TheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceNegotiatingGovernance:Kenyan contestation, cooperation, passivity toward theChinese.MaddalenaProcopioA thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations at the LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy,London,January2016.

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DeclarationIcertifythatthethesisIhavepresentedforexaminationfortheMPhil/PhDdegreeoftheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceissolelymyownworkotherthanwhereIhaveclearlyindicatedthatitistheworkofothers(inwhichcasetheextent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearlyidentifiedinit).Thecopyrightofthisthesisrestswiththeauthor.Quotationfromit ispermitted,provided that full acknowledgement ismade.This thesismaynotbe reproducedwithoutmypriorwrittenconsent.Iwarrantthatthisauthorisationdoesnot,tothebestofmybelief,infringetherightsofanythirdparty.Ideclarethatmythesisconsistsof97,903words.

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AbstractThescholarshiponSino-Africanrelationshasbeentoopre-occupiedwithChina’sbehaviourandimpactonAfricaandpaidlittleattentiontotheroleplayedbyAfricanactors,contextsandprocessesofgovernance.Thisthesisaddressesthisdeficiencythrough an examination of the interaction between Kenyan state and non-stateactorsintherelationshipwithChina.Indoingso,itfocusesonhowsuchinteractiverelationismobilisedandnegotiatedthroughKenyan‘agency’,andhowitconstitutesameansofbuildingnationalcapacityindomesticaswellasforeignpolicy,pavingthewayforalessdependentandmoresustainabledevelopmentalnation.Thethesisadoptsastate-societyapproachwhichcombinesmacro(national)-,meso(sectoral)-andmicro-(issue-specific) leveldynamicswithinasinglecountrycasestudy. Such complex and differentiated design helps to reach a nuancedunderstandingofactoragendasandmobilisationstrategieswithinspecificsystemsofgovernance.Thecasesaregroupedintothreemainsectors,i.e.trade,healthcareandeducation,cuttingacrosstradeandaidtypeofengagementsbetweenavarietyofChineseandKenyanactors.NegotiationsaremainlycharacterisedbystrategiesofcontestationandcooperationdomesticallyandwiththeChinese.Passivity,contrarytothemainstreamliterature,ismorerarelyobserved.ThethesisdemonstratesthatthefactorsthatcontributetoKenya’scontrolof therelationswithChinashouldnotbe identified in thestate’saggregatepower,orthesumofstate’sresources,butratheraresituatedwithinthecontext and the structure of the specific negotiations. The ability to safeguardinterestsisthendeterminedbytheabilityofKenyanactorstoguaranteeconformityofspecificnegotiationprocessestotheprevailingsystemofnormsandpracticesasunderstoodandlegitimisedbyKenyans.

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SelectedListofAcronymsACA–Anti-CounterfeitsAgencyACFTU-All-ChinaFederationofTradeUnionsADB–AfricanDevelopmentBankAPI-ActivePharmaceuticalIngredientsCBA-ContractBargainingAgreementCBD-CentralBusinessDistrictCCCMHPIE - China Chamber of Commerce for Medicines and Health Products’

ImportsandExportsCCK-CommunicationsCommissionofKenyaCCP–ChineseCommunistPartyCKRC-ConstitutionofKenyaReviewCommissionCMT-ChineseMedicalTeamsCNOOC-ChinaNationalOffshoreOilCompanyCOFEK-ConsumersFederationofKenyaCOMESA-CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfricaCOTU–CentralOrganisationofTradeUnionsCRBC-ChinaRoadandBridgeCorporationCSO–CivilSocietyOrganisationCSR–CorporateSocialResponsibilityDFID–(UK)DepartmentForInternationalDevelopmentEAC-EastAfricaCommunityFKE-FederationofKenyaEmployersFOCAC–ForumonChina-AfricaCooperationGFATM-GlobalFundtoFightAIDS,TuberculosisandMalariaHAC-Harmonization,AlignmentandCoordinationGroupHRH-HumanResourcesforHealthICC–InternationalCriminalCourtIISS-InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesILO-InternationalLabourOrganisationIP–IntellectualPropertyIRT–InternationalRelationsTheoryITUC-Africa-InternationalTradeUnionsConfederation-AfricaJICA–JapanInternationalCooperationAgencyKAM–KenyaAssociationofManufacturersKANU–KenyaAfricanNationalUnionKEBS-KenyaBureauofStandardsKEMRI–KenyaMedicalResearchInstituteKEMSA-KenyaMedicalSuppliesAgencyKESSP-KenyaEducationSectorSupportProgrammeKFRTU-KenyaFederationofRegisteredTradeUnionsKHF-KenyaHealthcareFederationKIPPRA–KenyaInstituteforPublicPolicyResearchandAnalysisKNCCI-KenyaNationalChamberofCommerceandIndustryKU–KenyattaUniversityMDG-MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsMOU–MemorandumofUnderstandingNARC–NationalRainbowCoalitionNASCOP-NationalAIDS&STIControlProgramme

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NATHEPA-NationalHealthPractitionersAssociationNCPD-NationalCouncilforPopulationandDevelopmentNPI-NaturalProductsInitiativeODA-OverseasDevelopmentAssistanceODI–OverseasDevelopmentInstituteOECD-DAC - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development -

DevelopmentAssistanceCommitteePCK-People’sCommissionofKenyaPEPFAR-President’sEmergencyPlanforAIDSReliefPRC–People’sRepublicofChinaSoE–State-ownedEnterpriseSSA–Sub-SaharanAfricaSSC–South-SouthCooperationSWAp-SectorWideApproachTU–TradeUnionTUK–TechnicalUniversityofKenyaTVET-TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingUNCTAD-UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopmentUNDP-UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUON–UniversityofNairobiUSAID–UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentWB–WorldBankWHO-WorldHealthOrganisationWTO–WorldTradeOrganisation

