadest trokes s quitean intellectual hallenge.Buttheoverarching urposeofthisessayis onlyto suggestthat hetensionbetween deologyand nterestsn foreignpolicymakinghaspersisted hroughoutranianhistory.PRE-ISLAMICEXAMPLES

In her classic Politicsand Culturen InternationalHistory,Bozemansuggeststhat Cyrussucceeded n establishingnot only the first worldstate,but also the first"internationalociety" n largepartbecausehewasmotivated y prudence ather hanideology nmakingpolicydecisions.3Cyrusestablished cosmopolitantateat atimewhen"thetyrannyof empiresplaguedthe fabricof communityife everywhere."nsucha world,she continues,"thePersianEmpire,vasterthanany precedingempirewestof China,attaineduniversalpeacefor sometwohundred ears n a largepartasthe result of tolerantrespectfor the culturaldiversityof the subjugated eoples...."Cyrus'spoliticalprudencemorethanreligious deologyunderpinnedis law.RichardFryenotes thatCyrus's aw, whichpredated he Roman aw, allowedthe religiouslaws of Egyptians,Babylonians,and Hebrews o stayin force.The testimonies f ancient ommentatorseem to attribute yrus'sobservancefthepracticalircumstancesndecision-makingohispersonalharacter. erodotusesti-fies tohis"statesmanshipnd iberality."enophon'sCyropeadiaindsCyrus"deservingadmiration,"boveall, forhonoringhis people"as f theywere his own children."4 fcourse, heBible reveresCyrus orliberatinghe Jews fromBabylonian aptivity. venthetemplen Jerusalem asrebuiltn the fifthcenturyBC"withPersian ssistance."5othis day,IraqiJews tracetheiroriginsto his liberation olicy.It is significanthatinacceptingheNobelPeacePrize,ShirinEbadiproudly eclaredotheworldonDecember10,2003"IamanIranian, descendant f Cyrus he Great"nd"Iam a Muslim."6 hisshowed hata quarterf a century f "Islamization"ad failedto underminehestrongattachmentf theIranian eople o theirpre-Islamicultural eritage,ncludingts con-cernwithhuman ights.Also,as willbeseen,despite heIslamist eal n theearlyphaseoftheIranianRevolution,he Iranianoreign policy-makersnever stopped takinginto

2. RichardN. Fryehas authored ndedited numerousbooks andmorethan120articles nEnglish,German,Russianand Iranian efereed ournals.For citationsof his works,see Contemporary uthorsOnline,Gale 2003. Myreferences ohis works ncludehisclassic TheHistoryofPersia(Cleveland:TheWorldPublishingCompany,1963),TheGoldenAgeof Persia: TheArabs nthe East(London:PhoenixPaperback,1975),andpersonalcommunications.3. See Bozeman, Politics and Culture.4. See JosefWiesehofer,AncientPersia: From550 BC to 650AD (London: .B.TaurisPublishers,1996, 2001) pp. 43-44.5. Old Testament extsascribe oCyrus heliberationof theJews (Judaeans) romtheirBabyloniancaptivity.See thewordsof Deutero-Isaiah s quoted n Wiesehofer,AncientPersia, p.44.6. Thefull textof ShirinEbadi's ecture,acceptingthe Nobel PeacePrize, hasappearedn variouslanguages.Forthetextinwhichthese specificremarks ppear nEnglish,see "TheNobelLecturegivenby NobelPeacePrizeLaureate2003, ShirinEbadi" Oslo, December10, 2003), http:flwww.nobel.no/eng_lect_2003b.html.Foreasy access to the text in Persian n the US, see Iman, Spring2004.


