www.cesran.org

Editor-in-Chief: Ozgur TUFEKCI, Dr. | CESRAN International, UK Executive Editor: Husrev TABAK, Dr. | CESRAN International, UK Managing Editor: Rahman DAG, Dr. | CESRAN International, UK Assistant Editors:

Faruk DUNDAR | University of Glasgow, UK

Seven ERDOGAN, Dr. | Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Turkey

Editorial Board

Journal of Global Analysis

* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.

The Journal of Global Analysis is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as bi-annual academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of CESRAN (www.cesran.org). CESRAN and the Editors of the Journal of Global Analysis do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in the Journal of Global Analysis.

Yasemin AKBABA, Assoc. Prof. | Gettysburg Col., USA Sener AKTURK, Assoc. Prof. | Koç University, Turkey Enrique ALBEROLA, Prof. | Banco de España, Spain Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. | Kadir Has University, Turkey Ian BACHE, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK Kee-Hong BAE, Prof. | York University, Canada Mark BASSIN, Prof. | Sodertorn University, Sweden Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. | Uni. of Queensland, Australia Richard BELLAMY, Prof. | Uni. College London, UK Andreas BIELER, Prof. | University of Nottingham, UK Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. | Bilkent University, Turkey Ken BOOTH, Prof. | Aberystwyth University, UK Stephen CHAN, Prof. | SOAS, University of London, UK Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. | MIT, USA Judith CLIFTON, Prof. | Universidad de Cantabria, Spain Zeki DOGAN, Prof. | Nigde University, Turkey John M. DUNN, Prof. | University of Cambridge, UK Kevin DUNN, Prof. | Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA Can ERBIL, Assoc. Prof. | Boston College, USA Seyfettin ERDOGAN, Prof. | University of Istanbul Medeniyet, Turkey Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. | MIT, USA Marc FLEURBAEY, Prof. | Princeton University, USA Bulent GOKAY, Prof. | Keele University, UK Ayla GOL, Dr. | Aberystwyth University, UK Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. | Uppsala Universitet, Sweden Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. | Carnegie Mellon University, USA David HELD, Prof. | London School of Economics, LSE, UK Tony HERON, Prof. | University of York, UK Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. | Uni. of St Andrews, UK John M. HOBSON, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK

Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. | University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA Michael KENNY, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK Oskar KOWALEWSKI, Dr hab. | Warsaw School of Economics, Poland Cécile LABORDE, Prof. | University College London, UK Scott LUCAS, Prof. | University of Birmingham, UK Martina U. METZGER, Dr. | Berlin Institute for Financial Market Research, Germany Christoph MEYER, Dr. | King’s College London, UK Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof. | University of Oxford, UK Ozlem ONDER, Prof. | Ege University, Turkey Ziya ONIS, Prof. | Koc University, Turkey Alp OZERDEM, Prof. | CESRAN International, UK Danny QUAH, Prof. | London School of Economics, UK José Gabriel PALMA, Prof. | Cambridge University, UK Jenik RADON, Prof. | Columbia University, USA Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. | University of Manchester, UK Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. | Regent’s College London, UK Ian TAYLOR, Prof. | University of St Andrews, UK Ratna VADRA, Assist. Prof. | Institute of Management Technology, India Ali WATSON, Prof. | University of St Andrews, UK Brian WHITE, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK Stefan WOLFF, Prof. | University of Birmingham, UK Yeliz YALCIN, Assoc. Prof. | Gazi University, Turkey Birol YESILADA, Prof. | Portland State University, USA Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assoc. Prof. | Florida International University, USA Ibrahim Guran YUMUSAK, Assoc. Prof. | University of Istanbul Medeniyet, Turkey

Academic Index

Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (BASE)

Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)

Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)

EBSCO Publishing Inc.

EconLit

EconPapers

Genamics JournalSeek

IDEAS

Index Islamicus

Infomine

International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)

International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)

International Relations and Security Network (ISN)

Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature

Peace Palace Library

Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)

Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)

Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory

Indexing & Abstracting

Journal of Global Analysis Vol.7 | No.1 | January 2017

Winter Issue

Journal of Global Analysis Vol.7 | No.1 | January 2017

Winter Issue

9 Human rights treaty ratification behavior: An ASEAN Way of creating regional standards by William J. Jones

Turkish Civilian Capacity in Post-conflict Scenarios: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo by Federico Donelli and Alessia Chiriatti Continuity or Change in Turkish Foreign Policy? Analyzing the Policy Fluctuations during the Justice and Development Party Era by Murat Ülgül*

Esra Özyürek Being German, Becoming Muslim. Race, Religion and Conversion in the New Europe by Linda Hyökki Kerri Woods Human Rights by Ori Swed Diana C. Mutz In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media by Z. Hall Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations by Muhammad Yaseen Gada Bernard Rougier & Stephane Lacroix (eds.) Egypt’s Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements by Marwa Fikry Abdel Samei Bernard Rougier The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from Al-Qaeda to ISIS by Itzchak Weismann

Book Reviews

Table of Contents

37

59

84

87

89

Research Articles

92

95

97

CESRAN International is a think-tank specialising on international relations in general,

and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to

a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international

organisations. CESRAN with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications,

journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on

strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is

particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different

countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to

public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic

material.

Some of CESRAN’s current publications are:

Journal of Global Analysis (biannual, peer reviewed) www.journalofglobalanalysis.com

Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (biannual, peer reviewed)

CESRAN Paper Series

CESRAN Policy Brief

Turkey Focus Policy Brief

CESRAN International also organises an annual international conference since 2014, called

International Conference on Eurasian Politics and Society (IEPAS)

www.eurasianpoliticsandsociety.org

CESRAN International is a registered CIC (Community Interest Company) in the UK

Company No: 9893156

CESRAN International is a member of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI)

www.cesran.org

International Think-tank

Consultancy

Research Institute

Ranked within the top 150 International think tanks

Vol. 7 | No. 1 | January 2017

Winter Issue

Journal of

Global Analysis

Human rights treaty ratification behavior: An ASEAN Way of creating regional standards

By William J. Jones*

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 7 | No. 1

January 2017

Winter Issue

www.cesran.org

Abstract The signing of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012 supposedly provides a long awaited triumph for human rights in the region and a measure by which regional human rights can finally prevail in parallel with the new ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. It is my argument that there are two primary challenges to realizing universal regional human rights standards; ASEAN’s constitutive norms/identity and fragmentation of human rights understandings in national legal interpretations of international human rights instruments. To substantiate this I will analyze treaty ratification behavior of ASEAN states to find out what are interests and preferences of ASEAN states in terms of human rights by analyzing treaties and reservations/declaration/statements which are attached to international human rights instruments that ASEAN states sign/accede to. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that treaty ratification behavior of ASEAN states is consistent with two strains of regional thought: sovereignty fears and cultural resistance to human rights norms and standards. Keywords: ASEAN, Human Rights, AICHR, Human Rights Southeast Asia, Human Rights Regime

William J. Jones is a lecturer in International Relations at Mahidol University International College and a PhD candidate. His articles have been published in Semiotica, ASIEN, and Journal of Southeast Asian Affairs, among other journals. His research interests include comparative regionalism and politics of Southeast Asia.

Introduction “a *human rights+ body which, while lacking in teeth, will at least have a tongue, and a tongue will have its uses” George Yeo Foreign Minister Singapore”1

On November 18, 2012, Association of Southeast Asian Nations *hereafter ASEAN+ Heads of State adopted at its 21st Summit the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration *hereafter AHRD+.2 Commentary surrounding the AHRD as with other recent ASEAN documents (i.e. ASEAN Charter) were highly polarized with civil society groups and NGOs criticizing ASEAN duplicity by adopting a document seen as falling below international standards of acceptability3 and general pragmatism of limitations entailed by the ‘ASEAN Way’ (common fair among diplomats and scholars) of ASEAN integration4 alongside views of optimism.5 Along with dismay were euphoric voices that pronounced a new era of human rights cooperation now emerging due to the ending of the Asian Values discourse.6 In 1993 ASEAN states at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights pledged to create a human rights mechanism and succeeded in doing some 18 years later. The very slow progress for the creation of a regional human rights body in Southeast Asia is evidence of a high level of intractability, obstruction, contestation and low political will which lessens the probability for an effective mechanism of human rights implementation. It is my argument that treaty ratification behavior of ASEAN states will be in line with two strains of behavior: state sovereignty and primacy of cultural. This should not be construed to mean these are universal traits but rather that both strains will be general and consistent thus influencing a distinct lack of consensus and ability to unify common standards relating to human rights in the region. The purpose of this study is twofold; first to uncover how ASEAN states position themselves with the international human rights regime and secondly how state positioning may impact ASEAN regional human rights standards and its regional human rights mechanisms’ development. I will analyze international human rights treaties which ASEAN states have ratified as well as their statements (declarations/reservations) to the aforementioned. In order to find preferences of ASEAN states, decoding of their reservations/declarations will used to find frames of reference for analysis and how these can be interpreted. I argue that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights *hereafter AICHR+ stands as an aspirational marker of external signaling to other countries that human rights are and will be protected while providing little substance in protection. If ASEAN states do not ratify HR treaties

10

Human Rights Treaty Ratification Behavior: An ASEAN Way of Creating Regional Standards

Journal

of

Global

Analysis

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

they are signaling resistance to normative pledging behavior and if they do ratify then reservations/declarations will be made with specific mention to “cultural” and sovereignty indicators which structurally inhibit standards creation. Regional norms of sovereignty and non-interference referencing, which support the state as a protected entity and cultural identity marking, will also be analyzed to determine if these regional norms are articulated to feed state prerogative in social contestation and block regional human rights standardization. I will limit my analytical inquiry to six (6) core human rights treaties; ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CAT, CRC, CEDAW. Coding will be used to identify interests/preferences and IHRL interpretations of ASEAN states. Words and phrases such as “self-determination, supremacy of or deference to “constitutional and national law”, reliance on definitions of “national and/or national and international law”, “non-recognition of ICJ/external arbitration”, references to the UN Charter Article 2 and lastly issues regarding citizenship, nationality and national racial policy will be interpreted as state sovereignty issues and frames. Whereas references to “religion”, “Shariah”, “custom”, “personal”, “family”, “ethnicity” and national ideology will be interpreted as cultural issues and frames. The objective for this study is to find out the latent interests and preferences of ASEAN states which are best displayed in their actions regarding human rights norms and treaties. In particular how do ASEAN states interpret international human rights? How may national interpretation affect regional standards? Nominally this will at least provide some insight into possible reasons for ASEAN state behavior regarding human rights and their attendant instruments while shedding light on possible research trajectories. Second, is providing reasoning for why there exist very high obstacles to regional human rights standards due to national standards fragmentation. ASEAN state behavior towards core human rights treaties in their declarations/reservations, signing/ratification should provide strong insight to the derivative argument of whether AICHR will be effective or not. For if state behavior regarding the core human rights treaties is fragmented displaying particularist characteristics of sovereignty, supremacy of national law and cultural relativism then by extension the arguments surrounding the AHRD and AICHR are essentially moot and hold little relevance for sustained inquiry at the moment. Simply put, ASEAN state treaty ratification behavior is the source of regional norms and understandings, not regional level undertakings which cannot bypass ASEAN states thus activating normative and constructivist claims of spillover. Central research questions are: what is the behavior of ASEAN states regarding core human rights treaties? Do ASEAN states and leaders act as they do because of culture and resistance, post-colonial fear attributable to weak state structure, rationalist calculations of opportunity costs or idealistic liberal democratic notions of liberty and freedom? There exists a large gap in the scholarly literature addressing ASEAN state preference and motivations for signing supposedly sovereignty eroding human rights treaties. The embryonic state of ASEAN level human rights instruments reflects the burgeoning literature in its depth. Strict legal analysis has been undertaken by Ginbar (2010) and Renshaw (2013) regarding legal interpretation of the ASEAN HR agreements while Collins (2006, 2008, 2013) and Durbach et al. (2009) consider the problems of people-orientation and the nature of an ASEAN human rights mechanism while Davies (2013) has considered a more theoretical perspective of regional rights. No studies currently systematically consider international treaty statements and the

11

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

messages these are sending via state statements and action with regard to legal effect.7 Taking as a priori fact an ASEAN human rights mechanism and speculating as to its possible effectiveness or not confuses scholarship as it looks at regional level action as detached from national action, which in the case of ASEAN as will be discussed later is a fallacy in itself. Thus this short analysis seeks to modestly account for motivations and reasons for ASEAN (regional level) human rights behavior and national positioning relating to human rights treaties and how the three different levels perhaps interact with one another and produce regional human rights instruments such as the AHRD which signal a particular understanding of human rights standards in the region. Theorizing State *ASEAN+ Behavior Regarding Human Rights Treaty Ratification The scholarly literature surrounding the study of ASEAN makes conflations of institutional agency which sees ASEAN as an autonomous site for policy formation and action. This is a misnomer and obscures the direction of inquiry. As such it is of the utmost importance to clarify what is meant when one refers to “ASEAN”.8 ASEAN is not an autonomous institutional entity regardless of the recent upgrade of the Secretariat and its Secretary General to ambassadorial status with ‘enhanced powers’.9 The Secretariat has a staff of 295 and a budget of $15.7 million10 leading to an understanding that capacity to act is highly constrained due to the structure of finance and human resources.11 The Secretary-General is more Secretary than General and has little power historically and contemporarily.12 ASEAN should be considered and studied as a collection of 10 independent states within an intergovernmental organizational structure13 that share limited sets of interests and goals along a narrow consensus among elite.14 With this in mind ASEAN as an organization is thus dependent upon its institutional framework of procedural norms of consultation and consensus decision-making15 and regulative norms of state sovereignty, no external interference or subversion, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful settlement of disputes.16 Put together these constitute the ASEAN Way17 but more importantly direct academic inquiry to the behavior (statements and actions) of ASEAN member states rather than ASEAN as an institution. ASEAN as such can be considered as a tool which serves state purposes for relational gains rather than relative regional gains. Descriptive treaty ratification behavior of individual states should shed light on some of the purposes of ASEAN and direct inquiry away from ASEAN an organization to ASEAN and its agreements as state tools. Theorizing of state ratification of human rights treaties generally falls into constructivist, rationalist/realist, domestic institutionalist, liberalism and world society approaches. Constructivist argue that norms are created by like-minded states and imbued with legitimacy via law stemming from shared ideas and values then diffused, cascaded or spiraled internationally.18 Constructivist are countered by rationalist/realist which posit that states entertain human rights in as far as it is in their best interests with high opportunity low cost ratio’s due to lack of enforcement.19 Institutionalist stress the internal domestic context of enforcement capability and locking in preferences of power players20 while the world society approach stresses the external environment of legitimacy gains, shaming, mimetics and normativity as well as international organizations and regimes influence.21 Lastly liberals posit a close link between values embedded in human rights discourse and

12

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

texts with democracy and the path dependent nature of rights language of individual ownership of universal human rights.22 Of these mainstream perspectives none take into account national level interpretation of human rights treaties for how and why states interpret and act as they do nationally, regionally and internationally. Rather broad and weak variables such as democracy, NGO activity and state action are used to explain why human rights treaties are bided by or not while discounting what states say and do regarding their supposed obligations directly in treaties and then trying to explain state behavior using deductive reasoning. Hopefully, this initial study may provide a small glimpse into ASEAN state behavior and help in trying to explain why ASEAN states act as they do by referencing a focal point of treaty ratification and statement behavior. International to Regional Human Rights Regimes: International & Regional Norms This section will trace ASEAN re-interpretations of international human rights in regional declarations and legal text within the context of creating a bulwark to substantive change by accessing internationally legitimating legal instruments to block regional mechanisms of reform and change regarding human rights. It will be shown that human rights standards at the regional level of ASEAN are rhetorically equivalent to international standards but are stripped of their universal potency by accentuating and emphasizing particular textual understandings of international human rights declarations and transposing these into ASEAN human rights standards. International human rights declarations of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action stand as a benchmark for ASEAN’s retrogressive stance and standards of human rights and in fact mirror and inform ASEAN declarations regarding human rights such as the 1993 Joint Communique, ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. The AHRD references the UDHR and essentially takes verbatim civil, cultural, economic, social and political rights. The AHRD lays claim that its contents are universal and dispels hierarchy in its general principles by stating that “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” (AHRD Article 7) in line with the UDHR.23 However, national prerogatives and discrepancy with universality displays itself by the understanding that “enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with the performance of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all other individuals, the community and the society where one lives. It is ultimately the primary responsibility of all ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (AHRD Article 6).24 The polemical notion of balancing rights and responsibilities between individual and community masks the nature of an abstract “community” and/or “society” in Southeast Asia as advocacy groups and transnational NGOs are to different degrees subject to state prerogatives of openness and access which leaves the notion of ‘civil society’ or for that matter individual in an asymmetrical position vis-à-vis governments who act on and behalf of the “community/society”. The seeming oxymoron of balance with illiberal governments is nothing new to the region and its human rights regime. In the lead up to the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, NGO’s which drafted recommendations for the UNGA conceded political space for exploitation by recognizing “human rights are universal in nature,

13

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (Bangkok Declaration Article 8).25 Particularism recognized by this epistemic community was considered legitimate as the 1993 VDPA noted that “having taken into account the Declarations adopted by the three regional meetings at Tunis, San José and Bangkok” (Ibid, Preamble)26 and subsequently was verbatim restated, recognizing that “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind” (VDPA Article 5).27 This demonstrates an appeal to universalism and interconnected rights without hierarchy but is countered by its subsequent sentence which in the ASEAN contexts means a non-politicization of human rights thus allowing leaders to interpret implementation according to regional fit. In the ASEAN context it should be contextualized as taking place simultaneously with the high point of the Asian Values debate which sought to counter the claims of universality and indivisibility. ASEAN leaders wasted no time in reaffirming relativism by further stressing “that human rights are interrelated and indivisible … they should be addressed in a balanced and integrated manner and protected and promoted with due regard for specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances” (ASEAN Joint Communique28 Article 16). The VDPAs key principles were re-asserted by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization and particularism upheld by stating that “taking in account the need for full respect of their human rights as well as their duties to the community” (AHRD Article 6. Freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community” (AIPO Article 1).29 The timing of these documents and lobbying is not inconsequential as this period of time coincided with the end of the Cold War and shift in American and ‘Western’ foreign policies integrating and upgrading human rights.30

Human Rights Treaty Ratification Behavior of ASEAN States As stated above the AHRD uses language which finds its logic in the 1980’s using language of balance, need for order and for human rights not to be politicized and as Chalermpalanupap (2008, 2009) suggests the VDPA is very much relevant today.31 The question is what does balance entail in terms of states actions in relation to the human treaties they sign and how is it expressed? ASEAN states accession to human rights treaties is checkered with Cambodia being party to all nine treaties with Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore on the low side with the exact same record of three treaty ratifications. It is important to consider what ASEAN members say and do concerning human rights and analyzing their behavior in reservations offers a glimpse into both aspects. A reservation as defined by Article 2.1(d) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations defines such practices as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or by an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” while declarations, interpretive declarations and statements are not intended to have binding effect.32 This is disputable however as statements can indeed constitute

14

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

reservations if they are effectual and conditional thus bringing interpretation specific provisions.33 Nonetheless it is germane to this discussion as ASEAN states lodge many types of statements, the majority of which are specific in provisional detail and thus the legal effect which would flow from such statements. This allows for another glimpse into the intent and interests of said states when entering into binding treaties. Cambodian Exceptionalism? Cambodia is an outlier of human rights treaty ratification in ASEAN and its behavior concerning such should be approached with a certain degree of cautious skepticism. Curiously it has ratified all major HR treaties (with optional protocols on CEDAW) with the exception of the migrant workers convention which it has signed. As such on the surface it would appear that Cambodia is at the forefront of the human rights movement and quite enlightened concerning the rights and the historical plight of its people. Rationalist would interpret its behavior as one of opportunity costs whereas institutionalist would see it as a means of a LDC signaling its place in the international community for legitimacy and presumably aid dispersal. Both these perspectives would not be wrong were it not for an interesting caveat of its behavior; all core human rights treaties with the exception of ICERD which Cambodia is party were signed and ratified by the genocidal Khmer Rouge (Democratic Kampuchea) regime. Timing in terms of its treaty ratification is quite interesting as the ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW were all signed on October 17, 1980 less than one year after the ouster of Democratic Kampuchea’s leadership *January 7, 1979+ and in the midst of intense ASEAN diplomacy in the UN to allow the DK regime to retain its UN seat. This can be seen as a measure of the DK regime to do an about face from its domestic practices of the preceding 5 years when it was in power in order to provide the international community with a veneer of legitimacy to its claim of international legitimacy. The Vietnamese diplomatic offensive to sign agreements with the PRK including Lao PDR34 and the NAM35 which began in April 1983 agreeing to frontier settlements and peace led to another bout of legitimacy36 strain coming into play. This is seen in DK diplomatic texts which are increasingly robust in their denouncing of ‘treaties’ and threats to their legitimacy the exile government ratified ICERD in October just after the Vietnamese attempted discredit the DK representatives at the 2nd World Conference on Racism and Racial Discrimination37 to shore up international support. Lastly, after the 1991 UNSC decision to deploy UNTAC in March 15, 1992 and prior to internationally monitored elections scheduled for 1993 the exiled DK leadership ratified the remaining five core human rights treaties38 (ICCPR & ICESCR on May 26 1992 and CAT, CRC, CEDAW on Oct 15 1992) under international pressure following the Paris Peace Agreements.39 Given the timing of these agreements and the absolute legitimacy needs of the exiled DK leadership it becomes evident that external demands for domestic political and military gains were the driving force for Cambodia. From this it may be inferred that human rights treaty ratification was as much part and parcel a method of retaining legitimacy in international politics and power rather than a genuine care for individual rights and constructivist claims of identity, unless identity is meant to construe illiberal genocidal behavior. These core treaties were signed by a regime responsible for genocide of its people and the timing bears eerie resemblance to critical periods of legitimacy struggles at the UN. Perhaps the sacrifice of human rights application is due to the parsimony of its mass ratification and history thereof?

