21st bomber command tactical mission report 317

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 317

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"'1)

' : 7 " "U IS S IO N N O . , - .

F L O W N 7 A U G 1 9 4 5

C O P Y N O . ~

HEADQUARTERS

T W E N T IE T H , .A IR F O R C EAPO 114

. .·l



E E l , D c U l o. R! !' ER S

TIiENTIEl'H AIR FaRCE

APO 234

TAQTICAL MISSION REPrn.T

Field Order No. 15 Mi.ssion No. 317

Target : Toyokswa Naval Arsenal (90,21-1653)

7 August 1'945

Tableo! Contents

Tactical Narrative. , . . . . . . . i I , . . . , . ' · · . . · ~AnneXli- Operations. • • ••

Part I _ Navigation Track Chart and.Report,

Part II _ Mean Points of Impact • • • • ••

Pert II I _. Bomhing. • • • • • • • •. • .• • • .• • •Part IV _ Flight Engineering Chart and.Report • •

. . . " . .Part V - Rad.ar., • , • • • , • •

Part VI - Gunnery • •. • • • • •Part VII - Air-Se8 Reacue ChartPart VIII ._VII .Fighter command

Mission Report,

Consolidated

Annex B ...Vieather • '. • .. • • .. i. • ., • II • . ,. .... • •

Part I _ Weather S1.MIl!1Isry.• •Part II _ Chart _Fo recas t \Jetlther va.

Observed Weather ., • • • • •

part III - ]"rogn0stic:: ]rep • • • • • • • •••

Part IV - SYl'l0ptic MaJ;l. • • • • •

.. ... .. Ii •

.hnnex C - C OI!II11' l!1nications. , • • • "Part I -Radar Counter Measures •

Part II- Radio • •. . . ,. . . .

Annex D ._ lnt.elligence.. • • •• • .,.. • ••• , •••

Part I _ EnemyAir Oppositi ot:]. • • • • • • • • • •

Part II -Enemy il.n'tia it'craft. • • • •

Part III - Strilte Attack Report • • • • • • •

1

78101112

141 51 6

17

20:a

22

2 324

2 52 628

30313133

Ann.I>X : E . . OORl:lolidated Statistical Summary. , •• • • • •• 41

An .n6X F .. Twentieth kir Foree Field order •. .

.annex G .. Distribution List • • • • . • • • .. . I I i i. .

Prepa red By:

li.-2 Section

Twentieth Air Force

51

55



SECRET

,ByAuth. of the cn20th Air Force

-r-c-B/U45 /J .'0. ~ .Dat~ Ini~ials. . . . ~ . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

HEAD~DARTERS

TWENl'IETH AIR FORCE

APO 23 4

SUBJECT: Report of Attack Against the ToyokawaNaval Arsenal on

Honshuon 7 August, 1945.'

TO CommandingGeneral, U.S. Ar~ Strategic Air Force, APO234.

San Franciso::; Calif arnis

1. IDENI'IFICATIONFREPORT:

a. Target Attacked: The ToynkawaNaval Arsenal (Target 90.21-

1653) near Toyohashi on the Island of Honshu.

h. ' Force Attacking: A normal effort of 1 Group each, c9nsist-

ing of 3 squadr-ons, from the 58th I 73rd. 3l3th and 314th Bombardment

Wings were to attack the target.

c. Directive: Field Order Nu~ber 15, Headquarters TwentiethAir Force , dated 6 August 1 9 4 5 . directed the attack against this target.

2. MISSION PLANNING:

a. Selection of Target:

(.1) Targets Cons.idered : The targets considered were those

that had been Singled out for daylight precision attacks when weather

would perm.it such strikes. The target selected had to be limited to 1

for attack by a force equiva Lerrt to a single wing due to the fact that

this mission immediately followed a maximumeffort night strike"

(2) -Target Selected and Reasons: The Toyokawa Navel k-

senal (Target 90&21-1653) was sele~ted for atta~k on the basis of a

favorable weather prediction for the Nagoya Area.

(3) Secondary Visual and Radar Target; The Yokosuka A.ir-

craft Factory and Research Center at YokosuKa (Target 9 0 0 1 7 - 1 3 9 2 ) was

selected in the event that weather conditions w~uld prevent visual bomb-

ing.

b. Importance of Target: The Toyokawa Naval Arsenal. located

in the Toyo River Valley about 37 miles southeast of Nagoya Castle and

4.5 miles north of Toyohashi. is the NUlJ1ber1 producer of naval al!J1lUD-

ition and 1 of the 10 major naval arsenals in Japan. Its products in-

clude machine guns. antiaircraft weapons, rifles. a ircraft cannon and

ammunition. It covers an area of 20.200,000 square feet with 18 per cent

of that area consisting of built -up s tr-uct.ur es , The principal buildings

are of steel construction having saw-tooth t 'pe of roofs.

c. Time Fact ors :

(1) Selection of D-Day: D-Day was selected on the basis

of a favorable weather forecast presented for the area in which the target

"as located.

- 1-



en bi (2) Selection o~Target Time: Target time was selected to.s e the B-29's to assemble at Iwo Jima and rends-zvouswith friendlyf~ghterB Bnd still hit the target as early as possible in the morning.

d. Munitions and Fuel Loading:

(1) Selection of Bombsand Fuzes:

(a) 1t~uniions :

~. All Groups were to carry the 500-pound generalpurpose bomb.fuzed W~ th 1/10 and 1/100 second delay nose and non-delayta il. The 314th VIing was to be the only wing that would use the 1/10

second delay nose fuze due to the unavailability of the 1/100 seconddelay nose to be used by the other n-ings.

2. The bombsselected Vlerebased on the factthat the target COVers;- large area end is made up of both storage and

manUfacturing installations. The buildings in the production sectionare small in plan areas and are dispersed ~ Throughout the target these

buildings are principally saw-tooth roof and short span construction notsubject to spreading collapse. The300-pound bombwas selected for thereason that the multiple number of direct hits obtainable would have thebest chance of inflicting maximumdamageto these structures as well 8s

to their contents. This size bombwas expected to prove most effectiveagainst the storage area. since individual buildings are protected by

revetments and could only be destroyed by a direct hit wi thin the revet-ment. This could best be accomplished ,by exposing the area to a large

number of bombhits.

3.. The 1/100 second delay nese fuze was selected asit would allow bombburst 6 to 10 feet beneath the roof, thereby causing

damage to structures and building "Contents. The 1/10 second delay nose

fUze was selected as the best alternate fuze to be used by the 314th

7hng. The non-delay tail fuze Viasselected to give ground level burstto near miss bombs.

(2) BombLoading;

(a) Based on safety factors. bombload estimates for

this mission were a potential capacity of 129000 pounds each for each

Or oup of 4 . Wi~gs and an expected average of the same number of :poundsper aireraft.

(b) The potential capacities were primarily governed

by the total distance to be travelled.

(3) Ammunition Loading: Ammunition loading was to be acc-

ording to the Tactical Doctrine for daylight precision attacks.

(4) Gasoline Loadingl Fuel reserve data indicated that the

58th, 73rd. and 3l3th Wing aircraft would require a total fuel load of

7100 gallons and the 314tl:! 'JJing 108d per plane would be 7300 gallons ..

e. Flight Planning:

(1) Route:

~ Reason for Choice

Base to 1"'0 JimaAssembly Area Number1 Tactical Doctrine

to

- 2 - Ii '



Reassembly o~f t he coast ofJ"apal)

toT ac ti ca l D oc tr in e

T his easily i dentified point of landin Nagoya Bey just east of ~tsuzaka

wa s selected far t he departure point.o

3 44 13 0N - l3 6583 0E (I P) This easily ident ifi ed point of land

near the cit y of Morosaki was select edfor the i nit ial point.o

Targetto

3452N - l3750Eto

This dead.reckoning point was selectedto miss the flak defenses at Hamamatsu.

I'I'7oTima to Base Tact ical Doctrine.

(2) Navigational and Radar Factors:

(a) The target is a large arsenal complex TIhichcaDbe identified as a single radar return. The straight approach frcm the

departure point to tbe target has 2 or 3 good radar check points that

could be used to kill drift and for target identification. The targetwas selected primarily for its visual references, although the radar

operator could be of assistance to the bombardier throughout the run.

(b) In the event that the secondary target had to be

bombed it is easily identified by radar since it is located on the coast

of the arrowhead shaped peninsula at 350]N - 13916Eo The secondary vis-

ual and radar target is excellent for direct synchronous radar bombin.;;

since it is located on a coastal projection on Tokyo Bay and resolves as

a Single radar return. The coast and its di.stinctive shape were expected

to aid in target identification.

(3) Assembly Points: The only radar check points are 1\70

Jima t Kita t and Minami 11."7ogThese 3 islands were to be used as assembly

areas and radar could be utilized to position the aircraft in the event

that clOUd cover existed over the area.

