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International Journals

INTERETHNIC POLITICS IN NORTHEAST INDIAAuthor(s): Shibani Kinkar ChaubeSource: International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 2 (AUTUMN, 1975), pp. 193-200Published by: International Journals

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INTERETHNIC POLITICS IN NORTHEAST INDIA*

Shibani Kinkar ChaubeCentreor Studies n Social SciencesCalcutta

In thispaper nterethnicolitics mplieshepolitics fconflictnd collaboration

among thnicroups ithin political ystem Politicalpower n modernimesis organized ithin territorialimit nd nevitablyuts cross s wellas limitsseveralthnicroups Theenquirys devotedoananalysis fthe xtentowhich

primordialthnicffinitiesurviver,constrainedythe verwhelmingower fthe tate mergentonew lignmentsnddeveloplternativespirationsThe story f interethnicolitics n northeastndia is the tory f disintegration

ofa once ompositetate f Assam. It has notmadeAssam long n questoflinguisticomogeneitya unilingualtatebuthasgiven irth o a numberfre-

lativelyomogeneoustates ominatedydifferentcheduledribes rtheirlliancesbuthardly ribal n contentAbandoninghedream f

"tribal freedomhedominantlite n thehill areas spire orterritorialutonomyithinndia. Theterritorialystemfgovernmentas drasticallyltered heorientationf ethnic

aspirationsfthenortheastndians nd hasgiven irth onew olitical dentitiesThe chiefnstrumentsf thisreorientationre an educatedndmodernizedlitewho notwithstandingheir esire opreserveegionalutonomybecamehe gentsof integration.Thissituation ay ecomparedith heNorthWest rontierrovincefPakistan

where thnicspirationsre beingused nto ecular emocraticovement.

Interethnicow comprisingpolitics

fiveinnortheast

states (Assam,India,

Interethnicow comprisingfive states (Assam,Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and

Tripura) and twoUnion territoriesAru-nachal Pradesh and Mizoram), haveassumed a critical dimension due tothree easons (1) theethnoculturalback-groundof the region, 2) loss of direct

contact of much of the territorywiththe Indian mainland after creation ofEast Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and(3) nationalist ensitivitybout territorialintegrity f the country. Foreign in-fluenceshave been noticedin particularsectors of the politics of the region.

♦Thissa revisedersionf discussantapersubmittedo heVlllthWorld ongressfSocio-gy, Toronto,August,974.Undertakingoleresponsibilityor heviewsexpressedere, he

authorwishes o thankBarunDe, AmalenduGuha,ParthaChatterjee,nd SunilMunsi fthe entreortudiesnSocial ciences,alcutta,andS. K. GhoshfBurdwanniversityor heircommentsnd uggestions.

Economic backwardnessnd a communi-cation gap have been consideredto be

the objective factors,while tribalism,

Christianity, lite conflict and subna-

tionalismhave been identified o be the

native subjectivelimitations. It is our

hypothesishat no foreignnfluence an

be effectiven a soil which is not pre-

pared to receive t. At the same time,no native category s permanentsince

everyhistorical ituation s subjectto the

processof change.Thus Furer-Haimendorf1945), while

characterizingthe many rebellions of

aboriginal tribesof peninsular India as

"defensivemovements", istinguishedhe

occasionalrisings fthefrontierribes s

"more in the natureof resistance o the

establishmentf Government's uthoritythan a challengeto theadministration."While the tribesin central and penin-sular India had long lost theirpolitical

193





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194 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

freedom nd were strugglingmerelyforeconomic survival, the frontiertribeswere waging a political truggle gainstBritish ule. Even suchrebellions ecame

infrequent ince the beginningof this

century.

