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TECHN OLOGY AND TH E 21ST CENTURY

BATTL EFI EL D: RECOMPL I CATI NG MORAL

L I FE FOR TH E STATESMAN AN D

THE SOL DI ER

Char les J . Dun lap, J r .

J anu ar y 15, 1999


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The views expressed in thi s report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the offi cial policy or posit ion of the Depart ment of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government . This reportis cleared for public release; distr ibuti on is unl imited.

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may be obtained from the Publi cations and Product ion Offi ce by call ingcommercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet [email protected] l

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Selected 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Insti tut e (SSI )monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Insti tut e Homepage

for elect ronic disseminat ion. SSI s Homepage address is: ht tp://carl isle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

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The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewslett er to update the nat ional secur ity community on the research ofour analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming

conferences sponsored by the Insti tut e. Each newsletter also provides ast rategic commentary by one of our research analysts. I f you areinterested in receiving this newslett er , please let us know by e-mail atout r [email protected] l i sle.ar my.mi l or by cal l i ng commer cial (717)245-3133.

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FOREWORD

Earlier in this century, George Orwell, in his novel, 1984,offered a vision of t he wor ld where the logical might be i l logical,r ight could be wrong, and 2 plus 2 might equal 5. Now t hat we arebeyond 1984 and at the end of the century, humanity faces afuture where a millennium of norms established by custom andlaw may be alt ered by the implementation of new technologies. Asin t he Orwel l ian wor ld of 1984, what seems to be may not be, andwhat was intended for good could become bad.

In t his monograph, Ai r Force Colonel Char les Dunlap start sfrom the t radi t ional Amer ican not ion that technology might offera way to decrease the horror and suffer ing of warfare. He point sout that historically this assumption is flawed in that pasttechnological advances, from gunpowder weapons to bombers,have only made warfare morenot lessbloody. With arelent less logic, Colonel Dunlap takes to task those who say thatthe Revolut ion in M i l i tary Affair s has the potent ial t o make warless bloody.

He covers the technological landscape fr om precision-guidedmunitions and Information Warfare to the use of space formilitary operations to raise issues that could pose difficultethical, legal and moral problems for statesmen and soldiers.Some of these conundrums are so confounding that the authorcould claim that in all humi l i ty his only purpose was to raise theseissues to prompt debate. But Colonel Dunlap takes the next stepto outline several broad thematic avenues that may help us alladdress the difficult problems that lie ahead. The issues areimpor tant and what fol lows in this monograph i nvi tes discourse.I am sure Colonel Dunlap joins me in welcoming you to thatdiscussion. Let me urge you t o indul ge yoursel f i n Technology andthe 21st Century Batt lefi eld.

LARRY M. WORTZELColonel , U.S. ArmyDi rector , St rategic Studies Inst i tute

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BI OGRAPHI CAL SKETCH OF TH E AUTH OR

COL ONEL CHARL ES J . DUNL AP, J R . is a Staff JudgeAdvocate, 9th Air Force/U.S. Cent ral Command Ai r Forces(USCENTAF). Colonel Dunlap earned his B.A. in history atSt. Josephs University, his Juris Doctorate from theVi l lanova Universi ty School of Law, graduated from the Ai rWar College, and is a Distinguished Graduate of theNational War College. In 1992 the Judge Advocates

Association named him the U.S. Air Forces OutstandingCareer Ar med Forces At torney, and in 1996 he received theThomas P. Keenan, Jr. Award for international andoperations law. He is a 1997 graduate of the NationalSecurity Management Course conducted by SyracuseUniversi ty and Johns Hopkins University. Colonel Dunlaphas served in a variety of CONUS assignments as well asoverseas. He deployed to Africa in 1992-93 during

operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE) and to Saudi Arabia in 1994 (OperationVIGILANT WARRIOR). Most recently he deployed to theMiddle East to serve as the legal advisor for Commander,USCENTAF, during Operation DESERT FOXs strikesagainst Iraq in December 1998. Colonel Dunlap speakswidely on national secur ity issues and is the author of suchessays as The Law of Cyberwar ; Asymmetr ical Warfare and

the Western Mindset; How We Lost the High-tech War of2007; A Vi r tuous Warr ior in a Savage Wor ld; Joint Vision2010: A Red Team Assessment; Taming Shiva: ApplyingInternational Law to Nuclear Operations; 21st CenturyLand Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths;and The Origins ofthe Amer ican M i l i tar y Coup of 2012.

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TECH NOL OGY AND TH E 21ST CENTURYBATTL EFI EL D: RECOM PL I CATI NG M ORAL

L I FE FOR TH E STATESM AN AND

TH E SOL DI ER

So by the benefi t of t his light of r eason, they have found outArtillery, by which warres come to a quicker ends thanheretofore, and the great expence of bloud is avoyed; for thenumbers slain now, since the invent ion of Ar t i l lery, are much

lesse than before, when t he sword was the execut ioner.

John Donne, 1621

In t roduc t ion .

To a French Foreign Legionnaire reeling undermurderous Viet Minh bombardments at the siege of DienBien Phu, the notion that the advent of artillery woulddiminish the carnage of war would seem to be thecruelestand most preposterous of ironies.1 Yet notuncommonly the int roduct ion of new mil i tary t echnology isaccompanied by enthusiast ic predict ions that the savageryof war will somehow be mitigated. All too often, however,these promises remain unfulfilled. Consider, for example,the widely held 17th century belief that the invention ofgunpowder made war less horr ible.2

Such is the faith in scientific progress. In truth,technological advances bear great responsibility for theexponential growth in the sheer destructiveness of war.3

Furthermore, as the grim statistics of modern conflictsamply demonst rate,4 much of t hat dest ruct iveness fal ls not

just upon belligerent armies and their weaponry, butincreasingly upon noncombatants and their property.

Today we are once again seeing renewed opt imi sm thattechnology might yet provide relief from the nightmare ofwar. Recent scientific developments raise hopes that 21st

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bel ieve that t he RMA wi l l give the Uni ted States a vir tuallyinsurmountable military advantage for the foreseeablefuture.13

The impetus to seek technological solut ions to vi r tual lyevery human dilemmaeven the costly viciousness ofwaris quintessentially American.14 Yankee ingenuityhas long sought to substitute machines for manpower.15

Unsurpr is ingly , therefore, the Uni ted States hasent husiast icall y embraced the RMA; technology has rapidlybecome the cornerstone of Amer icas mi l i tary planning. Theformer Chairman of t he Joint Chiefs of Staff declared thathis 1996 directive, Joint Vision (JV) 2010,16fur nishes anoperational ly based template17 as to how Amer icas armedforces wi l l channel the vi tali ty and innovation of our peopleand leverage technological opportunities to achieve newlevels of effectivenessin joint war fighti ng.18

All of this would seem to bode well for those concernedwith the ethical conduct of war. But are new technologies

unqual i fied vir tues? In Why Thi ngs Bi te Back: Technologyand the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, authorEdward Tenner reminds us that technological advanceshave the nasty habit of surprising us with unexpectedadverse qualities once their full import is experienced.19

Well-intent ioned effor ts can paradoxicall y create problemsworse than the ones a specifi c invent ion was meant to solve.Even general ly favorable scient i f ic developments

frequently manifest revenge effects which at bestrecompl icate a par t icular t ask or si tuat ion.

Th is monograph seeks to examine the mora lconundrums that 21st centur y statesmen and soldiers mayface by identifying some of the ethical issues that aregenerated or, as Tenner might put it, recomplicated bytechnological advances. Doing so will necessarily involve

assessing the impact of high-tech war on t he exist ing law ofarmed conflict (LOAC).20 The monograph contends thatthere is a direct relation between ethics and LOAC. AsGeoffr ey Best insists, [I ]t must never be forgot ten that the

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law of war, wherever it began at all, began mainly as amatter of r el igion and ethics . . . I t began in ethics and it haskept one foot in ethics ever since.21 As a result, this

monograph wi l l t ry to show where internati onal l aw, whichshould reflect at least minimum standards of ethics andmorality, needs reexamination because of the newtechnologies of war.

Neither ethics nor law, however, can answer all thequest ions that may arise on 21st cent ur y bat t lefields. Veryoften policyaddresses the many gray areas that ethi cs andlaw do not necessari ly enl ightenlet alone resolve. Pol icy iscritical because even where a particular course of action istechnically moral and legal, there remains the importantquestion of perceptions. Perceptions can materially affectthe public support that military operations conducted bydemocracies require. Professors W. Michael Reisman andChris T. Ant oniou explain:

In modern popular democracies, even a l imi ted armed confl ict

requires a substant ial base of publi c support . That suppor t canerode or even r everse i tself r apidly, no matter how wor thy t hepolitical objective, if people believe that the war is beingconducted in an unfair , inhumane, or iniquit ous way.22

In developing policy for 21st century statesmen andsoldiers, leaders must deal with two related aspects ofpost-Vietnam and post-Gulf War America. The first is the

growing aversion in both the electorate and i n theuniformed ranks toward incurring virtually any friendlycasualt ies in many mi l i tary operati ons.23 The second, whichWil l iam Boyne points out is unusual in hi story,24 requireswars to be won with a minimum number of casualtiesinflicted on the enemy.25 The rapid end to the Gulf Warfollowing televised pictures of the so-called Highway ofDeath i l lust rates the new ethical and pol i t ical perceptions

that can influence policymakers.Of course, this monograph does not purport to address

every, or even most, of the challenges of ethics, law, andpolicy produced by high-technology war. Moreover, even

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where the issues that could recompl icate moral l i fe for 21stcent ur y statesmen and soldiers are descr ibed, solut ions areseldom suppl ied. Rather, if t hi s essay succeeds, it wi l l pose

quest ions that, in turn, may suggest areas worthy of fur therstudy. With this in mind, let us return to PGMs, perhaps themost ready example of the unexpected conundrums ofhigh-tech war.