( J . j . ) Reassembly Areas: Twoareas were assigned for reass-

embly, one at 3325N - 13600E'and anotheJ;' at 3405N - l3620Eo The former

was expected to be excellent for radar assembly since it would utilize

a distincti~e southern tip of land and would also be an excellent point

for radar wind runs. The latter was chosen because the coastal features

could be easily identified by radar operators~

(5) Departwre Point: The departure point 7 345330N -

1363890E, was to be a good coostal check point on Is€!W5In" By making

this turn aircraft nould have a straight course fram the departure point

through tbe initial point to the target.

( 6) Initial Point: The initial point was to be easily id-entified southern pOint of the Morosaki peninsula.

f. BombingFactors: (For details of mean points of impact, see

Annex A. part II).

(1) Each of the Groupe of the 4 ,lings Vl8S called upon for



3 Squadrons whichw0uldmakethis effort the equivalent of a normalSingle Wingattack. It was planned for 130aircraft to bomb the targeteach with an average of' 14.500 pound s (based on overall performance fig-ures) for a gross tonnage of 930 tona. Of the 930 tons. 88 per cent,o~ 818 tons, were expected to be relea sed on the primary target. Per-v~cus experi ence indLea ted thet 50 per cent. or 409 taos, TIauld fa 11'I'llthin 1000feet of the 2 assigned mean points of ilnpact. Onthe basis

of this tonnage o n the target area complete des'truction would be effected.

(2) Alt i tude end axis of attac,k selected Tlera dependent

upon the following 4 factors: (1) wind direction and velocity, (2) pos-ition of the sun at time of attack. (3) flak conditions at the target.and (4) selection of easily identified initial points, both by visualand radar means. The following pertinent bombinginformation was select-ed on basis of the heretofore mentioned considerations: bcmb i.ng altitude,

15.000 and 17,000 feet; axis of attack, 68 degrees true; length of run,27 miles; time of run,S minutes and 15 to 40 seconds and. drift. 2 to2k degr'ees right.

(3) MeanPoints of Impact: The 2 mean points of impactselect ed , 1 in tbe eest area a nd the other in the west ar sa of the south

section of the plant, included all of the 3 units in the south section anda considerable portion of the northern storage area uithin e. probably cir-

cular error of 1500 feet.

U~) Secondary Targets t Because of Toyokawal\1avalArsenal

was not considered a good radar target. the secondary target at Yokosuka

was deSignated as primary radar and secondary visual. This target isapprOXimately 135 miles from the primary and there Vias even the possibility

that in the event that clouds obscured the primary, the secondary \lould be

open for vis1!l.a1bombf.ng , In the event visual bcrnbine;was not possible at

the secondary target it was considered a good radar target.

g. Defensive TacticE;

(1) Fighter Escort: 'fuo proups of 1'1>0 Ji.l:l:!a based fighters

were to provide the following escort:

(8) One Group was to rendezvous with B-29's at the

departure point at 070l00Z at 17,,000 feet to escort the bombers through

the pr imary vi sua1tal' get ar ea~

(b) The second group was to arrive at 3503N-13906E(which was to be the initialp8iXl.'; for the secondar-y visual target) at

21,000 feet at 0601.30Z, fly r n the area until O'sJ1,'IOZo escort the bombers~

If no bombers appeared. they riel'S then to g,J into the ~el.;on;:'"8ry:..~eaand

strafe.

(2) ~ The!"e are 22 heavy 8"n5 in the Toyohashi area,

and aircraft were expect ed t') be wi thin range of 12 of these on t.ueplanned approach to the targe"l;. This I~as conarder-ed a Wef.l_Lcefcl"'~e and only

meager flak was anticipated 0 The doon-wind axis of attack rra s p:!.ennedfrom

the west. The route to the initial point was expected to bring aircraft

barely within range of the 18 heavy gwns at Ujiyamada. Fallowing bombs

away, aircraft were to break away to the northeast and around the Hamamatsudefenses to land's end. The base altitudes specified, 15,000 and 17,000

feet, were expected to be beyond the optimum range of the flak effs'cti ve-

ness. In the event that the secondary target was attacked, the B,-29's

would be within range of 10 guns at Hiratsuka and apprax:iIr.ately 106 guns at

Yokosuka. For this reason, a ircraft were instructed to increase their

altitude by 4000 feet if the secondary were attacked.

- 4 -



(3) ReM: All squadrons were to be equipped to barrage jam

enemygun-laying ~rs in the 72 to 84 and 190 to 210 megacycleregions.;~ot jammingwas to be employedagainst gun-laying signals appearing out-1de the bar:rage. Search for enemyradars from 20 to 3000 meg,9cycleswasto be continued.

(4) EnemyAir Opposition: •

. (a) It was anticipated that 20 to 30 enemyfightersm

7ght offer opposition in the Toyokawaarea. A possible

5to 10 add-

t10nal interceptors were expected to pick up the B-29 stream and paceit in the bay area south of Nagoya. In the Tokyoarea a possible 40 to50 fighters were expected to intercept the B-29's if there were unableto bombToyokawaand proceeded to Yokosuka.

(b) Onthe basis of the above considerations, '2 groupsof fighter escorts were to be used as outlined above,

h. Air-Ses Rescue: The Navywas given deta ils of this missionand provided the air-sea rescue facilities shown on the chart in Anney.A,Part VII I "Whichalao ahCl¢!he facilities provided by the Tv!entieth AirForce.

3. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION:

a4

Take-off:

(1) Aircraft of the main bombingforce took off as [ollems:

~ Aircraft First Take-off Last Take-off

Airborne

58th 32 061750Z 061819Z

73rd 31 061810Z 061825Z

313th 35 061754Z 061828Z

314th -1L 0617h.OZ 061809Z

Total 131* 061740Z 061828Z

"'This total does not include 4 Super Dumboand 1 'Hi.ndRun Aircraft.

One airQraft of the 313th Wingwas to serve as a weather ship at theassembly point. It caFried a full bomb Load ,

(2) A total ef 104 fighters of the VII Fighter GOlPmand

Were airborne fran Iwo Jima at 0622l2Z.

b. Route Out: Long range naviga.t ion nas accomplished by indiv-

idual aircraft to the formation assembly point. No navigation difficul-

ties were reported and no aire:c'aft failed to bomb the primary target

because of navigational error.

c. Assemblies:. The fighter Gr:oupreaehed the dep!lr~ll.re pornt a

few minutes before the B-29IS• The 3 fighter squadrons fle\, escort ao

16ro o o . 17.000 and 19.000 feet and the lead bombers TIere escorted to the

target end 10 miles beyond. 'Dhis escort continued until the last bomber

had gone over the target.

d. Targets:

(1) Primary: Radar was used as an aid for navigation and

for wind determination in the target area D G.oodvisibility permitted

Tisual banbing. Wind in the target area was from 100 degrees at 15 knots.

All 124 aircraft bombing hit the primary target, dropping a total of

813.3 tons of bombs fran 070113Z to 070139Z at altitudes ranging from

1 6.0 00 t o 23.600 feet.

- 5 -



(2) Target of Ouport"ni ty; One aircraft, which also bombedthe primary target, dropped 3 •5 tons of bombs on Futamata a.t 070132Z

from 15,500 feet.

(3 ) Fighters~ Of the 10 4 fighters that were scheduled to

gi ve e scor t, 97 reached the target ~rea.

ea. Remai nder of Farce: Seven airoraft were non-effect ive.

1'. Route &leis: The returns to b ases we re f'lO'>"1Ils briefed.With the exception of 7 B-29's that landed at IV/o JimB..

g landing: Aircraft of the main force landed in shOl'lera at

bases as follows:

'iring lll'"stl&!,lldinS last Lani;i.O!s

58th 070735Z 070835Z

73 rd 070707Z 070822Z

31 3t b 070712Z 070824Z

31 4t h O707?9Z 0:Z080 9 Z

Total 070707Z 070835Z

h. Loss and Damageto Aircraft:

(1) One B-29 of the 313th '1lingwas hit by flak over the

target and the 11 crew memberswere forced to bailout over 1"110 Jima.

because the damage prevented control of th~ aircraft. All 11men ~ere

rescued.

('.2) Twenty-one B-29 IS were damaged by flak.

(3) One fighter was lost en route to·the targeto The pilot

parachuted safely and was picked up by an Air-Sea Rescue vessel~

1. Ex:ecution Versus Planning_~ There were no major differeroes

between the planning and execution of this mission.

4.RESULTS OFTHE ~rDSSION: (For detailed speoialist's reports of

this mission. see·annexes that follow tmis narrative).

a. Nodamage assessment is available on this target et the

writing of this re~ort Ihowever I strike atta·ok photography ind icated

that of the 3 2 3 6 bombs·dropped , 1290 ( 3 9 . 7 per cent) hit within 1000feet of the mean point of impact.