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IDEOLOGYNDPRAGMATISMNIRAN'SFOREIGNOLICY 551accountnationalnterest n makingpragmatic ecisions.The role of interestsas well as ideologyin theforeignpolicy of Cyrus'ssucces-sors seems muchmore difficultto surmise.We know thatDariusI (522-486 BC)invoked"the avorof AhuraMazda" n his statecraftn general.We alsoknow,fromwhatJosefWiesehoferells us, that heMagi(majus) during heAchaemeniddynasty(558 BC-330 AD) performedonly religious,administrative,nd educational unc-tionsand also playeda part n royal nvestiture.The implication eemsto be thattheMagi had little or no influenceon the king's policy decisions.This suggests thatCyrus'ssuccessorsmay have attached reaterweight to the imperialnterest hantoreligiousethics,just as Cyrushad donebeforethem.Untilmore directevidencebe-comes available, hequestionremainswhetherXerxesI launchedmilitary ampaignsagainstGreeceto erase the humiliationof DariusI in the Battleof Marathon r tospreadustice, by the favorof AhuraMazda, o non-Iranians?One may conjecturethat the Sasaniddynasty's (224 AD-651 AD) foreignpolicymakersmight have tilted the balance in favor of ideology more than theAchaemenids fter heirappearancen 226AD. RichardFryetells us that heSasanidEmpirewas a consciousrevivalof the Achaemenid tate with its pretensionso uni-versality.7But the question emainswhetherheirpretensionswere motivated ytheirwish to restore heterritoriesormerlyheld by the Achaemenids rby theirreligiousideology.I tend to think thatrelativeto the Achaemenid oreign policymakersheSasanids n generalwereperhapsmoremotivatedby Zoroastriandeology.Two fac-tors in particularmay speakto this point.First,we know that at least two Sasanidkings,Ardashir andShahpur , claimeddivinequalities.Second,and moreimpor-tantly, he Sasanidsmade Zoroastrianismhe officialreligionof the state.That deologization f thestate,however,didnotputtheMagiin controlof thepolity.The ZoroastrianpriestTansar n the Sasanidbook of council to the kingsadvisedthatkingshipandgood religionwere"siblings," ot one andthe same. Thissamedescriptionwas echoedmuch aterbytheMuslimwriterMas'udi.RichardFryenotes that the head of the priesthood,Mobadan-Mobad,became he partner f theShahinshah."his combination f Zoroastrianizationf the stateandthepartnershipbetweenthe leading priestand the kingdoes not seemto havetilted the balance nfavorof religious deologyin foreignpolicydecisionsat theexpenseof state nterest.This conjecture eems to be supported y Ardashir 's politicaltestament o his sonShahpur. In it he said: "Considerhealtarand thethroneas inseparable;heymustalwayssustainone another.A sovereignwithoutreligion s a tyrant."8

7. See forexample,Frye,TheGoldenAge of Persia, p. 1: "TheSasanianIraniansweredefinitelyheirsof Achaemenids."8. Personal communicationwith Professor Frye, 2003-2004. ArdashirI's political testament oShahpour is quoted n SirPercySykes,AHistoryof Persia,Vol.1 (NewYork:StMartin'sPress,1963),p.398.Arab historiansTabariandMas'udiwrote about he Sasanids.Mas'udiis mentionedherewithreference ohis mostimportantwriting,generallyreferred o as MurujorMurujal-dhahabwa-ma dinal-jawhar [Meadowsof Gold and Mines of Gems] in four volumes. Iranianscholarsattachgreatimportanceo thiswork.Fora translationn English,see PaulLundiandCarolineStone(translatorsndeditors),TheMeadowsof Gold:The 'Abbasids,by Masudi(London:KeganPaul, 1989).


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552 * MIDDLE AST OURNALAcoupleofexamplesromSasanid olicydecisionsmight ufficehere.DidArdashirwagewaragainstheRomans ecause f hisreligious eal ospreadZoroastrianeachings,or in order o regainSyriaand therest of Asia thathad been lost by theAchaemeniddynasty, r for bothreasons?Did hisson, Shahpur, launch militaryampaign gainstRome norder o consolidate nd egitimate isrule,or didheactto servesimultaneouslyreligiousaithandstate nterest is-'a-vis foreignpower?