THE POLITICAL HERITAGE OFNORTHEAST INDIA

Once "the North-East Frontier of

Bengal" (Mackenzie, 1884), this region,in 1947, consisted of one compositeprovince Assam), twomostly illynativestates (Manipur and Tripura), 25 lesser

chiefships n the Khasi hills and anunadministeredaga "tribalarea". Withthe partition f British ndia a Bengali-speaking and Muslim-majoritydistrictofAssam (Sylhet)wentto East Pakistan.The Khasi chiefshipswere annexed toAssam whileManipur and Tripurawereleft as separate states within India.Plains Assam retained the Bengali-dominated districtsof Cachar and a

substantial Bengali-speakingpopulationin the entireBrahmaputra alley. Parti-tion brought in thousands of Bengalirefugees,mostlyHindu, but the Muslimpopulationof Assam did not emigrate.The lesser ethnic groups in th evalleywere the "plains tribes" and "otherbackward groups",and the non-Bengaliimmigrants,rading nd workingmostlyin tea-gardens). Therewas bulkemigra-tion of Muslimsfrom

Tripura.Part of the ethnic complexityof theregionmustbe traced in the ethno-cul-tural factors. Migrationsfromdifferentdirectionsfrom the pre-historic eriodhave completely confusedthe racialpicture. Hinduism penetrated the or-ganized states of the area long be-fore the British dvent but hardlycastits spell below their feudal hierarchyand itsparaphernalia. This explains the

presencethere n large numberof half-Hindus. But since the British period,needs of administration, ea plantations

and oil industryausedthebulkof mmig-ration n the 19thcentury nd even the1961 census showed the urban areas ofAssam as

mainlynon- ssamese. Re-

clamation of waste land brought inMuslimpeasants fromEast Bengal sincethe early twentiethcentury. The factthattherewas no majortensionover theMuslimquestion, n spiteof an adminis-trative line system"meantfor heckingsettlementof Muslim peasants, intro-duced in thewakeofthe nationalKhila-fat agitationof 1919-21,showsthat theethnic tensionwas a function fmodern

politics. Discriminationetween local"and "domiciled" people was introduced

early in this centuryin the wake of

agitations in Bengal.

ETHNIC POLITICS AND ELITEARTICULATIONS

The grievanceswere clearlyconfinedto the emerging middle class. Theirdemand for Assamese as an additional

court language of the BrahmaputraValleywas accepted only n 1872. Fromthe 1920's the Muslim questionbecame

significantpartly because of the elec-toral potentialof Muslims vis-á-vis hereformedrovincial egislature ndpartlybecausean independent ssameseMuslim,Saadulla, emerged into the ministerial

leadership and inducted some Brahma-

putra Valley Muslims into the Govern-mentservices. About the time of trans-ferof power, the Pakistan question in-creased suspicion against the Muslims.The samefearshave beendirected gainstBengali Hindus afterpartition,BengaliMuslims in the Brahmaputra Valleyhaving mostlydeclared themselvesAs-samese. In spite of several "languagedisturbances", owever, ue to thesparsedistributionftheBengalisas well as the

cross-cutting leavage ofreligion, there

has been no major demand of Bengaliseparatism,xceptoccasionallyn Cachar,dominatedbytheBengalis.





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INTERETHNIC POLITICS IN NORTHEAST INDIA 195

The "plains tribal movement" n the

Brahmaputra Valley is stigmatizedbythe lack of regional compactness s wellas of an

articulatemiddle-class élite.

The hill districts fAssam,administered

separately from the plains since theBritishdays, have, on the other hand,emerged nto separate ill statespreciselybecause of their compactness of élitearticulation.The "frontier racts"havebecome Arunachal Pradesh purelythrough administrativeinitiative andwithout any agitation. ArunachalPradesh is much less self-governingand much less politicizedthan theotherUnion territory, izoram.