. .-"

~~" ;..4 =-r.. N. F. TIHNING I

Lieutenant General, U ~ _ § , 4 A .,

Commanding

- 6 -



A

OPERATIONS

Part I ~ N3.viga.t.ionTrack Chart and ReportPart II ~ Mean Pointe of Impa,ct

Part In • Bcmbi.ngPart IV • Flight Engineering Chart and Report

Part V- Radar

Part VI - GurrneryPart VII - ,Ajr..$ea Rescu.e Chart

Part VIII _ VII Fighter (3cmrlJ,Sl,ndOIl!3olidotedMission

Report

Mission No. '317

7 August 1943



EAF .l.T I - ~_Y]igA 'rI O N

1•. Longrs.nge aavigat ion was accomplished by indi vidu('ll aircraftto the fOl>ll!ation assembly points. The targst attacked was Toyokavla

i;.~al ~rsenal. , , : i t h ]!iiquadrons each from the 58th ~ 73rd 0 313th• and- 4thW .J.n,ga partlcipa.ting. No .navigation diffisultv,s were reportedand no aircraft failed to bomb the primary target becauae of navigationerror.

_ 2. Radar was used a .s an aid for naVigation and fo·r win.d. d.etermin-,

at ion in the target, area., Goed visi bill ty permitted visual bombing inall but one esse., Wind in the targst ares was from 1000 at 15 k,nots.

3. The returns tOMse were as briefed, 'with 7 aircraft landingat Iwo .Tima.

4 . loran work on this mission wa,s as fol1cms:

a • Number Lora n LOP's: 1939b. Number loran FiX-e,a: 917c. Number Equipment Ms.li'un.ctons: 15

d. Average Ji lEx i roum Range: (i n nautical miles):

(1) Fixed Antennae 600

(2) Trailing 'l,iire 650e. No int er:fer ence or jammingwa s reported. Het\ge5 gi ven

ground -r.'aVeS since this 1;;8.8 8 daylight precision. missionGere :for



1945SECR£TPART L NAVIGATION

145"35·

MISSION NO 317

DATE 7 AUG '45

G

----1--5•LEGEND

_________ .\~~~~ WI~G

------ 31311'1 II

_. ->:i--:X-!314Ih "

\

\

IIII

----t-ISSION317 MISSION317

"~

OKINAWA

::: :>

= ,

"--C §.-2.5 e ?

~ ~. . .

f i > -

i t

.r.J

. . .=

a e!:

581h WING 73rd WING

TAKeo~~ 061750l TAKEO~F0$18101

_ 061BI9l 061825l

LANDFAl.l.070112!

LANDFAl.L07010B!

07G124i! 070118l

TARGET 0701232 TARGET 070126!070134b- 07Q131i!-

LAND'S END07QI34t

l.ANe'S END070132Z

070148i! 07014~

LANDING070735l

LANDING0107072

20°--070835Z 070822l

MISSION 317 MISSION 317

313111WING 314'1'1WING

TAKEOFF06175~1 TAKEOFF 0617401061828l! 061809!

LANDFAl.L070055Z 0700481070103t LANDFALL 0700592

TARGET070126Z

TARGET010113l

070139l 070124r

LAND'S END070141Z

LAND's END0?0122E

070150l 070136l

15°- ----LANDING 0707121 07072;9'["070824Z LANDING

070809l.

TR A CK CHA AT



MEAN P I r - . . I T S OF IMPACT

•MPI WINGS

~

58th. a 313th.

73rd_8314th.

SECRET



PART III - BOMBING

1__ The Toyoke'l'ls Naval il:r,senal wa,s attack,sd by . '3 squadrons each

from the 58th .'7Jrd. Jl}lth. and ,J141;hWings 0,

. 2. The l'1eatberin the target area was CAW and all format ions made

:J.SUB1 runs. The lead bombard,iers of the format iens thstbG1llbed latet-Bd t~ ~se referenoe point bombing pr-os edur'e to sight on the t,arget as

_he aunlng point wa,s obscured by dense smoke.

J. The mission was I:onsidered ElXl!lellently planned. The averagedrift reported wes2 degrees left. Compressibility for the force was

26 minutes.

q.. Th e bombing acc ur'a cy wea good , w itb 39.7 per cent o. f all

bcmbs being releaBedwithin 1000 feet of the meenpoints of impaat"

To,e c.leaz- weather was the greatest factor contributing to the suecese

of this mission.



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: : : : : I~t~:~EfJ~"; ;.,: i ' · , i , , · ' · " " ." .+ ,. ." .. - 1 : ' , : , : . , . . , . · · · · ·· · t ·· · · · ·, , ·· · · · t , . ' · ·· · · · ·· · · ,\ , I . , , " . . , ~7000 + , r · · · · · .

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. . , , + , . . , . . , · · · · · f : , · · · · · · , · · · · · , · , · t ! · · · I . : · · - - · · · · · · ~ · ·..'i ' ' 1 '. , , + - " ' "'j' ,.., " ( " ' " . ~ 1 " ; ; . , . . . \ .

........x~..~ . ! ' :.~.x'~'1-'F"'(~. ; j . . . . .

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: 1 " ' " - ' " :

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600

(/J/1N~5 rtf.-.~./

iJ-9T£

'< ~.~



PART IV - ELICHI' ENGINI»lIID

1. Narrative of the Mission as Flown;

a~ Cruise to the Maialandc Individual climbs were wade immedi-at ely . a ft er t ake-off to alt i tudeg b etween 5,000 to 90000 feet, where

the initial cruise was flown. Assemblies were made off the coast of.Tapan.

b. BombRun: Bombingwas cond~cted by squadron formations atan average altitude o f . 17.000 feet.

c. Return to Ease: Returns to the bases WEre conducted by in-

dividual aircraft vllthout difficulty. Minimumfuel was USEd byair-

planes cruising at 14,000 to 16,000 feet and descending 20 0 feet per

minute into the traffic pattern. Maximumrange speeds as specified b y

this headquarters gave the best fuel consumption.

2. Comments: Of the aircraft airborne, 5 per cent landed at I"o

.ri~. Only aircraft of the 314thl'Iing loaded a bomb bay ts.nk. If the

target at Toyokawa had been closed in end the format.iolla proceeded on

to the secondary target 1 n the Yokoauka a r e a , a large percentage of

th e 58th, 73rd and 3l3th 'hng. planes 'IV ould have had to land at IVlo

Jima for fuel.

3. Exhibi ts:

e. For historical record, see chart that precedes this page ,

b. For further information, see Annex E, Consolidated

Stat istical SUJllIJ!8ry.



§;1!Q!!.J;:l.

PAR1' V! t . JO . 1 3 ' U N i ) 1 . E R Y' ....

1. No. of' Ale .f'irin{;p None,

2. Average turret load:

LA

1000

T .

1000

.£ E

2000

UA

1000 1000

.3. Average No. of rounds fired in combat per turret:

UF ]A ! L\

4) 0 0 0 o

4 .. No. of rounds fired in combat: None

5. No. of' rounds used, for test firing: 12,2619

6. Guna Load.ed: 58th Wing 73rdWi.ng 313th"i.!ing 314th'iing

Hot Cold Hot Cold

7~ Malfunetions; CAL. .50 M.G.

Timing off

Link Jams ~, (2)

Booster Motor

8. T o t al p er ce nt ag e o f ' e q u ip m, en t o p e ra ti ve :

O.F.O. , C A l. . • • 50 M.G.

1QO%

9. Rem.arks; There was· no gunnery activity on this mission.



0_

PART

J

IIII

- - - - + -II

I

SECRET

AI~

\----I-

I\

IIIIIII

~--t--I

III

q706lOZ

I.~ ~;;;s~j;~ ~E~ERE

STATION DURING ENTIR, MISSION.

2. AL.L DUM'BOS AND SUP~R DUMBOS WERE TO BE.FROM TIME INDIOATq:O TO RETURN PASSAGEKE AIRORF T. I

II135-

- - NAVY OUMBO

Cl'Uh Boats on Statioll Vicin ityo r T w e n t i e t h A i r F o rc e B a s e sduring t ake -o r r and land1Dg.

I8- I05-G>4 REPRODUCED 3l5""P YU.



PART VIII ..; CONlOOLID.i ;.TJIDMlSSION REPCBT.

HFADQ.UAHTERS VII FIGli 'JER CO]']\r lkND l o J > J 5 '

Office ot' the Cornrna.nd ing GeneTsl

Iw6 Jima

10 August 1 9 l 1 - 5

1.: a, Units and Targets: 15th FigbtosrGroup - Escort E-29s from DP tN:lgOya {~rea and

thence to lends

506th Fighter

end.

Group- ·Chofu (P). Sagrunl

(S). and A.tsugi

(lR) airfields:.

:2.. a , TyPe of Missiom Escort of E-29sover Nagoya or Tokyco•.A FightSI' Strike by one grOl!lP in event the bomber-s are not a.t their' IF.

b. Date of Missi on: 7 August 1945·

c • Field. Order No. 161.

e, VII Fight er Csmrn.sndMission No.' 257. VIR Mission No. 48.