ISLAMICPERIOD EXAMPLESIn some waysthe parallelsbetweenSasanidandSafavid(1502-1736AD) em-piresarestriking. ustas theSasanidshadconsciously ried o revive heAchaemenid

statewith claims to universality,heSafavids ried o revivethe Sasanid mpire nthesixteenthcenturyAD, also with pretensionsto universality.Just as the SasanidsZoroastrianizedhestate,theSafavids"Shi'itized"he state.Just as the firstSasanidkingArdashir (226?-240AD) claimeddivinequalities n founding he Sasanidem-pire, ShahIsma'il(1501-1524) consideredhimselfas "theAgent of God" n foundingthe Safavidstate.Yet,it is next to impossible o infer fromtheideologization f the Safavidstatethatforeignpolicydecisionsof theSafavidkingssimplyreflectedsome kindof Shi'icrusading hrustat all times and underall circumstances.To be sure,in Roger M.Savory'swords,ShahTahmasp1524-1576) "was a religiousbigot,"9but the com-plicationsof his fourmajorcampaigns n the Caucasus eem to revealthe extremedifficulty n sortingout the relative nfluenceof ideologyandstate interest n thesecampaigns.This complexityarises at least in partfrom the fact that two "foundingraces"of the Safavidstate,the IraniansandtheTurks,hadstruggled or controlofmajorstatepostsbefore thesecampaigns.Againstthisbackdrop, ould one say thatShahTahmaspwagedthosecampaigns o bringback to IranGeorgians,CircassiansandArmenians s apoliticalmeans ochallengeheprivileged osition f theqizilbash?10To cite an even moreimportant xample,why did Shah'Abbas (1587-1629)sign the ignominiouspeace with the OttomanEmpire n 1590?In this "treaty" eabandoned he age-oldShi'i practiceof cursingthe Sunni"first hreecaliphs"andalso made erritorialoncessions o theOttomans.Did he dosobecause nparthewastryingto reformShi'i ritualisticpractice?Or did he also cede Iranian erritoriesbecausewhen he acceded o thethrone heSafavidstatewas tooweak to fight ontwofronts,against he Ottomans ndthe Ozbegs?Some fortyyearsago I suggested hat

9. Roger M. Savoryalso characterizesShah 'Abbas I as a "pragmatist"ndpraiseshim for his"religioustolerance."See his Iran UnderTheSafavids (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1980),pp.76-103, especially atp.101.10."Qizilbash"literally"redheads"after heirheadgear) enerallyrefers oTurkomanribal orceswhich had nitiallybeenresponsible ortherise of theSafavids opower,andemergedsubsequently sa "militaryaristocracy." heirreligious loyalty to ShahIsma'il, the founderof the Safaviddynasty,waned afterhisdefeat ntheBattle of ChildiranorChaldiran)withtheOttomanEmpire n 1514.Theyno longerregardedhimashavingdivine orsemi-divinequalities.


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IDEOLOGYNDPRAGMATISMN IRAN'SFOREIGNOLICY 553Shah 'AbbasI mighthave adoptedsomething ike the principleof cuius regioeiusreligio(whoeverhas thestate,his is thereligion) or the first timein Iranianhistory,although hisWestern onceptmusthave beenalien to Iranians t the time.11Some may arguethatShah 'AbbasI could not have adoptedsuch a secularprinciple or two reasons.First,he consideredhimselfto be the spokesmanof theHidden mam.Second, n practicehe was a devoutMuslim.Hewalked, or example,fromIsfahan o the Shi'i holy shrine n Mashhad n a well-recorded ilgrimage.Yet,despite all these indicationsof his religiouspiety,his policy decisionswere signifi-cantlyinfluencedby Iran'sperceived tate interest.First, RogerSavory ells us thatthe Shahwas a "brilliant trategist nd tacticianwhose chief characteristic as pru-dence.He preferredo obtainhis ends by diplomacy ather hanwar."'2