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AcknowledgementsNavigatingthroughthisPhDhasbeenanextra-ordinaryjourney.Sounusualthat,asI submit this thesis I am yet to fully understand all the immense personal andprofessionaldiscoveriesthatIputmyselfthroughinthepastfouryearsandahalf.Manypeoplehavecontributedtotherealisationofthisproject.Prof.ChrisAlden,inhisroleassupervisor,supportedmeingoodandbadtimes.HewasthepersonwhoencouragedmetotakeonaPhDandhispresencewas,sincethen,aconstantsourceofconstructivecriticism,asourceofopportunities,asourceofmoralsupport.Ihavelearntalotthroughhimandwithhim.Ifeelprivilegedandgratefultohavehadhimonmyside.I am grateful to Prof. Jude Howell and Dr. Daniel Large,my viva examiners, forhavingengagedwithmythesiscriticallyandconstructively,andforhavingprovidedessentialfeedbackforadvancingmywork.SpecialthanksgoalsotothecolleaguesImetinNairobi.TheywelcomedmetotheInstituteforDevelopmentStudiesattheUniversityofNairobiandprovidedmewithamuch-neededplatformtoexchangeideaswith fellowPhD students and scholars. In particular, Iwant to thankProf.DorothyMcCormickandProf.JosephOnjala.Engagingwiththem,expertsastheyareofKenya,hasprovedtobeagreatintellectualexerciseandanecessarysteptoconfirmwhetherIwasgoingintherightdirection.My immensegratitudegoestothedozensofpeoplewhowillremainanonymousthatIinterviewedforthisthesisduringmyfieldworkinKenya.Ifeltprivilegedtohaveaccess tosomanydifferentpointsofview,personalitiesandvenues. Ihaveencounteredbrilliantpolicy-makers,societalleaders,privatesectorrepresentatives,Kenyan,Chinese,andelse.MostofthetimesIstoodverysmallinthemiddleofarelationshipthatdidnotreallyforeseemypresence,likethedashbetweenKenyaandChina in theserelationsunderstudy,but Istoodthereand learntmorethananythingIcouldhavefoundonbooks.My PhD studies and fieldwork in Kenyawere generously supported by the LSEInternational Relations Department. Studentship awards, as well as numeroustravel,conferenceand languagegrantswereprovidedthroughout the fouryears.FieldworkwasmadepossiblethankstotheDrDominiqueJacquin-BerdalgrantforresearchonAfricaandtotheIRDepartmentfieldworkgrant.TrustinmyresearchandfinancialsupportwerekeytofinishingthisPhD.Theemotionalroller-coasterthatthisPhDhasbeenwouldnothavebeencrossedthroughwithoutthesupportoffriendsandfamily.LuwasthefirstfriendImadeonthePhDprogrammeandsincethatdaybackin2011wehavenotstoppedsharingsweat,tears,doubtsandsmallvictories.Shehasbeenthemostamazingcompaniononecouldhave,andalotofmyideaswouldnothavetakenpropershapeifitweren’tforall thebouncingbackand forthwithher.MumbiandTanyawelcomedmeathome,inNairobi,ontheseconddayofsiegeoftheWestgateshoppingMall,whenIfirstsetfootinacapitalunderterroristattack.TheymadeNairobimyhomeforninemonthsandkeptmesaneallthroughthegoodandthebadofmyNairobiantime,andlifeeventsaroundit.Mygreatestdebtofgratitudegoestomyfamily,forbeinganinexhaustiblesourceofstrength. My sister Alessandra for being my best friend and my own personal

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counsellor, formanagingtoavoidreadingthethesistill theverylastmonths,butthen,spurredbysisterhoodties,engaginginseriouseditingsupport.Michael, formarrying her duringmy fourth year, thusmaking it a very busy one. Emanuele,thankyouforputtingupwithallthis!Foralwaysmakingthingseasierandmakingme happy, for your patience, for bearing distance, and still lovingme the same.Finally, I thankmyparents,Gianfranco andPatrizia, for being themost amazingteachersIeverhad.Forteachingmetobeagoodpersonaboveanythingelse, toworkhardandfacehardtimeswithdignity,todrawonmystrengthsandbelieveIcouldmakeeverythingpossible.Thankyouall,forlisteningtomydeliriousattemptstofindasenseinmythesis,andinmylife.Ioweyouallmorethanwordscansayanditistoeachofyouthatthisthesisisdedicated.

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TableofContentsAbstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3Selectedacronyms……………………………………………………………………………………………..4Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………6Tableofcontents………………………………………………………………………………………………..8ListofTables……………………………………………………………………………………………………10

CHAPTER1ResearchIntroductionandDesign.............................................................................................................111.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................111.2 LiteratureOverview.......................................................................................................................................131.2.1 Sino-AfricanRelationsLiterature.......................................................................................................15

1.3 UnpackingtheResearchquestions..........................................................................................................181.4 Methodology......................................................................................................................................................241.4.1 Thesectoralapproach.............................................................................................................................241.4.2 Kenya..............................................................................................................................................................291.4.3 DesignandDataCollection....................................................................................................................321.4.4 Fieldwork......................................................................................................................................................34

1.5 Chapters’Outline.............................................................................................................................................37CHAPTER2‘African’Agency:theState,SocietyandtheInternational..................................................................392.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................392.2 AfricainIR..........................................................................................................................................................412.2.1 Domestically-StateandSociety.........................................................................................................432.2.2 Internationally-Agencyanddependence......................................................................................462.2.3 TheemergenceoftheSouth.................................................................................................................50