3 . a ;. Group 15th Ftr Gp 506th Ft r G I! Totals

b. A / C scheduled 5 2 52 104-

c. A / C returned early 2 0 2

d. A / e over target area 45* 52 97

e. A/C Lost 1 0 1

f. A/C 03omp1eting mission 4 5 .5 2 97

g.. T/O last a/c off 0740 0812

h. Time RV w/nav bombers 0800 oe35

i. Time over DP 1055 1125

je " T ime of landfall 105.5 1125

k. Time ~vel' target area 1100-1145 1140 -1225---

1. Time at RP 11.501240

m. Time landed last a/c 151.5 1549

It Dispatched 48 planes, one of which went down en r-oute to th€ targEt.

4. a. Friendly aircraft losses - Total: 1; Pilots: None_

1 F-:51 VTas lost en route to the target due to a coolantleak. Pilot parachuted safely and was picked u.p in good condition by en

~SR surface vessel.

b. Friendly aircraft damaged -Total ; None •

. 5 • a. Enemy a ircra ft .S igh't ad - Air: Nona.Ground: 10.

b..Enemy airraft losses: NOlle.

c. Enemy Ground Instf:lllatioJl end. Shipping L"sses:

15th Fighter Group - None.

- 17 -

SECRET. . . . -----



bu. 506th Fighter Group - One200' freigbter exploded and ~ef~rnJ.ng, 1 Sugar Dogset afj.re, 3 Sugar Dogswere damaged. 11 fl.shl.ng

boa.~s, 3 50' trawlers and 1 30' lauDc,bwere damaged. Three steam 1000-motl.Ves. 22 freight cars, RRstation at l\I".agarimatsu,and the BRyards~nd sheds at Matsudawere strafed and damaged. 'I)/ofires ,Isre startedan stOl'age tanks ar vats at an industrial plant S of Sekimoto. ani 1building was damagedat Sakawa. Tworadio stations were damagedand 20POI" . 'er line tcwers short ci.rcuited and structurally damagedin the Sagami

valley. TWooi1 s tarage ta nka ]eft burning. 2 radar6

ta tiona damagedand1 ll.ghthouse destroyed at Noj1;. :11 Seki.

6. Narrative: 'l'I'10 fig~~'~r groups were scheduled for this mission.One group was to escort a force. of B-29s to Toyokaws, but if th is ter.getWere closed in. the bomberswere to proeeed to Yoke.llukawhere the second.fighter group was to take up the escort. If the bombers did not appearover the secondary target, this second fighter group was to strike air-

fields in the 51; Tokyo area.The escort phase of the mission was routine, with the bombers

hitting their primary target. One P-51 of the 15th Fighter Groupwaslost operationally on the way to the rendezvous. but the pilot Vias rES-

cued.· The group reached the DPa few minutes before the B-298. The 3squadrons fla'\7 escort 16,000,17,000 and 19,000 feet, with the bombers

at altitudes from 17,000 to 19.000 feet. The lead bombers Vlere escortedto the PI' and 10 miles beyond. Then tl:le fighters returned to the DPand

escorted tbe second ",ave of B-298. Aft er the ini tisl run. 8orneof theB-29s returned Wto E on a second run. Escort was given until the last

bomber had gone over the target. No enemyaircraft were seen or en-countered. Heavy flak W8 s meager insccura.t.e. Return t a base was-witho·Jot

incident.The 506th Fighter Group arrived at the point for rendezvous

with the bomber strike force at 1125 and ·orbitted T Im of 0 Shima far 15

minutes. The bomber-sdid not appear end the P-5ls continued on their

alternate mission. One squadron maintained high cover and sighted no

enemy aircraft. The other two squadrons investigated Sagami and i~t5ugi

airfields but found no wortn;,:;hile targets there; end so they eorrtLnued

south and southwest strafing a variety of targets of' opportunity i b:ud 4

ing pcmer lines, transformers, railroad facilities and rolling st:)~k,

Small shipping was strafed at lands end and one squadron split up Vihh

O1'1eection strafing the redio statJ.on and ligm.thouse at Chi·-ha-saki on

OShima 1 and the other section strafing Nojima-saki and nearby wa'tan,

damaging a lighthouse, radar stations and oil storage tanks and fll'i~g

a larg~ freighter. All planes of this group returned to base safeiy~

15th Fighter Group: Meager inaccurate heavy flak "as ("u·

countered between Mikawa Bay and Toyokawa&

506th Fighter GrClupi Meager inaccurate heavy flak "as <':1

countered at Chogo, Hiratsuka and between ~tsugi end Yokohama. Inten~~

inaccurate light and medium flak was received at Odawara. Meager iI.·

accurate light flak was observed at Shiraha~ and Nojima-sskio

8. COmmunications:

Loud and clear except for Jap jamming on Channel " C " (Y-3Sj,

9. Weather I

1'1110o llinpire - 4/10 to 5/10 cumulus based at 1800' with

tops at 60001 end few tops to 10,000'. Visibility 20 miles below

15.000' and unrestricted above.

- 18 -



515t h Fighter Group Targe t A re a - )/10 cloud cover, bases

,000' tops 6000'. V isibility unlimited.

506th Fighter Group Target Area - 3/10 cumu lus b ase d at3,000: with tops at 6,000' a l ong coast . b ecomi ng 6/10 to 8/ 10 coverage~t th~s level about 50 miles inland. Vi sibi lit y 10 to 12 miles in hazeelow 1 0,0 00 a .l1dunrestricted above.

10. a • A mmunition Ex p ended:

UNITS

15th Fighter Group

506t h Fighter GroupTOTAL

5" HVI..~OUNDSCllIBm .50

800

~27.1]0

aQ__

a

b~ Gasoline rellll9ining in planes ccmplettng mi6sion (gellons):

UNITS AVERAGE PER A L e A L e WITH MU Ale OJ ITH InR E S

15th Fighter Group

45th Ftr Sq 100 150 6547th Ftr Sq 98 134 5378th Ftr Sq 90 119 49

506th Fighter Group457th Ftr Sq 86 111 39458th Ftr Sq 71 90 50462d Ftr Sq 8 4 119 59

11. Observations:

a. Airfields:

Atsugi - Approximately 50 dummyand inoperational air-

craft including 2 4 /E planes were Sighted on the field from 60001.e

Sagami - Twoto 3 dummy aircraft were s ighbed, Ten planes

Were dispersed S of the field toward the coast.

b. Ground Installations:

Tihat appeared to be an over-size weather balloon with e

radar reflector Qevice suspended on8

long cable beToo, was sighted at15,000' N fi of 0 Shima. The balloon was white or silver with a red me?t

ball painted thereon~

c. Shippin8i:

Ten large vessels were Sighted in Yokosuka Harbor and 20

luggers were in 1o. tami HBrbor.

12• Remarks:

This was the loth VIR escort mission completed by t:l~_Commandand one of the most uneventful to date. Bombers were cl.)~d7

escorted over the target area :from the beginn'ing to the end of tl'S:l..:

attacks. Not a single enemy plane was sighted despite the tact that

weather conditions were favorable to interception, with visibility

unlimited. No friendly fighters were lost or damaged to enemyactionon the mission.

/s/ E . M OORE

/tJ E. MOORE

Brigadier General. ~.

Commanding

l? -



ANNIX

B

V,EATHliR

Part I - iJeather Summary

Part II_hart - Forecast va -Observed ~j;ee.ther

Part III _ Prognostic Ma p

Part IV - Synopt 1-eMap

"l A'4gust 194.5



PART I _ 'lI.EATH:ER SUMMARY

1. PLANNINGFOfUDAST

3-4/10 low cloud base 1800 rt, tops 8-12,000 ft. with scatteredmiddle amd high cloud and seet ter-ed shO;le,rs increasing in inten-

sity late in the afternoon.To 21oN: Same as bases.

To 230N: 5-6/10 lo w cloud base 1500 ft tops 8-l5.000.ft, brokan

thin layers of ;middle and high cloud and frequent shcm-ers.

T To coast: 3-5/10 1~ cloud base 2000 ft. tops 5000 ft.ar2ets: As indicated on previous briefing.

2. OPERATIaNAL FORECAST

Bases at Take-Off

Scattered low and broken middle and high clouds.

There wil l be scattered 101 '1 and broken middle and high clouds

to 20~. From 200N to 22QN there will be scattered low clouds

with a few cumulonimbus, overcast middle and broken high clouds.

From 220N to 310N there ~ill be scattered low. middle end high

clouds. From 3 10N t a the target there will be broken 100 and

scattered high clouds.

Targets

4 /10 stratocUInulus. base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft, 2/10 cirrus at

28,000 it; visibility will be 6-12 miles in haze. Winds at

17,000 ft will be 2600 at 20 knots.

Ease on Return

Scattered low I and broken middle and high clouds with light

sh~erB •.

Bases at Take-Off

Scattered low eLouds "'lith occasional scattered higb cLouds ,

There were scattered 100 and high clouds at 2 1 O N 0 From 210N

to 240N there were scattered 101'1 clouds and overcast middle

clouds with thunderstorms. From 240 to target there were

scattered Im1 clouds and occasional patches of middle clouds~

TargetToyoka'rla: 3-4/10 stratocumu1us t tops .5000 ft.. 'liinds at 17,0f)('

ft wer-e 1200 at 16 knots.