The Manipur kings used to control

parts of the neighbouringNaga andKuki-Mizo hills until their take-over

by the British t about the end of the19thcentury. To someextent, dminis-trationof these hills resembledthat ofthe Assam hills, both inhabitedby nu-merous tribal groups. In both these

areas Christianchurchesgot official n-couragement.Slightly allingbehindtheAssam hills, the Manipur hills have

recently btainedDistrictCouncils. Hill

Tripura, on the otherhand, was alwaysunder the rule of a Hindu tribal Rajawho settled engaliHindusand Muslims.AfterpartitionBengalis have far out-numbered the tribais, who are in amiserable stage of battle for survival,

expressed hroughccasionalviolence nd

leftist olitics Absence of protection asdisinherited he Tripura tribal of their

only wealth, i.e., land.Administrativerotection nd Christ-

ianity appear to be the commondeno-minatorsof the new identitiesthat are

growingn northeastndia whileTripuraand Assam withoutthese benefits, eemto be the losers in the game. Assamhas shed a large part of its alien ethno-

cultural element in a desperate searchfor linguistichomogeneitywhich is yetnowhere n the horizon. But it would

be misleadingto view the denominators

solely in termsof exclusiveness is-á-visthe dominantcultureof India and treatthem s instrumentsor he reinforcementoftribalism,gnoringhe conflictsetweenthe two. Such a view would be basedon an inadequate understanding f thefact that the "tribal" states that have

emergedare hardlyindicative of a re-turn of a tribal "golden age" but arethe synthesis f complex and dynamicsocial forces.

There is something in "tribalism"which is out of tune with the modern

political order. The first s based onkinshiprelations, the second on terri-

torial loyalty. Political boundaries in-

evitablycut across the ethnic,religiousor linguistic boundaries, and create

minorityproblems. Border adjustmentsof Assam with Bengal, Manipur and

Tripura in the 19th centurynot onlycreatedproblems or heAssamesebutalso

splitnumerous ribalgroups Garo,Khasi,

Mizo and Naga). Separation of Burma(1937) and partition of British India

gave internationalsignificance o their

bordersand restrictedthe mobilityof

thetribalpeople livingon shiftingultiv-

ationand doing tradewithneighbouringcountries. Finally, the establishmentf

districtboundaries affectedmost of the

tribal groups and created multi-ethnic

districts. Withthetransformationfad-

ministrativeistrictsntopolitical

entities,inter-districtborders created political

problems (Chaube, 1973).

ELITE CONFLICT IN A TRIBALSOCIETY

No lesssignificant as the nstitutional-ization of tribal authority raditionallybased on customs. Rules for adminis-trationof justice and police vested the

village chiefs, usually the chiefsof the

dominant lans,with dministrative,udi-cial and policepowersunderthe overallcontrol of the District Officers,thus





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combining ineagewith territorial utho-

rity. Where therewas no chief "head-man" was created. As a result,para-

doxically,heauthoritariantructure as

strengthened t the village level and,at the same time, a district rientationwas givento thepolitical outlook of thehillmen. The DistrictOfficer eing vir-

tuallythesupreme uthority, ll appealsfrom the verdicts of the village chiefwere sent to these officers.Naturallythe recourseto such appeal was takenmorefrequently ythe educated sectionsthan the uneducated and the District

Officers'ecisionswerenotalwaysappre-ciated by the chiefs. An agitation to

replacethesystem fexecutive ppeal bythe jurisdictionof the High Court wasstartedbythe chiefswith thebeginningofreformmovesin thename ofpreserv-ationoftribal utonomy Chaube, 1973).

A second paradox resultedfromthevirtual delegation of welfareworks tothe Christian Church, chieflyto the

protestantects. Activities ftheChurchwere not alwaysconduciveto the objec-tives of administration. It was theChurch whichgave thepeople ofnorth-east India their inguistic onsciousness.It was the Church which raised thefirstvoice of protestagainst thesystemof tribal slavery in the Mizo hills

(Chaube, 1973). Most important,how-ever, was the creation of an educated,modernizedélitewhoma former ritish

officer alled "the black coat revolu-tionaries" (McCall, 1949), and who

challenged the allies of administrationin the hills: the chiefs. The chiefsabhorredthe Church and the educationthat it gave. Education came to afew commoners who joined the juniorservices of government r the Church.As in thechiefs/Churchontroversy,he

policy of administration as to support

tradition,the handful of tribal officialstook the side of the chiefs. The bulkoftheeducatedhillmenoined the Church

servicesand the professionsnd becamethe agency of modernizationgoing tothe extent of demandingconstitutionalreformabout 1930

(Chaube,1973).