2.3 ConceptualizingAgency...............................................................................................................................552.3.1 Actors..............................................................................................................................................................612.3.2 Layeredinterests.......................................................................................................................................672.3.3 SystemsofGovernance–NegotiationArenas..............................................................................692.3.4 Modalities.....................................................................................................................................................70

2.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................................................73CHAPTER3Kenya:domesticpoliticsandtheinternationaldimensionsince2002.........................................753.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................753.2 Domestically:betweenthestateandsociety......................................................................................763.2.1 Background..................................................................................................................................................76

3.3 International......................................................................................................................................................883.3.1 Background..................................................................................................................................................88

3.4 Kenya-China:actors,stakesandnegotiations?..................................................................................923.4.1 Diplomacyandideology.........................................................................................................................953.4.2 Aid,trade,investment..........................................................................................................................1013.4.3 Thesectorsofanalysis.........................................................................................................................108

CHAPTER4Kenya-Chinatradepractices:labourissuesand‘unfair’competition.........................................1114.1 Thecontext......................................................................................................................................................1114.1.1 China-Africalabourissuesand‘unfair’competition...............................................................1134.1.2 Kenya-Chinarelations..........................................................................................................................114

4.2 Kenya’sresponses........................................................................................................................................1144.2.1 Labourrelations/disputes..................................................................................................................116

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4.2.2 Counterfeits..............................................................................................................................................1274.2.3 Smalltraders............................................................................................................................................137

4.3 Sectoraldynamics........................................................................................................................................142CHAPTER5KenyanresponsestohealthcarecooperationandtradewithChina............................................1465.1 Thecontext......................................................................................................................................................1465.1.1 China-Africahealthcarecooperation.............................................................................................1485.1.2 Kenya-Chinarelations..........................................................................................................................153

5.2 Kenya’sresponses........................................................................................................................................1565.2.1 TradeinHealthproductsandtechnologies................................................................................1575.2.2 Infrastructureforhealthcare............................................................................................................1665.2.3 TraditionalMedicine.............................................................................................................................173

5.3 Sectoraldynamics........................................................................................................................................182CHAPTER6EngagementintheEducationSector.......................................................................................................1866.1 Thecontext......................................................................................................................................................1866.1.1 China-AfricaEducationalCooperationandAssistance..........................................................1876.1.2 Kenya-ChinaEducationalCooperationandAssistance.........................................................189

6.2 KenyanResponses.......................................................................................................................................1936.2.1 TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining..................................................................1946.2.2 Humanresourcesforhealthcare.....................................................................................................2026.2.3 ConfuciusInstitutes...............................................................................................................................215

6.3 Sectoraldynamics........................................................................................................................................221CHAPTER7NegotiatingGovernance:Contestation,CooperationandPassivity..............................................2257.1 Overview..........................................................................................................................................................2257.2 Actors.................................................................................................................................................................2277.2.1 Repertoires................................................................................................................................................2287.2.2 Resources...................................................................................................................................................230

7.3 Layeredinterests..........................................................................................................................................2337.4 Arenas...............................................................................................................................................................2357.4.1 Rootedgovernanceandgovernance-in-the-making...............................................................236

7.5 Modalities........................................................................................................................................................2407.5.1 Initiator.......................................................................................................................................................2417.5.2 Tablesofnegotiation............................................................................................................................247

7.6 Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................................249CHAPTER8Conclusions.......................................................................................................................................................2518.1 Overview..........................................................................................................................................................2518.2 Agency-as-ownershipofthegovernanceprocess..........................................................................2538.3 Democracyoreconomicdevelopment?Blendedgovernanceinstead..................................2558.4 Dependenceforsustainability................................................................................................................2588.5 Timeforsocialchange...............................................................................................................................259

Bibliography...........................................................................................................................................................................262AnnexI–FOCACcommitmentsforhealth................................................................................................................297AnnexII–FOCACcommitmentsforeducation......................................................................................................300AnnexIII–ListofInterviews..........................................................................................................................................307

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ListofTablesTable1:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actorsandarenas/tablesofnegotiation–Trade............145Table2:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actors,andarenas/tablesofnegotiation-Health..........185Table3:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actors,andarenas/tablesofgovernance-Education...224Table4:Typesofsystemsofgovernance..................................................................................................................236Table5:Sub-sectoralsystemsofgovernance.........................................................................................................238Table6:Initiator’sbehaviour(bysub-sector)........................................................................................................246Table7:Conformitytotablesofnegotiation(bysub-sector)..........................................................................247

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CHAPTER1

ResearchIntroductionandDesign

1.1 Introduction

China’s vastly increased involvement in Africa is one of the most significant

developmentsintheregionsincetheearly2000s.Thescholarlyfocusonthetopic

has, more often than not, been on China’s foreign policy’s influence, impact,

priorities,achievementsanddifficulties inAfrica.Lessattentionhasbeenpaidto

analysing the African side of the equation: beliefs, interests, resources and

structuresthatdeterminethemotivationsandmodalitiesofactionindealingwith

theopportunitiesandchallengesthatChinaispresenting.

ThisshortcomingdoesnotcomeasasurpriseifonelooksathowAfricahasbeen

portrayedintheinternationalrelationsliterature:Africans’leverageinnegotiating

with external forces has chronically been neglected, depicting the continent as

dependent and powerless. Similarly, Africa’s relations with China have been

understoodasheavilyasymmetricalduetoChina’seconomicandpoliticaloverall

strengths,leadingtoassumethatlittlenegotiationwillingnessorabilitywasleftto

Africans.EvenwhenAfricans‘wereattributed’decisionalpower,ithasoftenbeen

believed that if they could choose betweenWestern1normative approaches and

China’sno-strings-attachedwin-winpromises,theywouldundoubtedlyoptforthe

latter,basedonideologicalaffinityandthepossibilityofquickreturns.Whilethese

conditionscontainelementsof truth, it is about time that theAfricansideof the

equationisanalysednotbystudyingthe‘consequencesforAfrica’ofChina’sarrival,

butthereasonsandmodalitiesofAfricans’action.