Eases on Return

Broken low and high e10~ds and scattered middle clouds with

shcmers.

- 21 -



"\'. \

: : : ~ --'" '~t!, . . .o -UI -

- -. a . . --



-,-

~r~!,/

• C HIC HI J I



C

CQMMUNICA.TION3

Paxt I - R eM

Part II - Radio

/

MissilDn No. 317

7 . AUgust 1945

( _



PART r . . . - . _ R Q A ' I

1• Pul"pos e:

a. To D fF enemyred.are.

b. To Cenduet a genera 1 aeElrcb in the 20 to 3000 me. reg~ om•

me e • Tobaorrage jam thee nemygun-1ay ing radars int he 72 to BIl,

and 190 to 210 me. regi ors and to spot jam any gun-lay ins signa 1e

appearing outside the barrage.

2. M_ethod:

a ~ Ten ReM observers part iei pated and USEidthe foli.Ol1ing equip-

ment t0 accomplish the search and jamming: 118 - AF-T-l..69 - 1,FQ,-.2.

" _ ARQ-B. 12 _ APT-3. 10 _ AFR-4. 1 _ i.JlR-7. B - AP1,-1l. 2 - 1J'1.-6 aId

2 -.A.PA-24.

b. Each airplane was equipped vli.th 1 or more electroni.c

jammers so tuned that each flight squadron produced it C M n barrage. Tn.e

barrage ...as aupp.l ement ed by the us e of spot j.ammer s •

3•. Results:

a • Thirty-f our int ere spts ""e1'e r acord ad and are 1i.st ad at th e

end of this section.

b. The barrage was reported. as continuous and strong" The

shifting of freq.uency by the enemy rad,8r operator,s to avoid spot jamming

l'16,S I'epOl:'ted.

4.. Remarks;

a. The following unusual s-igna 15 were int ercepted: 47/112/38,

293/344/34. l40/1490/~ I 41S/200/il-5. 322/100/13.325/200/15. 300/500/70.

- 26 -

w :>'" < ::

'e ~~

(;.

~C

~c~'



2 . :;~~11L!-1

00047

u:t:....~:~E~~:t~_OU2 38 3107N .1.2100060 08.50 13759":: 080745 09.51 21 S ·~r~r

0006700 33#:51 13BIlr'S 08071~5 1145 2l 12 1 is

OOC700967 20 3348); 13314~ 0807!~5 114C 21 12 1 S

'~ . . ' IJ~!J:

00071oM 5 4 4 3220U 13715'S' 080745 1018 21 121 .'l <:"" D1l1

0490 25J'

