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FourFourthth Generations Generations of of Modern Modern WarfareWarfare

(4GW)(4GW)

Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism

COL Engr. JÁNOS TOMOLYA Ph.D.

HUN Army

Chief of Capabilities

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Subject : 4th GW

Time : 20 minutes

Classify : Unclassified

Agenda :

1. Introduction;

2. Different classification of war (epochs, waves, forms);

3. Asymmetric Warfare;

4. Military cultures;

5. Fourth Generation of modern warfare;

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The Next War? How can we avoid being like the French knights at

the Battle of Agincourt?

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Future Warfare

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Or this one?

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Number of terrorist attacks 2003-2011

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Military Expenditure

UNCLASSIFIED SIPRI: 1531 billions USD in 2009

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1. Different classification of war: Epochs

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Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker :

4 epochs, based on energy sources human energy

animal-based energy

mechanical energy

post-mechanical energy:

Advanced technology

warfare

Non-Western warfare

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Waves

Agricultural warIndustrial-based war (late of 17th century)Knowledge-based war (from 1980s)

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Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare based on the economic and societal changes of civilization.

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Forms of warfare

SymmetricDissymmetricAsymmetric/Eric Walters/

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After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric

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Forms of warfare

SymmetricDissymmetricAsymmetric/Eric Walters/

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After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric

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Symmetric In symmetric conflicts, the two opposing

adversaries dispose of armed forces that are similar in all aspects such as force structure, doctrine and assets and have comparable tactical, operational and strategic objectives.

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A conflict is dissymmetric when one of the opposing forces is superior by means of force structure, doctrine and assets, but both parties are striving for similar political and military objectives.

Dissymmetric

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2. Asymmetric Warfare (AW)One of the opponents is unable or unwilling to wage the war with comparable force structure, doctrine and assets and has different political and military objectives than his adversary.

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Asymmetric Warfare (AW) What is it?

David and Goliath warfareUnsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically)Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entitiesThreat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or

Afghanistan) Often state sponsored/supportedAttacking opponent via indirect means such as

TerrorismCritical infrastructuresAvoids combat w/ conventional forcesTends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always

the caseMisc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies,

exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.

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3. Military cultures

Clausewitz: „War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.”

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The way of application of force depends on the military culture.

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Kinds of Military Cultures

Material-centric;Movement-centric;Guerilla warfare

Forms: terrorism, guerilla warfare, orthodox warfare;

Types: anarchism; equality-based; tradition-based; pluralist; secessionist; divider; reformer;

Used methods: coup d’état; exhausting, focus on military, warfare in build-up areas;

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Orthodox warfare

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Strategy of „indirect approach”

Characteristics:Daggering wars;Defence;Strategic objective:

exhausting of enemy Indirect warfare- not only

with military meansMain services: air force,

navyPreferred by: maritime

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Indirect approach

Material-centric

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Movement-centric

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Strategy of „direct approach”

Characteristics:Blitzkrieg;Offence;Strategic objective:

destroy the enemyDirect warfare- decisive

maneuversMain services: land force,

Preferred by: continental powers

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Guerilla warfare

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Strategy of „indirect approach in irregular form”

Supported by peopleCharacteristics:

Hit and run actions;Offence;Strategic objective:

exhausting of enemy, provoke a collapse internally

Media Indirect warfare- not

only with military means

Main services: land force

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4. Generations of Warfare

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COL BOYDNon-linear warfareFocuses on moral-mental-physical

portions of enemy & as single entityFocus on the enemy and environment

Knowledge of strategic environment Interact w/ environment

appropriately

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New dimensions

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TrinityClausewitz: „the war is

monopoly of the state”

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people

government

armysociety

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1GW=Age of Napoleon

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Massed manpower

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2 GW= Age of Firepower

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Massed firepower...

But still in lines

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3 GW= Age of Maneuver

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4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells

Asymmetric warfare in irregular form

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4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells

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Role of Technology in 4GW

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States & non-

states wage war

States & non-states wage war

1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

The “generations of war” model

New commo & transport networks

3 GW

Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before)

New weapons

& concepts

Peace of Westphalia

State-vs-state— only “legal” form

of war

2 GW

Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc.

Nuclear Weapons

Proliferate

Fall of USSR

1GW

4 GW

state vs. state

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Definition

Formless and most deadly kind of warUndermines enemy strengths (this may seem

obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it).

Exploits enemy weaknesses. Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and

techniques that differ substantially from opponents).

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4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory:

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Drivers

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The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following:The loss of the nation-

state's monopoly on violence.

The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict.

Globalization (via technological integration).

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Characteristics

Violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting the state.

lacks hierarchal authoritylack of formal structurepatience and flexibilityability to keep a low profile when neededsmall sizeVNSA’s forces are decentralized

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Tactics

4GW is fought on the tactical level via:Rear area operations -- 4GW

warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society. 

Psychological operations -- terror.

Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself

Human shields

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Tactics of 4GW

Ethnic cleansingAttacking C4I networksExploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs)

and International laws of war (ILOW)Exploitation of humanitarian relief

organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc… Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his rear;Use the enemy’s strength against him

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Differences

Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations.

Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold.

Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict.

Vulerability -- open societies and economies. UNCLASSIFIED

Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include:

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Differences II.

Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors.

Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation.

Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting.

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4th Generation Warfare (4GW)Formless and most deadly kind of war4GW ops are intelligence driven. Requires constant preparation and

resourcefulnessDistinguishing a combatant from a non-

combatant (civil) can be extremely difficultCan hit anytime, anywhere, anything and

anyone

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Winning a 4GW conflict

Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts.

Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US).

Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future.

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Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd):

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Center of Gravity Is The People

Leverage unconventional capabilities against insurgents. Become cellular like “them”. Defeat a networked threat with a network.

Develop small independent action forces (SIAF).

Establish disciplined, well trained and highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces.

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Power of Perception & Influence As “Ammo”

Money is ammunition Food is ammunition Medicine is ammunition Education is ammunitionFuel is ammunition Employment is ammunition Recognition is ammunition Respect is ammunition Information and knowledge is ammunition

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Summary

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Questions?