Second,and moreimportant, othRogerSavoryand MarshallG. S. Hodgsontell us howthe Safavidstateby thetime of Shah'Abbas hadmoved awayfromthedynamic deology thathad motivated he early Safavidmovement."3n theorytheShahwas still Murshid-iKamilfor the qizilbash,butin practicehe observed ran'sinterestearnestlyn making oreignpolicydecisionsof the kind ust mentioned.Theincreasing ecularizationf the stateobviouslyhad a greatdealto dowith the Shah'sforeign policy orientation.Againstthe backdrop f this observation,t shouldbe realized hatcontraryoconventionalnterpretations,y the timemodernWesterndeas, ncluding ecularism,arrivedn Iran, heIranianswerereceptive o these ideasfor theirown historicalandcultural easons. tendto see this receptivityo Westerndeas notonlyin the secular-izingtrend hathadbeenevident n thelaterSafavidera,but n theveryoriginsof theIranian tate during he Achaemenids. tendto thinkCyrusthe Greatwas probablythefirstIranian aradigm f a "secular umanist"olitical eaderwhenthe state tselfwas in its earliestformativestage. In foreignpolicy terms Iranianshad over themillenniadeveloped heirown secular endenciesby the time of Shah'Abbas . So,theWesternmodern deasof nation-state, ational nterestandeven the conceptofmodern oreignpolicywere notentirelyalien to IranianswhentheIranian tate wasexposedtoWesternmoderndeas, especially n the nineteenth nd the twentieth en-turies.In this light,thewhole debateof thepasttwo centuriesabout hecompatibilitybetweenIslam anddemocracy ingsespeciallytrue.To cite one of the mostinterest-ing examples n this debate,as earlyas the nineteenth enturyMirzaYousefKhan,knownas MostasharDowleh,arguedn his importantwork YekKalameh OneWord)thatIslamandseculardemocracy recompatible.'4 Oneword"herewas intended osuggestthat the rule of law could providea solutionto Iranianbackwardness.He

11.RouhollahK.Ramazani,TheForeignPolicyof Iran, 1500-1941:ADevelopingNation in WorldAffairs Charlottesville:UniversityPressof Virginia,completed n 1964andpublished n 1966).12. Savory,Iran UndertheSafavids,p. 101.13. See also MarshallG.S. Hodgson,TheVenture f Islam:TheGunpowderEmpiresandModemTimes,vol.3 (Chicago:TheUniversityPress of Chicago,1974) pp. 16-58,especiallyat pp.53-58.14. See his YekKalameh OneWord) Tehran:Nashr-eTarikh-eran,1912).


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554* MIDDLE AST OURNALcompared he 17-pointFrenchDeclarationof Rightsof Man and the Citizensandfundamental slamictenets andpronouncedhemcompatible.Enlightenedeligiousand secularntellectualswho led theConstitutional evo-lution at the turnof thetwentieth enturymaywell have shared he kind of interpre-tation hatMostasharDowleh hadpropoundedarlier.Thesupportersf theConstitu-tionalRevolutionaimednotonlyat thecountry'sndependenceromforeigncontrol,butalso at the freedomof thepeoplefromtheking'styranny.notherwords, he ideaof the national nterest n foreignpolicy decisionmakingwas then imbuedwith theconceptof constitutional emocracyor representative overnment.This was true, tmay be said, duringboth the Constitutionalregime and the governmentof Dr.MuhammadMusaddiq PrimeMinister1951-1953). For example,when the FirstMajlis decided to rejectthe government'sproposalfor acquiring oreignloans, toprotestagainst heAnglo-Russian artitioningf Iran,andto hiretheAmerican inan-cial adviserMorganShuster o helpreform ran's haotic inances, hesedecisionsallaimed not only at Iran'spoliticalindependence,but also at introducingdemocraticvaluesintoIranianoreignpolicydecisions.Contraryo conventionalnterpretations,lso,Musaddiq's ecisionto national-ize the Iranianoil industrywas not simplya matterof nationalistic rusade.To besure,he depictedhis disputewiththe Britishas a choice between"independencerservitude"Isteqlalya Enqiad)But his foreignpolicy goal of "completenationaliza-tion" of the Iranianoil industrywas also inspiredsignificantlyby his belief thatdemocratic ocial andpoliticalreforms n Iranwould be impossibleas longas the oilindustry,hebackboneof theIranian conomy,was controlledby the British.By contrast, ran's oreignpolicydecisions can be said to havebeendevoidofdemocratic aluesduring herule of Reza Shah(1925-1941)andhis sonMuhammadRezaShah(1941-1979).National nterestwas seenby themas coterminouswith thePahlavis'dynasticnterest.Their ssentiallyanti-clericalhrustwasseenbythemasses,who hadtraditionally lose ties to the clergy,as being anti-Islamic.Theirharkingbackto the SasanidandAchaemenidparadigmswasdisingenuous.t aimedatlegiti-mationof the Pahlaviruleby dictatorialmethods.MuhammadRezaShahwentso farasto crownhimself n 1971bysalutinghisself-proclaimedncientpredecessor,CyrustheGreat,at theking's gravesiteatPasargaede.Cyrusmusthave turned n his graveover the pretensionsof this moderndictatorwho had muchmore in common withsuchrulersas Duvalier n Haitiand Marco n thePhilippines hanwith the humanistCyrustheGreat.MuhammadRezaShah'sgrandiosegoal of turning ran ntoa "GreatCiviliza-tion"was animated y dynasticambitions ather han henational nterestof Iran.Hetried o achievethisgoalbyarming ran o theteethso that t couldbecomeone of thefiveconventionalmilitarypowersof theworld.Intheprocesshe turned ran nto oneof America's eadingarmspurchasers, surrogate tateof theUnited States, and anAmerican oliceman f thePersianGulf.Hispopularly-opposedtatus-of-forcesgree-ment with thePentagon eemedto manyIranianso violate Iraniannational nterestby revivingthe hatedforeign capitulatoryprivileges in Iran.AyatollahRuhollahKhomeinicalledtheagreement"adocumentof theenslavement f Iran."One of themostpopular evolutionary logans saidit all, "TheAmericanShah."