00074 j '°47J1i 138063 080745 091~1~ 21 12 1 S s · · , r ~~II

ooon,048$ 25 5 0 S O N ' 13805B 080745 0946 21 121 S

~~~r ~:;l

000811863 07 3 . 3 1 , ) 0 1 ' 1 13635-:: 080745 101,2 21 121 S GL o T J o p 3

0009104-72 4 0 3040!·) 13810S 08071~5 0941 21 12.1 S ~ ' : ' " f'j!II

00092

0000 12 30271·' 138150.; 080745 0938 21 12 1 s - r : : : " ' ~ P

00082 0370 3 6 3300N 13800'1: 080745 1<:01 2:1 12 1 '" ~~.~0010102021D445 /.;.03050rJ 13810:;: 080745 1003 Zl 12 1 S

~-~~Jr!r00097' 0700 09 3130N 136M!') 080745 1208 21 12 1 S '3".~ 00101000200100 048£ 16 3[ '20' ; . : 13920n-: 080745 oBS5 21 12 1 ~ " " ' : : " 1 - - - 00101020200100 050'Q 24 25 3 O J ! 1lj.13DB 080745 071~.5 21 12 1 !O : ? J r . 00101020200102 0000 24 - 3130N 13840.:: 0907lr.5 1234 21 12 1 f! ~.' 00,10102020 0 1 0 2 045.5 18 3105].' 13755""£ a80nS 1010 21 12 1 8 - - r ' ~ 001010202

0010:3 03.36 40 33..55~: 13540,:> O e 0 7 4 5 1601 21 122 P 1~'~01010202

00105 0480 20 2600N 141153 08071.. 0 7 5 5 21 12 1 8~r. 001010202

00106 ( " 1 1 . 5 0 26 323Dp- 13520!j; 0 1 ; ! 0 7 h 5 1139 21 12 1 S~ .. 001010202

00106 0500 22 265cm U:I05s 08071>5 OD07 21 12 1 S'"'::"I'"~. 0010l.O202,

00106 0180 3 7 3').2:Z 1]835.:;::80745 0918 21 12 1 8' P" :! I •• " 001010;:.02"

00107 0')00 14 2630}) 1~·Q5O=::00074.5 1400 21 12 1 St=!"L.' 001010002~.

00107 0335 !~8 2')501'~13853;'] 08071~5 1028 21 12 1 E ' !1.~ 001010202

00140 1490 09 294-01'~1l:.020S 080745 1315 21 12 2 P0011~7 0495 3 0 3 4 - 3 0 ) i ! ' 136_SSs- OS07!f5 1115 21 12.1 ;S 001030003

00149 0482 08 -'955rr 13835~ OS07hS 0')27 21 12 1 S3~~r

00103000300150 0450 16 33501; 13605:: 08074-5 llOO 21 12 1 S

~~. 001030003

00207 0984 30 3440H 138'04: 080745 112.5 21 12 1 ,$ . ~ . .= r 001020002

00293 0 . 3 4 4 34 3437IJ ; L3 65 0 3 0807~-5 1106 21 12 1 S

00210 !~S50 06 2635H H~10S1 t 080')'43 0 8 0 1 : _ 21 12 1 S

00300 0.500 70 3 310H 1360~ 080745 1050 ai 12 1 S

00J2'2 0100 15 31401>1 1.J73 OS 080745 1025 21 121 a00325 0200 1 . 5 321 O i ' J 1370Clj; 030745 1040 21 n sr00415 0200 1 5 305 S N 131H01 0 8 0 7 4 5 1013 21 121 S

- 27 -

§.!g,R~I.



; PART IL:~

1. Strike Reports: Twelve Strike Reports were received during thell1ission. T'"-

'.JCee each from the 58th, 7Jrd, JIJth and 3l.4th'l1ings.

a 2. FQXiTransmissions.: Eighty-six percent of all aircraft radio

Rperators received "Dummy" OF" type messages fran the ground stations.

t easona far not receiving these messages included being off watch due

a other duties, faulty equdpment and working with navigator. There

"ere only 3 operators without logical reasons for Dot receiving the

messages.

'3. E'l:eguencies: !i.tmospheric interference .16S slight throughoutthe ent~~ . ' th: . .R· .......ma s adon on all of the strike frequencies dur~ng is mlSSJ.ODo

elatively few instances of intentionel jamming or interference were

reported. FollOWing is a percentage breakdown of trai'fic per frequency:

3.75 p e r cent on 3 megacycles; 39.75 per cent on 6 megacycles and 56050per cent on 11 megacycles •

. 4. N9vigational Aids: The 58th -'iing reported using Air-To-Air

h0m~ng SUccessfully during this mission vri.t h 22 aircraft. No HF/DF

bearings or VHF/DF bearings v er e requested during this mission. Radio

ranges, broadcast stations and herners were used effectively.

5. Net Discipline and Security: Very satisfactory net discipline

'l7as reported. No violations of security were recorded on the strike

frequencies.

6. EnemyTransmissions: The following incidents of jamming, enemy

interferem e and transmissi ons ;;rere recorded during this: mission:

a. 3020 kcs: Voice at 1928Z was very effective.

b. 6615 kcs: Unidentified 0;3 at 19002. was partially effective.

e. 10305 kes: Unidentified O;i at different intervals was

ineffective.

d. ]16Q kcs: Negligible.

e. 6055 kcs: Band saw tone at 0030Z was effective.

f. ~0880 kcs: Veice betweeD 0300Zand 0447Zwas very €ffeetive~

g. 3410 kes and 7310 kcs: Negligible.

h. 10125 Res: St eady hum and Series of V's at 2000Z and 214.5Z

were very effeative.

i. 1990 kcs: Negligible.

j. 7li15 kcs: V's, steady tone and keyed 0;; at 2330Z, 0030Z ~ere

very effective.

k , 10820 kcs;

(1) ~i hash et 0030Z, 1904Z end ~0218Zwas very etfectivl) ..

(2) ~ hash at 0250Z and 0313Z was very effective.

7_ Distress: There was no distress traffic carried on by the

Wing Ground Stations during this mission.

- 28 -



D

INTELLIGENCE

Part I • Enemy ldr Opposition

. Part I I - Enem;rlUltiair ere ft

Part III - Strike h.ttaek Report

Mission No. 'U7

7 iH , l ,guat 1945



,T"

PART 1" - ENEMYAIR OPPCSIT10N

:rOYO~· J,ir OPposition was nil on tl,'lia daylight e-ffort against

. .' wa Neval Arsenal on 7 August. Only2 enamy aircraft wereSlghtE)d , nd ' .( " ',sno attacks WSr'S sustained. The 2 enemyo;Iuereft aeenun:tdsIil.tified but 'b ',' " , ) "the

op' .-' , I" ut elisved to be twin-engine flare gOl.ng an "POS!Lte direetionl,hen encountereCi neflr land'e end",

t" 2~ ,Someof tbe B-29s wer-e escorted by 1 Groupof P-51,e. frcm

heIPt010"'l '" '1'.51' t,'ll'co ,'!llJ.. as past bombs eway;. One 17l.ne;reported - ,1 3 p.s ro l.llgf ursa from IP to target. The P-.5l1 S 17hich strafed gro'Undtargete

a,~d no enellJye~craft on the ground on assigned airfiGlds, so they2 bac,ke~ gr ound l.nstel1a t ions. On 11augi air £ield. the P-51 '13 saw

mi 4-en&lOe and 48 s ingle-engine and twin-engine d1JJNnies. Over, the

siddle of' Tokyo Bey. they also saw a free balloon 20 feet, indIamet er

. 15. QOOfeet. gra y with red balls and e. box 6 to 10 feet squereSUspended beloo.

1. S\JJJlniary of Attack:

'Fbe primary target l1'as bombed by aireraft of the 4 . Win§38s

follows:

Nmnbe. r of .AircraftTime Over Target

altitude Bracket

Llxis of Attack

Undercast

3 0 29 3 2 3 30123Z-0l32Z0126Z-0131Z 0126Z-0139Z 0113Z-0124Z16.000 16.1JO-23 ,600 17.700-19.70017 .900.

19~40067°-780

Cl iVU

z a

68°_80°OAVU-2/10

66°_71°.2/10

:2 • Flak En Rout e to Target:

.m

65°-74°ChW-4/10

below:

En route to the target flak was eneountereda.e tabulated

Loc.ati0n

Uji Yamada

AkenogaharB

Kushimoto

Teu

Mat.suaaka

Coordinat es

3 4 5 1 N - 137 26 E

34 30 N - 1 3 6 4 5 E

34 3 2 N . . 1 3 6 40 E '

3 3 3 0 N - 1 3 5 5 0 E

34 43 N . . 13 6 3 0 E

34 3 5 J iI - 1 3 6 3 1 E

34 20 N . . 1 3 6 3 5 E

Remarks

Meager and inaccurate,

heavy and medium

Mea.ger ahd Lna.ccure te,heavy and medium


heavy and mediwn


heavy and med.ium

Meager a nd inaccurate I

heavy and medium

Meager and inaccurate,heavy and medium


heavy

- 31 -



3. .1:.1akOv- the m_ =< .ar·get:

Time Of'

_Release Number of' Aircraft

ill F.ormation

Jd;rcrai't

DB .magea_

011312 5

0120

0123-0124

0126_0127

12 .3

9-10 o

5-1-0

0128-01.3011-9-11-11 6-0-0-0

0134 9 o

Remarks

Meager and

acourate,heevyMeager and

accurate ,. heavyMeager and in-

accurate, heavy

Mea.gar--a ccur at e

to inaccuret'e,

heavy.,

Very accurat,efor 1st Sqdn .•

lnaccurate or

nil tor etherS,

Meeger and

accurate

a. An analysis of the i1bove fig);ll'es clearly indic,atedthat

the target defenses could edequately handle only 1 bombing formation

at a timej i.e., one Squadron was sufficient to saturate them to the

extent that trailing Squadrons within a 2-minute intervel fGund flaka1ther nil or inaccurate.

b. In all cases flak 'Wasdescribed as meager. and controlwas ei the.r cont inuously pointed or pred icted coneentr:at ions. Most

of the damage wasinflict.ed by 2 predicted concentrations of 10-.12

bursts eaea h~tting two ll-aircrart format· ions.

c. This relatively meager def'enae app!lrently accomplished

some of the most effective firing the Japs have demonstrated to date.

4. Flak on WithdFawa1: On r;rithdrawal me.:agerand inaccurate,

heavy :flak was observed at Rarramatsu and Shimada.

