Timber Theft Prevention:

Introduction to Security for Forest ManagersWilliam B. MagrathRichard L. GrandalskiGerald L. StuckeyGarry B. VikanesGraham R. Wilkinson

August 2007

Environment and Social Development

East Asia and Pacific Region

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Timber Theft Prevention:

Introduction to Security for Forest ManagersWilliam B. MagrathRichard L. GrandalskiGerald L. StuckeyGarry B. VikanesGraham R. Wilkinson

© August 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street, NWWashington, DC 20433 USA

All rights reserved.

This study was prepared by the Operations and Policy Unit of the East Asia and Pacific Region (EASOP). The World Bank’s environ-ment and social development strategy for the Region provides the conceptual framework for setting priorities, strengthening the policyand institutional frameworks for sustainable development, and addressing key environmental and social development challengesthrough projects, programs, policy dialogue, nonlending services, and partnerships. The East Asia and Pacific Region SustainableDevelopment Discussion Paper series provides a forum for discussion on good practices and policy issues within the developmentcommunity and with client countries.

Suggested citation: William B. Magrath, Richard L. Grandalski, Gerald L. Stuckey, Garry B. Vikanes, and Graham R. Wilkinson. “Timber Theft Prevention:Introduction to Security for Forest Managers.” East Asia and Pacific Region Sustainable Development Discussion Paper. East Asia andPacific Region Sustainable Development Department, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Cover photographs by: (counterclockwise from upper left) Richard A. Grandalski, William B. Magrath, Graham R. Wilkinson, WilliamB. Magrath, and Forest Practices Authority, Tasmania.

Cover design: James Cantrell and William B. Magrath.

This volume is a product of the staff of The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The findings,interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the executive directors of the World Bankor the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries,colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the WorldBank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be aviolation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank encourages disseminationof its work and normally will grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint anypart of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, tel: 978-750-8400, fax: 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licenses, includ-ing subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA,fax: 202-522-2422, email: pubrights@worldbank.org.

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Contents

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

F O R E W O R D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

A C R O N Y M S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

C H A P T E R S

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1William B. Magrath

Basic Concepts of Crime Prevention and Asset Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4William B. Magrath

Models of Crime and Crime Prevention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Risks to Forest Assets: What Can Happen and How . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Security Planning Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Forest Management Planning: Basis for Operations and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Graham R. Wilkinson

Forest Management Planning and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Security Dimensions of Key Elements of Forest Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Consultation with Stakeholders and the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Review and Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Securing Forest Land and Resources: Technologies and Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Garry B. Vikanes

Trespass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Controlling Trespass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Surveillance and Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

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Securing Timber Transactions: Technologies and Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Gerald L. Stuckey and William B. Magrath

Fraud in Timber Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44“Hardening” Timber Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Basic Elements of Timber Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Institutionalizing Administrative and Accounting Loss Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Annex 5.1 Sample Red Flags for Timber Fraud Detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Planning Timber Theft Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Richard L. Grandalski

Components of Security Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Contents of Timber Theft Prevention Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Case Studies of Timber Theft Prevention and Forest Security Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Annex 6.1 Security Planning Issues by Forest Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Annex 6.2 Revenue Administration and Control Matrix: Stumpage Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Conclusions: Policies and Strategies to Promote Timber Theft Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87William B. Magrath

Due Diligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Public Policies to Support Forest Security Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Forest and Wood-based Industry’s Role in Timber Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Policy and Operational Research for Timber Theft Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Development Assistance to Support Timber Theft Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

A P P E N D I X E S

Timber and Timberland Security Checklist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Recommended Readings and Websites by Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Participants List. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Boxes3.1 Forest management terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.2 Land ownership and boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164.1 Layers of protection: Onion skin theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324.2 Signage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344.3 Firearms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394.4 Examples of checkpoints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435.1 Documentation and reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475.2 Security implications of types of purchases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515.3 Kiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

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Figures

2.1 Three elements of crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.2 Crime triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.3 Risk exposure pyramid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.4 Intelligence Cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103.1 Simple model of forest management planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153.2 Five components of a forest management system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163.3 Landscape mosaic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214.1 Improper felling due to poor surveying skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324.2 Paint-marked boundary trees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334.3 Chain gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354.4 Locked gate with stop sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364.5 Vehicle barriers of forest byproducts as gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364.6 Vehicle barriers of forest byproducts at each end of gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374.7 Satellite images of forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394.8 Railway track trespass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404.9 Port facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414.10 Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414.11 Social fencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415.1 Fraud triangle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455.2 Low-cost covert camera system with lens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485.3 Commercial log labels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505.4 Log truck hauling logs to mill, Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535.5 Log yard with scaler. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545.6 Scale house equipped with cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555.7 Checkpoint gate, Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555.8 Hammer brand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565.9 Loader sheet to record time, date, and other identifying data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565.10 Log trailer with ID number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575.11 Three-part load tag ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585.12 Scaling unusual log length using rule tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595.13 Scale house with weigh scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605.14 Concurrent video recording from four scale-house cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605.15 Cant of logs numbered and stamped. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615.16 Highly fluorescent orange paint on load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615.17 Highly visible tag stapled to load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625.18 Example of settlement or payment sheet with tag attached. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636.1 Improper conduct to avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726.2 Virachey National Park, Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766.3 Identification of timber theft threats and risks in Dragon’s Tail, Virachey National Park, Cambodia . . . . . . 77

Tables

2.1 Examples of situational crime prevention techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.2 Causes of selected loss-inducing events in forestry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83.1 Summary of the key links between the elements of forest management planning and forest security . . . . . . 28

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Acknowledgments

This report grew out of the experiences of theauthors and their collective opportunities towork on forest law enforcement problems in over

15 developed and developing countries. In preparing thereport, the authors benefited from three days of inten-sive discussions with a group of forest and protectedareas managers and advisers from Australia, Cambodia,India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and the Philippines.The workshop was held in Cebu City, the Philippines, in November 2005. The participants are listed in appen-dix 3. Their strong support, instant collegiality, and will-ingness to share their hard-won lessons of experiencecontributed immeasurably to this work.

The work was financed by a generous grant from the World Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program(BNPP).

The authors would like to thank particularly KlausSchmitt, Michael Dyson, and Pramod Krishnan as wellas Arvind Jha for especially thought-provoking sugges-tions and contributions from which we have drawn liberally. Jay Blakeney contributed to the summary

table at the end of chapter 3. Merly M. Khouw carefullyreviewed an early draft of chapter 5, and Casey Canongewas very helpful in the design of the same chapter.

The authors are very grateful to Edmund McGarrell,Ph.D., Michigan State University School of CriminalJustice; Dennis Dykstra, Ph.D., P.E. of the PacificNorthwest Research Station, United States Forest Ser-vice; and Idah Z. Pswarayi-Riddihough, Rural Develop-ment, Natural Resources, and Environment (EASRE),World Bank, who carefully reviewed the final draft ofthe report, adding to its value.

Alicia Hetzner documented the workshop andedited the report, going through countless drafts andrevisions with good humor and grace. Evelyn Laguidao,Teri Nachazel, and Ethel Yu were of great help in organ-izing the Cebu Workshop and provided other supportalong the way. Under the supervision of Ed Scott of Circle Graphics, Christopher Phillips prepared themanuscript for publication.

Any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations arethose of the authors.

Foreword

This volume is part of a series of discussion papersintended to foster debate on public policy issuesregarding sustainable development. The views

expressed herein are those of the authors and do notrepresent the World Bank.

Illegal logging costs the developing world an esti-mated $5 billion per year in lost public revenues. It alsosignificantly contributes to the deforestation and degra-dation of some 10 million hectares annually. Surpris-ingly, little attention has been paid to the need tomobilize those most closely involved in forest resourcemanagement—foresters and forest enterprises—toactively prevent timber theft. There is a pressing needfor action by everyone involved in forestry and thewood industry to be part of a unified solution to illegallogging. The World Bank has joined other agencies andgroups in calling for commercial banks, wood traders,customs organizations, consumers, and others outsidethe forestry sector in both developed and developingcountries to join in efforts to strengthen forest lawenforcement and governance.

As this report makes clear, the susceptibility of foreststo illegal logging is a predictable consequence of thepoor quality of forest management planning and prac-tice around the world. The report's discussion of thelinks between good forest management and securityagainst illegal logging highlights the need for attentionand effort to focus on the basics of forest planning,resource assessment, and consultation. Focusing onthese three practices is essential––whether the man-agement objective for a particular forest is commercialtimber production, biodiversity conservation, forestrecreation, or watershed management. Therefore, theapproach to security that the authors advocate is entirelyconsistent with the kinds of measures demanded by

almost any of the internationally accepted forest man-agement certification systems.

The report, prepared by a multidisciplinary team offoresters, economists, and criminal justice and securityspecialists, advocates a deliberate and analytic effort byforest managers to identify and target the most seriousthreats and to address the most vulnerable parts offorest supply chains. It urges forest agencies and enter-prises to build ethical organizations and to address thesources of corrupt and fraudulent behavior internally.This report highlights the need for commerciallysound, transparent, and predictable land and timberallocation and sales; and for audits, oversight, andaccountability at all levels. Most of all, it puts the obli-gation for diligent efforts by responsible resource managersat the forefront of the forest law enforcement and gov-ernance challenge.

The report provides examples of many specific mea-sures and general planning approaches that are directlyapplicable to developing country forestry. Not all ideasdiscussed here will be applicable to every forestry oper-ation. However, the concepts and motivation are rele-vant to any forest manager or policy-maker responsiblefor resources threatened by crime.

Of special interest to the World Bank are the publicpolicy and investment implications of the proactive pro-tection approach advocated by the authors. Some parts ofa theft prevention approach can be implemented with-out adding to the costs of sustainable forest manage-ment. However, several of the proposed measures willinvolve new costs and require additional sources offinance. In addition, widespread adoption of the inno-vations urged by the authors will require political will,supportive public forest policies, public and privatecapacity building, and technical assistance. Developing

country governments are encouraged to look for devel-opment assistance—including assistance by the World

viii

Bank—and private investment to strengthen the pro-tection of their forests and natural wealth.

C. Delvoie, DirectorSustainable Development Department

East Asia and Pacific

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About the Authors

William B. Magrath is a lead natural resource economistin the East Asia and the Pacific Sustainable Develop-ment Department. He has managed World Bank lend-ing and analytic work on forestry in Belarus, Cambodia,and Lao PDR, and coordinates the World Bank’s workin forestry and forest law enforcement and governancein the East Asia and Pacific Region.

Richard L. Grandalski is a consulting forest law enforce-ment specialist. He concluded a career of over 30 yearswith the United States Forest Service in which he servedin positions from forest fire smoke jumper to forest lawenforcement; special agent, with international assign-ments to Brazil and Greece; and assistant director of theService’s Law Enforcement Division. His recent workwith the World Bank and the United Nations Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) has included assign-ments in Albania, Armenia, Cambodia, Indonesia, LaoPDR, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Gerald L. Stuckey is forestry security consultant and aprincipal in TimberWatch LLC. He has over 40 years ofgovernment, private, and industry experience as a pro-curement forester and timber sales manager. He alsowas timber security manager for Meadwestvaco Corp.,one of the world’s largest integrated forest productscompanies. He is a registered forester in South Car-

olina, a licensed certified fraud examiner, and a SouthCarolina state constable.

Garry B. Vikanes is director of Strategic Development at3Si Risk Strategies, Inc., Vancouver, British Columbia,Canada. A licensed security consultant, he is also a vet-eran staff sergeant of the Technical Security Directorateof the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and has over 35 years of security-related expertise. Possessing ex-tensive expertise in security consulting, he providessecurity management services throughout BritishColumbia, the Yukon, and internationally on threatrisk assessments and security planning for many indus-tries, including forestry and major international athleticcompetitions.

Graham R. Wilkinson is chief forest practices officer,Tasmania, Australia with responsibility for administer-ing the State’s forest practices system. He is a specialistin forest practices with extensive national and interna-tional experience and has over 30 years of experiencecovering forest operations, research, policy, and reg-ulation. He advises the United Nations Food andAgriculture Organization, many national governments,and the World Bank on reduced-impact logging, theimplementation and monitoring of codes of harvestingpractice, and other forestry concerns.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAC Annual allowable cut

ALPR Automatic license plate recognition

APRIL Asia Pacific Resources InternationalHoldings Ltd.

BMP Best management practices

CCTV Closed circuit television

CEPI Confederation of European PaperIndustries

CFE Certified Fraud Examiners

CFI Continuous Forestry Inventory

CCG Conservation International Centerfor Conservation and Government

cm Centimeter

CoC Chain of custody

DFID Department for International Development

EDP Eco-Development Project (India)

ETM Enhanced Thematic Mapper

FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FIN Forest Integrity Network

FIU Financial intelligence unit

FLEG Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (regional)

FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (European Union process)

FMP Forest management plan

FMU Forest management unit

FMV Fair market value

FRA Forest Resources Association, Inc.

FTN Forest and trade network

ft Foot, feet

GFTN Global Forest and Trade Network

GIS Geographic information system

GPS Geographic positioning system

HPN Humanitarian Practice Network

ICDP Integrated Conservation and Development Project

IFM Independent forest monitoring

in Inch, inches

IPM Integrated pest management

ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization

IVS Intelligent video surveillance

LAN Local area network

m Meter(s)

M&E Monitoring and evaluation

mbf Thousand board feet

MINEF Ministère des Eaux et Forêts de Côted’Ivoire

MIS Management information system

n.d. No date

NTFP Nontimber forest products

ODA Official development assistance

Acr

onym

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OH&S Occupational health and safety

PA Protected area

PDA Personal digital assistant

PDR People’s Democratic Republic (Lao)

PFE Permanent forest estate

PIDS Perimeter intrusion-detection systems

POA Protection of Assets

PROFOR/FIN Program on Forestry/Forest IntegrityNetwork

PTZ Pan tilt zoom camera

SBFEP Small Business Forest EnterpriseProgram (British Columbia,Canada)

sq Square

TFT Tropical Forest Trust

UNODC` United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

VRM Vehicle registration mark

WAN Wide area network

WOC Wood origin control

Introduction

William B. Magrath

61

Illegal logging is widely recognized as a serious threatto the sustainability and successful management offorest resources worldwide.1 The problem has many

layers and dimensions, and multiple responses frommany stakeholders are needed. Discussions of forest lawenforcement and governance have given attention to awide variety of approaches and interventions. Theserange from efforts to reduce incentives for illegal log-ging by limiting the marketability of illegal material ininternational timber markets,2 to pursuit of diverse legaland prosecutorial strategies such as anti-money launder-ing against people engaged and profiting from illegallogging (Setiano and Husein 2005), to clarification ofdefinitions of “legality” and many other possible andpotentially valuable avenues of assault.

However, relatively little attention has been given tothe scope for action by field-level resource managers toreduce opportunities for illegal logging and to proactivelyprevent timber theft before it occurs. This lack of at-tention is not completely surprising in view of the poor quality of most forest resource management andthe well known institutional capacity and human re-source limitations in developing countries. Nevertheless,

experience in many settings shows that proactive crimeprevention and asset protection efforts have demon-strated value and that practical and accessible optionsexist relevant to almost all forestry settings.

The widespread adoption of asset security approachesin both the private and public sectors attests to their valueas perceived by boards of directors, senior executives,managers, investors, and policymakers. These approachesare appreciated by commercial entities due to their im-pacts on profits. Increased emphasis on crime preventionis justified on other grounds as well.

1. There are important complementarities betweenforest law enforcement and sustainable forestmanagement agendas. As made clear in this report,the kinds of management planning and practicescalled for by virtually every analysis of the require-ments of sustainable forest management are con-sistent with a timber theft prevention approach.3

2. Even if they do not directly reduce crime, manyprevention measures can generate information,intelligence, and evidence that can support crim-inal prosecutions and other accountability mech-anisms. These can become part of a sustainable,long-term, and integrated approach to forest lawenforcement.

3. The attention paid to asset protection provides agood indication of policy-makers and managers’commitment to due diligence. While everyone in-volved in forestry should take some measure ofresponsibility, managers in particular should be

1 For general discussions of the global illegal logging problem, seeWorld Bank 2006 or Tacconi and others 2002. Seneca Creek Associ-ates and Wood Resources International 2004 offer the most author-itative examination of the economic impact of illegal logging. FAO2005 discusses a range of approaches to promote compliance withforest laws. Colchester and others 2005 critique forest law enforce-ment from a social justice perspective.

2 For example, the European Union Forest Law Enforcement,Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Initiative. See http://www.illegal-logging.info/ 3 For example, ITTO 1998 and 2006; FAO 2007.

accountable to plan and implement practical andrealistic risk mitigation measures.

4. Pursuit of even the most basic crime preventionmeasures sends a message. It tells potential thieves,employees considering fraud and embezzlement,and local communities that managers are alert tothe risks of crime and are committed to protect theresources for which they are responsible. Con-versely, indifference and inaction amount to aninvitation to criminals.

For all their attractiveness, asset protection and secu-rity approaches are not panaceas. Perfect security isimpossible, and protection against crime can be a costlyactivity that must compete with other resource uses.Moreover, criminals adapt, evade, and avoid. Obstaclesraised in one forest can divert criminals to other areas, orcan lead them to intensify their effort and resort to newcriminal methods or even to greater reliance on violenceand intimidation. These limitations do not mean thatcrime prevention can be ignored. Instead, they reinforcethe necessity for ongoing vigilance and creativity.

This report explores the prevention of illegal log-ging from the perspective of the forest managementunit (FMU) manager and planner. It introduces con-cepts, tools, and practices that are widely used in manydiverse industries and settings to prevent losses of valu-able assets from crime, accident, negligence, and othercauses. The report puts timber and timberland securityin the context of routine overall forest managementoperational planning and control.

The report also introduces specific security tools andprocedures commonly used in public and industrialforest management. Of particular concern to forestryare its special social and institutional dimensions. Inalmost all countries, even on “private” lands, forestry isa “public” undertaking. Public and social expectationsconcerning access to forest areas; the reality of humanoccupancy of forest lands (often by some of the poorestand most vulnerable people); the layering of timber,wildlife, environmental, and other values in forests; andthe diverse roles of public and private agencies andactors in forestry result in far greater complexity in for-est security than in security in many other venues.

The first two chapters explore general security conceptsand key aspects of forest management planning, respec-tively. The report then focuses on two major subsets ofsecurity concern: (1) preventing forest land trespass and

(2) ensuring the integrity of timber transactions. Control-ling trespass addresses the overall problem of prevent-ing unplanned, uncontrolled, and illegal activities in themanagement area. Controlling trespass encompassesthe problems of securing the area from undesired accessand illicit felling of trees. It also includes preventingfellings in excess of planned volumes and outside thedefined cutting limits and procedures set by the man-agement and silvicultural plan.

Controlling trespass is a security function that cutsacross all forest types and forest management systems.It includes not only commercial timber productionbut also parks and protected areas in which logging is prohibited or strictly limited. Controlling trespassis oriented primarily toward preventing activities bypersons not properly associated with approved oper-ations. It also covers activities that may be undertakenby management staff outside their official mandatesand responsibilities. Controlling trespass and associatedillegal logging involves measures that address accessto and monitor activities in the forest to ensure com-pliance with the management plan. Hence, timberlandsecurity essentially is an extension and application ofthe management plan. However, attention to assetsecurity will emphasize the identification and ongoingmitigation of threats and vulnerabilities and the needto respond to the detection of deviations from plannedactivities.

Protecting the integrity of timber transactions is ofspecial concern for areas managed for commercial pro-duction. In controlling the corruption of timber trans-actions, two challenges face forest managers. The first isto build and maintain honest and ethical workplacesand operations. The second is to establish and maintainrobust procedures for the conduct of timber transac-tions. These challenges call for efforts across all aspectsof ensuring that timber harvested according to a pre-scribed plan contributes its full value to the timberbusiness. “Hardening” transactions encompasses theprevention and deterrence of fraud in timber scalingand grading, under-invoicing, timber smuggling, andother fraudulent schemes. Securing timber transactionsinvolves well-thought-out and rigorously maintainedinventory controls, documentation, and record-keepingsystems; supervision of operations; contract provisions;and other controls and audits. Securing transactionscan include timber tracking and chain of custody (CoC)systems with sophisticated technologies, such as optical

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bar coding, or simpler traditional methods. Many ofthese systems also contribute directly to efficiency andprofitability.

The final chapters of the report discuss forest secu-rity plans and planning. These chapters provide recom-mendations for forest managers, forest policy-makersand international forestry development planners ongeneral and specific ways to advance forest security plan-ning and practice.

This report does not aim to make concrete recom-mendations that would be directly applicable to all forestmanagement situations. It does not intend to suggest thatpreventive measures at the disposal of forest managerscan eliminate illegal logging and other forest crimes.Rather, this report argues that theft prevention needsmust be given greater prominence in discussions offorest law enforcement and governance.

The main points of this report are:

1. Theft is, to a point, predictable and therefore, to apoint, preventable.

2. Responsibility for timber theft prevention beginswith the FMU organization and carries manage-ment, operational, and training implications.

3. Effort and realism are needed to link anticipatedrisks with mitigation measures.

4. Management decisions to bear certain risks shouldbe recognized and documented.

5. Resource security should be integral throughoutplanning and operations.

6. Timber theft is a concern not only for productionareas but also for parks and protected areas. Tim-ber theft overlaps with other forest protection con-cerns, including arson, wildlife, and encroachment.

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Basic Concepts of Crime Prevention and Asset Security

William B. Magrath

2

Valuable assets are subject to many risks, includ-ing exposure to theft. Illegal logging and timbertheft share many basic similarities with crimes

that affect other industries and economic activities. Thespecialized fields of asset protection and industrial secu-rity have developed in response to these problems. Thesefields provide useful and powerful ideas and tools thatcan help respond to many different risks and hazards.Their concepts are used widely in manufacturing, retail-ing, transportation, and government but only recentlyhave begun to be adapted for use in forestry.1

Asset protection and industrial security have theirorigins in law, criminology, economics, sociology, andengineering. Their unifying theme is that risks to assetsare predictable and therefore, at least to a point, pre-ventable. From this starting point, in various ways andwith different emphases, security professionals encour-age owners and managers to anticipate and mitigaterisks and to explicitly plan and document security sys-tems as integral parts their routine business.

This chapter introduces the key theft preventionconcepts most relevant to the forest unit manager. Itbegins with theories of the causes of crime and theirimplications for crime prevention. It then presents a classification of loss-inducing events that ranks crime,specifically theft, among other potential sources ofdamage. The chapter concludes with a review of someof the specific vocabulary of asset protection and indus-trial security.

As mentioned above, one of the main currents ofthought in asset protection is the need to integrate secu-rity considerations in overall business planning andoperations. This necessity is pursued in the next chapter,which explores specific linkages between forest manage-ment planning and timber security. Later (chapter 6), thereport returns to the asset protection approach.

Models of Crime and Crime Prevention

Forest law enforcement programs are made up of meas-ures to prevent, detect, and suppress crime.2 Criminolo-gists define crime prevention simply: it is the disruptionof the mechanisms that cause crime. Among the threemost important groups of theories of crime and associ-ated methods of prevention are:

1. Structural views2. Psychological views3. Circumstance or situational views.

Structural theories of crime revolve around issuesrelated to the structure of society and the functioningof social relationships. These theories emphasize issuessuch as class conflict, inequities in wealth and oppor-tunity, racial and ethnic tensions, and poverty as con-tributors to crime. Since these theories view crime asarising from society, they generally lead to suggestionsthat social change is needed to prevent crime.

On the other hand, psychological approaches focuson the behavior of the individual criminal. These

1 For an excellent discussion of asset security issues in agricultureand farming, see National Community Crime Prevention Pro-gramme 2004. For detailed treatments of risk in forest administra-tions, see Forest Service of British Colombia 1998 and 1999.

2 This discussion draws heavily on Pease 1997. See also Hughes1998 and National Crime Prevention Institute 2001.

approaches emphasize deficiencies and defects in indi-vidual personalities, mental capacities, and weaknessesin moral and ethical judgment as among the causes ofcrime. Psychological theories of crime tend to suggestchanging the individual to prevent crime. This approachcan involve training, counseling, “reform,” punishment,and continuing incarceration to keep criminals awayfrom crime.

While structural and psychological theories of crimemay explain some crimes, neither can explain nor helpprevent all crimes. In any case, neither provides muchguidance or advice to the forest manager.

In contrast, circumstantial or situational theories ofcrime generally posit that crime is opportunistic andcan occur when the environment permits. Much of thestandard economic analysis of crime is an extension ofa situational perspective on crime, sometimes referredto as the “rational choice theory.”3 It assumes that many,if not most, people will commit crimes based on theincentives that they encounter. It then develops themore specific notion that crime arises when the expectedbenefits of criminal activity exceed the costs. The eco-nomic analysis includes the value of profits and penaltiesadjusted by the probabilities of detection, conviction,and punishment.

Situational crime prevention has been defined as:“a pre-emptive approach that relies not on improvingsociety or its institutions, but simply on reducingopportunities for crime” (Clarke 1992). While situa-tional theories of crime and crime prevention also arelimited and incomplete, they are of particular interestbecause they propose proactive measures (table 2.1).

As discussed later, many of the generic crime preven-tion techniques listed in table 2.1 can be concretelyapplied in forestry, and many are within the scope ofcontrol of forest managers. Measures to increase effort,which include target hardening and access control,directly raise the costs of crime by making it physicallymore difficult. Examples include stronger gates andlocks and higher fences. These measures could includeeven more exacting and demanding processes that makecrime more costly and difficult.

Specialists distinguish deterrence from preventionbased on whether the crime disruption mechanism oper-ates through the prospective criminal’s perception ofrisks and reward or effort. Effectively, deterrence canbe seen as one form of prevention. This distinction isexplored in somewhat greater detail in chapter 5 regard-ing fraud in timber transactions.

Increasing risks includes measures that affect thepotential criminal’s perception of the probability ofbeing detected, apprehended, and punished. Percep-tions are the critical dimension; risk-increasing meas-ures involve important psychological and informationconsiderations. For example, perceptions can be affecteddirectly to immediately discourage crime by employ-ing conspicuous security patrols. Perceptions also canbe shaped to create a belief that, over a longer period,criminal activity will be pursued and effectively pun-ished. Deployment of cameras and other surveillancesystems, and their use as sources of evidence in courtand other proceedings, can create recognition that abusiness or property is a risky target. Cameras also canhelp to prevent crime or deflect criminal activity to othertargets. Boundary marks, signs, and notices are otherpotentially risk-increasing measures, provided that theperception is created and maintained that restrictionsare meaningful and will be pursued (chapter 4).

Reducing the reward of forest crime can be more dif-ficult, at least by managers at the FMU level. Recent pol-icy debates promote consumer actions that would reducethe marketability of stolen or illegal wood. However, anindividual FMU manager can do relatively little to reducethe potential benefit of timber theft. Some forms of logmarking may have potential (chapter 5).

Means, Motive, and OpportunityA related and complementary formulation of the sit-uational view of the causes of crime is that of “means,

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3 The classic reference is Becker 1968, 169–217. See also Felsonand Clarke 1998; Cornish and Clarke 1986; and Welsh 1986 in Cor-nish and Clarke, eds. 1986. Some of these theories have been appliedto forest law enforcement issues and lead to suggestions of greateremphasis on law enforcement and punitive sanctions. See, for exam-ple, Akella and Cannon 2004.

Table 2.1 Examples of situational crime prevention techniques

Increasing Reducing effort Increasing risks reward

Target hardening Entry/exit screening Target removalAccess control Formal surveillance Property

identificationDeflecting Employee Removing

offenders surveillance inducementsControlling means Natural surveillance Rule-setting

Based on Pease 1997.

Crime prevention is the disruption of the mechanismsthat cause crime

motive, and opportunity” as forming the elements ofa crime:

Criminals motivated by greed, need, aggression, orother desires employ the tools (means) available tothem to exploit the vulnerabilities (opportunities) oftheir prospective victims.

Figure 2.1 shows crime as the result of the simultaneousoccurrence of means, motive, and opportunity. Appliedto policy formulation to prevent crime, the task can bethought of as identifying and implementing measuresthat reduce the “size” of each element and “pull” themapart, thereby reducing the area of overlap.

For each factor contributing to the emergence ofcrime, this model leads to recognition of both forestry-specific and more general social, cultural, and economicfactors:

Means. Forest crime is perpetrated by a wide rangeof criminals using an equally wide variety of tools. Forexample, the mechanisms and tools of timber theftand illegal land clearance are exactly the same as thoseemployed in legal logging and land clearance opera-tions. The chain saws, trucks, barges, ships, sawmills,and other equipment employed illegally are intrinsicallyindistinguishable from legitimate forestry tools. Thisequipment is widely used and frequently is owned andused by relatively small businesses and even poor indi-viduals who are not priority targets for law enforcement.

It is worth noting that the problem of excess effortin logging is linked to thinking on perverse incentives

in the forestry sector (Gillis and Repetto 1988; Barr2001). These authors identify the unintended role ofpolicies such as subsidies to industry, trade protection,and deficiencies in the lending practices of banks andother financial institutions to excessive (often illegal)logging and land development. In other words, it alreadyis widely recognized that legitimate investors, encour-aged by public policies, distribute the instruments ofcriminal behavior!

Forest crime is not conducted merely with chainsaws. Moving up the criminal food chain reveals increas-ingly sophisticated and much less accessible means ofcriminal activity. At the acme of criminal enterprisesinvolved in large-scale illegal logging are techniques ofmoney laundering to conceal the illicit origins of income,tax evasion, and other forms of “white collar” crime.These techniques are largely beyond the scope of thisreview but can have important connections to defi-ciencies in the management of timber transactions(chapter 5).

Motive. People pursue many different interests underthe influence of many incentives and objectives. Crim-inal behavior in forestry is motivated primarily by nar-row economic objectives. It also can be motivated bypolitics, envy, or other causes that are generally beyondthe scope of this review.4

Need and greed probably are the economic drivers ofcrime of most interest in controlling illegal logging.Ethically, it is important to distinguish crimes based onpoverty from those perpetrated by the rich and power-ful. Clearly, poverty contributes to forest crimes, espe-cially in developing countries. Under the legal systemsof many countries, certain instances of traditional slashand burn agriculture are considered arson. Much of thelabor used directly in illegal logging is supplied by poorpeople. Poor people have few, and sometimes no, alter-natives to such crimes. In fact, they may be unawarethat their activities are considered crimes under the law.Moreover, they often are being exploited for their sub-sistence by rich and powerful patrons.

The relationship of poverty to illegal logging raisesmany considerations linked to the structural theories ofthe causes of crime mentioned above. It suggests manyquestions regarding the formulation of public policiesin forestry and the conduct of forest law enforcement,especially crime suppression operations. In particular,

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Criminals motivated by greed, need, aggression, orother desires employ the tools (means) available tothem to exploit the vulnerabilities (opportunities) oftheir prospective victims

Means

OpportunityMotive

Figure 2.1 Three elements of crime.

4 In Canada and the United States, ecoterrorism is one of the pri-mary forest law enforcement problems but certainly is not econom-ically motivated in the usual sense.

the formal criminalization of poor people’s pursuit of ameager livelihood should call for a reconsideration ofthe nature and intent of the laws they may be breaking.The idea that the costs of stricter law enforcement wouldfall disproportionately on the poor surely would beobjectionable to most people. Furthermore, in this case,stricter enforcement probably would prove unsuccessful(Colchester 2005).

Greed as a cause of crime does not raise the sameethical dilemmas. Economically speaking, crime payswhen the combined expected benefits exceed theexpected costs. In forestry crime, an extraordinarilyhigh benefit-cost ratio is common. In four case studies,Akella and Cannon (2004) show conservatively esti-mated benefit-cost ratios for illegal activity that rangedfrom 11.6:1 to 14,214:1! They argue that the nearlyinfinitesimal probabilities of penalty are a compellingcase for greater enforcement. This reality clearly pro-vides the greedy with a strong motivation to engage inillegal logging.

Opportunity. Forest resources in developing coun-tries are at enormous risk for crime in two ways:

1. These countries’ generally higher levels of crime,corruption, and disregard for the rule of law putpeople and their assets generally at greater risk(UNODC 2005).

2. Many developing countries’ level of technicalpractice in forestry generally is very weak. Lackof oversight, control, and other routine practicesof standard forest management create specificvulnerabilities.

Less than 4 percent of the world’s tropical forestsare covered by reasonable forest management plans.Less than 1 percent of forest management in the trop-ics is independently certified as sustainable. In prac-tice, the lack of inventory, planning, mapping, harvestdetermination, formal setting of silvicultural prescrip-tions, and other classic forest management disciplineleaves forest resources baldly exposed to criminal activ-ity. These weaknesses present criminals with nearlyunrestricted opportunities. The problem of opportunityposed by weak management is the core of this report andis taken up in detail in the next three chapters.

The crime triangle provides an analogous way ofthinking about crime.5 Crime or disorder results when

(1) likely offenders and (2) suitable targets come togetherin (3) time and space, in the absence of, respectively,(1) capable guardians, (2) handlers, and (3) managers(figure 2.2). Offenders sometimes can be controlledby other people, known as handlers. Targets and vic-tims sometimes can be protected by others known asguardians. Places usually are controlled by someone:such individuals are known as managers. Thus, crimeprevention requires understanding (1) how offendersand their targets/victims come together in places; and(2) how these offenders, targets/victims, and places areor are not effectively controlled.

Risks to Forest Assets: What Can Happen and How

Damage to forests from human activities arises fromthree sources: negligence, accident, or crime. The pyramidin figure 2.3 illustrates how resource managers couldconsider these three causes in planning protection andintegrating security measures in routine operations.

Negligence, however, is probably a more serious con-tributor to a lack of security in forestry. In contrast toother industrial sectors, forestry operations, especiallyin developing countries, pay very limited attention toprotecting resources from crime (chapter 1). In theface of today’s globally high level of forest crime, pru-dence requires forest policy-makers and managers totake special and explicit steps to protect the assets forwhich they are responsible. As discussed in later chapters,

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5 This section follows the discussion available at http://www.popcenter.org/default.cfm

Figure 2.2 Crime triangle. Source: http://www.popcenter.org/default.cfm

Offender Place

Target/victim

Guardian

Handler Manager

criminal. It poses a situation in which the aims of thecriminal conflict directly with the legitimate aims ofthe owner and manager and in which the criminaltakes the initiative to exploit the vulnerabilities andexposure of the asset.

Table 2.2 illustrates how selected damaging eventscommon in forestry can result from accident, negligence,or crime. Harvesting outside of sanctioned boundariesis one frequent example of damage to forests com-monly labeled as illegal logging. Apart from any legalconsiderations, logging outside approved areas cancause damage for a number of reasons. Boundariesmay have been set as yield regulation devices to pro-tect a fragile landscape feature (stream, mineral lick,archaeological resource). It also may be that revenuecollection cannot be guaranteed for harvests outsidethe approved block, or that the block boundaries maybe part of an entirely different property. In remote,rugged forest terrain, it is easy to understand how acci-dental errors in map reading, surveying, or boundary-marker interpretation can take harvesting crews outsideapproved perimeters. These kinds of errors are all the

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Crime

Accident

Negligence

Figure 2.3 Risk exposure pyramid.

these measures should be selected and coordinatedaccording to a written plan that is integrated in theoverall forest management program.

In the context of figure 2.3, the examples of the contri-bution of negligence to forest asset insecurity can includethe failure of staff to follow proce-dures for decommissioning roads,locking gates, or reporting unau-thorized access. Negligence alsocan include inadequately fundingbasic protection activities or fail-ing to prepare a protection planin the first place. At the level offorest policy, not establishing rea-sonable requirements for protec-tion planning by concessionairesand contractors and not requir-ing that such requirements besatisfied, is simply negligent.

Accidents happen in even thebest-managed operations. None-theless, a large part of standardtraining, supervision, and plan-ning at the FMU level is, or shouldbe, directed at reducing hazards toworker safety and physical lossesof resources.

Crime is at the apex of the risk-exposure pyramid. Crime is themost difficult contributor to assetinsecurity to fight. Crime involvesdeliberate effort and choice by the

Table 2.2 Causes of selected loss-inducing events in forestry

Damaging event Cause

Cutting outside authorized area

Cutting in excess of approved amount (prohibited species, under/over diameter limit, beyond retention standards)

Noncompliance with Code of LoggingPractice leading to erosion, stream sedimentation, and damage to forest values

Nonpayment of royalties, fees, taxes

Wildlife reduction

Fire

Source: Authors.

Accident: Survey error, equipment malfunction

Negligence: Acceptance of incorrect maps,lack of supervision

Crime: Intentional trespassAccident: Scaling error, collateral damageNegligence: Lack of supervision, incomplete/

incorrect specificationsCrime: Intentional theftAccident: Human errorNegligence: Lack of training or supervision,

inappropriate machineryCrime: Intentional neglect of codeAccident: Loss of documents, misdirection of

fundsNegligence: Lax supervision and record-

keepingCrime: Intentional fraudAccident: Unilateral disturbance of habitatNegligence: Failure to designate protected

areasCrime: Intentional huntingAccident: Fuel spills, recklessnessNegligence: Failure to control land clearance

firesCrime: Intentional arson

more plausible in developing country forestry, for whichmaps may not be available, let alone in more sophisti-cated surveying tools.

However, negligence of various sorts, such as know-ingly allowing logging to proceed on the basis of in-adequate or incorrect maps and surveys, or neglectful orlax supervision, also contributes to damaging logging.

Finally, cutting outside approved boundaries maybe a deliberate criminal act. It may be done by agentsof the authorized logging contractor with or withouthis/her knowledge and consent. It also may be done byunrelated parties enabled by access or by the opportu-nity to conceal their activities among those of legiti-mate loggers.

As subsequent chapters suggest, the overall qualityof the authorized logging program, including its plan-ning, supervision, and execution, will go a long way todetermine the ease with which potential criminals canoperate.

Similar distinctions can be made in the causes of otherloss-producing events such as excessive harvesting, rev-enue losses, fire, and harm to wildlife populations. Atheme advanced by this report is that FMU managersought to be expected to anticipate, avoid, and mitigateloss-incurring or damaging events from all three sources:accident, negligence, and crime.

Security Planning Vocabulary

The specialized vocabulary of asset protection and indus-trial security is quite accessible and nontechnical. Itscomprehensibility is potentially one of its most impor-tant contributions to the problems of illegal logging andforest law enforcement.

Red FlagsA red flag is an indicator or warning sign that shouldraise concern about the risk or possibility of theft orfraud. A red flag does not definitively indicate theft,only that there is a significant possibility of a problemthat merits investigation and follow-up. Red flags needto be developed in connection with overall business andmanagement systems to provide managers and stake-holders with confidence that security risks can be iden-tified and acted on as soon as possible after they arise.

