ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA,vs. MARINA BUAN, CFI ZAMBALES(G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988)

FACTS:Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential house and lot in favor of private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure a loangranted by the latter to the former.Valentin failed to pay the loan on its maturity period. Thus, Buan applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage which duly published and advertised. In the auction sale of said mortgage, Buan was the winning bidder. Thereafter, the City Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered in the Registry of Deeds. On the other hand, Valentin had a period of one (1) year from the date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged properties. However, Valentin failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. Thus, a Final Bill of Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff. Buan, thereafter ask for the delivery of possession of the property from Valentin but the latter failed to do so. So, Buan, filed before the court a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession" and this was not contested.When Deputy Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil tried to execute the writ of possession, he found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused to vacate the same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the house and lot in question from Valentin in the amount of P100,00.00. Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil that he introduced improvements consisting of one bungalow house and one store and that Valentin is no longer residing in the premises.In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession, private respondent filed on a "Motion for Contempt" against Roxas and Guia. The petitioners filed with the respondent court their answer thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of court because they were not made parties to the main action. The respondent trial court, finding merit in petitioners' position that they could not be declared in contempt, however they were ordered to vacate the disputed house and lot within fifteen days from the receipt of the order.Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the property, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration however, it was denied. Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 12, 1979. This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on May 19, 1980.The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession which was ineffective as against them, being third parties. Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private respondent should file an independent action to recover the property, otherwise, there will be a violation of due process of law if they are not given their day in court to prove their adverse claim.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner Roxas indeed is a party actually holding the property adversely to Valentin.

RULING:It will be recalled that Roxas' possession of the property was premised on its alleged sale to him by Valentin for the amount of P100,000.00. Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds title to and possesses the property as Valentin's transferee. Any right he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin. As transferee, he steps into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant case, considering that the property had already been sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem it within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter had conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption [Rule 39, Sec. 29 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court; Magno v. Viola, 61 Phil. 80 (1934); Rosete v. Prov. Sheriff of Zambales, 95 Phil. 560 (1954).] Consequently, Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered adverse to Valentin.Thus, in Belleza v. Zandaga [98 Phil. 702 (1956)], the Court held that where the purchaser in an execution sale has already received the definitive deed of sale, he becomes the owner of the property bought and, as absolute owner, he is entitled to its possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one who merely claims to be a "successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor," unless it is adjudged that the alleged successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser at the execution sale. Stated differently, the purchaser's right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. The rule was reiterated in Guevara v. Ramos [G.R. No. L-24358, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 194].The rule in Belleza, although relating to the possession of property sold in execution sales under what is now Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, is also applicable to the possession of property sold at extrajudicial foreclosure sales pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135 [see IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera,supra]. Thus, as petitioner Roxas is not a party holding the property adversely to Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest, there was no bar to the respondent trial court's issuance of a writ of possession upon private respondent Buan's application.It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named in the writ of possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest. On the other hand, petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as Roxas' alleged tenant Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his deputies to remove Valentin or any person claiming interest under him" from the property. Undeniably, petitioners fell under this category.

SPOUSES FELIPE and VICTORIA LAYOS vs FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE SPOUSES MARINA AND GENEROSO OTIC (G.R. No. 150470, August 6, 2008)

FACTS: The instant Petition originated from a Petition for Reconstitution filed by the Spouses Layos on with the San Pedro RTC and on the same day theyinstituted quieting of title case before theBianRTC. The Petition in for Reconstruction essentially contained the same allegations made by the Spouses Layos in their Complaints in the injunction cases and quieting of title case. However, in support of their prayer for the reconstitution of the original copy of OCT No. 239 from their Owners Duplicate Certificate they alleged that Original Certificate of Title No. 239 was lost and/or destroyed. Several parties filed their intervention and/or opposition to the Petition for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos. FEGDI and La Paz filed separate Motions to Dismiss, which the Office of the Solicitor General supported in its Comment on the Petition which the San Pedro RTC issued an Order dismissing the case. The Spouses Layos filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the ruling of the lower court dismissing the Spouses Layos Petition for Reconstitution. According to the Court of Appeals, the validity of OCT No. 239 of the spousesLayoswas already determined by the Supreme Court in its Decisionin G.R. No. 120958, in which the Supreme Court categorically declared that the said certificate of title was a forgery.The appellate court contradicted the SpousesLayos assertion that such declaration of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 was merely anobiter dictum, for the same was a resolution of one of thecontroverted issues and was part of the principal disquisition of the lower court. Hence, dismissing the case and affirming the decision of the lower court. The Spouses Layos moved for the reconsideration, but they failed to convince the Court of Appeals to detract from its earlier ruling. Thus, the Spouses Layos, filed before this Court the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUEWhether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle ofresjudicatain the instant case, when it declared that the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon the issue of validity of the [SpousesLayos] O.C.T. No. 239.RULING:The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, provides the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.It is on the ground of res judicata, in its second concept conclusiveness of judgment that the Petition for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos must be dismissed. As explained by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:In the case at bar, the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos] OCT No. 239, inasmuch as the said issue has already been mutually controverted by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court no less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos] title.