Archetypal eadershipof thismodern-ized ¿lite was provided by J. J. M.

Nichols-Roy, an educated Khasi,Christian, astor,businessman nd poli-tician,whobecame hefirstribalminister,agitatedfor thecurbingof chiefly ightsand became the guiding spirit of the

conceptofdistrict utonomyforthe hillareas within ssamat thetimeoftransferof power. The Khasi National Confer-

ence that he formedwas in contactwithsimilar élite organizations n the other

hills, ike the Garo National Conference,the Mizo Union, and theNaga NationalCouncil. The "grouping" controversyf1946 forged lliance betweentheChrist-ianized élite and the Indian National

Congress.On theotherhand, the chiefs,inspired yan officialchemefor "crown

colony" (Coupland, 1944) demanded

completeautonomyof theirtribalexist-ence. Afterfailure, ome of themtoyedwith the idea of oining Pakistan,someothers oughtto go to Burmawherethechiefs ad secured pecialrights Chaube,1973).

The resultwas the constitutional lanfor District Councils territorial nd se-cular local bodies as the guardian oftribal affairsand the overlordsof thechiefs,n the hill districts therthan the

"frontiertracts" and the Naga TribalArea. The chiefsopposed the DistrictCouncils which nitiallycame underthecontrol of the new élite and in some

places demanded secession. The irre-dentist grievances came in handy forsuch movements. The successes of the

challenge were not uniform. The mo-derates ostcontroloftheNaga NationalCouncil itselfto the secessionists,while

the Mizo Union, rulingthe Mizo Dis-trict Council abolished chiefshipwith

paymentof compensation. There were





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compromisesn the Garo and the Khasihills. In the Garo hills villageresettle-ment schemecould notbe implementeddue to the

oppositionof the chiefsand

in the Khasi villages no elected villagecouncils could be constitutedwhile the

big Khasi chiefs (siems obtained thestatus of Additional District Council

Judges. It was from theGaro and theKhasi hillsthat a movementfora hillstate within India emerged. The MizoUnion keptaloof from tuntil the MizoNational Front, backed by the formerchiefs, compelled them to demand a

statefor heMizos. The moderateswentunder a temporary clipse in the Nagahills where no council could be electeddue to separatistactivism.

What we findas thesalientfeatureof

politics n thenortheast ndian hills is aconfrontationbetween tradition and

modernity.Atthe material level, tradi-tion has vestedinterest n the old orderof chiefshipand its related oligarchy.

Modernitytandsforan elective "open"élite systemand demands an indivi-dualistic propertyystem o replace theso-called system f communal propertythrough which the chiefs and theirretenuesappropriatedmostof the com-munal lands. This is not to suggest hatthe tribal élite is clearlydemarcatedbythe inedividing raditionnd modernity.It must be noted that in the hill areasof northeast ndia the traditionalélite

has a strong opulistbase, and the classofprofessionaloliticians hathascroppedup as the functionaries f the modernstatehas to reckonwiththem.

In many ways therefore he DistrictCouncils failedand popularexpectationsabout the Councils were frustrated.A

scapegoatwas conveniently ound n themistakesof the Assamgovernment ndthe Assamese language movement was

used as the pretextfordemanding thehill state. Since 1947, however, theeffort o runan all-hills agitationcould

notfructifynspiteofappeals toracialismand evenreligion. The hill state agita-tiononly united two hill districts the

Khasi-Jaintiand theGaro whichmade

Meghalaya. The other hill states areonlyhill districts:Naga hills are Naga-land, Mizo hills are Mizoram. Khasi/Garo competitionhas already vitiatedthe alliance inMeghalaya. To theextentthat the hill states are no more than

political versionsf thehill districts, heterritorial rientationof modernityhaswon theround. The hill statehowever

synthesized uch fthetraditional spira-

tions fpoliticalfreedomn thestatehoodbut feels uncomfortablewith the irre-dentist logansof recovery f the neigh-bouring reas now or once inhabitedbycognate groups.