Some business procedures lend themselves easily tothe generation of exception reports, which can serve asred flags. Exception reports identify discrepancies, suchas differences between planned and actual deliveries or

between actual and estimated inventories. Thus, thesereports can be indicators of theft or other problems. Forexample, computerized log tracking and chain of cus-tody (CoC) systems can identify multiple uses of whatare intended to be unique or single-use log identifiersand can signal the need for follow-up investigation ofpossible abuse (chapter 5). Specialized systems for gen-erating red flags also include employee or public hotlinesor complaint mechanisms made available for reportingcomplaints and suspicions.

Red flags are indicators that are best formulated basedon intimate knowledge of an enterprise’s normal prac-tices. To be routinely useful, a system of red flags needsto be established around clear definition and under-standing of the kinds of transactions and events thatcharacterize proper and legitimate business activity.Identification of risks and irregularities is difficult orimpossible when business transactions are not stan-dardized and are not recorded through standardizedprocesses, forms, and systems that are subject to routinereview and special audits. Appendix 1 provides a sam-pling of red flag indicators that can be used as a basis fordeveloping enterprise specific indicators.

Intelligence CycleRed flags need to be acted on immediately and fol-lowed up rigorously. Not all red flags will signal gen-uine security problems or risks, and some may not beimmediately actionable but could provide informa-tion that will be valuable in the future. In employing asystem of red flags or other indicators, the concept ofthe intelligence cycle can be useful. To be useful in pro-tecting resources from theft or other attacks, data andinformation on potential and actual threats must bepurposely collected, analyzed, and applied. Figure 2.4illustrates the intelligence cycle, an iterative processthat integrates surveillance results in resource protec-tion programs.

1. Direction. Potential threats and vulnerabilities iden-tified during FMU planning and from ongoingexperience during implementation of the manage-ment program should be targeted for monitoringand surveillance.

2. Collection. Surveillance results from monitoringdevices, guards, patrols, other staff, and othersources should be assembled and collected.

3. Evaluation. Collected information should beassessed to determine significance and validity.

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The quality of the authorized logging program determinesthe ease with which potential criminals can operate

4. Analysis. Information should be analyzed andreports prepared (for example, to law enforcementagencies) recommending responses such as filingcharges or “target hardening.”

5. Dissemination. Information ought to be deliveredin usable form to decision-makers such as owners,managers, law enforcement, or others who candirect actions or responses, including redirectionof intelligence collection.

ThreatsThreats to asset security can be defined as the groups andindividuals who have the potential to commit crimes. Thespecific persons or groups posing threats may be knownor unknown, but generally can be categorized to be use-ful in developing protective measures and strategies.

Internal threats. Personnel from within an organi-zation can pose serious risks to asset security throughfraud, corruption, abuse, and neglect. In forestry, inter-nal threats are probably of most concern in relation totimber transactions. These threats include underpaidtimber scalers who can be bribed to mis-record volumes,species, and grades; truck drivers who can divert loads;and others involved in movements of material throughthe supply chain.

More serious internal threats are corrupt senior forestry officials and staff involved in large financialtransactions and reporting who canindividually or with relatively few co-conspirators perpetrate large fraudsand embezzlements. Chapter 5 pres-ents the fraud triangle to understandthe factors that can contribute toemployees and others emerging asinternal security threats.

External threats. Most of the con-cern related to timberland security isdirected at individuals and groupsnot formally connected with forestmanagement. External threats caninclude local residents, neighboringproperty owners and land managers(who may or may not be legitimatelyin the forestry business on theirown properties), and individuals orbusinesses based in relatively distantplaces. Any of these individuals orbusinesses may have powerful (and

illicit) connections to government authorities, includingthe police or military; or to other criminal, and sometimespotentially violent, groups and enterprises. Transnationalcriminal organizations increasingly are being recognizedfor their involvement in illegal logging.

Local residents individually may constitute a smallrisk. However, as a group, local residents often havetraditional customary rights, sometimes formalized inmodern laws, to access forest areas for subsistence orother uses of timber and nontimber forest products(NTFPs). Dealings with local communities in relationto timber theft involve many complexities and oppor-tunities, making advance recognition of their potentialimpact on the forest especially important (chapter 6).Exploitation of local residents as laborers and promisesof false economic stability for depressed communitiesby the more powerful and wealthy illegal loggers createadditional complexities that must be considered. Theselocal issues pose difficult challenges when developing atheft prevention strategy and highlight the critical impor-tance of community involvement in the process.

VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities are aspects of an operation that are partic-ularly subject to crime or are at special risk or exposure.

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CollectionDissemination

Direction

Analysis Evaluation

Monitoring of activities within an FMUshould be deliberate and driven bythe management program and by

accumulated experience that focuseseffort on priority targets

Figure 2.4 Intelligence Cycle

Threats are the groups and individuals who have thepotential to commit crimes

They can be physical areas that by virtue of remotenessor other geographic circumstance are difficult to moni-tor and control. They also can be phases in the transportor manufacturing process, such as log yards, landings,or rivers, in which material can be diverted and stolenwithout detection.

The ability of managers to explicitly identify vul-nerabilities is absolutely critical to the developmentof prevention strategies and programs. Vulnerabili-ties can be identified on the basis of experience withpast losses; knowledge of experiences in other prop-erties; and intelligence, such as data analysis fromcomputerized case tracking and crime-monitoringsystems. Security surveys can be designed and con-ducted by either managers or consultants to enumer-ate vulnerabilities.

RiskIn the security context, risk is usually defined as thepotential for damage or loss of an asset. According tothe British Columbia Forest Service (1998):

“Risk is the potential for loss or damage resulting froma particular action or decision. Risk assessment is theprocess of determining the likelihood and magnitudeof the loss or damage. Risk management is the ‘art’ ofweighing the assessed risks against the expected benefitsto make the ‘best’ decision.”

Risk is the point of intersection of the three variables:assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. The reduction of anyof the three categories reduces the overall risk. In anotherformulation:

which, if target and asset are synonymous, implies thatopportunity is a combination of vulnerability and threat.

Integrated Security PlanningAlthough the specific approaches and labels used byprofessionals vary slightly, most modern approaches toasset security and protection involve, first, some degreeof systems orientation. Second, they are aimed at aholistic integration of security in the overall manage-ment and operational processes of the business or gov-ernment agency. Integrated security planning buildson an explicit risk assessment or analysis (chapter 6).

Risk Opportunity Target= +

This assessment usually involves a loss prevention orsecurity survey that brings together historical infor-mation on previous security problems and issues andevaluation of known threats and vulnerabilities. Samplesecurity survey questionnaires and formats are availablefrom a number of sources.6 One model is provided inappendix 1 of this report.

The primary security objectives of any integratedsecurity system fall in five categories:

1. Deter (intruder attacks an easier target)2. Detect (intruder detected immediately when s/he

breaches perimeter of the property)3. Delay (intruder encounters many barriers while

attempting to reach the target)4. Assess (monitoring personnel determine whether

intrusion is real or a nuisance alarm)5. Respond (monitoring personnel initiate a response

force for apprehension and asset recovery).

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter is intended to provideforest managers and policy-makers with a basic intro-duction to the tools and thinking behind modernindustrial asset security practice and their applicabil-ity to forestry. To a large extent, asset security prac-tice applies a technical and engineering orientation to the problems of identifying and mitigating risks,threats, and vulnerabilities. However, asset protectionas applied to timber theft is more than merely a tech-nological issue.

As should be clear from the discussion of the causesof crime and the current thinking on models of crimeprevention, crime—illegal logging in particular—is asocial phenomenon. Efforts by forest managers at thelevel of specific properties cannot possibly be expectedto prevent all crimes or to address all the risks faced.Many of the causes of illegal logging and timber theft,such as poverty, conflict, inequality, and excess demand,extend beyond the forest manager’s areas of influenceforest manager.

The scope for effective timber theft prevention atthe FMU level is further limited because theft, crime,and criminals are dynamic. Actions by managers to

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6 See Fennelly 2004 in Fennelly ed. 2004.

The ability of managers to explicitly identify vulnerabilities is absolutely critical to the developmentof prevention strategies and programs

prevent crime will induce responses, avoidance, andevasion. Protection efforts in one forest may displacetimber theft to other areas, or may cause thieves toadopt more sophisticated methods. Some protectivemeasures, including some that will be discussed in thechapters that follow, may have only temporary impactor turn out to be primarily symbolic. As long as foresters

pursue management that produces valuable commodi-ties, there will be an incentive for theft.

Nevertheless, ultimately, the most basic security policyquestion for policy-makers and the public is whetherforest managers should be expected to proactively addresstimber theft risks. The answer suggested in this chapterand throughout the report is a simple yes.

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Actions to prevent crime will induce avoidance and evasion

Forest Management Planning:Basis for Operations and Control

Graham R.Wilkinson

3

Chaotic, disorganized, and undisciplined forestmanagement invites illegal logging. The indus-trial security approaches discussed in the previ-

ous chapter have found wide application in many fieldsof agriculture, manufacturing, warehousing, transporta-tion, and retailing. They generally have been adoptedand had greater impact in operations in which threeconditions are present:

1. Management systems are well developed.2. Accountability systems hold managers and

decision-makers responsible for results.3. Fundamental issues of ownership, rights, and

obligations are well defined.

Many examples of excellence in forest managementexist throughout the world. The common ingredientsof excellence include forest management plans withclear objectives, well defined and socially acceptedtenure arrangements, effective institutional frameworks,good systems of silviculture, public participation, andbenefit sharing with forest dependent peoples (Durst andothers 2005). However these features are lacking in a sig-nificant proportion of the world’s forests (ITTO 2006).

A recent International Tropical Timber Organization(ITTO) review estimated that only 27 percent of thetropical permanent forest estates of 33 ITTO producermember countries is covered by written forest manage-ment plans. Furthermore, in reality, sustainable forestmanagement is practiced on less than 7 percent of thearea. Problems to be overcome include absence of basicsurvey and inventory data, widespread poor quality ofengineering work, unsafe worker conditions, dilapi-dated equipment, unstandardized business practices,

and poorly trained, equipped, and paid staff. Amongthose concerned with sustainable economic develop-ment, social protection, and biodiversity conservation,developing forest management systems already is anestablished priority. Establishing these systems alsoneeds to be recognized as a precondition to better pro-tect forests from illegal logging and timber theft.

Forest management justifiably can be defined,described, and measured in a variety of ways (ITTO2006). The approach of this chapter is not to introducenew fundamentally new standards or views on thenature of sustainable forest management. Rather, thischapter builds on a reasonably mainstream characteri-zation of sustainable forest management. The chapterextends the standard discussion to highlight the closeconnection between the quality and content of forestmanagement and the security of forest assets. The plan-ning and operational choices made by the forest man-agement unit manager range from boundary definitionand demarcation to choice of silvicultural system tomonitoring and evaluation (M&E) to community con-sultation and conflict resolution. The chapter suggeststhat virtually every one of these choices can have signif-icant timber security implications.

In other words, the analysis in this chapter largelysuggests an extension of thinking that is already wellaccepted in the more established forest protection spe-cializations. These include forest fire management andintegrated pest management (IPM).

This chapter offers immediate and obvious practi-cal operational recommendations for FMU managers.However, its primary objectives are awareness-raisingand sensitization. The following three chapters are gen-eral and oriented to motivate managers to pursue their

own security solutions. These chapters provide moreconcrete examples of security options and approaches.Beyond FMU managers, chapter 3 aims to motivatepolicy-makers, forest planners, and development spe-cialists to consider the important complementaritiesand interdependencies of forest management develop-ment and forest law enforcement and governance.

Forest Management Planning and Implementation

Forest management involves human intervention toachieve specific objectives from forested landscapes,including the production of socially and commerciallyvaluable goods and services. The earliest known formsof forest management arose 2,000 years ago to regulateforest use and curb illegal activity (Osmaston 1968). Bythe early twentieth century, five basic components offorest management planning had been developed:

1. Techniques to measure the volume of trees and for-est stands (inventory) and their growth increment

2. Methods to regulate yield and determine sustainedyield

3. Design and application of silvicultural systems toachieve specific management objectives

4. Plans for road construction and harvesting systems5. Working plans or forest management plans (FMPs)

to specify the objectives of management and themeasures to achieve and document the prescribedoutcomes for a forest area over a set period.

The forest management plan is the primary tool fordelivering management objectives on the FMU scale.FMUs can vary in size and complexity from large con-cessions and protected areas (PAs) to small, privatelyowned woodlots and community forests. The five keycomponents of forest management planning are:

1. Prescriptions to set the allowable cut within woodproduction zones, generally based on a sustainedyield derived from inventory and growth data1

2. Information and prescriptions for other manage-ment objectives, such as the protection of soils,water, biodiversity, and cultural values (Davis andothers 2001)

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1 Obviously, cutting may be prohibited within specific subunits,or completely, as in the case of FMUs managed for protection andconservation.

3. Processes for public participation and engagementof stakeholder and community groups

4. Measures to achieve acceptable levels of publictransparency and accountability in forest manage-ment planning, monitoring, and reporting.

5. Provisions to assess and manage the risks asso-ciated with each management objective.

A simplified summary of the main processes involvedin forest management planning is shown in figure 3.1and summarized in table 3.1. In essence, the manage-ment objectives should be clearly linked to the prescribedmanagement activities and processes to determineand define:

● Who has the responsibility to take action● Why an activity or procedure will be undertaken● Where the activities will occur● When the activities will take place and be completed● What type and scale of activities will occur● How the activity will be undertaken● How the outcomes will be measured and reported.

Ideally, planning follows a hierarchy from broadassessments and classifications at the national or provin-cial level down to increasingly more detailed and spe-cific assessments at the FMU and compartmental levels.Imperfect knowledge at the national or provincial leveldoes not preclude sensible planning and decision-makingat the FMU level.

Box 3.1 Forest management terms

Forest management plan (FMP)Document that translates forest policies into a coor-dinated program for a forest management unit. Theplan regulates production and environmental andsocial activities for a set period through prescrip-tions that specify targets, action, and control arrange-ments (FAO 1998). FMPs generally are in operationfor 5–20 years.

Forest management unit (FMU)Area of forest—or any subdivision of it, such as a block (a specified location) or a felling series—for which an approved forest management plan isin operation (FAO 1998).

Chaotic, disorganized, and undisciplined forest management invites illegal logging

Once an FMP has been prepared, it needs to be imple-mented through an appropriate regulatory framework.This framework often is defined in detail by many fac-tors. Examples of such factors are:

● Mix of public and private tenures● Type and intensity of forest operations and asso-

ciated degree of environmental risk

● Institutional and governance ar-rangements

● Availability of skills and resourceswithin government and private sector

● Economics of forest management andavailability of finances to implementan effective forest regulation system

● Sociopolitical attitudes toward forestregulation.

Forest planning sometimes is dis-missed as irrelevant because plans are noteffectively or consistently put into prac-tice. The tendency for FMPs to becomemerely well-intentioned objectives that“sit on the shelf” in the forestry officeis due to a number of causes. Theseinclude arcane and irrelevant regula-tory requirements, lack of forestry staffand managers’ awareness and under-standing, misdirected cost conscious-ness, and many other rationalizationsand excuses.

Irrespectively, the professional con-sensus is that quality FMPs are essential.They need to be used as active docu-ments that are continuously applied andrevised (figure 3.2). While good plansare no guarantee of good management,good management is unlikely withoutdeliberate and well-considered plan-ning. Forest management plans providea systematic basis for managing therisks associated with illegal activities,whether they are done with deliberateand serious disregard for the law, or inignorance of it. When the legitimateactivities and processes for implement-ing and monitoring the objectives ofmanagement are patently clear, thenany illegitimate activities and processesalso should be patently clear.

Security Dimensions of Key Elements of Forest Management

Traditionally, forest management has focused on riskssuch as fire, pests, diseases, climatic extremes, erosion,and landslides.

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National ForestInventory

Classification into foresttypes and land-use classes

Pemanent forest estate Forest allocated for otherland use

Wood production forest Protection forestDesignation of forestmanagement units (FMUs)

Detailed assessment andinventory of resources

and values

Managemnet objectivesprescribed in forest

management plan (FMP)

Management zoning

Wood production zones Protection zones

Strategic Harvest Plan ofcompartments, silvicultural

systems, and cutting schedule

Strategic Plans to managenontimber forest values

Tactical (compartment-level)Harvesting Plans preparedunder Codes of Practice

Approval and implementationof plans

Silvicultural prescriptions,tree-marking, and pre-logging surveys

Post-logging assessmentand inventory

Monitoring andreview of plans

Protection zones and buffers

Sustainedyield

Allowablecut

Figure 3.1 Simple model of forest management planning.

When the legitimate activities and processes forimplementing and monitoring the objectives of management are clear, then any illegitimate activitiesand processes also should be clear

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Box 3.2 Land ownership and boundaries

In many countries, uncertainty or disagreement overland ownership is a major impediment to forest man-agement planning and forest security. The forest man-agement plan (FMP) should clearly identify land tenureand boundaries. The FMP also should define the pro-cedures and standards for determining ownershipand boundaries in the forest. Wherever possible, theprocess should avoid unduly legalistic or bureaucraticrequirements that will incur unsustainably high com-pliance costs. For example, arrangements to facilitatethe agreement of boundaries between neighborscan avoid the expense of more formal surveys andlegal disputes.

The objective of the FMP should be to adoptappropriate and efficient processes and standardsthat meet reasonable standards of due diligence forthe range of lands and boundaries within the FMU.Of most importance are that the outcomes (1) areagreed by the key stakeholders and (2) can be usedas a reliable basis for identifying illegal activities.

When setting management objectives, such as allow-able cut, the FMP should identify and take into accountall doubts or disputes over land ownership or bound-aries. Ideally, uncertainty about land status should beresolved through the legal and policy framework. Ifnot, the FMP’s review and reporting phase shouldidentify and quantify the implications for forest man-agement so that this information is clearly available tosenior decision-makers and the broader community.

Surprisingly, standard references on forest man-agement planning are almost silent on the risks of theillegal removal of forest products, a practice that hasplagued forest managers for over two millennia. Sim-ilarly, most forest management plans barely mentionthis risk.

They usually dispense with it by prescribing thatsome roads may be subject to restricted access by lockedgates (Forestry Tasmania 1996; Department of NaturalResources and Environment 1998).

This section examines the basic components of a for-est management planning and implementation process.It highlights the components that may relate to risks offorest products theft. This review cannot be exhaustive.Additional examples of the links between manage-ment and risk will be apparent to experienced forestryobservers. However, this section is intended to illus-trate the general proposition that management choicescan have unexpected and unintentional consequencesof exposure to security risks.

Legal and Policy FrameworkEstablishment of legislation and policies that governforest management is well beyond the job of forestunit managers. Nevertheless, ground-level managementstarts with the legislative and policy base. It is thereforecritical that these should be clear and unambiguous. Inparticular, the legal and policy framework should:

1. Clearly delineate the forest estate in terms of landtenures, land ownership, and land use, including

specifying the rights of key stakeholder groupssuch as traditional communities (box 3.2)

2. Prescribe the scope for choice of objectives of for-est management and associated documents suchas codes of practice, that is, set the boundaries onchoices by FMU managers with respect to man-agement objectives and practices

3. Clarify all legislation relevant to forest manage-ment, including legislation relating to conserva-tion, biodiversity, and water management.

Implications for forest security. If security threats areto be anticipated and managed, an unambiguous legal

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Legal andpolicy

framework

Planning

Implementation

Monitoringand

enforcement

Review andimprovement

Figure 3.2 Five components of a forestmanagement system.

framework is essential. The difference between “legal”and “illegal” activities should be readily apparent toforest workers, forest managers, the community, andthe judicial system. A sound legal and policy frame-work will not be effective unless it is clearly understoodby the regulators (forestry officers and police), forestmanagers, industry personnel, and community. FMUplanners and managers seldom will be able to directlyand immediately bring about changes in legislation andpolicy. However, they often will need to educateand train FMU staff and other stakeholders to anappropriate level of awareness and understanding of the requirements of legislation and penalties fornoncompliance. Consultation and education are par-ticularly important when changes to forest laws andpolicies impose new restrictions on the traditional useof forests. The need for these consultations and theirbudgetary, technical assistance, and other resourceimplications are among the considerations that shouldbe addressed in the planning process and incorporatedin the FMP.

PlanningForest management planning takes place at various lev-els, all of which will have ramifications and implicationsat the FMU level. Forest planning on the national orprovincial scale requires and employs broad informa-tion about the nature of the forest resource to form.This information forms part of a land-use frameworkthat identifies the categories of land tenure and owner-ship and the nature of land use.

1. Defining the forest estate: Assessment and inventoryof resources and values. An important part of thisframework is the identification of a permanentforest estate (PFE). It should define:a. Extent of forest areab. Classification of the forests by forest type or

ecological communityc. Land-use category or zoning for the forest

estate within broad categories such as:1) Reserved for conservation or protection2) Natural (indigenous) forest designated for

wood production or multiple use3) Plantation forest4) Excluded forest (available for development)

d. Area targets or thresholds to maintain the PFEwithin each land-use category.

The forests classified for wood production within aPFE may be refined to reflect forest management pri-orities at the FMU level by a zoning system. For exam-ple, state forests in Tasmania are classified into threeprimary zones: protection, production, and conditional.Within these 3, there are 18 special management zonesfor values such as flora or fauna conservation, sensitivewater catchments, landscape protection, and recre-ation (Orr and Gerrand 1998). Zoning forests into land-use classes should be an integrated, iterative process. Itinvolves assessing both the forest resources and valuesand the associated threats and constraints. Decisionsabout where to locate conservation reserves or high-value plantations are influenced by information relat-ing to how these forests will be protected from potentialdamage from factors such as fire and human activities.

Coupled with the PFE should be a national forestinventory. It usually is based on the following sourcesof information:

● Spatial data from topographic and cadastral maps,aerial photographs, satellite imagery, and geo-graphic information systems (GIS)

● Stratified samples of temporary field plots tocollect information such as timber volumes andforest type, together with a Continuous ForestryInventory (CFI) program to obtain data on growthincrement

● Surveys or databases documenting forest valuessuch as soils, flora and fauna, infrastructure, andsocial data.

A national or provincial inventory can be used todetermine forest productivity and sustained yield.Information at these levels also is used in planning anddecision-making about the location and nature of pro-cessing industries and the development of physical andsocial infrastructure.

Assessments and inventories at the FMU level aremore detailed. They are the bases for prescribed FMPactivities such as setting allowable cut and protectingenvironmental and social values. Pre-logging surveysrecord the location and nature of the resources. Yieldrecords and post-logging surveys of retained growingstock, residues, and damage enable review and update ofthe estimates of allowable cut and sustained yield. Post-logging monitoring verifies the accuracy of pre-loggingassessments and evaluates whether management pre-scriptions have been achieved.

The difference between “legal” and “illegal” activitiesshould be readily apparent to workers, managers,community, and judicial system

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Implications for forest security. Tenure and land-usezoning are major determinants of the risk of illegalactivities. Forest asset security depends critically onestablishing who has ownership rights to the resource,ensuring that the assignment of rights is widely recog-nized as fair and legitimate, and ensuring that informa-tion is readily available and clearly demarcated on mapsand on the ground. The FMP should clearly identifythe nature of intended land use, for example, whetherfor production or protection zones. This informationshould be widely disseminated through public educa-tion and targeted information programs. Disputes overboundaries and conflicts among stakeholders can beheightened or reduced at this stage of the forest man-agement cycle. Arbitrary or unjustified resource alloca-tions, impractical zoning decisions, and definition ofindefensible boundaries are examples of security prob-lems that can be avoided or minimized with carefulattention to the risk and vulnerability concepts dis-cussed in chapter 2.

Field boundaries should be agreed by the relevantparties and linked to secure survey or boundary mark-ers (chapter 4). It is important that local communitieshave knowledge and understanding of the tenure andzoning of forest land and that they are aware of therestrictions and regulations that are attached to differentclasses of forest. Community knowledge is importantfor two reasons:

1. To ensure that local communities do not unin-tentionally carry out or cause illegal activities.

2. To motivate local people to assist regulatoryauthorities by reporting potentially illegal activities.

Beyond providing data to support routine planningand decision-making, forest inventory results providecritical support to forest security. Without reliable dataon the extent, distribution, composition, and value ofthe resource base, it is impossible to plan protection oreven to ascertain whether theft is occurring. For exam-ple, pre-logging and post-logging surveys are importanttools for monitoring illegal activity. The detection of ille-gal activity in pre-logging surveys allows this informa-tion to be taken into account when planning operations.

Similarly, information gained from post-logging sur-veys will enable forest managers to review managementand security arrangements. The post-logging review isparticularly necessary if the illegal activity is directlyassociated with factors such as road access, boundary

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demarcation, or deficiencies in the regulation of pre-scribed harvesting activities.

Setting Management ObjectivesThe forest management plan must identify the FMU’sgoals and objectives in accordance with policy priorities;resource potential; and ecological, social, and economicconstraints. For many FMUs, goal- and objective-settingare determined virtually automatically by commercialconsiderations, or by legislative or regulatory decree.For examples, parks and protected areas, for example,largely will have management objectives established bythe initial legislation under which they were defined. Inmost circumstances, however, managers have some dis-cretion over the specific objectives to be pursued andhow conflicts and choices among options will be recon-ciled. Typical options could be:

● Supply a range of wood products as part of a sus-tainable yield

● Increase plantation area● Protect the forest from threats such as fire, dis-

eases, and illegal removal of forest products● Protect rare or threatened species● Maintain water quality and riparian values● Provide opportunities for traditional forest use,

including garden sites, grazing, hunting, andrecreation

● Conserve culturally significant sites.

The plan should prescribe how the objectives areto be achieved and how performance is to be meas-ured and reported. FMP objectives need to be tailoredto the resources and skills that potentially are avail-able to the forest manager. Thus, active training andeducation programs are essential to enhance the forestmanagers’ capacity to deliver multiple managementobjectives. Today, most forest management planningprocesses take note of the necessity for public input inpreparing the plans. Given the diverse views and expec-tations within many communities, productive engage-ment is not always easy to achieve. However, publicparticipation needs to move away from the top-downmodel in which an agency prepares a draft managementplan, then provides it to the public to critique. In thenew model, the public gets involved early in the processand helps craft the outcomes (Davis and others 2001).

Implications for forest security. Forest managementobjectives are not merely statements of noble intent.

They should be practical and achievable. For this rea-son, the management of risks should be one of themajor over-riding objectives of FMPs and factored intothe setting of other forest management objectives. Forexample, objectives for the production of forest prod-ucts must take account of the measures that are neces-sary to protect the forest from illegal harvest. Similarly,objectives to conserve important biodiversity valuesmust be determined on the basis of the degree of riskposed to the values by unwanted or illegal activities suchas poaching, forest clearing, grazing, or burning.

FMPs should strike a balance on management objec-tives that has the broad support of the community. At theleast, all stakeholders involved in a specific FMU need tounderstand, and to the greatest extent possible be moti-vated to comply with, the objectives and activities pre-scribed in a FMP. Any activity that contravenes the planwill be a consequence of one or more of the following:

1. Activity not foreseen within the forest manage-ment plan due to inadequate planning or majorchanges in policy or market forces, in which casethe FMP should be formally revised

2. Noncompliance due to a lack of knowledge, humanerror, or deficiencies in process

3. Deliberately illegal acts.

A FMP prescribes the activities that are to be con-ducted inside all of the forests within one FMU, includ-ing protection forests and reserves. Active managementis fundamental to good forest security. It means thatpeople on the ground are observing and reporting sus-pect activities. In some reserves, more passive manage-ment may be appropriate. However, a policy of benignneglect can degrade forest values through uncontrolledpests, weeds, fires, and illegal harvesting.

Prescribing a Code of PracticeCodes of forest practice are sets of regulations or guide-lines developed to help forest managers achieve desiredoutcomes (Dykstra and Heinrich 1996). The funda-mental purpose of most codes is to regulate forest useto protect the natural and cultural values of the forest(Wilkinson 1999). Forest management plans should pre-scribe the codes of forest practice to be applied withinthe FMU. Codes of practice determine the broad con-straints that are likely to apply to potential harvestingunits, buffers, stream management zones, and protectedareas (PAs) at the strategic planning level. However, the

main impact of codes of practice is at the operationalor compartmental level. At these levels, the principlesand provisions of the code must be translated into site-specific operational plans, such as timber harvestingplans or forest practices plans. These plans are the basesto control operations. They should be concise, prescrip-tive, and legally enforceable.

Codes of practice and associated operational-levelplans provide a prescriptive basis for legitimate forestpractices against which standards of compliance can bemeasured and reported. Operational plans should forman integral part of any timber transaction. In the firstinstance, timber products should not be harvested unlessthe operations are covered by an approved plan. Second,operational plans should be monitored to ensure thatthe harvesting operations comply with the plan provi-sions, such as those regarding harvesting boundaries,buffers, and tree-marking.

Different planning and regulatory systems impose dif-ferent technical standards, permit greater or lesser flexi-bility, and require different levels and methods of controland documentation. Field conditions vary widely, evenwithin relatively small areas, and engineering and otherchallenges can be very complex. Thus, it is unrealisticfor a code of practice to provide specific rules for allsites. Consequently, to a greater or lesser extent, codesof practice are advisory documents that need to betranslated through professional judgment and regula-tory approval processes into more definitive prescrip-tions by way of site-specific plans.

Implications for forest security. Both the technical pro-visions of forest practice requirements and their legaland contractual bases have implications for forest secu-rity, and in some circumstances and for some issues,define what is legal and illegal. Unrealistically demand-ing or inappropriately rigid codes of practice can exac-erbate security concerns in several ways.

Standards that are widely recognized by implementersand regulatory officials as unrealistic can diminish theperceived value of compliance and control measuresgenerally. Similarly, excessive regulatory demands canhelp to drive problems “underground” and promotecultures of concealment and denial. Therefore, it isimportant to design codes of practice and enforcementsystems around realistic expectations of the perform-ance capacities of implementing entities and to limitrequirements to genuinely important measures relatedto sustainability, commercial or community aspects, orother socially significant parameters.

It is important to design codes of practice and enforcement systems around realistic expectations ofthe performance capacities of implementing entities

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Choice of Silvicultural SystemSilviculture is the manipulation of the composition andstructure of a forest through activities such as harvest-ing and regeneration to achieve prescribed managementobjectives. A number of factors contribute to the formu-lation of a silvicultural system at the compartmentallevel in a FMU. They include:

Forest type. Ecological characteristics of the for-est, including species composition, structure, andcondition

Site factors. Environmental factors, which deter-mine the availability of moisture, nutrients, and tem-peratures for forest growth; physical attributes of theforest, such as topography and soils, which determinethe location of roads and the selection of harvestingequipment

Fire management. History of fire, use of fire forfuel management or regeneration, requirements toprotect forests from wildfire

Markets. Potential markets for commercial useof various forest products, including low-qualitywood; requirements to meet wood supply contractspecifications

Nontimber values. Measures necessary to protectother forest values such as biodiversity, soils, waterresources, and cultural sites

Social attitudes. Measures necessary to achieveoutcomes acceptable to the community to meet themembers’ expectations for other forest uses such ascollecting nontimber forest products and main-taining aesthetic, cultural, and recreational values.(Wilkinson 1994)

Silvicultural systems in tropical countries generallyare based on polycyclic, selective logging, which retainsan uneven-aged forest structure (FAO 1998). Mono-cyclic systems create even-aged strata through the har-vesting and regeneration of forests by clearfelling andshelterwood techniques.

In its simplest terms, the choice of silvicultural sys-tem is the determination of which trees to leave afterharvesting to enable the stand to regenerate for subse-quent harvests. In respect of timber security, it is alsothe determination of which trees to leave at risk of theft.

Implications for forest security. The choice of silvicul-tural regime dictates the nature of the retained growingstock and its vulnerability to damage through logging,windthrow, and fire. A silvicultural system that retains

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growing stock also may attract illegal harvesting, becausethe forest is more accessible via roads, skid tracks, andlanding sites. In some cases, illegal harvesting may beassociated with the removal of valuable growing stock.In others, illegal harvesting may be associated with theremoval of low-quality wood for firewood or other uses.In both cases, the illegal operations may damage advancedgrowth and regeneration. They also may damage soils,streams, roads, and areas protected for biodiversity orother values. Irrespective of the damage to the forest,illegal logging has an impact on the allowable cut. As faras possible, this impact should be factored into the FMP.

The management of these risks requires good docu-mentation and processes. As a general rule, silviculturalregimes in the FMP need to be translated into site-specificprescriptions in timber harvesting plans. In addition,consideration must be given to how the prescriptionswill be applied in the forest, who will select and marktrees for harvesting, and how the residual stand will bemonitored. These activities must be clearly defined sothat forest officers can readily detect any tree removalsthat do not comply with the harvesting plan.

Specific measures may be necessary to respond to thesecurity risks associated with various forms of silvicul-ture. In some cases, potentially high-value growingstock has been silviculturally retained to enhance futuregrowth and regeneration. Preventive measures at thecompartmental level may include the physical closure ofroads and skid tracks once legal harvesting operationsare completed.

Silvicultural systems may be manipulated to improvethe delineation of boundaries and to buffer importantforest values. In the APRIL Logging Concession Area inIndonesia, strips of plantation have been establishedalong major public roads to provide a visual and phys-ical buffer. Proximity to the roads reduces the incidenceof illegal harvesting from the residual natural forest. InIndia, plantation buffers have been used to protect theboundaries of natural forest from the edge effects ofgrazing by domestic animals on adjoining land.

Native forests and plantations form part of a land-scape mosaic in many FMUs. Strategically locating thedifferent management units within the mosaic optimizesthe protection of important natural and economic assets.The protection of plantation forests can be improvedby locating them close to major road infrastructure andsecurity/labor resources. In contrast, high conservationforests can be protected through buffers that controlaccess and reduce the encroachment of damaging activ-ities (figure 3.3).

The choice of silvicultural system is the determinationof which trees to leave after harvesting to enable thestand to regenerate, it is also the determination ofwhich trees to leave at risk of theft

Illegal activities may degrade the forest through theunauthorized salvage of low-value products after thescheduled harvesting operation. If so, preventive meas-ures may involve a more integrated approach to theprovision of these products. Logged areas often are tar-geted by firewood collectors because of easy access tofelled and standing timber. In some cases, the ground-wood and standing trees have been retained specificallyto provide habitat for threatened invertebrates, birds,and mammals.

In Tasmania, illegal removal has been managed bymodifying the silvicultural and regulatory system intwo ways. In some areas, low-grade logs are extractedand stockpiled during the conventional harvestingoperation to meet local requirements for firewood. Inother areas, “free firewood compartments” are setaside to provide an incentive by which collectors canobtain free wood provided that they comply with therules that protect green standing trees and buffers.The incentive is backed up by enforcement and finesfor people who are apprehended cutting in unautho-rized areas.

These two approaches may be modified dependingon whether the illegal activity is associated with localpeople or external parties. For local people, educationand communication programs will improve their under-standing of silviculture and appreciation of the longerterm benefits that could accrue from implement-ing appropriate harvesting and regeneration regimes.Their greater awareness and appreciation may lead tobetter surveillance and reporting of illegal activities.It is also important to recognize that, in many areas,local people traditionally have had use of the forest

to collect timber and nontimberforest products. The FMP shouldaddress this custom and provideappropriate opportunities for tra-ditional forest use.

Incentives also can be offeredto landowners to protect andmanage their forests for regen-eration after logging. In somejurisdictions, private landown-ers receive a higher royalty ratefor their harvested timber if theyagree to protect the regeneratingforest from fire, grazing animals,and additional timber removals.Private owners also can be given

improved security of their future harvest rights withinlong-term management plans or through legislation.

Planning Road AccessRoad and infrastructure development is usually a majorelement of the total cost to develop and operate a forestmanagement unit and a critical contributor to the over-all success and sustainability of management. The effec-tiveness of road access planning is determined by suchfactors as:

● Cost of construction and maintenance● Topographic and edaphic considerations● Harvest method; for example, ridge-top road-

ing for cable systems, mid-slope for conventionalsystems

● Safety● Access requirements for nontimber uses of the

forest and other management activities, includingfire protection

● Visual impacts.

The location, density, and type of forest roads haveinterrelated and often conflicting impacts on environ-mental, economic, and social factors. The economicimpacts of roads are related directly to the mean dis-tance to transport and skid logs, hence to the cost ofextracting timber. Environmentally, roads are potentiallong-term sources of erosion and stream sedimentation.Poorly designed roads and bridges may fail during highrainfall or floods, resulting in massive sedimentationand repair costs. Inappropriate stream crossings also canseriously affect the natural movement of aquatic fauna.

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Figure 3.3 Landscape mosaic. Plantation forest (middle) adjoins the land usedfor agriculture and settlement (bottom). The plantations are a buffer between the inten-sive land management of the agricultural/settlement zones and the extensive manage-ment of high-conservation-value native forests (upper). However, from a security pointof view, this arrangement also concentrates the risk of theft on the old-growth buffers.

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designed to restrict trucks’ access to protection forests.Similarly, road drainage structures such as cross-drains(ditches) and water bars can be used to restrict access tovehicles. All-weather pavements can ensure good accessfor surveillance and monitoring by responsible agenciesand communities. Conversely, unpaved roads can beused to restrict access to unauthorized persons duringperiods of low forestry activity such as wet seasons.

Roads that are temporary or required only for peri-odic harvesting may be decommissioned by removingstream crossings or installing physical barriers such ascross ditches or rock mounds.

The location and status of forest roads need to bewell documented and regularly reviewed by patrol andinspection. This information should enable forest man-agers to monitor the condition of their roads, plan main-tenance programs, and detect any signs of illegal roadconstruction or use.

ProtectionChapters 4 and 5 focus on security measures directed atcontrolling forest trespass and reducing risks in timbertransactions. Thus, the discussion addresses at the moregeneral relationships among the fire, pest, and diseaseactivities that frequently are part of forest managementprograms. In recent years, thinking and practice on insectand fire damage have evolved toward concepts such asintegrated pest management (IPM)4 and protectivesilviculture (Velez 1990b, 10–12). These approacheshave in common a reliance on knowledge and under-standing of natural systems and judicious recourse tohuman intervention. The approaches have developedin reaction to the limits and high costs of chemicals,and the unexpected consequences of fuel accumulationand other problems related to pest management andfire management, respectively.

Forest protection actions that would be consideredpart of the management program include:

● Surveillance and monitoring programs, whichmay be conducted through remote sensing, aerialphotographs, aerial patrols, and ground surveysand patrols

● Physical works and forest operations (firebreaks,access roads, watch towers, emergency responsefacilities)

● Salvage and regeneration works to accelerate reha-bilitation following losses that do occur.

For communities, roads can provide positive social ben-efits, including access to nontimber forest uses such asrecreation, hunting, and fishing. On the other hand,uncontrolled access opens up the forest to illegal activity.