15

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights There are six ASEAN member states party to the ICCPR of these only Cambodia has not lodged a declaration or reservation while the Philippines has broken ranks with other members and recognized jurisdiction of the Committee, in effect signaling a strong penchant towards peer review as well as ratifying optional protocols. Indonesia, Lao PDR and Thailand all seek to define self-determination in ICCPR Article 1 in accordance with the VDPA,40 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States,41 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Indonesia) which are all derived from Article 2 of the UN Charter upholding sovereign equality. Lao PDR adds reservations to Article 22 referring to freedom of labor union association which is governed by Article 7 of the Lao PDR constitution which states “Lao Federation of Trade Unions…are the organs to unite and mobilize all strata of the multi-ethnic people to take part in the tasks of protection and construction of the country; to develop the right of self-determination of the people and to protect the legitimate rights” (Constitution Lao PDR Article 7) and Article 18 concerning freedom of religion and Laos’ reservation that people have the right to believe or not to believe in religion42 and “all acts creating division and discrimination among ethnic groups and among religions are incompatible”.43 Thailand adds an interpretive declaration to Article 20.1 stating war is defined in accordance with international law thus Geneva Conventions I-IV Common Article 2 where war can exist with or without declaration. All statements by these states are specific in their conditional and provisional detail to constitute reservations. All reservations made link directly to sovereignty and national ideology which should be interpreted as national culture/identity and state security coding in their objections to the ICCPR. It would appear that national resilience in the form of socialist ideology, state security and historical underpinnings of state formation are expressed strongly in specifically defining rights and the limitations thereof. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The same six countries are party to the ICESCR but only three lodged statements. Indonesia and Thailand are the same as their ICCPR declarations. While Vietnam lodged a declaration considering ICCPR Article 48(1) and ICESCR Article 26(1) discriminatory because only states which are members of the UN, its specialized agencies, Statute of the ICJ or invited by the UNGA can take part in these treaties. Vietnam stated that “in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of States, should be open for participation by all States without any discrimination or limitation” (ICESCR Vietnam Statements).44 These once again are conditional and specific in provisional detail thus constituting reservations and point directly to state sovereignty as an overriding principle of ASEAN states towards the ICESCR. The Vietnamese statements can be taken in the context of socialist fraternity and equal participation by all states on discriminatory terms of being compelled to be within the UN system rather than simply a part of international society. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Three ASEAN members have lodged declarations and reservations to ICERD (Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam). Indonesia’s reservation concerns Article 22 which pertains to jurisdiction of the ICJ and arbitration as dispute settlement mechanisms. Indonesia only allows for dispute settlement through Convention mechanisms when

16

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

all parties consent. There are two readings to this reservation; first is that Indonesia is referring to Javanese political culture the Javanese tradition of “musyawarah” where leaders use informality and as the basis for decision-making, “mufakat” as the process or practice of decision-making (Sebastian and Lanti 159);45 second and more plausible considering the language of ICERD of specifically referring to state parties having obligations and Indonesia’s reservation language of “may be referred to the International Court of Justice only with the consent of all the parties to the dispute” (ICERD Indonesia Statements) is that blunting external dispute settlement couched in sovereignty terms is the primary reason for non-recognition. Thailand’s general interpretive declaration “does not interpret and apply the provisions of this Convention as imposing upon the Kingdom of Thailand any obligation beyond the confines of the Constitution and the laws of the Kingdom of Thailand” (ICERD Thailand Statements) and its interpretation of Article 4(a-c) “only where it is considered that the need arises to enact such legislation” demonstrates a clear understanding that racism is a hands off decision and that the supremacy of Thai law will inform the Convention (ICERD Thailand Statements).46 Its reservation of not being bound by Article 22 ICJ jurisdiction for dispute settlement shows state sovereignty is a major factor in Thailand’s signing of the Convention (ICERD Thailand Statements). Vietnam lodged the same declaration as it did with the ICESCR/ICCPR with reference to Article 17(1), 18(1) and a reservation to jurisdiction of the ICJ in Article 22 (ICERD Vietnam Statements). All of these statements can be once again considered reservations and point once again towards state sovereignty with the exception of the Vietnamese appeals to fraternity as being a key determinant and preference for dissenting ASEAN states especially when considering that ICERD was the first human rights treaty undertaken with urgency in the post-colonial period. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Of the five ASEAN members which have ratified the CAT, three have lodged statements thus showing a rather high degree of resistance. But as will be shown the specific nature of these statements essentially emasculates the CAT providing little impetus for focal reference. Indonesia’s declaration regarding Article 20(1-3) concerning inquiry into offending states must be carried out with “strict compliance with the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States” (CAT Indonesia Statements).47 While its reservation parallels its previous ICCPR and ICESCR statements regarding Article 30(1) ICJ jurisdiction and dispute settlement (CAT Indonesia Statements). Lao PDR reservations do not recognize competence of the CAT Committee in Article 20 and ICJ jurisdiction in Article 30. It also has declared regarding Article 8(2) that extradition of persons will only take place when an extradition treaty exists. These all are contingent upon it interesting declaration regarding the definition of torture in Article 1 where Lao states that torture is understood as “defined in both national law and international law” (CAT Lao PDR Statements).48 This may seem innocuous at first glance until torture in Article 160 of its Criminal Code is shown to define torture as “physical violence and torture, use of measures or other acts inconsistent with the law against suspects or prisoners during arrest, trial or service of sentence” (Lao PDR Criminal Code Article 160).49 This demonstrates that national rather than international definition of torture will be used and as Laos’ criminal code shows torture is not defined aside from its noun usage. Furthermore, the argument by Laotian authorities is circular offering no definition other than simply torture is

17

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

defined as torture. It should be noted that what the international community considers torture is recognized as part of customary law/practice by various ethnic groups such as Lu-Mien, Hmong, Akha, Lolo among others in their procedures to extract confessions which also points towards procedural deficiencies of fair trail and presumption of innocence.50 Put together these show strong resistance to the CAT and a strong push to sovereignty norms not to be held accountable for national practices. Thailand’s interpretive declaration merits consideration as it also states that torture “shall be interpreted in conformity with the current Thai Penal Code”. This is rather interesting as Thailand’s legal system does not have a definition of torture as is stated by Thailand “although there is neither a specific definition nor particular offence under the current Thai Penal Code corresponding to the term, there are comparable provisions” (CAT Thailand Statements) which leads one to understand that a piecemeal and fragmented case by case consideration of individual acts would be practiced rather than a coherent confluence of law derived from a source definitionally to inform practice and procedure. Thailand also has a reservation where it is not bound by Article 30(1) ICJ jurisdiction in line with the other ASEAN states. Thailand does mention aspirational consideration to revise its criminal law with reference to Article 4 and 5 though it is unlikely considering allegations of abuse stemming from the sustained civil conflict in Thailand southern provinces and military suppression of the Thai state51 (CAT Thailand Statements). The Lao and Thai reservations to Article 1 puts into serious question these legal validity of their reservations as both do not have national legislation clearly defining torture and limitations to it internationally which may in fact undermine the purpose and intent of the treaty itself. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women All ASEAN members are party to CEDAW (three ratifying and one signing the optional protocol) with seven lodging statements, showing a high degree of contention concerning this convention. This should not come as a surprise due to the highly contested nature of gender relations and cross-cutting issues of education, employment, family, marriage, public service and services and especially the public/private nature of these issues. Nonetheless, CEDAW offers insight into the prevailing differences of interpretation and interests of ASEAN members. Brunei lodged a general reservation concerning all principles that may be contrary to its constitution and Islam derived from the father in instances of birth outside of Brunei Darussalam and only inclusive of the mother if born in Brunei to natural parents both of Brunei nationality or Malay race (Brunei Nationality Act Article 4(1)).52 It further reserved against Article 29(1) concerning ICJ jurisdiction (CEDAW Brunei Darussalam Statements). These reservations demonstrate two strains of understanding; first Islam hence culture is a central theme of apprehension and interpretation, second nationality as culture and sovereignty bound parallels its statement on constitutional supremacy and jurisdiction of dispute adjudication. Malaysia lodged reservations concerning Article 5(a) inheritance, 7 public officials, 9(2) citizenship and 16 marriage stating that it would abide by principles in as far as the convention “do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia’ law and the Federal Constitution of Malaysia” (CEDAW Malaysia Statements).53 This reservation also has dual nature in that Islam as the religion of governance for Malay Muslims concerning marriage and personal law, property, religious authorities, religious

18

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

judiciary will be not be superseded by CEDAW but rather governed by the Constitution under Islamic law (Constitution of Malaysia Article 1 State List 2). Marriage as such would be governed by Islamic law where women can marry at age 16 and men at 18. Citizenship and nationality would also be defined by Article 14 of the Constitution which of consequence is differential to children born out of wedlock abroad to a Malay mother, of which the child would take the fathers citizenship. Otherwise normal procedure would take place concerning naturalization (Constitution of Malaysia Article 14, 15, 16).54 This as in the case above of Brunei show a strong penchant for religious understandings/exceptions as supremacy of national law as embodying the protection of the prior, thus both culture and sovereignty issues are salient. Singapore while somewhat different accessed reservations for Article 2 and 16 citing the need not to abolish laws/customs/practices of discrimination due to Singapore being a “multiracial and multi-religious society and the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practice their religious and personal laws… not to apply the provisions…that would be contrary to their religious or personal laws” (CEDAW Singapore Statements).55 To explicate Singapore has an advisory council to the President relating to regulation of Muslim affairs and Syariah Court which deal with issue pertaining to personal laws of Islam in Singapore (Constitution of Singapore Article 153, Administration of Muslim Law Act Article 34, 35) and to a lesser extent Hindu’s (Hindu Endowment Act 1968).56 For example this council has the ability to deal with issues of marriage and distribution of estates in accordance with Islamic law and/or Malay custom (Administration of Muslim Law Act Article 112). It also reserved not to be bound by 29(2) jurisdiction of the ICJ. These also demonstrate a dualist tendency by appealing to culture and custom within the context of a diverse society and its protection via state sovereignty and non-interference by an external body. Thailand only has two statements; a declaration stating clearly that the purposes of CEDAW are in accordance with the Thai Constitution and a reservation on Article 29(1) not to be bound by the ICJ. This shows clearly state sovereignty and deference to national constitutional provisions especially as CEDAW expressly places obligations on state parties. It should be noted that Thailand previously had reservations on Articles 7, 9(2), 10, 11.1(b), 15(3) and 16 the most recent of which Article 16 was withdrawn only in 2012 which dealt with issues of citizenship and restricted citizenship to persons in Thailand as servants, temporarily, illegal entry (CEDAW Thailand Statements).57 This both deals with issues of national custom, private family sphere, public service, security services, state security when Thailand’s historical context of refugees and neighbor state conflict and state sovereignty regarding regulation of citizenship and supremacy of domestic constitutional law. Myanmar and Vietnam both lodged reservations using language of distinct intent relating to not recognizing ICJ jurisdiction in Article 29(1) by stating “*Myanmar+ does not consider itself bound” “*Vietnam+ will not be bound” thus showing very strong conviction in state sovereignty and non-interference in affairs of state concerning family, gender and dispute adjudication. Convention on the Rights of the Child Only three ASEAN members still have active statements to the CRC as three have withdrawn prior reservations. Brunei has reservations on Article 14 and 20 regarding freedom of religious belief and 21 regarding adoption of children. It has stated

19

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

unequivocally that “provisions may run contrary to the beliefs and principles of Islam, the State, religion…*and in+ particular expresses its reservation to articles 14, 20 and 21” (Brunei Darussalam CRC Statements). This is verbatim its objection to CEDAW in line with religion hence culture with reference to supremacy of constitutional law. Malaysia has reservations with Article 2 concerning discrimination to race, religion that runs contrary to national Bumiputra policy, Article 7 dealing with nationality, Article 14 religious freedom of choice, Article 28.1(a) compulsory primary education with reference to religious schools and Article 37 legal representation for children. It is stated that all CRC articles must in be conformity with the “Constitution, national laws and national policies” (CRC Malaysia Statements).58 These at once with reference to nationality and religion parallel is CEDAW reservations while national level policy concerning race and legal representation is subject to national prerogatives. These all signal religion and culture while simultaneously reference state sovereignty as the active medium for culture reservations. Singapore lodged declarations for Articles 12-17 which allow for child freedom in law, expression, religion, education and family and Articles 19 and 37 which deal with administrative law and imprisonment and punishment. It stated that it was not prohibited by the need for “maintaining law and order… necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, the protection of public health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others… corporal punishment in the best interest of the child” (CRC Singapore Statements).59 These point directly towards Asian Values of the Lee Kwan Yew era and are strictly indicative of cultural arguments of differential relativism.60 Singapore’s reservations pertain directly to obligations or rights of the Covenant that will not go beyond those “prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic” (CRC Singapore Statements) thus directly inferring supremacy of national law. Furthermore, its reservations extend to national prerogative for citizenship, migration to national law dependent on Singapore being “geographically one of the smallest independent countries in the world and one of the most densely populated” (CRC Singapore Statements) and funds for primary education to citizens only. Singapore’s statements indirectly access cultural rationale via Asian Value discourse which emanated from its island and sovereignty fears associated with being a small nation which must maintain order via supremacy of its national law. It should be noted that this discourse is not dead as Villanueva insists as evidenced by the remarks of Deputy Prime Minister S. Jayakumar and Foreign Minister George Yeo at the UNGA in 2005 where they stated “the penchant of some states to present their views as universal norms inevitably provokes resistance, unnecessarily politicizes the process and is ultimately unhelpful to the cause of human rights”.61

Human Rights Treaty Ratification Behavior and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration It has been demonstrated that there is very little continuity in ASEAN states positions towards the global human rights treaty framework. ASEAN states positions are generally in line positions of guarding sovereignty and cultural relativity, specific to each member state. This fragmented positioning is represented in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and also in AICHR negotiations leading up to the AHRD. AICHR finds its legal basis in The ASEAN Charter which stipulates the formation of a human rights body62 whose Terms of Reference were adopted in 2009 within the framework of the Political-Security Community. This community is a purely

20

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

intergovernmental pillar, allowing for state control over final decision-making authority.63 AICHR’s ToR provides for among others:64

1. developing strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to complement the building of the ASEAN Community, 2. developing an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 3. enhance public awareness of human rights among the peoples of ASEAN through education, research and dissemination of information, 4. promote capacity building for the effective implementation of international human rights treaty, 5. engage in dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN bodies and entities associated with ASEAN, 6. consult, as may be appropriate, with other national, regional and international institutions and entities concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights, including civil society organizations and other stakeholders, 7. obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection of human rights, 8. develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters of interest to ASEAN 9. prepare studies on thematic issues of human rights in ASEAN

These mandated criteria appear to have created an extremely weak body in line with ASEAN’s statement that “AICHR is an inter-governmental body and an integral part of the ASEAN organizational structure. It is a “consultative body” bound by principles inter alia of ASEAN; sovereignty, non-interference, independence thus limiting AICHR effectiveness.65 A more contextual reading reveals vague legal language with no self-executing qualities. Further, it demonstrates a significant degree of internal flexibility as its members are “appointed and accountable to the appointing Government”.66 Flexibility is determined by member state governments which may appoint a non-government representative. The importance of this is degree of agency and autonomy which an independent and non-politically dependent representative may exercise. This was best seen by the composition of the first AICHR which brought together civil society NGO advocates (Rafendi Djamin – Indonesia), government/government connected representatives (Awang Hj. Ahmad bin Hj. Jumat – Brunei, Kyaw Tint Swe – Myanmar, Nguyen Duy Hung – Vietnam), long-time high level politically connected advocates (Rosario Gonzales Manalo – Philippines) and academic (Sriprapha Petcharamesree – Thailand). Within this varied composition of persons the degree and levity of action taken was highly dependent on the state in question and agency of the representative to act.67 For instance in the run up to the AHRD while AICHR did not meet with CSOs Sriprapha, Rafendi and Abdullah initiated dialogue with NGOs prior to and after AICHR meetings in order to provide transparency and allow indirect policy engagement. It was explicitly stated that this was done on a basis of personal initiative within their AICHR representative role rather than a collective AICHR basis (Asian Forum 30).68

It is instructive to note that one of AICHR’s purposes is “to promote human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the balance between rights and responsibilities” (ASEAN Article 1.4).69 This

21

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

view is articulated in the Declaration which states that the realization of human rights “must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds” but are “universal, indivisible, interdependent” (ASEAN 2012b supra 7).70 This relativist language finds its origin in the 1993 Bangkok and Vienna Declaration’s but most importantly in contested notions of human rights and the discourse of Asian Values. The apparent dichotomous relationship in the declaration and framing of human rights was the result of internal dynamics inside AICHR among its representatives. As noted by Muntarbhorn “one of the less liberal countries wanted explicit reference to “ASEAN Values” (parallel to “Asian Values”), but was not supported by the majority view in the drafting process”.71 Muntarbhorn further sees the ASEAN Way of consensus as incapable of gently nudging obstinate members who are major violators of rights thus supporting the lifeline of Asian Values to persist.72 The above was confirmed and further noted that members of AICHR, specifically the Chair supported by two other countries that countered by stating that having explicit provisions referencing anything approximating Asian Values was unacceptable and as such this strong proposal was negated.73 This points towards the understanding that there exists at present very different perceptions of human rights regionally and how they should be addressed. In this case, a regional declaration on human rights does not directly allow for cultural relativism but maintains a precarious balance between liberal and illiberal normativity as per Article 7 of the AHRD. Furthermore, the facts that all ASEAN member states affirm Civil, Political, Economic Social and Cultural Rights as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights74 yet all member states are not state parties to binding international treaty law is somewhat curious. The reference to the UDHR is implicitly a method to provide a linguistic affirmation of a document which is not binding treaty law but rather part of international customary law.75 The UDHR stands as an international customary legal document which is non-binding which ASEAN states affirm but their legal affirmation of binding human rights treaties is not unified nor maintained. Given this context the ability of a regional human rights framework to be promoted and protected by a viable and independent human rights body is simply not existent. This is best underscored in Article 6 of the AHRD as it specifies that “it is ultimately the primary responsibility of all ASEAN member states to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”76 The fragmented nature of regional human rights understandings is exemplified in member state treaty ratification behavior which is then overlaid onto the regional level which is informed by individual member states which then reaffirm and police their original positions. Conclusion From the analysis above it is possible to witness two distinct trends of ASEAN state behavior regarding obligations and derogation from human rights norms embodied in these core multilateral treaties; legally altering language used via treaty reservations and a strong penchant towards state sovereignty. State sovereignty can be seen by each treaty in that only two treaties are unanimously ratified CEDAW and CRC yet both of these treaties have/had the highest number of reservations attached; CEDAW fourteen reservations from seven countries and CRC seven with eight withdrawn from six countries. This may indicated that even with high ratification level there is a significant amount of resistance to the norms and state obligations embedded within

22

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

these texts. Aside from this if one considers the ratio of states ratifying these core treaties a rather bleak picture appears ICCPR – 6/10, ICESCR – 6/10, ICERD 7/10, CAT 5/10; only ICERD breaks a threshold of significant majority (considered as 66% of total ratio) and it has fully seven reservations from three states attached. The over exuberance for the AHRD is misplaced and hopes for a substantive regional mechanism to protect and enforce human rights in the ASEAN region will be stunted for the foreseeable future. Petcharamesree has noted that standards are central to formulating meaningful mechanisms and primary inhibitors to those standards are ASEAN norms which are embedded in all the major regional text analyzed (cited in Clarke 2012: 18).77 The harsh commentary is not justified when one views the history of human rights in the region and especially the structure of ASEAN and the behavior of its states regarding core human rights treaty ratification and statements. To expect an ASEAN level response is to expect too much from ASEAN. Human rights interpretations in the region are highly fragmented, disparate and subject to cultural interpretations and state sovereignty loss fears. Sovereignty strongly correlates to power; power to administer, adjudicate and deal with as state elites and institutions fit with culture is a masking device to support sovereignty. To tackle the formidable task of making human rights matter in ASEAN one must take to task the fragmentation of human rights understandings and build common ground and standards on the national level and work up, not down. ASEAN states have been resistant to human rights reforms and only grudgingly accepted in Vienna 1993 but as such have been able to stall a viable mechanism which needless to say is hardly viable if standards are not in place in ASEAN’s parts. Counterfactually it can be stated by simply looking at how long it took to formulate even a weak document as the AHRD that if there were no ASEAN there would be no difference as it is the sum of its parts that flow or in this case fragment and lead to a weak regional document. This study has demonstrated that ASEAN states view human rights through different lenses and have different interests when it comes to rights. This is not to say that the AHRD is nothing but rather that it simply reflects structural equities of its parts and as such perhaps more research into national standards, measures and can help add pieces to the puzzle of how to make rights effective in a region so resistant. Weak international enforcement, post-colonial sovereignty fears, national identity fragmentation and state security all have strong roles in determining state interests and action, regional interests and action and by extension international interests and action.

23

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

Notes 1. This statement by the richest ASEAN country and primary advocator for economic

integration demonstrates the rather contemptuous regard for human rights by regional leaders. Furthermore, it perhaps shows the latent fear of granting such rights and a viable mechanism for people of the region.

2. ASEAN. Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Phnom Penh. 2012a.

3. Asia Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development, “Adding Value: Removing morality from the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.” 2012; Human Rights Watch. “Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.” 2012; International Commission of Jurists. “ICJ condemns fatally flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.” 2012.

4. Asplund, André. “ASEAN’S Democracy Deficit And The Protection Of Human Rights”. East Asia Forum, 2012; Ng, Joel. “The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Establishing a Common Framework.” RSIS Commentary. 2012a. No. 114/2012; Ng, Joel. “ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Pragmatic Compromise.” RSIS Commentary. 2012b No. 211/2012; Southwick, Katherine G. “Bumpy Road to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 197, 2013.

5. American Bar Association. Experts’ Note On The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Rule of Law Initiative, Washington, DC, 2012.

6. Villanueva, Kevin H.R. “ASEAN’s ‘Magna Carta’ Universalises Human Rights”, East Asia Forum, 2013.

7. Ginbar, Yuval. “Human Rights in ASEAN--Setting Sail or Treading Water?”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 504-518; Renshaw, Catherine. S. “The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012.”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2013, pp. 557-579; Collins, A. “Forming a Security Community: Lessons From ASEAN.”, International Relations of The Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006, pp. 203-225; Collins, Alan. “A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar Or Closed For Civil Society Organizations?.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008, pp. 313-331; Collins, Alan. Building a People-Oriented Security Community The ASEAN Way. New York, Routledge, 2013; Durbach, Andrea et al. “‘A Tongue but No Teeth?’: The Emergence of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region.” Sydney Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2009, pp. 211-238; Davies, Matthew. ‘ASEAN and Human Rights Norms: Constructivism, Rational Choice, and The Action-Identity Gap’. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013, pp. 207-231.

8. For this essay ASEAN when mentioned will pertain to the collective of its member states and member states speaking on behalf of ASEAN as a grouping not to the ASEAN Secretariat or its Secretary-General.

9. ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta. 2007. Article 2, 3; Severino, Rodolfo C. “The ASEAN Charter: One year on.” Opinion Asia, 2010. 3 January.

10. Chongkittavorn, Kavi. ‘ASEAN Secretariat Must Be Strengthened.” The Irrawaddy, 2012; Fuller, Thomas. “Wary Neighbors Turn Into Partners in a Quickly Developing Southeast Asia.” New York Times, 5 July 2012, p. A4.

11. Severino, Rodolfo. ASEAN. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. 12. It should be noted that the ASEAN Secretariat was not even created until 1976, 9

years after ASEAN’s birth.

24

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

13. Jones, Lee. “Still in the “Drivers’ Seat”, But for How Long? ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International Relations.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2010, pp. 95-113; Jones, Lee. “Beyond Securitization: Explaining the Scope of Security Policy in Southeast Asia.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011a, pp. 403–432;

14. Chesterman, Simon. “Does ASEAN Exist? The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations As An International Legal Person.” ASEAN Life After The Charter, Sivakent Tiwari, ISEAS, Singapore, 2017, pp. 45-65; Narine, Shaun. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

15. Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. 1st ed., Routledge, 2000; Jones, Lee. “ASEAN Intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to Conditionality.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2007, pp. 523-550; Narine, Shaun. “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ‘ASEAN Way.’” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10, 1997, pp. 961-978; Narine, Shaun. “ASEAN into the Twenty-First Century: Problems and Prospects.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1999, pp. 357-380; Sebastian, Leonard C. and Irman G. Lanti. “Perceiving Indonesian Approaches to International Relations Theory.” In Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan, In Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia. Routledge , New York, 2010. pp. 148-173.

16. ASEAN. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Jakarta. 1976. Articles 2, 10, 11, 13.

17. Acharya, Amitav. “Ideas, Identity, And Institution-Building: From The ‘ASEAN Way’ To The ‘Asia-Pacific Way’?.” Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997, pp. 319-346; Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN And The Problem Of Regional Order. 1st ed., Routledge, 2000; Acharya, Amitav. “Do Norms And Identity Matter? Community And Power in Southeast Asia’s Regional Order.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, pp. 95-118; Ba, Alice D. “Regionalism’s Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN In East Asia.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2009, pp. 345-367; Jones, Lee. “State Power, Social Conflicts and Security Policy in Southeast Asia.” In Richard Robison. The Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics, Routledge, London, 2011b. pp. 346-360; Stubbs, Richard. “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge to ‘Global’ Governance.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2008, pp. 451-468; Nischalke, Tobias. “Does ASEAN Measure up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002, pp. 89-117.

18. Dunne, Tim and Marianne Hanson. “Human Rights in International Relations.” Human Rights: Politics and Practice. In Michael Goodhard, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 42-57; Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Jan. 1998, pp. 887-917; Hawkins, Darren. “Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2004, p. 779-804; Sikkink, Kathryn. “Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights.” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1998, pp. 516 -523.

19. Chayes, Abram and Antonia H Chayes. “On Compliance.” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1993, pp. 175-205; Conlon, Justin. ‘Sovereignty Vs. Human Rights Or Sovereignty And Human Rights?.” Race & Class, Vol. 46, No. 1,

25

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

2004, pp. 75-100; Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Dunne, Tim and Marianne Hanson. “Human Rights in International Relations.”; Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Philippines, Addison-Wesley, 1979.

20. Elkins, Zachary et al. “Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice.” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2013, pp.61-95; Hathaway, Oona A. “The Cost of Commitment.” Stanford Law Review, 55, No. 5, 2003, pp. 1821-1186; Landman, Todd. “The Evolution of the International Human Rights Regime: Political and Economic Determinants.” 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2002; Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2, Jan. 2000, pp. 217-252.

21. Greenhill, Brian. “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2010, pp. 127-145; Hathaway, Oona A. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, No. 8, 2002, p. 1935-2042; Hathaway, Oona A. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2007, pp. 588–621; Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984; Lebovic, James H., and Erik Voeten. “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 861-888; Wotipka, Christine Min, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2011.”Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2008, pp. 724-754.

22. Donnelly, Jack. “Natural Law and Right in Aquinas' Political Thought.” Political Research Quarterly, vol, 33, No. 4, 1980, pp. 520-535; Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights.”American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1982a, pp. 303-316.

23. Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights as Natural Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1982b, pp. 391-405.

24. Howard, Rhoda E., and Jack Donnelly. “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 03, 1986, p. 801-817.

25. ASEAN. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Phnom Penh. 2012b. 26. Ibid. 27. UNGA. A/CONF 157/ASRM/8-A/CONF 157/PC/59 Report of the Regional Meeting

for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (Bangkok Declaration). 7 April 1993. Geneva. 1993.

28. Ibid. 29. UNOCR. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Geneva. 1993. 30. ASEAN. (1993) Joint Communique of 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Singapore. 31. Ibid. 32. Aziz, Davinia et al. “Southeast Asia And International Law.” Singapore Journal of

International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 814-850; Tay, Simon S.C.

26

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

“Singapore: Review of Major Policy Statements.” Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 2004, pp. 219-234.

33. Chalermpalanupap, Termsak. “Promoting and Protecting Human Rights in ASEAN.” 2008.

34. Chalermpalanupap, Termsak. “10 Facts about ASEAN Human Rights Cooperation.” 2009.

35. See ICJ Advisory Opinion Genocide Case 28 May 1951 for insights concerning acceptability of statements and general purpose of treaties.

36. Akehurst, Michael Barton and Peter Malanczuk. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th ed., London, Routledge, 1997.

37. Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. 7th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

38. UNGA. A/38/316S/l5891 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 26 July 1983. New York. 1983.

39. UNGA. A/38/157S/15707 Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 14 April 1983. New York. 1983.

40. UNGA. A/38/314S/15885 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 25 July 1983. New York. 1983.

41. UNGA. A/38/510 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. 14 October 1983. New York. 1983.

42. UN. A/CONF.119/22 Letter to President of the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. 4 August 1983. Geneva. 1983.

43. UNSC. Resolution 717. 16 October 1991. New York. 1991. 44. UN. Department of Public Information. Agreement on a Comprehensive Political

Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. 23 October 1991. Paris. 1991. Articles 15.1, 15.2.

45. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 46. Ibid. 47. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic

Republic. Vientiane. 1991. 48. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 49. Ibid. 50. Sebastian, Leonard C. and Irman G. Lanti. “Perceiving Indonesian Approaches to

International Relations Theory.” in Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia. Routledge , New York, 2010. pp. 148-173.

51. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Penal Code. Vientiane. 1989. 55. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Customary Law and Practice in Lao PDR.

Ministry of Justice Law Research and International Cooperation Institute. Vientiane. 2011.

56. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights.

27

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

57. Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Nationality Act 1984 Ed. Cap. 15. Bandar Seri Begawan. 1984.

58. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 59. Malaysia. Constitution of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 1957. 60. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 61. Republic of Singapore. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. S1/63.

Singapore. 1965. 62. Republic of Singapore. Administration of Muslim Law Act 1 July 1968. Singapore.

1966. 63. Republic of Singapore. Muslim Marriage and Divorce Rules G.N. No. S331/1999.

Singapore. 1999. 64. Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2535/1992 No. 2 & 3

amending Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2508. Bangkok. B.E. 2535/1992; Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2551/2008 No. 4 amending Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2535/1992. Bangkok. B.E. 2551/2008.

65. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. 66. Ibid. 67. Singapore Parliament. Shared Values, Parliament of Singapore, Singapore. 1991. 68. Zakaria, Fareed, and Lee Kuan Yew. “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee

Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1994, pp. 109-126. 69. Cited in Lim, Chin L. S.C. “Singapore: Review of Major Policy Statements.”

Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 2006, pp. 323-348. 70. ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta. 2007. Article 14. 71. ASEAN. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Jakarta. 2009a. supra 15. 72. Petcharamesree, Sriprapha. “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community-ASCC. ASEAN

Community: Challenges, Problems and Prospects, Thammasat University, Bangkok. 2013.

73. ASEAN. Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Jakarta. 2009b. supra 4.

74. Ibid, supra 2.1a, 3. 75. Ibid, supra 5.2. 76. Interviews with AICHR representative September-December 2013. 77. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development. Still Window –Dressing: A

Performance Report on the Third Year of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 2011-2012. 2013.

78. Interviews with AICHR representative September-December 2013. 79. ASEAN. Terms of Reference of ASEAN AICHR, Article 1.4. 80. ASEAN. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Phnom Penh. 2012b. 81. Muntarbhorn, Vitit. Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in

the ASEAN Region, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. 82. Ibid. 83. Interviews with AICHR representative September-December 2013. 84. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Articles 10, 26. 85. Hannum, Hurst. “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in

National and International Law.” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 1-2, pp. 287-397.

86. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.

28

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

87. Clarke, Gerard. “The Evolving ASEAN Human Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 2012.” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-27.

29

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

Bibliography Primary References ASEAN. The ASEAN Declaration. Bangkok, 1967. ASEAN. ZOPFAN. Kuala Lumpur. 1971. ASEAN. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Jakarta. 1976. ASEAN. (1993) Joint Communique of 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Singapore. ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter. Jakarta. 2007. ASEAN. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Jakarta. 2009a. ASEAN. Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Phnom Penh. 2012a. ASEAN. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Phnom Penh. 2012b. ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights. Kuala Lumpur. 1993. Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Nationality Act 1984 Ed. Cap. 15. Bandar Seri Begawan. 1984. International Committee of the Red Cross. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Geneva. 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Geneva. 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Geneva. 1949. International Committee of the Red Cross. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Geneva. 1949. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Vientiane. 1991. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Penal Code. Vientiane. 1989. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Customary Law and Practice in Lao PDR. Ministry of Justice Law Research and International Cooperation Institute. Vientiane. 2011. Malaysia. Constitution of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur. 1957. Republic of Singapore. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. S1/63. Singapore. 1965. Republic of Singapore. Administration of Muslim Law Act 1 July 1968. Singapore. 1966. Republic of Singapore. Muslim Marriage and Divorce Rules G.N. No. S331/1999. Singapore. 1999. Singapore Parliament. Shared Values, Parliament of Singapore, Singapore. 1991. Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2535/1992 No. 2 & 3 amending Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2508. Bangkok. B.E. 2535/1992. Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2551/2008 No. 4 amending Thailand Nationality Act B.E. 2535/1992. Bangkok. B.E. 2551/2008. UN. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco. 1945. UN. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York. 1948. UN. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. New York. 1965. UN. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. New York. 1966.

30

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

UN. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York. 1966. UN. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York. 1979. UN. A/CONF.119/22 Letter to President of the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. 4 August 1983. Geneva. 1983. UN. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. New York. 1984. UN. Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York. 1984. UN. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations. Vienna. 1986. UN. Department of Public Information. Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. 23 October 1991. Paris. 1991. UNGA. A/38/157S/15707 Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 14 April 1983. New York. 1983. UNGA. A/38/314S/15885 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 25 July 1983. New York. 1983. UNGA. A/38/316S/l5891 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 26 July 1983. New York. 1983. UNGA. A/38/510 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. 14 October 1983. New York. 1983. UNGA. A/C.3/45/SR.41 3rd Committee 44th Meeting. 23 November 1990. New York. 1990. UNGA. A/CONF 157/ASRM/8-A/CONF 157/PC/59 Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (Bangkok Declaration). 7 April 1993. Geneva. 1993. UNOCR. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Geneva. 1993. UNSC. Resolution 717. 16 October 1991. New York. 1991. United Nations Treaty Collection Database Chapter IV Human Rights. Available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4. Secondary References Acharya, Amitav. “Ideas, Identity, And Institution-Building: From The ‘ASEAN Way’ To The ‘Asia-Pacific Way’?” Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997, pp. 319-346. Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN And The Problem Of Regional Order, 1st ed., Routledge, 2000. Acharya, Amitav. “Do Norms And Identity Matter? Community And Power In Southeast Asia’s Regional Order.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, pp. 95-118. Akehurst, Michael Barton and Peter Malanczuk. Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th ed., London, Routledge, 1997. American Bar Association. Experts’ Note On The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Rule of Law Initiative, Washington, DC, 2012. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development. Still Window –Dressing: A Performance Report on the Third Year of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 2011-2012. 2013, Available at http://www.forum-asia.org/

31

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

uploads/publications/2013/June/Still-Window-Dressing-final-ready-for-print.pdf. (Accessed 20 November 2013. Asplund, André. “ASEAN’S Democracy Deficit And The Protection Of Human Rights”. East Asia Forum, 2012. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/17/aseans-democracy-deficit-and-the-protection-of-human-rights/. (Accessed 13 September 2013). Asia Pacific Forum on Women Law and Development, “Adding Value: Removing morality from the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.” 2012. http://www.apwld.org/wp-content/uploads/APWLD-paper-on-Morality_final.pdf. (Accessed 13 September 2013). Aziz, Davinia et al. “Southeast Asia and International Law.” Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 814-850. Ba, Alice D. “Regionalism’s Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN In East Asia.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2009, pp. 345-367. Chalermpalanupap, Termsak. “Promoting and Protecting Human Rights in ASEAN” 2008. http://www.aseansec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/HLP-OtherDoc-2.pdf. (Accessed 24 August 2013). Chalermpalanupap, Termsak. “10 Facts about ASEAN Human Rights Cooperation” 2009. http://www.aseansec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/HLP-OtherDoc-1.pdf. (Accessed 24 August 2013). Abram, Chayes and Antonia H Chayes. “On Compliance” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1993, pp. 175-205. Chesterman, Simon. “Does ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations As An International Legal Person” ASEAN Life After The Charter, Sivakent Tiwari, ISEAS, Singapore, 2017, pp. 45-65. Chongkittavorn, Kavi. ‘ASEAN Secretariat Must Be Strengthened”, The Irrawaddy, 2012. Clarke, Gerard. “The Evolving ASEAN Human Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 2012”, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-27. Collins, Alan. “Forming a Security Community: Lessons From ASEAN”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006, pp. 203-225. Collins, Alan. “A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar Or Closed For Civil Society Organizations?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008, pp. 313-331. Collins, Alan. Building a People-Oriented Security Community The ASEAN Way. New York, Routledge, 2013. Conlon, Justin. “Sovereignty vs. Human Rights or Sovereignty and Human Rights?”, Race & Class, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2004, pp. 75-100. Davies, Matthew. “ASEAN and Human Rights Norms: Constructivism, Rational Choice, and The Action-Identity Gap”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2013, pp. 207-231. Donnelly, Jack. “Natural Law and Right in Aquinas' Political Thought”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1980, pp. 520-535. Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1982a, pp. 303-316. Donnelly, Jack. “Human Rights as Natural Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1982b, pp. 391-405.

32

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Durbach, Andrea et al. “‘A Tongue but No Teeth?’: The Emergence of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region”, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2009, pp. 211-238. Dunne, Tim and Marianne Hanson. “Human Rights in International Relations”, Human Rights: Politics and Practice. In Michael Goodhard, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 42-57. Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Jan. 1998, pp. 887-917. Fuller, Thomas. “Wary Neighbors Turn Into Partners in a Quickly Developing Southeast Asia”, New York Times, 5 July 2012, p. A4. Ginbar, Yuval. “Human Rights in ASEAN--Setting Sail or Treading Water?”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 504-518. Greenhill, Brian. “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2010, pp. 127-145. Hannum, Hurst. “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 25, No. 1-2, pp. 287-397. Hathaway, Oona A. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, No. 8, 2002, pp. 1935-2042. Hathaway, Oona A. “The Cost of Commitment.” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2003, pp. 1821-1186. Hathaway, Oona A. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2007, pp. 588-621. Hawkins, Darren. “Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2004, pp. 779-804. Howard, Rhoda E. and Jack Donnelly. “Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 03, 1986, pp. 801-817. Human Rights Watch. “Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration”, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/19/civil-society-denounces-adoption-flawed-asean-human-rights-declaration. (Accessed 1 September 2013). International Commission of Jurists. “ICJ condemns fatally flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration”, 2012, http://www.icj.org/icj-condemns-fatally-flawed-asean-human-rights-declaration/. (Accessed 1 September 2013). Personal interviews with AICHR Representatives, September-December 2013, Bangkok, Thailand. Jones, Lee. “ASEAN Intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to Conditionality”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2007, pp. 523-550. Jones, Lee. “Still in the “Drivers’ Seat”, But for How Long? ASEAN’s Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International Relations”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2010, pp. 95-113. Jones, Lee. “Beyond Securitization: Explaining the Scope of Security Policy in Southeast Asia”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2011a, pp. 403-432.

33

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

Jones, Lee. “State Power, Social Conflicts and Security Policy in Southeast Asia”, In Richard Robison. The Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics, Routledge, London, 2011b. pp. 346-360. Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984. Landman, Todd. “The Evolution of the International Human Rights Regime: Political and Economic Determinants”, 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2002. Lebovic, James H. and Erik Voeten. “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 861-888. Lim, Chin L. S.C. “Singapore: Review of Major Policy Statements”, Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 2006, pp. 323-348. Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, pp. 217-252. Muntarbhorn, Vitit. Unity in Connectivity? Evolving Human Rights Mechanisms in the ASEAN Region, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. Narine, Shaun. “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ‘ASEAN Way’”, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10, 1997, pp. 961-978. Narine, Shaun. “ASEAN into the Twenty-First Century: Problems and Prospects”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1999, pp. 357-380. Narine, Shaun. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Ng, Joel. “The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Establishing a Common Framework”, RSIS Commentary, 2012a. No. 114/2012. http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/8618/RSIS1142012.pdf?sequence=1. (Accessed 1 September 2013). Ng, Joel. “ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Pragmatic Compromise”, RSIS Commentary. 2012b No. 211/2012. http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/11694/RSIS2112012.pdf?sequence=1. (Accessed 1 September 2013) Nischalke, Tobias. “Does ASEAN Measure up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002, pp. 89-117. Petcharamesree, Sriprapha. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community-ASCC. ASEAN Community: Challenges, Problems and Prospects, Thammasat University, Bangkok. 2013. Renshaw, Catherine. S. “The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012”, Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2013, pp. 557-579. Sebastian, Leonard C. and Irman G. Lanti. “Perceiving Indonesian Approaches to International Relations Theory”, in Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan (eds) Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, Routledge , New York, 2010. pp. 148-173. Severino, Rodolfo. ASEAN, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. Severino, Rodolfo C. “The ASEAN Charter: One year on”, Opinion Asia, 2010. Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. 7th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Sikkink, Kathryn. “Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1998, pp. 516 -523. Southwick, Katherine G. “Bumpy Road to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration”, Asia-Pacific Bulletin, No. 197, 2013.

34

H

um

an r

igh

ts t

reat

y ra

tifi

cati

on

beh

avio

r: A

n A

SEA

N W

ay o

f cr

eati

ng

regi

on

al s

tan

dar

ds

Journal of

Global Analysis

Stubbs, Richard. “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge to ‘Global’ Governance”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2008, pp. 451-468. Tay, Simon S.C. “Singapore: Review of Major Policy Statements”, Singapore Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 2004, pp. 219-234. Villanueva, Kevin H.R. “ASEAN’s ‘Magna Carta’ Universalises Human Rights”, East Asia Forum, 2013. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/12/aseans-magna-carta-universalises-human-rights/. (Accessed 6 September 2013). Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics, Philippines, Addison-Wesley, 1979. Wotipka, Christine Min and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Global Human Rights and State Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2011”, Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2008, pp. 724-754. Zachary, Elkins et al. “Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2013, pp.61-95. Zakaria, Fareed and Lee Kuan Yew. “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1994, pp. 109-126.

35

Hu

man

rig

hts

tre

aty

rati

fica

tio

n b

ehav

ior:

An

ASE

AN

Way

of

cre

atin

g re

gio

nal

sta

nd

ard

s

Journal of

Global Analysis

Vol. 7 | No. 1 | January 2017

Winter Issue

Journal of

Global Analysis

Turkish Civilian Capacity in Post-conflict Scenarios: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

By Federico Donelli* and Alessia Chiriatti**

Abstract The disintegration of Yugoslavia has created huge instability in the Balkans since 1990. The post-conflicts challenges are still now on the table. Turkey continues to consider the Western Balkan countries as a priority: its activism reflects the multi-directionality of JDP’s policy. The paper will be oriented to enquire on Turkish networks in the Western Balkans. The approach will be historical and political, with an analysis of bilateral relations from the end of the Ottoman Empire, till ‘90s wars and the arrival of JDP on government. Throughout the analysis of two case studies - Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo- this article aims to highlight the application of the Turkey’s soft power in the Western Balkans. Keywords: Turkey, Western Balkans, civil capacity, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 7 | No. 1

January 2017

Winter Issue

www.cesran.org Federico Donelli, Ph.D. is Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Political Sciences and International Relations at the University of Genoa and Visiting Researcher at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İstanbul Şehir University. His research fields are International Relations and Foreign Policy with particular focus to the Turkish informal diplomacy and Turkey’s opening to different regions such as the Balkans, Africa and Latin America. Alessia Chiriatti, Ph.D. obtained PhD in Cooperation for Peace and Development at University for Foreigners of Perugia in September 2014, where she also obtained her MA degree in International Relations. She also studied International Relations at University of Bologna. Her main interests of research are Turkish foreign policy, with a particular attention to Georgia, Syria and Libya; Security and Regional Studies.

Introduction “The Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were a success story. Now we have to reinvent this”. With these words, pronounced by the former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in a famous speech in Sarajevo on 16 October 2009, Turkey has announced its intention to regain a central role in the Balkan region. There have been lots of reactions to this speech from the media, the public, from various think tanks and, also, from diplomatic circles. Some reactions were unjustifiably alarmist, while others too enthusiastic. However, all agreed on one point: Turkey was rediscovering the Balkans a century after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). This statement, taken as a matter of course, fostered the idea of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ that for several years had identified the Turkish foreign policy directed to the surrounding regions. Fifteen years after the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, JDP) it is possible to trace the main steps in a critical manner wondering if there was a return of the Balkans and especially if this represented a break in Turkish foreign policy, or simply a readjustment in a line of continuity. Understanding both the historical and cultural complex of relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans can help to comprehend the current Turkey’s activism in the region, providing elements able to forecast future developments. This work retraces the Turkish policy towards the Western Balkans1 over the last twenty years by a historical perspective, highlightening some features of its soft power. The first part will focus on the diachronic reconstruction of the inclinations of Ankara towards the Western Balkans, highlighting the historical, political and socio-cultural nature of Turkish tied with the region and stressing the steps taken by Turkey in the two wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during the Nineties. Then it analyzes the gradual increase of the Turkish presence in the Western Balkans during recent years when, following a new course of foreign policy, there has been progressive implementation of the ‘total performance’ principle. It means a complementary action between state and non-state actors in the foreign field. The work aims to demonstrate that the Turkish policy towards the Balkans hasn’t changed dramatically with the rise of JDP, but has pursued the common goal of the previous decades, ensuring peace and stability in a region considered central for future macro-regional balances and, also, for Turkish national security. However, after the 2002, Turkey has adopted a more assertive and autonomous policy following a multifaceted approach. Far from pursuing neo-imperial or neo-caliphate projects, Turkey shows a pragmatic vision towards Balkans that leads to pursue policies on two

38

Turkish Civilian Capacity in Post-conflict Scenarios: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

Journal

of

Global

Analysis

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

levels: multilateral, in agreement with international organizations, and unilateral, with autonomous initiatives aimed to strengthening bilateral ties and regional cooperation through extensive use of soft power. Turkey - from the perspective of the JDP’s government - must avoid building barriers along its geographical and mental borders, promoting the integration of the whole region through a network of common interests (political, economic, cultural, religious), based on equilibrium under Turkey guarantee. The historical ties with the region The historical ties between Turkey and the Balkans are the result of five centuries of common belonging to the Ottoman Empire. Although this common past has been manipulated and misrepresented in many cases by national historiographies, including the Turkish republican one, represented a region in with high level of multicultural and multireligious relationship until the rise of ethno-nationalism in the early Nineteenth century. Without idealizing the centuries of Ottoman rule and without ignoring the conflictual episodes, it is commonly recognized that the stability achieved under the Sublime Porte assured a long period of prosperity and stability in the Balkans.2 The survival and continuity for nearly six centuries of a composite and heterogeneous entity would not have been possible without the construction of an effective Pax Ottomana between all the different ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural components, which had its best product in the Balkans and with the Balkan.3 In the XVI century the Ottoman Empire, which was the main world power, could boast of a decisive contribution by the Balkan people. Davutoğlu in Sarajevo said: “who ran world politics in the 16th century? Your ancestors. They were not all Turks, some were of Slav origin, some were of Albanian origin, some were even converted Greeks, but they ran world politics”.4 Davutoğlu’s words summarize what was the great peculiarities of the Balkan region compared to other places under Ottoman rule (Arab lands, Maghreb). The Balkans, in fact, in addition to being an important and stable area of empire for centuries, constituted the main reservoir for the true elite of the palace, including many Grand Vizier, through the practice of devşirme.5 The common Ottoman legacy had and still has a deep impact on territories - State borders, cities, monuments and structures - and on Balkan societies. Although the region predominantly consist of Christian Orthodox population, Ottoman cultural heritage, including several Islamic elements, remains unchanged with a particular emphasis on the long period of peaceful co-existence between different populations. The Ottoman legacy is visible in a lot of political, cultural and social aspects. Among them, the most prominent is that of words of Turkish origin in the various Balkan languages, such as ‘Balkan’ which comes from Turkish ‘Balkan’ meaning “a chain of wooded mountains”.6 The linguistic element is one of the main issues on which the Turkish government has invested in recent years, through state and non-state actors. Among these ones the Yunus Emre Enstitüsü is an organization for the promotion of the Turkish language and culture, active in four Western Balkans states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo). Its recent spread, combined with the growing interest of the population for the study of Turkish, mainly due to the popularity of Turkish media and soap operas, are bringing out the Turkish language as a kind of ‘lingua franca’ of the Balkans.7 The gradual appeal to shared history is one of the innovative elements of the Turkish foreign policy comparing to the previous settings. Before the rising of the JDP, the use

39

Journal of

Global Analysis

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

of Ottoman history was impractical due to Kemalist beliefs as well as widespread negative perceptions in the Balkans. Indeed, during the 19th century the development of national movements used the Ottoman past in order to forge and strengthen the rising national identities usually presenting the Ottomans as the ‘others/ the out group’. This process led to the compilation of national history of different countries that inevitably portrayed the Ottoman past as a period of despotism, commonly called “Ottoman Yoke”.8

This novel approach presents several elements excluded by traditional Turkish foreign policy among which the constructivists notion of social identity. According to the constructivist school of thought, identities are relatively stable, role-specific understanding and expectations about self, and - most important - referring to the internal human, material, ideological or cultural factors. This because, constructivists apply role theories to structural IR theory, stressing the importance of self-fulfilling prophecies. In Turkish foreign policy there has been a tendency in shifting its the main axis from a Western-oriented position towards different regions including the Western Balkans. This is due to, structural change in international system (structure) and domestic factors (agent) which become mutually influenced.9 Therefore, analyzed through the prism of constructivist framework, the restoration of the Turkish past is the result of a much deeper process of revision and reinterpretation of its own identity and history. It began only in the mid-nineties and then it became a useful element to legitimize policies towards certain regions including the Balkans. A complex and gradual change began at the turn of the Eighties and Nineties in the wake of the deep socio-cultural dynamics, following the military coup of 1980. In the last decade the recovery of the Ottoman legacy accompanied by the general Turkish activism has provoked criticism and suspicions of some political elites and intellectuals of the Balkans.

Recently, a wide-ranging debate on the objectives of Turkish foreign policy has been aroused by the book of Serbian Orientalist Darko Tanaskovic. The book, entitled ‘Neoosmanizam - Povratak Turske na Balkan’ (Neo-Ottomanism - The Return of Turkey to the Balkans), defines Turkish activism as the outcome of a neo-Ottomanist vision, which is an amalgam of ideological Islamism, national Turkism and Ottoman imperialism. Tanaskovic bases his argument on the studies and writings of one of the leading experts of Turkish foreign policy Omer Taşpınar interpreting them as a sort of neo-Gaullism with the goal to “re-conquest” of the old Ottoman domains. The interpretation given by Tanaskovic seems very superficial because it intentionally avoids taking into consideration some precise definitions by Taşpınar about neo-Ottomanism. Without dwelling on the debate about the nature of neo-Ottomanism it must be recognized that suspicion and distrust towards Turkey persists among a lot of Balkan peoples. This perception still forces the Ankara government to move cautiously toward the region, mainly because there is a general suspicion that behind the Turkish activism could be a large hegemonic project highlighted by the alleged impartiality in favor of Muslim communities.