The politics of secession is fun-

damentally ircumscribed ythepowersof the modern state. The old chieflyclass is no longer powerfulenough toretain the secessionist stand and has

inevitablybeenremouldingtsaspirations.The emaciated ecessionistmovementsre

survivinghroughrecruitment rom he

disgruntledectionofthe educated élite.

According to the Naga underground'sownadmission, heeducatedNaga youthwas generally patheticto the movementin itsearlyphase. Butrecentlymoreandmoreeducated youngmen are oiningitas the employment pportunity s de-

creasing n the state. The revoltof the

frustratedouthbecomes ecessionist nlybecause of the geographical situationof the Naga and, for that matter,theMizo hills.

THE NORTH WEST FRONTIERPROVINCE: A COMPARISON

Grantofregional utonomynthe formof states has on the whole reinforcedthe newéliteofnortheastndia whohave

stood for integrationwith India. Thestory f PakistaneseNorthWest Frontier

Province,however, s ofregional ntegra-





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tion confronting he broader politicalentityof Pakistan.

The five ettled istrictsftheN.W.F.P.werewithin he

Punjabuntil1901. The

transfrontierribes were broughtunderBritishcontrol with the drawingof theDurand Line about which Afghanistanwas aggrieved as were many frontiertribes who cherish ethno-culturalcon-nectionswiththat country Spate et al,1967: 492-495). Ethnically,most of the

people belong to the ascriptivecategoryofPathan,whichmeans, in Pashtu,onewho has a share in the village land as

distinct from a Fakir who has none.Pathan identity s associated with thebelief n a commondescent,Islam andthe bservance f the conventional athancode (Barth 1959, 1969; Caroe, 1962).

Spate and his colleagues suggestedconnection ftheauthroritaian raditionofPathan leadershipnorthof the Kabulriver with the high and rough terrains

comparedto the ower and evener and-

scape to the south where tribalJirgas(assemblies) and maliks (masters/patriarchs) una more or lessdemocratic

village system. Although*he malikisno more than the first mong equals,in most clans the leading malikshipis vested in a particularfamily Spain,1963: 41), suggestinghesynthesisfthe

kinshipineage and the territorialystemsin indigenouseadership. In the settleddistricts he title s usuallykhan Spain,1962: 49), a feudal honorific. Thereis evidencethatBritish ule in thenorth-westfrontier,s in the northeast rontier,encouragedthegrowth f authoritarian-ism. Even in the unadministeredribal

agencies,there was at the beginningofthis centuryonly one organized stateunder a ruler, Chitral, ethnicallynotPathan (Spate etal, 1967). Threeothernativestateswererecognizedby Govern-

ment beforethe transferf power: Dir,Swat and Buner. The process of thebirth fSwat is analyzedbyBarth 1957).

The title of nawaband khan were alsobestowedon lesserchiefs.

There is anothergroup of leadership,the Pit and the Mulla describedas the

counterpartof the "warrior-bishop"ofthemiddle age (Spain, 1962: 49) as wellas "holymen-cum-arbitrators"Sayeed,1964), and extremely nfluential. Thesocial life of the frontier, owever,hasbeen little ffected ytheQuranic shariatand an attemptof Dr. Khan Saheb to

bringthecustomaryawsof the Pathansunderthe codes of slam was unsuccessful

(Sayeed, 1964).

As in northeastndia, in theN.W.F.P.,the British rule created an articulatemiddle class whichprotested gainsttheloss of a legislativecouncil since the

separation of the N.W.F.P. fromthe

Punjab. The most moderate amongthem, a commoner conferred he titleof nawab Abdul Qayyum, placed the

demand at theRound Table Conference.He was later nominatedto the Central

Legislative Assembly. Olaf Caroe, aformerGovernor of the N.W.F.P., re-

garded him as the leader of Pathan

enlightenmentCaroe, 1958: 426) whilea nephewof Abdul Ghaffar han calledhim a "collaborator" (Yunus, 1947).Abdul Qayyum'ssuccessorn the Central

legislature,AkbarKhan, nawabof Hoti,was more collaborator than reformerand belongedtothevanguardof Muslim