Implications for forest security. Controlling access isa major forest security consideration. Road and infra-structure design and layout is probably the single mostimportant concern. Access can be controlled in twoways: the location of roads and restrictions on their use(chapter 4).

Location of roads. Roads must satisfy often opposingrequirements. Wherever possible, to minimize the riskof theft or damage, roads should be located away fromsensitive areas, such as cultural sites, rare plants, orimportant habitats. In areas that have a history of illegalactivity, roads should be located to limit the number ofuncontrolled access points into the forest. Conversely,where local communities and neighbors are committedto good forest management, road access may be used tofacilitate better surveillance and stewardship.

When new roads or changes in width or alignment arebeing planned, sensitive natural environments shouldbe identified early in the planning process so that alter-nate routes and designs may be considered. Whereverpossible, road developments should be located awayfrom sensitive areas to avoid severe impacts. Water cross-ings should be minimized, and buffer zones of undis-turbed vegetation should be left between roads andwatercourses. Groundwater recharge areas should beavoided, and major roads should not be constructedthrough national parks or other protected areas. Oppor-tunities should be sought to twin new road corridorswith previously established transport rights-of-way, suchas railway or electric transmission lines.2

Restrictions on the use of roads. Road access is com-monly controlled through devices such as gates, otherphysical barriers, load limits, and road design. Accessbarriers are discussed elsewhere in this volume.3 Roaddesign factors, such as topographic location, alignment,width, and pavement material, also may be used torestrict access. For example, gates and barriers are moreeffective if located on sections in which off-road accessis limited, such as near streams or areas of major side-cut or fill. Roadside ditches and/or berms of heavy rockalso can be used to prevent off-road access into adjoin-ing forest. Horizontal and vertical alignment can be

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2 Based on chapter 10, “Impacts on Flora and Fauna” in Hobanand Tsunokawa 1997.

3 Chapter 4. 4 For a survey, see Speight and Wylie 2001.

In addition to contingency plans for salvage andrehabilitation works, managing events such as cyclonesinvolves risk management strategies such as modifiedharvest and silvicultural regimes. Activities associatedwith fire management and pest control require com-prehensive management plans and procedures, backedup by well trained personnel, adequate resources, andinfrastructure.

Implications for forest security. Surveillance andmonitoring programs for forest protection should beintegrated with security programs. Staff involved inmonitoring and operational programs should be vig-ilant for signs of illegal activity and should pass anyevidence from ground or aerial patrols to the appro-priate officer. To deter potential illegal operators, forestryorganizations should publicize their surveillance pro-grams and maintain a high degree of physical presencein the forest.

Protection activities require adequate levels of sur-veillance and access to the forest. In other words, for-est managers must find a practical way to provideefficient access for persons engaged in important pro-tection works, while restricting access to unauthorizedpersons. It would be counter-productive to have forestsburned by wildfire because forestry officers were unableto gain timely access. Even worse would be forest work-ers or members of the public put at risk because theirescape route was blocked by a locked gate.

Consultation with Stakeholders and the Public

Modern forest management is an interactive processinvolving forest owners, government, forest users, andthe broader community. Consultation and collabora-tion can foster a partnership approach to forest man-agement. They can provide a framework to:

● Recognize and clarify the rights, roles, and respon-sibilities of each party

● Optimize the use and development of skills andresources within both governmental and privatesectors

● Establish mutually agreed outcomes and standards,and minimize ongoing disputes

● Develop efficient processes and avoid unnecessaryduplication and bureaucracy

● Provide motivation and incentives to encouragebest practice through continuing improvement.(Wilkinson 2001)

Local communities and others who have historicalrights or privileges in a forest are important stake-holders and must be involved in forest managementplanning (FAO 1998). Community engagement shouldextend beyond consultation to recognize and enhancethe members’ opportunities to share in the benefits thataccrue from good forest management. Benefits includeemployment, royalties, improved fire protection, accessto timber and nontimber forest products, garden sites,and recreation.

Implications for forest security. The community is morelikely to protect forest assets when it sees a direct benefit.Local communities that receive short-term gain fromillegal operations need to be convinced of the longer termeconomic, social, and environmental benefits that willaccrue to them from sustainable forest management.

All stakeholders, particularly landowners and com-munity groups, can increase forest security throughparticipating in education programs, changing theirown behavior, and monitoring and reporting any sus-picious activities. Many “illegal” activities are carriedout by persons in ignorance of the law or in pursuit oftraditional rights or past-times. Such activities are bestaddressed through educating, developing managementstrategies, and designating areas to respect, and respondto, traditional rights, such as garden sites, grazing,hunting, and harvesting domestic timber and nontim-ber forest products.

Community groups can be effective “watch-dogs”over the forest estate, detecting, and reporting anysuspicious activity. An alert, informed, and motivatedcommunity is a strong deterrent to persons contem-plating illegal activity.5

For example, in Central Java, illegal logging is reportedto be rampant on state forest land but relatively uncom-mon in community-based forest management areas(Tacconi and others 2004). In Tasmania, rural commu-nity groups comprising landowners, forest workers,and recreational and hunting clubs have formed “BushWatch” associations. These associations detect and reportsuspect activity in a similar way to the urban-based“Neighborhood Watch” program.

Types Timber Sales and Management ContractsTimber sales may be made with respect to an agreed vol-ume of timber or as rights to an agreed area of forest.6

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5 See also social fencing in chapter 5.6 For an expanded discussion, see chapter 5.

Modern forest management is an interactive processinvolving forest owners, government, forest users, andthe broader community

Arrangements for the conduct and supervision of log-ging operations generally are specified in statutoryregulations, contracts, and licensing rules. Regulatoryframeworks vary in the degree of control exercised by government and the degree to which some relianceis placed on responsible self-regulation by the forestowners and logging contractors. Lack of clarity canlead to unnecessary duplication and over-regulation onthe one hand, or regulatory deficiencies on the other.Ambiguity of roles and responsibilities can be exploitedby those who wish to abuse the system.

The regulatory framework should clearly specifythe roles of the parties involved in logging. These rolesshould be articulated in the documentation for licensesor operational plans. For example, who will be respon-sible for marking boundaries and tree selection? Whowill be responsible for log scaling and for checking logdockets?

Implications for forest security. Timber sales that arebased on the allocation of a forest area, such as conces-sion systems, leasing, or other property rights, usuallyresult in the holder of the right assuming the primaryresponsibility for the management and security of thetimber assets. The commitment to asset security may beless for those who are allocated a certain volume that isnot restricted to any particular area of forest. In bothcases, there is a possibility that only one party—thelandowner or holder of the timber rights—is directlythreatened by illegal operations. As a result, other par-ties may be ambivalent or unsupportive about con-tributing to security arrangements.

Ideally, all parties should regard forest security asa necessary overhead to protect the rights of thosewho are engaged in authorized logging operations. Abalanced approach to forest security requires a com-bination of good procedures, education, incentives, andpenalties.

1. Effective procedures for log marking and for track-ing the movement of timber are fundamental toany compliance regime. Advances in log mark-ing and chain of custody (CoC) are detailed inDykstra and others (2003).

2. Education enables all parties to see the benefits thataccrue under a system of responsible forest man-agement, including improved security of resourcesupply and a fairer market that is not distorted bycheaper, illegal timber.

3. Incentives encourage a high degree of responsi-ble self-regulation. Training, accreditation, and

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streamlined approval processes can be used asincentives to counter the costs and inefficiencies ofexcessive governmental bureaucracy and interven-tion by enabling private operators to become moreefficient and responsible. Savings that accrue fromreduced governmental regulation of responsibleparties can be redirected to increase the regulationof problem operators, including illegal operators.Landowners and forest companies can encouragegood practice by preferentially awarding contractsto operators with good compliance systems.

4. Penalties provide a strong deterrent to those whocarry out illegal operations, either deliberately oras a consequence of inadequate self-regulatorysystems.

An effective regulatory framework enables forestoperators to know the rules and motivates them to meetor exceed the required standards. As a result, the oper-ators will be interested in the broader picture of soundforest management and will not support or tolerateillegal activity. Because they work both within the forestand in the industry, collectively they are important addi-tional sets of eyes and ears for forest surveillance andreporting.

ImplementationThe forest management plan should take into accountthe skills and resources that are available to the forestmanager to implement the prescribed managementactivities. Failure to properly implement plans may occurfor a number of reasons, most of which are predictable.Two are:

1. The forest manager does not have the capacity toundertake the prescribed activities.

2. Planned activities are changed to levels that arenot consistent with the prescribed objectives ofthe plan, such as changes to allowable cut or sil-vicultural regimes.

In either case, the result is the same: the forest man-agement plan falls into disuse, and forest managementoutcomes do not reconcile with the planned objectives.

Implications for forest security. Forest managementplans must be implemented by persons who have theappropriate skills, attitudes, and resources (equipment,vehicles, and planning tools) to undertake the prescribedtasks. The plan should clarify the respective roles, respon-sibilities, and rights of all parties, with the given that

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each party must have the capacity to fulfill his or her pre-scribed activities. These range from boundary marking,inventorying, tree marking, and felling to monitoringand enforcement. The plan should identify all deficien-cies in resources and capacity and describe the requi-site compensatory actions, such as providing trainingand other measures to develop and build resources andcapacities.

All departures from planned activities should beclearly documented. The reasons for the changes and theimplications for forest management should be reviewedand reported as part of the regular review and update ofthe FMP (Review and Improvement section below).

Monitoring and EnforcementMonitoring and enforcement are essential componentsof any compliance or regulatory regime. Transparentmonitoring and reporting systems are key componentsof forest certification systems. They also are increasinglyimportant for securing access to markets that demandevidence of legal and sustainable forest managementpractices.

Most regimes comprise a combination of three typesof regulation, which can be complementary:

1. Self-management by landowners and operators2. Monitoring and enforcement by government3. Independent verification by third parties, such

as that provided under formal environmentalmanagement systems and certification schemes.

Public scrutiny also can significantly foster improvedenvironmental performance and accountability. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media cangreatly help forest managers to garner social and politi-cal support for improvements to forest management andsecurity at all levels.

Poorly managed processes can become very inter-ventionist and adversarial. Public trust in forest man-agement can be enhanced by credible monitoring andtransparent reporting of operational performance byforest managers. Performance includes providing oppor-tunities for the community to be involved in monitor-ing forest activities in a cooperative and participatorymanner. (Wilkinson 2003)

Monitoring. There are two important types ofmonitoring within any regulatory regime: (1) com-pliance monitoring and (2) efficacy (effectiveness)monitoring.

1. Compliance monitoring measures and report onthe performance standards being achieved (out-comes) with respect to the prescribed objectivesand requirements of relevant laws, managementplans, and codes of forest practice. Compliancemonitoring typically includes these processes:a. Regular inspections and patrolsb. Formal checks, often on a sample, for exam-

ple, checks of log measurements and docketsc. Formal auditd. Investigations of suspected illegal activity that

has been reported through routine activities orinformation from other parties.

Monitoring programs must be transparent andcredible. In other words, they must be well docu-mented, engage well-trained and competent staff,and produce publicly available reports. The reportscontain the results of the monitoring program andthe actions taken to correct any deficiencies and toeffect improved forest management outcomes.

2. Efficacy monitoring means evaluating how well themanagement practices or actions have achieved thedesired outcome. For example, how well do the pre-scribed buffers protect streams or wildlife habitat?Monitoring compliance should be carried out rou-tinely across all operations. However, monitoringefficacy generally is done through a more targetedor strategic approach that involves research orlong-term monitoring projects. The results ofthese studies are used to refine the practices pre-scribed by management plans and codes of practice.

Monitoring programs are an essential feed-back mechanism for forest management. Mon-itoring compliance and efficacy enables forestmanagers to:a. Translate the information into improved pre-

scriptions and practicesb. Provide transparent and credible reports on the

standard of forest management being achievedwithin a FMU. By its nature, monitoring invari-ably highlights illegal activities and other man-agement deficiencies. However, recognizing goodperformance is equally important, because itpromotes and helps to strengthen the attitudes,skills, and systems that underpin good forestmanagement.

Enforcement. Enforcement generally refers to the exercise of statutory power by authorized officers.However, many others will contribute to enforcement

Compliance programs should not be viewed as the soleresponsibility of a “regulator” or specialist

by providing information obtained through the mon-itoring activities described above.

Modern enforcement regimes emphasize the preven-tion of crime rather than control and punishment. Mostregulators regard prosecution as indicative of their ownfailure to achieve good performance by other means(Farrier 1992). However, the power to resort to legalenforcement often is necessary to put “teeth” in regula-tory regimes. Penalties can strongly deter illegal activity,particularly by persons who are less receptive to otherdissuasions.

Two factors determine the effectiveness of usingpenalties as a deterrent: (1) risk of being caught and(2) magnitude of the penalty. The first is a function ofthe resources and systems in place to detect illegalactivity. The second is a function of the law and of theregulatory authority and judiciary’s capacity to imple-ment the penalty provisions.

A responsive and effective enforcement regime hasa range of enforcement options. They are implementedthrough:

● Designated officers who are well trained in inves-tigation techniques, negotiation, and conflictresolution

● Adequate resources, including transportation andeffective information and communication systems

● Properly documented procedures for investiga-tions and enforcement action

● Transparent reporting on investigations and actiontaken.

Enforcement decisions should take into account anumber of factors:

● Degree of environmental or economic loss● Cost of corrective action● Time required for rehabilitation or natural recov-

ery of the forest● Intent of the offender (whether the act was delib-

erate, accidental, or in ignorance of the law)● Offender’s past history● Level of cooperation shown by the offender in

reporting the noncompliance and in undertak-ing any relevant remedial measures or improvedpractices.

These factors can be put into a matrix to determinethe seriousness of illegal activity and the most suitableenforcement options. Enforcement options include

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warnings, notices to take corrective action, stop-workorders, cancellation of licenses or contracts, fines, andprosecutions.

All instances of noncompliance indicate deficienciesin either attitude, skills, resources, or procedures. Hence,the long-term key to achieving good compliance lies ineffecting continuous improvement through education,training, and the development and implementation ofsound forest management practices and procedures.

Implications for forest security. Monitoring andenforcement regimes are essential to determine whetherthe objectives of forest management plans are beingachieved. Compliance programs must be conductedproperly by competent persons. For routine monitor-ing and enforcement, forest officers must be adequatelytrained and competent in investigation techniques, nego-tiation, and conflict resolution. Highly confrontationalor dangerous investigations should be undertaken onlyby enforcement officers who are appropriately trainedand equipped.

However, compliance programs should not be viewedas the sole responsibility of a designated “regulator” orteam of specialist officers. A security program will notsucceed unless it has the support and involvement ofall staff. Security awareness needs to be integrated innormal management programs and activities such asmonitoring inventory plots; maintaining roads; andcarrying out patrols for fire, pest, or storm damage.Organizations should establish effective communi-cation systems to ensure that all officers who detectsuspect activities during their normal work pass theinformation to responsible investigative officers. Like-wise, officers involved in enforcement should liaise withoperational managers to review how compliance levelscan best be improved though changes to forest manage-ment activities.

As mentioned, the planning and implementation offorest management should involve all key stakeholders,including forest owners, forest workers, and govern-mental staff. All parties have a role in fostering improvedcompliance through training, education, reporting, andthe development of better systems and procedures. Ulti-mately, forest security will be enhanced when:

1. All parties—landowners, forest workers, the com-munity, and government—understand and sup-port the objectives of forest management and thenecessity for high compliance standards.

2. Forest managers implement effective internal man-agement systems to monitor and report on compli-ance and to enforce standards through correctiveactions or punishments.

3. Governments ensure that credible and transpar-ent processes are in place to enforce and report onstandards achieved.

4. Third parties verify internal management systems.

Review and Improvement

Good planning systems are based on the four principlesof adaptive management:

1. Prescribe2. Monitor3. Review4. Revise.

Forest management planning should be a dynamicprocess that responds to changes in the operating envi-ronment. Such changes span:

1. Management objectives and priorities, whichnaturally will change over time in response tochanges in economic, social, and environmen-tal factors

2. Improvements to the processes and tools to imple-ment plans in response to changes in technology,knowledge, governance arrangements, and insti-tutional capacity

3. Feedback from monitoring programs, whichenables forest managers to evaluate whether themanagement objectives are being achieved andto assess the relative success or failure of man-agement processes and activities.

Forest management plans should be reviewed regu-larly in a participatory, transparent, and credible man-ner. Ideally, progress in implementing the plan shouldbe assessed and reported annually. The plan also shouldprovide for more formal reviews every 5 to 10 years.The accompanying report should contain:

a. Information on the outcomes and an explana-tion of variances from planned outcomes, not-ing the impact of any changes in the operatingenvironment

b. Highlights (successful outcomes)c. Reasons for poor outcomes and the adaptive

responses proposed to improve future outcomesd. Other initiatives to foster continuing improve-

ment, such as programs for training, research,and development

e. Revisions to the management objectives and activ-ities prescribed by the forest management plan.

Implications for forest security. When the objectives offorest management are defined clearly and the outcomesare monitored, reviewed, and reported properly, thenany departures from the prescribed outcomes should bepatently clear. Recognizing the nature and causes ofnoncompliance is the first step toward an effective,adaptive management response.

As mentioned earlier, solutions to illegal activity can-not be developed in isolation from other managementactivities. Forest management planning provides theframework within which all of the threads of forest man-agement can be integrated and coordinated to optimizeresource use and produce the desired outcomes.

Ongoing review allows forest managers to progres-sively improve the forest management elements thataffect forest security (table 3.1).

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Solutions to illegal activity cannot be developed in isolation from other management activities

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Table 3.1 Summary of the key links between the elements of forest management planning and forest security

Forest management element Implications for forest security

1. Legal and policy framework

2. Planning

a. Define forest estate

b. Set management objectives

c. Prescribe code of practice

d. Prescribe silvicultural system

e. Plan road access

f. Protect forest resources

g. Consult stakeholders and public

h. Contract timber sales

3. Implementation of FMP

4. Monitoring and enforcement

5. Review and improvement

Remove ambiguity or doubts about legal activities, especially in relation to land tenure andownership.

Carry out comprehensive inventories and surveys from which to determine allowable cuts,identify values that require protection, and monitor any illegal removals or damage.

Demarcate boundaries on maps and in the field using secure markers or easily identifiable fea-tures (roads, streams, ridge tops) to facilitate accurate monitoring of boundary security.

Define forest management objectives so that any departures from planned outcomes, such asharvesting volumes, are patently clear.

Clarify the roles, rights, and responsibilities of all parties, including consultation with key stake-holders such as the local community and forest industry.

Translate management objectives into site-specific operational plans and standards, such astimber harvesting plans, as the bases from which to control activities.

Prescribe specific security measures to protect important silvicultural areas such as high-valuegrowing stock to enhance future growth and regeneration. For example, to keep out illegalloggers, close roads after logging.

Prevent public from retrieving firewood or other NTFP by extracting low-grade logs at pointsoutside the forest. This arrangement will ensure that local firewood demand is met. Alter-natively, set aside “firewood- and NTFP-gathering compartments” with rules to protectgreen standing trees and buffer zones.

Control access through road location and restrictions. Locate roads to avoid sensitive areas andto facilitate surveillance, monitoring, and control. Locate barriers, gates, and transport check-points at “choke points,” for example, bridge crossings or steep side cuts.

Integrate surveillance/monitoring for forest protection with timber/timberland security pro-grams. Train all staff to detect and report any illegal activities.

Involve stakeholders—landowners, community groups—as forest security “watch dogs.” Pro-vide educational programs and incentives to change their attitudes and behavior, andencourage them to report illegal activity.

Prescribe tree and log marking and tracking in sales procedures. Contract should includeincentives for good practices and penalties for bad ones. Curbing fraud and theft willreduce competition from cheap illegal logs and deliver higher returns to forest owners.

FMU manager must have the capacity to implement the FMP in terms of skilled labor andappropriate management systems and resources. Manager should conduct training toimprove skills in critical areas.

Manager should:Integrate monitoring by forest owner/managers, contractors, workers, and government

agency staff. Manager should not rely only on company security officers.Use audits and checks to identify potential security problems (“red flags”), for example, tim-

ber volumes, areas, tree or log numbers that do not match.Develop effective communication systems to ensure that those who detect suspicious activity

during their normal work pass information to security officer to investigate.Provide a range of enforcement options: warnings, notices of corrective action, stop-work

order, cancellation of license or contract, fines, and prosecutions. Enforcement optionsshould be “built into contracts” and balanced with degree of loss/damage.

Provide transparent reports on monitoring and enforcement activities to garner the support ofthe community, including NGOs and media.

Manager should regularly report and review outcomes, and explain variances from managementobjectives. This information should be used to improve management systems and/or high-light deficiencies that require higher level action.

Securing Forest Land and Resources:Technologies and Systems

Garry B.Vikanes

4

Timber theft can occur only when criminals haveaccess to the forest. Trespass thus is a fundamen-tal component of illegal logging. Trespass spans

behaviors from using established roads and transportinfrastructure to clandestine crossings of borders andboundaries to surreptitiously using an FMU’s own equip-ment and resources. Securing forest land against trespassis one of the most important components of timber theftprevention.

This chapter examines the protection of forest land. Itbegins by defining and analyzing trespass. It deconstructsthe protection problem into two parts: (1) controllingentry into and exit from the FMU and (2) preventingillegal activities within the FMU. The discussion high-lights the special security issues and limitations inherentin protecting large, remote areas. It also puts in per-spective the importance of carefully assessing transportroutes and natural features in designing and implement-ing protection measures.

The chapter reviews well-established methods ofcontrolling access, including fences, gates, boundarymarkers, and checkpoints on roads and rivers. It nextconsiders the role of guards and security forces andissues in their deployment and effectiveness. The chapterthen moves to advanced technologies, such as closedcircuit television and the innovative and low-cost tech-nology of “social fencing.”

Trespass

Tenure is the right, manner, or form of holding an asset.Forest tenure systems vary widely among and withincountries. Forest tenure sometimes takes the form ofownership of all of the features and resources on a

parcel of land. More often, it is limited to a subset, leavingto others the rights to passage, wildlife, water, and otherresources and services. Tenures may take the form of per-manent ownership that can be sold or transferred to heirsor others. Tenures also may be granted or acquired fordifferent lengths of time, and the rights and obligationsbeing transferred can be attenuated or restricted.

For example, forest concessions are forest tenuresthat convey rights to develop and exploit a forest, sub-ject to various constraints and obligations. The lattermay include paying royalties and other fees and adher-ing to standards of forest practice and other regulatoryrequirements. Concessions do not involve a transfer ofownership and usually do not abrogate or nullify theexisting rights and privileges of others, such as the cus-tomary privileges of indigenous communities. Commu-nity forestry represents a range of tenure arrangementsthat variously involve benefit-sharing, managementand protection responsibilities, and other privileges andobligations.

“Trespass” is the violation of the tenure rights of anowner by entering onto the owner’s lands without per-mission. Two legal approaches can be taken to deal withtrespass and timber theft: civil and criminal. Criminaland civil trespass laws vary by jurisdiction and by coun-try. Criminal trespass is the act of going onto anotherperson’s land or property without permission of theowner or lessee and is an offense or misdemeanor cov-ered by a jurisdiction’s criminal code. Under civil law,trespass is a tort, or wrongful act, that may be a validcause for a lawsuit to seek judicial relief, and possiblydamages.

Understanding and dealing with the trespass can bea challenge, so it is important that the interpretation of

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the statutes defining the term in a particular jurisdictionis clear. Without proper clarification and widespreadpublic understanding of tenure rights, conflicts candevelop when protection actions that limit or restrictaccess are introduced. It can be argued that trespass canoccur even with the permission of the landowner to beon the land. The reason is that trespass can includeelements other than simply entering onto the land ofanother without permission, especially regarding tim-ber trespass. For instance, in some jurisdictions, timbertrespass may include unlawfully cutting, damaging, orremoving timber without the consent of the landowner.As a first step in a protection program, landownersand managers concerned with trespass need to obtainauthoritative legal advice on the rights and limitationsthat accompany their particular tenures. Anti-trespassmeasures can be exerted only within the scope of therights conferred by law or a specific tenure instrument(deed, lease, contract). Thus, for example, an industrialforest concessionaire may not be entitled to preventaccess to hunters or other traditional users.

Control of trespass can be complicated by a numberof factors. Due to uncertain boundary lines, police oftenhave difficulty in determining whether someone hastrespassed. In some jurisdictions, trespass is not consid-ered a criminal or penal issue. Not all persons seekingor gaining access to property are trespassers. Laws oftenrecognize the rights of persons given express permis-sion to be on the property. Examples are licensees, gamewardens, police officers, government-licensed foresters,or members of groups, such as indigenous local com-munities, who may have specific legal access rights.Such individuals and any others with legal right to be onthe property are not trespassing and cannot be prose-cuted on this basis alone.

Property owners may allow some trespassers whileexcluding others. For example, a sign saying only “NoHunting” conceivably could allow hiking, all-terrainvehicles, or bird-watching, but would give notice tohunters that they would be trespassing if they enteredonto the property. Unless there are specific laws thatenable restriction of access, the public can demand itsright to access public forests. When restrictions areallowed and imposed, they must be based on criteriadefined by a law, regulation, or order; and generally willbe based on public safety or protection of the resource.Using a blanket control mechanism to limit access canbe challenged by the public, especially by those whodepend on the forest.

Timber trespass can occur when a contractor orlicensee targets and removes valuable trees withoutauthorization while cutting and removing trees underthe terms of a contract or license. In this case, the tar-geted high-value trees also could be located and cut out-side the boundary of the contract but still on publicland, in which case the contractor/licensee is culpableof criminal timber trespass and theft. Timber trespassalso can occur if public land is open to public access, butcertain activities are prohibited. An example would bea protected area in which the law prohibits entry to cutand remove forest products that is accessed by someonewho cuts and removes or damages timber.

Even more difficult areas for limiting access are com-mercial forest zones on which authorized timber harvest-ing is allowed by contract or license. In this situation,others may legally enter onto public land. However,depending on whether the ownership of the timberhas been transferred, if they illegally cut timber, tim-ber trespass and theft have occurred against either thecontractor/licensee or against the government.

Controlling Trespass

The practical control of forest trespass involves two keychallenges: (1) controlling entrance to and exit from theforest area, that is, controlling forest boundaries; and(2) controlling activities inside the boundaries. Theseare met by identifying and locating key vulnerabilitiesand by developing systems to exclude and control thoseposing threats to the property. These goals are accom-plished by a combination of (1) minimizing exposureof particularly vulnerable assets with physical barriers1;(2) zoning the property to minimize the presence ofthose posing threats; and (3) developing surveillancepractices to detect and deter threats.

VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities are points particularly subject to, or at risk of, crime (see chapter 2). This chapter addresses

1 Conventional asset protection and industrial security practice isconcerned with prevention of trespass to buildings and relativelysmall sites. These practices emphasize physical barriers such as gates,locks, and related systems such as lighting and alarms, which are rele-vant to limited forestry applications. Useful references include Fennelly,“Security Surveys” in Fennelly 2004 and National Crime PreventionInstitute 2001. For specific design guidelines on fences, a useful refer-ence is U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2001.

As a first step in a protection program, landownersand managers concerned with trespass need to obtainauthoritative legal advice on the rights and limitationsthat accompany their particular tenures

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vulnerabilities in space, while chapter 5 considers vul-nerabilities in the component processes of timbersales. The areas in forests that typically are at thegreatest risk are boundaries, infrastructure, rivers,and areas with particular concentrations of valuableresources.

Boundaries. Identification of the forest estate is anessential element of FMU planning and managementand is needed for yield regulation, harvest planning,and other basic work (chapter 3). Analysis of bound-aries from a security perspective is another basic com-ponent of timber theft prevention. The boundaries ofan FMU are a major element in its vulnerability to tim-ber theft. Nevertheless, these boundaries usually areestablished based on administrative or natural consid-erations, not on security concerns. Thieves access theproperty by crossing its boundaries and transportingstolen material across them. Because of their length,remoteness, and inaccessibility, forest properties seldomcan be completely controlled and secured. Nonetheless,border control measures, boundary demarcation, anddetection of trespass are critical to theft prevention.Proactive boundary control measures as simple asdemarcation and posting signs have a second benefit:they can improve the odds for successful prosecution inthe event of trespass.

FMU boundaries may be contiguous with the natu-ral limits of a forest canopy2; may coincide with naturalfeatures, such as rivers or ridge lines; may abut roads;and may align with national and subnational bound-aries. The total length of the FMU boundary, its com-plexity, and the nature of neighboring properties andland users all are factors that can expose the FMU togreater or lesser trespass risk.

While total boundary length is a component of tim-ber theft risk, specific vulnerabilities along the bound-ary are likely to be more significant. Typically, thesewill include points at which roads and trails enter and exit the property, outlets of rivers and streams,and human settlements near or adjacent to the FMUboundary. Identifying these vulnerabilities requiresgood maps and knowledge of neighboring communi-ties and properties.

Careless surveys lead to mapping problems, as notedin Cameroon:

“The failure to identify incursions detected on Landsat7 ETM3 images might be, in part entirely, due to ‘map-ping problems’ by the logging companies operating inthe area, and true mapping problems within MINEFdepartments.4 It has been observed that for a given titleseveral descriptions of boundaries existed, and some-times the FMU’s shape was unclear due to bearingerrors or errors in the legal description that accompanythe map of the concession” (Auzel and others 2004).

Other vulnerabilities within a forest. Vulnerabilitiesto timber theft within an FMU will be related to someof the same factors that are of boundary concerns.Vulnerable locations inside the FMU include roads,trails, streams and rivers, and human settlements.While pilferage of small volumes (although sometimesof significant value) from remote areas can occur,large-scale commercial illegal logging almost alwaysinvolves significant networks of trails, roads, and land-ings infrastructure.

On the basis of information that should be availablefrom resource assessments and inventories, maps, andother planning data, FMU managers should be able toidentify specific areas within the management unit thatneed to be prioritized for protection. These may includerecently logged areas, particularly in the case of selectivelogging systems, because of the presence of roads andtrails in good condition. Errors in cutting back delin-eation can result in improper logging or theft (figure 4.1).In the case of clear-felling, areas adjacent to recent log-ging may be prioritized. Settled areas within the FMUmay be considered vulnerable, as would areas withinthe economic radius of mills outside the FMU.

Among potentially vulnerable sites within the FMU,a ranking can be assigned according to the serious-ness of the risk and nature of the anticipated threat.These sites should be located on maps and classifiedby some simple scheme (see “Controlling Access andEgress” below).

2 Although some FMU areas encompass large nonforestedinclusions.

3 The Landsat Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM) was introducedwith Landsat 7. ETM data cover the visible, near-infrared, shortwave,and thermal infrared spectral bands of the electromagnetic spectrum.http://earth.esa.int/LANDSAT/

4 MINEF is the Ministry of Environment and Forests of Cameroon.

While total boundary length is a component of timbertheft risk, specific vulnerabilities along the boundaryare likely to be more significant

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ThreatVulnerability assessment based on a survey of physicalfeatures and infrastructure should be supplemented byhistorical information on any patterns of trespass andknowledge of the distribution of resources within theFMU. The mere presence of human beings in an FMUdoes not constitute a crime nor even necessarily a threat.Especially in developing countries, forests are exten-sively used and occupied by many people who pose nodanger to the management program. However, depend-ing on many considerations, community use of fire,wildlife, and timber as well as other activities can con-stitute risks. The needs and rights of local communitiesand traditional resource users should be respected.However, efforts will be needed to monitor the activi-ties of others within the FMU and to ensure consistencywith the planned program.

In assessing the potential of different groups or indi-viduals as threats, the means, motive, and opportunitymodel (chapter 2) can be a valuable tool. For example,local people seldom will pose a significant risk unlessthere is a ready market able to absorb large volumes ofmaterial. Knowledge of criminal businesses, militaryauthorities, or others actively involved in controllingmobile sawmills or in managing log transport outsidethe FMU will aid in identifying serious threats.

Intrusion detection is the ability to know when a per-son has entered a secured area. It may include the abil-ity to determine the identity of that person and assess

whether and what level of threat s/he poses. Becausetracking movement includes both authorized and unauthorized activity, it can serve as both a staff management and a security tool. Detection includesperimeter detection systems used on fences or placedin the ground to detect intruders. Intrusion detectionshould occur before damage can occur and thus shouldbe designed considering the time required for damageto occur and the time required for a managementresponse (box 4.1).

Surveillance is the ability to monitor a specified areaand is a key source of intelligence collection. Surveil-lance can be done through an on-site security staff andby mobile patrols covering the property by land, water,and air. Remote-sensing technologies include aerialover-flights, aerial photographs, wireless/video sur-veillance systems, and satellite imagery. “In Cambodia,remote sensing has also been used extensively as partof the new independent forest monitoring system todetect changes in land cover, new roads, stockpiles oflogs and recent illegal logging activity.” (Ouen andothers 2001)

Figure 4.1 Improper felling due to poor surveyingskills. These logs were felled in error because the timbercruiser was unaware that he was marking trees within a pro-tected community forestry area. Lao, PDR.

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Box 4.1 Layers of protection: Onion skin theory

The onion skin theory was developed by criminolo-gists to protect the most critical assets of an organi-zation. The concept is that the most critical asset isfound in the core of the onion and that each layer ofskin around the core becomes another layer of pro-tection called “target hardening.” When an asset istarget hardened correctly, appropriate security bar-riers make up each layer.

The outer barrier of the protection system must bedesigned to trigger an alarm or announce that a per-petrator is attempting to penetrate the barrier. The“alarm” goes to a monitoring point that activatesthe response force. For the protection system to beeffective, the response force must reach the asset(onion core) before the perpetrator does. To ensurethat the response force arrives first, each barrier (layerof protection) must have a penetration time assignedto it. The more time required for the response forceto arrive, the more barriers that must be installed.

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Access ControlThe purpose of forest access control is to manage andlimit access. Because of their large size, strict control offorest boundaries is almost impossible. In addition,such control very often would be undesirable or evenillegal because of the needs and rights of local commu-nities and others. Access control is a set of policies, plans,procedures, personnel, and physical components thatprovide control and awareness of assets and activitieson a forest company’s property, including facilities andrestricted areas. Access controls regulate the flow ofpeople, vehicles, and materials into, out of, and withina protected zone. Controls segregate property or build-ings into distinct zones, sometimes referred to as pub-lic, operational, and restricted areas.

Different levels of access are assigned to differentindividuals depending on their duties and responsibil-ities. Access control regulates who should be permittedaccess to forestry land, forestry buildings, and restrictedareas; what they can access (wood lots, heavy equip-ment storage, fuel supplies, forestry buildings); andwhen they can access these areas (certain days of theweek or shifts). Access control also includes the abilityto observe and track movement in and out of controlledareas. The forest manager can grant access to employ-ees, contractors, and government officials and assets,depending on the needs and restrictions established bythe company. Access encompasses not only people butalso vehicles, heavy equipment, and materials.

When developing an access control plan, forestmanagers must identify their assets and areas of theirproperty/facilities that must be controlled. They thencan make decisions about who will be given access to thevarious areas of the property and the assets. This accessmay be from roads, (main roads, trails, cut lines), water(rivers or lakes using water taxis, log barges, tugboats,cutout log canoes, rafts), or air (fixed wing or helicopter).5

A contact clause that requires the contractor/licenseeto close roads after logging activity can limit vehicularaccess to the area after logging. For example, placing agate on the road may not limit access as effectively as

using tractors and other equipment to place bouldersand other natural materials on the road surface, return-ing it to its more natural state. Use of a gate must bebased on a legal right by law or regulation that restrictspublic vehicular access into forest areas after loggingoperations, or restricts being on a road closed by orderor regulation. Without continual monitoring and patrolof areas closed by gates, the effectiveness of the gate andintended restriction will dissipate over time. Thieveswill find routes around the gate or tear it down.

Boundary demarcation. Field boundaries should beagreed by the relevant parties and linked to securesurvey or boundary markers (chapter 3). Boundariesalso should be linked to geographic positioning sys-tems (GPS), particularly if the former cannot berelated to obvious physical features such as roads,fences, rivers, or other topographic features. In addi-tion, boundary markers such as tracks, cut-lines, andpainted or branded trees should be used to minimizethe risk of boundaries being inadvertently missed ordeliberately moved (figure 4.2).

Few trees will be exactly on the boundary line. Forthose that are, the owner must place two marks onopposite sides of the tree so that the line passes throughthe marks. When there are not enough trees on the line

5 In addition, because many access management tools have mul-tiple security roles, access management efforts can be tightly woveninto an overall security strategy. Access management should be acritical component of a forest management plan. However, to ensurecompatibility with other, nonsecurity goals, these strategies must beintegrated into company-wide planning efforts.

Figure 4.2 Paint-marked boundary trees. Paintmarks on trees are the most common way to mark forestboundaries today. Forestry supply houses and some hard-ware or farm supply stores sell long-lasting paint madeespecially for this purpose. Each mark should be 4–6 in(10 cm × 15 cm) on a side and approximately 6 ft (2 m)above the ground. Only trees that are vigorous and not lessthan 4 inches in diameter should be marked.

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When developing an access control plan, forest managers must identify their assets and areas of theirproperty/facilities that must be controlled

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itself, marks that face the line must be made on treeswithin a prescribed distance of the line (1–1.5 m orapproximately 5 ft). The owner must be in sight of theprevious mark when making the next one. The goal isthat, once marking is finished, the owner can stand atany point on the line and see at least two boundarymarks. Boundary-marking trees should not be har-vested. If approval has been given to remove a bound-ary tree, a replacement tree should be marked.

If not enough trees grow on or near the line, or theyall are too small to mark, stone mounds, monuments,other markers, or fencing can be used. Special attentionshould be given to marking corners. To make the cor-ners more evident, 2 or 3 “witness” trees can be selectedand painted with 3 marks each, at 3-in intervals, 1 abovethe other. All the marks should directly face the corner.To deter trespass, property lines must be regularlyrefurbished. They must be patrolled often and repairedas needed.

Property lines also can include natural protectivebarriers such as mountains, deserts, cliffs, ditches, waterobstacles, or other terrain features that are difficult totraverse. Human-made barriers include roads, railways,berms, irrigation systems, and pipelines. Wide cut-linescan be made through the forest by removing the foliage,and bulldozers can make boundaries by clearing land.

A byproduct of these two methods is good fireguards.Fireguards themselves can be used to mark boundaries.Road boundaries serve multiple purposes: they arehighly visible landmarks, easy to patrol, easily recog-nized, and make it hard for the criminal to deny havingseen them when trespassing.

Along both external boundaries and internal compart-ment and other boundaries, the design and placement ofsigns themselves are important security considera-tions (box 4.2).