40

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

From the Balkan Pact to the Yugoslav War (1934-1993) Despite the mutual distrust that prevented the appeal to common imperial past for decades, Turkey’s policy towards the Balkans has always been focused on the search of some relationship and functional cooperation to its national security interests. Since the Thirties, the Kemalist perspective, focused on maintaining the status quo and the guarantee of territorial integrity saw the Balkans as an important buffer zone against the expansionist ambitions of Fascist Italy, and to the East, of the Soviet Union. Searching for agreements along its borders (Greece and Bulgaria) was considered a fundamental objective to ensure Turkish own safety as well as to consolidate its position of neutrality, avoiding involvement in any future conflict. For this reason, the Turkish diplomacy worked to reach agreements with the neighboring Balkan countries. The achievement of the so-called ‘Entente Cordiale’ with Greece in September 1933 was the result of these initiatives. Later separate non-aggression agreements with Yugoslavia and Romania were added. The establishment of close relations were always dictated by the growing fascist threat, and erupted in the conclusion of the Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania (February-March 1934).10 It was in the interest of Turkey to prevent materialization of joint attack over Turkey. This Pact also was against the Soviet Union in case of an unexpected attack from there. Despite the fact that pact was an inadequate and insufficient attempt for the protection of the territorial sovereignty of the signatory states, it constituted a first attempt of creating an embryonic regional cooperation. It also showed how the Turkish authorities pragmatically pursued a policy aimed to ensure peace and stability in the region. Turkey pursued this principle of peace and security in the region throughout the 20th century even within the balance of the Cold War, an attitude that inevitably limited its activism and autonomy. The bipolar balance created relations bound by the covenants of the two blocks and rigid alternative identities. However, during the period of distension (60’s) Turkey was quite free to pursue a more active policy focusing attention on the interests of Muslim communities and Turkish minorities in the region. The human factor is an important element that has pushed Turkey to take an interest in the Balkans.11 In this context, re-entered agreements with Tito in 1953 gave the opportunity to the people of Turkish descent to immigrate to Turkey. Such concessions, however, created an unexpected phenomenon. That is, a lot of Muslim ethnic Albanians (about 150 thousand) declared to be Turkish to reach Turkey, where they went to build the already large community of Albanian origin creating a diaspora that will be instrumental during the Kosovo crisis in the 90’s.12

The human factor was also decisive in the controversial relations with Bulgaria. The Agreement on Migration and Family Unification was signed in 1968 with the aim to reunite the families of Bulgarian Turks (Pomaklar) separated by the policy of expulsion perpetrated by Bulgaria during the 50’s.13 While the common alignment to the West had initially led Greece and Turkey to cooperate in a constructive manner in the region, Turkish’s choices towards the Balkans began to be strongly influenced by the hostility against the Greek state especially after the Cyprus crisis. The two states developed a real competition in the region. This condition will be evident after the collapse of the Soviet Union when, during the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early Nineties, the Greek

41

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

influence in the region grew. The Greek famous economic diplomacy was one of the reasons that led Ankara to strengthen its relations with the Western Balkans. However, unlike Greece, both the historical context and the emotional one, represented a serious handicap for Turkey which operates up to nowadays on regional level under the constant threat of being accused of neo-imperial tendencies. This perception was reinforced after the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, in order, as the intervening state maintained, to protect the Turkish-Cypriot population of the island. The fear is that this instance could be used in the future to legitimize a possible direct intervention in the Balkans. Therefore there is still a sort of a ‘Cyprus syndrome’ widespread among the non-Muslim populations of the Balkans.14 Decisive impulse to the rapprochement in the Balkans came from Turgut Özal15 who took advantage of the positive socio-economic dynamics inside Turkey (mainly privatization and liberalization procedures) to adopt a liberal vision of foreign policy.16 This liberal perspective in international relations considers the increased economic interdependence as the basis of better and stable political relations. According to Özal, the state had to facilitate the private sector actively operate abroad. This policy, centered on the promotion of Turkish interests in the world, was taken up and reconfigured outright by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Indeed, Turgut Özal introduced several innovations in the Turkish foreign policy, tracing the lines of what would become pro-active JDP policy. Özal rediscovered the cultural dimension as functional for the rapprochement to the former Ottoman provinces in the Balkans and Central Asia through the increasing use of soft power. In 1992 the establishment of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TIKA) was essential for the subsequent development because it was created with the intent to promote Turkish interests in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. After the outbreak of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia TIKA began to play an active part in the Turkish penetration in the Western Balkans. TIKA still serves as the operating arm of the Turkish government, paving the way for further economic and financial initiatives coming from private investors. Even though TIKA does not have among its tasks, the support of Islamic NGOs activities, its acts differed from the traditional Turkish bureaucratic organizations because it introduced a large number of young officers. They identified themselves with the emerging pro-Islamic civil society and with the new Muslim middle class. This identity was not mitigated and was reflected in TIKA activities relating to Islamic foundations (vakıfsa) and associations (dernekse) which played the role of intermediaries with local Muslim communities.17

At the outbreak of the Yugoslav War, Özal shaped Turkey’s main wartime strategy, bringing together Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania in a Balkan alliance against Serbia allied with Greece. Turgut Özal died on 17 April 1993. In the summer of the same year, after another failed mediation attempt (the Vance-Owen Plan) Bosnian Croats, who had proclaimed the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, opened a de facto civil war with the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslim). This event definitively prompted Turkey to be aware of its historical and moral responsibility towards the Balkan Muslims and for the peace and stability of the entire region.18

Turkey’s reactions to conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (1993-1999) The historical record highlights some key facts that can help to understand how

42

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

inaccurate is the statement that Turkey rediscovered the Balkans in 2000s. Indeed, although relations have been warm and strongly influenced by the global context rather than the regional one, is evident and undeniable as the Republic of Turkey has always had various interests (political, religious, cultural), for developing greater interdependence with the region. The two levels of Turkey’s diplomacy during the Bosnian crisis (1993-1996) In front of the Bosnian crisis Turkish policy makers faced a dilemma constantly present in Turkey’s Republican era: to reconcile objectives and pressures of domestic politics with the needs of the external reality. The outbreak of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia with the involvement of Muslim communities such as Bosniaks aroused vehement emotional reaction in the Turkish public. In a short time the people pressured the Turkish authorities not to remain motionless in front of the Balkan massacres. The request was to intervene in defense of the kin-people in the Balkans bringing to the surface many historical and family ties which were long unmentioned but never completely ignored. In those turbulent months, Turkey understood that if on one hand the end of the Cold War had opened a power vacuum that could be filled only by emerging powers on the other side global balance to be observed remained. Turkey began to outline a plan of action based on four different levels, which could be represented graphically in four concentric circles. This structure has remained almost unchanged till the present day showing: an external level that is international/global rim; the regional level; then the local level of the country or countries in which Turkey want to intervene and, finally, the circle of the national Turkish interest. Different instruments and objectives correspond to each one of these overlapping and complementary circles. Every decision taken is carefully valued considering the impact that this decision would have on all four levels. The most important considerations are those of the inner level (the national interest) to which every Turkish action must be directed and finalized. This type of assessment was also taken during the two major crises of the 90s in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The government knew that it could never act unilaterally. A direct Turkish intervention in the Balkans would have been unthinkable because of the geographical distance from Bosnia and Herzegovina and because an action of this kind would have moved Turkey away from the positions of its Euro-Atlantic allies. As a result of a lot of pressure coming from below, the Turkish authorities established a series of diplomatic initiatives. Turkish diplomacy tried to bring the attention of the international community on the massacres the Bosniaks suffered. This intense diplomatic activity proved to be functional for the rapprochement’s process to the United States and its NATO allies. After years of cold relations due to the crisis in Cyprus, a route of a thaw began with Özal’s governments. Behind the Turkish caution were not only the traditional doubts associated with the distrust of the non-Muslim population of the Western Balkans but also the fears that the end of the Cold War had led to a downsizing of its strategic importance. Turkey felt the need to demonstrate to its Western allies that it was still useful.

43

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the opportunity to Ankara to carve out a new role, which was that of a reliable mediator in the crisis areas. Moreover, the choice of taking action reflected the moment when Turkey itself was looking for a new identity and a new place in the international system, escaping from its traditional passive position.19 The decision taken by the Turkish authorities was formulated by the desire to respond effectively to the challenges of the moment with the willingness of breaking its general lethargy in the international arena.20 Turkish policy makers avoided assuming more responsibility because they wanted to maintain good relations with the Serbs, in line with the period of the Cold War when relations became increasingly stable at the end of the 70’s. These constraints led the Turkish leaders to avoid taking sides openly against Serbia and they waited four months before recalling their ambassador from Belgrade.21

The intense Turkish diplomatic activity led the pressure within the main international and regional organizations (UN, OSCE, NATO) developing a series of initiatives to stop conflicts and to convince the international community to act in a firmer manner. Meanwhile, however, Turkey began a work of direct mediation with the factions involved in the conflict: Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats.22 The two levels of Turkey’s diplomacy actions were clear: the multilateral level be pursued within the frameworks of international organizations and the unilateral one through its own initiatives aimed to strengthening relations and cooperation. News from Bosnia and Herzegovina aroused a deep awareness in Turkish public and brought back the religious element at the center of attention of foreign policy. Turkish public opinion, and also some of its political leaders, perceived the attacks against their Muslim ‘brothers’ of the Balkans as dictated solely by the different religious affiliation. The plight of Muslim people was summed with the strong influence of Turkey historical memory, recovered and rehabilitated during these years. Indeed Bosnia and Herzegovina was already considered, in the Ottoman era, the primary zone of contact and clash between Islam and the Christian West. For reasons of domestic balance, Turkish policy makers frequently emphasized more the humanitarian nature of their concerns with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than religious. Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy began to be accompanied by the promotion of the image of a strong country not only able to play a leading role on the international scene but also able to assume its historical responsibilities in the region. The Turkish propaganda presented its role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comparing it to that of the United States in the first Gulf War. For the Bosniaks the main idea was that Turkey was the only actor able to help and save them.23

In July 1994 Turkey began to contribute to the peacekeeping mission of the UN special protection force for Bosnia and Herzegovina (The United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR) launched in 1992. The initiative, consisting of about 1,500 troops, was harshly criticized by Greece but welcomed by both the Croats and Bosniaks. Turkish forces developed close relations with the Croats useful to carry on the work of mediation, presenting the conflict not as a clash of religions between Christians and Muslims. The continuing massacres and ethnic cleansing committed by all three factions (Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks) urged the international community to break its inertia

44

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

and, in August 1995, NATO launched the air campaign called Operation Deliberate Force. Turkey welcomed the action with favor but denied its involvement in the bombing against the forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once again Turkey appeared cautious and uncertain. However, the political support of intervention and the material support to the subsequent peacekeeping operations, should be interpreted with the desire to improve relations with the US and European allies.24

After the conclusion of the Dayton Accords in November 1995, Turkish leaders quickly tried to renew relations with the Serbs, establishing several major trade and entrepreneurial agreements. One of the main promoters was an Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği, MÜSIAD). It was the expression of an emergent pro-Islamic civil society and in specific representative of small and medium Anatolian Muslim enterprises. Its involvement prefigured what would become a constant feature of Turkish politics towards the region, namely the complementary action of Turkey’s state actors with Turkish-Islamic networks.

Turkey’s attitude in front of the Kosovo crisis (1998-1999) The Western Balkans situation had its temporary and precarious stability, a kind of cold peace until the outbreak of the crisis in Kosovo (1998-1999). The Kosovo issue was much more complex for the Turkish authorities, because there were different conditions than the previous crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was particularly critical on two of the four concentric circles: the regional level and the national security.

Unlike the Bosnian case, in Kosovo there was a conflict between different entities belonging to the same State. There were also precise separatist claims by an internal minority (Kosovar Albanians). This element represented not only a dangerous precedent for other Albanian communities in the region (especially in Macedonia) but also a precedent that could theoretically be used in the Kurds question.25

The presence of a Turkish minority in Kosovo forced the Turkish authorities to maintain a more cautious attitude with an internal conflicting pressure was coming from the Albanian diaspora in Turkey and from the nationalists close to Kosovar Turks.26

Turkey maintained an attitude aimed to find a compromise between the parties. The goal was not to undermine Ankara’s good relations with both factions, Serbs and Albanians, and seek a compromise on the basis of autonomous rights recognized by Tito’s regime. The Turkish proposal was to guarantee the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, restoring the rights and partial autonomy granted to Kosovo by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. The choice of standing up for Yugoslavia’s national integrity reflected a widespread position in the international community but, at the same time, showed how the Turkish national interest prevailed much more than any kind of religious, cultural and historical solidarity. Throughout 1998, the government led by Mesut Yılmaz stood in front of the bloody developments in Kosovo just with a little care. This position was the result of an

45

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

internal debate triggered by various endogenous factors and accentuated by the pre-election atmosphere, which transformed the Kosovo issue into an election platform. The growing pressure of the Albanian community present in Turkey with several cultural and folkloristic associations were added to the political debate.27 Since 1992, however, the Albanians of Turkey also began to have concerns and political interests. The most active was the Kosovars Association, founded in 1994, that was activated during the Serbs crackdown against the Kosovar Albanians in February 1998. The associations with the help of state entities played a decisive role in the accommodation of about 8,000 refugees from Kosovo. The Turkish authorities also had to cope with the demands of the Kosovar Turks minority28 that historically enjoyed more rights and privileges than the Kosovar Albanians. During the crisis of 1998-1999 Kosovar Turks were neutral and more favorable to the (re)establishment of a multicultural society into a federal political-administrative structure rather than of an independent entity dominated by Kosovar Albanian autonomists. The Serbian actions against Kosovar meant that Turkey, as a fellow-Muslim nation, could hardly stand aside. Thus Turkey, unlike what had happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, played an active role in the 1999 NATO intervention. Even in Kosovo, Turkey took an attitude in line with the United States positions participating in NATO air raids and, after June 1999, contributing to the international peace force. Turkey sent about 1,000 soldiers settled in the southern part of Kosovo 100 Turkish policemen who took part in the Interim Civil Administration. Furthermore, Turkish coordination offices opened in Prizren and Pristina to coordinate Turkish humanitarian aid. Positions taken by Turkey in the two conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were not only the answer to the challenges of the moment, but they were also functional to its strategic repositioning. Once again the Turkish choices were in some measure conditioned and antithetical to the positions of Greece which was little cooperative and mostly reluctant and critical to the involvement of NATO in the Yugoslav conflicts.29

Turkey-Balkans relations during Davutoğlu era (2002-2016) New course of foreign policy under JDP government With the rise of the JDP government in 2002, Turkey set an active foreign policy with the increase of the process of integration and rapprochement with neighboring regions. This policy is placed under the label of ‘zero problems with neighbors’. The new Turkish foreign policy course is characterized by multidirectional, multidimensional and inclusive nature and it multifaces policies with alternative approaches based on different contexts. Davutoğlu’s vision includes people and governments because, according to him, the best way to solve disputes is involving as much as possible the interested actors including non-state ones.30 His geostrategic vision is a mix of realist elements, referable to the traditional Kemalist ‘security-centered’ foreign policy, and a new approach with a strong liberal character focused on elements such as soft power, conflict resolution and promotion of ‘win-win’ solutions. Moreover Davutoğlu believes that Turkey’s unique geocultural position gives it a special central-country (merkez ülke) role, and therefore Turkey cannot

46

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

define itself in a defensive manner. This central position affords Turkey the scope to maneuver in several regions simultaneously, and to connect and influence them.31 This specialty endows Turkey with a political and moral responsibility regarding problem solving and contribution to regional peace-building.32

In the new Turkish foreign policy agenda the Balkan region holds an important place. Especially Serbia which became the most privileged partner in a lot of sensitive issues such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo’s independence. The immediate recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, just the day after the proclamation of independence, was the key event of policy towards the Balkans.33 This choice was the result of a change started at least in 2005, which was influenced by the increased willingness of the JDP government to reach a compromise with the Kurds. In the following years, Turkey scored some results through its diplomatic activity that are mainly linked to the growing inter-ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the failure of the mediation attempt made by the European Union and the United States - known as the Butmir process -, Turkey decided to pursue its own autonomous initiative in order to establish and strengthen the dialogue among stakeholders. The Turkish initiative was based on two mechanisms of trilateral cooperation between Turkey-Bosnia-Serbia and Turkey-Croatia-Bosnia with a series of meetings that led to the important result 24 June 2010 with the signing of the İstanbul Declaration.34 This was a document useful to guarantee the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The successful conclusion of this meeting led to another result achieved through Turkey’s mediation, like the decision of the Parliament of Serbia to adopt an official declaration condemning the crimes committed in Srebrenica. These initiatives have increased the popularity of Turkey but, at the same time, have aroused mistrust among the non-Muslim population. The Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat saw the intervention as an act of support to Bosniaks and they judged it an obstacle to the full implementation of the directives issued by the Dayton Accords.35

Turkey’s cooperation frameworks Turkey has developed, in particular in the last three decades, a competence to provide a civilian capacity assistance, significantly in conflict-affected countries. It has traditionally assumed a role in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. The nature of this assistance is more civilian than military, and Turkish foreign policy is oriented to expand on its current technical instruments of support. At the center of the initiative, lies the so-called CivCap which deals with a UN effort to deliver stronger support to institution building in countries emerging from conflict or crisis. Starting from the “Report of the Secretary-General on peace-building in the aftermath of conflict” (General Assembly, 2009), the General Assembly passed in March 2012 to a resolution36 that encouraged UN member states to broaden and deepen the civilian expertise for peace-building. The final report, published on August 2012, stands on three points:

the role of strong national institution to prevent decline into conflict; the south-south cooperation, in which countries from the global south can

share its experience in democratic process in order to prevent others conflicts;

47

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

the support to institutions-building in performing and strengthening five key points, like inclusive political processes, justice, economic revitalization, public administration and basic safety and security.

Turkey was, in 2012, one of the countries like Brazil, India, Norway, Russia, China, South Africa and Indonesia, which formed an international research network to examine the Civilian Capacity agenda. To date, Turkey, India and South Africa, have seen significant levels of civilian deployment arranged for long durations in such higher-risks settings. In this sense, it is really evident the degree in which soft power has substituted hard power in Turkish foreign policy. In principle, Turkish civilian deployment is useful to ensure long-lasting peace and stability, continuous political dialogue and economic integration in regions like the Western Balkans, as well as respect and preservation of its multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious characters.37 Turkey has tried - and is still trying - to play an active role in the region, with a more independent attitude because it wants to strengthen its political and economic position and to improve its image in the broader neighborhood. Turkey in this sense has a long-period view, wanting to become one of the leading actor with stronger social and cultural connections. In summary, Turkey’s CivCap initiatives are seen as useful tools to achieve priorities such as fostering peace and stability in its region and strengthening its soft power over its neighbors and traditional international partners, especially referring to the Ottoman space. With the JDP government, Turkey started to develop a strategic, multi-dimensional and balanced humanitarian oriented foreign policy with the specific idea to reinforce peace and stability inside its neighborhood. All these proactive initiatives, applied also in countries affected by natural disasters and not only in the aftermath of the conflicts, have been a driving force for its evolution from being an aid recipient country to a dynamic and cooperative player on the international level. After the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on November 1991, and despite initial claim to continuity by FRY, new entities were born, like Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina: they could be intended as weak states, or in permanent transition,38 as for the process of formation that had characterized them. It means that the state’s institutions are connoted by grave deficiencies in the accomplishment of at least one of its functions, and even their security could be threaten by exogenous factors. Perceived as a danger for peace and security for the other countries, the so-called fragile statehood, in a world characterized by a duality of domestic order, within a defined territory, and of international ones, with all countries together, tend to undermine both functions and cause problems at the national, regional and global level. Although fragile statehood is not a threat per se, problems connected to it are menaces that could worsen an already affirmed weakness inside the state.39 These threats could be identified with five clusters: (1) interstate and intrastate conflicts; (2) economic, social and ecological threats; (3) proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons; (4) terrorism and (5) transnational organized crime. The demolishing process that have interested Soviet Union by the early 90s had provoked a power vacuum in the Balkans, where upheavals mounted, with a consequent change in the international environment. The above mentioned five

48

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

clusters are also implicated in the post-Yugoslavia fragile statehood and they constitute a huge threat to the regional stability. With the constitution of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), the geopolitical realities, in Balkans as in Caucasus and Central Asia, gave the opportunity to Turkey to establish closer ties with some of the countries in this region, as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Specifically in the Balkans, the immense regional instability exploded between 1990 and 2008. In particular rising nationalism, ethnic cleansing and devastating wars had upset international peace, eventually requiring intervention from foreign countries. Even if the peace arrived with a signed agreement, instability continued, new states have emerged, while the post-conflict reconstruction was difficult to reach and challenged peace. Turkey has a priority in the Balkans, as for its geographic proximity, trade opportunities, but also for its historic, cultural and humanitarian ties. Turkey was involved at different levels in the strong support of mission, both civil and military, but also derived from multilateral efforts, as well as development cooperation assistance efforts funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in particular are two of the countries that have received Turkish development assistance. In this sense, Turkey has recently expanded its capacity to open a dialogue for the resolution of inter-state and inter-communal disputes in the region. The most fruitful of these cooperation was with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, with the SEECP (South-East European Cooperation Process), a regional initiative for political dialogue and cooperation launched in 2009.40 Turkey has also participated in other multinational institutions and missions, both civilians and military:

RCC (Regional Cooperation Council), for stability and peace in Southeast

Europe, that involves also non-European partners; SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre), in order to prevent

and combat organized crime in the Balkans; KFOR (Kosovo Force), a NATO peacekeeping force operating since 1999, with

Turkish troops that amounted to 365 out of 4985 unities; PIC (Peace Implementation Council), with the precise goal to implement the

Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina; EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission), in which Turkey is one of the

five non-EU members, that has the role to consolidate the rule of law with EU judicial and police deployment in Kosovo;

EUFOR ALTHEA, a mission that has intervened with 600 unities from EU military force in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004;

SEEBRIG (South-Eastern Europe Brigade), with 500-men joint military force; UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration in Mission in Kosovo), in

which Turkey has employed police and military components.

Muslim populations, and Muslim minorities, have constituted the most important pretext for Turkey to intervene. Most of these populations are also Turks. For example, this is the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which there is a large number of Turkish citizens, or Turkish people who have chosen to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of education, health care and employment, even if Bosnia and Herzegovina was the epicenter of a disastrous civil war that divided two ethnic groups after the fall of Yugoslavia. The same is for Albania. In Kosovo, there are approximately twenty thousand Kosovar citizens with Turkish origins. In reality, with a

49

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

more comprehensive vision, we have to consider that also in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro a lot of ethnic Turks and Muslim people live, with a shared history, but it is true particularly for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, if Kosovo (and Albania) were the recipient of military assistance form Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the others Western Balkans states) received technical assistance in the basic services cluster. Turkey has seen Kosovo as a state really important for the peace and the stability in Europe: for this reason, 500 Turkish military personnel have taken part to the Turkish Battalion, which has been operating with NATO KFOR Mission since 1999. This latter was partly substituted by a civilian operation, that is the EULEX, which operates on penal law in Kosovo, starting from 9 December 2008. Turkey has participated to EULEX, as a potential third country, with 1 Turkish judge and 100 Turkish police officers. During the ‘80s, Turkey was involved in regional neighborhood exclusively with operations conducted by the state, firstly because civil society was weak, and secondly because state would not readily welcome such a contribution. But after the Cold War, the situation changed rapidly, in particular with the Bosnian war that increased Turkish awareness about its potentiality. It was at this step that NGOs joined the process. These groups, mainly referred to religious brotherhood, have been concentrated particularly on charity and education, for example with the construction of universities or of primary and secondary schools. Following their own agenda, they had also collaborated with institutions such as TIKA, YEE and YTB. Recently, another program has been launched: it is the UNIW (the Istanbul-based Union of NGO’s of The Islamic World), in order to try to perceive the needs of civil society in the Balkans.41 However, the Turkish government has supported these civil organizations, on which there is also the interested eye of EU and USA, as they are the proof of a moderate Islam as opposed to more factious and radical groups that have penetrated the Western Balkans. In this perspective, Turkish aids are then developed in different ways and levels of intervention, and could be classified as the following: (1) development of social, economic and educational infrastructure; (2) construction of projects; (3) financing infrastructures; (4) humanitarian assistance; (5) promoting Turkic cultural cooperation; (6) donating equipment. It is clear that the interventions are devoted to a form of soft power, abandoning the hard power used, for example, through the participation to NATO KFOR. Turkey, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, was active in the distribution of food, carpet, rug weaving, in training course for women, in the water supply or sanitation irrigation, rehabilitation of water ducts, in the establishment of educational institutions, with short and long program of training programs and higher education scholarships for medicine students, construction of a center for children who need dialysis and of a blood bank, and equipment support for mentally disabled people. Another field in which Turkey was really involved was endogenous sectors like agriculture: particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Albania, Turkish experts have aided population in organic farming, apiculture, development of modern greenhouse, modern fishery techniques. Moreover, the micro-financing program has been the most successful experiment in order to provide women who wanted to implement and to acquire the necessary ability and the right skills to contribute to their household economy. Finally, Turkish experts have also trained local farmers, teachers and female laborers.

50

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Turkish language was also taught in schools, with the idea to build and to cultivate a common heritage, with a specific reference to the existing cultural and ethnic ties. Similarly, the construction and the restoration of mosques, or of holy sites of various sects of Islam, of museums or also of religious learning and cultural centers, are a proof of the Turkish civilian capacity in post-conflict countries to help to reestablish peace and stability by soft power. Nearly 5000 civilians from Balkans received Turkish help in different situations and in many fields. Moreover Turkish government to provide development in terms of civilian capacity training did an investment of $200 million between 2008 and 2009. It is not entirely negligible that the Gülen movement takes an important part in the Turkish civil capacity process: Fethullah Gülen, since 1989, said to his followers to open schools and universities in the Balkans with the aim to foster a morally conscious and educated elite in the countries’ region. In this way, it has become the most influential Turkish neo-Sufi community in the Western Balkans, especially in Albania. Actually, there are different schools also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with a growing number of students. After the failed coup of July 15 (2016) the deeply-rooted presence of Gülen movement organizations in the Western Balkans, could damage Turkey’s image as well as its relations with some countries in the region. Others Neo-Sufi communities, which have turned into transnational networks and have manifested an interest for Western Balkans, are the Nurcu, the Süleyman Efendi group and the Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Vakfı (AMHV). However their activities are not totally directed towards Turkish Muslims, because they address their message also throughout history and civilian ties: all these Sufi movements have traced a similar origin from the traditional Sufi orders, representing Sunni-Hanafi Islam, although they differ to their approach and activities. This does not preclude the possibility for Turkish Islamic networks to have a long-term evolution in the Western Balkans, firstly for the relationships between Islamic intellectual and activist circles, and secondly for the constantly increasing presence of students who go to Turkey from Western Balkans to receive education.