ISIDRO PEREZ and NARCISO A. RAGUA, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG and SPOUSES GAUDENCIO DIGOS, JR. and RHODORA DIGOS,(G.R. No. 157616. July 22, 20050)

FACTS:Spouses Digos secured a loan from the International Exchange Bank to finance their project for the construction of townhouses on their property in Quezon City. To secure the payment of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the said property. Because of the spouses Digos failure to pay the amortizations on their loan, the bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of their real estate mortgage. Consequently, the property was sold at public auction, with the bank as the highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register of Deeds.On July 2, 1999, the spouses Digos wrote the bank, requesting for a period of six (6) months from September 7, 1999 within which to redeem the property. However, the bank denied the request. Then again spouses Digos wrote to the bank, pleading for an extension of at least three (3) months to redeem the property. In a Letter to the spouses dated August 30, 1999, the bank granted the spouses Digos a period of one month from September 8, 1999 (or until October 8, 1999) within which to redeem the property. However, the bank consolidated its title over the property, and on September 19, 1999, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 206979 in the name of the bank.Instead of repurchasing the property on or before October 8, 1999, the spouses Digos filed a Complaint against the bank with the RTC of Quezon City, for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the property, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the bank from consolidating its title over the property. The court held that it had no authority to extend the period for redemption, and since it had already expired, the spouses had no more right to redeem the property; as such, the defendant had the right to consolidate its title over the property, and had, in fact, been issued TCT No. 206979. The court also declared that the spouses Digos had no right to demand that they be allowed to redeem the property.The spouses Digos failed to appeal the order; instead, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the Order of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition because it was filed out of time. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, which they later withdrew via a motion. The CA then resolved to grant the motion; hence, the CA resolution dismissing the petition became final and executory on May 7, 2001. Entry of judgment was made of record.Meanwhile, the bank sold the property to Isidro Perez and Narciso Ragua to whom the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 211888. The vendees caused the subdivision of the property into eighteen (18) lots. The Register of Deeds issued titles for each subdivision lot in favor of Perez and Ragua.On June 4, 2001, the spouses Digos filed a Complaint with the RTC of Quezon City, this time, against the bank, Perez and Ragua, for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as well as the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff, and the Torrens title issued to them. The spouses Digos prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.The spouses Digos reiterated the allegations in their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-38941 that they were not notified of the sale at public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid for the property was unconscionably low compared to the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on similar grounds of res judicata, splitting of a single cause of action and forum shopping.On June 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion, ruling that there was no identity of issue in the two actions because, in the second complaint, the spouses Digos assailed the legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure, on the sole ground that the bank had unlawfully increased their obligation, contrary to the terms and conditions of the loan contract. The court held that the causes of action in the two complaints were not identical: in the first case, it was for the redemption of the mortgaged property, distinct and separate from their cause of action in the second case which is rooted on the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan account with the bank. The court also declared that in the first complaint, the spouses Digos assailed the validity or regularity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction. Consequently, the court concluded, the complaint was not barred by res judicata; nor are they guilty of forum shopping.The trial court denied the defendants motion for reconsideration. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA, alleging therein that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint.On November 25, 2002, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed orders. The appellate court declared that there was no identity of causes of action in the two cases because the first action was one for injunction and redemption of the property, whereas the second action was for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous computation of the balance on the respondents account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were not estopped from filing their second action. The petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied. Petitioners Isidro Perez and Narciso Ragua forthwith filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE:Whether or not the judgment in Civil case No. Q-99-[38941] (Redemption Mortgage) is res juducata to Civil Case No. Q-01-44227 (cancellation and annulment of Foreclosure sale)

RULING:

The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint to avoid the application of the principle of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case, between the same parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or question is binding on the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective of whether the causes of action are the same. The ruling of the CA that the action of the private respondents and their legal theory in their second complaint were different from their causes of action and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A different cause of action is one that proceeds not only on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a different factual footing as not to require the trial of facts material to the former suit; that is, an action that can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiffs original complaint are concluded in defendants favor.In this case, the private respondents second complaint cannot be maintained without trying the facts material to the first case, and the second case cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues raised in the first complaint are considered in favor of the bank.The principle of res judicata applies when the opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the pleading of a different legal theory would have convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in the first action which, with the use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so, they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res judicata.Indeed, in Siegel v. Knott, it was held that the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first, merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed

SPOUSES AGUILAR vs THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION(G.R. No. 157911 September 19, 2006)

FACTS:Petitioners obtained a loan from the Manila Banking Corporation (respondent), secured by a real estate mortgage over their property.When petitioners failed to pay, the mortgaged property was extra-judicially foreclosed.Respondent was the winning bidder at the public auction. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued to the respondent. Subsequently, instead of redeeming the property, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure sale of the property before the RTC. While the case was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. They agreed that petitioner will pay the remaining balance of the loan and the property will be redeemed by them. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution to enforce the compromise agreement which was adopted and approved by the RTC Branch 165 which was granted by the same court. On January 22, 1990, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for deferment of the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31, 1990 because petitioners have a pending proposal for the settlement of their judgment debt.The manifestation was with the conformity of respondents.On January 24, 1990, RTC Branch 165 issued an Order granting the motion and holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31, 1990.However, no settlement was reached by the parties during the period. One year and four months later, petitioners still failed to settle their judgment debt.Consequently, respondent filed on December 2, 1991 a Manifestation reiterating its motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Thus the courtissued an Order granting the manifestation and directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987. However, petitioners filed a Notice of Appealbut RTC Branch 165 denied it in its Order dated August 21, 2000 on the ground that an order of execution is not appealable. Thereafter, petitioners filed a six-page Petition for Review onCertiorariwith this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144719, reiterating that the Decision dated January 30, 1987 can no longer be executed on mere motion since it is more than five years old.In a Resolution dated October 11, 2000, the First Division of this Court denied the petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and failure to show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule.Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality in its Resolution dated December 11, 2000.Since the Resolution in G.R. No. 144719 became final and executory on January 16, 2001, RTC Branch 165 issued a writ of execution on February 19, 2001 to enforce the Decision dated January 30, 1987.On February 23, 2001, the Sheriff issued a Notice for Compliance of the said writ. Undaunted by their previous setbacks, petitioners filed on March 6, 2001 in RTC Branch 165 an Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Execution insisting anew on their novation and prescription theories.They also moved for consignation of the amount of their obligation under the Letter dated June 7, 1991 of respondents Statutory Receiver.On May 24, 2002, RTC Branch 167 rendered its Omnibus Order denying the Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of execution and for consignation, as well as the motion to cite petitioners in contempt and theex partemotion for an order to divest petitioners title to respondent.Accordingly, RTC Branch 167 issued a Writ of Execution on July 4, 2002.On July 23, 2002, the Sheriff issued the Notice for Compliance of the said writ. Petitioners filed on July 26, 2002 a petition forcertiorariwith the CA. They reiterated that the Decision dated January 30, 1987 cannot be executed by mere motion filed on February 1, 2000 since more than five years have elapsed. The CA denied the petition forcertiorari.It held that since the delays were occasioned by petitioners own initiative and for their own advantage, the five-year period allowed for the enforcement of the judgment by motion have been interrupted or suspended.On November 13, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in not recognizing that Prescription has set in in this case considering that more than five (5) years, or more than ten (10) years, had elapsed since the decision based on compromise agreement became final and executor.RULING:The Court notes that the petition forcertioraribefore the CA should have been dismissed outright since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration from the RTC Omnibus Order dated May 24, 2002.Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:SECTION 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, andthere is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The plain and adequate remedy referred to in the rule is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision or order.The purpose for this requirement is to grant an opportunity for the court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the casewithout the intervention of a higher court. Thus, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a conditionsine qua nonto the institution of a special civil action forcertiorari.While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the rule, such as:(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the courta quohas no jurisdiction;(b) where the questions raised in thecertiorariproceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings wasex parteor in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved, none of these exceptions apply here.In the present case, the petitioners not only failed to explain their failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, they also failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement.A motion for reconsideration isnot only expected to be but would actually have provided an adequate and more speedy remedy than the petition forcertiorari.Certioraricannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. In any case, even if petitioners proceduralfauxpasis ignored, their contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their favor.Petitioners are barred from raising the issue on the prescription of execution of the decision by mere motion under the principle of thelaw of the case,which is the practice of courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It means thatwhatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Thelaw of the caseon the issue of prescription of the execution of the decision by mere motion or applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court has been settled in the Order dated March 20, 2000 of RTC Branch 165. Upon denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, they erroneously sought review with this Court which dismissed their petition for review oncertiorarifor violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule. This Courts Resolution became final and executory on January 16, 2001. Thus, petitioners are bound thereby.The question of prescription has been settled with finality and may no longer be resurrected by petitioners.It is not subject to review or reversal in any court, even this Court.The CA failed to consider this principle oflaw of the case, which is totally different from the concept ofres judicata.InPadillo v. Court of Appeals,the Court distinguished the two as follows:xxxLaw of the casedoes not have the finality of the doctrine ofres judicata, and applies only to that one case, whereasres judicataforecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In the 1975 case ofComilang v. Court of Appeals (Fifth Division.),a further distinction was made in this manner:The doctrine oflaw of the caseis akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application.It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case.The doctrine ofres judicatadiffers therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect ofan adjudicationin a wholly independent proceeding. To elucidate further,res judicataor bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises inany subsequent litigationbetween the same parties and for the same cause.The four requisites forres judicatato apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be,between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.The fourth requisite is wanting in the present case.There is only one case involved.There is no second independent proceeding or subsequent litigation between the parties.The present petition concerns subsequent proceedings in the same case, with petitioners raising the same issue long settled by a prior appeal. As to petitioners arguments on the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement, respondents receivership as a supervening event, and novation of the Compromise Agreement by the Letter dated June 7, 1991, the Court holds that these were raised as mere afterthought.If petitioners sincerely believed in the merits of their arguments, they should have raised them at the earliest opportunity and pursued their ultimate resolution.However, petitioners did not.Petitioners are barred from raising arguments concerning the inequity of the acceleration clause of the Compromise Agreement since they only raised it for the first time before the CA in their Petition forCertiorariin CA-G.R. SP No. 71849.To consider the argument raised belatedly in a pleading filed in the appellate court, especially in the executory stage of the proceedings, would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.In addition, after adopting and agreeing to the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, petitioners cannot be permitted to subsequently make a completevolte faceand attack the validity of the said agreement when they miserably failed to comply with its provisions.Our law and policy do not sanction such a somersault. What's more, petitioners also failed to comply with the reduced purchase amount and interest rate granted in the Letter dated June 7, 1991.They can hardly evoke judicial compassion.ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION(G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001)FACTS:

Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment.

RULING:Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIOG.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

FACTS:Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE:Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

RULING:The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.We are not persuaded.The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN vs ROLANDO BANIQUED(G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008)

FACTS:Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya and companions, filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law. Baniqued argued that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, so too are Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, National Building Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096 and the 1991 Local Government Code which does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied. On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of Baniqued and four (4) months later, the RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued. The latter moved for reconsideration which was opposed and on March 3, 2000, the RTC denied the motion. Baniqued appealed the decision of the RTC where the Court of Appeals sustained Baniqued and held that the mayor, although an executive official, has also been given the authority to hear controversies involving property rights in the exercise of his quasi-judicial functions. Left with no other recourse, petitioners interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in ruling that the act of the City Mayor in issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function.

RULING: Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Quasi-judicial function has been defined as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.

GONZALO R. GONZALES vs. STATE PROPERTIES CORPORATION(G.R. No. 140765. January 25, 2001)

FACTSRespondent State Properties Corporation filed a verified complaint for Recovery of Property based on ownership with the RTC of Las Pias against Petitioner Gonzalo R. Gonzales and his brothers and sisters, all heirs of the late Benito Gonzales. The complaint, accompanied by an application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, prayed that after trial, the Court render judgment confirming its right to take and enjoy possession of the property together with all improvements thereon to the exclusion of the heirs of Benito Gonzales, inclusive of herein petitioner.The case was raffled to Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias and summons was duly served on Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales but petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion other defendants therein did not receive any notice of raffle.Private respondent filed a manifestation expressing that it interposed no objection to the said Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales then filed his Answer.Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Service of Summons by Publication on all the defendants therein, except Petitioner Gonzalo Gonzales, for the reason that their residences could not be ascertained despite diligent inquiry. The Court granted the said motion at the hearing on May 21, 1999.Subsequently, private respondent received a Notice of Raffle from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias enjoining private respondent to attend the raffle of the case before the sala of herein public respondent. On the said date, the counsel of Petitioner Gonzales and counsel of private respondent appeared but petitioners counsel opposed the holding of the raffle on the ground that the other defendants were not duly notified of the raffle, again invoking Administrative Circular No. 20-95. This was granted by public respondent in his Order. Thus, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which petitioner filed an opposition.On August 30, 1999, public respondent issued the now assailed order which reconsidered his July 30, 1999 Order. Thus, the instant case was set for regular raffle on September 8, 1999.Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA. In which the CA affirmed the Order of the RTC of Las Pias City by setting the raffle of Civil Case No. LP-99-0077 even without notice to some of the defendants therein.

ISSUE:Whether or not a case may be raffled, even when some of the parties could not be served notice because their whereabouts are unknown.

RULING:In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served personally or by substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore, may proceed even without notice to and the presence of the said adverse parties.Indeed, contrary to the argument of petitioner, allowing the raffle to proceed in a case like this is not inconsistent with Section 5 of Rule 58, which reads as follows:SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.Furthermore, petitioner makes much ado about the requirement of notice of raffle. In ordinary suits, notice of a raffle is given to the parties in order to afford [them] a chance to be heard in the assignment of their cases. According to Justice Feria, the raffle of cases is done in open session with adequate notice, so that parties or their counsel will be prevented from choosing judges to hear their case.Petitioner has no ground to object, since he himself had been given notice prior to the holding of the raffle. Furthermore, he has no standing to complain on behalf of the other parties, because he does not claim to represent them.In any event, the other defendants had been located and served summons. In fact, the case was subsequently raffled on December 8, 1999, and a pretrial conducted on May 9, 2000. The other defendants have not complained of any impropriety in the raffle. Their silence on this question demonstrates the utter lack of merit of petitioners contention.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY vs JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, ROSE CARANTES, and all the other HEIRS OF MAXIMINO CARANTES(G.R. No. 181274, G.R. No. 181274)

FACTS: Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in possession of a parcel of land located in Loakan Road, Baguio City. On June 20, 1997, they obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over the land from the DENR. On the strength of said CALC, respondents secured a building permit and a fencing permit from the Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. Before long, they fenced the premises and began constructing a residential building thereon.Soon, respondents received a letter from Digna D. Torres, the PEZA, informing them that the house they built had overlapped PEZAs territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish the same within sixty (60) days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its demolition at respondents expense.Without answering PEZAs letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City was granted and enjoined PEZA to cease and desist from threatening respondents with the demolition of their house before respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. Also, the RTC likewise issued an Order, which directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case. Additionally, the RTC granted respondents petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of injunction against PEZA. The trial court ruled that respondents are entitled to possess, occupy and cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their CALC. The court a quo explained that by the very definition of an ancestral land under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, said lots have been segregated from lands of the public domain. As such, the rights of respondents to the land are already vested in them and cannot be disturbed by Proclamation No. 1825, which included said land within the export processing zone of Baguio City. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The appellate court echoed the trial courts declaration that the subject lots have been set aside from the lands of the public domain. On February 1, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for petitioner PEZA, filed a Motion to Admit petition, with the present Petition attach. Petitioner challenges the CA decision.

ISSUE:Whether petitioner can require respondents to demolish the structures they had built within the territory of PEZA-BCEZ (Baguio City Economic Zone).

