AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

March 28, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Increased U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition risks embroiling the U.S. in the escalating Saudi-Iranian conflict in Yemen.

2. The growing influence of military actors in Libya will exacerbate conflict over the country’s oil resources and set conditions for al Qaeda and ISIS to expand.

3. Al Qaeda and ISIS are attempting to develop the capability to attack commercial airline flights with bombs hidden in portable electronic devices.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda is developing bombs disguised in portable electronics to attack commercial airline flights. The U.S. and UK enacted new aviation restrictions preventing passengers from select Muslim-majority countries from carrying portable electronic devices onto inbound flights. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has developed advanced bomb-making capabilities and spread them to other affiliates. ISIS is pursuing similar capabilities.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will adapt their targeting of airliners to circumvent new security restrictions.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesDecapitation strikes will not diminish the capabilities of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the long term. A U.S. airstrike killed Qari Yasin, a TTP commander and explosives expert, in Paktika province in southeastern Afghanistan on March 19. Yasin planned the 2008 Islamabad hotel bombing, which killed two American servicemen. Yasin’s eulogy indicates that he trained his replacement before his death.

Outlook: The TTP will retain the ability to carry out spectacular attacks in Pakistan.

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalEfforts to negotiate a political resolution to the conflict have collapsed as Yemen marked the two-year anniversary of the Saudi-led coalition’s military intervention. Thousands of al Houthi-Saleh supporters demonstrated against the coalition’s intervention in Sana’a.

Outlook: Disagreement over President Abdu Rabbu Hadi’s role will hamper negotiations.

SecurityIran supplies strategically significant weaponry to the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Al Houthi-Saleh forces use offensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to disable coalition air defense systems. Iranian support may be intended to pre-empt U.S. engagement in Yemen.

Outlook: U.S. support for the coalition will increase the al Houthis’ reliance on Iran.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP resumed a normal operational tempo in central Yemen after a pause caused by a U.S. airstrike campaign in early March. AQAP is operating again in territory reported cleared by Emirati-backed security forces in southern Yemen.

Outlook: AQAP will increase the pace of complex attacks in southern Yemen.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 24 MAR: A reported U.S. airstrike targeted AQAP militants near Ja’ar village.

2) 25 MAR: AQAP assassinated an al Houthi-Saleh commander in Damt, al Dhaleh.

3) 27 MAR: AQAP detonated two SVBIEDs in a complex attack on a government headquarters in Hawta, Lahij.

4) 28 MAR: Saudi air defense systems intercepted four al Houthi-Saleh ballistic missiles over Asir region.

5) 28 MAR: Hadi government forces advanced to Hasy Salim village. 3

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PoliticalClan rivalry challenges the new Somali administration’s agenda. Parliament approved the prime minister’s cabinet selections after an initial rejection by Parliamentary Speaker Jawari and 105 parliamentarians, who demanded equal power-sharing among the clans.

Outlook: Clan obstructionism will impede President Farmajo’s reform efforts.

Security The withdrawal of AMISOM forces in central Somalia creates a vacuum that al Shabaab can exploit. Ethiopian AMISOM troops withdrew from several towns in Galgudud region on March 26. Al Shabaab militants ambushed the withdrawing forces on March 27 and 28.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will seize the towns vacated by Ethiopian forces in Galgudud region.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab conducts simultaneous humanitarian and insurgent operations in order to degrade Somali governance and security efforts in key areas of Lower Shabelle region in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab conducted its twelfth VBIED attack in Mogadishu in 2017.

Outlook: Al Shabaab may attempt to seize Marka, a key port town southwest of Mogadishu.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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1) 22 MAR: Al Shabaab attacked SNA forces in Lower Shabelle region.

2) 24 MAR: Al Shabaab detonated two VBIEDs in Mogadishu.

3) 27 MAR: KDF forces raided al Shabaab bases in Lower Jubba region.

4) 26 MAR: Ethiopian AMISOM troops withdrew from several towns in Galgudud region.

5) 27-28 MAR: Al Shabaab ambushed withdrawing Ethiopian AMISOM troops in Galgudud region.