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IDEOLOGYAND PRAGMATISM N IRAN'S FOREIGNPOLICY* 555REVOLUTIONARYXAMPLES

To most Iranwatchers he IslamicRevolution urnedon its head considerationof pragmaticnationalinterest in the making of Iranian oreign policy decisions.Khomeini'sworldviewand his supporters'wordsand actionsappeared o supportsuch a conclusion.Khomeini levated he interestof the Muslimcommunityumma),anddenigrated he veryidea of a secularnationalnterestby rejecting heconceptof"nationalism"(melli-garai).e also downgradedhe extantinternationalystem ofnation-stateson the groundsthat it was the creatureof a weak humanmind. Headvocatedan "Islamicworldorder"my appellation)or thebenefitof humanity. nhis words"Islam s notpeculiar o a country, o severalcountries, group,or even theMuslims.Islamhas comefor humanity...slamwishestobringall of humanityunderthe umbrella of its justice."'5Here, again,I see the tenacioushold of the Iraniantradition f pretensionso universality.The most vivid interjection f this universalistdeal by Khomeini ntoIranianforeignpolicycanbe seenin his ideologicalattitudeoward he Soviet Union on theone hand,and toward hePersianGulf stateson the other. n his letterof January1,1989 to the Soviet leaderMikhailGorbachev, e castigatedhebankrupt ideologicalvacuum" f theEastandtheWestandadvocated slamicvaluesthatalone,he wrote,"canbe a means or well-beingand salvationof allnations,"ncluding,of course, heSoviet Union. With respectto the ArabGulf monarchies,Khomeiniwished to seethemadoptgovernmentsimilar,notidentical, o thatof the IslamicRepublicof Iran,cut their"subservienties" with the superpowers, ndfind safetyunder he Iraniansecurityumbrellachattr-eamniyat).Khomeini'soreignpolicydoctrineof "NeitherEast,norWest, but the IslamicRepublic,"andhis insistence on the exportof theIslamicRevolution,bothstemmed romhis overriding spiration ltimatelyo createan Islamic-led nternationalrder.Theactionsof revolutionaryrannoless than ts leader'sworldviewappearedomostIranwatchers o reflectthe dominance f ideologyto thecompleteexclusionofthe national nterest n Iran's oreignpolicybehavior.Therevolutionaryovernmentheadquarteredumerousoreign"liberationmovements"n Tehran ndwassuspectedof acts of internationalubversionandterrorism, speciallyin the PersianGulf re-gion. Perhaps he most tellingexampleof the pervasivenessof ideologyin Iranianforeignpolicywas theexplosivedispute n theearlyphaseof the revolutionbetweenIran and SaudiArabiaover politicaldemonstrationsf Iranianpilgrims n Mecca.The worstincidenthappenedn the 1987 ha]jseasonwhen some four hundredpil-grims,including275 Iranians,died in the clash betweenthepilgrimsand the Saudipoliceforce.Hajj,Khomeinibelieved,wasa politicalas well asreligiousduty,whileSaudiArabia nsistedon its purelyreligiousfunction.Yet,the recordof Iranianoreignpolicysincethe eruptionof the revolutionn1979reveals hatpolicymakers ave seldomdisregardedhepragmaticnterestof the