Selected Recomp l i cati ng I ssues.

Precision Guided Munitions.

As already indicated, PGMs26 are considered by many asa key to more humane warfare. JV 2010 touts precisionengagement as a means to lessen risk to [United States]forces, and [t o] minimize col lateral damage.27 PGMs aim t odiminish the horror of war not only because they reducecollateral damage, but also because their accuracydecreases the number of at tackers required to go in harmsway to st r ike a given t arget.28 PGMs ful fi ll many t radit ionallegal and moral norms by providing a greatly enhancedcapability to limit the application of force to belligerentmi l i taries and those implements of war whose destruct ion i smandated by military necessity.29 In short, unlike otherhigh-tech armaments (e.g., nuclear weapons) that providemi l i tary advantages but pol i t ical l iabi l i t ies, PGMs uniquelyseem to offer both military efficiency and an unparalleledopportunity t o seize the moral high ground so conducive tomaintaining the necessary public support for militaryoperations.

What then might be the recomplicating effects of theiruse? One of these is occasioned by the unpredictabil i ty of theenemy response. Among other things, we cannot expectfuture adversaries to be grateful that the United Statesused humane PGMs against them. The February 1997

issue of Air Force Magazinerepor ts a star t l ing il lust rat ionof how one potent ial opponent might react :

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Many Russian military theorists believe nuclear weaponsprovide the best answer to the chal lenge posed byconventionally armed precision guided munitions, which havebecome such an important part of Western military strategies.

Russian generals fear that, in a general war, Western nationscould employ such smart munitions: to degrade Russianstrategic forces, without ever having to go nuclear themselves.Consequently, said General Volkov, Russia should enjoy ther ight to consider the first [enemy] use of precision weapons asthe beginning of unrest r icted nuclear war against i t . 30

Whi le the r isk of nuclear holocaust might be an ext reme

example of an unintended consequence of PGM use, thereare plent y of more convent ional resul ts of great concern. Forexample, it has been received wisdom since the Gulf Warthat Iraqs firing of Kuwaiti oil fields was a monstrousenvironmental crime.31 Yet the fact remains, ProfessorMichael Schmitt acknowledges, that [I]t could be arguedthat the fires were intended to take advantage ofweaknesses in high-tech Coalition weapons. . . . [S]moke

can foil guided munitions. Consider the difficulty, forexample, of using an electro-optical guided weapon on asmoke-covered target .32 As a mat ter of fact , the fi res smokediddegrade the effectiveness of PGMs as well as coalitionintelligence-gathering satellites.33 Authors Michael R.Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor argue that theI raqis torched the Kuwait i oi l fields to erase the Amer icanshigh-tech advantage.34 Indeed, the Iraqis were able to

launch one of their few offensive actions when an armoredformation emerged from the smoke of the burning Burqanoi l fields and st ruck U.S. Mar ines earl y in the ground war .35

As the I raqi act ions suggest , the use of PGMs might welldr ive adversar iesespecially in less-developed nat ionstoemploy pernicious methodologies to counteract them. It ispossible, therefore, that PGM use in cer tain i nstances mayrender the war more, not less, dest ruct ive. I f a bel l igerent isatt acked with high-tech systems against which i t lacks theabi l i ty to resist or respond in k ind, does i t not have the r ightto respond with whatever resources i t has available?36 Justbecause a count ry has the resour ces to develop and deploy

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high-tech weaponr y does not ipso factoendow i t wi th moralsuper ior i ty over economicall y infer ior opponents. Moreover,sheer destructiveness does not make a specific method of

warfare necessarily illegal so long as the requisites of thelaw of armed confl ict are observed.

But it is also evident that when accepted methods ofdefense against bombardment, such as hardening andbattlefield dispersal, are circumvented, at least to someextent, by the deadly accuracy of PGMs, frustrateddefenders may resort to conduct clearly in violation ofinternational norms. One such behavior may have beeninspired by an unint ended consequence of t he Gul f War useof PGMs to destroy the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad.Unbeknownst to coalition targeteers, that command andcontrol facility was also being used as a shelter by thefami l ies of high I raqi officials. The broadcast of pictures ofbodies being pulled from the wreckage caused U.S.leadersconcerned about adverse public reaction to the

noncombatant deathsto virtually end further attacks onthe I raqi capital.37 Though t he decision t o forego st r ikes onBaghdad had little effect on the outcome of the war, thepr ecedent is important in the context of Tennersrecomplicating effect thesis. The U.S. response to theunexpected resul ts of t he Al Fi rdos bombing could suggestto some opponents a rel iable (albeit unconscionable) methodof defending against PGM attacks: cover the target with

noncombatants.

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Such brute behavior creates compl icat ions forhigh-minded U.S. forces. As JV 2010asserts, high ethicalstandards are central to the American military ethos.39

This fact, however, makes them vulnerable to tactics thataim to manipulate their innate respect for human l i fe. Forexample, using human shield tactics enabled the Serbs todiscourage PGM st r ikes by U.S. and other NATO planes by

the simple expedient of chaining captured U.N. troops topotential targets.40 Other nat ions can be simi larly affectedby the exploitation of noncombatants. During the war inChechyna, for example, insurgents offset their techno-

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logical infer ior i ty by threatening civi l ian hostages to forcethe Russians to meet var ious demands.41

Several potential U.S. adversaries appear prepared touse noncombatants to blunt the power of high-techweaponry. Libya threatened to sur round the repor ted si te ofan underground chemical plant wi th mi l l ions of M usl imsin order to ward off att acks.42 Most recent ly, when Westernmilitary action seemed imminent, Saddam Husseininundated h is pa laces and o ther bu i ld ings wi thnoncombatant civi l ians (some of whom may have genuinelyvolunteered) in order to discourage PGM attacks byWestern forces sensitive to the effect on their publics ofcivilian deaths, regardless of the circumstances.43

All of this suggests that PGMs are no panacea. Theexpectations of decisionmakers that their employment wi l lreduce the dangers to noncombatants may be frustrated;indeed, noncombatants couldparadoxicallybe placed atgreater risk by PGM use in some instances. In truth, the

inclination of unscrupulous foes who are determinedcounter technologically superior U.S. forces to revive theage-old strategy of human shields may herald a new era ofbarbarism in warfare. In commenting on the actions ofSomali warlords who used human shields, James F.Dunnigan ominously warns that [i]f the opponents arebloody-minded enough, they will always exploit thehumanitarian att i tudes of their adversar ies.44

Along these l ines, technology it self may provide anotherrecomplicating effect : In order to avoid the effects of PGMs,new communications technologywhich JV 2010says isalready availablewill allow an unprecedented level ofdispersal of military forces. Dispersal is a way to reducePGM efficiencyand one that experts assert is militarilyimperativefor those wishing to confront an information-

superior opponent like the United States.45

Dispersalpresent s a number of recompl ications. Among other things,adversaries can employ inexpensive communicationsdevices to so disperse their forces (e.g., create virtual

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command posts rather than the fixed nodes which opt imizePGM efficiency) that the Uni ted States wi l l be forced to usecostly46 and limitedstocks of PGMs against small

targets, many of which wil l be individuall y expendable. Asyet another form of t he human-shield tact ic, an enemy canfurther complicate targeting solutions by intentionallydispersing into civilianareas.

Another way of obviat ing the effects of PGMs is to moveinto complex ter rain, especiall y jungles, forests and ur banareas. Laser and electro-opt icall y guided muni t ions wi l l nottrack targets through foliage. In urban areas, even theext reme accur acy of PGMs may not be adequate to preventcivilian casualties.Even the most advanced PGMs willlikely cause unintended noncombatant casualties whenused in densely populated areas.47

Noncombat ant s and Noncombatant Objects.

Dispersing combatants and military objects into thecivi l ian communi ty is offensive to internat ional law becauseit violates the principle that defenders have an obligation t oseparate mi l i tary targets f rom c iv i l ians and thei rproperty.48 I raq was r ight ly cr i t icized for purposely ignor ingthis tenet during the Gulf War.49 But as societies becomeincreasingly technological ly integrated and, moreimportant ly, dependent upon technology, separatingmilitary and civilian facilities becomes immensely morecomplicated, even for morally conscious statesmen andsoldiers.

