2.conducto vs. monzon

VOL. 291, JULY 2, 1998 619Conducto vs. Monzon

A.M. No. MTJ981147. July 2, 1998.*

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGEILUMINADO C. MONZON, respondent.

Courts Judges Ignorance of the Law Administrative LawPublic Officers Election Law Reelection of a public officialextinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liabilityincurred by him during his previous term of office.The findingsand conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are inorder. However, the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is toolight, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has beencontinuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudentialdevelopment [sic] in law ever since he passed the BarExaminations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failedto recall that as early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,this Court explicitly ruled that the reelection of a public officialextinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal,liability incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:The ruling, therefore, thatwhen the people have elected a manto his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledgeof his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave hisfaults or misconduct if he had been guilty of anyrefers only toan action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminalcase, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious incharacter than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by apublic officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious notonly to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole.This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminalliability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, atleast insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under theConstitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon ofa criminal offense.

Same Same Same Same Same Same While diligence inkeeping uptodate with the decisions of the Supreme Court is acommendable virtue of judgesand, of course, members of the Barcomprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is inthat area where ones competence may then be put to the test andproven.

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Conducto vs. Monzon

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrineenunciated in the abovementioned cases. If respondent has trulybeen continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudentialdevelopment [sic] in the law, it was impossible for him to havemissed or misread these cases. What detracts from his claim ofassiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v.Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995order. What is then evident is that respondent either did notthoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehendedthem. The latter, of course, would only manifest eitherincompetence, since both cases were written in plain and simplelanguage thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstandingor confusion or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrinepronounced by this Court. While diligence in keeping uptodatewith the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judgesand, of course, members of the Barcomprehending thedecisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where onescompetence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it hasbeen said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just acursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules it isimperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles andaware of wellsettled and authoritative doctrines. He should strivefor excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the endthat he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.

Same Same A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands

conscious realization of the position that they occupy in theinterrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of thenation.On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberatelydisregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v. Sanchez andreiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. ProvincialGovernor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it maythen be said that he simply wished to enjoy the privilege ofoverruling this Courts doctrinal pronouncements. On this point,and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote what thisCourt said sixtyone years ago in People v. Vera: As alreadyobserved by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333,337), and reiterated in subsequent cases if each and every Courtof First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisionsof the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, andjudicial chaos would result. A becoming modesty of inferiorcourts demands conscious realization of the position that

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VOL. 291, JULY 2, 1998 621

Conducto vs. Monzon

they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integratedjudicial system of the nation.

Same Same By tradition and in our system of judicialadministration, the Supreme Court has the last word on what thelaw is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting theConstitution and laws form part of the countrys legal system.InCaram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, this Court affirmed that bytradition and in our system of judicial administration, this Courthas the last word on what the law is, and that its decisionsapplying or interpreting the Constitution and laws form part ofthis countrys legal system. All other courts should then be guidedby the decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to doso, Vivo v. Cloribel warned: Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels,in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that theapplication of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority isagainst his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he maystate his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of thecase in accordance with his personal views he must first thinkthat it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the HighestCourt of the Land, and that any deviation from the principle laid

down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants.And if despite of what is here said, a Judge, still believes that hecannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative thanto place himself in the position that he could properly avoid theduty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9,C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Same Same A judge should administer his office with dueregard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, rememberingthat he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge underthe sanction of law.The last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canonsof Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with dueregard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but ajudge under the sanction of law.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.Ignorance of the Law.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

622

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDConducto vs. Monzon

R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn lettercomplaint dated 14 October 1996,1

complainant charged respondent Judge Iluminado C.Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San PabloCity, with ignorance of law, in that he deliberately refusedto suspend a barangay chairman who was charged beforehis court with the crime of unlawful appointment underArticle 244 of the Revised Penal Code.

The factual antecedents recited in the lettercomplaintare not controverted.

On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint withthe Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against oneBenjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay

IIIE of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, seriousirregularity and violation of law in that, among otherthings, said respondent Maghirang appointed his sisterinlaw, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangaysecretary on 17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of theLocal Government Code. At the same time, complainantfiled a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the RevisedPenal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor againstMaghirang, which was, however, dismissed

2 on 30

September 1993 on the ground that Maghirangs sisterinlaw was appointed before the effectivity of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991, which prohibits a punongbarangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civildegree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary.The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No.246, s. 1993

3 from Director Jacob Montesa of the

Department

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1 Rollo, 25.2 Rollo, 8.3Id., 1112.

623


of Interior and Local Government, which declared that theappointment issued by Maghirang to his sisterinlawviolated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, theLocal Government Code prior to the Local GovernmentCode of 1991.