Physical barriers. Perimeter fences define the physi-cal limits of a piece of property, facility, or controlledarea; provide a physical and psychological deterrent tounauthorized entry; channel and control the flow ofpersonnel and vehicles through designated portals;facilitate effective use of the security force; and enhancedetection and apprehension of intruders.6 Fencing canbe used as a barrier in various locations:

● Perimeter of property● Forest buildings and critical infrastructure such as

fuel and power facilities

6 For detailed technical design information on physical barriersincluding fences and gates, see American Society of Civil Engineers/American Water Works Association 2006.

Box 4.2 Signage

A significant number of “no trespass” signs should beerected on a property to ensure that potential intrudersare aware that they are entering private property. “Notrespass” signs should be installed along the boundarylines and at each entry point. An individual must be ableto easily see the signs when approaching the perimeter.In multilingual areas, signs must be in the local language(s)as well as in English.

“No trespass” signs should be posted at all principalentrances, in the lines of sight, and at all corners. Signsshould be legible under normal conditions at not lessthan 50 ft from the entry point. Signs should inform theentrant of the requirements (search of the person, vehi-cle, packages) or prohibitions (no smoking, matches,lighters) prescribed by the forest manager.

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Boundary markers can be simple signs placed along theperimeter of protected areas. Example is a U.S. NationalPark Service boundary marker, Washington, DC.

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● Parking lots and structures● Log yards, heavy equipment lots, and maintenance

depots.

In appropriate settings, a fence7:

● Gives notice of legal boundary of the outermostlimits of a facility

● Assists in controlling and screening authorizedentries into a secured area by deterring entry else-where along the boundary

● Supports surveillance, detection, assessment, andother security functions by providing a zone forinstalling intrusion detection equipment

● Deters casual intruders from penetrating a securedarea by presenting a barrier that requires an overtaction to enter

● Demonstrates the intent of intruders by theirovert action to gain entry

● Delays obtaining access to a facility, thereby increas-ing the possibility of detection

● Creates a psychological deterrent● Reduces the number of security guards required

and frequency of use for each post● Optimizes the use of security personnel while

enhancing the capabilities for detection and appre-hension of unauthorized individuals

● Demonstrates corporate concern for facilitysecurity

● Provides a cost-effective method of protectingfacilities.8

Both gates and fences attract thieves and vandals.Replacing stolen gates, fence posts, and netting is aheadache for forest managers. Nevertheless, damage tophysical barriers should be anticipated and budgeted inthe security plan. The possibility or even likelihood thatbarriers may be damaged does not mean that they shouldnot be tried. The psychological and symbolic messages

7 Based on Chain Link Fence Manufacturers Institute SecurityFencing Recommendations, http://www.associationsites.com/page.cfm?usr=clfma&pageid=887

8 Fencing can range from high-security grill to cost-effectivechain-link. The term to describe the materials used to constructfences is “fabric.” The most common type of physical barrier forperimeter control is chain-link fencing, often installed with barbed-wire outriggers. It is flexible, relatively inexpensive, and easy toinstall around any size and shape of structure/security zone.

Figure 4.3 Chain gate. A mere chain across a forestroad indicates the owner’s concern and can help detercasual theft.

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sent by the deployment of defensive measures can jus-tify the attempt (figure 4.3).

Although fences commonly are used to protect forestsfrom animal browsing or grazing, fences are not verypractical for excluding human beings. Perimeter fencingseldom is realistic or appropriate for large forest areas.Small plantations, nurseries, equipment landings, andother facilities are more likely candidates for protectionby fences. As discussed elsewhere in this report, gates aremore amenable than fences to be being made theft- andvandal-proof, particularly if strategically placed on ter-rain on which off-road access is restricted.

Perimeter gates. Gates can be integral to perimeterfences or can be positioned across roads, trails, andother sites in which their circumvention is difficult(figure 4.4). Forest companies should consider the fol-lowing requirements for perimeter gate integrity:

● The number of perimeter gates designated foractive use should be kept to the absolute mini-mum required for operations. Forest companiesshould construct sufficient entrances to accom-modate the operational requirements and ensureadequate lighting at egress and ingress points.

● Gates should be of a material, and installed toprovide protection, equivalent to the perimeterbarriers of which they are a part.

● The space between the bottom edge of the gate andthe pavement or firm ground should not exceed2 in (5.08 cm).

Perimeter fencing seldom is realistic or appropriate forlarge forest areas

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● All entry gates should be locked and secured orguarded at all times, or should have an effectiveentry detection alert system.

● Gates over 6 ft (1.83 m) in height should havelocks at the top and bottom to ensure that the gatecannot be pried open a sufficient distance toenable unauthorized entry.

● Vehicular gates should be set well back from thepublic highway or access road so that temporarydelays caused by identification control checks atthe gate will not unduly impede traffic.

● Sufficient space should be provided at the gate toallow for spot checks, inspections, searches, andtemporary parking of vehicles without impedingtraffic.

● At least one vehicle gate should be provided perenclosure to permit entry of emergency vehiclesand heavy equipment. This gate should be at least14 ft (4.3 m) wide.

● Forest companies employing a security force canprovide a security guard house at the site perime-ter for permanently staffed gates.

● Fenced facilities that employ electronic card accesssystems should consider configuring the mainentrance gate with an automated entry controlsystem with closed circuit television (CCTV) topermit visual assessment and record vehicle licensenumbers.

For unattended/inactive gates, forest companiesshould consider the following requirements:

● Unstaffed gates should be securely locked at alltimes. Hardened chains and padlocks with keyretention features should be used to secure thegates.9 Security lighting should be provided todeter tampering during darkness.

● Perimeter intrusion-detection systems (PIDS)and CCTV are appropriate to meet identifiedrisk control requirements when the gate is notunder the direct visual observation and control ofa security officer.

● A decommissioned road should be dug up orbermed on the inside of the gate to prevent vehic-ular access.

Vehicle barriers. Barriers capable of stopping movingvehicles include chain-link fences reinforced with cable,reinforced concrete, pipe bollards, planters, ditches,and berms (figures 4.5, 4.6). To stop moving vehicles,Jersey barriers and planters must be anchored in theground. The cables in the reinforced fence also must beanchored in the ground or partially buried.

Clear zones. Clear zones are areas set aside so that anunobstructed area is maintained on both sides to makeconcealing a potential intruder more difficult. Clear zones

9 Key retention means that the key cannot be retracted from thepadlock when the shackle is open.

Figure 4.4 Locked gate with stop sign. For a moreheavily trafficked road or for more vulnerable areas, a moresubstantial gate and lock is justified.

Figure 4.5 Vehicle barriers of forest byproducts asgate. Many forestry byproducts can be used to create vehi-cle barriers. Stumps, logs, and/or large rocks can be placedstrategically near entrance gates. Byproducts also can beused to protect assets within the forest by creating peri-meter barriers around them.

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can be particularly useful in connection with surveillanceoperations around selected potential targets and high-value resources. Fences should be constructed so that,whenever practical, they provide exterior and interiorclear zones of 20 ft (6 m) or more. The clear zone shouldbe free of any object or feature that would offer conceal-ment, such as a physical structure or parking area; or thatcould facilitate unauthorized access, such as an overhang-ing tree limb. When a clear zone is not practical, othercompensatory measures may be necessary to controlaccess to secured areas. Appropriate supplemental protec-tive measures include increasing the height of portions ofthe fence, providing increased lighting, CCTV surveil-lance cameras monitored from a remote location, instal-lation of intrusion-detection sensors, and security patrols.

Surveillance and Deterrence

Forest managers must decide how the range of securitymanagement tools—guard forces, intrusion detection,and surveillance—can function as an integrated securitysystem. These components are referred to as counter-measures. They encompass physical, electronic, opera-tional, and procedural interventions that reduceidentified vulnerabilities of assets to an acceptable ormanageable level as dictated by senior managers andoften the risk manager. The two basic approaches tocountermeasures are:

1. Reactive. This is the predominant mode of responseto illegal logging. Action is prompted by immedi-ate issues in which illegal operations have occurredor are occurring and the suspects, if present, arepotentially threatening.

2. Proactive. Preferably, systems are in place toanticipate problems. Surveillance and patrols

are programmed for high-riskareas that have a history orincreased likelihood of illegalactivity. The objective of sur-veillance is to detect emergingthreats before crimes can takeplace. Ideally, threat monitoringis designed to provide sufficientwarning and notification toresponsible authorities in timeto enable meaningful deterrentresponse. The desired result islayers of protection and poten-

tial warning designed to provide opportunity toreact (box 4.1).

The routine presence and activity of forest manage-ment staff in the forest is the most basic and probablymost reliable form of protection against timber theft.The activity of forestry staff conducting inventories,maintaining infrastructure, observing operations, andconducting research, and all of their other myriad rou-tine tasks not specifically connected to security sends themessage that a forest is owned, controlled, and managedand is not freely available to criminal intrusion.

Unfortunately, the common standard is for forestrystaff to be office-bound and inadequately equippedwith transport, communications, and other basic fieldequipment. Ensuring presence in the forest is anotherfundamental connection between the general quality ofresource management and protection that cannot beoveremphasized. In many countries, “forest guards”used to be synonymous with “forest rangers.” Theywere the stewards of the forest who managed and pro-tected their ranges. However, in an increasing numberof jurisdictions, the concept of all-encompassing “stew-ardship” is being lost or weakened as a result of a moveaway from the “territorial” model of forest manage-ment to the “functional” model. At the operationallevel, increasing functional specialization causes forestofficers to concentrate solely on their specific responsi-bilities and priorities and ignore other issues.10

10 This shift is occurring at two levels. At the institutional level,responsibility for forest management is changing from the one-agency model (forestry department) to a multiagency model inwhich different agencies have separate (or overlapping and compet-ing) responsibilities for different aspects of forest management(inventory, sustained yield, contracts, biodiversity, timber sales,planning, and monitoring).

Large logs Boulders

Figure 4.6 Vehicle barriers of forest byproducts at each end of gate.Installing barriers on the sides of gates restricts traffic from going around gates.

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.Ensuring presence in the forest is another fundamentalconnection between the general quality of resourcemanagement and protection that cannot be overemphasized

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As a consequence, agencies and officers often seepoaching and illegal logging as “someone else’s” respon-sibility. The single-agency control and territorial mod-els of forest management are not necessarily appropriatefor all circumstances. Nevertheless, it is necessary forroles and responsibilities to be clearly defined at boththe institutional and work unit (FMU) levels. No forestofficer or staff should ignore any signs of illegal activity.At a minimum, every forest officer should be motivatedand able to at least report such signs to the responsibleauthority. The public should be able to see all forestofficers as defenders of good (legitimate) forest man-agement, not as being unconcerned about, or complicitin, illegal activity.

Forest officers often are the first line of informationand defense against illegal logging, so it is imperativethat they clearly understand their roles and are properlytrained and equipped. To confront potential or actualillegal operators, they need to have certain skills andpreparation. These include the capacity to collect evi-dence, so that subsequent legal procedures do not col-lapse due to faulty evidence. Most importantly, forestofficers need skills in negotiation and dispute resolutionand in dealing with potentially threatening people. Inmany jurisdictions, forest officers do not carry armsand have no arrest powers. They must be trained inknowing when they must call armed police or securitywith arrest powers. Higher level training is required forjurisdictions in which forest officers do have arms andpowers of arrest.

In many jurisdictions, forest officers are not ade-quately paid or resourced to carry out their duties, orare paid so poorly that they feel forced or entitled tosupplement their incomes through participating in ille-gal operations. Forest guards—whether forest officersor security contractors—must be paid enough to resistthe temptation of illicit activities. Serious action andheavy penalties must be applied to any officers who dobecome involved in illegal operations.

Security forces. In many countries, concessionairesand logging contractors may employ private securityguards. Whether on a contracted or in-house basis, spe-cialized security can be a major expense. It also canintroduce many new risks and a need for continuousmanagement attention and oversight. Where the needfor specialized security cannot be avoided, it may be nec-essary to re-evaluate the entire feasibility of sustainableforest management, so that recourse to armed guardscan be seen as a protection measure of last resort.

Untrained, unqualified, and poorly supervised guardforces in forestry have been associated with seriousabuses of local communities and with complicity incriminal activity.11 Specialized expertise is needed toproperly contract and manage these kinds of securityoperations and to ensure compliance with local lawsand requirements and international standards. Suchexpertise is especially necessary if security contractorsor staff are to be armed (box 4.3).

Some duties of a private security guard and a forestguard, such as monitoring and detecting violations,may overlap. However, with meticulous planning andcommunication, this duplication can strengthen effortsto deter or prevent theft of timber and other forestproducts and protect the assets of each entity. Requiredskills may include performing routine forest sector ortimber harvesting inspection and patrol procedures;investigation techniques; detecting, recording, andreporting illegal activities; collecting and preserving evi-dence; monitoring forest crime to develop trends andidentify problem areas; sharing intelligence; and safelycontacting a forest visitor or violator. Where employed,security forces can provide the enforcement element inthe physical-security program consisting of personnelspecifically trained, organized, and equipped to protectthe forest.

Security should be deployed to provide coverage tothe most vulnerable areas and assets of the forest com-pany. Patrols can be set up to check boundary lines,especially in isolated areas and remote facilities. Due tothe areas that must be covered, aerial patrols from hel-icopter or fixed-wing airplanes may be justified. If theprotected area includes large bodies of water, rivers, orcoastline, boat patrols can be used.

Security patrols will:

● Detect, report, and respond to trespass and theft● Monitor critical parts of the forest property on a

routine but random basis

11 For a discussion of related issues, see Colchester and others2006. See also UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force andFirearms by Law Enforcement Officials 1990, http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Police/5._Reference_Documents/s._Basic_Principles_Use_Force_Firearms_by_Law_Enforce_Officials.asp),and UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Police/5._Reference_Documents/p._Code_of_Conduct_for_Law_Enforcement_Officials.asp. See alsoKoenraad Van Brabant 2000.

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Box 4.3 Firearms

Risk is inherent in protecting public land assets andprivate assets, employees, and the public in remoteareas, in which criminal activity may include violence.Therefore, it is important to consider whether for-est and private security guards should be equippedwith firearms. Country laws may allow or restrict pri-vate security companies, or even forest guards, fromcarrying firearms. However, if firearms are allowed,it is extremely important that the use-of-force laws areclearly understood. Carrying a firearm is not intendedto force compliance with a law but rather to protectthe security guard or enforcement office when hisor her life or the life of another is threatened. It isessential for FMU managers to define in writing poli-cies toward the carrying and use of firearms by thoseinvolved in forest protection and timber harvestingoperations on public lands.a

Poor training and lack of understanding of the pur-pose and legal use of force associated with a firearmor any other defensive protection equipment canresult in misuse, such as displaying a firearm to geta violator to obey the law, or further violence andinjury. Arming security forces also can lead to seriousabuses, such as protecting those engaged in timbertheft or prohibiting public access to public lands. Onceany such abuse is suspected or reported, immediateresponse is required to stop the unwanted activity.Contract clauses for private security guards shouldprovide for immediate suspension of contract activityuntil the breach of contract is resolved or, if the mis-use of a firearm was serious, the contract is cancelled.Situations involving reported misuse of firearms bya public land management agency or police agencycharged with enforcing forestry laws should be han-dled through an investigation conducted by an inde-pendent source such as another police agency. Theforest officer(s) or police officer(s) charged with mis-use of firearms should be removed temporarily fromenforcement duties until the matter is thoroughlyinvestigated.

Note:a. For references to research the use of force in law enforcement,see Adams 1999.

● Investigate illegal activities by conducting fieldinvestigations and gathering evidence

● Conduct undercover operations for intelligenceand prosecution

● Monitor staff, contractors, and visitors by usingintrusion-detection devices and satellite imageryto identify and detect threats and breaches in theintegrated security plan.

Satellite imagery. “Satellite imagery can detect indi-rect evidence of illegal logging activities, such as roads orillegal log-yards; or direct evidence, such as clear cuts orintensive selective logging in prohibited or unallocatedareas [figure 4.7]. Analysis of time-sequenced satelliteimagery can provide clear indications of the level ofactivity in specific places.” (World Bank 2000) Satel-lite imagery is used as a security tool in the forestindustry to:

● Most important, collect data remotely● Enable visual overview of forest companies’

properties● Identify boundary lines if marked appropriately● Identify roads, access points, buildings, and

equipment● Show where logging, legal and illegal, is taking place● Document infractions● Record objective evidence suitable for court● Prioritize and monitor operations● Identify start-up fires

Figure 4.7 Satellite images of forests. Roads, loglandings, and skid trails can be readily seen on satellite images.Cambodia.

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It is necessary for roles and responsibilities to beclearly defined at both the institutional and work unit(FMU) levels

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● Readily communicate findings to all relevantparties

● Accurately dispatch response forces to remote areasusing GPS coordinates.

Satellite imagery seldom is available on a frequency orcost basis that permits real-time dispatching of responsesto ongoing illegal activity, even if it can be identified.However, there have been cases of large-scale illegallogging involving road construction, log landings, andmills that have been identified from remote imagery(chapter 6) Most often, use of satellite imagery in tim-ber theft prevention will be restricted to planning andrisk assessment.

Other technologies. Wireless/video surveillance sys-tems are designed for remote applications and can beeither covert or overt. They operate using batteries andsolar power and transmit video over single or multi-channel formats. The systems provide rapid deploymentto target areas, scalability, and secure data transmission.

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) assists in deter-rence, surveillance, apprehension, and prosecution.Industry “best practices” add CCTV applications tocorporate integrated security systems. The latest digitalvideo recorder software delivers an intelligent surveil-lance solution. This new technology can be integratedwith a company’s legacy CCTV equipment or can takefull advantage of communications technologies todeliver software-based camera switching and control aswell as digital recording. Automatic cameras, such asthose used in wildlife surveys, also can be deployed.While these systems do not directly prevent theft, bypossibly heightening the risk of detection, arrest, andpunishment, they may be deterrents. To maximizedeterrence, the FMU may want to publicize the pres-ence of cameras and surveillance equipment.12

Video analytics, also known as IVS (intelligent videosurveillance), is an emerging market for security thatenables its users to easily monitor and secure areas withsecurity cameras. With this new state-of-the-art tech-nology, logging operations easily can monitor high-riskareas with sophisticated software that makes detectingthreats and trespassers simple and effective.

Using IVS, a logging operation can protect its phys-ical boundaries by layering in virtual barriers based onits safety and security policies. When a breach occurs,

the incident can be shared in real time with first respon-ders. This technology can monitor the route of loggingequipment or trucks, specific logs, and people in andaround the logging site.

For example, a person may be loitering in an areaor a truck may stop at a log sort during odd hours.This software will issue alerts via onscreen audio/visual notifications and text messages, thus enhanc-ing response time, as well as record a video of the inci-dent for future review.

IVS allows a logging site to improve situational aware-ness by providing proactive security for the exteriorperimeter and interior operational areas without imped-ing normal business operations. The technology setsrules that monitor the movement of vehicles, objects,and people into and around the logging site. It identifies,classifies, and tracks vehicles, objects and people, andthen automatically detects activities that violate therules. It also enables tripwires to be set at openings in theperimeter fence or around assets that require additionalprotection. If there is no fence, the software can create avirtual fence. The end result is more efficient security atreduced expense and enhanced protection against un-authorized entry of people and vehicles.

12 See also British Security Industry Association 2006.

Figure 4.8 Railway track trespass. Monitor showstrespass into a restricted area. The pan tilt zoom (PTZ)cameras will track the individual’s movement and locationuntil a response force arrives.

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the surrounding agricultural fringes are poor and vul-nerable. Rural communities dependent on forests forenvironmental services and for income can play a keyrole in sustainable forestry and discouraging conflicttimber incidents. Because rural individuals live in prox-imity to forests, they likely will have high-quality infor-mation about activities occurring in them (Thompsonand Kanaan 2003, 31).

One extension of the Integrated Conservation andDevelopment Project (ICDP) approach (discussed laterin this chapter) is called “social fencing,” an innovativeand highly effective form of perimeter security andactivity control. Social fencing makes local people theeyes and ears of forest owners (figure 4.11). In socialfencing, local peoples voluntarily protect forests withno enforcement. This system greatly enhances the secu-rity of a forest management district and prevents theentry of wildlife poachers and illegal logging.

Social fencing can transform indigenous forest prac-tices. For example, villagers have been transformedfrom timber thieves into forest protectors. Social fenc-ing can be either active or passive:

● Active. Village-based teams go into the forestactively looking for wildlife poachers and illegalloggers. This approach involves planning patrols,selecting and training villagers, establishing pro-tocols for intervention and response, and settingup reporting and record-keeping systems. Partic-ipation in patrols could be based on individualwages, on benefits provided in cash or kind to thecommunity at large, or both.

Figure 4.10 Airport. Corporate Security also can buildvirtual barriers based on characteristics such as height,speed, direction, and time. When a security violation occurs(vehicle stopped by fence for too long, and the boat travel-ing toward the airport foreshore), the PTZ cameras automat-ically track the violations and send alerts to the guard force.

Figure 4.11 Social fencing. Local women are mobilizedto guard the Periyar Tiger Reserve, India.

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Figure 4.9 Port facility. Corporate Security builds vir-tual barriers (orange outline) using software that automati-cally detects potential security breaches (boat in green), andthen shows the location and close-up of the boat with PTZcameras.

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IVS can be integrated with Automatic License PlateRecognition. ALPR is an image-processing technologyused to identify vehicles by their license plates, driversthrough facial recognition, and loads on the vehicles byload tags (chapter 5).

Social fencing. Due to the topography and lack ofroads in many forest areas, conventional layers of pro-tection such as perimeter security including fences andgates often are impractical and prohibitively expensive.The majority of the people who occupy forest areas or

In many forest areas, conventional layers of protectionare impractical and prohibitively expensive

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● Passive. Passive social fencing involves generationof understanding and a high level of acceptanceand commitment by local people to a set of secu-rity goals and objectives. Based on their awarenessof these, community members are expected to bealert to security risks and violations that theymight observe during their everyday activities.A passive social fencing system would provideawareness training broadly throughout the com-munity, establish reporting mechanisms andresponse protocols, and provide incentives forparticipation. For example, a villager notes atruckload of logs going by the village in the wrongdirection. The villager does not necessarily per-sonally intervene but quickly passes the intelli-gence to forestry officials to follow up.

Enabling indigenous people to share in the benefitsas well as the management of forest development andcommercialization alleviates poverty and diversifiessources of income. In practice, one of the most com-pelling reasons for using social fencing to manage for-est resources has been governments’ inability to policeforest areas effectively and enforce their own rules ofaccess and use without local public support. When localcommunities and private companies share in thedesign, benefits, costs, and management responsibilitiesof forestry projects, they have incentives to cooperate inenforcing rules to which they themselves have agreed.

A great deal of experience and thinking has gone intoexploring the problems and possibilities of combin-ing attention to local community development withforestry conservation, particularly in regard to parksand protected areas management. Integrated Conserva-tion and Development Projects (ICDPs) build on thebasic idea of employing local communities to protectresources. ICDPs emphasize attending to the subsis-tence needs and economic opportunities of the com-munity that do not interfere with protecting naturalresources. The ICDP approach, which is well docu-mented elsewhere,13 relies on:

1. Participatory approaches2. Working collaboratively with communities to

identify nondamaging uses of forest resources

3. Reaching agreements on land-use zoning4. Developing alternative livelihood options.

These approaches can be relevant to both protectionand production management. They ought to be docu-mented in management planning and recognized ascomponents of a protection strategy.

Checkpoints. Once theft has occurred, checkpointsalong transport routes are a fallback to attempt to captureillegal loggers. Checkpoints do not require advanced andcostly technology. Case studies have demonstrated thatcheckpoints can be effective in detecting wood that hasbeen logged, or is being transported, illegally (box 4.4).

Both stationary and mobile checks can be consid-ered. The checkpoints can be set up on an owner’s orlessee’s property, or on local government- or state-owned roads. Similar checkpoints can be established forlogs transported by water. Some checkpoints are estab-lished at highway scales. On private or leased land, thecheckpoints usually are staffed by either contract orproprietary security.

For checkpoints to be effective, they must be operated24 hours a day, have laws that prohibit the movement oftimber at night, or physically block the access of a vehi-cle through the checkpoint when it is not operating.

Conclusion

While completely controlling trespass in large andremote forest areas may not be possible, it is central toprevent timber theft and secure the forest asset. The keypoints in this chapter are that, rather than ignoringthreats and vulnerabilities, forest managers can turn toa number of useful concepts, practices, and technolo-gies to bar criminal trespass. These range from postinglow-cost signs and notices to decommissioning roadsand trails, and from developing social fencing arrange-ments to installing the most modern surveillance tech-nologies. As introduced in preceding chapters, a centraltheme is that theft is predictable based on careful analy-sis, and analysis can identify meaningful responses andmitigation measures. After discussion in the next chap-ter of analogous issues in the management of timbertransactions, chapter 6 discusses security planningapproaches that can lead to integrated security plansand programs.13 See, for example, Chape 2001; Wells and others 1999.

Theft is predictable based on careful analysis, andanalysis can identify meaningful responses and mitigation measures

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Box 4.4 Examples of checkpoints

MozambiqueOne of the most important elements of the forest con-trol system in Mozambique is the roadside checkpointsbetween the logging sites and the major ports and cities.At the checkpoints, government controllers check tim-ber volumes by category and track licensing compliance(registered volumes also are used for tax collection pur-poses). When possible, the work of these fixed check-points is complemented by mobile patrols.

A new law forbids the circulation of large trucks at night.The major checkpoints coincide with police posts sooperate 24 hours. Persons transporting forest productsduring the night are halted by the police, are fined imme-diately, and undergo additional controls/investigation.

Weigh stations function as checkpoints. APRIL weighstation.

However, in remote areas, due to lack of equipment andhuman resources, road checkpoints are staffed only duringthe day. Plans are being made to have all checkpoints work-ing 24 hours and, in the absence of forest law enforcerson the checkpoints, to delegate forest law enforcementauthority to any official agent (customs or police officer).

EcuadorVigilancia Verde (Green Surveillance) was created inEcuador in 2000 by a coalition of the National Police,National Defense Ministry, Ministry of Environment,and five NGOs. Vigilancia Verde is a supervisory bodyresponsible for controlling the transport of timberbetween the forest and processing and marketing loca-tions. Thirteen fixed road checkpoints and 7 mobilecontrol points are being established. Each is formed by1 representative from the forest authority, 1 from civilsociety, and 2 from the police. These teams operate 24 hours. Their members periodically are reassigned toother control points. The system is funded by a trust thatreceives 50 percent of the sale value of the timber thatis detected, confiscated, and auctioned.

This scheme has already demonstrated its effective-ness. In its first year, the volume of timber seized wasnearly 600 percent more than that seized by the gov-ernment during the previous year (Contreras-Hermosillaand Vargas Rios 2002). When a computerized link wascreated for the whole chain, the possibility to tracklicense compliance online resulted in twice the volumeof illegal timber being retained.

Source: FAO 2005.

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Securing Timber Transactions:Technologies and Systems

Gerald L. Stuckey and William B. Magrath

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This chapter considers methods and systems toensure the integrity of timber transactions inwhich commercial sales are part of the planned

management program. Fraud and corruption in timbertransactions are serious problems that can threaten theviability of timber enterprises and entire forestry sec-tors. Harvests and sales are the bases of the silviculturalsustainability of commercial management. Theft orcorrupt manipulation can endanger the forest, reduceeconomic returns to the landowner (private or public),reduce public confidence in the value and integrity offorest management, and introduce criminal behaviorinto wood-based industries and stolen material into thewood supply chain.

Timber transactions can be corrupted in at least asmany ways as there are systems for land and timberallocation, harvesting, and log sales. Wood volumes,unit values, species, grades, and qualities can be misrep-resented. Illicitly harvested wood can be commingled insupply chains. Costs can be inflated, bids manipulated,and taxes evaded. Timber theft includes underpaymentbased on un- or under-reported volume, underpay-ment based on misgrading or species misidentification,and manipulation of bids. Timber transactions subjectto abuse and manipulation range from small sales of firewood and building materials to local users to the award of long-term concession rights by publicagencies. All involve risks of some form of misrepre-sentation or deception with the intent of depriving the resource owner of some of the value of the timberharvest.

To control the corruption of timber transactions,two challenges face forest managers: to build and main-tain honest and ethical workplaces and operations, and

to establish and maintain robust procedures for theconduct of timber transactions. To provide an overviewof these issues, this chapter begins by describing fraudand corruption as general concepts and as they occurspecifically in timber-based operations. The discus-sion describes the fraud triangle, a modification of themeans, motive, and opportunity model (chapter 2) usedspecifically to understand the occurrence of fraud.

Many of the general preventive measures available torespond to risks of fraud are similar to those recom-mended to reduce corruption. Together these are thenext subjects of this chapter. The discussion then turnsto four main classes of abuse and crime that frequentlypervert timber sales: (1) collusion and deception in tim-ber sale contracting; (2) misrepresentation and decep-tion in pricing, valuation, measurement, and other salesprovisions; (3) physical theft or diversion of materialduring transport; and (4) fraudulent sales (misrepre-sentation and sale of stolen logs and wood). For each ofthese potential forms of timber theft, the chapterreviews prevention techniques used in the private andpublic sectors to address risks of fraud and corruptionin typical timber sales systems.

Forest unit managers may find the security checklist(annex 5.1) valuable. By reviewing operations on a yesor no basis, managers can quickly see the areas that maybe vulnerable. Managers may need to pay closer atten-tion to these flags or indicators. The security checklistalso covers other nontimber-harvesting security issues.

Fraud in Timber Transactions

Timber theft can occur in various forms, but the resultis always the same: loss of timber or money properly

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belonging to the landowner or timber enterprise. Thereare two types of theft: robbery and fraud. Robbery istaking another’s possessions by force. Its prevention isgenerally a matter of controlling access (chapter 4).Fraud is theft by trick, deception, or misrepresentation;or crimes of opportunity, false statements, or confi-dence. Employee embezzlement, employee kickbacks,vendor fraud, and customer fraud are kinds of fraud.1

Fraud is a process of deception and opportunity; itsmost important ingredient is confidence. Unless oneperson has confidence in another person, fraud cannothappen.

In most legal systems, “fraud” per se is not a crime.Although not a crime of violence in itself, fraud can be an integral aspect of a number of crimes and can bethought of as a class of methods by which other crimes,including theft, are committed.2 Essentially, fraud istrickery. Two basic categories of fraud exist. Internalfraud is committed by employees and officers of organ-izations. External fraud is committed by organizationsagainst individuals, by individuals against organiza-tions, by organizations against organizations, and byindividuals against individuals. Fraud can range fromminor employee theft and unproductive behavior tomisappropriation of assets and fraudulent financialreporting.3

Fraud TriangleThe fraud triangle consists of opportunity, pressure, andrationalization (figure 5.1). This triangle is useful tounderstand the origins of fraud and to develop strate-gies to identify specific threats and vulnerabilities aspart of a prevention and deterrence program.

A variety of pressures or motivations can lead tofraudulent behavior. Financial pressures can includepersonal debt, medical bills, living beyond one’s means,greed, drug addiction, extramarital affairs, or gambling.Nonfinancial pressures include job dissatisfaction,feeling overlooked for promotion, fear of job loss, orwanting to challenge the system. In many developingcountries, the compensation systems for public forestryagencies traditionally have been designed around theexpectation that staff will supplement their official

salaries by diverting public resources to personal use.Financial pressures that lead to fraud may not beentirely personal in their origin. Forestry agencies insome countries are severely deprived of official andlegitimate budget sources. Consequently, managersmay resort to developing parallel budget systems basedon diversion of revenues to support reasonable, butunofficial and otherwise unsupported, agency expenses.These diversions, which themselves frequently are ille-gal, are executed surreptitiously. Without transparencyand disclosure, they can become subject to deepeningabuse and distortion.

The second leg of the fraud triangle is rationalization.Fraud typically evolves from routine activities thatbecome distorted and misused. As participants tran-sition from pursuing their formal, expected, andlegitimate roles and responsibilities to fraudulentexploitation, they justify and rationalize their changingbehavior. Some of the most common rationalizationsare “I’ll pay the money back,” “I’m only borrowing it,”“They owe me,” “I need it more than the company,” “Itis a fringe benefit,” “Who am I hurting?” and “It didn’tseem dishonest.” Because organizations are faceless,they often are the targets of fraud. Potential fraudsterscan rationalize that corporations and governmentagencies are not being victimized by theft, or at least cansee them as not being important or morally relevantvictims.

Opportunity is the final leg of the fraud triangle.Opportunity for fraud requires individuals in theorganization to have access to assets, authority, andability to conduct transactions on behalf of the

1 Silverstone and Sheetz 2004.2 Specific fraud crimes can include mail fraud, and conspiracy to

defraud, computer fraud, bank fraud, and wire fraud. For a detailedlegal analysis, see Podgor 1999, 729–69.

3 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and others.

Figure 5.1 Fraud triangle.

Rationalization

Pressure Opportunity

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organization, as well as freedom from close supervision.In forestry organizations, it is common for individuals tooperate with great autonomy and independence. Forestareas are large and remote, making close and frequentsupervision impossible or impractical. 4 Logging opera-tions involve movement of large volumes of materiallong distances, with substantial scope for physical diver-sion, alteration of load documents, and other mischief.Many measurement systems widely used in forestryinvolve statistical methods, rough approximations, andcomplex formula. The potential for legitimate error builtinto these practices can conceal deceit and abuse.

Fraud Prevention and DeterrenceFraud risks can be reduced through prevention, deter-rence, and detection measures.5 Fraud can be difficultto detect because it involves concealment through fal-sification of documents or collusion among man-agement, employees, or third parties. Therefore, it isimportant to focus on prevention, reducing oppor-tunities for fraud to take place, and deterrence by per-suading individuals that there is a high probability ofdetection and punishment.6 Fraud prevention anddeterrence usually involve variations on three funda-mental elements: (1) creating and maintaining an organizational culture that values honesty and ethics; (2) evaluating the risks of fraud and implementation ofrisk mitigation processes, procedures, and controls; and(3) continuing vigilance from oversight processes anddesignated accountability mechanisms.

Organizational culture. A consistent theme of virtu-ally all asset protection and security advice is that gen-uine commitment and serious attention of seniormanagement and leadership are essential ingredients offraud prevention. Managers must send clear signals thatintegrity is valued. They can do this by setting goodexamples. Short cuts, exceptions to the rules, not askingtough questions, and closed-door policies that avoidthe awareness of problems encourage fraud. Some

managers get complacent in their duties; some areafraid of finding problems. Other managers are afraidthat fraud prevention measures will offend staff andclients.

To be both credible and effective, management com-mitment must be demonstrated in concrete actions thatinfluence the organization’s operations. These actionscan include preparation and implementation ofexplicit, written security policies and plans (chapter 6),assignment of security functions to specific qualifiedstaff, provision of adequate resources and mandates,and an ongoing and serious interest in the securityprogram.

Development of an ethical organizational culturealso depends on recruiting and hiring honest employees.Background checks, checking references, and followingup on why a potential employee left previous employ-ment are basic steps that are often ignored. Employeesshould be made aware at the beginning of their employ-ment that honesty is expected and that, in the event ofdishonesty, sanctions will be applied. Staff training onethics and security awareness is another device to deterfraud and corruption. Training also should emphasizered flags, security awareness, and how to report fraud-ulent activities. Employees sometimes get complacentand think that fraud cannot happen around them.Security should be a frequent discussion topic to keepit on the minds of everyone.

Organizational arrangements and structuring of jobresponsibilities are other important components oforganizational culture. Separation of responsibilities isan important organizational principle. Functions suchas financial recordkeeping and reporting should be seg-regated from physical custody and protection of assets.Separating production and financial responsibilitiesreduces the opportunity for collusion among employ-ees. It also enables greater reliance on comparison offinancial and production data and reports as indica-tions of asset losses and theft. Job rotation is anothermanagement device to reduce fraud. Employees shouldphysically move to different job sites and functions, andsupervisory personnel should rotate to avoid opportu-nities for collusion, such as might develop betweenscalers and truck drivers or loggers.

The difficulties and challenges of developing ethicalorganizational cultures in forestry organizations cannot be trivialized or dismissed. The recognized extent ofthe illegal logging problem is a clear indication ofdeeply entrenched and longstanding moral and ethical

4 For an interesting discussion of how the bureaucratic culture ofthe U.S. Forest Service helps to overcome these risks, see Kaufman1960.

5 This section draws especially on American Institute of CertifiedPublic Accountants and others.

6 Although the terms are related, specialists in fraud distinguishbetween “prevention” and “deterrence.” Prevention implies remov-ing the root cause of a problem. Deterrence is the modification ofbehavior through the threat of sanctions. See Wells 2002.

Genuine commitment and serious attention of seniormanagement and leadership are essential ingredientsof fraud prevention

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weaknesses in forestry. Some of the problems of illegallogging arise outside of natural resource managementorganizations, but significant problems exist withinthem. To deter fraud, punishment of offenders is nec-essary but demanding and difficult in organizationswithout traditions of discipline and accountability.However, not prosecuting and punishing perpetratorssends a very clear and destructive message to others.The need for self-aware leadership prepared to confrontinternal challenges and risks can not be overstated.

Risk evaluation. Managers should be proactive inreducing fraud opportunities by identifying fraud risksand vulnerabilities in their organizations. Experiencedand observant managers usually will be aware of secu-rity and fraud problems, and may have detailed knowl-edge and information. In some cases, special audits,possibly conducted with outside advisors or consult-ants, will be needed. In any case, managers have theresponsibility to establish and monitor their organiza-tions’ fraud risk-assessment and prevention activities.Managers should consider the organizational, indus-trial, and country-specific characteristics that influencethe risk of fraud. Risk assessment efforts should beappropriate to the size and complexity of the organiza-tion, but must recognize that fraud can occur in organi-zations of any size or type.7

Fraud detection relies heavily on the capacity toidentify deviations from what is normal. “Exceptionreports” or “red flags” (chapter 2) are the standard toolsused to identify possible fraudulent activity. Their useis dependent on the forest management units’ (FMUs)establishing and maintaining standard operatingprocedures for routine transactions. Defining propersystems for bidding, timber sales, transport documen-tation, and other elements of the harvest and salesprocess should enable the FMU to detect discrepancies,deviations, or exceptions that could reveal fraud. Inmany developing country forestry operations, proce-dures are consistently ad hoc. Documentation andreporting systems and practices are not standardized,and rights and authorities are so vague and overlappingthat determining whether a transaction has proceededproperly is virtually impossible (box 5.1).

Proper physical controls and audits are essentialthroughout the timber sale process and supply chain.

The weaknesses in many security systems are the lack ofreconciliation of documents along the forest manage-ment, timber harvest, transport, and delivery chain.Data is collected at various points––tree marking, scal-ing in forest, scaling and grading at second landing(stamping point), transport documents, and eventuallydelivery documents at the wood processing plant. How-ever, seldom is this documentation reconciled, and tim-ber thieves and smugglers are free to commit fraudcrime with little chance of discovery or apprehension.