5. StmmBryof Loss and Dam:tge:One aircraft was lost to flak onthis missi0n (severely damaged over the target and crashed at Iwo Jima).

Of 124 aircraft bombing, 21, or 17.0%. sustained flak damage•

• 32 -

§'!QB.];!



QQ~;[1!!.E~1:1.!.1

Pi.8T III _ STRIKE ATTACK REFOR'!""

9.0.21-16.53TOYOK/ i. .. .. N I: .. V 1 .L i >R S EN Io L

20 A' 14 hU' For ce Miss ion 317. 7 August 19&5 _ 58th• 73rd, 313t h a n.d 3 c t

Bomb Wings

CClvlBINED ST1<TISTIGS ON BOMBING kCGURl.CY

Percent oftotal dropped

B:m~ droppedV:tSl ble bW:sts

CalcUlated and preboble bursts

I.!i:J.pects 0-1000' of" AI'

R 1-2000' of AP

n 2-3000' of Apn beyond 3000I 0'1' AI'

3256

510

2 2 7 4

1290902

282

527

40278

16

Classificat Lon ef bombi:q.gaccuracy.: Goed

S'lRnar ATTACK REPORT 58th BON.B YilNG

Time .o f Attack: 070123Z t. o 070132Z

Headi,.ng Over Target; 670' True

BombLoade 960 x 500 lb. GF

Fusing: 001 nose , non-delay tail

NO' . Ale DverTarget: 30 BombaDropped On Target: 880

BombingAectu'acy: .Fair

First formation over target dropped bombs in pattern around lVJPI. These

bursts ..ere obserVed inS',i ql!l8rter of ar-ea N 1 t " and NEquarter of area ~BD

(Ref ... c ro Industrial Report 48). Immediately after this formation

struck, the entire target area was obscured by smoke ,making necessarv

the plotti.ng of seecnd and third format i ons by ca.lculat ion~

The ma.jority of bomb bursts of second :formation of 11 . i V e were calcu-

lated tooe "l7ithin 1.,000' of MPI. The bombs of the third fornetion of

9 A/C were calculated. to be more than 3,OQO' sh0rt of rv~I.

Table of bombing statistics:

Total numbe'r of bombs dropped over target 880Total number of visible btU'.sts plotted 173Total number of calculated mnd probable bursts plotted 707

Total number of bursts within 0-1000' 278 - 31.6% o f bursts

" "If

" " 1-2000' 331 - 37.6% ft "II n

" " . . 2-;lOOO I None

"n n ft beyond 3000' 271 - 30.8%

Following formations were plotted:

462 Bomb Group ~ 657 A /e - 293 bombs

40 Bomb Group - 548 A ./ e . . 316 bombs4 4 4 Bomb Group - 982iAjC -271 bombs

• Based on 20thAF Strike Attack Report No. 1'5.

- 33 -



Ai J: - , ._, "'-'rne bcmb~'

~~ not ;plotted;

4 . Ale . ·t~~2 bo . J e ttsQned 78 bombs

~mbs not accounted for

PhotoSl'eceived, .All prints from banbs away to

series: 3 01 - ]18.

S'l'RIJ{g A.,..."

- ....~-l.'AG1{ REPORT ?3rd BOMB>;,ING

bomb bursts of follOlling

07 0126z - 0701.3 lZ B0111b Load.' .574:x Nb4:30.5 x M 64 (QOOlP B )

Fus ing : M64 - .01 DOSe,. 0011-

~ delay tail.

No. of Hits 00 Target: Unkn~n

Heading O Ve r T ar ge t,

No, hie aver T,arget,

660 to 710 True

2 9

BQDlbi.ngccuracy: Unknown

1 lM < R R A TlV E R E PO R T:

., S.trike photos from 7.11./0 indicate good to excellent results withmaJOr~tyofbombs hittingwi thin target area, Numeroushits observed

~n ot:f ic es , rnachine shops ~and st Ol'age bui Id :lings in SE sect i on of target.

S orne a dditi one1 hits vis ible in barrs clcs and housing 61' ell. at SE, edge of

target. Bombpatt erns could be plotted! for only 2 squadrons sineethe

second squadron over the target did not obta.in any photos shewing bombsaway or bomb impact.s. It isbeli eved hcwever the maj6ri ty of bcmbs frOlJl

~his squadron fell within fhe target area. HUge columns of smoke obscur «

lng all except eastern most portio.n of target prevented a more completeassessment of damage.

Table of bombing statisj;ics:

Bombs dropped on primary ta.rg·et: 544:1t MG 4257 x M 6 4 (Camp . , B)

Visi ble burst a plotted: 73Calculated proba ble bursts plotted: 480Hits within 1000 r of 1,P: 150 - 18.8%

Hits within 2000' of AP: 233.29.2.5%

Hits within 3000' of 1 > P : 167- 20.8%

Hits - exa'ct location unknown: 278 ... 30.9%

FollOWing fQr'matio!!ls were plotted:

1st SquadroB 10 .A/C 287 x M b k

2nd Squadron 9 A /e 249 x M64

3rd SQ.uadron 10 11/0 265 x M64Bombs Jett is ened 1 30 x M i S l I -

48 x M64 (Comp. B)

Phot cs received: 5M317 lV2, 3. 4, 5; 2Vl, 2; 3V4...9i SV2-11i bV2-7i 7V1-I5

STR IKE J,TTaG K R EPO RT 313th B OM B ·!! ING .:

Time of attack: 070126z - 010139Z

Heading Over Target: 67i'o - 75° True

BombLoad & FlI:sing=903 x 500 lb.

GP. FUsed Inst nose, NIl tail.No. of A/e Over Tar get: 33

No. Bursts on the Target: 815 Bombing AccUTsey: li'xcell ent

Total Number bombs dropped over target: 843Total number of visible bUrsts plotted: 28* (Carried as ~jettisonedn

belOi'l )

Total number of caleuJ.ated probable bursts plotted: 843



"

S/I< ".n°Port 13"".~ Cont 'd.

Total N ' 0 : : %Tt '.• ' .e, bursts within 1000' of NiP1 - 612 - 7.-1.

'1 '0 a.l No., bllXBt.S wi thin 1-"'000.' of' MP1- 20.3 - 25%otal N' .. -. "'';;Total o, bl:U'sts l'1ithin2-300D' of 1 1' 11 '1 ' -. N 'o n e

No. bursts l'J:lore than 3000'from MPI - None

Til e ,fOllCl'll. nl!; :formations were plotted'

lat Formation- 11 Ale dropped 278 % 500 lb. ap'a.2nd. l1'ormetio·n; llJ./C dropped 273 x .500 lb. GP's.3rd Formatior:flll~/g dropped 292 x .500 lb. GP'a.

The be' ~n 1"" t d for ebove.,.. """ ce 0 bemba aLrbcr ne but not accoun e ..

"'60 Jo t 500 lb. 01' Jettisoned before bemb run (28 visible in photos

and plotted)

25 x .500 lb. 0,P dropped on Pri1ll!'lry Target with 7.3rd I'ling formation--no camera.

Nl i. RR 1 . .T IVE REPORT :

The targetl'1.9.,s completely obscured by smoke and no bursts ucrerecorded all strike photography. 1,11 bursts reported above uere

calculated from fair to poor strike photography. Aoolysis of thesUccess of the mission based uponoalculatcd bursts teflect.s that

the MPIvas well covered and that on effective pattern. of bombswas placed on the assigned target area. The smoke bi11cms over

the target appeertoverifythe 'calculat ed impac.t area.

One afthe aircraft released. prematurely and bombs .struck apprCIX-im a t ely 16,000 I short of the target. Thea sham bs CB 'I!lsedpossible

to a railroad and train--these bombs fell within a small built-uparea.

There is one cluster of bursts about 14,000'short of MPIwhich T Ie

are uI)abl e to aceount for with informat ion ava ila ble at this tiree.

STRIKE i .TTl:.CK REPORT3l4th BOlVJBING

Time of Attack: 070113Z - 0701242 BombLoad: 732 x 500f iN W b 4

Heading Over Targ'st: 67°, 68°, 76° True

No. J..C Over Target: 33

Fused: .1 Nose,NDtail

Nq. Bursts on Target; 450

BGIDbingi.ccuraey: FJ:cell ent

W lR R liTIV E R E PO R T:

Good quality strike phat ogt"aphy shoos excellent results tlith

several hits on the j,\/p building and addit ionsl hits end near-

misses concentrated on the bl!.lildings wit hin approximately l,OOOI

of the A/P.

Smoke and dust quickly obscured the taT get ®!1'81.'l1 prevent ing furtheraccurst e asaeeemens,

Bombing atatistica =

Bomba dropped. - 7.32

Visible bursts - 264

- 35 •



MISSIONA-2 S o B . •

7 AUGUST 1945

T 1uKAM A NAVA L ARSE NA L .90.21-1653

CONF IDENT IAL

- --

• V IS IB LE B URSTSo PR OB A B LE E lJR STS

.t==C A LC U LA TE D B U RS TS.. -

STRIKE ATTACK RPT 135GJ.U.-20AF



(. .



E

\

CO N>OLIDA TJ ID STAT r sTIC : f~L STJMMl. :RY

.

Mia:sitlla No. 317

7 AUgQ.s t 1'745



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SllOll):If------

Boab Weights: 1 4 - 6 4 ( m ) - 5 3 5 1bs.

M-64 (Comp») - 550 1bs.

s.47-A2 (lfP) - 125lbs.

MISSIOJl"

DAn 7 Al:lgl:l:Bt 19l~5

~ &. FU EL O ONS T.MP TI ONIGHT

M IS S I ON H U M BE R " " " 1 7 *317 #317 " ' "317 *311-,

-,"rl~ t _ , . , ...,.on "''..1'1i1' t< ,., ,,- -n ~'l'~ \'[(1- 'rOTA!.m r I T

-AIBCBA1'T COllsIDEllED 2 8 2 8 }O 32 118

AVERAGE FLYING f I : J(E 1 4 : 1 0 13:39 1 3 : 3 1 1 4 : 1 3 13:54-

F UE L CO NS rna D:

5 9 2 6verage 5 6 7 9 5 8 0 6 6 0 1 0 6167

MaxuUJlj 6 0 2 5 6 2 1 1 6 2 5 5 6 6 0 4 6 6 0 4

M1nimUIII 5 4 0 0 5 4 1 0 576B 5 5 3 4 5 400

1 1 ~F U E L B . E M A I J I N G :

8 9 4verage 7 8 5 9 1 7 7 4 7 1 1 0 7

Max imum 1 0 5 0 laB 1050 1 6 5 6 1 5 5 6

Minimum 4 7 5 5 S 9 4 3 5 700 4 3 5t