In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,4 the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed thecase, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sisterinlaw asbarangay secretary.

On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that theOffice of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon reconsider

5 the

order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s.1993 of Director Montesa.

Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft

Investigation Officer II of the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon, issued an order

6 on 8 February

1994 granting the motion for reconsideration andrecommending the filing of an information for unlawfulappointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code)against Maghirang. The recommendation was dulyapproved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman forLuzon.

In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,7 the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record of the caseto the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City andinstructed the latter to file the corresponding informationagainst Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecutethe case. The information for violation of Article 244 of theRevised Penal Code was forthwith filed with the MunicipalTrial Court in Cities in San Pablo City and docketed asCriminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the presidingjudge, respondent herein, issued a warrant for the arrest ofMaghirang, with a recommendation of a P200.00 bond forhis provisional liberty.

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4Id., 1314.5Id., 1718.6Id., 19.7 Rollo, 20.

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With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsmanfor Luzon, on 4 May 1995, the City Prosecutor filed, inCriminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension

8 of

accused Maghirang pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No.3019, as amended, which reads, in part:

SEC. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminalprosecution under a valid information under this Act or underTitle 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offenseinvolving fraud upon government or public funds or propertywhether as a single or as complex offense and in whatever stageof execution and mode of participation, is pending in Court, shall

be suspended from office.

In his Order of 30 June 1995,9 respondent judge denied the

motion for suspension on the ground that:

[T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT underArticle 244 of the Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17,1989, during [Maghirangs] terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994and said accused was again reelected as Barangay Chairmanduring the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offensescommitted during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal(Lizarez vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L22059, May 17, 1965)an order of suspension from office relating to a given term maynot be the basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumptionof the same office under a new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R.No. L34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove apublic officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To dootherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to electtheir officer. When the people have elected a man to office, it mustbe assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life andcharacter, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos,et al., G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992).

The prosecution moved for reconsideration10 of the order,

alleging that the court had confused removal as a penaltyin

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8Id., 2627.9Id., 30.10 Rollo, 3335.

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administrative cases and the temporary removal fromoffice (or suspension) as a means of preventing the publicofficial, while the criminal case against him is pending,from exerting undue influence, intimidate (sic) witnesseswhich may affect the outcome of the case the former is apenalty or sanction whereas the latter is a mere procedural

remedy. Accordingly, while a reelected public officialcannot be administratively punished by removing him fromoffice for offenses committed during his previous term, . . .said public official can be temporarily removed to preventhim from wielding undue influence which will definitely bea hindrance for justice to take its natural course. Theprosecution then enumerated the cases decided by thisCourt reiterating the rule that what a reelection of a publicofficial obliterates are only administrative, not criminal,liabilities, incurred during previous terms.

11

In his order of 3 August 1995,12 respondent denied the

motion for reconsideration, thus:

There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecutionis premised upon the act charged allegedly committed during theaccused [sic] previous term as Barangay Chairman of Brgy. IIIE.San Pablo City, who was subsequently reelected as BarangayChairman again during the last Barangay Election of May 9,1994. Certainly, had not the accused been reelected theprosecution will not file the instant motion to suspend him asthere is no legal basis or the issue has become academic.

The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs.Hechanova, et al., L22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58, whereinthe Supreme Court subscribed to the rule denying the right toremove from office because of misconduct during a prior term.

It is opined by the Court that preventive suspension isapplicable only if there is [sic] administrative case filed against alocal

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11 Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 11959, 31 October 1959Lizares v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L22059, 17 May 1966 Oliveros v. Villaluz, G.R.No. L34636, 30 May 1974 Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)Ingco v. Sanchez, 21 SCRA 1292).

12 Id., 3637.

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official who is at the same time criminally charged in Court. Atpresent, the records of the Court shows [sic] that there is nopending administrative case existing or filed against the accused.

It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by theHonorable Supreme Court in Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., thatSince petitioner, having been duly reelected, is no longeramenable to administrative sanctions for any acts committedduring his former tenure, the determination whether therespondent validly acted in imposing upon him one monthssuspension for act [sic] done during his previous term as mayor isnow merely of theoretical interest.

Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himselffrom Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21September 1995,

13 respondent voluntarily inhibited himself.

The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S. Escoses perorder of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of theRegional Trial Court of San Pablo City.

On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn lettercomplaint with the Office of the Court Administrator.