In a way, the thesis is an attempt to simply change the standing point for

observing real world dynamics, to invert the logic to ask ‘What is the influence

AfricancontextsandpeoplehaveonSino-Africanrelations?’ratherthancontinue

asking only ‘What is the influence China has?’. The aim is thus that to explore

whetherAfricanshavethewillingnessandabilitytosafeguardtheirinterestsinthe

relational dynamicswith external forces,what are their reasons andmodalities,

1ForagoodaccountoftheconceptualizationoftheWestininternationalrelations,seeJ.O’Hagan,ConceptualizingtheWestinInternationalRelations:FromSpenglertoSaid,Palgrave,Houndmills,2002.

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howthe interactiverelationbetweenstateandnon-stateactors ismobilisedand

negotiated, and how it constitutes a strength in building national capacity in

domestic aswell as foreignpolicy.Thewillingnessandability to safeguard their

interests, i.e. ‘agency’, is articulated as the definition and determination of

governanceprocessesvis-à-visthesameprocessesbeingdefinedanddetermined

byexternalactors.Bystudyingtheseprocesses,thethesisaimsatcontributingto

the existing literature on Africa in international relations, andmore specifically

Sino-Africanrelations,throughempiricalfindings.

Togatherafullpictureofthesedynamics,thisthesistranscendsthedisciplinary

boundariesthatoftenadoptsinglelevelsofanalysis.WhiletheliteratureonSino-

African relations has mostly understood the African engagements with China

throughadichotomouslens,i.e.stateornon-stateaction,inthisthesistheauthor

usesacombinedstate-societyapproach,believingthatthegovernanceofparticular

issues, domestically andwith external actors, cannot be so easily circumscribed

within such boundaries. AsMohan and Lampert suggest “Chinese relationswith

many African countries are maturing and moving beyond state-to-state deals,

implicatingmanymoreactors.So,theneedtomovebeyondstatist,elitedialogues

isnotsimplyatheoreticalexercise,butonemademorepressingbythisgrowing

‘embeddedness’ofmutualpoliticalandeconomicties”2.

Moreover, the asymmetries identified between China and African countries,

whichpresumablyvoidthewin-windiscourseofitsmeaning,areoftencompared

within a single sector without taking into consideration the wider context. To

overcome this problem, this thesis combines reasoning aboutmacro-,meso-and

micro-leveldynamics,national, sectoraland issue-specific. It isargued thatusing

such three-layered approach and paying attention to the specific and broader

contexts simultaneously, leverages thestrengthsandweaknesses thata country-

systemadoptsvis-à-visexternalforces.Thisishelpfulforatleasttworeasons.

First, perpetuating the discussion about ‘Africa’ and China, often adopted in

studiesofmultiplecountries,maybeproducinginaccuratedepictionsofrealworld

dynamics that are instead always, inevitably, context-dependent. While it is

explained,inthenextchapter,theinevitabilityoftalkingof ‘Africa’asacollective

presence,mainlybecausetheliterature,historically,referstoitassuch,theaimof

2G.MohanandB.Lampert, ‘NegotiatingChina:ReinsertingAfricanAgencyintoChina-AfricaRelations’,AfricanAffairs,vol.112,no.446,2014,p.100.

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thethesisistoselectonesinglecountryanddigdeepintoitsprocessesofdecision-

making.

Second,bylookingatbroadernationalcontexts,inconjunctionwiththesector

andissue-specificcontexts,itmaybepossibletonotethatdespitenotwinningin

the same ‘discipline’ asChina,Africancountriesdogain from the relation.While

somesectorssufferfromincreasedrelationswithChina,othersmaybenefit.Kaluin

his doctoral dissertation suggests that “Nigerians are willing to experience a

continuedtradedeficitwithChinainordertoachieveotherimportantobjectives”3.

Thisalsorelatestotheneedofbreakingdownnationalcontextsandmovebeyond

thewidespreadbeliefthatAfricancountriespracticeasingletypeofgovernance,

according to which “states and public services operate in clientelist mode, the

generalmodelisneopatrimonialinnatureandmostpracticesfallintowhatiscalled

the informal realm” 4 . Doing so does not aim at suggesting that these types of

governancemechanismsaredisappearing,butratheratestablishingwhetherthey

arestilllargelyrepresentativeofactualgovernancedynamics.

Finally,thethesisestablishesthattheprocessesofgovernance,negotiatedacross

thestateandnon-staterealms,areacrucialsitefordeterminingpowerdistribution

betweenAfricansandexternalactors.Thewillingnessandabilityofdomesticactors

tosafeguardtheirinterestsintherelationswithexternalforcesistheresultofthese

processesofgovernancethatare,inturn,shapednotbylinearrelations,butbya

complex and non-static blend of beliefs, interests, resources negotiated within

specificsystemsofgovernance.

1.2 LiteratureOverview BylocatingthisthesisinthefieldofInternationalRelations,themainproblem

concerns, first and foremost, a necessary disambiguation about the fundamental

3N.E.Kalu,‘UnderstandingAfrica’sChinaPolicy:ATestofDependencyTheoryandaStudyofAfricanMotivationsinIncreasingEngagementwithChina’,PhDthesis,UniversityofNebraska-Lincoln,2012,p.1.4J.P.OlivierdeSardan,‘ResearchingthePracticalNormsofRealGovernanceinAfrica’,AfricaPowersandPoliticsProgrammeDiscussionPaper,no.5,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,December2008,p.1.