Conclusion Turkish foreign policy and its civilian capacity are permeated both by an ability to deploy efficiently resources and a few perils that should be not ignored. In this sense, they follow a visionary approach that could be threatened by clusters inside conflict-affected nations. Obviously, Turkey is among those countries that affirmed that conflicts are one of the causes of the unequal distribution of the resources and of the unrealized dialogue between different parties involved in the struggles. The NGOs’ role is fundamental at this step. If TIKA has a great potentiality to become a center of an excellent program, establishing a functional evaluation and monitoring quality of the processes, no civilian capacity assistance will have a social impact if Turkey itself neglects to involve, for example, women in the NGO. Women are really important for political reforms, democratization, multilateral relationships, that could be improved also by the use of these non-state actors, but only if this process is conducted in a symmetric way. In conclusion, Turkey has definitively demonstrated its intention to

51

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

fulfill its role as a reliable provider of civilian assistance in post-conflict areas, but, in front of the problem to present itself to the international community as a ‘model’, it has also to improve its good practices and share its successful undertaking with them. Moreover, the emphasis used by Neo-Sufi movements on considering Western Balkans as a kind of ‘Turkish hinterland’ sometimes is not appropriate for states like Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo that want to find their own national identity. Yet, too much focus on religion and history, ignoring perceptions and misperceptions of regional actors. Finally, the European role is fundamental: it functions as an attractive pole. However there is a dysfunction that could be act as a scissor (or as an obstacle) in the Turkish attempt to impose its soft power: while the European integration is high in the agenda of Western Balkans and religious leaders empathize with the western-style democracy and values, trying also to make Islam compatible to them, Turkish accession in EU is not a primary goal in its foreign policy, thus generating a different perception of the same broad regional neighborhood, and, above all, a sort of misidentification from Balkans to the be a part of the same Ottoman destiny.

52

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Notes 1. The work refers to Western Balkans as the south-east European area that

includes the countries of “ex-Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia). Thus, this geographical region would include: Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania.

2. Barkey, Empire of Difference. 3. Aydin, The role of Ottoman law in the Establishment of Pax Ottomana’. 4. Davutoğlu, Speech, Sarajevo, 16 October, 2009, http://www.ius.edu.ba/dzsusko/

Davutoglu_transcript_dzs.doc. (Accessed 16 December 2016). 5. Literally (changing or collecting in Turkish), was the practice by which the

Ottoman Empire took slave boys from their Christian families. This “child levy” was a method of recruiting administrators and soldiers. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire.

6. Todorova, ‘The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans’. 7. Öktem, ‘Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State: Muslim

communities in the Balkans’ 8. Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 104-105. 9. Uzer, Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy; Demirtaş, ‘Turkey and the Balkans:

Overcoming Prejudices, Building Bridges and Constructing a Common Future’, 165-166. About the constructivist theory see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Bozdaglıoglu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructive Approach.

10. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2002, 61-62. 11. Türbedar, ‘Turkey’s New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and

Obstacles’, 141. 12. Kut, ‘Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect’. 13. Kirisçi, ‘Refugees of Turkish Origin: “Coerced Immigrants” to Turkey since 1945’;

Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria. 14. Gangloff, ‘Turkish Policy towards the conflict in Kosovo’, 107. 15. Turgut Özal was Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–1989) and President of Turkey

(1989–1993). 16. Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. 17. Solberg, ‘The role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans’. This paper

uses ‘pro-Islamic’, like Solberg, as an umbrella term for a variety of organizations and movements that are grounded in Islam and therefore can be distinguished from the dominant secularist ideology in Turkey.

18. Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, 125-126.

19. Öniş, ‘Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity’. 20. Demirtaş, ‘Turkey and the Balkans’, 167-170. 21. Gangloff, ‘Turkish Policy towards the conflict in Kosovo’, 108. 22. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, 343-352. 23. Demirtaş, ‘Turkey and the Balkans’, 168. 24. Oğuzlu and Güngör, ‘Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s

Security Policy’. 25. Roper, ‘The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests’, 95. 26. Tabak, The Kosovar Turks and Post-Kemalist Turkey: Foreign Policy, Socialization

and Resistance. 27. Uzgel, ‘Kosovo; Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International

53

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Intervention’. 28. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates this population at around 20,

000. 29. Lialiouti, ‘Greek anti-Americanism and the war in Kosovo’. 30. Chiriatti and Donelli, ‘Turkish ‘Zero Problems’ Between Failure and Success’. 31. Grigoriadis, ‘The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy’. 32. Dinç, ‘Turkey as a New Security Actor in the Middle East: Beyond the Slogans’, 64. 33. Petrovid and Reljid, ‘Turkish Interests and Involvement in Western Balkans: A

Score-Card’. 34. İstanbul Trilateral Summit Declaration, İstanbul, 24 April 2010, at http://

www.seecp-turkey.org/icerik.php?no=60 35. Petrovid and Reljid, ‘Turkish Interests and Involvement in Western Balkans’, 161. 36. It was the 66/255 Resolution, titled “Civilian Capacity in the aftermath of the

conflict”, on 15 May 2012. 37. Linden and Irepoğlu, ‘Turkey and the Balkans: New Forms of Political Community’. 38. We can roughly divide fragile statehood in weak, failing and failed. See Baskin,

‘Interim Notions of Statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A Permanent Transition?’. 39. Schneckener, Fragile Statehood, Armed Non – State Actors and Security

Governance. 40. Ekinci, Turkey’s Zero Problems Era in the Balkans. 41. Musliu, ‘KosovoTextbooks Soften Line on Ottoman Rule’. 42. Demirtaş, ‘Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans’.

54

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Bibliography Anastasakis, Othon, “Turkey’s Assertive Presence in Southeast Europe: Between Identity Politics and Elite Pragmatism”, in Kerem Öktem Öktem, Ayşe Kadıoğlu (ed.), Another Empire? A decade of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Under the Justice and Development Party, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2012. Akilli, Erman and Federico Donelli, ‘Reinvention of Turkish Foreign Policy in Latin America: The Cuba Case’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2016, pp. 161-182. Aras, Bülent, ‘The Davutoğlu era in Turkish foreign policy’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 127-142. Aydin, Mehmet Akif , ‘The role of Ottoman law in the Establishment of Pax Ottomana’, in Kemal Karpat and Yetkin Yıdırım (eds.) The Ottoman Mosaic, Seattle: Cune Press, pp. 121-130, 2010. Barkey, Karen, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Baskin, Mark, “Interim Notions of Statehood in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A Permanent Transition?”, in Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo (eds.) Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, Washington: United States of Institution of Peace, 2007, pp. 263-286. Bennett, Christopher, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences, London: Hurst & Co., 1995. Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructive Approach, New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, Armonk/London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. Çandar, Cengiz, ‘Turkey’s “soft power” strategy: A New vision for a multi-polar world’, SETA Policy Brief , 38, 2009, http://setadc.org/turkeys-soft-power-strategy-a-new-vision-for-a-multi-polar-world/ (Accessed 23 May 2015). Chiriatti, Alessia and Federico Donelli, “Turkish ‘Zero Problems’ Between Failure and Success”, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), Vol. 4, No. 3, 2015, pp. 108-131. Cohen, Lenard J. and Jasna Dragovic-Soso, State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2008. Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Alternative Paradigms: the Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, Lanham: University Press of America, 1993. Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, Istanbul: Küre, 2001. Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Speech, Sarajevo, 16 October, 2009. http://www.ius.edu.ba/dzsusko/Davutoglu_transcript_dzs.doc. (Accessed 16 october 2016). De Coning, Cedric, John Karlsrud & Lotte Vermeij, Civcap, Emerging Powers and the Global South: Evidence for a New phase of Engagement, Oslo: Norwegian Insitute of International Affairs, No. 6, 2013. Demirtaş, Birgül, “Turkey and the Balkans: Overcoming Prejudices, Building Bridges and Constructing a Common Future”, Perceptions, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2013, pp. 163-184. Demirtaş, Birgül, ‘Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanised foreign policy in a de-europeanised national context?’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 10, 2015, pp. 1-17. Dinç, Cengiz, “Turkey as a New Security Actor in the Middle East: Beyond the Slogans”, Perceptions, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011, pp. 61-80.

55

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Donelli, Federico, “Il ruolo della società civile ‘islamica’ nella politica estera turca”, Afriche e Orienti, Vol. 16, No. 1-2, 2014, pp. 99-115. Ekinci, Mehmet Ugur, Turkey’s Zero Problems Era in the Balkans, Washington D.C.: SETA, 2013. Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, London: Hurst & Co, 1997. Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, London/Portland: Frank Cass Publisher, 2002. Gangloff, Sylvie, “Turkish Policy towards the conflict in Kosovo”, Balkanologie, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2004, pp. 105-122. General Assembly, Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on peace-building in the aftermath of conflict”, United Nations, 11 June 2009. General Assembly, Security Council, “66/255 Civilian Capacity in the aftermath of the conflict”, United Nations, 15 May 2012. Grigoriadis, Ioannis N., “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, ELIAMEP Working Paper, No. 8, 2010. Halliday, Fred, The Middle East in International Relations. Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-20, London: Taylor & Francis, 2002. Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Kirisçi, Kemal, “Refugees of Turkish Origin: ‘Coerced Immigrants’ to Turkey since 1945”, International Migration, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, pp. 385-412. Kösebalaban, Hasan, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Kut, Şule, “Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect”, Perceptions, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 49-60. Lialiouti, Zinovia, “Greek anti-Americanism and the war in Kosovo”, National Identities, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011, pp. 127-156. Linden, Ronald H. and Yasemin Irepoğlu, “Turkey and the Balkans: New Forms of Political Community’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013, pp. 229-255. Musliu, Jeton, ‘KosovoTextbooks Soften Line on Ottoman Rule’, Balkan Insight, 22/01/2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-textbooks-soten-line-on-ottoman – (Accessed 28 November 2016). Öktem, Kerem, ‘Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State: Muslim communities in the Balkans’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011, pp. 151–169. Oğuzlu, Tarik and Güngör Uğur, “Peace Operations and the Transformation of Turkey’s Security Policy”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 27, N0. 3, pp. 472-488. Öniş, Ziya, “Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 48-68, 1995. Örnek, Cangül and Çagdas Üngör, Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Perritt, Henry H, The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Petrovid, Žarco and Dušan Reljid, “Turkish Interests and Involvement in Western Balkans: A Score-Card”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 159–172, 2011. Quataert, Donald, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

56

Tu

rkis

h C

ivili

an C

apac

ity

in P

ost

-co

nfl

ict

Scen

ario

s: T

he

Cas

es

of

Bo

snia

an

d H

erz

ego

vin

a an

d K

oso

vo

Journal of

Global Analysis

Robins, Philip, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, London: Hurst & Co, 2003. Rogel, Carole, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998. Roper, John, ‘The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests’, International Spectator, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1999, pp. 89-102. Schneckener, Ulrich, Fragile Statehood, Armed Non – State Actors and Security Governance, Geneve: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006. Solberg, Anne R., ‘The role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans’, Südosteuropa, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2007, pp. 429-462. Tabak, Hüsrev, The Kosovar Turks and Post-Kemalist Turkey: Foreign Policy, Socialization and Resistance, London: I.B.Tauris, 2016. Tanaskovic, Darko, Neo osmanizam – povratak Turske na Balkan, Banja Luka: Official Gazette, 2010. Taşpınar, Ömer, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, Carnegie Papers, September, 2008, www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs (Accessed 13 January 2017). Todorova, Maria, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans”, in Carl L. Brown (ed.) Imperial Legacy The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 45-77. Türbedar, Erhan, “Turkey’s New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, N0. 3, 2011, pp. 139-158. United Nations. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, 23-54. 2004. Uzer, Umit, Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy, London, I.B.Tauris, 2011. Uzgel, İlhan, “Kosovo; Politics of Nationalism and the Question of International Intervention”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, No. 4: 203- 234, 1999. Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

57

Turk

ish

Civ

ilian

Cap

acit

y in

Po

st-c

on

flic

t Sc

enar

ios:

Th

e C

ase

s o

f B

osn

ia a

nd

He

rze

govi

na

and

Ko

sovo

Journal of

Global Analysis

www.cesran.org

Journal of

Global Analysis

Continuity or Change in Turkish Foreign Policy? Analyzing the Policy Fluctuations during the Justice and Development Party Era By Murat Ülgül*

Abstract For decades, change in Turkish foreign policy has remained as “a neglected phenomenon” in the literature while continuity is explained with two main pillars: Westernization and preference for the status quo. The topic started gaining popularity at the end of 2000s when some conflicts of interest emerged between Turkey and its traditional partners. Scholars mainly explained this change as the result of the new Turkish leadership under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). While the debate in this period provided extensive literature on the subject, the arguments created could not explain the policy fluctuations during the AKP era. In this article, the change in AKP foreign policy is examined during three time periods that show different characteristics in terms of domestic and international opportunities/constraints. It is argued that while Westernization still remains an important pillar in Turkish foreign policy, the main change seems to be in Turkey’s traditional preference for the status quo. Keywords: Foreign policy change, Turkish foreign policy, Justice and Development Party, Westernization, Status-quo, Civil-military relations, Arab Spring

Dr. Murat Ülgül is currently working as a researcher at Karadeniz Technical University. After receiving his Bachelor’s degree from the International Relations Department at Gazi University, the author got his graduate education in the East European and Russian Studies program at Florida State University (M.A.) and then in the field of Political Science and International Relations at University of Delaware (M.A. and Ph.D). His main research areas are ethnic conflict, civil-military relations, Israeli politics, Turkish foreign policy and American foreign policy.

www.cesran.org

Vol. 7 | No. 1 | January 2017

Winter Issue

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 7 | No. 1

January 2017

Winter Issue

Introduction For several decades, change has been “a neglected phenomenon” in the foreign policy literature for a number of reasons, but mainly because of the static characteristic of the Cold War era. The subject gained little attention in the 1980s, but with a groundbreaking development, the end of the Cold War, more scholars started analyzing why, when, and how a state changes its foreign policy. In similar fashion, change in Turkish foreign policy has been “a neglected phenomenon” in the literature for decades as Turkey’s alliance with Western political institutions as well as the supremacy of the military and bureaucracy in Turkey’s politics provided some degree of continuity in the foreign policy decision-making. Until the late-1990s, scholars mainly focused on the pillars of continuity in Turkish foreign policy, which had been basically Westernization and preference for status quo. This disinterest in change in Turkish foreign policy abruptly came to an end as an alternative voice, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power in 2002. Because the founders of the party were former members of the Islamist Welfare Party and foreign policy makers wanted to re-establish Turkey’s ties with Middle Eastern countries, a “shift-of-axis” argument was strongly voiced as the party consolidated its power in Turkish politics. These arguments reached their zenith in 2009-11 as Turkey’s relations with Israel deteriorated while the Erdoğan government voted against Iran sanctions in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In this period, several articles, books, policy reports, op-eds, etc. were written on the subject of goal- and orientation-change in Turkish foreign policy. While some were giving voice to an “axis shift” and/or some other fundamental changes in Turkish foreign policy, the majority was arguing that the “new” Turkish leadership was simply following a more activist and multi-dimensional foreign policy without detaching from the Western world. More than the previous decades did, this discussion provided an extensive literature on the subject of change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy. Yet time passes, domestic and international conditions change and former arguments lose their power to explain change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy. In the last five years, fundamental changes have taken place despite the same leadership. In 2009, Turkey was regarded as an example to other Middle Eastern countries; Ankara followed a “zero problems with neighbors” policy while extending its relationship with multiple actors, and; Turkish leaders used dialogue, cooperation and soft power as main foreign policy tools. Today nobody mentions Turkey as a model country as Ankara has to deal with its own internal problems; Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and major powers deteriorated and pushed the Turkish leaders to adopt

60

Continuity or Change in Turkish Foreign Policy? Analyzing the Policy Fluctuations during the Justice and Development Party Era

Journal

of

Global

Analysis

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

the concept of “precious loneliness,” and security politics and interference in other states’ internal affairs replaced cooperation, dialogue and soft power. As a result of these changes, today it is common to hear comments about the failure of Turkish foreign policy and questions such as “What happened to Turkey’s foreign policy?” Therefore, it is necessary to re-evaluate the change and continuity issue in Turkish foreign policy because those who explained the change with the AKP leadership cannot explain the policy fluctuations during the same leadership. Instead of comparing the pre-AKP and AKP years, this article will mainly examine change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP leadership. To do this, I divide the AKP period into three sub-periods, which each involve different domestic and international conditions. The first period includes the years between 2002 and 2009 in which we witness the liberalization and civilian takeover of foreign-policy decision-making. In this period, the decisions on foreign policy cannot be separated from the internal power struggles between different institutions. The second period takes place between 2009 and 2013, which constituted the golden years of the AKP leadership. In these years, Turkish foreign policy took on a more ambitious and activist form as domestic and international developments provided the AKP government an opportunity to realize its objective to make Turkey a regional and global power. The final period starts in 2013 when the domestic and international atmosphere drastically changed while the foreign policy goals and methods of the AKP government took on a more complex form. The main argument of the article is that while it is difficult to prove the “axis shift” argument because of constantly-changing power struggles in the region and Turkey’s inability to play a role independent from the West, the principle of “preference for status quo” was significantly altered during the period of AKP leadership, especially from 2009 to present. The article will continue as follows: First, I will present historical background and a literature review about change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy between the pre-AKP and AKP years. Then I will analyze the three sub-periods of the AKP leadership in accordance with the research question. The final section will summarize the findings of the article. Historical Background and Literature Review Since the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, its foreign policy has been established on two pillars: Westernization and the preference for status quo. Although the founding fathers fought against the Western powers in the war of independence, they sought close relations with their former enemies as soon as the fight was over. This choice had both practical and ideological reasons. Practically, at that time Turkey had to build extensive relations with the West since it shared borders with them through the British mandate in Iraq and French mandate in Syria. More importantly, ideologically the founding fathers believed that the only way to modernize the country was to be included in the Western civilization. Since one-third of the top leadership in this period was occupied by former soldiers in the Ottoman army - including President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü - and the Ottoman military was the very first institution that was modernized in a European-style, a Western-mindset was quite established among the decision-

61

Journal of

Global Analysis

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

makers. Indeed, on the day the Republic was established, Mustafa Kemal told a French reporter that the new state had no choice other than looking at the West if it wants to enter to the civilized world. The second principle that has shaped Turkish foreign policy, preference for status quo, was also based on the belief-system of the founding fathers. As former Ottoman military officers, the founding fathers were the ones who closely witnessed the end of the Ottoman Empire as a result of ambitious foreign policies. As the new state was born out of the Ottoman Empire, the priority of the leaders became stabilization of the internal conditions while trying to build a new secular, modern and Turkish national identity. This objective necessitated a stable international environment. While Europe witnessed the emergence of nationalist and anti-status quo leaders, the Turkish leaders adopted a motto, “Peace at home, peace in the world,” which linked domestic and international peace together. As a result, the founding fathers were inclined to solve the border problems of their time - Mosul with the United Kingdom and Hatay with France - through diplomacy while they preferred to stay away from regions such as the Middle East whose political order was not yet established. Turkish leaders also refrained from interfering in the internal matters of other states as it expected the other states - especially the Soviet Union - to do the same towards Turkey. In the following decades, Turkish leaders, under the control of the Turkish military and foreign ministry bureaucracy, followed these principles in general terms. Both Westernization and preference for the status quo led Turkey to approach the West, whose political structure was stabilized after the Second World War, while avoiding other areas, especially the Middle East as it became the cradle of wars and instability in the context of Arab-Israeli wars. During the Cold War Turkish foreign policy generally remained passive – with the exception of the Cyprus affair in 1974 - and Western-oriented. The first significant change on this issue came when Turgut Özal, Prime Minister in 1983-89 and President 1989-93, challenged the traditional order as a new international system began to emerge with the end of the Cold War. Being eager to challenge the traditional order, both in domestic and international affairs, and worried that Turkish geostrategic importance may diminish with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Özal sought to follow an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy. In order to increase Turkish political and economic interests, Özal started an engagement policy with the neighboring areas, including the Middle East, which he regarded as a natural market for Turkish goods. During his period, Özal developed a water pipeline project to carry Turkish water to the Middle Eastern countries, including Israel; tried to play a more constructive role to address the Arab-Israel conflict; actively participated in Islamic organizations; suggested establishing a “Turkish common market” with the newly-born Central Asian Republics; played a leading role in the establishment of Black Sea Economic Cooperation; relaxed visa requirements to enter Turkey, and; even approached to the Iraqi Kurdish groups, an issue that was an anathema for the Turkish military. This active policy was followed without detaching from the West as Özal actively supported the United States in the First Gulf War; applied to the European Economic Community for full membership, and; even attempted to resolve the issues of conflict with Greece, a policy mainly unthinkable before him.

62

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

Most of these foreign policy projects failed while Özal’s vision did not make a lasting impact as the Turkish military and bureaucracy reestablished control over Turkish domestic and foreign policies after his death in 1993. In the 1990s, Turkey approached the neighboring areas from a security perspective as it almost went to war against Greece in 1996 over the Imia/Kardak islets and against Syria in 1998 over the latter’s hosting the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) leader Abdullah Öcalan. In 1999 Turkey once again seemed to change its foreign policy vision as the European Union (EU) accession process brought some reforms and Öcalan’s capture, as well as the PKK’s dropping arms, relieved the security concerns of Turkey. İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister in 1997-2002, also contributed to this change as he favored an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy, again, without detaching from the Western world. Similar to Özal, Cem envisioned a greater role for Turkey in its region while he successfully brought a peaceful approach to the relations with Greece; yet, his effect too was not long-lasting. As this brief historical background shows, there was a great level of continuity in Turkish foreign policy from 1923 to the end of the century. In general terms, Turkish foreign policy had been passive and Western-oriented and it dealt with the neighboring areas mainly from a security perspective. Indeed, change in Turkish foreign policy became a controversial topic mainly after the AKP came to power in 2002. As its founders were former members of the Islamist Welfare Party and the AKP represented conservative Muslims, change in Turkish policy became an anticipated development. Indeed, as soon as 2003 when the Turkish parliament rejected the deployment of U.S. troops in Turkey to form another front before the Iraq War, “‘What on earth is happening in Turkey?’ has become a familiar cry…around the capitals of the Atlantic community.” With the European opposition to the Iraq War as well, this rejection was not necessarily interpreted as detachment from the West, but with Ankara’s renewed interest in its neighborhood, it was clear that something in Turkish foreign policy was changing. As the main section of this article will show in detail, in its first years the AKP government followed the footsteps of Özal and Cem by following an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy. With Ahmet Davutoğlu as his chief adviser, Erdoğan started an engagement process with the neighboring countries and various regions avoided before, such as Latin America and Africa. At the same time, Ankara gradually solved its problems with the United States and started the negotiation process with the EU. Nevertheless, the discussion about change in Turkish foreign policy restarted in 2009-2011 when Turkey cuts its relations with Israel, hosted Hamas leaders in Ankara, voted against Iran sanctions in the UN, worked closely with Sudan despite the genocide charges against its president, increased its relations with Russia and China, and Turkey’s relations with the EU slowed down. With these policies, some Turkey experts argued about the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy and its detachment from the West. For example, Cornell argued that “the salience of anti-Western and Islamist thinking in the Turkish government” are the reasons behind some Turkish foreign policy decisions. Cohen wrote about the concerns in Washington that “Turkey is coming under the rule of a populist authoritarian regime rooted in Islamism.” More famously, Çağaptay highlighted the axis shift by arguing that Islamist foreign policy drifts Ankara away from its Western allies.