In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed incompliance with the resolution of this Court of 27 January1997, respondent asserted that he had been continuouslykeeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development[sic] in the law since he passed the 1955 BarExaminations and that he issued the two challengedorders only after due appreciation of prevailingjurisprudence on the matter, citing authorities in supportthereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguingthat to warrant a finding of ignorance of law and abuse ofauthority, the error must be so gross and patent as toproduce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that thejudge knowingly rendered an unjust decision.

14 He

emphasized, likewise, that the error had to be so graveand on so fundamental a point as to warrant condemnationof the judge

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13 Rollo, 39.14 Citing Ramirez v. CorpuzMacandog, 144 SCRA 462, 474475 [1986]

Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597 [1994] Roa v. Imbing, 231 SCRA57 [1994].

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as patently ignorant or negligent15 otherwise, to hold a

as patently ignorant or negligent15 otherwise, to hold a

judge administratively accountable for every erroneousruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred,would be nothing short of harassment and that would beintolerable.

16

Respondent further alleged that he earnedcomplainants ire after denying the latters Motion for theSuspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which wasfiled only after Maghirang was reelected in 1994 and thatcomplainant made inconsistent claims, concretely, while inhis letter of 4 September 1995 requesting respondent toinhibit from the case, complainant declared that hebelieved in respondents integrity, competence and dignity,after he denied the request, complainant brandedrespondent as a judge of poor caliber and understanding ofthe law, very incompetent and has no place in Court ofJustice.

Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would notdare soil his judicial robe at this time, for he had only three(3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching thecompulsory age of retirement of seventy (70) and that forthe last 25 years as municipal judge in the seven (7) townsof Laguna and as presiding judge of the MTCC, San PabloCity, he had maintained his integrity.

In compliance with the Courts resolution of 9 March1998, the parties, by way of separate letters, informed theCourt that they agreed to have this case decided on thebasis of the pleadings already filed, with respondentexplicitly specifying that only the complaint and thecomment thereon be considered.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)recommends that this Court hold respondent liable forignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with awarning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in thefuture shall be dealt with more severely. In supportthereof, the OCA makes the following findings andconclusions:

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15 Citing Negado v. Autojay, 222 SCRA 295, 297 [1993].16 Citing Bengzon v. Adaoag, A.M. MTJ951045, Nov. 28, 1995.

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The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who iscriminally charged can be preventively suspended only if there isan administrative case filed against him is without basis. Section13 of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) states that:

Suspension and loss of benefitsAny incumbent public officer againstwhom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Actor under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offenseinvolving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether asa simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution andmode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended fromoffice.

It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes itmandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend anypublic officer against whom a valid information charging violationof this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involvingfraud upon government or public funds or property is filed incourt. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty todetermine whether preventive suspension is required to preventthe accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses orfrustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance inoffice. All that is required is for the court to make a finding thatthe accused stands charged under a valid information for any ofthe abovedescribed crimes for the purpose of granting or denyingthe sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).

In the same case, the Court held that as applied to criminalprosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last forless than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within thatperiod otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90) days.

Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged withUnlawful Appointment, punishable under Article 244, Title 7,Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it was mandatoryon Judge Monzons part, considering the Motion filed, to order thesuspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of ninety (90)days. This, he failed and refused to do.

Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion forSuspension because offenses committed during the previous term(is) not a cause for removal during the present term is untenable.In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos andMelvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that the rule is

that a public official cannot be removed for administrativemisconduct committed

629


during a prior term since his reelection to office operates as acondonation of the officers previous misconduct committed duringa prior term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove himtherefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application tocriminal cases x x x (Italics supplied)

Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs.Sanchez, G.R. No. L23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292,that The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected aman to office it must be assumed that they did this withknowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded orforgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of anyrefers only to an action for removal from office and does not applyto a criminal case. (Italics ours)

Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment wascommitted during Maghirangs first term as barangay chairmanand the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 duringhis second term, his reelection is not a bar to his suspension asthe suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case.

Respondents denial of complainants Motion forReconsideration left the complainant with no other judicialremedy. Since a case for Unlawful Appointment is covered bySummary Procedure, complainant is prohibited from filing apetition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition involving aninterlocutory order issued by the court. Neither can he file anappeal from the courts adverse final judgment, incorporating inhis appeal the grounds assailing the interlocutory orders, as thiswill put the accused in double jeopardy.

All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judgemanifested his ignorance of the law in denying complainantsMotion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang, there wasnothing shown however to indicate that he acted in bad faith orwith malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note thatgood faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely freerespondent from liability.

This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48,ruled:

In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judgedone in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, eventhough such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not bedisciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes orerrors of judgment,

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yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basicprinciples. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of

justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.He is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with thestatutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration ofjustice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupantsof the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legalprinciples.