Owners and employers must provide an easymethod to report timber theft and other fraudulentactivities. Ethics hotlines for staff and the public toreport unethical or suspicious behavior should beestablished, publicized, and monitored. Internal audi-tors uncover only a small percentage of fraud, but tipsfrom the concerned public and jealous individualsoften uncover deceptive activities. Mechanisms for theconfidential submission of allegations and informationneed to be designed to fit local circumstance. Means can

7 For details, see American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-tants and others.

Box 5.1 Documentation and reconciliation

Documents easily can be forged to fabricate an ille-gal load. If data is not recorded or is recorded incor-rectly at one point in the chain, the entire paper trailis compromised. Without strict adherence to thesecontrols, illegal timber very easily can be introducedin the supply chain and become indistinguishablefrom legitimate timber.

To tighten documentation and reconciliation, timbertheft prevention planners should ask:

1. Is the system commercially robust? Has all crit-ical information been collected? Is data collec-tion well engineered? Well monitored?

2. Are the data or information reconciled? Areexception reports being generated?

3. Are the data/exception report data easilyaccessible to all involved?

4. Is the report easily readable? Does it highlightcritical information?

5. What actions are taken on red flags generatedfrom the reports? Who undertakes the initialinvestigations? How do stakeholders knowwhether red flags are being investigated?

The weaknesses in many security systems are the lackof reconciliation of documents along the forest man-agement, timber harvest, transport, and delivery chain

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range from advertisement ofspecial telephone numbers or addresses for mailed submissionsto designation of ombudsman or other officials. Input must remain confidential and theinformant’s identity kept secretuntil the calls are completelyinvestigated.

Oversight. To effectively pre-vent or deter fraud on an on-going basis, an appropriateoversight function must be inplace. Oversight can be per-formed by many within andoutside the entity. Oversight ar-rangements for public agenciestypically will be established bylaw and can include inspectors-general, anticorruption andaudit agencies, and legislativebodies. In private firms, over-sight mechanisms can include the audit committee orboard of directors, management, internal auditors,external independent auditors, and certified fraud ex-aminers. Cameras and video systems, which can beovert or covert, can be part of an integrated oversightsystem (figure 5.2).

Corruption Prevention and DeterrenceCorruption is related to fraud in that both involve adegree of deception and abuse of trust. Corruption canusefully be considered abuse of office for personal gain.8

Unlike fraud, it is a general class of crime that is explicitlycriminalized by law. It covers many activities and abuses,including bribery, embezzlement, extortion, abuse of dis-cretion, and nepotism. Corruption is most often asso-ciated with public officials but can involve privateindividuals. It sometimes is classified as grand or pettycorruption. Grand corruption is corruption at the high-est levels of government. Petty corruption can involve theexchange of large or very small amounts of money, minorfavors, or the employment of friends and relatives. Granddistorts the basic functions of government, while pettycorruption is part of the “normal” governance and social

framework. Most cases of corruption subject to preven-tion at the FMU level will be in the petty corruption cat-egory. Grand corruption in forestry, such as the wholesalegranting of industrial logging concessions to speciallyfavored interests, may be more significant in terms ofaggregate damage to the sector, and involves remediesand controls beyond the control of forest managers per seand beyond the scope of this review.

Corruption prevention measures can be classified aseither social or situational, as in the typology of preven-tion measures discussed in chapter 2 (table 2.1).9 Socialanticorruption prevention is directed at general socialor economic factors. Its goal is to create conditions thatare less likely to produce or support corrupt practices.Most social prevention measures are concerned withraising awareness of corruption, mobilizing people torefrain from corrupt practices, and setting the standardthat integrity that is expected from those providingpublic services. Many of the social elements of anti-corruption programs are forms of empowerment thatprovide the public with opportunity and incentives foraction against corrupt officials.

Most of what is discussed in this section falls into the category of situational corruption prevention. It

8 This section draws heavily from UN Office on Drugs and Crime2004.

Figure 5.2 Low-cost covert camera system with lens. Cameras come ina wide variety of types and cost. From digital to night vision to time lapse to tele-scopic lens, an FMU manager has a complete selection from which to choose. Theone controlling factor is power supply.

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9 See UNODC 2004.

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concerns reducing the scope for corrupt behavior andintroducing internal processes and controls that in-crease risks of detection and sanction. These comprisefive main thrusts: regulating official discretion, reduc-ing procedural complexity, increasing transparency,changing employee culture and motivation and elimi-nating conflicts of interest and disclosing assets.

1. Regulating official discretion. In any organization,to provide enough discretion for officials to beeffective while ensuring that abuse is avoided, abalance is needed between efficiency and ac-countability. Typically, as discretion increases,accountability falls and corruption becomes eas-ier and more widespread. Conversely, corruptioncan be deterred or prevented with clear, con-sistent, and coherent decision-making criteria.These criteria reduce opportunities for abuse andincrease the likelihood that corrupt officials canbe held accountable. To control corruption,accountability structures must operate continu-ously and consistently.

2. Reducing procedural complexity. Overly complexprocedures raise the potential for corruption.Bureaucracies with too many layers, overly com-plex rules, and unclear lines for reporting andaccountability make it difficult to distinguishappropriate and corrupt conduct. Complex pro-cedures can hide corruption and decrease theeffectiveness of controls by making it difficult tohold individuals accountable. Complexity often isexacerbated by other factors, such as the lack oftraining and resources. This point is especially rel-evant in forestry, in which staff frequently arepoorly trained and under-equipped and in whichtechnical, social, and biological complexities areinherent. In such circumstances, losses, dis-crepancies, and other signs of theft or corruptioneasily can be blamed on legitimate errors and mis-takes, making it even more difficult to hold offi-cials accountable.

3. Increasing transparency. Transparency helps pre-vent corruption by reducing opportunities forcorrupt transactions to go undetected. Publicscrutiny based on transparency can lead to crim-inal, civil, and disciplinary actions and loss ofpolitical support. Transparency may be inter-nal, such as internal audit systems, or external.Transparency requires not only that the relevant

information be disclosed and accessible but alsothat the information be gathered and produced ina clear and easily understood format. Internally,transparency requires effective budgeting andauditing systems with access to information thatis accurate and sufficiently independent.

4. Changing employee culture and motivation, andcreating positive incentives. The culture and mo-tivation of officials matter for corruption pr-evention programs. Where corrupt values andpractices are institutionalized, officials and staffresist reforms, greater transparency, and otheraccountability mechanisms. Officials with lowstandards of living are more easily tempted bybribes or other benefits of corruption. Lowsalaries and living standards also are commonlyassociated with low morale and low self-esteem,both of which can supply rationalizations for cor-ruption. Officials who enjoy high status andbetter remuneration have more to lose if they aredisciplined or prosecuted.

Internal accountability of officials also can bestrengthened by management styles. Results- orfact-based performance management systemstend to provide better accountability. Employeesshould be encouraged to provide information ofwrongdoing by management, and mechanismsestablished to handle such allegations.

5. Eliminating conflicts of interest and disclosing assets.A personal interest that conflicts with officialresponsibilities is not necessarily corrupt or im-proper. However, it can be if the interest is not dis-closed or if it influences the exercise of publicfunctions. Many governments require officials toidentify and disclose personal interests to try toreduce or eliminate conflicts of interest. When aconflict arises or as a condition of employment,officials can be required to either dispose or divest.

Requiring officials to disclose their assets, eitherpublicly or to internal government agencies, pre-vents corruption in two major ways. Disclosure ofassets and interests assists in determining whetherconflicting interests exist. Requiring officials todisclose their wealth and assets also provides abaseline and means for comparison to identifysubsequent illegal enrichment. Disclosure systemsmay be based on self-reporting but usually need tobe supported by provisions for sanctions of offi-cials who misreport or misrepresent.

Where corrupt values and practices are institutional-ized, officials and staff resist reforms

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“Hardening” TimberTransactions

The security and asset protectiontask in timber sales administra-tion and planning promotesadherence to the managementplan prescriptions and supportsrealization of the full value ofsales to the timber business.Advanced technologies can playan important role in controllingillegal logging. Log labeling andtracking devices and surveillancesystems can supplement soundbusiness practices (figure 5.3)and receive prominent attentionin discussions of the control ofillegal logging.10 However, theyare not substitutes for well-designed and well-implementedtimber sale administration. It ismore appropriate to think of amix of strategies aimed at miti-gating the particular vulnerabili-ties and exposures of a specificoperation.

This section describes fourforms of timber theft and some of the most importantprevention options. The discussion follows the processby which timber transactions typically are conducted:from the definition and planning of the harvest andsale, through harvest, scaling, and delivery. Preventionof theft in timber transactions is largely an extension of an orderly and methodical approach to the timberbusiness.

Basic Elements of Timber Sales

While they are conducted in many ways, timber salesalways involve determining:

● What is to be sold? Any forested tract will consistof a mix of resources. A specific timber sale typi-cally will target only a portion of the entire man-agement unit that can be defined by species,location, size, age, or other characteristic(s).

● From what location will it be sold? The specifica-tion of the timber to be sold also determines thetrees to be retained and provides the setting forsuch specific sales administration and executionactivities as tree and boundary marking. The pre-cise nature of the transfer of ownership––beforefelling, after felling, at a landing, or upon deliveryto a site outside the forest––are additional parts ofthe sale design.

● Who are the parties involved? Successful sales reston the legitimacy of the ownership claim of theseller, the selection and awarding of tracts of landor timber assortments to specific purchasers, anda clear designation of the purchaser’s agent(s) orrepresentative.

● What are the prices, rates, and other terms? Timberis sold on various terms including by volume, byweight, and by area to be harvested. Charges canbe levied at the stump, roadside, mill, port, orother location. Taxes and fees also can be assessedby species, grade, girth, and other qualitative10 Dykstra and others 2003.

Figure 5.3 Commercial log labels. A commercial log labeling system trackslogs from stump to mill. A plastic tag indicating tree and log number is attached toeach log harvested. Another tag is placed on the stump, thus linking this tree stumpto these logs and completing the chain of custody. This system is very easy to rec-oncile with cruise accuracy and harvesting separation.

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dimensions. Sale terms should dictate the dura-tion of the cutting and transport period, securitydeposits, payment arrangements, other terms ofaccess to the forest, and arrangements in cases ofdefault or dispute. The sale basis determinesmeasurement systems and allocates responsibili-ties for scaling and other aspects of the conduct ofthe sale between seller and buyer (box 5.2).

These and related choices are extensions of the basic forest management planning issues (chapter 3).These choices are needed to meet the objectives of

management, and they drive many strategic and plan-ning decisions. A variety of accessible and useful refer-ences on timber sales administration and contractingare available to the interested reader, including variousgovernment operational and policy manuals.11 Thefocus here is to build fraud and theft prevention intoand on top of basically sound sales practices.

Box 5.2 Security implications of types of purchases

Lump sum and per-unit (sometimes called volumetricsales) are two common ways of structuring payment intimber transactions. If timber volumes, values, and loggingcosts are known with certainty by buyer and seller, bothmethods will yield equivalent returns to both parties.Information is limited, and timber cruises are costly anduncertain. Thus, the choice of sale basis involves differentdistributions of risk for buyers and sellers and exposestransactions to different risks of fraud and corruption.

Lump-sum sales sell the timber volume of an entire tractfor a set price. The buyer assumes all risks and liabilitiesfor any shortfall from expected wood volume. Lump-sum sales warrant a higher intensity cruise before buyerand seller close on price. The buyer also stands to gain ifthe volume harvested from the sale is larger than antici-pated. Thus, there is a motivation to maximize the use oftimber harvested, rather than leaving lower-quality logslying in the forest. For the seller, a lump-sum sale requiresrelatively limited oversight and supervision. The sellerknows whether the full amount has been paid or not anddoes not need to scale the volume of wood harvested.The seller may need to monitor compliance with forestpractices and ensure that the harvesting remains withinthe established cutting boundaries. These are relativelyeasily and objectively assessed with few opportunities formanipulation.

In per-unit sales, the prices for product and species arenegotiated or set by bidding before the contract and paidwhen the timber is harvested. This arrangement can be

extremely beneficial for both parties, but the landownertakes a greater risk due to the critical nature of timberseparation. Trees can be marked for felling by the seller,or the harvester can select which trees to fell and whichto leave behind. Normally, a cruise will be conductedbefore the sale is contracted so that the landowner andpurchaser both have an expectation about the potentialtimber volume and sale revenue. The sale may notrequire as intense a cruise as that for a lump-sum sale,but the volume harvested will need to be scaled (meas-ured) to determine the amount due to the seller.

The need for timber scaling introduces special risks forper-unit sales. There are a variety of recognized and gen-erally accepted scaling methods and standards prone todifferent and known statistical measurement errors andbiases. More importantly, the need for scaling introducesspecific risks of fraud and corruption. Scalers are subjectto bribery, especially in developing countries in which payscales are low and supervision is lax. Even automatedscales can be manipulated or circumvented.

Despite their risks, volumetric sales can be necessary andappropriate, especially in locations in which presalesinventories are expensive or uncertain (as is the case inmany mixed tropical forests) and in which the applicationof selective logging systems makes it difficult to predictharvest volume. In these cases, it is possible to combinevolumetric and area-based charges to better balance therisks and benefits involved in the two sales methods.

11 See for example U.S. Forest Service and British Columbia man-uals at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/ and http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/manuals/policy/resmngmt/rm-toc.htm, respectively.

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Every timber sale transaction needs to be docu-mented by a written and recorded contract. The contractprotects both landowner and buyer and addresses thebasic questions listed above. It should define all obliga-tions and rights related to the transaction. A contractoffers more protection than a verbal agreement and islegally binding. A contract should describe the sale areaand reference a map of the sale area. A complete de-scription of the timber and species to be sold is essen-tial. Buyers must verify that the seller or seller’s agenthas clear title to or ownership of the property to be sold.Terms must be clear and easily understood. “Per-unit”sales should include specifications for each species and product. The contract must establish the methodand terms of payment––lump sum, per unit, or cashadvance––before the sale begins. The seller must watchout for the unscrupulous buyer who might change theprices and/or the units of measure. The payment forwood is another area in which a thief may deceive theinnocent. Payments need to be made on a timely basisthroughout the sale as the timber is cut.

Sources of Loss and Loss ControlsThere are four primary ways in which timber trans-actions go wrong due to fraud and corruption:

1. Collusion and deception in bidding, negotiations,and other phases of preharvest sale contracting.These frauds can be committed during the earlieststages of the establishment of a logging operation.The frauds can be committed by buyers actingalone, or can involve staff and officials from withinthe timber organization cooperating with buyers.

2. Diversion of wood or timber at harvesting or duringlog transport (figure 5.4). Loggers and truck driv-ers, with or without the connivance of super-visors, have many opportunities to steal wood,deliver it to unauthorized locations and mills,engage in under- and over-invoicing, and commitother frauds.

3. Outright theft or mismeasurement at the time ofdelivery and scaling, or in inventory. Staff and man-agers responsible for measuring, recording, andaccepting deliveries are in a position to manipulaterecords, participate in many different kinds offraud, and abet and conceal fraud by others.

4. Fraudulent sale of material (timber purchasersoften refer to this as procurement fraud). Log-gers, truck drivers, other shippers, and agents of

organized illegal logging organizations can mis-represent timber and semiprocessed material toeither unscrupulous or unaware buyers as havingbeen legitimately sourced.

Preventing Collusive Practices in Timber Sale Contracting“Collusion” is the making of an agreement by two ormore persons to perpetrate fraud, or engaging in illegalactivity, or in legal activity with an illegal intent. Forexample, the British Columbia Ministry of Forestry def-inition of collusion covers:

● Offer of an inducement to another bidder in anattempt to have the other bidder bid in a particu-lar manner

● Threats made in an attempt to make another bid-der bid in a particular manner

● Agreements made not to bid in an attempt toensure that there will be no bids

● Prearranged bids.12

If timber sales are contracted under collusive circum-stances, the seller likely is being deprived of the some ofthe fair market value of the transaction. No sale admin-istration or surveillance measures applied at later stagesin the sale process can compensate for the effect of cor-rupt practices at the initial stages of bidding and award.

To protect against the risks of selling into collusivemarkets, managers need to be aware of market condi-tions. They should be familiar with prices and terms of comparable timber sales in the area, know the range ofpotential buyers, and be able to identify indicators ofpossible collusion or manipulation. A timber sale mustbe based on a realistic assessment of the fair market valueof the planned transaction. This rule applies to sales oftimber from specific tracts as well as to the disposal oflong-term concession rights to large areas by publicagencies. In large commercial operations, procurementand sales will be handled by specialized units and staff.However, in all operations, local forest managers shouldbe aware of general market conditions in their areas.

Other helpful measures can include:

● Making deliberate efforts to attract bids from alarge number of bidders through advertisementsand public notifications

12 For details see British Columbia Ministry of Forestry at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/manuals/policy/resmngmt/rm16-25.htm

Every timber sale transaction needs to be documentedby a written and recorded contract

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● Requiring written bids that include statementsthat bids are made independently

● Incorporating floor prices in tenders and offers ● Developing bid monitoring systems to identify

patterns suggestive of collusion ● Holding public pre-bid conferences and bid

openings ● Specifying in the sales prospectus penalties for

collusion, including debarment from future sales. ● Specifying bidder qualifications at the time of

advertisement to exclude operators with recordsof poor performance and questionable businessconduct.

Contractors who are in financial trouble also may besecurity risks. Qualifications should require technicalcapacity on the part of bidders to execute the contractin compliance with the terms of the offer. The sellershould clearly define the sale area on the map and onthe ground. Delineating sale areas should deter cuttingover sale boundaries. In the bidding transaction, theseller must ensure that any prospective bidder, auditor,or interested party can locate the timber on the ground.

Harvesting and Timber Movement Risks and ControlsOnce sales contract terms are finalized, actual logging,transport, and delivery operations need to be mon-itored for compliance (figure 5.4). This monitoring is sometimes referred to as sale administration. Ittypically involves scaling, supervising cutting areas,monitoring timber transport and deliveries, andrecord-keeping. Supervision of sales will addressnumerous issues not directly related to theft and fraudprevention, such as compliance with forest practicestandards, worker safety, and traffic management. Con-trol of timber theft by misrepresentation during opera-tions depends on the landowners having detailedinformation on the material that is being sold andinstalling and maintaining systems to identify devia-tions from the planned and authorized amounts.

The seller should know what is being sold. Fraud victimsoften do not know their estimated timber volume or theirtimber’s value. If the timber is sold on a per-unit basis, theseller should make a comparison between the initialcruise and harvested volumes. Prior to the sale of forestproducts, the seller needs to conduct a timber cruise toobtain a detailed projection of the quantity of timber,species mix, grade, and other qualities. This informationwill be the basis for comparison with actual removals andrevenue results. Information should be summarized in an

accessible format and be represented on maps showingthe harvest area and key transport infrastructure androutes. Cruise data can be compared with actual harvestdata throughout the sale process to determine the variousstages of sale completion. Accurate cruises may showproblems such as receiving mills’ under-scaling or mis-representing species mixes (figure 5.5).

An unscrupulous timber cruiser may over- or under-cruise the sale to split the excess proceeds with either thelogger or the seller. If the estimated and actual volumesand dollars are not within a given percentage, which istermed “cutting out,” the sale should be audited. In areasin which trees are cruised, numbered, and recorded, everylog should be accounted for in this process. Establishingan audit is a subtle way of putting the responsibility on thecruiser and letting him know that someone is looking.

The seller must make sure that bid prices are paid asspecified in the contract. When the sale is completed, theseller should compare the data. Discrepancies could bered flags. Have all payments due been received, anddoes the rate of payment correspond to the rate of harvest? For example, if 25 percent of the area has beenharvested, then 25 percent of the funds should havebeen received. This aspect of compliance supervisionrequires coordinating financial and accounting staffwith field supervisory staff. In public timber sales, com-pliance supervision can involve different governmentagencies. High-quality presales planning should enablethe forestry agency to predict sales and revenues with

Figure 5.4 Log truck hauling logs to mill, Laos.During transport of logs, visual chain of custody must bemaintained to protect against load diversion. Load tags,paint, stamps, and GPS locators are methods to ensureproper load transport.

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Fraud victims often do not know their estimated timber volume or their timber’s value

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confidence. Finance authorities then can be in a posi-tion to identify discrepancies (box 5.3).

A visible presence deters theft. One of the most impor-tant functions of the entire timber sale process is inspec-tion of the harvested area. It is the first line of defenseagainst timber theft and a function that often is the mostoverlooked. Contractors can and will distract inspectorsto cover up theft. During their visits, foresters shouldlook for unusual occurrences, such as contractors lead-ing them away from specific areas. An effort to distractcan be a sign that the forester should come back later toinspect. Foresters should avoid visiting harvest areas atthe same time each day. They need to time their inspec-tions at unscheduled hours and days, including dayswhen no one is there. Foresters and vendors see oneanother every week, and friendships develop. Never-theless, inspectors need to stay at arm’s length fromcontractors. To avoid inappropriate relationships, from

time to time, managers should rotate foresters from onearea to another. Foresters should not inform loggers oftheir vacations and holidays.

Independent, nonprofit scaling bureaus have beenformed in some places, such as the Western UnitedStates, to serve as arbiters between log sellers and logbuyers. Although there have been instances of fraudinvolving scalers employed by these bureaus, disagree-ments between log sellers and log buyers are much lessfrequent with this type of system than when logs arescaled by the log buyers. Another possibility is for thelog seller to do the scaling, the method normally usedby the US Forest Service when it sells timber. Under theterms of the purchase contract, buyers are required toaccept the USFS scale. Of course, provisions are madefor settling disputes.Figure 5.5 Log yard with scaler. Logs are sold to a

delivery point and scaled to determine volume and amountto be paid. Scaling provides an opportunity for a log ownerto be defrauded. Logs can be under-scaled by just an inch orcm, their length under-measured, the number of logs mis-counted, or the wrong species recorded. Sometimes theseare mistakes. Log scaling genuinely is an art as well as a sci-ence. Aside from measurement errors, legitimate differencesin assessing log quality and/or allowances for defects such asinsect damage and stains can lead to large differences in val-uation. For managers to maintain control and quality, scalersneed to know that they are being monitored. For a managerto simply put a crayon mark on the end of the log couldmake the scaler realize that the logs have been scaled priorto the landing and the proper scale recorded.

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Box 5.3 Kiting

Kiting (“robbing Peter to pay Paul”) is a scheme famil-iar to many foresters. The term describes coveringshortages in one account or tract by taking funds orassets from another. Kiting is a simple method to “pro-vide” timber for a timber theft. This practice can beused to perpetrate theft when a logging enterprisekeeps records of the amount of timber harvested byareas or by accounts, but a thief can substitute or com-mingle wood from other sources, or of other qualitiesor species. Shortfalls are concealed, and harvests fromanother tract are substituted. This practice may beused to harvest low-value timber in exchange forwood of a more highly valued species that is then soldelsewhere by the thief, or resold to the original owner.

Another scheme is to cut company stumpage andcredit it to an outside purchased timber tract. Thispractice may be used to hide poor cruising habits,cover up a theft, or receive unearned sale incentives.

Such practices hide fraud for a time or until an auditof the remaining timber is made. Sometimes, pro-curement foresters are paid incentives if purchasedtracts cut out the volume originally cruised and aprofit is realized. By kiting or crediting timber fromanother tract to the original volume, foresters canlook good on paper and collect incentives that arenot deserved. Managers should be alert to buyerincentives to manipulate harvest numbers.

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A vendor can alter a marked timber sale by markingadditional trees. This increases the volume and coverstheft. The owner should register paint with a manufac-turer or mix paint with special dye or material to makeit unique. Doing so will help law enforcement to iden-tify that owner’s paint. Special tracers and microtag-gants can be added to paint. These approaches costmore but, for high-value species, could be worth the added cost. Another tool is a transponder read by ahand-held device. Transponders can be embedded intrees in proposed harvest units to determine whetherthe right tree has been harvested, or in logs to determinewhether the logs have gone to the proper mill. Anotherapproach is to put in surveillance plots, in which treesare measured and located through a reference such asGPS but the coordinates are unrecognizable on theground. These plots can be revisited to make sure thatunauthorized trees are not being cut.13

Supervision of log transport. Cameras similar to thosein common use to monitor wildlife can be installedeither covertly or overtly to record all material passingthrough the checkpoint (figure 5.6). Smugglers andthieves will be reluctant to pass through a station withstolen logs if they perceive the possibility of beingcaught. Enforcement officers also should be assigned topatrol secondary roads that thieves may use to avoidcheckpoints (figure 5.7).

Branding hammers, bar-coded log labels attached tothe log end, and nail-based labels are available (fig-ure 5.8). Newer systems have a reader that can compareoriginal cruise data by stem with harvested logs andmaterial data sold to the processing facility. Geo fencingcan assist in determining when trucks arrive or leavespecific areas and locations.14

Real travel time and location information can betransmitted to laptop computers for tracking, alongwith maps and aerial photographs of the location. Mon-itoring the time it takes to complete wood deliveries versus the time normally required is one way to detecttheft. The forester should know how much volume thecontractors can haul during a given period. A reductionfrom the norm may be a red flag indicating theft.Increased volume could indicate the creation of falsetickets at scales and crediting to a special tract for pay-ment. An increase in production also could indicate

additional volume being credited for special pricing orzone jumping. To compensate for longer hauling dis-tances to the mill, foresters should establish differentprices by zone based on the haul distances. Some millshave found that 10 percent–20 percent of the received

13 Dykstra and others 2003.14 Dykstra and others 2003.

Figure 5.6 Scale house equipped with cameras.This is a good example of a scale house equipped with cam-eras that can record the front of the load as it arrives andthe rear as it leaves. Note that the camera captures thenames on the door of the cab and the driver’s face. It alsocan see the chain of custody tag or paint on the front of theload. This scale house has two cameras located on theoutbound scales as well.

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Figure 5.7 Checkpoint gate, Laos. These check-points are staffed by government officers to check for avariety of products. The checkpoint is an ideal spot to checkand record logs being transported to mills. In addition, theofficer can count the number of logs on load. If a checkpointbecomes too congested, an overt camera can recordevents for reviewing later.

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Many scale house frauds go on for years

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volume was paid at a higher price because of zone-jumping infractions.

Loader sheets are another way to track what has beenloaded and shipped to the mill (figure 5.9). Forestersshould designate one person to record the trucks that areloaded, the product, departure time, destination, num-ber of logs or stems, and truck or trailer ID. This datacan be reconciled later with tickets or covert camera sur-veillance. Another form of load identification is to useone-inch plastic or metal bands around the load and tosecure the load with a load tag. Another approach is tostrap loads with nylon straps that have a seal that can bebroken only after the load has been properly identified.Thus, a loaded truck can travel a great distance from theharvest area to a mill site with increased security.

Truck or trailer identification. By requiring contrac-tors to label both sides of their trucks and log trailerswith unique number, the forester can capture load IDthroughout the harvesting process (figure 5.10). Scaletickets at mills should capture these numbers for com-parison. A forester can make a “destination check” by recording the ID of the vehicle and trailer, time,

Figure 5.8 Hammer brand. The clear impressionmade by this hammer is easily recognized. One drawback isthe worn hammers used. Smaller hammers can be used toclandestinely mark logs that may be subject to theft forfuture identification.

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Figure 5.9 Loader sheet to record time, date, and other identifying data. Sheets are filled in by a loaderoperator or crew foreman. Management should ensure that the sheets are being kept and the accuracy of the informationis maintained. Foresters inspecting the harvesting need to verify loader sheets whenever they visit the job site. When thesale area is complete, reconciliation is done by comparing the loader sheet with the number of loads hauled.

Mead Woodlands—Loader Sheet

Company Name: Loading Operator:Tract Number: Authorization #:

Date Time Wood Type Destination Trucker Name Trailer ID#123456789

10111213141516

Any labeling process has many flaws

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location, direction, and product. The following day,they can check to see whether this truck arrived andcompare it with the findings. Without an identificationsystem, trailers lose their identity as soon as they leavethe woods; the forester would have to follow the truckto the scale house or observe the staged trailer until itwas recoupled and pulled to the mill. The trailer identi-fication number enables the forester to radio the mill,request a routine destination check, and continueworking. The trailer ID system is an easy and efficientway to track trailer loads of timber from the woods tothe mill.

Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) wasdeveloped in the 1990s. It has since undergone manyupgrades. Its latest enhancements enable it to monitorthe movement of logs on logging trucks. The ALPR sys-tem can be installed at main entrances to logging oper-ations and designated checkpoints. The system can bedesigned to provide the following data:

● Front license plate capture● License plate patch● Vehicle registration mark (VRM)● Front overview image● Rear number (and/or log stamp/load tags) plate

capture ● License plate patch● Log stamp● Load tag● Overhead view of load image● Vehicle occupancy image

● Verification of license plate and/or vehicle regis-tration mark, and/or facial recognition againstdatabase.

ALPR can:

● Raise audible and visual alarm, if match● Produce local log file to include plate patch,

VRM, date and time, confidence level, and loca-tion ID.

The ALPR server will check all VRMs and licenseplates against multiple databases. Facial recognitionsoftware will check vehicle occupancy images againstdatabases. In the event of a match, the system will raisean audible and visual alarm on the user monitorinstalled in a secure location. Using other communica-tion technologies, both the alarm and the images can betransmitted to a response force.

Extreme CCTV uses infrared light and a camera totake the image of the front or rear of the vehicle. Animage-processing software then analyzes the imagesand extracts the plate information. This data is used forenforcement and data collection. When integrated withan access-control system, the data can open a gate if thevehicle is authorized. It also can keep a video of the logload, its load tag, and log stamps.

In addition, forest products companies should con-sider implementing a load tag security system. Prenum-bered load tags are affixed to a load of wood and listedconsecutively in a contractor’s shipment logbook (fig-ure 5.11). When the trailer is pulled from the tract,there is no doubt in a contract compliance forester’smind about the status of a particular load. If the load tagnumber is not evident on a loaded trailer, it could be adiverted load. If the tag is visible, the forester can tracethe load tag’s number back to the contractor’s shipmentrecords. These records should indicate the time anddate of shipment, product, truck/trailer number,driver’s name, destination, delivery time for the load,and scale ticket number used to weigh the load. Thelogging contractor should periodically submit theseshipment records to the stumpage owner and retain acopy for himself.

The combination of truck and trailer identificationnumbers and load tags give individual loads of wood adistinctive identity. Systems using a GPS unit, either

Figure 5.10 Log trailer with ID number. The largenumbers make it easy to recognize the trailer ID when pass-ing on the road or when video recording. ID numbers alsoshould be included on scale tickets for further auditing.

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covert or overt, can track trucks and their loads fromdeck to destination and all stops in between. Theforester should count the logs that are loaded on thetruck at the landing and compare them to the numberof logs received at the mill. One new commercially

available satellite system identifies the load, product, anddestination of the material at the log deck.15

When selling “per unit,” the seller must clearly statethe specifications of the products to be separated, andthe penalty for poor separation and damage. A selleralso must insist that scale tickets accompany all settle-ments. A scale ticket stating where the wood was deliv-ered, time, date, scaler, volume, and product shouldaccompany every load. In some locales, branding isused to identify logs’ origin. Branding is one way toensure that logs do not get “lost” in transit.

Delivery, Scale, and Inventory Risks and ControlsChain of custody (CoC) is “the custodial sequence thatoccurs as ownership or control of the wood supply istransferred from one custodian to another along thesupply chain.”16 It is the method by which logs aretracked from the stump or deck to the processing facil-ity. Many innovative methods have been implementedto accomplish CoC. Forest check stations should vali-date the products being hauled, and inspect the bills oflading, transport documents, and number of stems onthe load. This process establishes a record for reconcil-iation to follow the chain of custody of legal logs anddeter illegal loads. Loads can be checked for fraudulenttransportation documents and other data.

1. Scaling is the measurement of wood volume andthe process by which wood is turned into money(figure 5.5). It is the activity during which thegreatest financial loss can occur during the short-est time and is the most difficult to detect. Logscaling is an art and a science. There are no hard

15 Aldata Software, based in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, offers aproduct called Custody Manager. It combines the power of a com-puter, connectivity of the internet, accuracy of GPS data, and relia-bility of satellite communications to provide accurate and timelyinformation on each load leaving the forest. The computer mountedin the loader collects data on each load, including the GPS positionof the load, and transmits that data back to the office before the loadeven leaves the tract.

In addition, Custody Manager utilizes 3D motion data to build aloading profile while the loader works in the field. This profile can beutilized day and night to review each loader’s activities and identifyany unauthorized activity. Applying Custody Manager to an opera-tion is a powerful tool to combat illegal logging, track chain of cus-tody for any certification programs, and deter the theft of logs fromthe field. http://www.aldatasoftware.com/cm-overview.htm

16 Dykstra and others 2003.

Figure 5.11 Three-part load tag ticket.One part of the ticket is stapled on the load; thesecond part is turned in to the scale house; andthe third part is kept and turned in to theinspecting forester. Scale-house operators areresponsible to verify that the tag numbers arethe same and that the number is part of theticket information. Compliance with thisrequirement is stated in the contract. Tags areplaced on the load in a location that the foresterhas designated.

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and fast rules for assessingdefects and making deduc-tions for large limbs,crooked stems, stains, in-sect holes, and many otherconditions that influencethe net volume and gradesof logs. In some areas, thesame load of logs scaled by2 different scalers is almostcertain to have net volumesthat differ by as much as 20 percent simply becauseof legitimate differences inallowances for defects. Forexample, one scaler may seeindicators of internal de-fects that the other missed.This is especially true if thelogs are scaled on the truck rather than in the millyard. A policy on check scaling can be that unlessthe check scaler’s tally agrees with, or is within acertain percentage of, the original, a red flag israised to trigger further investigation.

2. Scaling methods and formulae vary with productand use. In pulp production, scale weight is themost common standard, and loaded and un-loaded trucks are weighed to determine woodvolumes delivered. The old method of scalingpulpwood measured the height, width, and lengthto determine the cubic feet. Because of the highervalue, saw and veneer logs’ volume is determinedby applying mathematical conversions and for-mulas based on measurements of log length anddiameter, supplemented with deductions andadjustments for defects (figure 5.12).

Many scaling log rules are used. Some cater to the logbuyer; others that favor the sizes of the log both largeand small. The latter method is particularly subject toerror or fraud because it is based on the judgment andguesswork by an individual. Weight measurements thatconvert pounds per board foot have been calculated forvarious species. “Scale house” normally refers to theweight scales themselves, but “scale house fraud” oftenis used to refer to any fraud related to log measurement,whether scaling by weight or stick scaling. Scalers havethe opportunity to take millions of dollars by fabricat-ing fictitious tickets and splitting the proceeds with an

unscrupulous contractor or individual. Many scale housefrauds go on for years.

Other forms of fraud are caught very easily throughexception reports. Many scalers are long-time employ-ees and have assisted in changing and installing newequipment. They may be experts in knowing how thesystem works and how to get around it if somethingbreaks. Scaling is an area in which “theft by default” istrue. The first time that a fraudulent ticket is created, itprobably is an error. False or bogus tickets after that aremore likely to have been created intentionally.

Cameras, either video or still, are a necessity at anymodern commercial scale house and serve as the maindeterrent to scale house fraud. Cameras record everytransaction that takes place in chronological order.Camera placement depends on which information isneeded (figure 5.13).

Some cameras record the ticket number with a pho-tograph of the driver, truck, and product being hauled(figure 5.14). Some scale houses have up to four cam-eras looking at the loads. Another scale house deterrentmay be new scales. Both a zero balance device and asingle print device should be installed. Additionaldeterrents are electric eyes around scales and account-ing systems that do not allow manual ticket creations.All of the above inhibit fraud, but many unscrupulousscalers have found ways around them.

Any labeling process has many flaws. Nevertheless, itis essential for industry and government to demandthat logs and loads be identified during the harvesting,

Figure 5.12 Scaling unusual log length using rule tape. This particular theftcase was of cherry blocks measuring 42” and sawn for banister balusters. Typical logsare measured from 8 feet up.

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merchandizing/separation, transport, and scaling proc-esses. Forest certification requires that industry main-tain a chain of custody. Auditors now insist that logsand loads be identified and tracked throughout the har-vesting process. Commonly used marking methods are:

● Hammer or branding. This isthe most used method in thewoods. Drawbacks are that thehammer’s raised metal wearsout and leaves only a smallindentation in the wood (fig-ure 5.8). These marks are easilycounterfeited and give no pos-sibility of identifying individ-ual logs in transport unless theviewer is up close.

● Conventional paint. The for-ester paints the ends of the logswith a particular color, puttinga spot either on each log or ononly one log of each load. Thismethod is used only to identifya log or group of logs, because

paint affords no way to record specific volume ortrack tree identity. Paint is not recommended as astand-alone CoC method because, over a longperiod and with abuse, the paint will fade or chip off(figure 5.15).

● Highly fluorescent colors ofpaint on log ends are easily rec-ognizable when the load passeson the highway (figure 5.16).

● Load tags made of paper orplastic are considered by someto be the best CoC method. Im-provements have been made tothe various systems by addingbarcodes that can be easily readand analyzed. However, a tagcan be switched or removedand reapplied to another load.Paper tags often get wet, are notreadable, and will not last a longtime under certain conditions.

● Nail-based tags are imprintedwith a machine-readable bar-code. These tags hold up betterin transport and weather, butremoving nails or not remov-ing nails can be a severe prob-lem (figure 5.17).

● Magnetic strip cards (“smart”cards) may be suitable in the

Figure 5.13 Scale house with weigh scale. When employing weight scales,it is always necessary that the scale operator has a clear view of the front and rearof the scales to ensure that trucks are completely on the scales. Note that the oper-ator can see the load, name of the logging contractor or hauling contractor, and condition of the material. An overt camera is installed on this scale house to capturethe front and rear of the load.

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Figure 5.14 Concurrent video recording from four scale-house cam-eras. Cameras are focused to capture both inbound and outbound vehicles on thescales, and to capture the rear of trailers as they depart from the scales. The videoeasily can be reviewed for audit purposes and stored for further review of potentialfrauds.

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future, but cannot hold up under certain weatherconditions and are very costly.

● Chemical, genetic fingerprinting, and radio frequencyID are among the more advanced technologies

considered for log tracking but are too expensive toconsider today.

Multiple methods may be necessary to trace a truck-load of logs. Paint on the end of one log might indicatethat the logs or load is coming from a particular desti-nation or supplier. A numbered, colored, or barcodedload tag can be attached to accompany the load to theprocessing facility. However, if tags are not collectedand reconciled, this method is futile. A loader sheet de-scribing the species, destination, time, and truck/trailerID can be maintained on the loader or deck (figure 5.9).To complete the process, these loader sheets must bereconciled with the collected tag numbers. Using cam-eras to audit the loads transported from the sale isanother method to verify that loads leaving the tractwere delivered to the specified destination.