RULING:By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director general may require owners of structures built without said permit to remove such structures within sixty (60) days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures.As regards the issuance of fencing permits on ancestral lands, particularly within Baguio City and the rest of the Cordilleras, DENR-Circular No. 03-90 (Rules on the Acceptance, Identification, Evaluation, and Delineation of Ancestral Land Claims by the Special Task Force Created by the Virtue of DENR Special Order Nos. 31 and 31-A both Series of 1990) prescribes in Section 12:SEC. 12. The Regional Land Management Services or the CENROs, through their respective Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), shall prepare and submit to the Special Task Force a report on each and every application surveyed and delineated. Thereafter, the Special Task Force after evaluating the reports, shall endorse valid ancestral land claims to the Secretary through the Indigenous Community Affairs Division, Special Concerns Office for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim. As soon as ancestral land claim is found to be valid and in meritorious cases, the Special Task Force may recommend to the City/Municipal Mayors Office the issuance of a fencing permit to the applicant over areas actually occupied at the time of filing. (Emphasis supplied.)This is the general rule. Considering, however, that in this case, a fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that within the premises of PEZA, it is the Authority that may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by the Authority.From the foregoing disquisition, it clearly appears that respondents likewise failed to satisfy the second requisite in order that an injunction may issue: that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed, are violative of said right. PEZA acted well within its functions when it demanded the demolition of the structures which respondents had put up without first securing building and fencing permits from the Authority. Thus, the petition is granted. Respondents are hereby DIRECTED to demolish the residential building they had built within the premises of PEZA within sixty (60) days from notice. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS(G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006)

FACTS:Petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company, granted a total of eight (8) loans to Noahs Arc Merchandising. Per Certificate of Registration issued by the Department of Trade and Industry , Noahs Ark is a single proprietorship owned by Mr. Albert T. Looyuko. The said loans were evidenced by identical Promissory Notes all signed by Albert T. Looyuko, private respondent Jimmy T. Go and one Wilson Go. Likewise, all loans were secured by real estate mortgage constituted over a parcel of land registered in the names of Mr. Looyuko and herein private respondent. Petitioner, claiming that Noahs Ark defaulted in its obligations, extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The auction sale was set on April 14 1998 but on April 8 1998 private respondent filed a complaint for damages with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the auction sale. In the Order dated April 10 1998 a temporary restraining order was issued and in the same order the application for Preliminary Injunction was set for hearing in the afternoon of the same day. After hearing, the Order granted the application for preliminary injunction which shall take effect upon posting of a bond. Private-respondent then filed a bond as required by the order. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforementioned order which motion was denied on the ground that the extrajudicial foreclosure was premature as to four (4) promissory notes.After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated July 30, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying that the orders dated May 7, 1998 and July 30, 1998, granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively, be annulled and set aside and the writ of preliminary injunction be dissolved. Furthermore, petitioner asked to be allowed to proceed with the auction sale of the property. The CA denied the petition for certiorari however, private respondent is ordered to file an injunctive bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00.Hence this petition.

ISSUES:Whether or not the private respondent was entitled to the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.Whether or not the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were properly issued by Judge Victorio.

RULING:On the first issue, this Court finds that private respondent was not entitled to the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, agency or person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.Private respondent is not entitled to the relief of injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale neither the extrajudicial foreclosure nor auction sale violative of private respondents rights.It is clear from the facts that FEBTC and Noahs Ark are both principal obligors and creditors of each other. Their debts to each other both consist in a sum of money. The eight promissory notes of Noahs Ark are all due; and the lease payments owed by FEBTC become due each month. Noahs Arks debt is liquidated and demandable; and FEBTCs lease payments are liquidated and are demandable every month as they fall due. Lastly, there is no retention or controversy commenced by third persons over either of the debts. Novation did not occur as private respondent argued. The Court has declared that a contract cannot be novated in the absence of a new contract executed between the parties. The legal compensation, which was acknowledged by FEBTC in its May 19, 1998 letter, occurred by operation of law, as discussed above. As a consequence, it cannot be considered a new contract between the parties. Hence, the loan agreement, as embodied in the promissory notes and the real estate mortgage, subsists. Since the compensation between the parties occurred by operation of law, FEBTC did not waive Noahs Arks default. As a result of the absence of novation or waiver of default, FEBTC is therefore not estopped from proceeding with the foreclosure. Private respondent further argues in his memorandum that FEBTC was in bad faith when it initiated the foreclosure proceedings because Noahs Ark had been requesting for accounting and reconciliation of its account and the application of interest payment, and that there were on-going negotiations with FEBTC for the settlement and restructuring of the loan obligation. From the evidence on hand, it is clear that FEBTC was acting within its rights. Private respondent did not present any other agreement signed by the parties subsequent to the promissory notes and mortgage contract which can be considered as replacing, altering, or novating the contractual rights between the parties. Even if Noahs Ark was trying to seek an accounting and reconciliation of its account and even if it was trying to negotiate a restructuring of its loan obligation, it cannot deny the fact that it had already defaulted on the entire loan obligation. This gave FEBTC the right to exercise its contractual rights to foreclose on the security of the debt, which in this case was the real estate mortgage subject of this case. FEBTC was therefore just exercising its contractual rights when it initiated foreclosure proceedings and cannot be considered to have acted in bad faith. With regard to the second issue, this Court finds that the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction were improperly issued by Judge Victorio. First of all, on substantive grounds, as discussed above, private respondent was not entitled to the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. Second, the issuance of the TRO was, on procedural grounds, irregular. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. Judge Victorio, in an order dated April 14, 1998, issued a TRO for five days, then, in an order dated April 15, 1998, extended it for fifteen more days, totaling twenty days. However, in the first order, Judge Victorio excluded Saturdays and Sundays; and in the latter order he added legal holidays to the exclusions. As quoted above, a TRO is effective only for a period of twenty days from notice to the party sought to be enjoined. The rule does not specify that the counting of the twenty-day period is only limited to working days or that Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded from the twenty-day period. The law simply states twenty days from notice. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court is pertinent, to wit:How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.It is clear from the last sentence of this section that non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period only when the last day of the period falls on such days. The Rule does not provide for any other circumstance in which non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed period. Hence, Judge Victorio exceeded the authority granted to lower courts, in Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he excluded non-working days from the counting of the twenty-day period. In sum, private respondent was not entitled to the TRO nor to the preliminary injunction, and the period granted in the TRO issued by Judge Victorio exceeded that prescribed in the Rules of Court.