Largely due to budgetary pressures, the United Statesitsel f can no longer afford to maintain very many high-techcapabil i t ies separate from those found in the civi l ian sector(where the cutting-edge technology often first appears50).Professor Dan Kuehl of the National Defense Universitys

School of Information Warfare worries that this growingintermingling in the integrated information society ofsystems used and needed by both t he mi l i tary and civi l sidesof society . . . is making our national information infra-

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structure a viable, legal, and ethical target in the case ofconflict.51 Nowhere is this use more extensive than in thecommunications area.52 The U.S. armed forceslike other

modern mil itariesrelies heavily upon the civi l iancommunications infrast ructure; more than 90 percent of i tsmessages flow through commercial channels.53 I f thatsystem is attacked by a bel l igerent int ent upon cut t ing thatflow, what does its loss mean to noncombatants in todayssociety?

At tacks against communications nodes and their relatedcomputer faci l i t ies do more than just inconvenience peoplein t echnologically advanced societ ies. Such systems suppor tessent ial emergency services and qui te oft en cont rol cr i t icalparts of the infrastructure indispensable to civilians,especiall y in vulnerable urban areas. Consequent ly, st r ikesagainst electr ical gr ids, designed to undermine a militaryshigh-tech computer and communications capabil i t ies, haveprofoundand often unintendedreverberating effects

on noncombatantsand theirhigh-tech systems.

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Statesmen and soldiers must consider the legal and

moral ramifications of using civilian systems for militarypurposes. Such military use may turn themas well astheir suppor t ing infrast ructureinto a bona fide target forfuture opponents. Parenthetically, statesmen and soldiersmust also ask themselves the practical question as towhether they are creating target sets whose destruction

could cause undue noncombatant hardships in t he Uni tedStates wi thout a cor responding vu lnerab i l i ty fo radversaries from less-developed countries.

Of course, depending upon the adversary, attacks ontheirdual-use systems could be equally devastating to theircivilian populace. Thus, it is essential for statesmen andsoldiers to avoid the misconception that surgical strikes

using certain high-tech methodologies (PGMs or even abloodless comput er attacks) necessari ly obviates legal andmoral complications just because the immediatecasualties

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(including noncombatant losses) may be few.55 CommanderJames W. Crawford explains:

Precision t echnology l imi ts the immediate and dir ect harmfuleffects of aer ial bombardment . However, one must t ake issuewith t he asser t ion t hat the systematic destruct ion of t he civilinfrastructure through the use of precision weapons actuallyreduces the harmful effects of war. Ironically, the verycapability of precision potentially augers greater collateralcasualties, not less . . . [PGMs are] clearly an efficient andeffective application of force. . . . Unfortunately, such amethodology not only impedes the enemy i n some respects, but

i t also el iminates civi l ian l ife-support systems.

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Attacks on dual-use systems need not, however, beforegone. Rather, what is needed is a firm grasp of thelong-term, indirectimpact upon noncombatants priorto theauthor izat ion of an attack. Clear ly, an enhancedintelligence architecture is necessary to provide the rightkind of data to conduct the more probing proportionality

calculat ion t hese new technologies requi re.

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One way of analyzing the data that an enhanced

intelligence system might provide would be to employ thenew modeling and simulation techniques now becomingavailable. For example, using data drawn from JointResource Assessment Data Base, U.S. StrategicCommands Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) canproject the expected numbers of k i l led and injured when a

given nuclear weapon is del ivered by a designated platformin a cer tain fashion on the selected target .58 Simi lar systemscould be developed to analyze the effects of conventionalattacks on high-tech networks.

However, model ing and simulation themselves presentsignificant recomplications for statesmen and soldiers.Specifi call y, are leaders legal ly or morally obligedto fol low

the model? Suppose, for example, that a decisionmakerchooses a cour se of act ion t hat the model shows wi l l resul t ingreater noncombatant casualties than another availableopt ion. Since the legal and moral duty is to t ake all feasible

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precautions to avoid noncombatant casualties,59 i f acomputer calculates that a cer tain method of at tack amongseveral options most minimizes noncombatant loses, does

that automatically preclude consideration of the otheroptions? If a commander selects another option, has hefailed to do everything feasible to avoid noncombatantlosses? How wil l a commander just i fy a decision t hat seemsto fl y in the face of dispassionate computer logic? Considerthat casualty estimates from whatever source can createvery real quandar ies for commanders at a later t ime. In therecent cont roversy over the decision to use the atomic bomb

on Japan to end Wor ld War I I , the relati vely crude casualt yest imates of near ly 50 years ago were rel ied upon by some toasser t that an invasion would have cost fewer l ives than theatomic attack.60

What the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima andNagasaki did do, however , was to evaporate what was left ofthe Japanese government s wi l l to resist . The object in war

is to break the enemy and to impose our will in its stead.That is best accompl ished with a combinat ion ofpsychological and physical shock. The dropping of twoatomic bombs in August 1945 seems to have accomplishedthat objective.

As technology progresses, one might fairly expect thefidel i ty of the models to improve,61 but i t is not yet clear t hatthey can eversubst i tut e for the judgment of t he commander

in the performance of the warfighting ar t. The linear,mathematical nature of computer processes may never beable to replicate the nonlinear and often unquantifiablelogic of war.62 The history of human confl ict is l i t tered withexamples of how military forces achieved results that noalgorithm would have predicted.63 Still, in a world thatincreasingly considers reports provided by an electronicbrain innately more authoritative than human-derived

analyses, it may well behoove decisionmakers in futureconflicts to somehow capture the essence of their rationalewhen they select a computer-produced option that on its

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face seems to be more casualty-intensive than anothercourse of action assessed by the same source.

Parall el ing the problematic commingling of mil i tary andcivil ian high-tech faci l i t ies is the infusion of civi l ians intoformer ly mi l i tary jobs. In the past few years there has beena determined effort to convert as many military billets aspossible to less expensive civi l ian posi t ions.64 For much thesame reason, other effor ts have attempted to pr ivat ize andoutsource many functions traditionally performed byuniformed personnel. These initiatives have resulted inthousands of civilians filling what were once militaryassignments at stateside bases and, increasingly, on foreigndeployments.65

Whi le these act ions are pr incipall y mot ivated by a desireto save scarce defense dollars, they are also a tacit recog-ni t ion t hat the growing sophist ication of t he technologies ofwar require the mi l i tary to ever more frequent ly tap civi l ianexpertise. Armed Forces Jour nal repor ts, for example, that

in fiscal year 1997, 70 percent of the Department ofDefenses information technology transactions wereoutsourced to private vendors.66

This trend exacerbates the long-held fear that newtechnology requir ing ever -greater civi l ian involvement wi l lcloud a principle vital to the law of armed conflict:67 therequirement to dist inguish between combatants who could

be legit imately at tacked, and noncombatants who could not .As wi th civi li an objects, cur rent internati onal law requiresbell igerent s to exercise care to separate individual civi l iansand the civilian population as such from the vicinity ofmi l i tary object ives.68

Int ernat ional law does, however, recognize that civi l iantechnicians and contractors are necessary for modernmi l i tari es. I t holds that they are subject to att ack only whenactually performing tasks in support of the armed forces.Unlike uniformed personnel, they would not ordinarily betargeted when they are away from their jobs. If captured,they are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.69

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Nonetheless, the law has always held that noncombatantsimmunity from damage and harm was predicated upontheir obligation to abstain from hostile acts. If they took

action against a partys armed forces, they automaticallylost immuni ty.70

Unfor tunately, that appears to be exact ly the dir ect ionwe are heading. Defense News characterized the largenumbers of civilian technicians required for the Armysdigitized battlefield as surrogate warriors.71 Indeed, theoperation of high-technology systems is moving civiliantechnicians and contractors from traditional supportfunctions to what are arguably hostile activities. Forexample, a civil ian technician who helps executeacomputerized offensive information attack against anenemy system may well have gone beyond mere support .

Likewise, the Air Force, probably unaware of theimplications of its statement, has openly announced itsintent ion to use civ i l ians operational ly. I n Global

Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, t heservice states that combat operations in the 21st Centur ywi l l broaden t he defini t ion of the fut ure operator .72 I t goeson to state that: In the future, any military or civilianmember who is exper ienced in the employment and doctr ineof air and space power wil l be considered an operator.73

Once civi l ian technicians or cont ractors become involved

as operators in combat operations, they risk beingcharacterized as unlawful combatants under inter-national law.74 This has a number of consequences,including the possibil i ty that i f captured they can be t r iedand punished for their hostile acts, to include the samethings for which a uniformed combatant would beimmune.74 I t is very doubtful that many of t hese sur rogatewarr iors are cognizant of t heir new status or comprehend

the ramif icati ons of i t .Since i t is unl ikely that mi l i tary dependence on civi l ian

expertise will diminish any time soon, several writerssuggest establishing a new type of part-time military.75 I t

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would be composed of engineers, information specialists,and other technical exper ts who could be called into mi l i taryservice when necessary. Endowing civilians with military

status would support recognition as lawful combatantsunder international law, and would also be a step towardsolving another problem with civi l ianizing mil i taryfunct ions: the fact that civi l ians cannot be compel led to stayon t he job in t imes of cr isis.77 Only t hose subject to mi l i tarydiscipli ne have a legal or moral responsibil i ty t o remain attheir posts.