Many areas have set up checkpoints at various loca-tions to inspect the logs being transported. Some ofthese points are too overwhelmed by the number oftrucks to inspect the loads. However, by using detach-able, two-part tags or tickets attached to bills of lad-

ing, reconciliation of these loads can stop the hauling of illegal logs (figure 5.18). Checkpointsalways should be equipped withcameras.

Forest companies can use GPSsystems to track transport vehiclessuspected of moving illegal logsfrom their properties. Such sys-tems also can be used to protecthigh-end forest equipment. AGPS system enables a target vehi-cle to be tracked or monitored ona map, or to be protected byalarms. It also can be set to oper-ate in a “passive” mode for routineor periodic monitoring. The sys-tem uses cellular telephone forcommunication and a satellite-based navigation system to deter-mine vehicle location. The systemincludes equipment mounted inthe vehicle being protected (ormonitored) as well as equipmentand software on a personal com-puter (PC) or laptop at a monitor-ing center. The vehicle segment of

Figure 5.15 Cant of logs numbered and stamped.Log has been sawn, branded, and numbered accounting forthe log and number of sawn cants.

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Figure 5.16 Highly fluorescent orange paint on load. Highly fluorescentorange is highly visible when approaching a log trailer on the highway. Specific col-ors can be used to identify specific ownerships. The rule of thumb is that when thefirst stem is loaded on the trailer, the paint is applied. In this way, whenever anyonecomes up on a log deck and the loader is loading, the log has been marked. Wherethe paint is applied is up to the load supervisor. Contrasting colors can be used todenote top size, product, subcontractor, and other characteristics.

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the system is a small device containing a GPS receiver/transmitter and a cellular phone (satellite phone).

Microdot technologies are being used to covertly iden-tify more and more assets throughout the world. The lat-est large application for this technology is on high-endvehicles. The system consists of thousands of microdotssprayed onto an asset. Each microdot contains a uniqueidentification number. On vehicles, the dots are sprayedon noncosmetic surfaces throughout, including the driveline and suspension components. The same techniquecould be used on forest vehicles, heavy equipment, and cutlogs. When the dots are exposed to ultraviolet light, theyglow “blue.” Once located, the identification numbers canbe read with a simple magnifier. The sheer coverage of dotssprayed across an asset makes them too expensive toremove, and it is virtually impossible to remove them all.

Procurement or Fraudulent Timber Sales Risks and ControlsProcurement is the purchasing of raw material, logs, orsemiprocessed wood for further processing or resale. In

the usage developed by the Amer-ican Paper Institute (1991), thepurchase of timber from contrac-tors or shippers without knowl-edge of the wood’s specific sourceis termed a gatewood purchase. Thesale occurs at the gate to a mill,rather than on the property of thetimber seller. Although a long-standing and accepted practice inmany areas, “gatewood” is a lawenforcement security professionaland auditor’s nightmare. Woodtraders and manufacturers thatpurchase wood from areas experi-encing high levels of illegal loggingor that sell products to environ-mentally sensitive markets arepaying increased attention to thepossible sale/purchase of illegallyharvested wood.

The general strategy for re-sponsible wood procurement in-volves diligent efforts to ensurethat a wood seller can providesatisfactory documentation ofownership of the specified tim-ber. High-quality forest manage-ment practices that embody the

kinds of security planning and awareness discussedthroughout this report can offer a strong degree of con-fidence in the legitimacy of timber origin. For example,all tickets should include the landowner’s name andlocation either by general location, such as county,range, or township, or by GPS coordinates. Especiallyin areas in which the risk of illegal logging is high, gate-wood deliveries should not be accepted by mills becausethey show the lax attitude and nonsecurity mind-set ofthe scalers and their companies.

Timber purchasers need to be alert to the risk ofbeing presented with, and their staff accepting, fraudu-lent documentation. Receipts, certificates of origins,bills of lading, and other documents are easily forgedand altered. Staff should be familiar with local docu-mentation practices and standards; documents must bereviewed in the local language; and internal policiesshould clearly specify that suspect documents shouldnot be accepted and should be reported.

A number of references have been developed and areavailable to guide the introduction of defensible wood

Figure 5.17 Highly visible tag stapled to load. On this particular load, thetag is located in the back so that anyone can see it after passing the truck or comingfrom behind.

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procurement systems. The World Wildlife Fund GlobalForest Trade Network recommendations advise thatwood purchasers move toward procurement frommanagement that is independently certified as sustain-able (Miller, Taylor and White 2006; White and Sarshar2006).17 Tropical Forest Trust18 (TFT), an organizationthat promotes forest certification and good forest man-agement to wood-using industries, has developed aseven-part “Wood Control System” to guarantee useonly of what it calls “Good Wood”:

1. Wood Policy that identifies the kinds, qualities,and origins of wood that are and are not acceptable

2. Procurement program that ensures that the woodused reflects the Wood Policy

3. Chain of custody (CoC) system that orig-inates in the forest and is in place through-out the supply chain

4. Wood Origin Control (WOC) proceduresthat control the wood that enters the sup-ply chain

5. Internal audit system6. Independent third-party audit to verify

the integrity of the system7. Reporting system that informs stakehold-

ers (customers and others).

The TFT report also provides detailed guid-ance on adoption and development of WoodControl Systems for specific applications.

Institutionalizing Administrative andAccounting Loss Controls

Every timber enterprise must develop its ownprocedures and safeguards to protect theintegrity of its business processes. The mix ofinternal and external controls, specific red flagsfor which it will monitor, and assignment ofresponsibilities within the organization will varywith the nature of the timber business, its sizeand value to the organization, and its past expe-

rience with fraud and theft. Annex 5.1 to this chaptercontains a sampling of red flags. Appendix 1 presents adetailed sample Security Checklist. Both can be adaptedto the needs of specific operations.

Internal and external auditors should continuallyinspect financial data for inaccuracies. An auditor whois familiar with forestry terminology or who has aforestry background is extremely helpful on an audit-ing team. Even the mere presence of an auditor maydeter a thief. To cover up a fraud, documents must bealtered or misplaced. A good audit process will easilydetect any manipulations or false entries in the records.Internal auditors complement a good security depart-ment. They cause the perpetrators to wonder whetherthey will be caught and punished.

Key loss controls to restrain theft include:

● Establish a good audit trail to follow costs.● Keep detailed cost records of all transactions.● Maintain and compare as many items as possible,

from costs to harvest to scale weights.

17 http://assets.panda.org/downloads/keep_it_legal_final_no_fsc.pdf and http://assets.panda.org/downloads/rpg_nopapercredit12sept2006.pdf

18 Tropical Forest Trust n.d.

Figure 5.18 Example of settlement or payment sheet withtag attached. Ticket shows contractor, landowner, date, species,and number of logs by species, trailer or truck ID, ticket number, andscaler ID.

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● Look for unusual trends, unusual costs, and dou-ble entries; they may be early red flags.

● Continuously look for identical entries to com-pare with accounting numbers. Example: High-way departments’ weights compared to mill scaleweights.

● Have internal and external auditors periodicallyreview accounting functions. Security controlswill work only with scrutiny and continuousimprovement.

● Periodically retest programs and controls toensure that they are accurate and have not beenbypassed.

Exception reports. The computer has simplified dataanalysis. Reports that compare several sets of givenparameters are called “exception reports.” Exceptionreports are a major tool to detect fraud and can bescanned quickly for errors in the system. They functionas red flags that require auditors’ and managers’ atten-tion. However, exception reports are only indicators.An example might be a report that shows a log truck’stime weighing out before it was weighed in. Immedi-ately, a manager might think that a crime has beencommitted, but it may not have been. There may be twosets of scales, one for the inbound trucks and one for theoutbound. The clocks may not be synchronized so thatthe outbound scale clock time was ahead of theinbound. Other exception reports might include loadedtrucks that are weighed back-to-back weighing thesame or within several hundred pounds of each other.This situation often happens, but it needs to bereviewed. Has a duplicate or false ticket been created?Another example might be that the same scaler alwaysweighs the same logger. Is it just a coincidence, or aphantom logger?

External audits. Depending on legal and regulatorycircumstances, a forestry enterprise may be obligated tosubmit to some form of external audit or review. Oper-ations owned by publicly traded corporations may besubject to independent audit. Government-managed

forestry operations may be subject to review by agenciesrepresenting other sectors or government functions(finance or planning ministries), audit and accounta-bility bodies, legislative oversight authorities, or otheraccountability provision. Independent forest monitoring(IFM) arrangements are relatively new accountabilityapproaches in which, by agreement with state authori-ties, a third party provides an assessment of legal com-pliance, and observation of and guidance on officialforest law enforcement systems. Monitors are expectedto work in the public’s interests independently of thehost organization.19

In preventing fraud and abuse, external audits are alast resort. With sufficient mandate and adequate dili-gence and effort, external auditors may be able to iden-tify fraud and abuse perpetrated by senior managementor by lower level staff and contractors. Awareness of thepresence and mandate of external auditors can be adeterrent but also can motivate recourse to greatersophistication and concealment. Ultimately, the pre-vention of fraud and abuse remains an ongoing chal-lenge for senior management and enterprise leadership.

Conclusion

Timber transactions are susceptible to fraud and abusein the same ways as any other set of commercial trans-actions. Orderly, documented, and well-executed bus-iness practices––from the hiring of staff and use ofstandardized forms to the conduct of audits to theestablishment of “hot lines” and ethics training––arerepresentative of the wide range of practices that canhelp the timber business reduce theft. These can be sup-plemented by a range of technical devices, such asscales, cameras, and video surveillance as needed and asjustified by the value and extent of a theft risk. These,together with the trespass controls discussed in chapter4, can be developed into an integrated security plan, asdiscussed in the next chapter.

19 Global Witness 2005; Brown and Tucker 2006.

Orderly, documented, and well-executed business practices supplemented by a range of technical devicescan be developed into an integrated security plan

Annex 5.1 Sample Red Flags for Timber Fraud Detection

● Contractors who have poor merchandising prac-tices. This loss very easily could exceed all othertimber theft losses. Companies and individualslose more money by poor separation than anyother form of theft. Foresters should inspect whatis being hauled to the mills, especially the last loadof the day. Sale administrators must make surethat the logging rates do not hamper or restrictgood merchandising.

● Products not listed on the contract being sepa-rated on the log deck. Although it may be only asmall volume, higher value timber can be sepa-rated to some markets for an extremely high price.It may have been a small patch of timber that thecruiser missed, but it should be investigated.

Red flags for scale house fraud:

● Out-of-date scales that lack single print devices orzero balances.

● Missing scale tickets and load tags. ● Trucks spending too much time on scales and in

the mill. Scales open at unusual hours and on holidays. Holidays and late nights are good timesfor deceitful scalers to avoid supervision. Trucksother than log trucks enter and leave the mill at alltimes of the day and night. Many of them have tocross the scale for accounting purposes; nights arean excellent time to capture their weight to createfraudulent tickets.

● Scales down for an unusually long time and man-ual tickets created. From time to time, scales aredown due to lightning, electrical problems, orperiodic maintenance. Unscrupulous scalers couldcreate downtime to generate counterfeit tickets. Ifdowntime continues, managers must correct theproblem instead of allowing manual scaling.

● Changing products or species.● Pulpwood that is weighed in and paid as sawlogs,

poles, or high-value species easily can be beingscaled as lower-value species.

● Two sequential loads that weigh the same. Loadsweighing the same or within several hundredpounds of each other are common, but they needto be reviewed.

● Permitting courtesy weighing of products otherthan wood.

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“A red flag is an indicator or warning sign that shouldraise concern about the risk or possibility of theft orfraud. A red flag does not definitively indicate theft,only that there is a significant possibility of a problemthat merits investigation and follow-up.” (chapter 2, 7)Examples of red flags indicating possible timber theft orfraud follow.

● Logs left or stored in the woods. A logger may betrying to get a quick load and haul it undetected,or it could be a crowded log deck.

● Contractors who work on weekends, holidays, orunusual hours. These are times at which very fewinspections are conducted, so contractors haveunlimited opportunities to steal.

● Contractors who do not comply with procedures. ● Complaints about a contractor. All such com-

plaints should be investigated. ● Contractors who do not know the name or loca-

tion of the tract that they are cutting. They couldbe a sign of kiting by the forester or manipulationof tracts by the logger.

● Wood deliveries on contracts that have not yetbeen opened or have expired or closed. Are theykiting or early signs of fraudulent activities?

● Sporadic deliveries from one tract that interrupt theregular flow of wood from another. Has the loggermoved, or is s/he delivering stolen logs? The truckdriver may have erred by using the wrong deliveryID card. Foresters should remove all truck cardsthat are not pertinent to the current operation.

● Contractors who have multiple names, multiplecrews, and multiple tracts. Normally, these samecontractors also have multiple trucking contrac-tors. This distracting array is nothing more thana license to steal. At any time, any load or truck IDcards can be switched.

● Contract truckers who haul from many suppliers,to many mills, and at all times of the day and night.

● Firewood being harvested during normal saleoperations. Firewood harvesting for personal orcommercial value should not be allowed duringthe harvest of the sale. The easiest wood to gathermay be on the deck, and the easiest wood to splitis sawlog material with very few knots. Firewoodcutters also may harvest commercially valuabletimber and disguise it as firewood.

● Contractor’s production abruptly changes. Em-ployers should know their logging contractors’production capabilities.

● Volume suddenly increases or decreases for noapparent reason. Such sudden changes need to bescrutinized.

● Supervision of family members. Family ties rundeeper than company loyalty.

● Trucks working together. Truck drivers some-times increase their payloads by colluding. Whenone truck is weighing in, the trucker behind itputs his front axle on the scale. The scaler weighsthe trucks, overstating the weights. On the out-bound side, the first trucker leaves the rear axle offthe scales to decrease the tare weight, thusincreasing the net weight of the load. Placing anelectric eye across each end of the scales will not allow the truck to be weighed if the beam isbroken. The scale edge should be painted toincrease visibility.

● Yields below company or industry averages.Many publications and organizations publish theaverage yield for a mill with a given head rig andcertain other equipment in line. The employershould compare these numbers with what thecompany’s mill is doing. If the numbers are notclose, the employer should review all aspects ofthe process to determine the cause, starting withthe scales.

● Employees living above their income levels. Is thescaler purchasing lavish gifts? What kind of vehi-cle does the scaler drive? Is he buying large blocksof land? Can he afford these on his income level?Does the scaler have an additional business ven-ture? Is it related to the forest product industry? Is it a business that deals primarily with loggingcontractors?

● Several scalers using the same password to accessthe computer. A different password must beassigned to each scaler who uses the computer.Each employee must take individual responsibil-ity for what s/he scales.

● Log scale differing from check scale. When sellinglogs by measured scale, scalers must keep a recordof what was shipped and the estimated volumedelivered. From time to time, supervisors shouldscale logs before they leave for the mill. Someoneelse should periodically scale the loads at eitherthe deck or in transit. Managers should compare

this weight with what was scaled and resolve thedifference. The number of logs on a load shouldbe recorded by species to enable quick compari-son with the mill scale.

● Unusual or incorrect mixing or segregation oflogs at the mill or concentration yard. Managersshould notice sawlogs piled on a pulpwood con-centration yard. Is the separation of productsauthorized, or could it be the new coffee fund?Finding a separate pile is a good time for man-agers to check for discrepancies between bookand actual inventories.

● Deductions for one logger are higher or lowercompared to others. A good comparison is theaverage deduction for all loggers. All loggers havedeductions from time to time. If a logger doesnot, managers should make sure that the logger isa real person and not a false name used to createfraudulent tickets.

Timber harvesting accounting controls:

● Establish the approval process on all sales, and setthe authorization for expenditure of funds or dis-posal of assets at the highest level.

● When feasible, separate timber purchasing, cruis-ing, harvesting, scaling, and accounting.

● Send money received from harvesting operationsdirectly to a banking institution for disbursement.Individuals should never be given the responsibil-ity of collecting settlements from purchasers.

● Establish that accounting operations pay for tick-ets as they are presented for payment by record-ing ticket numbers and comparing sale ticketswhen payment is requested. Numerous incidentshave been reported in which duplicate or falsetickets have been turned in for collection.

● Create easily understandable accounting ledgersand exception reports. Send them to variousmanagers within the organization for their re-view. Document all entries and make sure that allmanagers can understand them. Complicateddocuments, ledgers, and programs often are notreviewed, creating opportunity for fraud.

● Document all transactions for a particular sale inone ledger. Doing so reveals the true costs ofdoing business.

● Separate other accounting functions, such asaccounts receivable and accounts payable, as isstandard in any accounting operation.

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● Above all, never send checks or disbursements tothe requester. Attach the proper supportingdocuments to requests for checks and accountspayable before they are paid.

● Verify vendors by independently checking physicaladdresses and telephone and ID numbers. Manyaudit programs are available to compare vendors’information with employees’ information.

● The accounting department should control depletion of assets. Shrinkage factors are verycommon in the wood products industry. This factor is the loss–or may be the gain–from theoriginal volume. Breakage, cull, and moistureoften are attributed to losses. Gains can be associ-ated with fiber that is stored under water or asprinkler system. These percentages need to becompared with industry averages, time of year,mill location, and specific mills. All discrepanciesshould be investigated.

Red flags for the accounting department:

● Specially priced tracts that continually needextensions. Such tracts may or may not be the

sources of the wood being harvested. Such a tractmay have been completed, but because of a deliv-ered price associated with it, wood is beingdiverted from another location to capture theincreased price of the special tract.

● Data in the tract folder is incomplete or missing.Maps, cruise information, tally sheets, and deedsneed to be in every purchased tract folder so that,with no inside assistance, an independent auditorcan reconstruct everything that has taken place onthe tract.

● Forester frequently needing extensions on con-tracts. The forester may be kiting by harvestingcompany stumpage and charging it to anothertract to cover up poor cruising techniques, theft,or another problem such as a loss on the tract.

● Name on the deed is different from the seller’s.Does s/he have the power of attorney? Is this indi-vidual the landowner’s representative?

● Tract names on scale tickets change constantly.This is a good sign of zone jumping, a fraudulentspecial-price tract, wood that is being stolen fromone tract and credited to another, or a driver notknowing where s/he is cutting. Se

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Planning Timber Theft Prevention

Richard L. Grandalski

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Protection against the many threats and risks thatcan arise against forest resources and forest busi-nesses requires careful planning and deliberate

choices that interact with the full range of resourcemanagement planning and operations. Earlier chaptershave introduced the logic and terminology of industrialasset protection, developed the idea that forest manage-ment decisions can be linked to timber theft risk, andexplored in somewhat greater detail approaches to con-trolling timber trespass and hardening timber trans-actions. This chapter discusses security planning as aspecific component of the general management plan-ning process.

Security planning at the forest management unit(FMU) level should bring together the concepts dis-cussed in earlier chapters together into a sequenced andbudgeted security program that addresses the FMU’sparticular risks and threats. As discussed earlier, serioussecurity planning can build only on the kind of organi-zational culture that is sensitive to the risks of timbertheft and fraud. There is no single standard or template,and there are limits to what planning and action at theFMU level can achieve. Notwithstanding, this chapterdescribes what can be considered the essential elementsof timber theft prevention planning. The chapter con-cludes with brief case studies that illustrate the use ofthe kinds of concepts and approaches discussed in thisreport to develop protection programs in three very dif-ferent circumstances.

Given the need for deliberate and explicit securityplanning, planning is broken out as a specific topic.Plan documentation is one of the most neglected andunder-appreciated dimensions of timber theft preven-tion and forest law enforcement. As evidenced by the

global severity of illegal logging. responding after thefact is a clear failing in forest law enforcement. Despitegrowing recognition of the significance of the problem,few forest managers take proactive measures to mitigatetheir risks and exposure. Concerted planning is an essen-tial first step. Planning should:

1. During the earliest stages, involve interactionbetween the enforcement specialist and resourcemanagers and planners

2. Install a monitoring system that generates theviolation statistics and investigative data that willbe thoroughly analyzed to develop the preventionmeasures.

Additional groups and individuals who should beinvolved are prosecutors; judges; other relevant govern-ment entities such as customs or border police and localand national police agencies; and local communities,who can assist in vigilance to prevent theft. Incorporat-ing these groups as parts of a resource protection pro-gram enables the development of a matrix of strategiesin the form of the timber theft prevention plan thatshould help close the gaps that allow illegal activities.

Components of Security Planning

A timber theft prevention plan has three main pur-poses.1 The first is to ensure that forest managementpractices and authorized user activities comply withlaws and regulations that promote sustainable forest

1 This section draws on Dyson 2006.

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management and use. The second purpose is to ensurethat commercial timber and nontimber forest productexploitation occurs only in forests authorized for suchuse. The third and ultimate purpose is that of all preven-tion strategies and actions: to prevent or mitigate illegallogging and other forest violations before they can occur.

The foundation of a security planning process com-prises four components: risk assessment, security survey,analysis, and a written plan. The first three are summa-rized below. The next section details the fourth compo-nent: the typical contents of a written security plan.

Risk AssessmentA security risk assessment is a methodical process ofidentifying the security issues and contributing factorsthat an organization needs to address:

● What needs to be protected (assets, tangible andintangible)?

● From whom are we trying to protect them(threats)?

● What might make it likely that thieves will suc-ceed (vulnerabilities)?

● What happens if they do (consequences)?● What needs to be done to ensure that they do not

(countermeasures)?

Risk is the intersection of the three variables: assets,threats, and vulnerabilities (chapter 2). The basis for for-mulating a concrete security program is a risk assess-ment. The risk assessment determines how and in whatways these three variables present themselves in a partic-ular forest. To assess risk, the analyst must consider thefull range of physical, biological, social, and commercialaspects of the forest. This task includes reviewing relevantmaterial and sources that might provide information ontimber theft and forest asset security. Sources include:

● Previous surveys/studies● Crime statistics● Interviews with officials, nongovernmental orga-

nizations, and others● Law enforcement authorities● Investigations and case reports● Reports of forest crimes in the country and sur-

rounding area● Other forest crime history information● Security best practices● Media.

Applied across an entire forest management unit(FMU), the risk assessment will prioritize the physicallocations and points along the timber sale process thatrequire attention in further security planning. In rank-ing risks, the analyst (with input from the risk managerand/or FMU) will need to make explicit judgments aboutthe value of the various assets at risk, probabilities ofdamage and loss, and volume of material at risk due tothe possible different loss events.

Security SurveyA security survey is an on-site assessment of a propertyto determine the security situation, identify shortcom-ings in protection measures, determine the needed levelof asset protection, and recommend improvements.2

A security survey should be designed to anticipate thecrimes that can threaten a property; recognize the oppor-tunities, vulnerabilities, and threats that leave the prop-erty susceptible to crime; appraise the significance of thesurvey results; and begin the process of using the resultsto propose mitigation measures.

As preparation for a security survey, the analyst shouldreview:

● Legislation and public policy considerations● Cultural issues● Police actions and specialized training in forest

crimes recognition and actions● Geography and topography● Security devices and systems● Physical security features.

From site visits, planners would:

● Obtain an appreciation of the topography andgeneral forest and community environment

● Evaluate factors relevant to risk and vulnerability(remoteness, road layout, places of concealment,accessibility, law enforcement resources and meas-ures, conditions)

● Interview those with knowledge of forest crimesand/or the forests/surrounding area

● Identify mills and potential consumers and mar-kets for stolen material, estimate mill capacity

2 See Fennelly 2004, chap. 3, “Security Surveys,” in Fennelly, ed.2004. This citation includes sample survey instruments for a varietyof circumstances.

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and market size, and assess demand for differentspecies, grades

● Assess resource management practices and woodsupply patterns from adjacent properties and otherforest lands within the timbershed.

Planners also would assess the characteristics of theforest area and would analyze past incidents based on,to the extent that they are available:

● Police reports● Incident reports● Media information● Previous surveys and studies.

Security practices, program, and security personnelalso would be considered:

● Security-related policies and procedures● Both local public law enforcement and contract

or proprietary guard force capacities (staffing levels,post orders, duty hours, response times, equipmentprovided)

● Job descriptions, evaluations, training, hiring pro-cedures, and supervision

● Roles and actions of nonsecurity personnel relatedto security personnel

● Security equipment and measures (road designand site plans, security devices use, environmentalsecurity features).

Appendix 1 provides a template of a security check-list. This example, together with the list of red flags in theannex to chapter 5, can be adapted to the specific secu-rity concerns and operational practices of almost anyforest management setting. The examples are intendedas tools to help the motivated manager and policy-maker collect and organize information about histori-cal security problems and to systematically identify therisks, vulnerabilities, and threats that confront a specificFMU. By simply checking off the items with yes or no,or making a brief comment, a manager can quickly for-mulate a view of the areas that may be vulnerable andthe threats and risks present.

AnalysisIn analyzing information obtained in the risk assess-ment and security survey, the security planner’s goalsare to predict crime and to use the predictions as the

bases to propose prevention measures. Unfortunately,in moving from historical data and the observation ofcurrent circumstances to the development of scenariosfor possible future events, the security planner has fewstandard templates or recipes on which to rely. To effec-tively assess risks and vulnerabilities, experienced secu-rity professionals voice the need to have a “suspiciousmind” or to think “like a thief.”

While this advice may be accurate and helpful, con-verting it into specific formulae or models is difficult.Plausible starting points for the development of scenar-ios include such assumptions as a continuation of histor-ical patterns of violations or projecting a continuation ofrecent trends in violations (to the extent that either canbe estimated). These or other planning assumptions canbe justified or modified on the basis of changes in thedrivers of illegal activity, as indicated by the risk assess-ment and security survey. Growing timber demand dueto investments in new processing capacity in the area,new roads, changes in border-crossing controls, armedconflict or civil unrest, or political changes are amongthe factors that can increase timber theft risks and callfor intensified theft prevention measures.3 Even thoughthese kinds of external developments may be beyond theFMU’s control, they need to be recognized by the secu-rity planner and factored into the analysis.

Changes in resource management or business prac-tices by the forest enterprise are subject to the discre-tion of the FMU. However, these changes also can havesecurity consequences. Employment of new staff, changesin logging and transport contractors, opening new log-ging compartments or coupes, road construction andtransport route changes, positioning of firebreaks, andother management choices are examples. Security plan-ners need to be aware of these and other managementintentions and need to be creative and imaginative inconsidering their possible impact on timber theft risks.

Security conditions also can be analyzed by decon-structing the protection problem into its components.Annex 6.1 differentiates among forest managementsystems—national forest lands, industrial concessions,protected areas, and community lands—showing howcrime is expected to be prevented, detected, and sup-pressed. Annex 6.1 helps identify protection strategiesthat are geared to the needs, stakeholder incentives, andopportunities of the different systems.

The security planner’s goals are to predict crime and to use the predictions as the bases to propose prevention measures

3 See Associates in Rural Development (ARD), http://www.ardinc.com/projects/detail_region.php?id=34

An example of a detailed analysis of fraud risk andits use in developing appropriate control mechanismsis the “Revenue Administration and Control Matrix”developed by the British Columbia (Canada) Ministryof Forestry (reproduced here as annex 6.2).4 Ministrypolicy establishes that “The Ministry will assert the finan-cial interest of the Crown in its forest and range resourcesin a systematic and equitable manner by establishingclear revenue administration and control standards andresponsibilities.” (Policy 12.4, Revenue Administrationand Control) The ministry also will specify controls inmatrix form and direct the preparation of Revenue RiskManagement Plans.

The matrix identifies the range of major forest man-agement functions and summarizes the related ministrypolicy and procedures. As the matrix summarizes, dif-ferent management functions are associated primarilywith different revenue-related activities and objectives,involve different controls, and require oversight fromdifferent individuals in the organization. For example, atthe “pre-award” stage, tenure and cutting permit appli-cations are reviewed. Timber cruises and stumpage ratesdetermination contribute to the determination of therevenue that is expected from the parcel. Revenue objec-tives related to other management functions include col-lecting revenue, identifying and claiming revenue, andrecording revenue. The matrix specifies the control meas-ures that ministry staff will exert, such as checking cruis-ers and scalers, inspecting boundaries, and comparingcruise and scale results. The matrix also specifies the stan-dards, or the basis of the standards, against which con-trols will be exerted; and designates the assignment ofresponsibility for each subject.

The British Columbia system is designed aroundwhat is essentially a concession system similar to thatemployed in many developing countries. A comparablematrix designed around short-term sales of standingtimber is used by the U.S. Forest Service. Both matricessummarize more detailed guidance contained in officialoperational policy manuals and handbooks. By definingstandardized routines for regular and recurrent transac-tions, policy and operational manuals and handbooksare fundamental underpinnings to maintain order andcontrol in widely dispersed operations. They provide aneasily accessible source of guidance to staff and clients.By defining procedures and accountabilities, these

publications circumscribe officials’ scope for discretionand facilitate supervision and audit.

Contents of Timber Theft Prevention Plans

The appropriate level and detail of formal written plan-ning for a forest management unit depends on the size,sophistication, value, and risks involved (chapter 3). Asmall woodlot or plantation managed directly by mem-bers of the local community normally would require onlythe most basic planning and documentation. The docu-mentation would need to address, in language and a for-mat accessible to community members, issues related tooperations, benefit-sharing, and participation. A simplesketch map could be adequate to describe the locationof resources and the zoning of activities.

On the other hand, large-scale, long-term industrialconcessions will merit much greater planning effort.Planning would have to address the possibilities of signif-icant environmental impact and risks to local commu-nity interests and also would be justified by the potentialrisks associated with what might be large industrialinvestments. The level of inventory precision, detail ofmapping, intensity of consultation, and rigor of planassessment and review would be expected to be of thehighest quality. Obviously, however, the most impor-tant measure of any plan is that it is implemented.

The same general principles should apply to timbertheft prevention planning. Historically, some FMUshave experienced low levels of crime, are stocked withtimber of limited commercial interest, and have low-intensity management activities or high levels of partic-ipation from supportive local communities. Such FMUsmay not warrant heavy investment in security planning.In these circumstances, integration of attention to secu-rity concerns into the general provisions of the manage-ment plan could be sufficient.

If the primary objective of management is protec-tion from illegal threats, parks’ and protected areas’plans might, in their totality, be tantamount to crimeprevention plans. Concessions and publicly managedproduction forest lands in countries facing serious andwell-established illegal logging problems could requirefree-standing theft prevention plans, or at least specificchapters in the overall management plans devoted tosecurity. Based on risk assessment work in Cambodia,annex 6.1 suggests the kinds of issues that theft preven-tion planning could need to address across different for-est types and classifications.

4 Also available at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/manuals/policy/resmngmt/rm12-4a1.htm

The most important measure of any plan is that it is implemented

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Subject to this general perspective, the specific con-tents of timber theft prevention plans typically will bedrawn from, and include, the topics and contents dis-cussed below.

1. Introduction and BackgroundThe introduction of the plan needs to include a concisestatement of the land management agency’s policy requir-ing the development of a timber theft prevention plan.To have merit and meaning, the policy needs to be sup-ported and approved by the highest levels of the organ-ization. Equally important, all levels of managementmust demonstrate commitment to this policy by issu-ing directives that can be referenced in the plan’s intro-ductory statement.

In either its introduction or background section, aplan would describe the overall resource managementcontext and plan (chapter 3). Included would be a basicdescription of the resource, activities, harvests, and worksthat are planned and expected. The introduction alsowould discuss the results of the risk assessment, securitysurvey, and analysis; and would enumerate the mainthreats and key vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.

The introduction also should point out the impor-tance of cooperation between the land managementagency and timber harvest contractors. The plan willenhance consistency in harvest preparation and admin-istration, and uniformity in the steps to reduce theft orunwanted activity. A plan will minimize misinterpreta-tions that can result when the management or enforce-ment program has no such uniformity and consistency.Collaboration between land management agenciesand companies using private security can create a uni-fied effort to prevent timber theft and to protect assets.Close collaboration can be achieved by developingresponsibilities and operational protocols in a timbertheft prevention plan that will lead to a partnershipapproach to eliminate or reduce timber theft.

2. ObjectivesObjectives are the foundation on which to build a strat-egy that will lessen opportunities for violations and theft.Objectives should be measurable so that performanceand outputs can be evaluated to determine compliancein meeting the desired results. During planning, objec-tives should be defined that will improve the agency’sability to monitor and deter violators; and detect,apprehend, and prosecute them when theft occurs. Inaddition, objectives would include practice of specific

management practices tailored to timber harvest prepa-ration, timber harvest administration, contact viola-tions, and law enforcement activities.

3. Basic Timber Theft Prevention PrinciplesThe plan should describe the fundamental philosophyor principles that will be pursued in the security pro-gram. Principles should be specified in the most basicterms and can be formulated as if they would be usedas the headings in a staff training manual or program.Figure 6.1 shows an excerpt from a Cambodian Code ofConduct for Eco-Tourism Rangers, which simply andclearly states: “Ecotourism Rangers must not behave dis-honestly and corruptly,” a message that could be con-veyed directly in a security plan. Principles also shouldtake into account the vulnerabilities unique to the enter-prise. The number and specific elements of each shouldbe tailored to the resource management agency’s struc-ture, operational procedures, and risks. Other princi-ples can include:

● Timber theft prevention will be the responsibilityof every employee.

● No timber will be cut without an executed con-tract, permit, or other legal transmittal document.

Figure 6.1 “Improper Conduct to Avoid. Eco-tourism Rangers must not behave dishonestly andcorruptly.” Source: Code of Conduct for EcotourismRangers,” BPAMP, Ministry of Environment, Cambo-dia, n.d., 15.

● All timber sold, including additional cut, will havesupporting recorded measurements and cruisereports.

● All timber harvest contracts will require that tim-ber authorized for removal be marked or taggedwith an approved tracking system.

● No timber will be cut without prior designation byauthorized land management agency personnel.The timber will be designated by approved mark-ing paint or tracking tags.

● All timber harvest contracts will contain an areamap showing the location of designated timber.

● All timber harvest contracts will contain approvedtransportation maps showing the approved haulroutes, log rest areas, scaling locations, and mill orprocessing sites.

● A cutting unit closure audit will be conducted forall harvest contracts.

● Forest management and forest law enforcementwill coordinate in accordance with establishedprotocols.

● The community will be involved in protection.

4. Access Control, Surveillance, and DeterrenceThis section would describe actions, physical barriers,and other measures to control entry, exit, and activi-ties within the forest (chapter 4). Measures would beselected and designed based on the security survey andrisk assessment. Physical barriers and gates, as well asareas to be prioritized for patrols and surveillance,would be located on maps. Protocols for patrols andincident reporting would be described, as would plansfor use of staff, contracted security firms, social fenc-ing, or other approaches to surveillance. Specifics mightinclude:

● Recommendations for road alignment changes,road and trail decommissioning standards, andtree removals

● Use of gates, locks (disposition of keys), fences,and other physical barriers

● Signage● Definition of security zones● Specification of incident reporting and notifica-

tion arrangements (names and positions of offi-cials to be contacted in case of various events)

● Community involvement and motivation ap-proaches

● Checkpoint locations.

5. Timber Transaction SecurityWhere commercial harvesting is planned, the plan shouldidentify the harvesting system or systems approved forthe FMU and apply the kinds of considerations discussedin chapter 5 to the proposed operations. Regardless ofthe harvest sale system used, the plan should specify stepsto guide managers and foresters during the timber salepreparation phase. Steps include:

● Timber cruising standards.● Timber designation standards. These criteria

should include security and accountability meas-ures to prevent counterfeiting or misuse of mark-ing materials to steal timber (tracer element paints,tree identification tags, bar code tags).

● Standards for boundary marking, cutting unitboundaries, transportation routes along withrequirements, and mapping.

● Timber appraisal standards.● Bid-opening procedures.

In relation to sale administration, plan provisions mightaddress:

● Use of independently certified personnel.● Conduct of pre-operations meeting with managers

or contractors.● Provisions to inspect sale-related activities and

documentation.● Procedures to handle undesignated cut or dam-

aged timber.● Standards to follow, including procedures to notify

law enforcement if unauthorized cutting is discov-ered, or theft indicators are found.

● Operation inspections, audits, and reviews by for-est managers and law enforcement specialists.

● Preparation of harvest/timber sale closure checklist.● Post-logging inspections of all cutting units. Inspec-

tions should include inventory and exploratoryharvest activities associated with road construc-tion for future cutting units.

● Definition of red flags and meeting data collectionand analysis requirements for exception reports.

● Security and accountability of tree-designationmaterial.

6. Provisions to Ensure Industry CooperationAn Industry Cooperation section will guide establish-ment of communication links between the land owner

The plan should specify steps to guide managers andforesters during the timber sale preparation phase

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and the private entities authorized to remove timber.This section would prescribe specific ways in whichindustry and land managers can interact to ensure thattheft prevention becomes integral to harvest prepara-tion and administrative practices. For example,

● Timber theft prevention should be included asan agenda topic at industry group or associationmeetings.

● Antitheft material and advice can be jointly devel-oped and published.

● Forest law enforcement specialists should be invitedto attend pre-operations (pre-entry) meetings todiscuss timber theft prevention measures. Theirattendance can facilitate cooperation. It also canhelp break down the negative perception that lawenforcement exists only to arrest violators.

7. Program Monitoring Inspections, Audits, and ReviewsThe plan should specify review of its own implementa-tion and effectiveness. Specific evaluation criteria anddata acquisition provisions can include:

● Procedures for recording dates, times, and indi-viduals and firms involved in observed contractnoncompliance issues and corrective actions; andfor notifying management.

● Records of sanctions.● Inspection routines.● Joint inspections conducted with forest law

enforcement specialists.● Plans for adjustments in response to infractions

(for example, increase inspection schedule whenindicators of theft surface).

8. Timber Theft Prevention Training for ForestManagement and Law Enforcement PersonnelAn important ingredient in a meaningful timber theftprevention plan is to make explicit which specializedtraining is required for personnel. Courses should bedesigned and provided on a recurring basis. Suggestedcourses might include:

● Timber Theft Prevention (6 hours). Should beprovided to all land management field personnel.

● Basic Timber Theft Investigation (8 hours). Shouldbe geared for and provided to forest law enforce-ment personnel responsible for conducting timbertheft investigations.

● Timber Theft for Managers (2 hours). Should beprovided to all forest managers with timber man-agement and/or other forest product managementresponsibilities.

9. Law Enforcement ProtocolProcedures for cooperation between forest managementand law enforcement personnel should be formulated inthe security plan and before unauthorized activities aredetected. In the event of problems, joint protocols agreedin advance with law enforcement agencies will enhancecooperation, and public knowledge of such cooperationcan help provide a deterrent effect. Protocols also shouldspecify which personnel are responsible to do what, andidentify actions to stop losses and to protect evidencecritical in identifying the violator. The plan should doc-ument policies on the use of weapons and force, and oninstructions to staff, contractors, and others on inter-vening in ongoing crimes.