League politics in the N.W.F.P. Yunus

(1947: 74) called such landlord chiefsthe representatives f the vested in-

terests.The emergence f theKhudaiKhidmat

gar movementunder the leadership of

the "saintly" Abdul GhaffarKhan andhis western ducated brother,Dr. KhanSaheb was consideredto be a reactionof British"immobility" (Caroe, 1958:

431). Abdul Ghaffar, son of a rich

khan of Peshawar, connected with ananti-Britishigmulla ymarriage, ntered

politics by starting the mw//a-backed





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"national educatiod movement" and

joined hands with the Indian National

CongressthroughtheKhilafat agitation

movingheSunnisthatconstitutedlmost

98 percentof theN.W.F.P. 5spopulation.The partydefeated the Muslim Leaguein the electionsof early 1946. But its

appeal to religion backfired when thePathans were given the optiont о joinPakistan after the partition decision.

Anticipating efeat,the KhudaiKhidmat-*

gar boycotted the plebiscite of 1947

(Azad, 1959). The Khan brothershadfailed to secularize theirmovement nd

now demanded a separate state ofPakhtoonistanwith an appeal to racial-ism. On the otherhand, the govern-ment servants,the soldiers,the tradersand theprofessionals ad a greater takein Pakistan than in India.

The failure fthePakhtoonistanmove-ment cannot be explained by religionor even the fact that the people of theN.W.F.P. were not given the option.

In spiteof tsethnic ffinityithAfghan-istan, the political connectionsof theN.W.F.P. with the once-British ndiafor ver a century ad firmlystablisheda set of economicnexusesin which thenew élite was deeply involved. This

applies also to the tribal agencies eth-

nicallyas much affiliatedoAfghanistanas to the settleddistrictsftheN.W.F.P.It has to be notedthatthe Pathan poli-tical movementbecame

significant nlywhen Abdul Ghaffar's on, Wali Khan,fusedthe Pakhtoonistanmovement ntothesubsequent, nd broader,democratic

agitationin Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

An Indian anthropologistwho usedto apply the geo-politicalconcepts of

bridge and buffer o the little commu-nities surviving between the frontiers

of greatcommunitiesorganized states),now considers uchroles withregardtothe tribal areas of Northeast India

"dysfunctional"nviewofrecent hangesin the political organizationof the con-cernedstates India, Burma and China)as well as in themodes of

transportnd

communicationRoy-Burman, 972: 72).It is submittedhat hispoint seminentlyapplicable also to theNorthwest rontierProvince,but not the northernfrontierof India where the smaller states of

Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim largelyeli-minate the "tribal problem".

In a territorial ociety, ethnic cate-gories are under the constantpressureof political power. Ethnic distinctions

through ascriptivelliances do persist,according to Barth (1963: 10), despitechanging participationand membershipin the course of individual lifehistoriessince "Ethnic distinctions o notdependon the absence of social interactionndacceptance, but are quite to thecontraryoften the very foundationson whichembracing social systems are based."The socio-cultural aspirations of each

ethnic group, are, on the other hand,perenniallymoulded and reviewed ac-cording to the circumstances roximalto the conditionsof its existence. Thisis how inter-ethnic onflictswithin apolitical system eek to be resolvedandnew fieldsof collaborationand conflictare discovered. The processis howeverlikely to be determinedmore by theinternalelationofforces hanbyexternal

agencies.In northeast ndia as well as in theN.W.F.P., the greatest ntegrative olewas played by the market economyofthe regions they joined. Governmentcontinued to play a dominant role asalmostthe sole source ofpatronageand

non-agriculturalmployment. n north-eastIndia, creationofthenewstateshasincreased that opportunity.One hillstatewoulddo so tò a lesser xtent.The

hill states of northeastndia may,conse-quently, lamourformoreCentral tten-tion or readjustment f politicalboun-





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daries, but will have little capacity toobtain secession.

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