AVG . GALS . U SED PER HOU R 4 0 1 . 1 4 3 5 .0 4 4 4 . 5 4 3 3 . 4 2 8 . 9

fO TAL U SED ON AIRBORNE A/ C171'\471 19~qlO 211~l:t-) 21TH7 7 8 8 2 0 1

W EIG HT D ATA~. .NO . .A .IR CR AH A lR BO BB E

12 " 3 1 3 5 33 1 3 1

AV G. R AS IC 'iT. O "H A llI.CR AF 'l'7 4 8 1 9 7 5 1 9 4 74980 7 5 6 1 6 1 5 1 5 2

AV ER AGE U SEFU L LO AD6 1 4 0 0 6 2 2 1 5 0 6 1 4 0 5 6 2 3 9 0 6 1 8 5 9

AVG. NO . OF BOM B S LOADED30 - M 6, 28.4 - 2 6 , 5 - 2 2 . 1 8 - 2 6 . 7 1 -

1 > 1 6 4 M - 6 4 M - 6 4 M-64

AVG . 'iT. O F BOM B S LOADED

1 6 5 2 1 1 5 3 5 9 1 4 4 - 38 1 1 8 6 6 14518

AV ER AG E FU EL ID J.D ED6 4 6 6 6 7 2 4 6 7 5 8 7 2 7 4 61509

AVG. WT. O F FU lL LOAD ED

3 8 7 9 6 40344 4 0 5 4 8 4 36 l . ! 4 4 0 8 54

AV DAGE M ISC . WE IGHT6 0 1 7 6 5 7 7 6 4 1 9 6 s S 0 6467

AVG . GROSS W'f . AT TAD OFF1 3 6 2 1 9 1 3 7 4 7 4 1 3 6 3 8 5 1 3 8006 1 3 70ll



roOOIEI'H AIR .FORCE FIELD OflDm

917

7 August : , 1 . 9 4 . 5



'P.O. /11')

( .',) Tilll'~ :Jontl',,l: !,<,,:.d s,t'u!ldl'on pass -,s oval' DePflr-';.-ur', P,'tn~. "1+

0711001(.

C. J13tl l Wing"

FORCEWX lUTR ! ' : DMPI

prirnl1.ry Visual: 076102

$ecCl'ldll.l ';I' -Jisunl: 068086

(1) Reassc'lIfbl.y Area: J325N _- 136001'~.

(2) Bombfu.si,ng': 1/100 noaa Imd non-d:>l"l;' tnil.

(J) J\ I , tH ude s ,

3 S(1ua,ll'onsJ Sgu·:drons

(c.) Enr oube to t01.1·eot: 6,000 - f "BOO fCl~t and 8,000 - 8,800

f!~e~..

Priwlll"y Vif-:ull.l'. 17,GOO r" b I••S(~t"ondary Visual and Pr1lTh".rv Rvlm:: 21,000 f~.>t..

( t . \ . ) Tim;:, Cchr,rol: L,;nd squadr-on !'Jc.i"lS'~S OVi1C del'tl},vuro ; i:.oin;. ~t

07111t;K.

! - IPI YO RC E R EQ U IH ED

Primary Visual:

S',condary Visunl:

0900%

068086J Squadr-ons

:3 g",uanrons

(1) Rells ,3$mbly Are a: 31 - :- 0 51 ' 1· - 1 3 620E .

(2) J:loml<lusing: 1/10 nose and non-dGla;,r tail.

(3) :ll bi tudes:

(a) Lnrcute to t',rget: 6,000 - 6,800 _f0e~ and 8~OOO - 8)800

feet.

(b) At,sr,ck: P:r-iO"llar·\r Vi.sml: 1'1',000 fe.,'t.

S,~COndtlry Vi sulitl and Prinm.r'y H9..dt!.T': 21 ,000 tJ ' ' : > C.

f. Omit ':,ed.

~;. OmHtad.

x, (1) Method of ii."I;.t.&ck: By squadr-ons in column wtt:l mmdmum tii1\,~

in't.er;rnl bt~~wr~,, 'nsq'l!t:ldl:'ons.

(2) Route:

';.,." (1:":3)j r~·wi \." .

:3.11-52n- l ]S4530E3 5 0 l N - 1 3 9 0 6 £ (IP)

J,;jG\-!'~1bly ~~(ln-:) 1

: - 1 - a ' _ , : 3 fle mbly iirGf.l,

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b. CO:1.mandPos!:.; Eq., Twontillt;l1 A:Lr p'oX'ce, GUl\jn.

BY CO ! ,1 i\ lANDOF L IEUTE i' IJ I. ,. 'I J' J' GE l \1 ~R b \L T i' H ll 1 ING :

P . K rA~ " LOR0010113 1, A ir Cor psChief of Stafr

O F F I C I A L :

D I S T R I B l J ' f I Q N :

2 CG, 58 ~,h Bomb W:\'ng

2 - fJG, '731'0 /Jomb Wil1:g

,2 - CO , 313th B omb Wi ng2 - C C : _ 3 J . 4 t hBomb W i n g2 - CG, 315th Bcmb Wing

lO G, V II F igh to o :J:" C omd1 CO, Jrd Photo Rocon Sq

6 - A-C ~actics, ~~~ntietc A ir force2 - 33rd SOY, Twent,ieth Air ]l'Ol'ce

1 - ReM Office, Twentieth Air l"orce1 OAS,Twentieth Air F,)rC8

2 CIU, TP.entie th l\iT Force

1-A-2 Reporting, Twent , iEl t r l Air Fdrc<:

4 - A-2, ~'wonti€lth Air For-ce



G

DISTEilffi)TIo.N LlST



CoPY No.

1

2

:34--5

678

910

11121 314 -151 6171819202122

23 - 24-

2 52 6 - 2 7262 9 ._ 53

34

35

3 6

3 7

38,-67

68 - 69

70

7 1727J747 57 6777879 - 80

D I S T R I B 1 J ' I ' I O N

'l'ACTICALMISSION REPORT

Commandi,ng General; .ArIW' Jlir F'orcesCorronanding General; U~S. Army Strategie Air .Forcee (~ar)

Cormnanding General. UoS, .1.rlllYStrategic ':dr 1"0=,"0013 (%=)

Chief' of Staff. U.,S. Arpy Stratogic '.l.ir F'oroes ({}.l3l:L)

Commanding General; Twentieth .'I.ir F'orce

Commanding General; Ei8hth Air F'orce' (Okinawa.)Oornrnander in Chief'. U. oS . A r T i l Y force s. Faci fic

Chief of Naval Operations. OP_lb-V

Coromander in Chief.; Pacif:i.c Fleet (M" Hq)

Commander in Ol,1.iai,' Pacific Fleet (Hear Hq)

Commander' Air Force. Pacific F.lset

Cormnaaiel.'; Third Fleet

Commander; Fifth FleetCommander; First Carrier Task Force

Commal].der,A1arianasCOlll.'1landing General; V.S. Army Forces, 'Hidd1e Pacific

COlWJanding Gener al; .A1lied J\ir i'orce s. S;rP;,..

Commanding Gene;L'sl; Far East Air ForcesCO'llll'OOli ng General; Uo,so Strat egi o Air For cas in Europe

Corrmanding Genera.l', MeditGrranean Allied Air Forces

Commandi.og General~ Fifteenth Air ForceCommanding General; Seventh Air .Foroe

Corrmand il]g General; V II Bomber Cormn__and

Cormnarding General~ VII Fighter Oommand

Commanding General.; Eleventh Air Force

Commanding' General, 301st Fighter Wing

Command Hq, Allied Air lilorces, S"lPA'

ATTN: Senior In tell ige nee Offi cer, .R. A.l •.F •

Oommander in Chief t u~s~ .ArmyForces, Pacific

.n-TN: G-2 (For Section 22. HCM)

Officer in Charf,te, Joint Intelligence Center

Pacific Ocean AreasCommanding General •. \r,ny Air Forces

A~TN; A e / A S Intelligence

C@':manding Gtmerru.. itrTrry lir Forces.'lTTN: lO/ x s , rntell igence, Oo11e ction :;]iv: sienCOl l l l11E l l " ld ing General, U.S. j . \ : : r r r i f Strategic ...ir ForceS (frJ.2.::')

ATTN: Intelligence .Commanding General, U.S. ,Al' l l lY Strategic A;i,r Forces (G'l.laa::)

ATTN: Co:nmunicat ionsFOR: Counter Measures Air Analysis Cellt.;!l'

Commanding Officer, 'l'wentieth Air Force Lead C:,',:;7 Sc~.ool

Brigad ier General, H.B. Iianse 11, Jr.

Chief of Staff. ' I \ ; { e n t i e t . hAir Foree

Deputy O/S, Opus ~ 'lwentiath Air Force

.AOof Sf A-2, Twentieth :':i.:t' Fo:.C'oCher,:' (>.a1 \",;"'f are 'orfi(',~':, L':.e.r;:t~v~,h .\ir Fo::,ce

OrQl'.;l!lCe C?d'icer. T"':~ntit:l'~:1. J: ': "', ):':ce

Di!'er;;~or of Tao::tiC(;, A-3, r . cwe. / i_;;~i .t~ir Force

Bistorieal. O f f i c e r , T w e n t i e t h A : " r Force

--~



8182

83, 8 i J .

8 5868788

89

909 1929394959 6979899

100

101102

103

104

10 5106107108

109

110

III112

113114-

1 1 5

1 16117 - 130

Commanding General; 58th Bombardment iHng

C:ornm~ning General; 73rd Bombardment ':TingCommanding General; 313th Bombardment ',"ling

Commanding General; ]14th Bombardment ,':ingCommanding General; 31.5th Bombardownt '."ling.

Commal'lding Officer; 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Sq

Commanding Officer; 41st Photo Reconnaissance SqCo~~nding Officer, 55th Reconnaiss~nce Sq, Long Ra~e

:l{eather

Commanding Officl3r. Twentieth Air Force Combat Staging

Center (Provisional)

Comraandd ng Officer; 33rd Statist1c:;!.1 Control OnitCommandingOffi eel'; 6th Bomb Gr6LlP' (VH)

Commanding Officer; 9th BombGroup (VB)

GOl'lll!landingO:fficer~ 16th Bomb Group (VB)

Command l ng Off icer ; 19th BombGroup (VH)

Oommand ing Officer; 29th Bomb Group ( V B )

CornmandinBOfficer; 39th BombGroup (VB)

CommandingOfficer~ 4,Oth Bomb Group (VB)

Commanding Officer; 330th B omb Group (VH)

Commanding Officer; 331st Bomb Group ('.111)

Commanding Officer~ 44.hth Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Offic'3r; 462nd Bomb Group (VB)Ccnmandf.ng Gi'i'icer; 468th Bomb Group (VIi)

Commanding o'fficer; 497th Bomb Group (VB)

Commanding Officer; 498th Bomb GToup (VH)

Cororuanding Ot'ficer~ 4-99th Bomb Group (VH)

COlllmanding orficer~ ,SOoth Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Cffieer; 501st Bomb Grol:l.ll (Vii)

Comma nd ing O ffi ce r; 502nd Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Officer ~ 504-th Bomb Group (VB)

COll1iilanding Officer; 505th Bomb GraUL) (YH)

Commanding Offi coer ~ .509th Composite Group

Co~nanaing Officer; 15th Fighter Group (VIR)

Com ma nd in~ Off ic er ; 21st Fighter Group (VIR)

Commanding orficer~ 414th Fighter Group (VIR)

Commanding Officer. '506th Fighter Group (VLR)

Reporting Unit; A-2; Twent ieth .Air Force (File Copy)Reporting Wnit, 3 1 . . . . 2. 'I\'lentieth Air !&'orce

21st bomber command tactical mission report 317

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