10. Staffing and ResourcesImplementation of a successful prevention plan dependson adequate staffing to meet the land managementobjectives. The plan must realistically address mini-mum staffing levels and the funding necessary to meetthe stated objectives and activities of the plan. At a min-imum, the plan should identify what specialties areneeded; the required certification standards; and thesalary, travel, and equipment costs needed to supportthe organization.

In the discussion of cost implications, it is espe-cially important for the planner to identify the meas-ures that can be undertaken at little or no cost, and todistinguish them from actions that may have signif-icant costs or even be prohibitively expensive. Forexample, a recommendation to avoid a road align-ment that could provide access to illegal loggers mightnot involve any additional costs. In contrast, a pro-posal to install locked gates would need to recognize thecosts of the materials, management of keys, replace-ment of lost and stolen keys, and replacement of dam-aged and vandalized locks.

Some security costs may not involve direct expen-diture. Leaving areas unharvested or unroaded asbuffer zones will reduce the volume of wood availablefor harvest. Installation of access controls on roadwaysmay slow or impede wood deliveries, and changes ininventory tracking procedures or methods could entailadditional costs. A formal cost-benefit calculation might

be appropriate in advising on some security options.However, risks and the effectiveness of risk mitigationmeasures always will be uncertain. In evaluating thejustification of security costs, managers and policy-makers inevitably will need to rely on judgment andexperience.

Program ReviewsOnce in place, timber theft prevention plans should bereviewed and updated regularly. This should be doneannually for large areas that face serious theft problemsand have great economic value. It can be done less fre-quently in the case of smaller, less valuable, or lessproblematic areas. Generally, a program review is fairlybroad. Nevertheless, it is helpful in demonstrating man-agement’s commitment to take action to prevent theft.The make-up of a review team could include corporatesecurity; mid- to upper-level forest managers, includingforest law enforcement personnel (national/central,provincial, district); and a manager from the concession/timber sale contractor. The timber theft preventionplan should include criteria that will assist the reviewteam to determine whether timber theft preventionmeasures are being implemented and used in both theharvest planning and administrative/harvesting phaseof the timber management program.

Depending on the number of active concession/timbersale contracts, the theft prevention plan should identifythe minimum number of program reviews that should beconducted each year. Sites selected for reviews shouldbe scheduled in rotation so that all areas under contracthave periodic program reviews, including sites in whichlogging has not occurred but sale layout is being done.A report with findings and recommendations should becompleted within 30 days of a review. Units inspectedshould be required to submit follow-up reports identi-fying actions taken to correct any deficiencies reportedin their reviews.

A program review may not detect all instances or indi-cators of theft. Therefore, it is important that the theftprevention plan require that a timber-accountability auditbe conducted on all active concession/timber sale con-tract areas. This audit will become the tool to moreclosely monitor timber theft prevention efforts.

The audit should be structured to validate that tim-ber is being cut, removed, and paid for under the termsof the contract. Terms include the harvest preparationand administration phases of the timber managementprogram.

The audit process should be built around specificcriteria, such as to:

● Define who is responsible for ensuring that auditsare conducted and that appropriate authoriza-tions have been delegated to carry out this activity.

● Select the audit team from another unit. To reducepotential conflict of interest, or the appearance ofit, team members should come from an adminis-trative unit other than the one being audited.

● Select team members to form a mix of special-ists. They might include personnel from forestproduction, forest protection, forest administra-tion, forest law enforcement, and finance/fiscaland accounting,

● Establish the frequency of the audits: preferablyannually; minimally, once every two years.

● Specify audit standards along with responsibilitiesfor each team member in the prevention plan.Responsibilities should include to (a) review har-vest preparation methods; and check compliancewith (b) marking standards; (c) tree designationsystems being used; (d) established harvest admin-istration procedures; (e) check volume-sold vs.volume-cut documents, and finance/fiscal andaccounting procedures; and (f ) regarding prevent-ing, detecting, and reporting timber theft.

● Distribute the audit report to the appropriatelevels of forest managers including forest lawenforcement; include a description of findings andrecommendations for all deficiencies discovered.

Case Studies of Timber Theft Preventionand Forest Security Planning

There are relatively few available examples of well-documented timber theft prevention plans. While moreis available on park or protected areas management,much of that work addresses primarily threats fromencroachment on forest resources of alternative landuses, hunting, and subsistence demands from localcommunities. The documented examples of responses toindustrial- or commercial-scale illegal logging in parksand protected areas are cases of emergency reactions toproblems rather than of proactive prevention planning.In many cases, timber theft prevention plans preparedby industrial forestry firms are held as confidential doc-uments that are not publicly disclosed for security rea-sons. The three case studies summarized in the next

Timber theft prevention plans should be reviewed andupdated regularly

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The Dragon’s Tail is extremely vulnerable to threatsdue to these two reasons and to its easy transboundaryaccess from Laos and Vietnam. There are no accessroads to the Dragon’s Tail north of the Sesan River.Depending on the season, ranger foot patrols requireat least six days to reach the Dragon’s Tail from thenearest station within Cambodia. In contrast, accessfrom Laos and Vietnam is easy. A road through theDragon’s Tail connects these two countries, and theirborder police and military units are stationed in andaround the reserve.

In analyzing the problem, planners were able to locateor identify additional threats (figure 6.3):

● Internal threats. It later became evident that corruptsenior park staff had been supporting the illegallogging operation, gained financial benefits from it,and ensured that the logging was not reported.

● External threats. Powerful individuals in the threecountries, including high-ranking provincialand border police officials from Cambodia, wereinvolved in the illegal logging.

After the discovery of the illegal logging in theDragon’s Tail, the government initiated criminalinvestigations that have resulted in convictions ofhigh-ranking officials and the removal from office of several provincial officials and staff. The Ministry

section are based on presentations made at a meetingheld to discuss an early draft of this report.5 They illus-trate actual applications of some of the principles andconcepts discussed in this report.

CAMBODIAResponding to Illegal Logging in the Virachey National Park’s “Dragon’s Tail”Virachey National Park is one of the top-priority areasfor conservation in Southeast Asia (figure 6.2).6 It cov-ers 3,325 km2 and protects flora and fauna of inter-national conservation priority. A high percentage ofCambodia’s ethnic minorities live around the park. Itsvegetation, dominated by evergreen forest, is more orless undisturbed. Since March 2000, with World Bankand Global Environment Facility (GEF) support, Cam-bodia’s Ministry of Environment has implemented aBiodiversity and Protected Areas Management Pro-ject (BPAMP). Its overall development objective is toassist the government to sustainably manage its nationalprotected area system, specifically Virachey NationalPark (VNP).

In 2003, following a one-year participatory process,BPAMP developed a management plan for VNP. Exten-sive reconnaissance flights provided up-to-date plan-ning information such as the status of the vegetation,encroachment, and illegal activities. Flights also iden-tified potential areas in which to develop tourism andobtain baseline data for a comprehensive monitoringprogram. The 2003 inspection flights over the parkobserved no logging. However, flights in 2004 revealedlarge-scale logging and an extensive network of loggingroads in an area of the park called the Dragon’s Tail.

The Dragon’s Tail is a roughly triangular 120 km2 areain the far northeast of the park along Cambodia’s borderswith Laos and Vietnam (outlined in red in figure 6.3).The area is mainly low bamboo forest on undulatingterrain with remnants of evergreen forest along ridgesand on hills. The illegal logging must have started dur-ing the 2003–04 dry season. Yet, it went unnoticed forseveral months because of the Dragon’s Tail’s remote-ness and difficult access from Cambodia.

5 See Acknowledgments and appendix 3.6 This section is based on a presentation by Klaus Schmitt. The

Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project (BPAMP) isdocumented at http://www.bpamp.org.kh/Main/bpamp_pub.htm

Figure 6.2 Virachey National Park, Cambodia.Mainland Southeast Asia showing the location of ViracheyNational Park. Source: K. Schmitt, BPAMP.

Planners were able to locate or identify additionalthreats

of Environment also initiated a planning process toinstitute long-term measures to prevent the reoccur-rence of illegal logging. Development of the plan beganwith a threat analysis that surveyed 166 kilometers ofroads in the Dragon’s Tail and located 1,683 cubicmeters of logs left behind by loggers and stumps indi-cating additional illegal activity. In addition to theabove threats to the Dragon’s Tail area, the risk assess-ment identified these two threats (figure 6.3):

1. Border dispute involving Lao armed groups whohad occupied approximately 20,000 ha of VNPsince 2002, preventing access by ranger patrols(outlined in blue)

2. Selective logging of eaglewood trees (Aquilariacrassna) for incense (the three areas outlined inblack).

Building on the risk assessment, four sets of meas-ures to prevent timber theft in the Dragon’s Tail havebeen instituted:

1. Operational. Patrol deployment and staff rotationmodified; two ranger outposts constructed in theDragon’s Tail area; communication with parkheadquarters upgraded through the installationof high frequency (HF) radios at the outposts;aerial monitoring increased.

2. Staff motivation. Training, adequate patrol equip-ment and infrastructure, and performance-basednonmonetary incentives provided; salaries scaledto encourage good performance.

3. Cooperation (local, regional-transboundary). On-going cooperation between the park and stake-holders intensified: from the local level throughprovincial, military, and policy authorities to trans-boundary cooperation with adjacent protectedareas in Laos and Vietnam. In addition, BPAMPand the Ministry of Environment collaborate withthe Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice toensure prosecution of those involved in illegal log-ging, including high-ranking officials. The Officeof the Prime Minister supports these efforts.

• Border dispute• Lao military occupying approx. 20,000

ha of VNP since 2002

Selective logging of eaglewood trees for incense

Vulnerable through:• Location (remote ⇔ transboundary access)• Internal threats (corrupt staff)• External threats (powerful individuals)

Figure 6.3 Identification of timber theft threats and risks in Dragon’s Tail, Virachey NationalPark, Cambodia. Source: K. Schmitt, BPAMP.

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4. Disincentives. With support from BPAMP, theMinistry of Environment prepared the court caseto prosecute the high-ranking officials involved inthe Dragon’s Tail illegal logging. This court casehas attracted substantial public and media atten-tion and, if successful, will create a real disincen-tive for timber theft.

To address threats to eaglewood resources, the pro-posed measures included:

● Patrols in known areas of eaglewood● Development of informant networks● Surprise attacks on eaglewood poachers● Stop and arrest encountered offenders● More aggressive transfer of cases to court, and

follow-up● Conservation education about eaglewood for

specific and general audiences● Support to community information networks.

To address the problems along the Lao border, theplan proposed to:

● Carry out patrols without engaging Lao P.D.R.soldiers

● Carry out aerial monitoring● Lobby the Government of Cambodia to resolve

border dispute.

The successful criminal prosecutions are positiveindicators, but it is too early to know whether the effortsin the Virachey National Park will be successful in thelong term. It does appear that, in addition to obviouspolitical commitment at the highest levels of govern-ment, having a park protection strategy located withina sound overall park planning and development pro-gram provides a framework for adaptive management.In it, simplicity and flexibility are achieved by includingonly the basic framework of the proposed managementin the Management Plan. Details are addressed in moreflexible supporting documents, such as Detailed Zon-ing Plans, Operating Guidelines, Visitor and BusinessPlans, Memoranda of Agreement, and Strategy Docu-ments. Thus, the project has been able to combine skills,experience, and creativity with a disciplined analyticprocess to put in place a credible timber theft preven-tion strategy.

PERIYAR TIGER RESERVE, INDIAConverting Timber Thieves to Park Protectors through EcotourismPeriyar Tiger Reserve lies in the Western Ghats in theIndian state of Kerala.7 The reserve lies along the water-shed of the Periyar and Pamba Rivers. Wildlife is plenti-ful: 62 species of mammals, 381 species of birds, 44 speciesof reptiles, 16 species of amphibians, 38 species of fish,and 119 species of butterflies have been formally iden-tified. The Western Ghats is one of the oldest tropicalmountain systems. Spanning 1400 km and spreadingover 0.14 million sq km, it is home to over 40 millionpeople (including 5 million indigenous persons).

The region originally was a natural habitat for tigers.However, due to the extraction of timber, extensiveagricultural expansion in the region during the nine-teenth and twentieth centuries, manipulation of thehydrologic regime for irrigation and power generation,and mass tourism, the tiger population has dwindled.In 1973 the Government of India introduced ProjectTiger to ensure a viable population of tigers in India.In 1978, when Periyar was declared a Tiger Reserveunder Project Tiger, only 5 tigers were known to inhabitthe forest. Project Tiger consolidated boundaries, relo-cated human dwellings out of the interior to minimizedisturbances to wildlife, fenced or dug trenches to excludecattle, prevented wildfires, maintained swamps andwaterholes, encouraged the growth of fodder species,and eliminated commercial exploitation of forest prod-ucts. By 2000, 22 years after the project was begun, 36 tigers were living in the reserve.

In addition to its natural features, the area has enor-mous cultural and religious significance. Over 5 milliontourists and Hindu pilgrims visit the area each year,many within a 2-month peak Hindu pilgrimage period.Despite the relocation program and other control efforts,shops and hotels were opened along jungle routes toaccommodate the annual pilgrimage. Nearby trees werecut for construction and fuel. The increased traffic mar-ginally raised living standards of the local impoverishedpeople through menial jobs. Nevertheless, overall, wide-spread poverty persisted, and animosity to the Reserveand public authority deepened. Many local peopleresorted to illicitly collecting fuelwood and logging tosupply makeshift hotels, shops, and accommodations.

7 This section is based on a presentation by Pramod Krishnan andKutty and Nair, “Periyar Tiger Reserve: Poachers Turned Game-keepers,” in Durst and others 2005, 125–34.

Successful criminal prosecutions are positive indicators,but it is too early to know whether the efforts in the Vi-rachey National Park will be successful in the long term

Simultaneously, development of transportation infra-structure facilitated access by poachers, smugglers,and illicit grazers. They sought a range of productsfrom the forest, including the vayana bark; prized sandalwood, teak, and rosewood; and elephant tusks.Some—including encroachers from adjoining TamilNadu State—cultivated narcotic plants such as Cannabissativa inside the Tiger Reserve.

By the mid-1990s, the gravity and extent of theencroachments forced the realization that policingalone could not control them. With the Reserve facingillegal felling of cinnamon and sandalwood trees andpoaching, hard-core criminals, and constant conflictwith park staff, a handful of enthusiastic forest officersat the Reserve realized that the participation of localpeople in management, decision-making, and the day-to-day running of the park was the only hope for itsconservation.

In 1996 the Kerala Forest and Wildlife Departmentlaunched the India Eco-Development Project (EDP)for the Periyar Tiger Reserve with financial assistancefrom the World Bank and Global Environment Facility(GEF). EDP’s important components are village eco-development programs, improved protected area man-agement, and environmental education and awarenesscampaigns.

The basis is the preparation of microplans for incomegeneration and conservation measures for each villagefringing the reserve. The project tries to minimize bioticpressures resulting from grazing, fuelwood collection,nontimber-forest-product collection, fishing, and fireby providing alternative income-generating activitiesand improving the efficiency of natural resource use.Eco-Development Committees (EDCs) are formed tocontribute to the protection and management of theTiger Reserve in return for opportunities to earn legallivelihoods. These opportunities are based on people’susing their knowledge of the jungle to protect it, sustain-able use of nontimber forest products, and protection-oriented ecotourism. Some EDCs are comprised offormer smugglers and poachers who, after intensivetraining in the basics of forest protection and manage-ment, are deployed as social fences (chapter 4). Becausethey know the reserve so well, this group helps staffprotect the forest and wildlife by forming patrol squads.Others guide tourists on wildlife-spotting excursions inpackages developed by their EDCs.

As of 2006, 72 committees had been established inwhich approximately 5,540 families participate—from

the overall target population of 58,000 people livingwithin a 2-km radius of the reserve. The results havebeen unmistakable:

1. Illegal tree felling has been completely stopped(equivalent to saving 100,000 trees/year).

2. Park management has been strengthened.3. Community relations have dramatically improved.4. Poverty has been reduced.5. The social stigma that had been associated with

indigenous communities has been removed.

The recognized success of the Periyar Tiger Reserve isa valuable demonstration of the use of social techniquesto prevent forest crimes. On the basis of experienceand observations that played the role of a securityassessment, Reserve management identified the failureof physical access barriers (fences and trenches), forcedresettlement, and unneeded suppression of nontimberforest product commercialization. The identified failureof physical barriers recast the problem to turn poachersinto wardens.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICEThefts Lead to Change to Tree Measurement TimberSale System and Theft Prevention PlanningDuring the 1980s and 1990s, the United States ForestService (USFS) experienced increased levels of illegallogging. Investigations disclosed thefts conservativelyestimated to amount to US$10 million–100 million.8 Asthe manager of vast forest resources, the Forest Servicehad believed unquestioningly that its managementpractices could prevent large-scale theft. However, itsinvestigation revealed that it had been mistaken. Ananalysis was conducted on each known timber theftcase. The analyses found that (1) 80 percent of the tim-ber theft cases had been discovered by sources otherthan the Forest Service; (2) theft had been going on forsome time before being detected; (3) theft indicators hadbeen misinterpreted by forest managers; and (4) theinvestigations were complex and costly.9

Numerous weaknesses and threats were identifiedthat had allowed large-scale theft. For example, the agencyhad primarily used a scaled timber sale program. Inves-tigations into the theft revealed significant weaknesses

8 McLean 1994.9 USDA Forest Service Law Enforcement and Investigations 1991.

Periyar Tiger Reserve is a valuable demonstration ofthe use of social techniques to prevent forest crimes

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in this program. It was determined that opportunities fortheft increased the farther trees had to be transportedbefore being scaled and the ownership switched. Amongthe threats identified were corrupt third-party scalers. Inone case, a single log scaler underreported actual tim-ber volumes amounting to US$50,000 every month for25 years to the benefit of the lumber mill. This singlefraud cost the United States government $15 million.10

As a direct result of the weaknesses and threats discov-ered in the old system, management changed directionto move toward a tree measurement timber sale system.In a tree measurement system, ownership of the treeschanges before they are cut (through pre-harvestingcruising to determine species and volume, the purchaserpays for the timber prior to cutting and transporting thelogs). This system reduces the opportunity to defraud orsteal timber through scaling schemes.

Significantly, the change also marked the agency’sincorporation of timber theft prevention planning as anessential component of its timber management program.The internal, but independent, USFS Office of InspectorGeneral conducted a nation-wide audit of timber theftcontrols. Its report found that the Forest Service did havepolicies in place to minimize losses from theft. However,the management program lacked a mechanism to ensurecompliance. As a result of the audit and an analysis ofthe timber theft investigations, the agency emphasizedimplementing policies that required development oftimber theft prevention plans at the national, regional,and local levels of the agency.

The USFS case illustrates clearly that timber theft isnot exclusively a developing country problem. It alsoshows the necessity for the senior management of aninstitution to be ready to recognize and confront prob-lems in long-established systems. The important role ofan independent internal control authority in assessingsystems performance also is clear.10 McLean 1994.

Timber theft is not exclusively a developing countryproblem

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Forestmanagement

function

Pre-Award:Tenure/cutting per-mit; Application, review, approval

Logging plan submis-sion, review, approval

Post-Award:Ongoing

Forest tenures:Harvesting inspections

Final inspection

Residue and waste

Private land

Revenue management

activity

Cruise timber

Determine stumpagerate

Award tenure

Monitor timber harvesting

Mark timber

Scale timber

Adjust stumpage rates

Reappraise timber

Mark timber

Inspect boundaries

Inspect boundaries

Compare cut to cruise

Assess residue andwaste

Inspect boundaries

Revenue management

objective

Determine revenue

Determine revenue

Collect revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Determine revenue

Determine revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Primary control

Check licensee’s timber cruise in field

Check licensee’s compilation in the office

Check cruise compilation computer programs

Check licensee’s appraisal worksheetin field

Check licensee’s appraisal worksheetin office

Check calculations

Check to ensure successful applicant does notowe money

Assess revenue risk and determine inspectionfrequency

Set timber-marking requirements

Designate scale site for scaling

Check calculations

Check calculations

Inspect marking of timber in field

Inspect boundaries in field

Inspect boundaries in field

Compare scale and cruise; investigate signifi-cant differences

Check licensee’s survey in field

Check licensee’s data in office

Inspect boundaries in field

Annex 6.2 Revenue Administration and Control Matrix: Stumpage Revenue

Source: Ministry of Forestry, British Columbia, Canada, http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/manuals/policy/resmngmt/rm12-4a1.htm

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Control standard

100% of cruise-based cutting authorities;75% of scale-based cutting authorities

All compilations

As required

Under review

All worksheets

All rates

All timber tenures

All timber tenures

All logging plans

All logging plans

All adjustable rates

All adjustable rates

Inspection frequency as determined by Timber Harvesting Monitoring Plans

Inspection frequency as determined byTimber Harvesting Monitoring Plans

All cutting authorities

All scaled-based cutting authorities

25% of cut blocks; 10% of aggregatedcut blocks

All surveys

As required, or in conjunction with aninvestigation

Control standard reference

Cruising Policy (draft)Cruise-based Sales PolicyCruising Manual

Cruising Policy Compilation Manual

Cruising Policy Compilation Manual

Appraisal Manuals

Appraisal Manuals

No reference

Section 63.1, Forest Act; Small BusinessForest Enterprise Regulation; CollectionPolicy

Timber Harvesting Monitoring Plan Policy

Timber Marking and Transportation Policy

Section 73, Forest Act; Scaling Regulation

Coast and Interior Appraisal Manuals

Coast and Interior Appraisal Manuals

Timber Marking and Transportation Policy; Timber Harvesting Monitoring Plan

Timber Harvesting Monitoring Plan Policy

Timber Harvesting Monitoring Plan Policy

SBFEP Commitment Control Policy

Provincial Logging Residue and WasteMeasurement Manual

Provincial Logging Residue and WasteMeasurement Manual

No reference

Responsibility

District manager

District manager

Director, Revenue Branch; Regionalmanager

District manager

District manager; Regional manager

Regional manager

District manager; Regional manager

District manager

District manager

District manager

Director, Revenue Branch

District manager; Regional manager

District manager

District manager

District manager

District manager

District manager

District manager; Regional manager

District manager; Regional manager

(continued)

Forestmanagement

function

Revenue management

activity

Revenue management

objective Primary control

Annex 6.2 Revenue Administration and Control Matrix: Stumpage Revenue (continued)

Timber transport(unscaled timber)

Scaling

Timber transport(scaled timber)

Billing

Collection

Inspect timber in transit(cut block to scale site)

License scalers

Authorize scale sites

Inspect scale sites

Check scaling

Scale data submission

Inspect timber in transit(scale site to scale site)

Invoicing

Statements of account

Collection

Identify and claim revenue

Determine, identify, claim,and record revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify and claim revenue

Identify, claim, and recordrevenue

Identify, claim, and recordrevenue

Claim revenue

Record revenue

Collect revenue

Check timber in transit and at scale sites toensure it is delivered to designated scale site

Examine and issue licenses to scalers

Endorse scalers

Authorize scalers

Designate where timber must be scaled

Approve scale sites

Check compliance

Check accuracy of licensee’s scale

Check scaler’s compliance with authority/endorsement

Reconcile scaler diary with scale tally sheetssubmitted to ministry

Check licensee’s compilation in office

Check compilation computer programs

Transport requirements

Check to ensure all scale data received isinvoiced

Check to ensure all invoices are on statements

Monitor accounts and collect vigorously

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Control standard Control standard reference Responsibility

All timber

All scalers

All scalers

All scalers

All timber

All scale sites

As required on a risk basis

1 check every 2 months per scaler;accurate within 3%

1 check every 2 months

Ongoing, based on random samples

As required

No standard

All timber

All scale data and all invoices

All account statements and invoices

All accounts

Timber Marking, Branding and Transporta-tion Regulation; Timber Marking and Transportation Policy

Sec. 78, Forest Act; Licensing and Administration of Scaling Policy

Sec. 79, Forest Act; Licensing and Adminis-tration of Scales Policy

Sec. 73, Forest Act; Licensing and Adminis-tration of Scales Policy

Sec. 73, Forest Act; Administration of ScaleSites Policy; Timber Marking and Trans-portation Policy

Sec. 73.1, Forest Act; Licensing and Admin-istration of Scaling Policy

Monitoring, Inspecting, and Auditing ScaleSites Policy

Monitoring, Inspecting, and Auditing ScaleSites Policy

Monitoring, Inspecting, and Auditing ScaleSites Policy

Monitoring, Inspecting, and Auditing ScaleSites Policy

Monitoring, Inspecting, and Auditing ScaleSites Policy

Scaling Requirements Policy

Timber Marking, Branding, and Transporta-tion Regulation; Timber Marking and Transport Policy

Timber Invoicing Policy

Forest Act; Financial Administration Act

Collection Policy

District manager; Regional manager

Chief forester; Director, RevenueBranch; Regional manager

Regional manager

Chief forester; Director, RevenueBranch; Regional manager; Districtmanager

District manager

District manager; Regional manager

District manager

District manager

District manager

District manager; Regional manager

District manager; Regional manager;Director, Revenue Branch

Regional manager; Director, RevenueBranch

District manager; Regional manager

District or regional manager; ordirector, Revenue Branch (dependenton where scale data was received)

Director, Revenue Branch

Regional manager; Director, Revenue Branch

Conclusions: Policies and Strategies toPromote Timber Theft Prevention

William B. Magrath

7

The extremely limited application of the industrialsecurity and asset protection thinking and practice indeveloping country forestry contrasts markedly withboth the widespread problem of illegal logging andparallels in other industries and forestry practice indeveloped countries. To an extent, the lack of securityawareness in forestry simply reflects forestry’s generallylow level of professional and technical sophistication.There is no reason to think that forest protection effortwould run ahead of general management performance.However, policy, institutional, and other constraintsalso stand in the way. Positive public policies, forest-industry-based initiatives, and international donor poli-cies and practices could ease these constraints andmotivate greater security effort. To conclude this report,this chapter explores some reasons for limited proac-tivity in timber theft prevention, and considers whatselected stakeholder groups can do to raise the level ofattention and effort.

Due Diligence

Effort on the part of forest resource managers to preventtheft should be considered a part of due diligence in theconduct of their responsibilities. Due diligence describesa number of concepts that involve either the perform-ance of an investigation of a business or person, or theperformance of an act, with a certain standard of care.It can be a legal obligation, but the term more com-monly applies to voluntary efforts.1 For example, of-fers to purchase an asset or to engage in some other

transaction can depend on the results of analysis by anorganization’s staff or an expert. Due diligence implies alevel of effort and attention that would prevent unnec-essary harm or undue risk.2

Expectations as to what constitutes due diligence oran adequate standard of care will vary, but this reportsuggests that in countries that face recognized illegallogging problems, forest resource managers should beexpected to proactively anticipate the risk of timbertheft and to pursue explicit and documented mitigationefforts.

The widespread failure of forest managers to practicedue diligence in regard to timber theft prevention seemsto come from at least five factors: misconceptions; lack ofawareness; weak incentives; absence of consequences, andcomplicity.

MisconceptionsPeople unfamiliar with the crime prevention and assetsecurity concepts discussed in this report often mis-interpret the suggestion that forest management unitoperations should be proactive in preventing timbertheft. For example, it is suggested that timber theft pre-vention will amount to draconian measures that willlimit the rights and access of poor local communities,impractical efforts to surround forests with fences, oroutlandish high technology schemes to electronicallymonitor remote areas. It also is said that matters of for-est policy and economic incentives are the importantdrivers of illegal logging and that narrow technical“fixes” are doomed to failure. It often is said that forest

1 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Due_diligence 2 See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/duediligence.asp

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conditions and institutional and social circumstances indeveloping countries prohibit serious and significantsecurity effort. In particular, it sometimes is said thatwithout such basic preconditions as acceptance of therule of law and a commitment to socially sound andinclusive forest resource management, illegal loggingand other forest crimes cannot be prevented. It also issaid that so long as consumer demand for wood andwood products is indifferent to their legality or illegal-ity, illegal logging will uncontrollable.

There is much in these critiques. It would be easyfor specific technologies or systems to be inappropri-ately deployed in settings for which they are completelyunsuited. The resulting failures would be equally easyto anticipate. The sources of many of the problems ofillegal logging do lie in deeply rooted social and polit-ical problems far beyond the influence or control offorest managers. However, similar statements couldbe made regarding many other criminal and socialproblems. Nevertheless, few would suggest ignoringthe risks of burglary by leaving doors and windowsunlocked or of car theft by leaving keys in ignitions;or other risks of victimization by not taking any of themany routine precautions that individuals, families,and business take every day to protect themselves andtheir valuables.

Nothing in this report should be taken to suggestthat timber theft prevention by forest managers is easyor would be a complete and sufficient response to theproblem. Nor is the emphasis in asset protection sim-ply on physical technologies or hardware, although theymay play a part. The report has tried to make clear thatasset security and theft prevention stem from carefulthinking and serious analysis. Theft prevention andasset protection are simply tools and concepts that, ifwisely applied, should be part of an integrated responseto illegal logging.

Lack of AwarenessThis report was prepared in recognition that informationon the potential application of industrial security andasset protection to developing country forestry is verylimited and difficult to access. Until only recently, illegallogging was a problem that was denied and ignored andreceived little serious or prolonged attention. Crime pre-vention is not a specific subject in forestry education any-where in the developed or developing world. Some of thelarge forest industrial firms, operating primarily in the

developed countries, seem reluctant to share their ownexperiences or to openly discuss the effort they expendon security and asset protection. Many senior employeesand managers of these firms are themselves, it seems,unaware of the sophistication and extent of the internalrisk controls that are deployed in their own companies.Therefore, it is not surprising that there is such under-appreciation of security practice in developing countryforestry.

This report is intended to raise awareness and to beillustrative of possibilities. It is not meant as a “user’sguide” or “how-to manual.” In view of the magnitudeof the illegal logging problem and the likelihood that itwill remain a major issue in many countries, the long-term development of theft prevention as a new subspe-cialty with the field of forest protection should be priorityfor the forestry profession. This will be a long-termprocess. It will require technical assistance, professionaland in-service training, building extensive networkslinked to expertise outside of forestry, and leadershipand commitment from inside the profession.

Weak IncentivesStemming from the lack of information about the pos-sibility and value of theft-prevention measures at theforest management unit, few incentives at either theindividual or organizational level would promote theiradoption. Public service employment compensation sys-tems generally do not reward initiative and are unlikelyto support risk-taking and innovation in an unfamiliararea such as timber and forest security.

A private landowner or a corporation managing itsown land does have an incentive to protect its forestassets and could be expected to take measures in accor-dance with a profit and loss calculation. Normally, aprivate operator would not seek to protect against allrisks at all costs. A rational manager would aim to allo-cate resources to protection up to the point at which themarginal cost of protection equals the marginal value oftheft prevented. In stark contrast, the very same indi-vidual or company operating on public land under theterms of concession contracts or licenses typical ofthose in force in developing countries would act withtotal disregard to the risks of illegal logging. The costsof security planning may not be recognized in royaltycalculations; there are few examples of specific regula-tory requirements for concessionaires to address tim-ber theft risks; and there are still fewer examples of fiscal

Asset security and theft prevention stem from carefulthinking and serious analysis

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incentives or royalty rebates or reductions that wouldencourage security planning.3

Absence of ConsequencesAn extreme version of the weak incentives for theftprevention innovation is the near total lack, in mostcountries, of serious consequences for poor securityperformance. Not only do few cases of illegal loggingresult in meaningful prosecution and penalty, but alsoresource managers typically experiences no conse-quences if the resources under their charge are damagedby theft or other crime. Concessionaires and licenseesare very rarely penalized on account of illegal loggingoccurring on their areas. For example, damages done byillegal loggers to closed harvest compartments resultin essentially no impact or consequences to most con-cessionaires and often will go entirely unnoticed, letalone unprevented. This lack of accountability extendsto public agencies themselves and even to senior man-agers and policymakers in Ministries of Forestry andsimilar agencies, who seldom are held liable or respon-sible for damage to publicly owned resources.

ComplicityMost difficult of all the constraints limiting adoption ofproactive approaches to timber theft prevention is theactual involvement of foresters, industry, local commu-nities, and government agency staff in illegal activity.Long-established and accepted ways of doing businessin forestry, general acceptance and anticipation of cor-ruption, and perceptions that crime is inevitable andreform impossible all are deep seated obstacles to aproactive security mentality. The occurrence of corrup-tion at the highest levels of public forestry agencies canmake it impossible to expect probity at the field level.Some government forestry agencies are so systematicallystarved of official sources of revenue that they becomedependent on parallel and illicit sources of income.Wood procurement practices that turn a blind eye tothe legality of wood origin are additional forms of com-plicity in illegal activity that restrain serious adoption oftheft prevention approaches.

Where the officials and employees involved in for-est management and timber transactions are actively

complicit in theft, due diligence is a logical and practi-cal impossibility. In fact, individuals complicit in illegalactivity can be expected to actively oppose institution ofcrime prevention policies and programs. As with a lackof commitment to other measures to promote goodforest law enforcement and governance, disinterest intimber theft prevention may be rooted in complicityand institutional compromise, which are fundamentalsources of an illegal problem. Overcoming complicityin crime requires broader and deeper reforms than cancome from a veneer of prevention planning.

Public Policies to Support Forest Security Awareness

Public policies that promote good governance generally,and good forestry more particularly, should be the start-ing point for reforms to promote a proactive approachto timber and timber land security. The analysis dis-cussed in chapters 3 and 4 makes it clear that timbertheft prevention needs to build on a fundamentallysound approach to resource management. Similarly, theissues related to fraud prevention in timber transac-tions are best approached on the basis of fundamentallysound commercial practices in the conduct of timbersales. Building on these general frameworks, there aremany possibilities, including options discussed below, toshape public policies to support asset security in forestryby shifting the incentives that drive resource allocationand behavior by managers and resource users.

Incorporate Security in Design of Tenures and LicensesMuch of the world’s forest land, especially areas withcommercial timber potential, are owned and managedby government agencies. However, one of the most sig-nificant trends underway in forestry globally is therestructuring of forest and forest land tenure arrange-ments.4 Increasingly, control of forest resources is beingdevolved to local communities, decentralized to subna-tional authorities, and allocated under various arrange-ments to private interests.

One rationale behind the modification of resourceownership is the possibility of achieving better man-agement through tenure reform. In many countries,industrial forest concession systems have been designedand justified on the notion that, by linking wood indus-tries investment with access to natural resources, the3 An exception is the requirement, not yet realized in practice,

under Cambodian forest concession regulation for concessionairesto prepare and submit for government review a specific Timber TheftPrevention Plan. 4 See White and Martin 2002.

Individuals complicit in illegal activity can be expectedto actively oppose institution of crime prevention policies and programs

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private sector can be mobilized to provide better man-agement and protection than the public sector can pro-vide. For instance, in much of South Asia, recognitionthat local communities can have strong interest inresource protection and can be better positioned thangovernment agencies to control illegal grazing and fire-wood collection has been an important driver behindthe expansion of social and community forestry. Incontrast, in Indonesia, decentralization of control overforest resources was done with no attention to securityimplications—with disastrous consequences.5

While resource protection implications have beenimplicit in some forest tenure reform discussions, theyhave not received the attention they deserve. Simplyput, forest resources should not be placed under thecontrol of those unable to provide for their security andprotection. This principle should be applied to publicagencies as well as to private and community entities. Ina broad range of circumstances, putting a premium onforest protection could be expected to favor decentral-ized and community-oriented tenures. Nevertheless,the specifics of individual cases need to be consideredand weighed on their individual merits.

Consider Security Performance in License Award and RenewalAn extension of the principle of integrating considera-tion of security in the design of tenure systems should beto incorporate security in the determination of individ-ual award and renewal decisions. Corporate histories or“track records” in relation to protection performanceshould be explicit criteria in the evaluation of bids andapplications for forest concessions and logging licenses.International firms should be required to provide doc-umentation of their security performance in other juris-dictions in which they operate, and their claims shouldbe verified with the relevant authorities. Concession-aires and licensees also should be evaluated regularlyon their resource protection performance and on thequality of their prevention planning. Furthermore, sat-isfactory performance should be a condition for exten-sion or renewal.

Require Standards and Security PlanningThe planning and operational control obligations thatgovernments place on private forestry operations varyand often could be criticized as excessively onerous and

arcane. However, when timber theft is pervasive andpersistent, governments should require concessionairesand licensees to prepare and submit for approval timbertheft prevention or comparable security plans. Intro-duction of this kind of requirement could be on thesame basis as are the plans required for infrastructure,harvesting, environmental impact, or other more con-ventional topics. This introduction would be withinthe existing jurisdiction and discretion of virtually anyMinister of Forestry.

As a practical matter, to accompany a planningrequirement, governments would need to provide tech-nical guidance and standards for security planningand plan appraisal and assessment. As discussed in thisreport, security planning requirements can and shouldbe tailored to the risks and threats facing specific forestsand forest operations. Plan requirements should not,and need not, be excessively costly or indiscriminatelydemanding of technical expertise. This report indicatesthe kinds of issues that timber theft prevention planstandards would need to address, but they would needto be refined for specific applications. A consultativeprocess involving industry, community interests, andother public law enforcement agencies could ensure therelevance and practicality of guidelines and standards.Consultation also could ensure compatibility withnational and local legal principles and with specific reg-ulatory features.

Deduct Illegal Harvest from AAC and Include in Royalty and Fee AssessmentsGovernments should not indemnify concessionaires andlicensees from the results of poor security performance.Especially in the case of long-term forest managementconcessions arrangements, in which resource protec-tion is or ought to be a specific obligation, resourceslost due to illegal activities, whether caused by the con-cessionaire or by others, should be deducted from theconcessionaire’s authorized harvest volume. Where con-tracts permit, in certain circumstances, concessionairesalso should be held liable for royalties, fees, and othercharges on resources lost due to illegal activity.

Refund Concessionaire Security Planning Costs and Offer Partial IndemnificationGovernments should not indiscriminately absorb thecosts of illegal logging. However, when concessionairesdemonstrate serious good faith protection efforts, orcrime is clearly due to social and political issues beyond

Forest resources should not be placed under the control of those unable to provide for their securityand protection

5 See Barr and others 2006.

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their influence, there may be justification for the publicto absorb some private protection costs. Especially wheresecurity planning is a new approach with undemon-strated value, governments may partially subsidizesecurity planning and be justified in doing so. Subsi-dization could be based on royalty and fee discount, orrebates based on submission of theft prevention plansand security policies or other demonstrated efforts toprotect assets. In recognition of security effort, and onthe basis of prior government review and approval oftheft prevention plans, governments could be justifiedin waiving some penalties and royalty assessments onresources lost to crime.