63

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

The “axis shift” arguments started an intense debate about the goals and orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Some agreed with the orientation-change argument but put the blame on the Western countries, especially the EU, that played a significant role in blocking the negotiation process. Taşpınar also acknowledged the change but instead of Islamist ideology he pointed out the “Turkish Gaullism” - growing Turkish self-confidence and independence vis-à-vis the West - and disappointment with the Transatlantic and Western norms as the reasons behind it. Recently, after the Turkish-Western relations deteriorated more, Hoffmann and Cemgil denied the “axis-shift” arguments by claiming that Turkish foreign policy, in fact, has never been pro-Western or pro-American. Similar to Hoffmann and Cemgil, Danforth emphasized the continuity by arguing that pragmatism instead of ideology shaped Turkish foreign policy from Atatürk to Erdoğan and it is misleading to focus on Western and Eastern - or Islamist - identities to explain Turkey’s foreign policy decisions. In this period most of the Turkish scholars denied the axis shift argument; yet, they accepted the goal-changes and evaluated them in a positive perspective. Özcan and Usul argued that the while there are some changes with the AKP leadership as the new leaders sought more active and multi-dimensional foreign policy, it does not mean a departure from the West. Similarly, Başer acknowledged the increased activism in Turkish foreign policy but denied the axis-shift argument by pointing out that being a “member of the Western world” role is “the most stable and dominant Turkish foreign policy role” from 1992 to 2012, the period he examined. Kanat argued that the changes in Turkish foreign policy should be seen as “attempts to create an autonomous, self-regulating, and self confident foreign policy agenda and normalize the previous crisis-driven foreign policymaking of Turkey” instead of attempts to change its international orientation. Similarly, Kirişçi highlighted change in a positive light by pointing out Turkey’s transformation from a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft power” as security-oriented policies were replaced by economic interdependence and trade relations which started playing a more important role in Turkey’s relations with the external world. All in all, the important part of the literature concluded that the Erdoğan government was following in the footsteps of Özal and Cem by adopting active, multi-dimensional and constructive foreign policy without detaching from the West. While this debate provided an extensive literature on change and continuity in Turkish policy, most of the arguments are no longer usable because of the recent developments in Turkey and the Middle East. In 2009, despite the presence of axis-shift arguments, Turkey was regarded as a model country which proves that Islam and democracy can live together. American President Barack Obama made his first overseas visit as the president to Turkey to show that the Erdoğan government, leading a secular and democratic Muslim country with a liberal market, can be an example to the religious political parties in the Middle East. In 2016, Turkey is no longer seen as a model country. Instead, Turkey experts in the West highlight rising authoritarianism, growing use of force by the police, jailed journalists, terror attacks in major cities, the renewed Kurdish conflict, etc. and today even Obama is said to consider Erdoğan “a failure and an authoritarian.” In 2009, Ankara was following a “zero problems with neighbors” policy and attempted to solve its foreign policy problems with all neighbors but especially with

64

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

Armenia, Syria and Greece. One of the ultimate foreign policy goals of the AKP government was to transform its conflict-prone neighborhood, especially the Middle East, and Turkish politicians even envisaged a European-Union style organization which would unite the Middle Eastern countries on political and economic terms. Complementing this neighborhood policy, Ankara also attempted to balance its relations with all major powers by increasing its ties with Russia and China. In 2016, these policies have, to a great extent, failed. Turkey’s Armenia and Cyprus openings did not produce any positive result while its relations with Syria, Iraq and Russia have significantly deteriorated. Because of strained relations, today Turkey has no ambassador in Syria, Egypt and Israel. After Turkey’s shooting down a Russian warplane on the Syrian-Turkish border in November 2015, there was even a rumor of war between two countries. Finally, Turkey’s relations with the West are full of problems and tensions, despite some cooperation against terrorism and the refugee flows. All in all, today Turkey has left its “zero problems with neighbors” policy and replaced it with a term called “precious loneliness,” which implies that Turkey is on the right side of history in international affairs. In 2009, Turkey’s main foreign policy tools were dialogue, cooperation and soft power. Indeed, these were the necessary instruments to apply the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. In parallel with the failure of this policy, these foreign policy tools are seemingly being replaced by military power and hostile rhetoric. In 2016, Ankara is one of the ardent supporters of the removal of the Assad regime in Syria and it supports the armed opposition groups which target the regime more than those that target the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). When Moscow actively supported the Assad regime, Ankara did not refrain from shooting down a Russian warplane. In December 2015, Ankara also involved in a dispute with the Iraqi central government over the presence of Turkish troops in Northern Iraq, a dispute that is renewed in October 2016 before the military operation to retake Mosul from the ISIL. The AKP government also seems to be adopting a hostile rhetoric against the governments it has strained relations with, such as Netanyahu’s Israel and al-Sisi’s Egypt. Sometimes it uses the same kind of rhetoric against Western states, as happened recently when the Obama administration refused to identify the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish armed group in Syria, as a terrorist organization. All in all, today we have a very different Turkey from the one we had in 2009. Based on those changes mentioned above, we need to reevaluate the change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy. The debates in 2009-2011 cannot explain what happened in Turkish foreign policy because they mainly focus on the AKP and its leaders in explaining change. Yet, we see different foreign policy objectives and methods between the different periods within the AKP leadership. Therefore, we need to analyze change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP leadership as the following three sections will do. Civilian Takeover of Turkish Foreign Policy, 2002-2009 Although the AKP came to power with 34.2 per cent of the national vote in the November 2002 election, the party was clearly lacking the political strength it has today. In this period Turkish politics was largely under the control of the state establishment - military and bureaucracy - with a strong secular-Kemalist ideology and the AKP leadership had to challenge these groups that opposed its conservative-

65

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

religious identity. Indeed, as Stein points out, the AKP “had to contend with the very real threat of another ‘post-modern’ coup until 2008,” and the party managed to consolidate its power only after it survived several crises that put its rule at risk whereas the state establishment lost its power to control politics and society over time. This struggle affected all aspects of political life, especially foreign-policy decisions. As soon as they came to power, the AKP leaders realized that the best way to survive in politics was to liberalize, democratize, and civilize the political system so that the state establishment would find little grounds to challenge a government chosen by the popular will. Being aware that they could not effectively challenge the traditional state actors within the domestic system, the AKP leaders were dependent upon foreign support for their rule. This foreign support for democratization would only come from Western states; therefore, the AKP leadership tried to establish close relations with them. In the first months of AKP rule, the main foreign policy topic was the American demand to open a front in Turkey before the anticipated Iraq War. Erdoğan, who could not become the prime minister until March 14, 2003, because of his ban from politics, was willing to accept the American demand; however, party discipline was not strong at that time and some AKP parliamentarians voted against the resolution on March 1 because of the large-scale public opposition as well as their unwillingness to support the war. As the resolution failed to pass the parliament and it created disappointment in the Bush administration, the AKP government quickly embraced the EU accession process to realize the Western support it sought. The accession process started with the 1999 Helsinki Summit when Turkey was declared as a candidate state. To meet the EU standards, the coalition government under Bülent Ecevit made some constitutional changes that not only affected domestic politics, but foreign policy decision-making as well. The most important of these changes was made to the role and participants of the National Security Council (NSC) through which the state establishment had controlled foreign and domestic politics in the past. Before the amendment, the Council of Ministers had to give “priority consideration” to the decisions of the NSC whose majority was composed of military officers. With the change of the constitution, not only the status of NSC decisions were diminished to being “advisory,” but the number of the council’s civilian members increased as deputy prime ministers and Ministers of Justice were declared as participants to the council. Following the 2002 elections, the AKP rulers simply followed this road as an effective means for diminishing the military’s role in politics. Between January 2003 and July 2004, the AKP government adopted five “harmonization packages” that included political and constitutional reforms in order to meet the EU standards. Further changes to the NSC were made in this period as the office of General-Secretariat of this institution was entrusted to a civilian, an office previously held by a military officer who answers to the Chief of General Staff. Yet, constitutional changes and political reforms were not enough to end the traditional military control of Turkish politics. Some segments of the media, universities, civil society organizations and population were supporting the military’s role in politics as they saw the AKP as a threat to the secular regime. As the EU Progress Report in 2006 stated, even after the reforms the military kept affecting

66

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

politics by making speeches in public on important domestic and foreign issues including Cyprus, secularism and the Kurdish issue. Therefore, the AKP had to challenge the state establishment not only in institutional and constitutional terms, but in political terms as well. Therefore, the government decided to make changes to critical political issues that had previously been controlled by the state establishment. It was clear to AKP rulers that as long as foreign policy issues were evaluated only from a security perspective, it was impossible to end the military control of Turkish politics. For decades security threats have been an effective means to reinforce military control of Turkish politics while military control increased the security mindset in the decision-making structure. As a way to legitimize their role in politics, both the military and bureaucracy kept the critical security issues under their domain and excluded the politicians from the decision-making process. As Ali Balcı noted, the Cyprus issue was a symbol of the military-bureaucracy elites’ hegemony on Turkish foreign policy. Since the conflicts started between the Greek and Turkish populations of the island in 1960s, the state establishment governed the issue on the Turkish side and looked at the issue mainly from a security perspective. For the AKP, bringing a civilian perspective to the Cyprus issue was a means to break the state establishment’s hegemony on Turkish politics. Therefore, the AKP government supported the peaceful solution of the Cyprus issue through the Annan Plan of the UN, which proposed a referendum for a united Cyprus in 2004. Although the plan failed because of the negative vote of the Greek Cypriots, it was an important step to bring a new approach to the traditional security issues dominated by the state establishment. The AKP government followed the same approach to its neighborhood. In the 1990s, relations with the Middle East were shaped by the security considerations based on the Kurdish threat. Iraq, Iran and Syria were frequently blamed for supporting the PKK terrorist organization and, as mentioned, Ankara even came to the brink of a war with Syria on that matter in 1998. During the AKP rule, on the other hand, Turkey’s approach to the region was mainly shaped by economic considerations as the Turkish government and business associations regarded the Middle East as a huge market for Turkish goods. With the AKP’s interest in establishing close political and social ties with the Middle East, the business associations became one of the driving forces of Turkish foreign policy in the region and Turkey’s volume of trade increased from 6.27 billion dollars in 2001 to 43.05 in 2008. This new approach was accompanied with a new Kurdish policy in domestic affairs as the AKP government attempted to solve the 20-year old conflict by political means. All in all, these policies - EU process, Cyprus issue, Middle East rapprochement, and Kurdish policy - were part of an attempt to transform the country from the ‘security state’ to a “trading state,” which would diminish the role of the military and bureaucracy in the decision-making process. Yet, in this early period the AKP government could not show its full potential in the foreign policy arena as the party’s first priority was to survive in its fight against the state establishment. The most brutal part of this fight took place in 2007-2009 when multiple political crises took place in the country. First, a presidential crisis erupted in 2007 when the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the presidency. The presidency was a critical post for the state establishment as since 1960, the first military coup in Turkish history, it was occupied by former generals or civilians

67

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

favored by the military. Against Gül’s candidacy, the army issued a memorandum reminding the government that the army officers are “staunch defenders of secularism.” The crisis turned the 2007 elections into a vote of confidence for the AKP, which emerged victorious. Gül became the president but it did not end the fight. In 2008, the Constitutional Court opened a closure trial against the AKP, indicting them for being at the center of anti-secular activities. The party survived only by a margin of one vote which showed the fragile balance of power in Turkish politics. While surviving these two crises increased the AKP’s popularity, the Ergenekon trials of 2009 changed the balance of power between the government and state establishment in favor of the former. The trials resulted in the imprisonment of several military officers, journalists and academics on the charge of planning to overthrow the government. Following the trials, the public trust in the army significantly dropped and the AKP government saved itself from domestic restraints. In sum, in the years between 2002 and 2009 it is difficult to claim that there was much change in Turkish foreign policy in terms of Westernization and preference for status quo. Although there was some tension with the United States until 2006, Turkey accelerated the EU accession process in this period and started negotiations officially on 3 October 2005. While the AKP government renewed interest toward the Middle East, this policy was not quite different from the multi-dimensional foreign policy followed by Özal and Cem. Erdoğan’s inclination to accept the deployment of U.S. troops before the Iraq War in exception, Turkey also did not pursue any policy to change the status quo of the region. It is important to remember again that all these foreign policy decisions were taken under the shadow of the domestic struggle between the AKP government and the state establishment. Once domestic restraints were removed, Turkish foreign policy started taking a different shape. Golden Years of Turkish Foreign Policy, 2009-2013 In terms of foreign policy-making, the years between 2009 and 2013 can be called the “golden years” for the AKP rulers as the party faced less domestic and international restraints in shaping its policies. Domestically, as mentioned, the party managed to survive from the threat of military intervention as the government increasingly dominated the decision-making structure. In April 2011, Erdoğan was confident enough to state that they had made significant process in terms of controlling the military. This control increased more when General Işık Koşaner, the Chief of the Army Staff, as well as Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force resigned in July 2011 over their disagreement with the Ergenekon trials. As General Necdet Özel, who replaced Koşaner, worked in sync with the government, the AKP rulers became more tranquil in shaping foreign policy. Furthermore, despite the loss of votes in the 2009 local elections, the AKP rule was mainly unthreatened by the other political parties as the party continued its one-party rule throughout this period. More confident in domestic politics, the party could follow more ambitious foreign policies. Internationally, this period also offered more opportunity for the AKP rulers to follow different foreign policy objectives. Although the EU accession process officially started with the adoption of negotiating framework in October 2005, the negotiations rapidly lost momentum as Turkey declined to open its sea- and air-ports to the Cypriot ships and planes as a part of its responsibility to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus. As a result, the EU decided that eight

68

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

negotiation chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey assumes its responsibility. In addition to the Additional Protocol crisis, some European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy opposed Turkey’s full admission to the EU and offered a “privileged status” to Ankara instead of full membership. All in all, these developments diminished the eagerness of the Turkish public to join the EU and pushed the Turkish government to pursue alternative foreign policy goals. At the same time, a leadership change took place in the United States as Barack Obama became the President while Hilary Clinton assumed the post of the Secretary of State. When this duo arrived at the White House, their initial foreign policy approach was basically summarized as “anything but Bush,” especially in the Middle East, as both determined to change the American image whose example and appeal were diminished because of their former president’s unilateral and aggressive policies in the region. Obama attempted to change this image with a more multilateral and pro-dialogue approach and Turkey played an important role in his plans. As Tanış explained, for the Obama administration Turkey was an ideal partner in the Middle East where Washington cannot spend any more of its resources. Obama acknowledged the fact that political Islamist parties were too powerful in the region and the ideal policy was to moderate their discourses with the help of Erdoğan, who, in spite of his Islamist credentials, showed a liberal, democratic and pragmatist leadership style. As a result, in his first overseas trip as a president in April 2009, Obama visited Ankara where he said that Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim nation, and the United States, as a predominantly Christian nation, “can build a model partnership” and “create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous, that there are not tensions.” With the lack of domestic restraint, frozen relations with the EU and active encouragement from Washington, the AKP government focused more on its neighborhood and realized that it could follow a more active and ambitious foreign policy that may bring the status of regional power. Indeed, in a predictable move for those who want to be a regional power in the Middle East, Ankara confronted Israel as early as January 2009 when Erdoğan slammed Israeli President Shimon Peres - ironically, one of the dovish politicians in Israel - over Tel Aviv’s Palestinian policy at the World Economic Forum. While this unexpected move increased Erdoğan’s popularity both in Turkey and throughout the Arab world, it did not affect Turkey’s relations with the Western world. During this period the Obama administration aimed to extend a hand to the Muslim world while putting some distance - at least in rhetoric - between Washington and Israel, and the EU was far more critical of Israel’s Palestinian policy than the United States. As a result, the Erdoğan government kept playing the Palestinian card in its regional policy, which contradicted, not only with Turkey’s role as a potential mediator in the regional conflicts, but also with the traditional Turkish policy not to actively take sides in the conflicts of others. As Daloğlu notes, criticism of Israel became “the hallmark of Prime Minister Erdogan’s new Middle East policy” and it had reflections on other regional issues as well. For example, when Turkey tried to play a mediator role between Iran and the West on the Iranian nuclear program in 2009-2010, Ankara attempted to link the issue with Israel’s Palestinian policy by claiming that the

69

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

Palestinian issue is at the center of all the problems in the Middle East. At the same time, when the West focused on the Iranian nuclear program, Erdoğan’s political discourse was targeting Israel as he stated that “those who criticize Iran’s nuclear program…need to first give *their weapons+ up.” Turkey’s new active and ambitious foreign policy showed itself more clearly when the Arab Spring starting in 2011, giving an opportunity to the AKP rulers to increase their influence in the region. As soon as the civilian uprisings broke out in the Arab streets, Turkey positioned itself as a regional leader to help the Arab populations to transform their countries from autocratic regimes to popular democracies. While in doing this Turkey claimed to be on the “right side of the history,” as Ayata argues, Ankara also aimed to change the power balances in the region by spearheading the “new Middle East” in which the influence of the West and Israel would be diminished. Therefore, Turkey once more left its traditional policy of “preference for status quo” and actively took sides in the conflicts of others. In Egypt, the AKP officials actively supported and provided political expertise to the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni-Islamist political party, and after Mohammed Morsi from the Brotherhood took the presidential seat, Turkey and Egypt established close political, economic and security relations. In Syria, the Turkish government, after a brief period of attempts to convince Assad to make reforms, took a confrontational stance against the Shiite regime and cooperated with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in arming and training the Sunni rebels. As Karaveli noted, in this period Turkey adopted an “exclusively Sunni cause in Syria” and “*s+ectarian considerations have acquired an importance in Turkish foreign policy as never before.” Finally, in Palestine the Erdoğan government increased its backing of Sunni-Islamic Hamas as Israeli intelligence found that Turkey had replaced Iran as the organization’s top financier and had hosted the Hamas leadership since the organization was expelled from Syria in late 2011. All in all, one can conclude that Turkey’s foreign policy went through some observable changes after 2009. Unlike the early AKP years when the EU accession process was the main priority of the Turkish government, Ankara focused more on the Middle East after 2009 as its involvement in the Palestinian issue increased and the Arab Spring opened the status of regional power to the Turkish politicians. In this period, axis-shift arguments were pronounced although, as mentioned, many claimed that Turkey’s new Middle East policy did not necessarily mean a departure from the West. Yet, it was clear that Turkey’s traditional policy of the preference for the status quo basically changed as the AKP followed more active and ambitious foreign policy by taking sides in the conflicts of others and supporting Sunni political groups in its neighborhood. Turning Tides in Turkish Foreign Policy, 2013-Present The lack of domestic and international restraints was a decisive factor in Turkey’s new focus on the Middle East and its relative success as a candidate for regional leadership between 2009 and 2013. In this respect, it is possible to claim that tides started turning in Turkish foreign policy in the summer of 2013 when political conditions suddenly changed in Turkey and the Middle East. Domestically, between May and August 2013, Turkey experienced violent clashes between security forces and the public after an environmental protest against the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul turned into countrywide protests against the AKP government when the

70

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

police used heavy force to suppress the protestors. All of a sudden, several political and social groups gathered in the streets to show their grievances against the AKP government, which led some to describe the events as a “Turkish Spring,” and country-wide protests, taking three months to end with some casualties, increased the political and societal polarization in the country. A few months later, the AKP faced another domestic crisis when a major corruption scandal, involving some cabinet members and their sons, hit the news in December 2013. In a short period of time, the AKP faced two political crises at home, representing the first challenges to its rule since the military-bureaucracy opposition to the party in 2007-2008. Throughout this period, the AKP failed to control the crises without damage. In the protests and corruption investigation, the AKP leaders saw a matter of political survival and adopted a confrontational attitude which cost them the country’s international image and its objective to be a regional model and power. While excessive use of police force in the Gezi Park protests received criticism from several states and international bodies, Erdoğan preferred to describe the protestors as “looters” and “bums” and publicly stated that he could gather ten times the number of people in the streets if he wanted. Furthermore, instead of recognizing people’s grievances and alleviating them, the AKP leadership and the media close to the party relied on conspiracy theories to explain these political crises, as it is claimed that there were some foreign countries, interest lobbies and their domestic allies behind the demonstrations and corruption investigation. While a term called ‘Mastermind’(üst akıl), which mainly shows the Jews as the leader of this foreign plot, was created, Washington also took its share from the conspiracy theories as the CIA was accused of allocating $24 billion to overthrow the AKP government. Summer 2013 was also the time when some international developments started affecting Turkey’s ability to play the role of regional leader. In July 2013, when the Turkish government was dealing with the Gezi Park protests, the Egyptian army overthrew the Morsi government and suspended the constitution. While Morsi’s ouster was welcomed by Israel and Arab rulers who saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to their power, and other major powers remained silent, AKP officials made harsh statements against the coup and blamed the Western states, especially the United States, of following double standards in the Middle East by failing to support democracy when it didn’t like the people’s choices, such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Gaza. Turkey’s response to the coup resulted with the Egyptian decision to expel the Turkish ambassador in November on the charge of interfering in Egypt’s internal affairs. While Turkish officials kept condemning the military rule in Egypt, Western states as well as Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates gave political and financial support to the military government. Turkey’s grand-plan to be the regional and global power was struck even more when the developments in Syria did not take the shape the AKP had dreamed. Unlike the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and contrary to the expectations of the AKP officials who thought Assad would fall from power in a maximum six months, the Syrian regime managed to stay in power although the country turned into ruins and led to new problems for the unstable region. While those escaping from the war flew towards the Turkish border, the rise of the ISIL beyond the southern frontier created an uncontrollable situation for Turkish foreign policy. With the help of Iran and

71

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

Russia, the Assad regime crushed the Muslim Brotherhood network in Syria and resisted against the Sunni opposition groups armed by countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. As the Assad regime was involved in war-crimes and human catastrophes, the Obama administration shared Turkey’s demand for Assad to leave the power; however, when the United States supported the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units, to fight against the ISIL and declined to define them as terrorist organizations as Turkey did, it created tensions between Washington and Ankara. As the Turkish officials criticized the United States for not sticking to its red-lines in Syria - when the regime used chemical weapons against opposition groups and civilians - and differentiating between “good terrorists” and “bad terrorists,” Ankara took risky steps such as shooting down a Russian plane violating the Turkish-Syrian border when Turkish officials saw that they were losing the power-game in the region. All in all, from 2013 to 2016 Turkey’s international image dramatically deteriorated as the country found itself in a fight with multiple actors while Erdoğan, once President Obama’s role model for the Middle East, was labeled an authoritarian leader due to domestic developments. How do these domestic and international restraints affect the general principles of Turkish foreign policy? In terms of Westernization, regional developments after 2013 showed that without the robust EU link, which has been attractive to the Middle Eastern states in their relations with Ankara, and the US backing, Ankara alone does not have enough capability and resources to be a regional power in the Middle East. As Kuru points out, after the 2013 military coup in Egypt and Assad’s survival in Syria, Ankara failed to create an alternative bloc that would prevail over the blocs led by Iran and Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s standing in the regional power-game slumped more when Putin’s Russia took an opposing stand to Turkey in Syria. As the EU accession process froze and Washington lost its interest in Turkey’s being the model country, Ankara was isolated in international politics more than ever before. Ankara needed to reanimate its close relations with the West and, indeed, the AKP government found this chance when the EU needed Turkish cooperation to deal with the refugee problem while the United States sought Turkey’s help in the fight against ISIL terrorism. However, the refugee issue and terrorism threat could not create an effective rapprochement between Ankara and the West as domestic developments in Turkey kept damaging those relations. Unlike the pre-2009 years when the Western states backed the AKP government against the powerful state establishment in the name of democracy, since 2013 the AKP government has been regarded as the “bad guy” in Turkish politics and the critics of the Turkish government in the West did not welcome cooperation even in dire circumstances. While critical reports and news about democracy and the human rights situations in Turkey did not necessarily stop the urge to build security cooperation with Turkey at the government-level, it led to the flow of mixed messages from the West to Ankara about the future of Turkish-Western relations. On the Turkish side, the criticisms frustrate the President Erdoğan and the AKP officials whereas the need for security cooperation, the ongoing power struggle in the Middle East and the lack of alternative to the West keeps Ankara on the Western side. All in all, although Turkey re-focuses on its relations with the West in this new period, this rapprochement is based on necessity rather than a preference and because of this, it is not clear if Turkey will stay on the Western path.

72

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

On the preference for status quo, it is also possible to observe some degree of backpedaling as Ankara held rounds of reconciliation talks with Israel in this period to fix the relations broken in 2009, and has toned down its criticism of Israel’s Palestinian policy. In addition, similar to the 1990s, Turkey’s primary focus in the region again became the Kurdish threat in its neighborhood which increasingly affects its regional policies. Yet, these developments did not necessarily indicate a return to the preference for status quo. First, similar to the rapprochement with the West, Turkey’s increasing contact with Israel is the result of Turkey’s growing isolation in the Middle East instead of a mentality change. Indeed, Turkey did not give up his interest in being a regional power and shaping the region. The AKP government has maintained its confrontational position against some governments, such as al-Sisi’s Egypt and Assad’s Syria, while President Erdoğan blames Russia and Iran of committing massacres in Syria along with Assad regime. Second, Turkey’s renewed focus on the Kurdish threat did not push Turkey into a defensive position as in the 1990s. Today Ankara could not follow the policy of the preference for status quo even under the Kurdish threat as the political structure of the Middle East is ever-changing and the power struggle is open to different future scenarios. One of these scenarios is the Kurdish political structure in northern Syria and to prevent this Ankara knows it has to follow an offensive foreign policy around its unstable neighborhood. The alternative is to support the central government under Assad’s leadership, which is a total contradiction of the AKP’s Syrian policy in the last five years. All in all, it is impossible to prefer status quo when there is none, and at the time of change the Turkish government tries to play the regional leadership role even though its chances are not as high as in the period between 2009 and 2013. Conclusion This article attempted to explain change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP leadership through two main principles that have been followed since the foundation of the Republic: Westernization and preference for the status quo. Recently scholars and experts have given increasing attention to change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy. However, this literature mainly compares the pre-AKP years and AKP foreign policy and focuses on the “axis-shift” arguments which culminated in 2009-2011 as some scholars maintained that Islamist and anti-Western thinking became dominant in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. This article separates from this literature in two respects. First, this article deals with the change and continuity during the AKP leadership under three sub-periods whose domestic and international characteristics differ from each other. Therefore, it refrains from showing the AKP foreign policy as one constant and stable foreign-policy mindset as many scholars do. By analyzing the factors that explain change and continuity in AKP foreign policy, this article focuses more on the policy fluctuations and their reasons than some stable ideological variables. Second, I mainly focus on the principle of the preference for the status quo, rather than Westernization, in explaining change in Turkish foreign policy. While Turkey’s relations with the West has showed significant ups and downs during the AKP years, its objective to change the status quo in the Middle East and make Turkey a regional leader remained constant throughout the AKP rule. The findings show that the Western orientation is a constant phenomenon in Turkish foreign policy despite the fact that Ankara mainly focused on the Middle East

73

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

between 2009 and 2013 and prioritized its relations with the West less than other periods. However, during the AKP leadership the relations with the West were drastically shaped by domestic and international conditions. In the early AKP years, Turkish officials valued the close ties with the West in order to balance the threat of the state establishment to the civilian government. Although the Iraq War and Turkey’s rejection to the opening of a front in its territory caused a rift between Ankara and Washington until 2006, the government pursued the EU accession process which institutionally and politically helped the AKP government in the domestic power struggle. After 2009 relations with the West lost its importance as the EU accession process froze and the Obama administration encouraged Turkey to play an active role in the Middle East. Yet, with the international developments in the Middle East and Turkey’s growing isolation after 2013, Ankara and the West once more started a rapprochement. Yet, unlike in the early AKP years, this time domestic developments did not bring cooperation but caused a rift between the two sides. Although Turkey is still on the path of Westernization as a result of the lack of a potential alternative, it is unclear what the future will bring if there is no change in domestic and international conditions. The article argues that the real change in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP leadership took place on the principle of the preference for status quo. Throughout its history, except small periods during Özal’s presidency and Cem’s foreign ministry, Turkey followed a defensive foreign policy and refrained from getting involved in the internal affairs of other states. In its early years, similar to Özal and Cem, the AKP leaders attempted to follow active foreign policy around its neighborhood and tried to build close relations with multiple actors which were conceptualized with the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. While its main focus was the domestic power struggle, Ankara also played the moderator role in regional conflicts, more famously between Syria and Israel, but it principally avoided interfering in the internal affairs of the other states. This principle seemed changing in early 2009 when Erdoğan started heavily criticizing Israel’s Palestinian policy. As Erdoğan’s popularity in Turkey and on Arab streets increased, the Palestinian issue became the center of Turkey’s Middle East policy. However, the real divergence from the traditional policy of the preference for the status quo came with the Arab Spring in whose wake Turkey attempted to shape the region to its preferences by cooperating with Sunni groups in the Middle East. While this policy poisoned Ankara’s relations with multiple actors in the region and it failed, especially after 2013, Turkey still follows it as there is no more status quo to return to in the region. Although Turkey has little capacity to shape the region as it wants, its leaders will keep trying to influence regional developments and taking sides as a new Middle Eastern order is formed today.