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unitsofthediscipline.TheliteratureontheAfricanState5andAfricanCivilSociety6

hasmainly focusedon theappropriateness of applyingwestern concepts tonon-

westernrealitiesandhowsuchconceptshavebeenreadapted/rejectedbyAfrican

statesandpeoples,inthefaceofbothinternalissuesandexternalforces.Inother

words,ithasbeenquestionedwhethertheinstitutionsofthestateandcivilsociety

inAfricaexistatallgiventhattheoriginalformsofassociationalspaceexistentin

Africabeforetheadventofcolonisersweresignificantlydifferentinstructuretothe

westerndivisionofpowersbetweenthestateandothersocietalactors.

Asaconsequenceofthesedebatesabouttheunitsofanalysis,theroleofAfrican

agentsininternationalrelationshasoftenbeenunderestimated.Cornelissen,Cheru

andShawassertthat“Africaisgenerallyunder-representedinthemainstreamIR

scholarshipemanatingfromtheNorthAtlanticworldandismostlyleftoutofthe

theoretical debates that have animated this scholarship”7. This is grounded in a

widespread belief, in the realworld and the scholarship onAfrica, thatAfrica is

marginal,irrelevant,powerlessintheworld’sglobalprocesses.Thepredominance

ofinformalgovernanceinAfrica,consequentialtotheabsenceofaproperdivision

between formal state apparatuses and social formations has led to believe that

Africanstates“mightberatherdifferentfromthestatesthattypicallyinhabitatleast

‘traditional’ IRtheory”8(IRT)andbecauseof this, theycouldhardly fit IRT9.This

normative understanding of political dynamics overlooked the historical

trajectories and the complexities of empirical statehood without realising, as

Williamsclaims,that“Africanstateshelptoprovidesomeofwhatwemightcallthe

5J.F.Bayart,TheStateinAfrica.ThePoliticsoftheBelly,Longman,NewYork,1993;J.F.Bayart,‘AfricaintheWorld:AHistoryofExtraversion’,AfricanAffairs,vol.99,no.395,2000;C.Young,‘TheEndofthePost-ColonialStateinAfrica?ReflectionsonChangingAfricanPoliticalDynamics’,AfricanAffairs,vol.103,no.410,2004;L.J.Diamond,J.Linz&S.M.Lipseteds.,DemocracyinDevelopingCountries,LynneRienner,Boulder,1988;D.S.RothchildandN.Chazan,ThePrecariousBalance.StateandSocietyinAfrica,WestviewPress,Boulder,1988;A.Mbembe,OnthePostcolony,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,2001;M.Meredith,TheStateofAfrica :AHistoryoftheContinentsinceIndependence,Simon&Schuster,London,2011.6D.Lewis,CivilSocietyinNon-WesternContexts:Reflectionsonthe‘usefulness’ofaConcept,CentreforCivilSociety,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience,London,2001;P.ChabalandJ.P.Daloz,AfricaWorks:DisorderasPoliticalInstrument,International African Institute in associationwith James Currey, Oxford, 1999; J.M.Makumbe, ‘Is there a Civil Society inAfrica?’,InternationalAffairs,vol.74,no.2,April,1998;S.Orvis,‘CivilSocietyinAfricaorAfricanCivilSociety?’,JournalofAsian and African Studies, vol. 36, no. 1, 2001; M. Bratton, Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa, Institute forDevelopmentResearchReportSeries,vol.11,no.6,InstituteforDevelopmentResearch,1994;M.Edwards,‘TheChallengesofCivilSocietyinAfrica’,lecturegivenatTrustAfrica[lecturenotesonline],12February2009.7S.Cornelissen,F.CheruandT.M.Shaw,‘Introduction:AfricaandInternationalRelationsinthe21stCentury:StillChallengingTheory?’, in S. Cornelissen, F. Cheru and T.M. Shaw eds.,Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century, PalgraveMacmillan,Houndsmill,2012,p.2.8D.Williams,‘Agency,AfricanStatesandIRTheory’,paperpresentedtotheBISAAnnualConference,Manchester,27-29April2011,p.3.9W.Brown, 'Africaand InternationalRelations: a commenton IR theory, anarchyandstatehood',Reviewof InternationalStudies,vol.32,no.1,2006;D.Lemke,'AfricanlessonsforInternationalRelationsresearch',WorldPolitics,vol.56,no.1,2003;D.Lemke,'Intra-nationalIRinAfrica',ReviewofInternationalStudies,vol.37,2011;C.Clapham,'Degreesofstatehood',ReviewofInternationalStudies,vol.24,1998;Williams,op.cit.

15

‘limitcases’butthebroadissuesthatemergeareonesthatcanbeappliedtothinking

aboutstateagencyingeneral”10.

Toincludetherangeofactorsandpoliticalformationsthatconstitutepolitics,it

isnecessarytobreakdownassumptionsabout‘difference’.Hence,thegovernance

of domestic affairs in this thesis is defined as the power relations between the

governingandthegoverned,devoidofnormativeattachments.Itisnotabout‘good’

governance,butratherabout‘real’governance11.Aspectsof‘poor’governancesuch

ascorruption,ethnicallegiance,clientelism,areconsideredinthisstudyasrelevant

asaspectsof‘good’governance,suchasaccountability,participation,theruleoflaw.

Realgovernance,asstatebyOlivierdeSardan,“iscomposedofmultipledimensions,

someconvergentandotherscontradictory;itisalsotheproductoflocal,sectoral

andindividualmicrodynamics;andlastly,itfacesoneveryfrontapluralismofforms

ofaction”12.Therefore,itisimportanttolookatstate-societyrelationsinAfricanot

“as a promised agenda for change”13 but as Mamdani suggests, in their “actual

formation”14.Thismeansthatindefiningstate-societyrelations,thefocusshould

beonthebroadrangeofcollectiveactivityandnorms,betheydemocraticornot,

thatconstituteactualsociety15.