While this approach would solve one technology-drivenproblem, it creates a new recompl ication for statesmen andsoldiers. Specifically, these proposals differ from ordinaryGuard and Reserve membership in that the militaryaffiliation contemplated would not require the technicalexperts to undergo all the rigors of military training.78 Indescribing such an organization composed of informationspecialists, Brigadier General Bruce M. Lawlor, ARNG,

argues that the well-paid innovators, intellectuals, andhighly-ski l led techni cians most needed would not l ikely beimpressed by the oppor tuni ty to wear hair high and t ight ordo pushups and two-mile runs. 79 Accordingly, herecommends that much of the military regimen bediscarded.80

Soldiers and statesmen need to be cautious, however,about abandoning much of the mi l i tary r egimen simply to

indulge the predilections of civilian technical experts.Military personnel are not just people in uniforms. Thereare instead, as Stephen Crane, the author of Red Badge ofCourage, put i t , a myster ious fraterni ty born out of smokeand the danger of death.81 In his book, Acts of War: TheBehavior of Men in Battl e, Richard Holmes explains:

However much sociologists might argue that we l ive in an age

of nar rowing skil l dif ferent ials, where many of the soldierstasks are growing ever closer to those of his civiliancontemporaries, it is an inescapable fact that the soldiersprimary function, the useor threatened useof force, setshim apart from civi l ians . . . [T]he fact remains that someone

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who joins an army, is both crossing a well-defined border wi thinthe fabric of society, and becoming a member of an organizat ionwhich, in the last analysis, may require him to ki ll or be ki l led.82

Impor tantl y, Holmes argues that much of t he mi l i tarysregimen (even including such things as haircuts) haspsychological importance beyond its obvious practicalvalue. Many military requirements and rituals serve toaccul turate an individual t o the armed forces and to buildthe kind of unit cohesion and esprit de corpsnecessary toendure the enormous pressures of combat. Impor tant ly, forstatesmen and soldiers concerned about the ethi cal conductof war, such a transformat ion also helps to create a sel fl ess,morally conscious combatant .

The uncertainties and unpredictable dynamics of 21stcentury battlefields make it unwise to assume thattechnical experts will always be in situations that renderunnecessary the kind of bonding and mental preparationthat has sustained winning military organizations for

centuries. Notwithstanding the need to secure sufficientnumbers of technical experts for 21st century conflicts,statesmen and soldiers must be especially wary of anyactions that might erode the altruistic warrior ethos thatunderpins instinctively proper behavior in the crucible ofwar.

Civi l ianizing uni formed posit ions is not the only way the

U.S. defense establishment hopes to deal with tightbudgets. Innovative applications of technology are alsoexpected to help cont rol costs. But cost is a two-edged swordin the context of the RMA. While computers and otherinformat ion technologies oft en produce economies, the priceof many new weapons is st i l l qui te high. PGMs, for example,are significantly more expensive than unguided dumbbombs.83 This fact produces a new question for statesmen

and soldiers: to what extent must a nat ions people sacr i fi cein order to acquire systems to protect enemycivilians? If arelatively inexpensive artillery barrage can neutralize anenemy force notwithstanding a few noncombatant

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casual t ies, is the commander obliged t o employ a cost ly bevyof PGMs to reduce that number to zero? I t could be arguedthat simply having PGMs mandates their use under the

theory that the commander has an available alternativethat can save noncombatant lives. The accepted view,however , holds that there is no per seobli gation t o use PGMsso long as the tenets of the law of armed conflict areobserved.84 The commander can proper ly consider the pr iceof t he weapons as a factor in deciding the means of at tack.85

For statesmen and soldiers, however, there is the fur therquestion of expectations raised by Gulf War videos ofPGMs.86 Undoubtedly, the percept ion that PGM use avoidsvir tually all col lateral l osses is something that could createa new precept in the court of world opinion. A paradigmmight arise that assumes that i f the Uni ted States wishes todo so, it can employ force via PGMs in any circumstancewi th few or no noncombatant casualt ies.87

I t is the converse that statesmen and soldiers may find

most vexing, that is, the perception t hat the fai lureto usePGMs represents a considered American decision to causenoncombatant deaths. If t hi s percept ion comes to representthe consensus of world opinion, it is not inconceivable thatinternat ional law may someday requirePGM use (as wel l asother high-tech instrumentali t ies) by those nat ions wi th theresour ces to produce or acqui re them.88 At fi rst blush such adevelopment would appear to be morally and ethically

attractive, but consider that even for wealthy nations likethe United States, national budgets are zero-sum games.For each dol lar spent to acqui re an expensive PGM, one lessdollar is available for other desirable social purposes.President Dwight Eisenhower captured this dilemma in a1953 speech when he pointed out that:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket

fi red, signif ies in the final sense a theft from those who hungerand are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. Theworld in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending thesweat of its laborers, the genius of i ts scient ists and the hopesof its chi ldren.89

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Thi s raises an int r iguing quest ion: To what extent is thecivi l ian populace of an aggressivebell igerent ent i t led to thet reasure of a rightfuldefender?90 How many of the r ight ful

defenders own people should be denied, for example,prenatal care to make resour ces available to procur e PGMsso that if it must defend itself the danger of collateralcivil ian casualt ies in t he aggr essor state is minimized? Inanalyzing this question one may wish to ponder historianDaniel Boorst ins content ion that Amer icans suffer from theMyth of Popular Innocence, that is, the tendency todemonize enemy leaders but absolve adversary populations

of responsibility in war.91

Americans often assume thatenemy societ ies are helpless victims of power ful tyrantsdespite evidence, Boorst in cont ends, that [r ]ecent historyproves that ruthless rulers can be removed by popularwil l .92

Even if one chooses to exculpate the populations oftotalitarian states, technology may yet recomplicate moral

judgments when addressed to nations with other forms ofgovernment , especially democracies. Proponents insist thatthe phenomenal growth of the Internet and othercommunication t echnologies has helped st imulate the riseof democracies around the wor ld. A September 1997 ar t iclei n t h e New York Times Magazine credits moderncommunications technologies with spurring the growth ofdemocracy and forcing totalitarian regimes to wither.93

Another author, analyzing the nature of advanced com-munications capabilities, maintains that high technologyand totalitarian governments are oxymorons.94 Thus, ifrevolutionary communications systems produce democra-cies as the ent husiasts cont end, t hen we are on the verge of anew era of t echno-peace as convent ional wisdom holds thatdemocracies dont fight democracies.95

Regrettably, however, new studies are eroding the

democratic peace thesis.96 In truth, the notion thatdemocracies may indeed fight democracies should not reallybe surprising given the growing evidence of wars culturalbasis.97 According to Samuel Huntington, future conflicts

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may well arise not from nations in the grip of a depravedleader (as Americans are wont to believe) but rather fromclashes between civil izationswhose basic values are

fundamentall y at odds.98

Bosnia present s a manifestation ofHuntingtons hypothesis. Henry Kissinger argues that itwas a misconcept ion that the removal of a few evi l bigotsthere would create unity and peace in a society wheredeep-seated ethnic hatreds pervade the populations.99

Quite obviously, Amer icans must learn to accept that wholesociet ies may freelychoose to embark upon courses of act ionthat lead to war.100

St i l l , internat ional law has never sought to necessari lyequate noncombatant status with moral innocence. Butshould the sent ient , adult population in a democracy escaperesponsibility for their nations actions in an era whenscience is globalizing weapons of mass destruction? JamesW. Chi ld cont ends, for example, in Nuclear War: The MoralDimension that people have a duty to restrain their

government from committing nuclear aggression, and ifthey fai l in that duty, their absolute immunity asnoncombatants is undermined.101 Even the U.S.sDeclaration of Independence asserts the Lockean conceptthat people have a duty to alter or abolish theirgovernment when it fails to serve life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness.102 Though beyond the scope of thispaper, it may be appropr iate for statesmen and soldiers to

reexamine the question of the culpability of democraticsocieties engaged in high-tech conflict. That examinationcould indicate thatat least where democratic states areconcerneda modification of current understanding ofnoncombatant immunity might be in order, especiallywhen such states engage in unlawful acts such as thewr ongful use of a weapon of mass dest ruction.

I n for mat i on Oper at ions.

The idea that democratic societies might properly beheld accountable for the unlawful actions of their

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governments raises the broader question as to whetherdemocracies ought to be exempted from certain kinds ofinformation operations that aim to corrupt the democratic

process. Powerful information and cyberwar technologiesare becoming available that can radically affect anelectorates percept ions of i ts leaders. Thomas Czerwinski,then a professor at the School of I nformat ion War fare of t heNat ional Defense Univers i ty , ind icates how suchtechnologies might be used when he asks: What wouldhappen i f you took Saddam Husseins image, alt ered i t , andprojected it back to I raq showing him voicing doubts about

his own Baath Party?103

Quite obviously, the technologyimpl ici t in Czerwinski s proposi t ion could just as easi ly beapplied against a democratically-elected leader.