74

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

Notes 1. Huxsoll, Regime, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, 18-20. 2. Holsti (ed.), Why Nations Realign; Goldmann, “Change and Stability in Foreign

Policy”; Hermann, “Changing Course”; Gustavsson, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change”; Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change”.

3. Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”, 26 October 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west (Accessed 2 May 2015); Özdal et al. (eds.), Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası; Cohen, “Washington Concerned as Turkey Leaving the West”; Yenigün and Efegil (eds.), Türkiye’nin Değişen Dış Politikası; Şahin, “Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikası”; Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy”; Özdal et al. (eds.), Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2; Kardaş, “Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Kayması mı?”; Özcan and Usul, “Understanding the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy”; Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy”; Çağaptay (ed.), “Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP”, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote03.pdf (Accessed 2 May 2015).

4. Barkey, “Erdogan’s Foreign Policy is in Ruins”, 4 February 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/04/erdogans-foreign-policy-is-in-ruins/ (Accessed 3 May 2016).

5. İdiz, “What Happened to Turkey’s Foreign Policy?”, 23 February 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-former-diplomats-say-islamist-outlook-cause-isolation.html (Accessed 3 May 2016).

6. Sander, “Türk Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri”; Oran, “Türk Dış Politikası”. 7. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 260. 8. Karluk, Avrupa Birliği Türkiye İlişkileri, 1. 9. Sander, “Türk Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri”, 108-110. 10. Şahin, “Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikası”, 10. 11. Ataman, “Leadership Change”; Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign

Policy”, 43-45. 12. Robins, “Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad”, 547. 13. Cornell, “Axis Shift”, 3. 14. Cohen, “Washington Concerned as Turkey Leaving the West”, 26. 15. Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”. 16. Akgün, “Turkey”, July 2010, https://mondediplo.com/blogs/turkey-what-axis-shift

(Accessed 7 May 2016). 17. Taşpınar, “The Rise of Turkish Gaullism”. 18. Hoffmann and Cemgil, “The (Un)making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East”. 19. Danforth, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy”. 20. Özcan and Usul, “Understanding the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy”. 21. Başer, “Shift-of-Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy”. 22. Kanat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy”, 205-206. 23. Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy”. 24. Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (Accessed 8 May 2016). 25. Boulton, “Turkey Says Mideast Needs Own EU”, 23 November 2011, http://

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13b35658-15ce-11e1-8db8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz42gpjRcfT (Accessed 9 May 2016).

75

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

26. Reuters, “France’s Hollande Warns of Risk of Turkey-Russia War over Syria”, 19 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-france-idUSKCN0VS2JC (Accessed 9 May 2016).

27. Gardner, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy of ‘Precious Loneliness’”, 15 November 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/69662b36-7752-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html#axzz42gpjRcfT (Accessed 9 May 2016).

28. Botelho, “Turkish Leader”, 10 February 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/10/middleeast/turkey-erdogan-criticizes-us/ (Accessed 9 May 2016).

29. Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, 1. 30. Sever, Abdullah Gül ile 12 Yıl, 43-44. 31. T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, “Türkiye’de Siyasi Reform”,

2007, http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/tsr.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2016). 32. Avrupa Komisyonu, “Türkiye 2006 İlerleme Raporu”, Brüksel, 2006, 6-7, http://

www.mfa.gov.tr/data/AB/IlerlemeRaporu_8Kasim2006_TamamininCevirisi1.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2016).

33. Balcı, “1990 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Bazı Notlar”, 94. 34. Tür, “Economic Relations with the Middle East under the AKP”, 593. 35. Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, 91. 36. Casier and Jongerden, Nationalism and Politics in Turkey, 30. 37. Gürsoy, “Turkish Public Attitudes toward the Military and Ergenekon”, 11. 38. Koç, “12 Eylül’den 12 Haziran’a Siyasi Partiler”, 16-17. 39. Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 342. 40. Tanış, POTUS ve Beyefendi, 44-45. 41. CNN, “Obama Says U.S., Turkey Can be Model for World”, 6 April 2009, http://

edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey/index.html?iref=mpstoryview (Accessed 14 May 2016).

42. Daloğlu, “Turkey Takes Sides”, 16 April 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/16/turkey-takes-sides-2/ (Accessed 14 May 2016).

43. Hürriyet Daily News, “Stop Palestinian Suffering for Mideast Peace, Says Erdoğan”, 19 October 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=stop-palestinians-suffering-for-mideast-peace-says-erdogan-2009-10-19 (Accessed 14 May 2016).

44. Haaretz, “Turkey PM”, 31 October 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-pm-if-you-don-t-want-iran-to-have-nukes-give-yours-up-1.5055 (Accessed 14 May 2016).

45. Ayata, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World”, 97,99. This policy, in fact, was in sync with the first reaction of the Obama administration towards the Arab Spring as the White House officials emphasized the concept to be on the “right side of the history” while they see the demonstrations, which are regarded as “the antithesis of al Qaeda,” as an opportunity to redesign the region in the direction of popular democracies led by moderate Islamic parties. Ross, Doomed to Succeed, 353-354.

46. Gümüşçü, “Turkey’s Peace Initiatives in the Middle East”, 44-45. 47. Karaveli, “Why Does Turkey Want Regime Change in Syria?”, 23 July 2012, http://

nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-does-turkey-want-regime-change-syria-7227 (Accessed 15 May 2016).

76

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

48. World Tribune, “Turkey Replaces Iran as Primary Funding Source for Hamas”, 22 December 2013, http://www.worldtribune.com/turkey-replaces-iran-as-primary-funding-source-for-hamas/ (Accessed 15 May 2016).

49. Seymour, “Istanbul Park Protests Sow the Seeds of a Turkish Spring”, 31 May 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/31/istanbul-park-protests-turkish-spring (Accessed 15 May 2016).

50. Esposito et al., Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, 43. 51. Akyol, “Unraveling the AKP’s ‘Mastermind’ Conspiracy Theory”, 19 March 2015,

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-zion-protocols-akp-version.html (Accessed 16 May 2016).

52. Barkey, “Obama’s New Problem”, 23 January 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/turkey-united-states-obama-pronlem.html (Accessed 16 May 2016).

53. Stein, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, 45-47. 54. ibid., 65. 55. Radikal, “Erdoğan”, 9 May 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-

suriyede-kirmizi-cizgi-coktan-asildi-1132885/ (Accessed 16 May 2016). 56. Daily Sabah, “No Differentiation Between Terror Organizations, President Erdoğan

Says”, 23 February 2016, http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/23/no-differentiation-between-terror-organizations-president-erdogan-says (Accessed 16 May 2016).

57. Kuru, “Turkey’s Failed Policy toward the Arab Spring”, 109. 58. Deutsche Welle, “European Parliament Slams Turkey over Deterioration of Rights

and Democracy”, 14 April 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/european-parliament-slams-turkey-over-deterioration-of-rights-and-democracy/a-19189464 (Accessed 17 May 2016); United States Department of State, “Turkey 2015 Human Rights Report”, 18 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253121.pdf (Accessed 17 May 2016).

59. Deutsche Welle, “Turkey’s Erdogan Rejects Western ‘Lessons in Democracy’”, 5 April 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-rejects-western-lessons-in-democracy/a-19163842 (Accessed 17 May 2016).

77

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

Bibliography Akgün, Mensur, “Turkey: What Axis Shift?”, July 2010, https://mondediplo.com/blogs/turkey-what-axis-shift (Accessed 7 May 2016). Akyol, Mustafa, “Unraveling the AKP’s ‘Mastermind’ Conspiracy Theory”, 19 March 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-zion-protocols-akp-version.html (Accessed 16 May 2016). Ataman, Muhittin, “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No 1, 2002, p.120-153. Avrupa Komisyonu, “Türkiye 2006 İlerleme Raporu”, Brüksel, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/AB/IlerlemeRaporu_8Kasim2006_TamamininCevirisi1.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2016). Ayata, Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing Arab World: Rise and Fall of a Regional Actor?”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 37, No 1, 2015, pp. 95-112. Balcı, Ali, “1990 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Bazı Notlar: Avrupa Birliği ve Kıbrıs Örneği”, Yenigün, Cüneyt and Efegil, Ertan (eds.), Türkiye’nin Değişen Dış Politikası, Ankara, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2010. Barkey, Henri, “Obama’s New Problem: Turkey”, 23 January 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/turkey-united-states-obama-pronlem.html (Accessed 16 May 2016). Barkey, Henri, “Erdogan’s Foreign Policy is in Ruins”, 4 February 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/04/erdogans-foreign-policy-is-in-ruins/ (Accessed 3 May 2016). Barnett, Michael, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No 1, 1999, pp. 5-36. Başer, Ekrem T., “Shift-of-Axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 16, No 3, 2015, pp. 291-309. Botelho, Greg, “Turkish Leader: U.S. Responsible for ‘Sea of Blood’ for Supporting Syrian Kurds”, 10 February 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/10/middleeast/turkey-erdogan-criticizes-us/ (Accessed 9 May 2016). Boulton, Leyla, “Turkey Says Mideast Needs Own EU”, 23 November 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/13b35658-15ce-11e1-8db8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz42gpjRcfT (Accessed 9 May 2016). Casier, Marlies and Jongerden, Joost, Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism, and the Kurdish Issue, New York, Routledge, 2011. CNN, “Obama Says U.S., Turkey Can be Model for World”, 6 April 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey/index.html?iref=mpstoryview (Accessed 14 May 2016). Cohen, Ariel, “Washington Concerned as Turkey Leaving the West”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 9, No 3, 2010, pp. 25-35. Cornell, Svante, “Axis Shift”, in Çağaptay, Soner (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP: The Rift with Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes, No 3, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote03.pdf (Accessed 2 May 2015). Çağaptay, Soner, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”, 26 October 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west (Accessed 2 May 2015).

78

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

Çağaptay, Soner (ed.), “Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP: The Rift with Washington,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes, No 3, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote03.pdf (Accessed 2 May 2015). Daily Sabah, “No Differentiation Between Terror Organizations, President Erdoğan Says”, 23 February 2016, http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/02/23/no-differentiation-between-terror-organizations-president-erdogan-says (Accessed 16 May 2016). Daloğlu, Tülin, “Turkey Takes Sides”, 16 April 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/16/turkey-takes-sides-2/ (Accessed 14 May 2016). Danforth, Nicholas, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No 3, 2008, pp. 83-95. Deutsche Welle, “Turkey’s Erdogan Rejects Western ‘Lessons in Democracy’”, 5 April 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-rejects-western-lessons-in-democracy/a-19163842 (Accessed 17 May 2016). Deutsche Welle, “European Parliament Slams Turkey over Deterioration of Rights and Democracy”, 14 April 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/european-parliament-slams-turkey-over-deterioration-of-rights-and-democracy/a-19189464 (Accessed 17 May 2016). Esposito, John L. et al., Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, New York, Oxford University, 2016. Frey, Frederick W., The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1965. Gardner, David, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy of ‘Precious Loneliness’,” 15 November 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/69662b36-7752-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html#axzz42gpjRcfT (Accessed 9 May 2016). Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obama Doctrine”, April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (Accessed 8 May 2016). Goldmann, Kjell, “Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Detente as a Problem of Stabilization”, World Politics, Vol. 34, No 2, 1982, pp. 230-266. Gustavsson, Jacob, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 34, No 1, 1999, pp. 73-95. Gümüşçü, Şebnem, “Turkey’s Peace Initiatives in the Middle East: A Tragic Turn of Events”, Eralp, Doğa Ulaş (ed.), Turkey as a Mediator: Stories of Success and Failure, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2016. Gürsoy, Yaprak, “Turkish Public Attitudes toward the Military and Ergenekon: Consequences for the Consolidation of Democracy,” İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Working Paper No 5, 2012, http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2014/05/21/working_paper_5_.pdf (Accessed 12 May 2016). Haaretz, “Turkey PM: If You Don’t Want Iran to Have Nukes, Give Yours Up”, 31 October 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-pm-if-you-don-t-want-iran-to-have-nukes-give-yours-up-1.5055 (Accessed 14 May 2016). Hale, William and Özbudun, Ergün, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, New York, Routledge, 2010. Hermann, Charles F., “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No 1, 1990, pp. 3-21. Hoffmann, Clemens and Cemgil, Can, “The (Un)making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social-Historical Roots of Foreign Policy”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2016, pp. 1-24.

79

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

Holsti, K. J. (ed.), Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World, London, Allen & Unwin, 1982. Huxsoll, David B., Regime, Institutions and Foreign Policy Change, Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, The Department of Political Science, 2003. Hürriyet Daily News, “Stop Palestinian Suffering for Mideast Peace, Says Erdoğan,” 19 October 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=stop-palestinians-suffering-for-mideast-peace-says-erdogan-2009-10-19 (Accessed 14 May 2016). İdiz, Semih, “What Happened to Turkey’s Foreign Policy?”, 23 February 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-former-diplomats-say-islamist-outlook-cause-isolation.html (Accessed 3 May 2016). Kanat, Kılıç Buğra, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No 1, 2010, pp. 205-225. Karaveli, Halil, “Why Does Turkey Want Regime Change in Syria?”, 23 July 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-does-turkey-want-regime-change-syria-7227 (Accessed 15 May 2016). Kardaş, Şaban, “Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Kayması mı?”, Akademik Orta Doğu, Vol. 5, No 2, 2011, pp. 19-42. Karluk, Rıdvan, Avrupa Birliği Türkiye İlişkileri: Bir Çıkmaz Sokak, İstanbul, Beta Basım, 2013. Kirişçi, Kemal, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No 40, 2009, pp. 29-57. Koç, Yaşar Taşkı, “12 Eylül’den 12 Haziran’a Siyasi Partiler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi”, SETA Analiz, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/12-eylulden-12-hazirana-siyasal-partiler-ak-parti.pdf (Accessed 12 May 2016). Kuru, Ahmet T., “Turkey’s Failed Policy toward the Arab Spring: Three Levels of Analysis”, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 26, No 3, 2015, pp. 94-116. Oran, Baskın, “Türk Dış Politikası: Temel İlkeleri ve Soğuk Savaş Ertesindeki Durumu Üzerine Notlar”, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Vol. 51, No 1, 1996, p.353-370. Öniş, Ziya, “Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No 1, 2011, pp. 47-65. Özcan, Mesut and Usul, Ali Resul, “Understanding the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes Within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing from the West?”, USAK Yearbook, Vol. 4, 2011, p . 159-185. Özdal, Habibe et al. (eds.), Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara, USAK Yayınları, 2009. Özdal, Habibe, Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 2, Ankara, USAK Yayınları, 2010. Radikal, “Erdoğan: Suriye’de Kırmızı Çizgi Çoktan Aşıldı”, 9 May 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-suriyede-kirmizi-cizgi-coktan-asildi-1132885/ (Accessed 16 May 2016). Reuters, “France’s Hollande Warns of Risk of Turkey-Russia War over Syria”, 19 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-france-idUSKCN0VS2JC (Accessed 9 May 2016). Robins, Philip, “Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq”, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No 3, 2003, pp. 547-566. Ross, Dennis, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015. Sander, Oral, “Türk Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri”, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF

80

C

on

tin

uit

y o

r C

han

ge in

Tu

rkis

h F

ore

ign

Po

licy?

...

Journal of

Global Analysis

Dergisi, Vol. 37, No 3, 1982, pp. 105-124. Sever, Ahmet, Abdullah Gül ile 12 Yıl: Yaşadım, Gördüm, Yazdım, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2015. Seymour, Richard, “Istanbul Park Protests Sow the Seeds of a Turkish Spring”, 31 May 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/31/istanbul-park-protests-turkish-spring (Accessed 15 May 2016). Stein, Aaron, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Davutoglu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order, Philadelphia, Taylor and Francis, 2014. Şahin, Mehmet, “Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikası: Süreklilik ve Değişim”, Akademik Orta Doğu, Vol. 4, No 2, 2010, pp. 9-21. T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği, “Türkiye’de Siyasi Reform: Uyum Paketleri ve Güncel Gelişmeler”, Ankara, 2007, http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/tsr.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2016). Tanış, Tolga, POTUS ve Beyefendi: 2002 Gün Türkiye-Amerika İlişkisinin İnişli Çıkışlı Hikayesi, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2015. Taşpınar, Ömer, “The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No 1, 2011, pp. 11-17. Tür, Özlem, “Economic Relations with the Middle East under the AKP - Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No 4, pp. 589-602. United States Department of State, “Turkey 2015 Human Rights Report”, 18 April 2016, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253121.pdf (Accessed 17 May 2016). World Tribune, “Turkey Replaces Iran as Primary Funding Source for Hamas”, 22 December 2013, http://www.worldtribune.com/turkey-replaces-iran-as-primary-funding-source-for-hamas/ (Accessed 15 May 2016). Yenigün Cüneyt and Efegil, Ertan (eds.), Türkiye’nin Değişen Dış Politikası, Ankara, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, 2010.

81

Co

nti

nu

ity

or

Ch

ange

in T

urk

ish

Fo

reig

n P

olic

y? ..

.

Journal of

Global Analysis

www.cesran.org

Esra Özyürek Being German, Becoming Muslim. Race, Religion and Conversion in the New Europe Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015, ISBN: 978-0-691-16279-9, 171 pp., $24.95 | £18.95 Esra Özyürek’s newest book, “Being German, Becoming Muslim. Race, Religion and Conversion in the New Europe” discusses difficulties Muslims face when Islam is racialized in processes of group identity construction. Based on her lengthy research and fieldwork among Muslim communities in Germany, Özyürek’s book moves between the experiences of German convert Muslims and those of German Muslim youth with immigration background. The book starts by setting Islam historically as a part and parcel of German society, following in six chapters Özyürek’s accounts and analysis on how also today Islam is a way of life for many citizens who simultaneously have a strong German national and cultural identity, yet have found their spiritual calling in this Abrahamic religion. Özyürek’s ethnographic approach gives the reader insight into a wide range of Islamic life from German living rooms to multicultural youth camps and Salafist mosques. One of Özyürek’s main findings is that Germany’s geo-political past affects the way new Muslims have approached Islam in different parts of the country. The book’s narratives reveal how Eastern Germans have found their way to Islam largely after the collapse of the Berlin wall and through a spiritual journey rather than through established contacts with Muslims. In Özyürek’s analysis, Islam’s role for these converts is similar to those who choose the Salafi path amongst many different interpretations of Islam; finding solace and brotherhood in religion when dealing with identity crises or feelings of instability in own life. The book gives a voice also to those German Muslims, who are descendants of immigrant parents. In her research, Özyürek focuses on young people, who similarly to converts, break from traditions of their own families and resettle in German society and the multiethnic Muslim community. Like Özyürek’s convert interviewees, these “born Muslims” experience social discrimination from the majority society, and their “Germanness” is questioned. Thus, to define their distinctive religious and cultural identity, both groups disassociate themselves from national Muslim communities and mosques, live in multiethnic marriages and prefer Islamic learning in the German language and social context. However, Özyürek’s interviews and observations also show the social discrepancies within the bigger Muslim community in Germany. Often, xenophobic resentment

84

BOOK REVIEW

Journal

of

Global

Analysis

Book

Rev

iew

against Muslim immigrants drives Muslim converts to react and establish a distinct convert identity by taking distance from “born Muslims”. Residence location, dress, and constructing an image of the convert Muslim being socially and religiously on a higher level, helps to define the Self different from the foreign Other, who – according to Özyürek’s interviewees – does not live by the “real, pure Islam”. For many German converts, the new Self is a proactive Muslim whose Islamic lifestyle, rationality and values follow the principles of German Enlightenment. Yet, Özyürek’s argument on converts employing almost Orientalist strategies for their identity construction leaves a rather negatively laden picture of ethnic German Muslims. As an ethnographic work that acknowledges the limits of its own scope, the conclusions are sometimes too generalizing and insensitive to possible variations. For example, Özyürek’s Eastern German interviewees were only those who were raised and lived in the GDR and with no contact to Muslims. Hence, experiences of Eastern German converts of a post-wall-generation might be different, as for instance conversion is now more probable to be facilitated through friendships and relationships with Muslims. Özyürek also argues, that for many, Salafism is merely a phase in the beginning of the conversion. However, it would have been interesting to learn whether there are exceptions in which a person has stayed for several years in that path or opted for it only in the later years of conversion, as in this aspect Özyürek’s sample – or her analysis of it – lacks of such individuals. For renegotiating one’s identity the title of the book suggests two identity construction processes: one “being German,” which is envisioned as static, and the other “becoming Muslim”, described as a dynamic identification. Yet, along the chapters the reader learns that conversion processes are dynamic both in their religious as well as cultural aspects. While finding the suitable path in Islam from Sufism to Salafism, converts also must simultaneously review their national and cultural identity, to come to terms with a “Germanness” that does not include drinking alcohol or eating pork schnitzels. Although this might seem banal, the reality is often rather complicated for those who have to proof themselves worthy of their “Germanness” in the eyes of their families, friends and the public, when converting to Islam. To describe such developments in convert Muslims identities, Özyürek introduces in the beginning of her book the concepts “double-consciousness” and “queering ethnicity”. It would be beneficial for the reader not familiar with these concepts, which are indeed fruitful to discuss phenomena of conversion in contexts where religions are racialized, to benefit more of an explicit discussion how they are connected to Özyürek’s findings. The discussion in the book also fails to acknowledge the fallacy in the objective of convert Muslims trying to live by a “culture-free” Islam as opposed to the immigrant Muslims. While they do not want to adhere to Arab or Turkish cultural traits mixed into the Islamic lifestyle, they for instance create a “cultural German Islam” when they offer their children Ramadan-calendars instead of Christmas-calendars. Thus, it should follow, that religion and culture are always intertwined, as no human life is completely separated of its local context. The book is very timely and a recommendable read for policy makers who deal with intercultural and multi-religious contexts. Islam’s attractiveness for indigenous

85

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

Europeans grows constantly and with the demographic developments that many countries deal with regarding both their old immigrant communities and the new ones, the book helps to understand the variety of identities that Muslims in Europe adhere to. It offers students and researchers from a wide range of disciplines manifold insights to the experiences of German Muslims, who have embraced Islam while being in-between, neither quite part of the majority society nor same-minded with rather “traditional immigrant Muslims”. By combining research and narrations from interviews with her own analysis Özyürek’s book in total is a pleasure to read. It is a depiction that is based on real life experiences, but should be read with the disclaimer that there are still many more to explore.