1.2.1 Sino-AfricanRelationsLiteratureSimilartothetreatmentofAfricainthebroaderfieldofIR,theliteratureonSino-

AfricanrelationshasbeenlessconcernedwithAfricathanithasbeenwithChina.

ThedebateonSino-AfricanrelationshasattractedscholarlyattentionsincetheCold

War period. Snow, Filesi and Duyvendak focused on the historical ties between

Chinaand theAfricancontinent16;otherssuchasYu,Larkin,HeviandHutchison

haveinsteadfocusedonChina’sforeignpolicyinAfricasincetheendoftheSecond

WorldWartothelate1970s,withaviewtotheideologicalunderpinningsthatstill

feature in nowadays relations 17 . However, it is only since the late 1990s that

10Williams,op.cit.,p.3.11OlivierdeSardan,op.cit.12OlivierdeSardan,op.cit.,p.4.13 M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism, Princeton University Press,Princeton,2006,p.19.14Ibid.15Orvis,op.cit.,p.18.16SeeP.Snow,TheStarRaft:China’sEncounterwithAfrica,WeidenfeldandNicolson,London,1988;T.Filesi,ChinaandAfricaintheMiddleAges,trans.DavidL.Morison,FrankCass,London,1972;J.J.L.Duyvendak,China’sDiscoveryofAfrica,ArthurProbsthain,London,1949.17SeeG.Yu,‘PekingVersusTaipeiintheWorldArena:ChineseCompetitioninAfrica’,AsianSurvey,vol.3,no.9,1963,pp.439-453;G.Yu,‘China’sFailureinAfrica’,AsianSurvey,vol.6,no.8,1966,pp.461-468;E.Hevi,TheChineseCommunistsandAfrica,Praeger, New York, 1966; B. D. Larkin, China and Africa 1940-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of ChinaUniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1971;A.Hutchison,China’sAfricaRevolution,Hutchinson,London,1975.

16

scholarlyattentionintensified,initiallycharacterisedbyconventionalviewsabout

thescopeandroleoftheChinesepresenceinAfrica.Especiallyinthefirstyearsof

engagement (ca2000-2008), thedebatesbroadly reliedon journalistic accounts,

exacerbatingadichotomousunderstanding18:Westernmedia tended toview the

development with scepticism and wariness 19 , while the Chinese perspective,

observed in official Chinese sources, was often characterised by unbounded

optimism.Inotherwords,therelationswerepolarisedaseitherdangerouslyneo-

colonialoroptimisticallybeneficialforAfricancountries.

AsAldensuggests“weseemunabletoescapeoursingularfocusoncompeting

discourses claiming colonial intent or benign purpose on the part of China in

Africa”20 . This inability seems to be due to an urge “to capture ongoing global

transformationsandtheirmanifestations”whiletheyare intheprocessoftaking

shape.Aninabilitythatisalsocharacterisedby“ourownbiasesandassumptions,

includingtheideologyofdifferencethatcausessomeWesternscholarsinparticular

toexoticizethisrelationship,ortheideologyofsamenessthatcausessomeChinese

scholarstofamiliarizeit”21.

Eitherway,thedepictionoftheroleplayedbyAfricanswithintherelationswas

minimal,mostlycharacterisedbyAfricansbeingactedon.Thisunderstandingwas

boundby,especially in the firstdecadeof intensifiedSino-Africanstudies(2000-

2010),adisproportionatepropensitytounderstandChina-Africarelationsinrealist

terms,focusingonstrong/weakpowerasymmetriesrevolvingaroundtheChinese

extraction of African natural resources. In effect, the narrow scholarly focus

reflected the limited initial approach between China and African countries,

characterised by state-to-state engagements and driven, first and foremost, by a

Chineseappetitefornaturalresources,claimedtobesatisfiedunquestioninglyby

Africans. In this initialphase,despite theChineseproclaimedwin-windiscourse,

fiercecriticismwasraisedagainstChina’s involvementwithstatesofallpolitical

orientations,includingauthoritarianones,andconcernswerevoicedregardingthe

benefitstherelationswouldbringtoAfricansocieties,asopposedtoAfricanelites.

Inotherwords,thewin-winsymbolismseemedtoberelevant,ifatall,atstate-to-

18AlsoseeChinaAidDatatounderstandtheroleofthemediaasthefirstsourceofknowledgeuponwhichmanyacademicstudies draw their data: China Aid Data, ‘Methodology’, China Aid Data [website],<http://china.aiddata.org/content/methodology>.19S.T.Freemaned.,China,AfricaandtheAfricanDiaspora:Perspectives,AASBEAPublishers,WashingtonDC,2009.20C.Alden, ‘InSearchofGravity’sRainbow.TheoreticalApproachesandChina-Africascholarship’,paperpresentedat theMaking Sense of the China-Africa Relationship: Theoretical Approaches and the Politics of Knowledge conference, YaleUniversity,18-19November2013.21Ibid.

17

state level but not in relation to society. Based on a few studies of, mainly,

authoritarian African countries, generalisations about elites’ behaviour across

AfricaassumedthattheselastwouldunquestioninglywelcomeChina’sno-strings-

attached approach, as opposed to more critical perceptions rising from society.

African elites were often portrayed as passive watchers of Chinese abuses, i.e.

disrespect for localrulesandexploitationof localresources,evenincaseswhere

society’suneasinesstowardstheChinesewasvoiced.