Moreover, the capability is hardly science fiction. Asanyone who has seen the film, Forest Gump, can attest,technology now permits the creation of extraordinarilyconvincing but false images.104 Of course, propaganda

aimed at enemy populations has long been considered alegitimate method of warfare. But this norm may needreexamination when the government affected is ademocratic one. It needs to be reconciled with a keycomponent of U.S. nat ional secur ity pol icy: the promot ion ofdemocracy.105 Whi le no one would dispute that the improperactionsof t he leaders of any enemy stateincluding those ofdemocraciesmust be stemmed, i t is something altogether

different to hold that i t is an appropriate st rategy to att emptto change democratically-elected leadership via thedissemination of manipulated information.106

Furthermore, Michael Walzer asserts that war aimsleg i t imate ly reach to the des t ruc t ion o r de fea t ,demobilization, and (partial) disarming of the aggressorsarmed forces. Except in extreme cases, like that of NaziGermany, they dont legitimately reach to the transforma-tion of the internal politics of the aggressor state or thereplacement of its regime.107 Surely, a democraticgovernment is not the kind of extreme case that Walzerexempt s. Thus, statesmen and soldiers may wish to develop

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pol icies that rest rain information warr iors from engaging intact ics that damage the democrat ic process. Democracy hasan int r ins ic human value even when i t produces

government s whose act ions lead to war .The interplay of democratic values and modern

technology presents other recomplications for statesmenand soldiers. Specifically, JV 2010 insists that the U.S.military must have information superiority in futureconflicts. To do so requires not simply controlling theadversarys information sources, but also the avalanche ofdata available from third parties, including the globalmedia. This latter source would be extremely difficult todominate.108 With the latest technology freeing the pressfrom reliance onand control bybelligerent govern-ments,109 it is unlikely that any major aspect of futuremilitary operations wil l escape near-instantaneousreporting by international news agencies. In a very realsense, global news sources could become the poor mans

intelligence service.In addit ion, information about cur rent operat ions wi l l be

obtainable from other sources for a modest investment.Al ready commercial satel l i tes are providing high-resolut ionimages heretofore the exclusive province of t he int el l igenceagencies of the developed nations.110 Another informationsource, the Internet, is now being described as a simple,low-cost, non-threatening and relatively risk-free way of

collecting data valuable to intelligence agencies.111 All ofth is makes a s t ra tegy o f in format ion super ior i tyquestionable.

Thus, the capabilities of new technology presentstatesmen and soldiers with several unat t ract ive options. I finformation superiority is truly imperative, achieving itmay require aggressive, draconian measures against

internati onal information sources that are not par t ies to theconflict. Such measures are of doubtful legal and moralval idity, and they could have the unint ended consequence ofantagonizing allies and even bringing the United States

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into confl ict wi th third par t ies.112 Another approach mightbe to develop means that discretely deny t he t ransmission ofinternationally produced information to an adversary.

Given t he number and var iety of sources, however, it wouldnot seem practical or even possible to do so. Finally, wecould change our approach, that is, develop doctrine andstrategies for conducting mil itary operations in anenvironment of information transparency or informationparity. It seems that this last alternative, which obviatesthe need to inter fere wi th informat ion produced by ent i t iesnot otherwise involved in t he par t icular confl ict , would most

readi ly mesh with our legal and moral norms.

Space.

As already implied, any discussion of informationoperations necessarily brings up the issue of space.Satel l i tes provide cr i t ical survei l lance and communi cationsupport for U.S. forces, as well as those of potential

adversaries. According to General Char les A. Horner, spacesystems are fundamental to modern warfare.113 Forexample, PGMs, the weapons that so many hope willproduce more humane warfare, very often requiresatel l i te-der ived informat ion for guidance.114 Because of t heimportance of space to high-tech operations, Americanmilitary leaders believe that war in space is inevitable.115

Accordingly, several preparatory steps have been taken,

including test ing laser weapons against satel l i tes.116

However, space warfare presents significant moralrecomplications for statesmen and soldiers. Mostfundamentally, there is the quest ion as to whether combatoperations ought to be conducted there at all. In fact, thenature of space systems creates legal and ethical reasonsthat weigh against doing so. As previously discussed, a basic

LOAC principle is the obligati on of bel l igerents to separatemilitary targets from civilian objects.117 Since the verybeginning of space exploration, however, military andcivilian developments commingled to a such a degree that

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t he separation of mil i tary fr om civi l ian . . . space technology[i s] meaningless.118 While there are some purely mi l i tarysystems today,119 the Uni ted States i tself r el ies heavil y on

civilian satellites, many of which are owned by inter-nat ional consor t iums.120

Future opponents wi l l l ikewise depend upon commercialcommunication and surveillance systems.121 As a result,space presents the classic legal and moral conundrum ofmulti-user systems: how do you attack them withoutcausing dispropor t ionate injury t o noncombatant s and t heirproperty, especially when the same system is used bynat ions not involved in t he confl ict? As a pract ical matt er , itis difficult to foresee many scenarios where a proportion-ality analysis122 would justify attacks on mul t i - usersystems. This is especially true as noncombatants in agrowing number of countries become ever more reliant onspace-based technologies for a whole range of essentialcommunicat ions and other services.

Nonetheless, U.S. Space Command is seeking to havespace declared its area of operations so as to facilitateplanning for conflict there.123 Lit t le internat ional appet it eexists for the notion of militarizing space, however.Vi r tually every t reaty r elated to space asser ts that i t is to beused only for peaceful purposes.124 (The United Statesinterprets these provisions to prohibit only aggressivemilitary actions.125) Is it wise, therefore, for the United

States to take act ionssuch as declar ing space as an area ofoperations for one of its combatant commandsthatsuggest that space is simply another field of battle?126

Should statesmen and soldiers advocate a course of actionthat might st imulate a space arms race, akin t o the nucleararms race, as many fear?127

It may be shrewder to pursue a legal regime that

declares space a sanctuary similar to that affordedcommunications facilities located in neutral territory.128

Th is wou ld permi t any na t ion to use space fo rcommunications, sur vei l lance, and comparable act ivi t ies

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even during armed conflictswith the systems not beingsubject to attack. Arguably, th is st rategy would renew theU.S.s original policy toward space. President Eisenhower

established a self-imposed space sanctuary policy . . . [inorder to] establish the principle of freedom of space, toprotect U.S. satellites from interference, and to avoid anarms race in space. . . .129 Neutralizing space would notappear to degrade Amer icas warfight ing capabil i ty i f U.S.space systems were therefore protected and, in any event ,existing legal and policy norms already limit or precludeattack on the multi-user international systems that

adversaries wi l l rely upon dur ing war.This proposal would not preclude sub-space means that

selectively deny adversaries military forces the use ofsignals fr om space plat forms. However, the development oflasers and other space weapons would be prohibited,although passive defensive measures (hardening, stealth,etc.) would be allowed. Accordingly, the proposal would not

be inconsistent with current U.S. space policy, whichadvocates diplomatic and legal measures to preclude anadversarys hostile use of space systems and services.130

Some may argue that the movement of weaponr y int o spaceis inevitable and cannot be effectively banned.131 But theremarkable history of nuclear arms control (during whichmany of the same arguments were made) leaves room foropt imismespecially i f act ion i s taken soon.

Th r eshold of Conf l i ct .

Another r ecomplicat ing effect of the new technologies isthe danger that they may inadver tent ly lead to a lower ing ofthe threshold of violent conflict. Peacetime informationoperations are one example of how this might occur.Consider, for instance, that there is no clearly accepted

definition of what kind of data manipulation constitutesaggression cont rary to internat ional law and condemnedby the U.N. Charter.132 Current interpretations ofaggression were largely built upon notions of armed

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attack committed by aggressors employing traditionalkinetic-effect weapons.133 Whi le legal defini t ions of armedattack may seem t o all ow peacet ime data manipulat ions so

long as bombs or bullets are not used,134

the recipientcountry may not share such a pacific interpretation andreact violent ly, start ing a cycle of escalat ion unintended bythe in it iat ing info-warr iors.

The growing pro l i fe ra t ion o f the popular newnon-lethal technologies presents similar recomplica-tions.135 Part of the recomplication results from mis-understanding the terminology. The characterization ofthese capabil i t ies as non-lethal , for example, is a sour ce ofreal confusionvir tually all of them are potent ially deadlyto some persons.136 Moreover, certain of them also clashwi th existing t reaties such as those that l imi t or prohibit theuse of chemical and biological agents.137 Consequently,while i tems like rubber bullets, st icky foam, and so for th dohave the potential to lower the risk of casualties in

particular situations, there is the danger that decision-makers will be seduced by the same misconceptiondiscussed previously in t his essay, that is, the flawed not ionthat military operations can be conducted without risk tosoldiers or civi l ians.138

All of this is especially worrisome because of theunpredictability of the reaction of those against whomsupposedly nonlethal means are used. To reiterate a cent ral

theme of this essay: what was intended as a bloodlessmeans of coercion may well generate a lethal response. Itwould seem prudent then for statesmen and soldiers to viewinformation operations and non-lethal technologiespr incipall y as means to minimize noncombatant casualt iesunder circumstances where the use of force is otherwisenecessary and appropriate. If this is clearly understood,miscalculation is aver ted, and the unint ended involvement

in unexpectedly host i le si tuat ions is precluded.139

I t is wor th not ing that a simi lar issue exists wi th regardto other high-tech systems. Indeed, the post -Gul f War uses

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of PGMs against Iraq raise the issue. Quite often thedeclared purpose is to send a message to that government ,a function traditionally the role of a diplomatic bag.