15. Khomeini n FBIS-NEA,December18, 1979.


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556 * MIDDLEEASTJOURNALIranianstate. In Revolutionary Iran; Challenge and Response in the Middle East,16and n an articleentitled"Iran:Burying heHatchet"nForeignPolicy,7 I arguedhata streakof pragmatic ational nterestexistedeven in theearliest,mostvolatile,andideologicalphaseof Iranianoreignpolicy.Given hehistoryof Iranianoreignpolicythisargumenthould omeasnogreat urprise. heforeignpoliciesof theAchaemenid,the Sasanid,andthe Safavidgovernments howedpragmatic onsideration f stateinterestsas well as thepresenceof religious deology.Nevertheless, he conundrum f ideology and national nterest n Iranian or-eign policy continuesto preoccupyIranianscholars andpolicymakersalike. In awide-rangingnterviewreported nApril 5, 2003, forexample,Ayatollah AliAkbarHashemi-Rafsanjani,formerspeakerof theMajlis,a formerpresidentandthe cur-rent chairmanof the influentialExpediencyDiscernmentCouncil,insisted that therelativeweightof ideology [Islam]andnational nterest n foreignpolicy decision-makingdependson thecircumstances f a particularase at a given pointin time.Perhapshemoststriking xampleof dominance f pragmaticactorsover ideo-logical influences n Iran's oreignpolicyduringKhomeini's ifetime was the secretpurchaseof arms from the UnitedStates,"theGreatSatan"andIsrael,"the lesserSatan." ran'sdefensivewaragainstIraqoccasionedsucha bold move. A deal wasstruck hroughntermediaries. mericanand Israeliarmswereto be shipped o Iranin return or Iran'shelpwiththe release of Westernhostages n Lebanon.Six ship-mentsof armswent to Iran,severalAmericanhostageswerereleased,eachafterIranreceiveda shipmentof arms.Embarrassedy thedisclosureof the secretdeal, someIranianeaders,particularlyHashemi-Rafsanjani,ried o coverup thetransactionsydenouncingAmericaandridiculingheAmericanmissionwhichhadarrivednTehranwitha Bible and a cake.Intheend,whenthe internalpressuresbuiltupfordemand-ingaparliamentarynvestigationf thescandal,Khomeini imself ntervenedosquashthe demand.Meanwhile, he Iran-Contra ffairwentthrougha seriesof hearings nthe UnitedStatesCongress.Forme the mostvexing questionremains heprolongation f theIraq-Iran ar.Did Irandecide to take the warintoIraqi erritory n or afterJuly 13, 1982 to exportthe IslamicRevolution,or didit do so to defend ts national ecurity nterestsas Iraqcontinued o occupyIranianerritory? hecontroversial uestionpersistsbecausebythatdate Iranhadliberatedmost of its territoryromtheIraqioccupationorces.Theexplanation f Hashemi-Rafsanjanin 1999 still didnot ruleout thepossible nfluenceof ideology.He saidthat Khomeini"decreed hat ourforcesshouldnotenter[Iraqi]populated egions and thearmed orcesof Irancarriedoutthe decree.""8hatdirec-tive seems to haveleft theuninhabitedreasof Iraqas opentargets.In continuingmy searchfor a satisfactory xplanation,a yearafterHashemi-Rafsanjani'sxplanation,raised he samequestionwithamajorwartime olicymaker.I quoted o himKhomeini'sown statemento theeffect that"Weexportedourrevo-

16. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).17. Foreign Policy No. 60, (Fall 1985).18. See Hashemi-Rafsanjani's interview in the Persian newspaper Hamshahri, December 22, 1999.