Withtime,academicdebatesaroundthepresumablyexploitativeattitudeofthe

ChineseandassumedpassivityofAfricanelitesstartedtobeacknowledged.Alden,

Large andSoaresdeOliveria in2008asserted thatBeijingwas,more andmore,

finding itself “at odds with an emerging consensus on the necessity of good

governancewithinAfricaitself”andthat“thevoicesarguingforimprovementsin

accountability,transparencyanddemocracywerenotjustcivilsocietyactivistsbut

someofthetopleadersofthecontinent,likeNigeria’sformerPresidentOlusegum

ObasanjoandSouthAfrica’sThaboMbeki”22.

The seemingly consistent Chinese foreign policy discourse on win-win

cooperationstartedbeingquestionedbyAfricansasthepracticesofadiverserange

ofChineseactors,notonlystateactors,furtherexacerbatedthediscussion,among

societalgroupsaswellasinternationalorganisations,concerningtheexploitative

natureofChineseactivities.Atthesametime,Chineseleadersbeguntoshowsigns

of awareness concerning the importance of accounting for African internal

perceptionsaswellasAfricangovernancedynamicsforthesuccessoftheirinitiatives,

thuspayingattentionnotonlytoformalinstitutionsbutalsoinformalones,notonly

tostateorgansbutalsotonon-stateentities,notonlytothepragmaticaspectsofthe

engagementbutalsototheimageofChinaanditsreceptioninAfricancontexts.

Sincetheearly2010s,theliteraturehastriedtomakeupforitsbiases,providing

moreattentiontoengagementsbeyondnaturalresourcesextractionand,iflimitedly,

totheroleplayedbyAfricanpeopleandcontexts23inSino-Africanrelations.This

diversification did not aim at diminishing the importance that natural resources

play in Sino-African relations or the prominence of China. However, the actual

engagements,increasinglymorecomplexanddiversified,weresignallingtheneed

toexpandthefocusandincludeunitsofanalysisthathadbeen,untilthen,neglected.

22C.Alden,D.LargeandR.SoaresdeOliveiraeds.,Chinareturns toAfrica.A risingpowerandacontinentembrace,HurstPublishers,London,2008.p.21.23Kalu,op.cit.;Mohan&Lampert,op.cit.

18

StudiesontheAfricanelaborationoftheChinesearrivalstartedfocusingoneither

Africanelites’responsestotheChineseorcivilsociety’sbehaviour.Thecontentand

modalitiesoftherelationsbetweentheelitesandsocieties,inlightofthegenerally

newengagementwithChina,wasnotproblematized,butmerelydescribedaspolar

with the first having a positive attitude towards the Chinese, welcoming them

withoutmanyconditions24, and the latterholdinganegativeandcynicalviewof

China’spresence.

1.3 UnpackingtheResearchquestionsTheanalysesofChina-Africaengagementsintheinternationalrelationsfieldare,

moreoftenthannot,framedasanalysesofChineseforeignpolicy.Asnotedabove,

African actors and contexts involved in the relations with China are often

overlooked or deemed passive, unable and irrelevant to the outcome of the

interaction. The relations are often characterised as asymmetrical with the

preponderanceofpowerresidinginthehandsofChineseactorsandstructures.An

increasingbodyofliteraturehasstartedpayingattentionto‘African’agency25inthe

recent years, suggesting that it shoulddeservemore attention than it had so far

received.ThisbodyisonlylimitedlyaddressingspecificSino-Africanrelationswhile

enquiringmore generally about African agency in international relations26. As a

consequence,thesubjectstillneedsasystematicinvestigationtobegroundedon

empiricalobservationssotobuildamoresubstantialbodyofliterature.

Aimingatcontributingtofillingthisgap,thisthesisstudiesAfricanagencyasthe

indigenous/African ownership of governance processes within Sino-African

relations and asks:what are the degree, the motivations and modalities through

whichAfricanownershipofgovernanceprocessesisexertedinSino-Africanrelations?

Theprocessesofgovernanceareacrucialsitefordeterminingpowerdistribution

24 Africa and Asia Departments at Georgetown University, Africa and China: Issues and Insights, Conference Report,GeorgetownUniversity,7November2008.25W.Brown,‘Aquestionofagency:Africaininternationalpolitics’,ThirdWorldQuarterly,vol.33,no.10,2012;W.BrownandS.Harmaneds.,AfricanAgencyandInternationalRelations,Routledge,Abingdon,2013;D.NeubertandC.Scherereds.,AgencyandChangingWorldViewsinAfrica,LitVerlag,Berlin,2014;T.Shaw,‘AfricanAgency?Africa,SouthAfricaandtheBRICS’,InternationalPolitics,no.52,2015;L.WhitfieldandA,Fraser,‘NegotiatingAid:TheStructuralConditionsShapingtheNegotiatingStrategiesofAfricanGovernments’,InternationalNegotiation,no,15,2010;P.Murray-Evans,‘RegionalismandAfricanagency:negotiatinganEconomicPartnershipAgreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandSADC-Minus’,ThirdWorldQuarterly,vol.36,no.10,2015.26Arecentexceptionistheeditedvolume:A.Gadzalaed.,AfricaandChina:howAfricansandtheirgovernmentsareshapingrelationswithChina,RowmanandLittlefield,London,2015.

19

between Africans and external actors. To delineate what agency-as-ownership

means,itisfirstnecessarytoexplainhowgovernanceisconceived.

Governance

According to Rosenau 27 , the concept of governance is more inclusive than

government as it embraces “governmental institutions and informal, non

governmentmechanismswherebyneedsandwantsare fulfilled”.Heasserts that

governanceisasystemofrulesacceptedbythemajority28.Thisbroadeningofthe

focustotheconceptofgovernance–insteadofthenarrowerideaofgovernment–

isnecessarytoprovideanaccurateportrayofactualSino-Africanrelations.Infact,

thewillingnessandabilitytoexertcontrolinprocessesofnegotiationwithexternal

actors,dependontheexistenceofarangeofactors,ontheirideas,interests,andon

thewaypowerandresourcesaredistributedandsharedamongthemdomestically,

whichcanbeaccentuatedintherelationswithexternalactors.