REY LAADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ(G. R. N0. 102390 February 1, 2002)

FACTS:The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a picket line in front of the companys Cabuyao, Laguna factory. NLRC issued a TRO enjoining the UFE to desist from blocking, barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress from Nestles Cabuyao plant. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary and the fire brigade of Cabuyao. Seeking to transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig during the strike, Nestle hired 6 cargo trucks from brothers Constancio and Jesus Alimagno. Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss said transfer of products, as the matter was not overed by the TRO. However, in bad faith, Santos instead ordered the PC to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front of the plant gate so that the trucks can get out of the plant. The PC and the fire brigade began hitting the strikers with truncheons and water cannons. With gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound.Meanwhile, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez was on his way home from his masteral class at the UP College of Public Health. He arrived at the Nestle factory while the dispersal was ongoing so he stopped his car. At that time, the one of the cargo trucks, driven by Pacifico Galasao, was leaving the Nestle compound at full speed. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction, the truck driver drove in a crouching position. However, he lost control of the truck and bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez. Pinned down by his overturned car, Dr. Hemedez asked someone to inform his parents and pleaded for help from the people. While extricating Dr. Hemedez from the overturned car, his mother and brothers repeatedly asked the help of PC soldiers, specifically to unload the cargo truck to speed up the rescue, but said soldiers refused, saying that the truck might get looted if they did so.Dr. Hemedez was pulled out from under his car 2 hours later by his family members and was rushed to the hospital, where he died shortly after arrival. Spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, sued Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Laada for damages. After defendants filed their answers to the complaint, the Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified answer to the request for admission. The Hemedez spouses moved to strike out said answers and to declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted, contending that defendants themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the request for admission.The trial court issued an Order dated April 10, 1989 denying for lack of merit the Hemedez spouses motion to strike out the defendants answers and/or declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted. It held that the grounds relied upon by plaintiffs counsel in his motion were more formal than substantial for several reasons. First, by signing and verifying the answer to the request for admission, the counsel of a defendant or defendants reposed upon himself the same undertaking the defendant would have undertaken had he been the one who verified the answer. Second, since the purpose of verification is merely to serve as an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination, and that the pleading is filed in good faith, the absence of verification is formal and not jurisdictional. Third, the defendants were bound by the acts of the counsel of their choice. Fourth, the generalizations made in the answer were expected because the plaintiffs requests for admission were substantially identical with the allegations in their complaint. On certiorari in the SC, the matter was referred to the CA. CA granted the motions to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declared each of the matters requested to be impliedly admitted. It also remanded the case to the court a quo for proper proceedings.

ISSUE:Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order ofApril 10, 1989was timely filed.