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PoliticalA power grab by hardline Islamist militias in Misrata city may sideline moderate political leaders. Hardliners, some with ties to al Qaeda-linked militias, are trying to overthrow the Misrata Municipal Council, which supports the UN-backed GNA. Declining relations between the GNA and Libya’s National Oil Corporation threaten the GNA’s access to oil revenues.

Outlook: Hardline militias will seize power in Misrata and pursue conflict with the LNA.

SecurityThe LNA seeks to secure air bases and oil infrastructure to project power into western Libya. It is negotiating with Misratan forces for control of select sites in the southwest and its forces surrounded Islamist militias at a base in Jufra, central Libya.

Outlook: Militias may attack LNA-held oil infrastructure to fix LNA forces in the northeast.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is degraded in Libya but remains a threat to U.S. interests. Between 100 and 200 ISIS fighters operate in Libya. The group retains ties to ISIS’s leadership in Iraq and Syria.

Outlook: ISIS will seek to activate recruitment networks and rebuild its capabilities.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 21 MAR: The MSCD established checkpoints in northern Derna.

2) 21 MAR: Misratan institutions tried to overthrow the Misrata Municipal Council.

3) 22 MAR: The LNA clashed with the Misratan Third Force near TamnahintTK airbase and Sebha.

4) 18 MAR: The LNA conducted airstrikes against the MSCD in southern Derna.

5) 28 MAR: Hadi government forces advanced

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1) 21 MAR: The MSCD established checkpoints in northern Derna.

2) 21 MAR: Misratan hardliners launched an attempted overthrow of the Misrata Municipal Council.

3) 22 MAR: The LNA clashed with the Misratan Third Force near Tamnahint airbase and Sebha.

4) 23-24 MAR: The LNA conducted airstrikes against the MSCD in Dahr al Homir and Fata’ih, northern Derna.

5) 26 MAR: The LNA surrounded the BDB in Jufra airbase.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebSecurity forces are preventing Salafi-jihadi militants from expanding their operations in the Maghreb. Algerian forces killed the reported head of ISIS Wilayat Jaza’ir in northern Algeria. The group had operated in the area before it pledged allegiance to ISIS. AQIM affiliate Uqba ibn Nafa’a Brigade used landmines to defend its safe havens in Kasserine, western Tunisia.

Outlook: ISIS may conduct a retaliatory attack against a security target in northern Algeria.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)AQIM affiliate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is exploiting an ethnic Fulani insurgency to expand its influence in central Mali. JNIM claimed attacks conducted by Fulani militants against ethnic Bambara militias and Malian soldiers.

Boko Haram-Barnawi, the ISIS-recognized faction of Boko Haram, risks alienating the local population amid famine in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram-Barnawi militants stole food and supplies, kidnapped civilians, and issued corporal punishments in southern Borno State.

Outlook: A Fulani uprising with JNIM support will divert security forces from northern Mali, allowing AQIM to expand governance. Boko Haram-Barnawi may adapt its tactics to preserve popular support.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 25 MAR: Algerian forces claimed to have killed two ISIS militants in Constantine province, Algeria.

2) 26 MAR: The Uqba Ibn Nafa'a Brigade claimed credit for a landmine explosion that wounded two Tunisian soldiers in Kasserine, Tunisia.

3) 26 MAR: Algerian forces dismantled an ISIS recruiting cell in Oran, Algeria.

4) 26 MAR: Tunisian security forces dismantled an ISIS recruiting cell in El Hamma, Tunis, and Ben Guerdane.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA

SAHEL

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SAHEL

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1) 24 MAR: The Macina Liberation Front (MLF) killed 10 Bambara militia in Ke-Macina, Segou Region, Mali

2) 26 MAR: The MLF attacked Malian soldiers in Djenne, Mopti Region, Mali

3) 27 MAR: Boko Haram-Barnawi issued corporal punishments in Konduga area Borno State, Nigeria

4) 27 MAR: Boko Haram-Barnawi stole food from civilians in Sabon Gari, Borno State, Nigeria

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Group for the Aid of Islam and the Muslims (JNIM)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569