Analysts A. J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan ask,Given the precision weapons that the United Statesadver t ises as cent ral t o the new Amer ican mi l i tary doctr ine,how many people is it permissible to k i l l merely t o send amessage?140

I t is t rue that affect ing the psychology of an adversarycould constitute a legitimate military objective.141 Thedifficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, is quantifying the oftenvery subjective estimates of psychological effects intosomething rational enough to support a meaningful findingof the defini te mi l i tary advantage that the law requires towarrant the use of force.142 How does one definit ively assess,for example, the psychological effect of an i ncrement al use offorce on persons of another culture?143 Absent thesupport ing data, the use of force for psychological pur poses

may be diff icul t to just i fy. The real issue for statesmen andsoldiers is ensuring that the casualty-minimizing featuresof high-tech weaponry do not induce decisionmakers toinappropriately lower the threshold for the use force.Bacevich and Kaplan warn:

Ultimately, a doctrine that relies on antiseptic methods ofwarfare may prove dangerously seductive. Seemingly tailor-made for an era of post-modern poli t ics, precision weapons also

have the potent ial t o increase the propensit y of poli t ical leadersto resor t to violent means. The ready availabi l i ty of [PGMs] maytempt them to conclude that force need no longer remain theoption of last resort, and induce them to employ their arsenalwithout due reflection.144

Or gani zat i onal Cul t ur e.

High technology also carries potential unexpectedconsequences for the organizational cultures of militarieson 21st centur y batt lefields. Communications advances wi l lbe the most important agent of organizational change. As

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JV 2010145 indicates, technology is already becomingavailable that wi l l provide individual soldiers withunprecedented access to all kinds of information.146 Such

technology will allow the elimination of various levels ofcommand and supervision resulting in a flattening oftraditionally hierarchical military organizations. Othertechnology fathered changes will directly affect battlefieldorganization. The Marine Corps, for example, is experi-menting with a new concept called infestation tacticswhich capitalizes on t he new technologies.147 The techniquerelies on advanced communications systems to coordinate

large numbers of small infantry teams assault ing the sameobjective.

While increased combat effect iveness should resul t fr omthese and other technology-driven organizational changes,there are, nevertheless, potential revenge effects ofconcern to statesmen and soldiers. In his book, TheUnintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies,

David S. Alberts warns that when subordinates areprovided with the larger picture that new data transfercapabil i t ies allow, they are l ikely to second-guess decisionsmade at higher levels and . . . have the informat ion requiredto under take in i t ia t ives the i r super iors may f indinappropriate.148

It seems therefore that, ironically, controlling t heactions of lower echelon troops may not necessarily be

enhanced by better communications technologies.Regrettably, it is at those very levels that the risk ofindiscipline is the greatestthe My Lai massacre duringthe Vietnam War being just one example.149 Sadly,atrocities seem to be an enduring feature of war. StephenAmbrose notes that :

When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, or twenty

years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands,sometimes terrible things happen that you wish neverhappened. This is a reality that stretches across time andacross cont inents. It is a universal aspect of war , from the t imeof t he ancient Greeks up to the present .150

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What is worrisome about 21st century battlefieldtechnology is that it will put ready access to vastly morepotent firepower into the hands of the young troops that

Ambrose describes. The new battlefield organizationproduced by infestation tactics is illustrative. Analystsassert that the most revolutionary aspect of the newconcept is that the infant ryman does not rely on his personalweapon to engage the enemy, but will instead call inexternal fi re suppor t .151 I n shor t , the exper ts say, [r ]atherthan a shooter, the infantryman becomes a spotter.152

They fur ther observe that:

This change of identity for the infantryman stems fromtechnological advances. With enhanced digital communi-cations, more accurate smart munitions, and manportableguidance systems, fi re support . . . is the king of t he batt lefield.In addit ion to t radit ional t ube art i ll ery, the individual t eam cancall for and dir ect close air suppor t , rocket fi res, naval gunfi re,and missile attacks.153

Quite obviously, whatever havoc troops were able towreak with their personal weapons at places like My Lai,that terrible potential will be markedly greater in futureconfl icts because of the new technologies of war,par t icularly since the command and supervisory st ructurethat might int ervene is, by design, less robust .

By empower ing junior personnel, the new technologies

of war create other recompl ications as wel l . Aviation Week &Space Technologyrepor ts that senior Amer ican offi cials areconcerned about the effect of the absence of clear rulesconcerning information operations.154 They believe thatOnce soldiers and airmen star t dying in a war, the youngcomputer-literate officers and enlisted men are going tostart making their own efforts to crack enemy computersystems.155 Fr ee-lance effor ts of t hi s sor t can create ser ious

problems. For example, a computer virus loosed on anenemy might have unintended consequences and comeback and cripple friendly computers.156 The adverse

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reverberating effects of such actions on noncombatantsmay be quite signi ficant.

Still, the solution is not to deny lower echelons thebenefits of the technology. Rather, when technologydramatically empowers junior personnel, steps must betaken to ensure that they are fully prepared, bothtechnicall y and psychologically, to handle the greater legaland moral responsibilities that the enhanced capabilitiesimpose upon t hem. Unquest ionably, maintaining discipli neand professionalism under the new combat conditions ismore essential than everyet ever more difficult toguarantee.

Another recomplicating effect is caused by thepro l i fe ra t ing numbers o f e-mai l -equ ipped laptopcomputers, fax machines, and similar technologies thattroops themselves own and carry with them into warzones.157 What is more is that, according to CongressmanNewt Gingrich, virtually every soldier in combat in 2010

will have somewhere on their body a personal telephonelinked by satellite to a world telephone network.158 Suchdevices raise a number of complications, not the least ofwhich is that they are extremely vulnerable to monitoringby hostile forces.159

Equall y impor tant is that these devices hasten t he daywhen the authority of the military commander could be

questioned on the battlefielda development withpotentially disastrous consequences. Instant communi-cations by soldiers fr om future bat t lefields causes NicholasWade to quest ion, Would any commander want his soldiersto receive parental advice in the midst of a firefight? What i fDad disagrees with the officer in the scene? As Napoleonsaid, one bad general is better than two good ones. 160

Similarly, Newsweekasked over 6 years ago, i f soldiers can

phone mom or the local newspaper from the middle of thebattlefield, what are the implications for maintainingmilitary discipline or secrecy?161

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To answer such concerns some commanders wi l l attemptto rest r ict the use of t hese communications devices. But isthis reali st ic? Can a democracy rel iant on an al l -volunteer

force expect to isolate forward-deployed t roops from cont actwith their friends and families, especially when they mayhave grown up in an environment of instant communi-cat ions grat i fi cation? I t may be more pract ical, as suggestedpreviously, to abandon the goal of informat ion secur ity andplan accordingly.162

Finall y, the inculcation of t he revolut ionary technologiesinto the armed services might create a generation ofconsole warriors who wage war without ever confrontingthe deadly consequences of their actions. Statesmen andsoldiers should not assume that such combatants willautomatically share the militarys traditional values thatrest rain i l legal and immoral conduct in war. Up unt i l now,much of the militarys ethos was drawn from concepts ofhonor and chivalry sourced in the physical reality of direct

combat. Although the extent to which the proliferation oflong-distance push-but ton war serves to replace that ethoswith a new ethic is as yet uncertain, it is imperative thatwhatever emerges instills in tomorrows soldiers thosemoral underpinnings which will further develop theappli cati on of ethical and legal norms in fut ure confl icts.

Sum mar y and Conclusi ons.

At this point , the reader may agree that the promise ofthe introduction of this essay has been fulfilled: far morequestions have been raised than solutions offered.Hopeful ly, it is now clear that despit e their many beneficialaspects, the emerging RMA technologies have greatcapacity for unintended consequences and revenge effects.Our examination reveals several broad themes that

statesmen and soldiers may wish t o address:

The unpredictability of an adversarys response tohigh-tech attack. While U.S. intent in using PGMs orother high-tech means in a particular conflict might

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be to minimize casualt ies on both sides, their use may,nevertheless, dr ive an enemy incapable of r espondingin kind to resort to measures that could make war,

paradoxically, moredest ruct ive or inhumane than i fthe high-tech weapons had not been used at all .

The increasing commingl ing of mi l i tary and civil ianhigh-tech systems. Alt hough this dual- and mul t i-usetrend is unlikely to change in the future, greaterconsideration should be given to the moral and legalimplications of making legitimate targets out of

systems upon which technology-dependent societiesrely. Where possible, steps should be taken t o ensurethat essential services are preserved in the event ofwar . At a minimum, decision-support systems need tobe developed not only t o analyze the vulnerabi l i ty offriendly populations but also to assess high-techtargets in host i le count r ies in order to assist mi l i tarycommanders in making an informed proportionality

judgment. Such systems need to be able to evaluatesecondary, reverberat ing ef fects on c iv i l ianpopulations.