Linda Hyökki Alliance of Civilizations Institute

Fatih Sultan Mehmet Waqf University, Istanbul Email: lindahyokki@gmail.com

86

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

Kerri Woods Human Rights New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-230-30274-7, 209 pp., $120.00 Human rights are an integral part of our political and legal language, acting as a moral authoritative compass for what is right or wrong. The branding alone of an action, legislation, or policy as a violation of human rights would severely damage its legitimacy. We regularly talk about human rights and identify them as important in interpreting right and wrong. Nonetheless, at the same time it seems that we cannot agree on what human rights are and when they should be applied or not. This paradox of broad acceptance of human rights as an authoritative moral guide while not being able to define it properly is the entry point of Kerri Wood’s book. Kerri Wood’s Human Rights tackles this paradox by systematically demystifying the concept of human rights, taking the reader into the historical development of the concept, the philosophical and political foundations of human rights, and eventually into an introduction to vital contemporary debates on the topic. The book is organized into nine chapters, with the first introducing the challenge of trying to define human rights. The next three chapters attend to the historical, philosophical, and political perspectives on the development of human rights. Chapters five, six, and seven present important debates that converse with the development described in the former chapters. The last two chapters highlight urgent current debates on human rights. The first chapter directly addresses the question of what a human right is. Wood does not try to provide a definitive answer to this question. Instead, she introduces ways to conceptualize rights so the reader would be better equipped with differentiating human rights from claims of human rights. These conceptualizations guide the reader through the next chapters. The second chapter provides the historical dimension of the development of the human rights discourse, introducing the reader to the events that contributed to the emergence of the human rights regime as we know it today. Woods focuses here on three key historical moments in the development of human rights. The first is the Natural Rights debate as it was inspired by the American and French revolutions. The second focuses on the 19th century socialist response to the industrial revolution, with emphasis on the abolitionist movement. The third historical moment presented is the creation of the global human rights regime in the post-WWII world. The third and fourth chapters examine the philosophical foundations of human rights, its critics, and the political views emerging in this dialogue. The author introduces several important discussions pertaining the question of why we have human rights, addressing the work of Christopher McRudden, Michael Freeman, Richard Rorty, and others. In the fourth chapter Woods presents the outcome of these discussions. Here the focus shifted of the undecided debates into what is referred to as the “political view” of human rights. The next three chapters correspond with the “political view”, focusing on some of its major challengers. The fifth chapter examines two fundamental sets of questions

87

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

related to religion and human rights. The first explores the possible conflict between human rights as a secular term and the religious interpretation of human rights; and the second the tension between the “political view” and the Islamic interpretation of human rights. The next chapter introduces the debate of Universalism and Relativism in relations to human rights, with emphasis on the feminist critique of human rights definitions and scope. The seventh chapter expands upon some of the discussions of group rights, multiculturalism and, and minority rights presented in the sixth chapter. Chapters eight and nine target global justice and environmental human rights, respectably; two contemporary debates that have recently been at the center of human rights debates. The chapters look at the counterpart human rights’ duties and their limitations, including the human rights of future generations. In this book Woods attempts to cover substantial ground while avoiding the simplification of the philosophical and legal arguments. Her success in doing so is this book’s advantage, but also the source of my main critique. This approach, though laudable, is always challenging and invites critique. From my reading two main critics stood out: accessibility and coherency. First, the complicated language and ideas presented are not always accessible. Woods uses legal and philosophical terms and concepts that are not fully explored or explained, leaving the reader with a feeling that they miss something. The reading becomes even less accessible as Woods make an effort to exhibit how theories and concepts corresponds with one another across chapters, creating a convoluted web of influences. Woods attempt to incorporate multiple important points and debates generated an incoherent book structure that is sometimes hard to follow. I believe that a genealogy of the discourses presented, as an appendix or illustration, would have provided a useful guide to Woods' complex discussion, aiding readers' comprehension. Regardless, Human Rights is an important and effective contribution to the human rights literature. As mentioned earlier, Wood assumed an ambitious and challenging task and handled it well. The book’s two main strong points are its comprehensive review of both the foundations of the human rights discourse (historical, philosophical, and legal/political) as well as the presentation of the main debates in the field (universalism, feminist, religion and others). In both instances the author demonstrates a high level of understanding and careful attention to details. Additionally, the author navigates through historical, philosophical, and political landmarks that are essential readings for human rights researchers. These two points provide an effective introduction to the study of human rights. I see this book as important reading material and reference book for human rights researchers and political theory scholars.

Dr. Ori Swed The University of Texas at Austin

E-mail: oriswed@utexas.edu

88

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

Diana C. Mutz In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015, ISBN: 978-0-691-16511-0, 263 pp., £22.95 hb “I wish we lived in the day where you could challenge a person to a duel,” Georgia Senator Zell Miller said to Chris Matthews during coverage of the 2004 Republican National Convention. In a 2016 primaries debate, Donald Trump, who has made insulting people a central feature of his presidential campaign, called Texas Senator Ted Cruz “the single biggest liar." It is widely held that incivility in political discourse is destructive to the democratic process and governance. Scholars, journalists, politicians and citizens argue it is on the rise. Uncivil political behavior and associated concerns about the effects of incivility on democracy makes Diana C. Mutz’s latest contribution to the field, In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media, compelling and timely. Mutz researches public opinion, political psychology and mass political behavior, with a particular emphasis on political communication at Penn where she teaches and holds the Samuel A. Stouffer Chair in Political Science and Communication. As Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics, founded at Penn in 2003, she oversees research on the ways citizens interact with the political world. Mutz’s award-winning work includes: “Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes” (2004) and “Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy” (2006). Mutz lays out the rigorous research of In-Your-Face Politics with clear and often humorous writing that balances accessibility for non-specialists with engaging and thorough coverage for those working in the field. Mutz defines “uncivil discourse” as communication that violates the norms of politeness for a given culture. She applies what is widely known about social norms and spatial proximity to explicate in-you-face politics. She wrote: “It refers to both the level of incivility and the up-close and personal way that viewers experience political conflict on TV” (5). Mutz draws upon well-established knowledge within the fields of linguistics, evolutionary psychology, political theory, and communication to explore the unique visual perspective television produces, which is more intimate than we are accustomed to having with complete strangers. Numerous studies focus attention on print media or face-to-face interaction in national political forums and in local public forums where there is direct citizen participation in governance. Mutz, however, examines televised, uncivil political discourse. Because of its audio and visual elements, television has the capacity to arouse positive or negative emotions about uncivil political phenomena in ways that print or radio media does not. Her book addresses whether norm violations typical in face-to-face interactions have consequences when they occur on television. She posits that being “in the viewer’s face” matters because of the stakes concomitant to how citizens react to politicians, political engagement, and governance. The rules of civility permit people of diverse positions to discuss differences in a courteous and considerate manner. Through a series of original studies, using a

89

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

representative national survey experiment and survey data from the National Annenberg Election Panel Study (2008, providing extensive data about viewership of specific political programs) Mutz demonstrates that breaking the rules of civility has a mixed bag of consequences. However, Sobieraj and Berry argue in “From Incivility to Outrage” (Political Communication, 2011) that Mutz is not addressing the most pressing danger to deliberative democracy—outrage. They define it as “something grander” involving the intention to provoke anger, moral indignation—extreme emotions—through the use of sensationalism, ad hominem attacks, and other outrageous speech. Outrage, they claim, is not political deliberation but melodramatic, verbal competition. The authors are correct, understanding outrage in important, but that does not diminish the need to explore how incivility functions. Mutz lays out compelling evidence that in-your-face politics has consequences for the democratic process that should not be ignored. Her hypothesis is that the way conflict is portrayed in political television produces a negative reaction in viewers because it violates the real-world social norms people are accustomed to. The experimental, multi-design research of In-Your-Face Politics is ambitious, including a political talk show produced by Mutz to obtain a high level of control over the experimental stimuli and laboratory experiments incorporating adults who were not college students. In addition to a rigorous series of experiments, Mutz draws upon her earlier ideas that appear in essays and book projects. She uses a series of seven different laboratory experiments, some including psycho-physiological measures, among other resources to explore her research questions. Mutz is interested in effects of communication styles rather than the political substance of messages. I.e., rather than negative appeals or polarizing issues, she isolates behaviors considered impolite in face-to-face interactions. However, “in the absence of meaningful information about content,” Sobieraj and Berry argue, “questions of effects, … , are premature (2011). This is an insightful observation, but it is a claim that requires evidence. Mutz’s findings confirm her hypothesis that people respond to television in “fundamentally social ways.” To arrive at this she investigates the effects of incivility in three domains: arousal and memory, public perception of the legitimacy of political opponents, and political trust. Mutz writes: “Importantly, arousal is a state of excitation that involves activation of the autonomic nervous system and heightened activity in both mind and body … Our bodies are energized and prepared for action” (19). As in real-world situations, the sense of physical closeness produced by close-up camera shots intensifies viewers’ emotional reaction to the subject. Breach of another’s personal space is a norm violation in American culture. Particularly, when the offender is someone we dislike or disagree with we tend keep our distance, which is not possible with televised political shows. Hence, the viewer experiences emotional arousal. Mutz finds that incivility is not detrimental among those who share similar views however it has a negative effect on the perceived legitimacy of the political opposition. Trust in government, politicians and politics are, likewise, negatively affected by incivility.

90

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

The costs of polarization and loss of trust are high, but the effects of in-your-face politics are not entirely disadvantageous. Though close-up camera perspectives and in-your-face discourse intensifies the negative affect viewers have for disliked politicians and issue positions, it heightens viewer involvement. Politicians express their negative reaction to it and citizens say the vitriol is detrimental to their feelings about politics. Yet, uncivil political talk shows hold viewers’ attention. Mutz finds that not only does incivility expose citizens to the deliberative process, it aids recall, and boosts viewer’s desire to share what they have learned “even when the arousal is not due to the information that is being shared.” The widely held view is that incivility in political discourse is on the rise. Calls for greater civility are rising in response. However, Mutz posits that political discourse is no more uncivil than earlier times; it is our unprecedented exposure to such exchanges that is on the rise. My observation is that, in addition to increased exposure, how we experience these interactions as a result of technological advancements is affecting our perception of increased incivility. The prescriptions for in-your-face politics proffered by Mutz have been criticized. Some are fair assessments. The investment of additional work to make the recommended solutions more clear if not more developed is needed. Nevertheless, In-Your-Face Politics is an important work. The legitimacy of democratic outcomes depends upon the contestation of political options. It is through access to political deliberation that citizens gain awareness of opposing views and their justifications. In-Your-Face Politics is a useful investigation into incivility, its negative and positive effects on viewers, and how it functions in support of deliberative democracy. It is a well-written treatment of rigorous research that scholars and students of communication, journalism, and political science will appreciate having access to in their institutions’ libraries.

Z. Hall Independent Scholar

Email: zhall@finepoint-media.com

91

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

Ahmed Mohsen Al-Dawoody The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-349-29386-5, 337 pp., pb. The book under review attempts to “examine the justifications for and the regulations of the use of force under Islamic law in both international and domestic armed conflicts” (p. 4). It consists of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. Based on the Muslim classical and contemporary literature juxtaposing against the Western sources, it adopts a comparative approach to reach its conclusion. Chapter one examines the wars that took place during the Prophet’s lifetime, and that are recorded in the early Sirah literature. Al-Dawoody observes that the failure of Western scholarship to recognize and understand Ghazwat and Siyar of the Prophet as offensive attacks is misleading and distorts the tradition of war in Islam. He maintains and shows that the meaning of Ghazwat denotes all the Prophet’s travels and does not necessarily mean a raid, fighting or battle as Western scholars are confused it with its pre-Islamic meaning (pp. 22-23). Chapter two attempts to explore the Qur’anic texts and their ways in which the Qur’an justifies warfare. Al-Dawoody concedes that there is a “full contradictory readings on the context of the incidents of war” (p. 45) in the Muslim and Western literature. After examining all the relevant Qur’anic verses and the views of some modern Muslim scholars such as Rashid Rida, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Syed Qutb, and Maulana Maududi, he maintains that the so-called sword verses (9:5; 9:29)—which the Western scholars often accused the Qur’ān calls for holy war against non-Muslims—are misquoted without discussing the facts leading to the fighting (p. 65). Although, he admits that Qutb and Maududi advocated a revolutionary theory of Jihād calling for continuous struggle for the implementation of Islamic principles. However, he believes that the Qur’anic justification (casus belli) of war is aggression, persecution (fitnah) irrespective of the oppressor’s religion. (p. 69). Chapter three examines the justifications for war and Islamic attitudes towards non-Muslims in the classical Islamic juridical theory of international law and modern Islamic writings on the issue. Al-Dawoody observes that the major “common error in Western scholarship in the area of Islamic international law is the confusion between Sharī‘ah and fiqh” (p. 71). For Al-Dawoody, Sharī‘ah is a permanent divine law while as fiqh represents individual interpretations of jurists, exegetics conditioned in particular historical and socio-political atmosphere. This crucial mistake turns these individual interpretations of a particular circumstance into “an allegedly sacred and unchangeable Sharī‘ah”, the divine law (p. 73). Chapter four discusses the regulations governing war in international armed conflicts under Islamic law. Refuting the grave allegations of the dominant Western scholarship about Jihād, eight major issues concerning the conduct of war in Islam that Islamic jurists have mainly focused that, according to the author, are “relevant to contemporary issues of world security” (p. 110). The issues are Noncombatant Immunity; Human Shield; Night Attack; Mutilation; Weapons; Property Destruction;

92

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

Quarter and Safe Conduct; and Prisoners of War. Quoting Roger C. Algase that the Islamic law of war “strikes a balance between necessity and respect for human life in manner which gives a higher priority to saving the lives of non-combatants than does modern international law” (pp. 109-110). Chapter five discusses internal/domestic armed conflicts/hostilities and terrorism; and the justifications and regulations for the use of force in these conflicts in Islamic law. This chapter is interesting. Al-Dawoody picks two important conflicts discussed under Islamic rulings. These are bughāh (rebellion), and ḥirābah (bandits, robbers etc.). Except under a few conditions, the classic Muslim Jurists strongly prohibited rebellion against the head of state/ruler in order to prevent political instability and bloodbath of Muslims. He further observes that Islamic law provides considerable degree of tolerance dealing with its internal opponents (p. 157); thus preventing a potential civil conflict at par with the “current international approach to resolving civil conflicts through negotiations and reconciliation” (p. 162). Coming to ḥirābah which exemplifies a group of citizens attacking, intimidating, robbing, killing or terrorizing innocent civilians of the Islamic state. The nature of the crime of ḥirābah makes its punishment severest in Islamic (based on the Qur’anic verses 5:33-34) because it constitutes not only an aggression against the individual victims, but also an attack on the security, peace, and economy of society as a whole”. (p. 182). While discussing the contemporary terrorism, he expresses displeasure on the way terrorism is being studied in the West, let alone the definition of “terrorism”. Al-Dawoody observes, “to determine whether such terrorist activities are Islamically justifiable by judging them according to Islamic law itself and not merely accepting at face value the terrorists’ justification for their acts as Islamic” (p. 189). The term “Islamic terrorism” thus stands a misnomer. Al-Dawoody believes that the Islamic law of war would make enormous contribution toward international peace and security in the modern world. Said that, there are some shortcomings that can be levelled against the book. First, the ḥadith literature which consists a wealth of traditions on the Jihād concept, has not been given its due palace in the book. In the first three chapters, perhaps only two references to ḥadith (pp. 79, 80) are found; otherwise, Al-Dawoody’s discussion towards his conclusion would become complex. Secondly, the contradictory treatment with regard to Muslim classical jurists’ interpretations and their understandings is perplexing. At some places, he undermines their authority (see, for example, pp. 44, 73, 121, 141, 143), while at other instances, he is not behind to give them due credibility (see, for example, pp. 82, 202). Thirdly, while discussing abrogation in the Qur’an, he superficially engages with 9:5 verse, which is important while dealing with the Jihād concept. Based on three scholars’ views, the author’s stand that the verse 9:5 is abrogated by the verse 47:4 (p. 65), is surprising because he first rejects the abrogation of other verses by the same 9:5 verse. Finally, the title of the book does not seem appropriate; it should have been The Muslim Law of War, for the author does not seem to have properly defended the “Islamic” and as his arguments are also based on the same classical jurists (Muslims) he fails to acknowledge their interpretations are Islam in the strict sense of the word. Apart from these limitations, Al-Dawoody deserves appreciation for bringing such a timely book, incisively presented, simple to understand, and a must read for all those concerned to understand the Muslim concept of Jihād. It forms a formidable

93

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

contribution to its study and one, which undergraduate, graduate and research students alike, will find engaging.

Muhammad Yaseen Gada Aligarh Muslim University, India

E-mail: myyaseenm2@gmail.com

94

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

Bernard Rougier & Stephane Lacroix (eds.) Egypt’s Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, ISBN: 978-1-137-56322-4, 281 pp. $89.63 Egypt has always been a central country in the Arab and Islamic Worlds; therefore, its 2011 revolution has caught the attention of many academics. Egypt’s Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements represents an attempt to understand what happened in Egypt since 2011 in order to make sense of where to the country is heading. The book is divided into four parts preceded by an introduction. In their introduction, the editors shed lights on the contradictory dynamics that shaped the 2011 revolution. In their view, the contrasting motives and visions of the main political actors (Islamists, the military, liberals, trade unionists, and revolutionaries) are the keys to understanding the political and institutional instability that plagued Egypt from the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 to the fall of Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Part one—The Muslim Brotherhood Faces the Test of Power— focuses on the rise and fall of the group. Patrick Haenni blames the MB for their obsession of providing stability through governance (the completion of the institutional framework) instead of governmentality (consultation and openness to the political class). On his part, Marie Vannetzel sheds light on the internal dynamics of the MB and its effect on the group’s societal appeal. In his view, acquiring a legal status was a major challenge as the group’s existence was always related to its prohibition. Moving to the economic aspect, Amr Adly argues that the political failure of Islamists is the product of their inability to overcome the structural contradictions of Egypt’s political economy. Adly highlights some of the root causes of the revolution, but he does not provide a specific recipe to overcome them. He leaves the reader wondering about the valid alternatives that could have been available to the MB while in power. Part two deals with Government, Institutions and Political Processes. Clement Steuer argues that post-revolutionary elections will have a long lasting imprint on Egypt’s political life. On his part, Nathan Brown shows how the Judiciary perceived the revolution as a challenge that increased with the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. He sees the real contest in the future to be between the forces of popular sovereignty and democracy on one hand, and bureaucracy and professionalism on the other. On his part, Zaid Al Ali critically analyses Egypt’s 2014 constitution highlighting some of its major drawbacks: the excessive independence of state’s institutions, the unimproved status of civil and political rights and the lack of any enforcing mechanism, and the tilted balance of power in favor of the presidency. Meanwhile, Bernard Rougier and Hala Bayoumi introduce a sociological reading of the Egyptian voting patterns in the 2011-2013 elections. Through a quantitative analysis of the electoral data, they shed light on the relationship between the social category and political preference as well as the social and geographical cleavages that currently divide the Egyptian society. Part three concentrates on Social Actors and Protest Movements. Stephane Lacroix and Ahmed Shalata explain the rise of revolutionary Salafism after 2011 showing how it benefited from the mobilizing networks that existed before the revolution. They

95

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

believe that the brutal repression of the current regime will probably lead to radicalization among segments of Islamists. On his part, Ismail Alexandrani gives a rich analytical account of the situation in Sinai and the different phases of jihadism there. His main argument seems to be that the state’s policies toward the area, particularly the current military operations, are the real production of terrorism. Alexandrani’s deep understanding and knowledge of local communities provide him with an extensive network of sources. This, however, sometimes negatively affects his chapter by looking more like an investigative report than an academic piece of writing. Nadine Abdalla shifts the focus to the labor movement by analyzing the challenges facing its institutionalization and relationship to politics since January 25, 2011 revolution. According to Abdulla, Tthere is no consensus on the legal framework regulating the unions, in addition to the latter’s low efficiency resulting from the lack of state recognition, experience and financial resources. Gaetar Du Roy discusses another social actor: the Copts. He argues that the challenge facing the Copts after the fall of the MB is great because they have to push for their demands without siding with the current regime. The reader was still wondering about the role of the Coptic Church itself as a social actor and its relationship to Coptic activism. Urban planning and the role of civil society in this regard is the focus of Roman Stadnicki. The chapter attracts attention to the relationship between the organization of public space and politics; an area of study that still needs further research. Part four is biographical sketches of some Egyptian political figures. Noticeable here is the different approaches in writing these biographies. Some biographies were positive about the person under investigation, others were more critical, while a third group balanced the different views involved. There is a common conviction among all the contributors that 2011 revolution was an event that has shaken the stagnant water and would eventually shake the grip of authoritarianism. It was not very clear, though, the mechanisms through which this change could take place. The book’s attempt to understand what is happening in Egypt was also not very comprehensive. In discussing social actors, for instance, Egyptian youth groups were completely absent. Media role is also missing despite its undeniable influence over the course of the revolution. Most surprising point is the lack of any deep discussion of the military’s role and its stakes in the overall system. Overall, the book is illuminating, insightful and engaging from the very beginning. The title itself can start endless debates: why is the use of the plural form of revolution? Was it only one revolution or two? It constitutes a useful reading for those who are interested in the so- called Arab Spring and Middle East politics in general.

Marwa Fikry Abdel Samei

Assistant Professor of Political Science Faculty of Economics and Political Science

Cairo University Email: marwa_mfikry@hotmail.com

96

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis

Bernard Rougier The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East: Northern Lebanon from Al-Qaeda to ISIS Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015, ISBN 978-0-691-17001-5, 280 pp., $35.00, hb Rougier's book examines the rise of Sunni Jihadism of the al-Qaeda and ISIS type through the case of the marginalized city of Tripoli and the adjacent areas in Northern Lebanon and Western Syria. As he explains, "What makes North Lebanon such an interesting and troubling setting is what it lacks, or only weakly possesses. It is not an intellectual hub generating new political rhetoric and local innovation. The region is instead a locus of hybridization, a crucible for multiple influences, and a cradle for mobilization" (pp. ix-x). Following an overview of the political history of Tripoli from the period of the French Mandate through the civil war and the Syrian army domination, the major part of the book is devoted to the past decade, beginning with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. This is one of the first studies to tackle the Sunni Islamic scene in Lebanon, which has long remained under the shadow of its powerful rival from the south, the Shi'i movement of Hezbollah. Tripoli's modern history is marked by deterioration and decline. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with its loss of primacy to Beirut, the incorporation of the city into Greater Lebanon in 1920 severed it from its hinterland, which was included in Syria. The struggle to escape isolation as a Sunni minority outpost was led before and after independence by the notable Karami family, but following Nasser's June 1967 defeat and the establishment of Fatah in Lebanon, urban politics succumbed to street militancy. The Syrian army's intervention in the civil war in 1976 turned Tripoli into a key battleground between the Syrian regime and the PLO and its local leftist allies, and after 1980 also militant Islamists organized in the Tawhid movement. Strangely, the role of Fathi Yakan and the Muslim Brotherhood is largely overlooked. Two sieges and the "massacre of Bab al-Tabbaneh *neighborhood+" in 1983-1986 secured Tripoli's lasting hatred of Ba'thist Syria. Rougier focuses instead on the Salafis. He shows how, as in other parts of the Middle East, Lebanese and Palestinian Islamists found refuge in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, volunteered for Jihad in Afghanistan, or escaped to Europe. Returning to Tripoli after the end of the civil war in 1990, they founded a variety of Salafi networks: Haraki (political) Salafis who followed the Saudi Islamic Awakening, quietists associated with the Wahhabi religious establishment or the Kuwaiti Salafi charity society, Jihadi-Salafis wishing to extend the Afghan jihad to other fronts, and Salafi preachers radicalized in Europe who embraced fiery anti-Western rhetoric. Salafi-jihadi terrorism erupted in Syrian-dominated North Lebanon right after 9/11 with a series of attacks against Western symbols like McDonald's restaurants. Framed as actions in defense of the "imagined global Muslim umma," they were carried out by poor young militants from Tripoli urged on by Lebanese émigrés in Europe and Australia and assisted by Palestinian jihadis from the Ayn al-Helweh camp near Sidon. Such actions did not fail to attract the attention of al-Qaeda. From these beginnings Rougier moves on to disentangle the kaleidoscope of forces that shaped the course of Lebanese Salafi-Jihadism after the Syrian withdrawal in

97

Book

Rev

iew

Journal of

Global Analysis

April 2005, in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. In the first stage his son Sa'ad's Future Movement entered to fill the vacuum and extended its political influence to the north of the country. This enhanced the status of political Salafi shaykhs, who offered their services in reining in local militants, expounding religious criticism of Hezbollah, and reactivating anti-Syrian sentiment. Syria's reaction transpired with the November 2006 proclamation of the jihadi group Fatah al-Islam, the core members of which were recruited to the service of the Assad regime mostly from among Palestinian and Syrian political prisoners. First directed to support Zarqawi's anti-American and anti-Shi'i jihad network in Iraq, with the latter's approval they were relocated to Lebanon, to fight Israel. Taking over the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared, north of Tripoli, Fatah al-Islam was legitimized by a new generation of Palestinian Salafi preachers and sought to win over Tripoli's Sunni shaykhs against the Future Movement-led anti-Syrian coalition. In July 2007 its terrorist and criminal acts escalated to confrontation with the Lebanese army that lasted three months and resulted in large-scale destruction and defeat. At that time the Syrian regime was in the process of shifting to a new rhetoric, presenting itself as a bastion against jihadism. Hariri's Future Movement aided the Syrian uprising beginning in spring 2011 in the hope of toppling the Assad regime, but also to contain the religious enthusiasm of Tripoli's Salafi-jihadis, whose violence threatened the cohesion of the Sunni community. Setting up supply lines to the resistance, especially to the strategically-located Homs, "the capital of the Syrian revolt," Hariri's envoys aided the Free Syrian Army whereas the Salafi networks helped Ahrar al-Sham. But the insurgency threatened to spill over into Lebanon when clashes erupted between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli's neighborhoods, and with the fall of the border town of Qusayr to Syrian-Hezbollah forces in June 2013 the Lebanese government was compelled to withdraw. Thereby the door to the reassertion of jihadi terrorism was re-opened, now in collusion with the rising force of ISIS. Rogier's book is based on first-hand acquaintance with the Lebanese Islamic scene, an impressive array of interviews with major actors in both the security services and the Salafi arena, and hard-to-come-by documents. This combination has resulted in an invaluable "thick description" of the tapestry of local, regional and global forces that in their intricate and ever-shifting interactions and conflicts shaped the trajectory of jihadi-Salafism in North Lebanon. In the strength of this excellent study also lies its major weakness, as Rougier's constant digression to intelligence-style reports on individual protagonists and specific incidents makes it sometimes difficult to follow the broader picture, which I have tried in the above to distill.

Itzchak Weismann University of Haifa

Email: weismann@research.haifa.ac.il

98

Bo

ok R

evie

w

Journal of

Global Analysis