The findings and conclusions of the Office of the CourtAdministrator are in order. However, the penaltyrecommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of thefact that despite his claim that he has been continuouslykeeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development[sic] in law ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recallthat as early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,

17

this Court explicitly ruled that the reelection of a publicofficial extinguishes only the administrative, but not thecriminal, liability incurred by him during his previous termof office, thus:

The ruling, therefore, thatwhen the people have elected a manto his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledgeof his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave hisfaults or misconduct if he had been guilty of anyrefers only toan action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminalcase, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious incharacter than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by apublic officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious notonly to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole.This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminalliability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at

least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under theConstitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon ofa criminal offense.

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17 21 SCRA 1292, 1295 [1967].

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In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioners insistencethat he was benefited by the ruling in Pascual v. ProvincialBoard of Nueva Ecija

18 that a public officer should never be

removed for acts done prior to his present term of office, asfollows:

There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basisof the investigation which has been commenced here, and which issought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation the object ofwhich is to cause the indictment and punishment of petitionerappellant as a private citizen whereas in the cases cited, thesubject of the investigation was an administrative charge againstthe officers therein involved and its object was merely to cause hissuspension or removal from public office. While the criminal casesinvolves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and thePeople of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case, anadministrative case involves only his actuations as a public officeras [they] affect the populace of the municipality where he serves.

19

Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The ProvincialGovernor, et al.,

20 this Court likewise categorically declared

that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective publicofficial during his previous term of office were notextinguished by his reelection, and that Pascual v.Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Hechanova referredonly to administrative liabilities committed during theprevious term of an elective official, thus:

1. The first problem we are to grapple with is the legal effect ofthe reelection of respondent municipal officials. Said respondentswould want to impress upon us the fact that in the last generalelections of November 14, 1967 the Makati electorate reelected allof them, except that ViceMayor Teotimo Gealogo, a councilor

prior thereto, was elevated to vicemayor. These respondentscontend that their reelection erected a bar to their removal fromoffice for misconduct committed prior to November 14, 1967. It isto be recalled that the acts averred in the criminal information inCriminal Case 18821

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18 106 Phil. 466.19 At 12941295.20 28 SCRA 517, 526527 [1969].

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and for which they were convicted allegedly occurred on or aboutJuly 26, 1967, or prior to the 1967 elections. They ground theirposition on Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil.466, and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58.

A circumspect view leaves us unconvinced of the soundness ofrespondents position. The two cases relied upon have laid downthe precept that a reelected public officer is no longer amenable toadministrative sanctions for acts committed during his formertenure. But the present case rests on an entirely different factualand legal setting. We are not here confronted with administrativecharges to which the two cited cases refer. Here involved is acriminal prosecution under a special statute, the AntiGraft andCorrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019).

Then again, on 30 May 1974, in Oliveros v. Villaluz,21 this

Court held:

I

The first question presented for determination is whether acriminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed byan elective officer during one term may be the basis of hissuspension in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection tooffice.

Petitioner concedes that the power and authority ofrespondent judge to continue trying the criminal case againstpetitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact ofpetitioners reelection, but contends that said respondentspower to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of

Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon petitionersreelection arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placedover that of sovereign and supreme people who ordained hisreturn to office.

Petitioners reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs.Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that each term is separate fromother terms and that the reelection to office operates as acondonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent ofcutting off the right to remove him therefor is misplaced.

The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that thePascual ruling (which dealt with administrative liability) appliesexclu

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21 57 SCRA 163, 169171.

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sively to administrative and not to criminal liability andsanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez the Court ruled that thereelection of a public officer for a new term does not in anymanner wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in aprevious term.

In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that thecases of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that areelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrativesanctions for acts committed during his former tenure but thatas to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of theAntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, thesame are not barred by reelection of the public officer, since, interalia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetualdisqualification from public office and it is patently offensive tothe objectives and the letter of the AntiGraft and CorruptPractice Act. . . that an official may amass wealth thru graft andcorrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchasereelection and thereby launder his evil acts.

Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense againstthe State and the body politic. The small segment of the nationalelectorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality ofAntipolo has no power to condone a crime against the publicjustice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public

office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code asa mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a publicofficer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of theAntiGraft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case ofconviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty ofperpetual disqualification entails the deprivation of the publicoffices and employments which the offender may have held, evenif conferred by popular election.