The blur r ing of the di stinction between noncombatantc iv i l ians and combatant mi l i ta ry personnel .Technologies, along with budget-driven decisions tooutsource and privatize and otherwise civilianize

m i l i t a r y f unc t i ons , ca r r y mo ra l and l ega limplications. Care must be taken to ensure that awho le c lass o f un lawfu l combatan ts i s no tinadvertently created. There may be util ity indevising new kinds of reserve organizations fortechnologicall y ski l led personnel which do not requiremembers to conform t o all the rigors of a professionalmi l i tary. H owever , such effor ts must not compromise

those aspects of the military regimen that developmilitarys altruistic, warrior ethos which underpinsmoral conduct in war .

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Information operations. Information operations (IO)and cyberwar can complicate the moral life forstatesmen and soldiers in many ways, but of

particular concern are the new techniques that canint er fere wi th democratic societ ies. IO and cyberwartechniques are properly applied to control theaggressive behavior of nations, but they should not bepermi t ted to dest roy democratic values in t he process.Moreover, the proliferation of third-party communi-cations sources renders suspect military strategiesaimed at achieving informat ion super ior i ty.

The militarization of space. Satellites and spacevehicles are irrevocably integrated into modernwarfare. However, this does not mean that spaceshould become another bat t lefield. Rather , the Uni tedStates should use i ts prest ige as the preeminent spacepower to forge an international consensus thatdesignates space a neutral area and, therefore,

possibly avoid a space weapons race.

The lowering of the threshold of conflict. Advancedtechnology provides the capabil i ty t o employ coercionvia non- or low-lethal means in a way that greatlyminimizes the immediate noncombatant losses.Because of the unpredictability of the response ofthose targeted, however, care must be taken to ensure

that misapprehensions of t he nature and impli cati onsof mi l i tary means do not delude decisionmakers withvisions of bloodlessly compell ing opponents short ofviolent conflict. Absent such caution we risk takingactions with the dangerous potential to spin out ofcont rol into ful l-scale war.

Organizational Cul ture. Vastly enhanced communi-

cati ons capabil i t ies that shi ft more and more bat t le-field responsibi l i t ies to lower-levels of command mustbe accompanied by appropriate training to ensure

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that legal and moral norms of the law of war areobserved by technology-empowered junior personnel.

These are by no means all the high technology issueswith potential to recomplicate moral life for 21st centurystatesmen and soldiers. Of cour se, it would be a mistake toconclude that the problems just discussed somehowwarrant a retreat from infusing RMA technology intodefense planning. After all , high-tech weapons ordinar i ly dohave their intended effectand sometimes that is theunexpected consequence. For example, military historianMartin Van Creveld observes that, ironically, in everyregion where [nuclear weapons] have been introduced,large-scale, interstate war has as good as disappeared. 163

I n shor t , however horr i fi c their potent ial, nuclear weaponshave successfully performed the deterrent function thatcreators hoped they would, to the surprise of a myriad ofnaysayers . To many i t i s , perhaps, the u l t imateunexpectedthough not unintendedconsequence that

the advent of the nuclear age has coincided with t he absenceof t he kind of savage global war that twice visi ted the wor ldthis century.

Whi le technology can obviously deter war, it is st i l l t ruethat t echnology and war fare have never been far apar t .164

Clear ly, statesmen and soldiers need to be concerned aboutprocur ing the technology necessary for U.S. forces to prevai lin any confl ict . Analysts Ronald Haycock and Keith Nei lson

ominously warn t hat t echnology has permi t ted the divisionof mankind into ruler and ruled.165 In that regard, evenAmer icas vaunted free-enterpr ise system, t he engine thatfuels i ts technological might , has i ts own recompl ications.

Consider that American valuesin this instance thecommitment to fu l l and fa i r compet i t ion wi th in acapitalistic economymight deny U.S. troops the best

technology on 21st century battlefields. Author DavidShukman explains: While the Western military strugglefor a decade on average to acqui re new weapons, a count rywi th commercially available computer equipment and less

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rigorous democratic and accountingprocesses could fieldnew systems wi thin a few years. I t is the stuff of mi l i tarynightmares.166 Al though high-tech systems are touted as a

means to get inside an adversarys decision loop,167

thereality is that nations unencumbered by Western-styleprocurement regulations may well be able to get inside ouracquisi t ion loop and fi eld newer weaponr y even before theUni ted States finishes buying alr eady obsolete equipment .

Just as the speed of technological change createsdiff icul t ies for the procur ement process, so i t does for t hoseconcerned with law, ethics, and policy. President HarryTruman once remarked that he feared that machines wereahead of morals by some centuries. That certainly is thecase in todays RMA environment.168 Consequently,statesmen and soldiers must accelerate their efforts todevelop norms of law, ethics, and policy that honor thisnations finest ideals while at the same time appreciatingthat t echnology is Amer icas mani fest dest iny.169

This is not an easy task. Nor is the problem withouthistorical precedent. Russell F. Weigley notes in his 1977classic, The Amer ican Way of War, that: To seek refuge intechnology from hard questions of strategy and policy [is]another dangerous American tendency, fostered by thepragmatic qualities of the American character and by thecomplexities of nuclear-age technology. Quite obviouslystatesmen and soldiers must recognize technologys

potent ial, but they must do so wi th the clear understandingthat it wi ll never subst i tute for answer ing the kind of hardquestions of law, ethics, and policy that will continue torecomplicate moral life on 21st century battlefields.

ENDNOTES

1. Viet Minh ar t i l lerymen fi red more than 130,000 rounds from over

200 heavy cannons and mortars during the siege. See J. D. Morelock,The Army Times Book of Great Land Battl es, 1994, p. 262.

2. Bernard and Fawn Br odie, Fr om Cr ossbow to H-Bomb, MidlandEdition, 1973, p. 70.

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3. See Nathan Perry, Revolution in Military Affairs, NationalGuard Review, Summer 1997, pp. 23, 51. (In fact, contrary to theopinions of many analysts, there appears to be a patt ern of confl ict thatfollows each major step forward in mi l itary technology.)

4. This is not to say that wars of previous eras were not destruct ive.Consider that the Thirty Years War may have caused a populationdecline in Europe of as much as a third. See Curt Johnson, ThirtyYears War, in Brasseys Encyclopedia of Military History andBiography, Frankl in D. Margiotta, ed., 1994.

5. Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey A. Harley, Information,Technology, and Cent er of Gravity, Naval War Col lege Review, Winter

1997, pp. 65, 80. ([T]he exposur e of t he American publ ic and media onlyto high-technology combat supported an aversion to casualties and anexpectation of sophistication that will not be appropriate in all futureconflicts. The danger in making this particular work a blueprint forfuture confl icts is that i t reinforces a growing perception t hat war can benear ly bloodless.)

6. George and Meredith Fr iedman, The Futur e of War, 1996.

7. Ibid., p. xi .

8. There are many possible defini t ions of informat ion operati ons buta common official definition is that used by the Air Force, that is,actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information andinformat ion systems. Ai r Force Doctr ine Document 1, Air Force BasicDoctrine, September 1997, p. 44, hereinaft er AFDD-1. This defini t ion isalmost identical to that once used by the Air Force to describeinformation warfare. See Captain Robert G. Hanseman, USAF, TheRealities and Legalities of Information Warfare, No. 42, A.F. L. Rev.,

1997, pp. 173, 176, cit ing USAF Fact Sheet 95-20, November 1995.

9. Cyberwar suggests a form of war fare more hol ist ic, st rategic, andmanipulative of information in its concept than the informationoperations definition set forth in note 8 supra. AFDD-1 notes thefollowing:

In describing information operations, it is important todifferent iate between information i n war and information

warfare. The second element, information warfare, involvessuch diverse activities as psychological warfare, militarydeception, electronic combat, and both physical and cyberattack.

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AFDD-1, Ibid. For an excel lent cyberwar scenar io, See John Arqui l la,The Great Cyberwar of 2002, Wired, February 1998, p. 122.

10. He visualized the foes phone system brought down by a

comput er vi rus, logic bombs ravaging the transportati on network , falseorders confusing the adversarys military, the opponents televisionbroadcasts jammed wi th propaganda messages, and the enemy leader sbank account electronically zeroed out. All of this is expected to causethe adversary to give up. SeeDouglas Waller , Onward Cyber Soldiers,Time, August 21, 1995, p. 38.

11. The Department of Defense defines these weapons as follows:

Weapons that are expl icit ly designed and primar i ly employed soas to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizingfatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesireddamage to property and the envi ronment . Unl ike conventionallethal weapons that destroy their targets principally throughblast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weaponsemploy means other than gross physical destruct ion t o preventthe target from functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended tohave one, or both, of the foll owing character isti cs: a., they have

relatively reversible effects on personnel or material; b., theyaffect objects different ly wi thin t heir area of i nfluence.

Nonl ethal Weapons: Terms and References, USAF Inst i tute for Nat ionalSecurity Studies, Colorado Springs, CO, Robert J. Bunker, ed., July1997, p. ix, citing Department of Defense Directive 3000.3, Policy forNon-Lethal Weapons, Jul y 9, 1996.