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IDEOLOGY NDPRAGMATISMN IRAN'SFOREIGN OLICY 557lution to the world through he war... ." I was trying to suggest thatperhaps ran'sprolongation f the war foranother ix yearswas motivatedprimarily y ideologicalconsiderations. he respondent ppeared o suggestthe opposite.That s, Iran'smili-taryforays nto Iraqi erritorywere basedmainlyon the calculation f Iran'snationalsecurity nterest.He simply told me that such pronouncements s the one I quotedfrom Khomeini were nothing but "bragging"(rajaz khaany).'9To the pragmatic onsideration f the national nterest n Iran's oreignpolicycalculationPresidentMohammadKhatami riedto add a democratic imension.Hispresidential ampaign tatementsbefore his firsttermas presidentn 1997 empha-sized the promiseof social andeconomicreforms.As a resultmostobserversdid notseemto realize he importantoreignpolicy implications f his reformist genda.Hisstrongadvocacyof the need for civil society,the rule of law,freedomof expressionand otherrequirementsf democracywas matchedby anunprecedented id for rein-tegration f theIranian ociety intothemodern nternationalystem.Inotherwords,he seemedto suggestthatdemocracy t home andpeaceabroadwere two sides of thesamecoin.2"It came as a surprise o manyobservers hat PresidentKhatami's irstmajorforeign policy statementwas addressed o the Americanpeople.He drewparallelsbetween he Americanandthe IranianRevolutionsby emphasizinghecompatibilityof religionand iberty.Given heheavybaggageof mutualantagonism etweenWash-ingtonand Tehran n the one hand,and the ingenuityof bothin missingsignificantopportunitiesor reconciliation n the other, he US-Iranrelationsarestill stuckinthemuda quarter f a centuryafter he relationswere brokenoff by President immyCarter.Yet, during he ClintonAdministrationranian opesfor reconciliation eemedto grow.PresidentClintonsurprised is ownofficials nApril1999 when he said thatIran"hasbeen the subjectof quitea lot of abusefromvariousWesternnations," ndthatsometimes"it'squite importanto tell people 'look, others have a rightto beangryat somethingmy countryormy cultureor others hataregenerallyallied withus todaydidto you 50 or 60 or 100or 150years ago.""'2t was even moremusictoIranianears when Secretaryof State MadeleineK. AlbrightpubliclyadmittedonMarch17, 2000, the Americanrole in the overthrow f the populargovernment fMusaddiqandexpressedregrets or the United States'havingsidedwithIraq n itswaragainstIran.The positiveimpactof all suchconciliatory hetoricon Iranwasdrastically egatedbythe BushAdministration'subsequent ellicoseapproacho thecountry.22

19. Theconversation ook place duringa one-monthresearch ripto Iran n 2000.20. R.K. Ramazani,"TheShiftingPremiseof Iran'sForeignPolicy:Towards DemocraticPeace?,"The MiddleEast Journal,Vol. 52, Number2 (Spring 1998). [Editor'sNote: ProfessorRamazanihaspublishedregularlyn the Journal ince 1958.]21. See "Remarksby PresidentClintonAnd First Lady Hillary RodhamClintonat MillenniumEvent, White House," in Federal News Service, Inc., April 12, 1999.22.For he text,see U.S. Departmentf State,Officeof theSpokesman, Secretaryf StateMadeleineAlbright:RemarksAt Conferenceon American-Iranian elations,"WashingtonDC,March17, 2000.


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558* MIDDLE AST OURNALHowever,Khatami'sconciliatoryforeignpolicy in pursuitof Iran's nationalinteresthas paidoff handsomely lsewhere n the world.Forexample,theimprove-mentin the relationsbetween IranandSaudiArabiawas unprecedented. he Iran-Saudirapprochementlsohelpedreduce ensionswithIran'sotherneighborsdespitethecontinuingdisputebetweenIranand theUnitedArabEmirates.BeyondtheGulfregion, Iran'srelationswithLebanonand Jordan ook a turnfor the better,andthequestionof restoration f relationswithEgyptas well is nowunder eriousconsider-ation.Perhaps he most important esultof Khatami's onciliatorypolicy,devoid ofideologicalbaggage,has been Iran'sexpanding ies withEurope.Theprincipal tum-bling block in Iran-Europeanelationshad been Khomeini's ife-threateningatwa