It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officers faultor misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of hisreelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only tohis administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctlystated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q.Antonios memorandum for the State, to hold that petitionersreelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer thedetermination of the criminal culpability of an erring official fromthe court to which it was lodged by law into the changing andtransient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so,for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corruptofficial by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiatedagainst the latter can

634


only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious acthaving been committed against the very State whose laws he hadsworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erodethe very system upon which our government is based, which isone of laws and not of men.

Finally, on 21 August 1992, in Aguinaldo v. Santos,22 this

Court stated:

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removedfrom administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of theofficers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the rightto remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds noapplication to criminal cases pending against petitioner for actshe may have committed during the failed coup.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the

doctrine enunciated in the abovementioned cases. Ifrespondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast oflegal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law, itwas impossible for him to have missed or misread thesecases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the factthat he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz andAguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order.What is then evident is that respondent either did notthoroughly read these cases or that he simplymiscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would onlymanifest either incompetence, since both cases werewritten in plain and simple language thereby foreclosingany possibility of misunderstanding or confusion ordeliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronouncedby this Court.

While diligence in keeping uptodate with the decisionsof this Court is a commendable virtue of judgesand, ofcourse, members of the Barcomprehending the decisionsis a different matter, for it is in that area where onescompetence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus,it has been said that

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22 212 SCRA 768, 773.

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a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursoryacquaintance with statutes and procedural rules it isimperative that he be conversant with basic legal principlesand aware of wellsettled and authoritative doctrines.

23 He

should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passionfor truth, to the end that he be the personification of justiceand the Rule of Law.

24

Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance,wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revereddoctrine on a simple issue.

On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberatelydisregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v. Sanchez andreiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. ProvincialGovernor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it

may then be said that he simply wished to enjoy theprivilege of overruling this Courts doctrinalpronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to alljudges, it is apropos to quote what this Court said sixtyoneyears ago in People v. Vera:

25

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases if each andevery Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege ofoverruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no endto litigation, and judicial chaos would result. A becomingmodesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of theposition that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of theintegrated judicial system of the nation.

Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals:26

________________

23 Estoya v. Abraham Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21, citing Aducayen v.Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973] Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980] Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48[1991] Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993].

24 Id., at 22, citing Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].25 65 Phil. 56, 82 [1937].26 34 SCRA 73, 7879 [1970].

636


The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men ofthe robe may at times be commendable, but certainly not whenthis Court, not once but at least four times, had indicated whatthe rule should be. We had spoken clearly and unequivocally.There was no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was clearand unmistakable. We did take pains to explain why it must bethus. We were within our power in doing so. It would not be toomuch to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of thejudiciary would at the very least, take notice and yield deference.Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear formisinterpretation what is expected of them. Thus: A becomingmodesty of inferior court[s] demands conscious realization of theposition that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the

integrated judicial system of the nation.27

In the constitutional

integrated judicial system of the nation.27

In the constitutionalsense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a category. Thegrave abuse of discretion is thus manifest.

In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras,28 this Court

affirmed that by tradition and in our system of judicialadministration, this Court has the last word on what thelaw is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting theConstitution and laws form part of this countrys legalsystem.

29 All other courts should then be guided by the

decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to doso, Vivo v. Cloribel

30 warned:

Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of hismission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrinepromulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning,or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter,but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with hispersonal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply thelaw as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that anydeviation from the principle laid down by the latter wouldunavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences,delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is heresaid, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings,then he has no other alternative than to place himself in theposition that he could properly avoid the

________________

27 Citing People v. Vera, supra note 25.28 237 SCRA 724, 735 [1994].29 Article 8, Civil Code.30 18 SCRA 713 [1966].

637


duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9,C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.

Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons ofJudicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office withdue regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power,

but a judge under the sanction of law.That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the

recommended penalty of reprimand is not commensuratewith the misdeed committed. A fine of P5,000.00, with awarning that a commission of similar acts in the futureshall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least,appropriate, considering respondent is due for compulsoryretirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his firstoffense.

WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignoranceof a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or deliberatedisregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of theCanons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge Iluminado C.Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five ThousandPesos (P5,000.00) and warned that the commission ofsimilar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ.,concur.

Respondent Judge meted a P5,000 fine and warnedagainst a commission of similar acts.

Notes.Only from the Supreme Courts decisions andrulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants,take their bearings. This is because the decisions referredto in Article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, Judicialdecisions applying or interpreting the laws or theConstitution shall form part of the legal system of thePhilippines, are only those enunciated by this Court of lastresort. (Insular Life

638

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDPeople vs. Amamangpang

Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees AssociationNATU vs.Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 [1971])

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repealsby implication are not favored and this is based on therationale that the will of the legislature cannot beoverturned by the judicial function of construction andinterpretation. (Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500 [1995])

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