12. For a discussions of the revolution in military affairs in the

information age, see, generally, Select Enemy. Delete., TheEconomist, March 8, 1997, p. 21; Eliot A. Cohen, A Revolution inWarfare, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, p. 37; Andrew F.Krepinevich, Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of MilitaryRevolutions, The National Interest, Fall 1994, p. 30; and James R.Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, Revolutions in Military Affairs,Joint Force Quarter ly, Spr ing, 1994, pp. 24.

13. The Future of Warfare, The Economist, March 8, 1997, p. 15.

14. See Robert N. Ellithorpe, Warfare in Transition? AmericanMil i tary Culture Prepares for the Information Age, a presentation forthe Biennial I nternational Conference of the Inter-University Seminaron Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 24-26, 1997, p.18, American military culture historically emphasized scientific

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approaches to warfare to the point of holding an almost mystical beliefin t he power of technology to solve the chal lenges of war, unpubl ishedpaper on fi le wi th author .

15. See, generally, Colin S. Gray, U.S. Strategic Culture:Implications for Defense Technology in Defense Technology, No. 31,Asa A. Clark IV and John F. Lilley, eds., 1989. Gray quotes George S.Patton, Jr :

The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechani cs of theworld. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for themass production of machines. It therefore behooves us todevise methods of war which exploit our inherent super ior i ty.

We must fight the war by machines on t he ground, and in theair , to the maximum of our abi l i ty . . . .

Ibid., citing George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It, No. 345, 1947;Bantam reprint, 1980.

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996[hereinafter referred to as JV 2010].

17. General John M . Shali kashvi l i, Ibid., p. ii .

18. Ibid., p. 1.

19. Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and theRevenge of Unintended Consequences, 1996.

20. LOAC might be descr ibed as follows:

LOAC is a body of law that der ives from several i nternational

treaties, specifically, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, aswell as customary international law, law created by thecustom and practice of civilized warring states, which isbinding on all nat ions. I t applies to all armed confl icts betweenstates, thus, civi l wars or bat t les wi th t error ist groups are notcovered. Hague Law is concerned mainly wi th the means andmethods of warfare, while Geneva Law is concerned withprotecting persons involved in conflicts, such as POWs, thewounded, and civi l ians.

Hanseman, supranote 8, p. 189.

21. Geoffrey Best, Law and War Since 1945, 1994, p. 289.

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22. W. Michael Reisman and Chr is T. Ant oniou, The Laws of War,1994, p. xxiv, emphasis added.

23. Seenote 5, supra. This t rend has led Edward Lut twak t o argue

that an even greater investment in technology is required becausemodern democracies simply cannot tolerate casualties. See EdwardLuttwak, Post-Heroic Armies, Foreign Affair s, July/August 1996, p.33.

24. Walt er J. Boyne,Beyond the Wil d Blue: A History of the Ai r Force1947-1997, 1997, p. 7.

25. Ibid.

26. There are at least six categories of PGMs: 1) man-in-the-loopweapons such as laser-guided bombs which require an operator toilluminate the target or weapons that have on-board sensors whichallow an operator to guide the weapon to the target; 2) autonomousweapons relying only on inertial navigation systems (INS) andautonomous weapons updated by Global Positioning Satellites (GPS)for guidance to the target; 3) autonomous weapons with terrain-aidedINS/GPS systems; 4) autonomous weapons wi th INS/GPS systems andtemplate matching algor i thms for guidance; 5) ant i-emi t ter PGMs that

rely on onboard systems to home on emitting targets such as enemyradars; and 6) PGMs with smart submunitions that use varioussensors to guide themselves to targets. See John Birkler et al., AFramework for Precision Conventional Str ike in Post-Cold War M i l i taryStrategy, Rand Corporation, 1996, pp. 6-11.

27. JV 2010, supranote 16, p. 21.

28. Benjamin S, Lambeth argues:

[P]ossibly the single greatest impact of the technologyrevolution on airpower and its effectiveness relative to otherforce component s is its capacity t o save l ives through t he use ofprecision attack to minimize noncombatant and friendlyfatalities by the substitution of technology for manpower andthe creation of battlefield conditions in which land elements,once unleashed, can more readily do their jobs because of thedegraded capabilities of enemy forces.

Benjamin S, Lambeth, Technology and Air War, Air Force Magazine,November 1996, pp. 50, 53. See alsoLieutenant Colonel Edward Mann,One Target, One Bomb, Military Review, September 1993, p. 33;contraseeSean D. Naylor, General : Technology is No Subst i tut e for

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Troops, Air Force Times, March 3, 1997, p. 26, citing remarks byGeneral John Sheehan, USMC, then Commander-in Chief of U.S.Atlantic Command.

29. Mil i tary necessity may be defined as fol lows:

Mil itary necessity is the principle which just ifies measures ofregulated force not forbidden by internati onal law which areindispensable for securing the prompt submission of theenemy, with the least possible expenditure of economic andhuman r esources. . . . The principle of mil i tary necessity is notthe 19th Century German doctrine, Kriegsraison, assertingthat military necessity could justify any measureseven

violations of the laws of warwhen the necessities of thesit uation purportedly just i fied it .

Depart ment of the Ai r Force Pamphlet 110-31, I nternational LawTheConduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, November 19, 1976,para. 1-3a(1) [Hereinafter referred to as AFP 110-31].

30. David R. Markow, The Russians and Their Nukes, Air ForceMagazine, February 1997, p. 41.

31. Colonel James P. Terry, USMC, Operati on Desert Storm: StarkContrasts in Compliance with the Rule of Law, No. 41 Naval L. Rev.,No. 83, 1993, pp. 92-94. More than 600 wells were fi red.

32. Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of theEnvi ronmental Law of International Armed Confl ict , No. 22, Yale J. ofIntl L., No. 1, 1997, p. 21. Schmitt concludes that, in any event, thedamage inflicted so outweighed possible gains the acts were wrongfulunder international law. Ibid.

33. See, also, Adam Roberts, Environmental Issues in Inter-national Armed Conflict: The Experience of the 1991 Gulf War, inInternati onal Law Studies 1996: Protecti on of the Envi ronment Dur ingArmed Confl ict, 1996, pp. 222, 248. [As to the burning of t he oi l wells,there is no evidence that I raq actuall y intended to achieve a mi li taryeffect by this means. However, the huge smoke clouds caused by thefi res, and poor weather dur ing the last week of t he war, did signifi cantlyimpede air operations over Kuwait, including reconnaissance and

ground at tack].

34. See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor , The Generals War,1995, p. 364.

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35. Ibid., pp. 363-371.

36. However, the Hague Convention IV, 1907 provides that theright of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not

unlimited.

37. See Gordon and Tr ainor, supranote 34, pp. 324-326.

38. AFP 110-31, supranote 29, provides as foll ows:

The term noncombatant includes a wide variety of disparatepersons . . . civi l ians, who are not otherwise lawful or unlawfulcombatants, combatants who are hors de combat, PWs and

wounded and sick, members of the armed forces enjoying specialstatus, chaplains and medics, and civilians accompanying thearmed forces.

Ibid., para. 3-4.

39. JV 2010, supranote 16, pp. 28, 34.

40. See Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, Dont Look Back,Theyre Not Behind You, The Marine Corps Gazette, May 1996, pp.72-73, discussing the military implications of chaining hostages totargets.Hostage taking was not clearly prohibited until after WorldWar I I . SeeH. Wayne El l iot , Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Ret., Hostagesor Prisoners of War: War Crimes at Dinner, No. 149, Mil . L. Rev., No.241, Summer 1995.

41. See Stephen Erlanger, Russia Allows Rebels to Leave withHostages, New York T imes, June 20, 1995, p. 1.

42. See Libyans to Form Shield at Suspected Arms Plant,Baltimore Sun, May 17, 1996, p. 14.

43. See Barbara Slavin, Iraq Leaves U.S. Few Options, USAToday, November 14, 1997, p. 13A.

44. James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolution ofHigh-Tech Weaponr y and Tomorrows Brave New Battl efi eld, 1996, p.219.

45. See Ties that Bind, The Economist, June 10, 1995, p. 19,discussing the need for irregular armies to disperse in the face ofinformat ion-super ior opponents and not ing that dispersed forces poseproblems for high-flying observations systems.

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46. Seenote 83, supra, and accompanying text.

47. See Earl H. Til ford, Jr., Halt Phase Strategy: Old Wine in NewSkins . . . With Powerpoint, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, July 23, 1998, p. 26.

48. W. Hays Parks, Ai r War and the Law of War, No. 32, A.F. L.Rev., No. 1, 1990, p. 168.

49. See Danielle L. Inf ield, Precision-Guided Munit ionsDemonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is aCountry Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize CollateralCivi l ian Injury and Damage?, No. 26, Geo. Wash. J . Int l L . & Econ., pp.

109, 110-111, note, 1992.

50. It appears that in a number of technological fields, e.g.,micro-electronics and software engineering, the civilian sector hasalready become more advanced than the military one . . . . SeeLev S.Voronkov, John Gri n, and Wim A. Smi t , Some Conclusions on FutureStudies and Policies, in Military Technological Innovation andStabil i ty in a Changing World,No. 287, Voronkov, Grin, and Smit , eds.,1992.

51. Daniel Kuehl, The Ethics of Information War

21stcenturybattlefield

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