RULING:While the Court upholds the petitioners contention on the propriety of an answer to a request for admission being filed by counsel, there is no merit in their contention on the late filing of private respondents omnibus motion. It is indeed a fact that private respondents received a copy of the questioned Order of April 10, 1989 on April 26, 1989 and that they filed the omnibus motion by registered mail only on June 21, 1989 or fifty-six (56) days thereafter. Petitioners contend that the omnibus motion should have been filed within the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Suffice it to state that the Order sought to be reconsidered by the lower court did not finally dispose of the merits of the case so that it should be covered by the reglementary period stated in Section 39. That section speaks of final orders and not interlocutory ones or those that leave something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. By denying the motion to strike out the answers of private respondents to petitioners request for admission, the lower court did not terminate the proceedings. When it ruled on the omnibus motion which petitioners believe was filed out of time, the lower court simply disposed of a matter that was, in a manner of speaking, getting in the way of the expeditious disposition of the case. Private respondents who should be most interested in the speedy disposition of the case unfortunately and unwittingly caused its delay by a request for admission that only achieved nothing but further delay in the proceedings.

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR vs JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ (G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006)

FACTS: Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loretos death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the RTC of Quezon City. But, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of a law firm claiming to be the representative of heirs of Casa, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative. Thereafter, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient. He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the case.On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. It is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed.San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15, 2003 and filed, on December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Alleging that the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa did not file any petition for the appointment of an administrator of his estate; hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is not qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased devisee. San Juan pointed out that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court contravened its August 14, 2002 and November 22, 2002 Orders. The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the probate court declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised by the parties and found no compelling ground or cogent reason to set aside its December 2, 2003 Order. On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for reconsideration dated May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2, 2003 Order of the RTC. On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments in his first motion for reconsideration which had already been passed upon. When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed, on July 23, 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which was granted by the CA. San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22, 2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate court but dismiss by the court. A Motion for reconsideration was filed but denied. Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari, for the reversal of the resolutions of the appellate court

ISSUE:Whether or not the sixty-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the rules of courts is reckoned from notice of denial of the first motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order even though a second and third motion for reconsideration (which are not prohibitive motions) of the same interlocutory order had been filed and ere later denied.

RULINGWe agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004.The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioners receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial courts denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue. We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective pleadings not only on the timeliness of the petition for certiorari in the CA but also on the validity of the assailed December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal of the petition because it was time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. However, in this case, we find it appropriate and necessary to resolve once and for all the issue of whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, vs BENIGNO TAPPA,(G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009)

FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (Danao heirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao which they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might need it. Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy the subject property even after Consuelos death, building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. was claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, Danao heirs demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this, saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the heirs title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC. ISSUE:Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?

RULING:No Grave Abuse of Discretion was committed by the Judge. Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, awill, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase may be brought under the RTC. These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses may, the amended Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000 (MM). In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the RTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, the case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.

HEIRS OF SUSANA DE GUZMAN TUAZON vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 125758. January 20, 2004)

FACTS:RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, issued an Order granting the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4331 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, in lieu of the lost copy of petitioner. But, private respondents filed in the same court an action for Quieting of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title, praying in the main that an order be issued directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the owners duplicate copy which was issued pursuant to the order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. Thus, the petitioners averred that the private respondents had no cause of action against them; that Branch 74 had no jurisdiction to annul and/or reverse an order of a co-equal court; and that OCT No. 4331, on file with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, is subsisting, otherwise, Branch 71 would not have ordered the issuance of a new duplicate OCT in lieu of that which was irretrievably lost.On September 25, 1995, the private respondents filed a Motion to Transfer Case to Branch 71 in order to avoid any conflict of decision between two separate branches of this court which are co-equal to each other. However, the petitioners opposed the motion and prayed that the private respondents motion to transfer case be denied and an order be issued dismissing outright the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.On October 24, 1995, Branch 74 issued an Order denying the petitioners prayer to dismiss the case as well as the private respondents motion to transfer case Defendants prayer for dismissal of this case is likewise denied.The petitioners on December 4, 1995 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the order. On March 12, 1996, the respondent Court rendered its herein assailed decision dismissing the petitioners petition for certiorari. The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was, likewise, denied by the respondent Court in an Order dated July 19, 1996. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court erred in holding that the petition filed by private respondent in Branch 74 of the RTC of Rizal, is for quieting of Tile and Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title.RULING:A cursory examination of the foregoing averments readily shows that the private respondents petition is indeed, as captioned, one for quieting of title and nullification and cancellation of title. Thus, the private respondents assert therein that the issuance to petitioners of a new owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 4331, which was procured by fraudulent representation, casts a cloud on the titles of the private respondents and, therefore, should be ordered cancelled. In Baricuatro, Jr. v.