Forest and Wood-based Industry’s Role in Timber Security

Forest and wood-based industry in many countries faceambiguous incentives in regard to the control of illegallogging and timber theft. Enterprises managing timber-land and investing in silviculture can be the victims ofthese crimes. They will have incentives to prevent themand to cooperate with government, other firms, andcommunities on prevention and other enforcementactions. Wood-based enterprises may have long-terminterests in controlling illegal logging that are groundedin security of timber supplies and raw material prices.Managers of many wood-based manufacturing firms areaware of an increasing sensitivity in the marketplace tothe legality and sustainability of wood origin. Neverthe-less, wood purchasers can benefit in the short term fromstolen material in terms of both price and ease of access.

Whether a country’s forest industry will choose todevelop a strong ethical culture and be a positive forcefor change in forestry will depend on many consider-ations. However, where the leadership and interestare present, the forest industry can do a great deal toadvance compliance with forestry laws and to promoteproactive prevention of illegal logging and timber theft.Industry and trade associations in many countries bringtogether firms for commercial, political, and other pur-poses. They can address forest security issues in thesefora. Industry associations can help establish and police“codes of corporate conduct,” provide platforms fordiscussion of forest law enforcement policy, and pro-vide leadership in demanding curtailment of forest-based corruption.

In the United States, the Forest Resources Associa-tion (FRA) is an industry association with membership

that ranges from among small independent and family-based logging companies to the world’s largest integratedpulp and paper companies. FRA aims to represent theinterests of this diverse membership and to enhanceits members’ ability to compete in the global market-place.6 It has been active in developing a network offorest industry security specialists. FRA also promotescooperation between industry and state and local lawenforcement authorities in the prevention and controlof a wide range of forest crimes, including illegal log-ging, arson, narcotics, and ecoterrorism. It supportssix regional Forest Security Working Groups that reg-ularly bring together security specialists and others fortraining, awareness-raising, and exchange of informa-tion on threats, security practices, and other issues.

Another form of industry-based initiative is theForest and Trade Networks (FTNs), which involveover 300 firms in more than 25 countries. The GlobalForest & Trade Network (GFTN) is WWF Inter-national’s initiative to eliminate illegal logging andimprove the management of valuable and threatenedforests. GFTN is an affiliation of national and regionalFTNs, each consisting primarily of companies com-mitted to practicing responsible forestry, or support-ing responsible forestry through purchasing policies.GFTN participants generate annual forest productssales exceeding $48 billion, are engaged in 128 trad-ing deals with other GFTN participants, manage over19.8 million ha of forests committed to certification,buy or sell in excess of 295 million cubic meters offorest products per year, and employ over 1.5 millionpeople globally. GFTN disseminates information onethical and sustainable forestry practices and publishesand disseminates resources such as the “ResponsiblePurchasing of Forest Products Guide” and “Keep ItLegal” manual.7

Similar groups, associations, and networks, such asthe Tropical Forest Trust,8 facilitate development andexpansion of sustainable forest management certifica-tion systems, some of which are closely aligned with for-est security issues. Forest Certification Watch is a usefulreference.9

6 http://www.forestresources.org/7 Miller and others 2006; White and Sarshar 2006.8 http://www.tropicalforesttrust.com/9 http://www.certificationwatch.org/

Governments should not indemnify the results of poorsecurity performance

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Policy and Operational Research for Timber Theft Prevention

Most forest law enforcement innovation and policymak-ing is uninformed by relevant research. This lack of cur-rent knowledge extends to almost all aspects of forest lawenforcement and puts the burden on practitioners tolearn by doing and to adapt models and examples fromother sectors. This process is slow and costly. It stalls inno-vation and becomes an excuse for inaction. To strengthenthe prevention of forest crime, research is needed to:

1. Better document and disseminate security prac-tices employed in developed country industrialforestry

2. Document and describe resource protection strate-gies employed by community groups with tradi-tional or recently awarded tenure rights

3. Explore the emergence of professionalism and therole of ethics and morality in forestry agencies.

Research on security approaches in other areas, espe-cially plantation agriculture, animal husbandry, min-ing, and border control would seem to be particularlypromising places to start.

Development Assistance to SupportTimber Theft Prevention

Official development assistance (ODA) and resourcesprovided through and by nongovernmental organiza-tions help set the development and policy debate in the forestry sector. Donor support to regional ForestLaw Enforcement and Governance (FLEG)10 processesand to activities linked to the European Union ForestLaw Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)11

initiative are closely linked to the emergence of recog-

nition of the global illegal logging problem and to thegrowing legitimacy of discussion of the problem andthe search for solutions.

Development assistance to forest law enforcement asa specifically labeled focus is relatively new and quitelimited.12 In forestry, law enforcement often is treatedas a very limited subject, largely isolated from the moregeneral theme of sustainable forest management. Thisand other problems, such as lack of awareness andmisconceptions (discussed above) have restricted thegrowth of support to forest crime prevention. Somecomponents of timber theft prevention practice, such aslog tracking and chain of custody systems, have receivedattention from the development community. Never-theless, these devices generally are treated in isolationfrom a holistic theft prevention approach; or on thebasis of objectives, such as inventory management orappealing to consumer market sensitivities, that areonly indirectly related to the situational crime preven-tion approach developed in this report.13

Probably more important than the specific projectsand technologies that do or do not receive assistance isODA work’s general neglect of an emphasis on, or expec-tation of, due diligence with good faith effort in forest lawenforcement. Capacities, risks, and threats vary fromcountry to country. Nonetheless, development assis-tance should be targeting governments, resource man-agers, and others prepared to take proactive steps toprevent crime and illegal logging before they occur. Thelow costs and high returns of basic prevention plan-ning, and the largely unexploited potential of the assetprotection and security approaches described in thisreport, should make them high priorities for develop-ment assistance.

10 http://go.worldbank.org/84WOFA260011 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fore/various/index_en.htm

12 See World Bank (2006) for a classification scheme for assis-tance to forest law enforcement and a discussion of Bank supportbroken down by prevention, detection, and suppression.

13 See Dykstra and others 2003.

Development assistance should be targeting those prepared to take proactive steps

Timber and Timberland SecurityChecklist

A P P E N D I X

1

Aforest manager needs to consider all of these elements and measure them against Forest Management Unit(FMU) operations to identify the “weakest elements.” This “checklist” should be used to assess each specificoperation. The forest manager should then prioritize strengthening the weak elements in the unit’s forest

monitoring and enforcement plan.

1. Introduction

RedYes No flags Comments

A. Timber provides a large cash flow from diverse operations. � � � _________B. Timber sales have unique, inherent contract problems. � � � _________C. Timber and forest products are very valuable and easily accessible assets. � � � _________D. Security is essential to prevent and/or detect the theft of assets, and

recover assets if stolen. � � � _________E. The recognizable risks in timberland operations are:

1. All volumes of timber are estimates until scaled.2. There are no locks or fences. Because timberland is a large, open geographical area to protect, foresters

have time to do very few inspections.3. Once timber is harvested, thieves have many markets to which to sell the stolen material.4. Timber can be transported long distances in a short time.5. Numerous contracts are used in timber sales and harvesting, and vendors are readily available. 6. Once a tree is cut and loaded, it becomes indistinguishable from other trees on the load.7. Managers and staff often become complacent toward theft (“We don’t have a problem”).

F. Fraud triangle

1. Opportunity. What opportunities exist for a person to steal?2. Rationalization. Would any relationships with the public, employees, or vendors rationalize or excuse

theft?3. Pressure. What are the pressures on the thieves? Social, family, gambling, drug addictions?

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2. Management Responsibilities

RedYes No flags Comments

A. Do you hire honest employees? � � �

1. Have background checks been performed on prospective employees? � � �2. Have prospective employees’ references been checked? � � �

B. Has everyone in your organization been informed that the security of assets is part of his/her responsibilities? � � �

C. Does the organization stand behind a zero tolerance for theft? � � �D. Does the organization have an ethics hotline (tip line)? � � �

1. Who is responsible for following up on the calls? � � �2. Are calls kept completely confidential? � � �3. Are all complaints and tips investigated? � � �

E. Do managers have an open door policy so that employees feel comfortable to come in and talk? � � �

F. Has every employee taken timber security training and awareness training? � � �G. Is a timber theft prevention plan in place? � � �

1. Notification. Does every employee know whom to notify? � � �2. Investigation. Who does the theft investigation? � � �3. Internal controls. Are internal controls in place to detect theft? � � �

H. Is an incident-tracking system in place? � � �I. Do unintended incentives encourage theft or fraud? � � �

1. Do buyers receive additional compensation for overcuts profits? � � �2. Do buyers receive extra compensation for low-priced wood? � � �

J. Are all state and federal laws being obeyed? � � �

1. Local weight laws? � � �2. Best management practices (BMPs)? � � �3. Codes of practice? � � �

K. Are all incidents of suspicious activity or crimes reported? To whom? � � �

3. Personnel

A. Are all employees told of their responsibilities for timber security? � � �

B. How often do you offer timber theft awareness training? � � �

C. Are you and your employees sensitive to risk factors and warning signs (red flags)? � � �

D. Do you stress the separation of job duties? � � �

1. Is timber harvesting is separated from timber purchasing? � � �

2. Are accounts payable separated from accounts receivable? � � �

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RedYes No flags Comments

3. Is timber harvesting separated from timber cruising? � � �

4. Do harvesting and procurement personnel report to different supervisors? � � �

5. Are procurement, accounting, and scaling all performed and supervised by different employees? � � �

E. Do you rotate jobs among employees? � � �

F. Do you have in place more than one level of supervisory approval? � � �

G. Is any employee competing with company or state goals (conflicts of interest)? � � �

1. Is s/he a timberland owner? � � �

2. Do any of his/her family members work for the vendors, or work for your organization? � � �

3. Is s/he the owner or employee of another forest-related business? � � �

4. Legal Ownership of Property, Company Lands, or Concession

A. Are all required records (deeds, titles) on file? � � �

B. Who is paying the taxes or royalties? � � �

C. Are there adequate plats and maps? � � �

D. Is area recorded as GIS/GPS data? � � �

E. Are the inventory and cruise data on file? � � �

F. Is the property optimally protected? � � �

1. Signage

a. Are signs posted around boundaries? � � �

b. Are signs highly visible? � � �

c. Are signs unmovable? � � �

d. Are boundaries and markers refurbished regularly? � � �

2. Other boundary identification methods

a. Do you plow lines around the property? � � �

b. Are lines marked? � � �

c. Are ditches used to identify property boundaries? � � �

d. Are rivers or streams used as boundaries? � � �

e. Are roads used to identify boundaries? � � �

f. Is property fenced? � � �

G. Property access restrictions or limits

1. Are gates installed? � � �

a. Are they locked? � � �

b. How often are the locks changed? � � �

c. What is the condition of the gates? � � �

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RedYes No flags Comments

d. Are gates hinged properly? � � �

e. Are locks attached to posts or gate? � � �

2. Are there physical barriers? � � �

3. Do public or private roads cross the property? � � �

H. Are there neighbors near the property? � � �

I. Is the property inspected? � � �

1. How often is property inspected for trespass? � � �

2. Who does the inspection? � � �

3. How are the inspections done? � � �

4. Are aerial inspections needed? � � �

5. Timber Procurement

A. Procurement

1. Timber sale contract

a. Is it signed? � � �

b. Is there clear and legal title? � � �

c. Are location, sale area, and property boundary maps in file? � � �

d. Is the deed recorded? � � �

e. Other specific information needed on file:

(1) Rate and time of payment? � � �(2) Termination date? � � �(3) Specific products to be harvested? � � �(4) Equipment to be used? � � �(5) Notification of beginning, interruptions? � � �

2. Cruise data file

a. Cruise report summary on file? � � �

b. Percent cruise calculations? � � �

c. What cruise method was used? � � �

d. How was acreage determination made? � � �

e. Who is the cruiser? � � �

3. Was the sale bid or negotiated? � � �

a. List of all bidders? � � �

b. Bid prospectus on file? � � �

c. What are the bid results? � � �

d. Reviewed by proper level of authority? � � �

4. Sale correspondence on file? � � �

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RedYes No flags Comments

a. E-mails pertaining to sale? � � � _________b. Copy of checks remitted? � � � _________c. Other associated sale correspondence? � � � _________

B. Vendors or contractors

1. Reference Information Sheet (on file)? � � � _________

a. List physical address � � � _________b. List all telephone numbers � � � _________c. List references from other companies � � � _________d. Type of equipment used � � � _________e. Insurance coverage � � � _________

2. What is vendor’s financial status? � � � _________3. What logging certifications are on file? � � � _________4. Does vendor have more than one crew? � � � _________5. Does s/he use contract haulers? � � � _________6. Does the vendor have conflicts of interest? � � � _________

a. Are relatives employed by the government or concession? � � � _________b. Does vendor have other financial holdings in other companies? � � � _________

7. Is there a list of vendor’s employees? � � � _________

6. Timber Harvesting

A. Timber sale contract

1. What are the harvest rates? � � � _________2. What is the termination date? � � � _________3. Any specific terms of contract? � � � _________

a. Equipment to be used? � � � _________b. Special products and markets? � � � _________c. Special record-keeping requirement? � � � _________

B. Is chain of custody being followed? � � � _________

1. What method is used? � � � _________2. Special record-keeping requirements? � � � _________

C. Tract inspection

1. How often are sale inspections done? � � � _________2. Are they announced or unannounced? � � � _________3. Is there a separation of duties? � � � _________4. Are sale area boundaries clearly marked? � � � _________5. Does inspector walk completed sale area? � � � _________

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RedYes No flags Comments

6. Are destination checks performed? � � � _________7. Is there an on-the-ground location map of high-value species? � � � _________8. Is there a third-party inspection? � � � _________9. Are inspection reports made? � � � _________

D. Inspection reports

1. Who was the inspector? � � � _________2. What were time and date of inspection? � � � _________3. What was condition of sale at inspection? � � � _________4. What corrective actions were taken? � � � _________5. Was a map drawn indicating areas harvested? � � � _________6. What was the volume on deck at time of inspection? � � � _________7. Was any conversation with contractor recorded? � � � _________8. Was loader sheet information kept? � � � _________9. Were load ID numbers being recorded? � � � _________

10. Is vendor merchandizing properly? � � � _________

E. What records are being kept? � � � _________

1. Inspection reports? � � � _________2. Comparison of cruise vs. harvest report? � � � _________3. Analysis report by cruiser, by vendor, and by area? � � � _________4. Completion report on file? � � � _________5. Are out-dated contracts deleted from system? � � � _________

F. Other harvesting issues

1. Pricing

a. Is mileage or distance pricing being checked and observed? � � � _________b. Are special or premium price tracts checked often? � � � _________

2. Where are premium price tracts located? � � � _________3. Does data match reality? � � � _________4. Does buyer purchase from third parties? � � � _________5. Is the contractor hostile and evasive? � � � _________6. Are all documents completed on time? � � � _________7. Are there inconsistencies in data? � � � _________8. Have harvesting or stumpage rates changed during contract? � � � _________9. Was confirmation reached with seller on issues or questions? � � � _________

10. Has a paper trail been established? � � � _________11. Does pricing encourage the separation of high-value products? � � � _________12. Is the shrinkage or recovery factor in line? � � � _________

G. Post-harvesting

1. Are data fully reconciled? � � � _________

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RedYes No flags Comments

2. Is there formal close-out process? � � � _________3. Was cruise-vs.-harvest report generated? � � � _________4. Was cruise-vs.-harvest report analyzed? � � � _________

7. Scaling

A. Scales

1. Are sales fully automated? � � � _________2. What method was used to identify material?

Truck ID, bar code, swipe cards? � � � _________

a. Is landowner information recorded? � � � _________b. What is the true point of origin? � � � _________c. Is data collected, including trailer ID, logger, driver’s signature? � � � _________

3. Are scales zero-balance devices activated? � � � _________4. Is single-print device activated? � � � _________5. Are scales equipped with electric eye? � � � _________6. Are CCTV cameras installed? � � � _________7. Are exception reports being generated? � � � _________8. Is access to scales and yard limited? � � � _________9. Are scales certified? � � � _________

10. When are manual tickets generated? � � � _________11. What happens to manual tickets? � � � _________12. Who approves manual tickets? � � � _________

B. Log scaling

1. Is ticket generated for each load? � � � _________2. Are loads checked against scale loads before reaching mill yard? � � � _________3. Are logs on load counted for comparison with scale tickets? � � � _________4. Are all logs marked on each load? � � � _________5. Are comparisons made for each scaler? � � � _________6. Is a comparison of product mix made during and after each sale? � � � _________

C. Are scalers periodically rotated? � � � _________

8. Other Timberland Security

A. Site preparation operation

1. Is contract on file? � � � _________2. Is a vendor reference sheet on file? � � � _________3. Has accurate acreage been determined? � � � _________4. Is a time or shake clock being used? � � � _________5. Has area been GPS’d? � � � _________

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RedYes No flags Comments

6. Is there a conflict of interest? � � � _________7. Does vendor have insurance coverage? � � � _________8. Is proper equipment being used? � � � _________9. What method is being used? � � � _________

B. Road construction and maintenance operation

1. Is contract on file? � � � _________2. Is vendor reference sheet on file? � � � _________3. What are method and rate of payment? � � � _________4. Are inspections being made during contract life? � � � _________5. Are there conflicts of Interest? � � � _________6. Is proper equipment being used? � � � _________

C. Tract inspections

1. What is frequency of inspections? � � � _________2. Is there recent activity on adjacent landowner’s property? � � � _________3. What is method of inspections? By air, on foot? � � � _________

a. Who does inspections? � � � _________b. Is there third-party inspection? � � � _________

D. Land and mineral sales operation

1. Are sales bid or negotiated? � � � _________2. Who has approval authority? � � � _________3. Is sale recorded? � � � _________4. Is contract executed with proper signatures? � � � _________

E. Special areas leases

1. Are special areas leases bid or negotiated? � � � _________2. Who has approval authority? � � � _________3. Is contract executed? � � � _________4. Do eases include multiple-species lease? � � � _________5. What are rates? � � � _________6. Does leasee have insurance coverage? � � � _________7. Is members’ list on file? � � � _________

F. Trash dumping

1. Is tracking system in place to track dumping? � � � _________2. Is surveillance being done on dumping areas? � � � _________3. Has access been restricted? � � � _________4. Do we prosecute offenders? � � � _________

G. Illegal substances

1. Does our organization report any and all illegal substances found? � � � _________

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RedYes No flags Comments

2. Do employees know what to do if illegal substances are found? � � � _________

H. Nontimber-related products

1. Have all valuable nontimber products been identified? � � � _________2. What are their locations? � � � _________3. What is their value? � � � _________4. What are chances of product theft? � � � _________5. Are preventive measures in place to prevent theft? � � � _________

I. Arson

1. Do we report all arsons? � � � _________2. Do we investigate wildfires? � � � _________3. Are we knowledgeable in collecting evidence? � � � _________

J. Trespass

1. Is it intentional? � � � _________2. Is it unintentional? � � � _________

K. Do we record and report all vandalism? � � � _________L. Do we have endangered species to protect? � � � _________

1. What are they? � � � _________2. Where are they located? � � � _________

M. Are there terrorist threats? � � � _________

9. Security Training

A. Do we have security awareness programs? � � � _________B. Do we have a security organization? � � � _________C. Do I or does our organization participate in security? interface with

other companies on security? � � � _________

10. Auditing

A. Are audits conducted on tract inspections? � � � _________B. Are the following exception reports generated and easily readable? � � � _________

1. Scale and scalers report? � � � _________2. Cruise-vs.-harvest comparison? � � � _________3. Are risk matrices created for various processes of the operation? � � � _________

C. Are controls in place to test security measures? � � � _________

1. When are these tests conducted? � � � _________2. Who conducts these tests? � � � _________

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RedYes No flags Comments

D. Are red flag matrices being used? � � � _________E. Surveillance of various operations

1. Personnel surveillance?2. Is camera surveillance used? � � � _________3. Is third-party surveillance used? � � � _________

F. Are outside auditors invited to audit process? � � � _________

1. Are auditors timber-security auditors? � � � _________2. Are auditors from national firms? � � � _________

Recommended Readings and Websites by Topic

A P P E N D I X

There is a large, but scattered, literature on thevarious topics of forest protection and indus-trial security, and a rapidly growing body of

relevant material is accessible through the internet.The footnotes and references given in the main text ofthis report point the way for the interested reader tosome of the essential sources and most useful sources.This guide lists by topic both many of the readings ref-erenced in the text and other relevant sources.

Illegal Logging and Forest Law Enforcement

● The Royal Institute of International Affairsmaintains a website with probably the best andwidest connections to current literature and pol-icy and advocacy sources:http://www.illegal-logging.info/

● Seneca Creek Associates LLC and Wood Resources International LLC. 2004. “‘Illegal’ Logging andGlobal Wood Markets: The Competitive Impactson the U.S. Wood Products Industry.” Preparedfor the American Forest and Paper Association.http://www.afandpa.org

● The UN FAO supports a variety of work relatedto forest law enforcement, including support toregional institutions and publications.http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/law/en/

● Colchester, M., with others. 2006. “Justice in theForest: Rural Livelihoods and Forest LawEnforcement.” CIFOR Forest Perspectives 3.Center for International Forestry Research,Bogor, Indonesia. March.

http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BColchester0601.pdf

● Problem-oriented policing is discussed at http://www.popcenter.org/default.cfm

Forest Protection

Traditionally, as a specialty within forestry, forestprotection has centered on fire, insect pests, and dis-eases as threats to forests. These are rapidly changingareas. New insights and practices are emerging fromresearch on, and better understanding of, for exam-ple, the natural roles of fire and other disturbances inthe dynamics of forest ecologies. Literature on thesesubjects may be relevant to the possibilities suggestedin chapter 3 of minimizing exposure to risk byadapting management approaches.

Durst, P. B., C. Brown, H. D. Tacio, and M. Ishikawa, eds. 2005. In Search of Excellence: Exemplary ForestManagement in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok: FAORegional Office for Asia and the Pacific.

Useful sites on fire include:http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/firemanagement/en/http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/fire/Index.htmhttp://www.fs.fed.us/fire/science/index.htmlhttp://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de/

Sites on integrated pest management (IPM) in forestryinclude:

http://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/pesticide/index.shtml

http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPP/IPM/Default.htm

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Asset Protection and Industrial Security

Much of the readily available literature on asset protectionand industrial security is oriented toward developed-country retailing and manufacturing applications. Thisliterature strongly emphasizes awareness-raising andmotivating senior and middle managers to take anactive interest in security matters. Technical guidanceand standards on locks, gates, and fences are availablein many of the most accessible sources. However,much of this technical guidance is of limited relevanceto developing-country forestry.

Particularly useful general introductions and refer-ences include:

● Fennelly, L. J., ed. 2004. Handbook of Loss Preven-tion and Crime Prevention. 4th ed. Burlington,MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.

● Hughes, G. 1998. Understanding Crime Preven-tion: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity.UK: Buckingham, Open University Press.

● Maguire, M., R. Morgan, and R. Reiner, eds.2007. The Oxford Handbook of Criminology.3d ed. Oxford University Press.

● Nalla, M., and G. Newman. 1990. A Primer in Pri-vate Security. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston.

● National Community Crime Prevention Pro-gramme. 2004. Crime Prevention for Farms: AGuide for Rural Communities. Canberra: Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of Australia.http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2645824B)~XNEWFarm+BOOKLET.pdf/$file/XNEWFarm+BOOKLET.pdf

● National Crime Prevention Institute, Departmentof Justice Administration, University of Louisville.2001. “Planning the Community Program.” InUnderstanding Crime Prevention. 2d ed. Woburn,MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

● Purpura, P. P. 2002. “Foundations of Securityand Loss Prevention.” In Security and Loss Pre-vention. Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

● _____. 1998. Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction. Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

● Tyska, L. A., and L. J. Fennelly. 2001. CargoTheft Prevention: A Handbook for LogisticsSecurity. Alexandria, VA: American Society for

Industrial Security. http://www.asisonline.org

Abundant websites address security issues, includingthose of many commercial security providers. ASISInternational, formerly the American Society forIndustrial Security, provides professional securitytraining and maintains an extensive website:

http://www.asisonline.org/

ASIS also publishes the Protection of Assets Manual(ASIS International 2004):

http://www.protectionofassets.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Content.About

Other sites of interest include:

● International Centre for Prevention of Crimehttp://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/

● National Crime Prevention Center (USA)http://www.ncpc.org/

Anticorruption and Governance

● Bardhan, P. 1997. “Corruption and Develop-ment: A Review of Issues.” Journal of EconomicLiterature XXXV (September): 1320–46.

● Hill, I. 2000. “Corruption in the Forest Sector inIndia: Impacts and Implications for Develop-ment Assistance.” International Forestry Review2 (3): 200–07.

● Rose-Ackerman, S. 1999. Corruption in Gov-ernment: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.Cambridge University Press.

● Rosenbaum, K.L. 2005. Tools for Civil Society Action to Reduce Forest Corruption: Drawing Lessons from Transparency International. PROFOR at the World Bank/FIN. January. http://www.profor.info; http://www.forestintegrity.org/TI_Tools.pdf

● Mookherjee, D., and I. P. L. Png. 1995. “Corrupt-ible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Com-pensated?” The Economic Journal 105: 149–59.

● www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance● The United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC) has prepared an Anti-Corruption Toolkit:http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption_toolkit.html

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● Schott, P. A. 2004. Reference Guide to Anti-MoneyLaundering and Combating the Financing ofTerrorism. World Bank.

● The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, amembership organization, works to reduce theincidence of fraud and white-collar crime and toassist in their detection and deterrence. It quali-fies Certified Fraud Examiners through the CFEExamination and provides public and continuingeducation services, publications, and training:http://www.acfe.com/home.asp

Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement

The formal economic analysis of crime and law enforce-ment is extensive and often highly mathematical.Enforcement is often described in very general andabstract terms. Nevertheless, the literature can behelpful in formulating a general policy approach tocrime prevention. The primary reference is:

Becker, G. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Eco-nomic Approach.” The Journal of Political Economy76 (2) (March/April): 169–217.

Another interesting references is:

Polinski, A. M., and S. Shavell. 2000. “The Eco-nomic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.”Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45–76.

Comparative analysis of crime across countries is an inter-esting area suggesting the general risks of victimization of the poor in developing countries and the dynamics ofcrime as economies grow and develop. See, for example:

● Soares, R. R. 2004. “Development, Crime andPunishment: Accounting for the InternationalDifferences in Crime Rates.” Journal of Develop-ment Economics 73 (2004): 155–84.

● United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2005.Crime and Development in Africa. New York.

Much of the economic analysis of enforcement issuesrelated to natural resources emerges from discussionsof common property or open access externalities. Thesediscussions examine problems that arise due to incom-plete or costly-to-defend property rights and the result-

ing economic inefficiencies (Magrath 1988). Analysis ofextensions into geographic aspects have recognized thatdistance and transport costs matter for both criminalsand enforcers, and relate to the access and trespassissues discussed in chapter 4. Interesting applications offormal economic analysis to natural resources include:

● Akella, A. S., and J. B. Cannon. 2004. Strengthen-ing the Weakest Links: Strategies for Improving theEnforcement of Environmental Laws Globally. CCGReport. Washington, DC: Conservation Inter-national, Center for Conservation and Government.

● Albers, H. J., and E. Grinspoon. 1997. “A Com-parison of the Enforcement of Access Restrictionsbetween Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve (China)and Khao Yai National Park (Thailand).” Environ-mental Conservation 24 (4): 351–62.

● Albers, H. J. 1999. Spatial Modeling of Extractionand Enforcement in LDC Protected Areas. Wash-ington, DC.: Resources for the Future.

● Bulte, E. H., and G. Cornelis van Kooten. 1999.“Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement andthe Ivory Trade Ban.” American Journal of Agri-cultural Economics 81 (May 1999): 453–66.

● Clarke, H. R., W. J. Reed, and R. M. Shrestha. 1993.“Optimal Enforcement of Property Rights on Developing Country Forests Subject to Illegal Log-ging.” Resource and Energy Economics 15: 271–93.

● Magrath, W. B. 1988. “The Challenge of theCommons.” Environment Department WorkingPaper 14. World Bank.

● Milliman, S. R. “Optimal Fishery Management in the Presence of Illegal Activity.” Journal of Environ-mental Economics and Management 13: 363–81.

● Milner-Gulland, E. J., and N. Leader-Williams.1992. “A Model of Incentives for the IllegalExploitation of Black Rhinos and Elephants:Poaching Pays in Luangwa Valley, Zambia.”Journal of Applied Ecology 29: 388–401.

● Robinson, E. J. Z. 1996. Dynamic Enforcement:Protecting the Common Lands of Southern Indiaagainst Encroachment. Palo Alto: Stanford Uni-versity Food Research Institute.

● Skonjoft, A., and J. T. Solstad. 1996. “WildlifeManagement, Illegal Hunting and Conflicts. ABioeconomic Analysis.” Environment and Devel-opment Economics 1 (1996): 165–81.

● United Nations Interregional Crime and JusticeResearch Institute http://www.unicri.it/index. php

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● United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC)http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html(provides access to the UN Conventionsagainst Transnational Organized Crime andagainst Corruption)

Of particular interest is the Anti-CorruptionTool-Kit:

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption_toolkit.html

Forest Security and Law Enforcement

● American Paper Institute. 1991. Timber SecurityGuidelines.

● Albrecht, W. S., G. W. Wernz, and T. L. Williams.1995. Fraud: Bringing Light to the Dark Side ofBusiness (business guide to prevent, detect, andinvestigate fraud). New York: McGraw-Hill.

● Bonpin, T. T., A. G. Perez and Associates. 2000.“Primer on Administrative Procedures forViolations in Protected Areas.” Philippines:National Integrated Areas Protected Areas Pro-gramme. Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau,Department of Environment and NaturalResources, Quezon City.http://www.denr.gov.ph/

● Confederation of European Paper Industries(CEPI). 2005. Illegal Logging: Codes of Conductfor the Paper Industry. Brussels.www.cepi.org

● Dykstra, D. P., G. Kuru, R. Taylor, R. Nussbaum,W. B. Magrath, and J. Story. 2003. “Technolo-gies for Wood Tracking: Verifying and Monitor-ing the Chain of Custody and Legal Compliancein the Timber Industry.” Environment andSocial Development East Asia and Pacific RegionDiscussion Paper. World Bank.

● Eddins, K. M., and W. A. Flick. 1997. “CriminalAspects of Environmental Law: An EvolvingForest Policy.” Journal of Forestry.

● The Forest Resources Association (FRA)The mission of the Forest Resources Associationis to promote the interests of forest productsindustry members in the economical, efficient,and sustainable use of forest resources to meet

the needs of the wood fiber supply chainthrough private enterprise. The association iscomprised of many working committees andsubcommittees. Of these, six regional securitygroups have been established within the UnitedStates. The association publishes quarterly“Security Alerts” apprising members of scams,red flags, and methods of theft preventionrelated to the forest product industry.http://www.forestresources.org/

● Food and Agriculture Organisation of theUnited Nations (FAO). 2005. “Best Practices forImproving Law Compliance in the Forest Sec-tor.” FAO Forestry Paper 145. Rome.

● Lober, D. J. 1992. “Using Forest Guards to Pro-tect a Biological Reserve in Costa Rica: One Step towards Linking Parks to People.” Journal of Envi-ronmental Planning and Management 35 (1): 17–41.

Many public forest and land management agenciespublish operational and policy manuals containingrisk assessment, fraud prevention, and law enforce-ment guidelines and examples on public websites:

● United States Forest Servicehttp://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/

● British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Rangehttp://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/manuals/policy/poltoc.htm

● Sarawak (Malaysia)http://www.forestry.sarawak.gov.my/forweb/homepage.htm

● Sabah (Malaysia)http://www.forest.sabah.gov.my/english/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx

Legal Studies

Hirakuri, S. R. 2003. Can Law Save the Forest? Lessonsfrom Finland and Brazil. Bogor: Center for Inter-national Forestry Research.

Fox, J., ed. 1993. “Legal Frameworks for Forest Man-agement in Asia: Case Studies of Community/StateRelations.” Occasional Papers of the Program onEnvironment 16. East-West Center, Honolulu.

Lundmark, T. 1995. “Methods of Forest Law-Making.”Environmental Affairs 22 (4): 783–805.

Participants ListTimber Theft Prevention Experts Meeting

Mactan IslandCebu City, Philippines

November 21–25, 2005

A P P E N D I X

Jay BlakeneyConsultantKuching, SarawakMalaysiaEmail: juneau@pc.jaring.my

Nazarudin bin BohariManagerNumber System Sdn. Bhd.52, Jalan Sg. Antu 3Sg. Antu Industrial EstatePO Box 1257, 96008 SibuSarawak, MalaysiaTel: 084 320117, 328939, 336788 (days)Fax: 084 335624Email: numsyskl@streamyx.com

Michael C. Dyson (Security) Risk ManagementDyson Corporate SecurityLevel 1, 123 Collins St.Hobart, Tasmania 7000AustraliaTel: 61 3 6231 4407Fax: 61 3 6231 4408Cell: 0407 826 736Email: mdyson@dysoncorp.com.auWeb: www.dysoncorp.com.au

Richard L. GrandalskiForest Law Enforcement Advisor21111 81st St. EastBonney Lake, WA 98391-8328USATel: +1 253 205 1004Fax: +1 253 862 0567Email: rich_grandalski@msn.comrich_grandalski@hotmail.com

Alicia J. HetznerSenior EditorEast Asia and Pacific Rural and Environment (EASRE)World Bank1818 H St., NW, MSN MC9-915; MC9-322Washington, DC 20433USATel: 202 473-3379Fax: 202 477-2733Email: ahetzner@worldbank.org

Arvind Kumar JhaChief Conservator of Forests (Wildlife)Social Forestry, Central Bldg.Pune CampPune-411001IndiaTels: 91-0253-2599632

91-020-26056006Cell: 9822601595Email: dr_arvindjha@yahoo.com

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Pramod G. KrishnanDeputy DirectorPeriyar Tiger ReserveIndian Forest ServiceThekkady 685 536 KeralaIndiaTel: 91 4869 222027, 222413Fax: 91 4869 223750Email: edo@periyartigerreserve.org

mail@pramodkrishnan.comWeb: www.periyartigerreserve.org

www.pramodkrishnan.com

Jose Campoverde LeonPresident del Comisariado de Bienes ComunalesComunidad Indígena de Nuevo San JuanParangaricutiro, MichoacánAv. Cerro Prieto S/N Fracc. Félix Ireta C.P. 60490 San Juan Nuevo, MichMexico.Tels: 01 452 594 00 51; 594 06 04; 594 00 56; 594 01 88Email: afcinsaafcinsjp@comunidadindigena.comWeb: www.comunidadindigena.com.mx

William B. Magrath Lead Natural Resource EconomistEast Asia and Pacific Operations and Policy (EASOP)World Bank1818 H St., NW, MSN MC9-915; MC9-321Washington, DC 20433USATel: 202 458-1679Fax: 202 477-2733Email: wmagrath@worldbank.org

Canesio P. MunozGeneral ManagerEnvironmental and Community AffairsRiaupulpPT Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper, member of theAPRIL GroupJalan Teluk Betung No. 31–32Jakarta 10230 IndonesiaTel: +62 (0) 21 3193 0134Fax: +62 (0) 21 392 3420Cell: +62 (0) 812 101 5748Email: Munoz_cp@april.com.sg

Peter Jay NegaraAPRIL GroupEnvironmental and Community AffairsRiaupulpPT Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper, member of theAPRIL GroupJalan Teluk Betung No. 31–32Jakarta 10230 Indonesia

Pablito M. OfreciaSenior Forest Management SpecialistForest Management BureauDepartment of Environment and Natural ResourcesQuezon CityPhilippines

Daniel Aguilar SaldanaDirector del PaiaFundación Rigoberta Menchu TumHeriberto Frias 339, Col. NarvarteC.P. 03020México, D.F.Tels: 5639 3091; 5639 1492Fax: 5639 3976Email: frmtmexico@rigobertamenchu.org

danielaguilar@rigobertamenchu.org

Klaus SchmittSenior Project AdvisorMinistry of EnvironmentBiodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project(BPAMP)#48, Samdech Preah SihanoukTonle Bassac, ChamkarmonPhnom PenhCambodiaTel/Fax: +855 (0) 23 213900Cell: +855 (0)12 719024Email: Klaus@bpamp.org.kh

Bernardo C. SinuesForestry and Planning ManagerSurigao Development Corporation4th floor, ENZO Bldg.399 Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave. Makati CityPhilippines Tel: 63 (2) 897-1307; 63 (2) 890-9697 Fax: 63 (2) 897-630

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Meas SophalPark ManagerBiodiversity and Protected Areas Management Project#48, Samdech Preah SihanoukTonle Bassac, ChamkarmonPhnom PenhCambodiaTel/Fax: +855 (0) 12 719024Email: bpamp@online.com.kh

Gerald L. StuckeyTimberWatch, LLCPO Box 11Pinopolis, SC 29469USATel: 843 899 4477Cell: 843 509 9528Email: Smokeybear@homexpressway.net

Agus SB SutitoPark ManagerBetung Kerihun National ParkJL Kpt. Piere TendeanPutussibau 78711West KalimantanIndonesia Tel/Fax: 62 567 21935Cell: 081 345 707 346081 522 721 142Email: asbsutito@yahoo.com

Garry B. VikanesDirector of Strategic Development3Si Risk Strategies, Inc.Suite 392, 5158 – 48th Ave.Delta, BC V4K 5B6CanadaTel: 604 541 6577Cell: 604 916 1953Toll-free: 1 866 374 3434Pager: 604 891 1904Email: gvikanes@3si.ca

H.E. Thuk Kroeun VuthaUndersecretary of StateMinistry of EnvironmentPhnom PenhCambodia

Haji Saidi Bin WahieChairmanNumber System Sdn. Bhd.52, Jalan Sg. Antu 3Sg. Antu Industrial EstatePO Box 1257, 96008 SibuSarawakMalaysiaTel: 084 320117, 328939, (days) 336788Fax: 084 335624H/P: 013 808 0133Sibu email: numsys@pd.jaring.my

numsys@tm.net.my

Graham R. WilkinsonChief Forest Practices OfficerForest Practices Authority30 Patrick St.Hobart, TasmaniaAustralia 7000Tel: +61 3 6233 7451Cell: 0403 341 632Fax: 03 6233 7954Email: graham.wilkinson@fpa.tas.gov.au Web: www.fpa.tas.gov.au

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Akella, A.S., and J.B. Cannon. 2004. “Strengthening the WeakestLinks: Strategies for Improving the Enforcement of Environ-mental Laws Globally.” Center for Conservation and Govern-ment, Conservation International, Washington, DC.

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Timber Theft Prevention:

Introduction to Security for Forest ManagersWilliam B. MagrathRichard L. GrandalskiGerald L. StuckeyGarry B. VikanesGraham R. Wilkinson

August 2007

Environment and Social Development

East Asia and Pacific Region

THE WORLD BANK

1818 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20433, USA

Telephone:

Website: www.worldbank.org/eapsd

202 473 1000

Facsimile: 202 522 1666

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