againstSalmanRushdie. ran ook a boldstepby distancingtselfpubliclyfromthatideologicaldecree.Ina newsconferenceon September 2, 1998,in NewYork,Presi-dentKhatamiuggested hat hefatwawas theexpressionof Khomeini'sown view asanIslamic urist,reportedly dding,"We houldconsider heSalmanRushdiessueascompletelyfinished."23wodays laterForeignMinisterKamalKharrazieportedlytoldBritishForeignSecretaryRobinCook:"Thegovernment f theIslamicRepublicof Iranhasno intention,noris it goingto takeanyactionwhatsoever o threatenhelife of theauthor f TheSatanic Verses ranybodyassociatedwith his work,norwillit encourageor assistanybody o do So."124Thetriumph f thenational nterestoverideology in Iranianoreignpolicycouldnothave beenmore clear.TheKhatamigovernment riedhard o put Iran'snational nterestaboveideol-ogy even whenthe bellicoseBushAdministrationookpower.Irancondemnedun-equivocally heattacksontheTwinTowersandthePentagon n September 1,2001,assisted the BushAdministrationn destroying he Taliban egime,helpedwith theestablishment f HamidKarzai's nterimgovernment, ndcommittedmore han$500million to the reconstructionffortsin Afghanistan.As thanks,PresidentBush in-cludedIran n his moralistic"axis of evil"phrase, hreatenedran ndirectlywith apre-emptivetrikeas a "rogue" tatewhichmightprovide errorist roupswithweap-ons of mass destruction, ndworst of all, abandonedhe reformistpro-democracygovernment f PresidentKhatamiby trying o playthe Iranian eople, on morethanoneoccasion,against heentireregime, ncluding heKhatami overnment.TheBushAdministration'sisceralrhetoricagainstIranparalleledAmerica'sunprecedentedmilitarypresence n statesbordering ran,Afghanistan, raq, andthe CentralAsiastates.No matterwhatmay be said aboutKhatami's ailure in domesticsocial andpoliticalreforms,whichhe himself franklyadmits,his foreignpolicy has enjoyedrelativesuccess.Tobe sure,seriousforeignpolicyproblems, uchas Iran'sallegednuclearweaponsambitions, tsproblematicelationswith theLebaneseHizbullah ndHamas, ts positionon thePalestinian-Israelionflict,andits stagnant elationswiththe UnitedStatesremain.YetKhatami'sndisputable ommitmento democracyn

23. As quoted in TheNewYorkTimes,September23, 1998.24. As quoted n TheWashington ost, September25, 1998.


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IDEOLOGYNDPRAGMATISMN IRAN'SFOREIGNOLICY 559thepursuit f Iran's ationalnterest asbeenunprecedented.oreignMinisterKharrazi'sstrategies ndtacticshave gonea longway to advancing ran'snationalnterest n theworld community.These encouragingdevelopments cho historicalantecedents.The success ofCyrus heGreat, he founderof the Iranian tate,overwhelmingly eflected he domi-nanceof pursuingprudenttate nterestsn foreignpolicy, as did thatof Shah 'AbbasI. This verytradition f prudencehas alsobeen evident n Khatami's verall oreignpolicy.It took the "Shi'itized"Safavidstateabouteightdecadesto overcome deo-logical zeal in foreign policymaking. n contrast, he "Islamicized"epublicof Iranhas significantlymovedawayfrom the intrusionof ideology into foreign policy inonly a quarter f a century. believethatthisprocessof maturationn the makingofIranian foreign policy is unstoppableas the Iranianpeople's demand for thepragmatizationf theirgovernment nd its foreign policycontinues o grow.A second-termGeorgeBushadministrationraJohnKerry dministrationhouldseriously akeinto account his demonstratedattern f pragmatismn the historyofIranian oreignpolicy-making.As seen,in every majorperiodof Iranianhistory hedictateof circumstances as forced Iranian oreign policy-makerso interpretheirreligiousideology pragmaticallyn orderto advancethe state interest.Iran'sdireeconomiccircumstancesndthedrasticgeopoliticalchanges n its neighborhoodo-day impelIranian eformers ndconservatives liketo consider eriouslyany positivestepsAmericamighttake towards esuming alksthatWashington rokeoff in May2003.

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