Toaccountforsuchdiverseelementsofgovernance,thisthesisdoesnotadopta

single theoretical paradigm. It rather asserts that to capture the complexity of

governance processes unfolding across the domestic and international

environments,acombinationoftheoreticalapproachesisrequired.InChapter2,the

aspects that are deemed relevant, for this thesis, of the realist, institutionalist,

constructivistandpluralisttheoreticalapproacheswillbepresented.Thoughaware

thatunitingthemwillinevitablydecreasetheirparticularexplanatorypower,itis

believed that together they can provide a more accurate depiction of actual

governance dynamics. By means of introduction, by pulling together relevant

elements of each of these theoretical approaches, the thesis presents a

conceptualizationofgovernancethatdoesnotplacethefullexplanatorypoweron

individuals or structures, but rather on a complex intertwining of the two. This

conceptualization:

- Identifies the diversity of actors in Sino-African relations. In doing so, the

author recognises the importanceof theStatebutunderstands it asacting

through human agents, in a non-unitary fashion, subjected to social and

market forces whose interests are negotiated through processes of

27J.Rosenau,‘Governance,OrderandChangeinWorldPolitics’,inJ.N.Rosenau&E.O.Czempieleds.,GovernancewithoutGovernment:OrderandChangeinWorldPolitics,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1992,p.4.28Ibid.

20

competition and cooperation, based on the asymmetrical availability of

resources.

- Recognises that agents identify their interests not only based on rational

decisionsbutalsobasedonsocialconstructs,i.e.ideasandperceptions.

- Assignsparticularrelevancetoinstitutions,inparticularinrelationtotheir

dependenceonhistoricalpaths.

- Recognisesthatgovernanceisfarfrombeingmerelystate-determined,within

onecountry’sboundaries,butisratherincreasinglytheconsequenceofthe

inclusion in the decision-making of social and market forces, including

multilateralorganisations.

- Finally, all this is subjected to change over time. Even though path

dependencefindssignificantspaceinthisconceptualization,changeisalsoan

important element of Sino-African relations, determined by heuristic

approachestointeraction,andofAfrica’srelationswithotherexternalforces.

Resultingfromthisisanideaofgovernancethatisdynamic,encompassingawide

rangeofactorswhohaveasymmetricalaccesstoresourcesandpowerandwhose

interestsarenegotiatedacrosssub-national,nationalandinternationalplatforms.A

governancethatisconstitutedbyamultitudeofrelationshipsthathavehistorically

determinedtheformalandinformalnorms,procedures,conventionsofinteraction;

that is ideationally subjectively constructed, and that is subject to change. It is a

multi-level type of governance according to which decision-making norms and

institutionsareforgedatspecific levelsandnegotiatedthenwithtiersaboveand

below29.Theseinteractionsoccurascompeting“economicandpoliticalforcesseek

themostfavourableconditionsforinsertionintoachanginginternationalorder”30.

Ownership

Ownershipof thesecomplexgovernanceprocesses in internationalrelations is

contrastedwith theseprocessesbeingdefinedanddominated by external actors,

hencetheideaofagency-as-ownership.Inotherwords,itmeansthesafeguarding

ofAfricaninterests(vis-à-vistheinterestsofexternalactors)throughtheprotection

ofthedecision-makingprocess.Africaremainsaregionwhoseformalandinformal

29N.Brenner,NewStateSpaces,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004.30B.Jessop,‘TheCrisisoftheNationalSpatiotemporalFixandtheEcologicalDominanceofGlobalisingCapitalism’,InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch,Vol.24,No.2,2000,p.343.

21

structures, institutions and norms have been shaped, re-shaped, contested and

challenged by external actors to an unprecedented degree. Considering China’s

relatively new arrival in Africa and its proclaimed non-interference policy, it

remains fundamental to understand how domestic capacities and international

configurationsofpowerinteract.

As Whitfield and Fraser suggest in their study of aid negotiations between

externalactorsasdonorsandAfricanrecipients,lookingatAfrican‘ownership’of

governanceprocessesinaninternationalrelationscontextmeansexploring“howa

realm of decision-making can be protected from external influence, defending

spacesinwhichAfricanagentscanstruggleamongstthemselvesoverthenatureof

appropriate political and economic processes”31 . By ownership, they mean the

‘control’overthecontentandmodalitiesofgovernance,asopposedtothesebeing

decideduponbyexternalactors,advancingtheideathat“lossofcontrol[…]hashad

amaligneffect”32.They continueby stating that, tooneextreme, “thedefenseof

ownershipisineffectadefenseofthesovereignrightsofAfricanstates”33.

It isassumedthat if thedomesticsystemofgovernance issafeguarded,thenthe

interestsofAfricanactorsarealsoprotectedsincethedomesticsystemofgovernance,

whichregulateshowpowerandresourcesaresharedamongactors,servesasapoint

of leverage over acts of narrow self-interest. It is, in otherwords, theproduct of

(continuous) negotiations overwhat is deemed legitimate and thus accepted by

indigenous stakeholders 34 . This does not, however, imply that the system of

governanceis,normativelyspeaking,amorallycorrectoneorthatproceduresare

boundby legalityand formality.This thesis isabout ‘real’governance,not ‘good’

governance. As a consequence, the content and modalities of action to be

safeguardedcanbemoreorlessmorallyjustifiable,pertainingtotheformalaswell

asinformalworlds.

Moreover,safeguardingthesystemdoesnotnecessarilymeanmaintainingit.It

canalsomeanrevisitingittomakesureitissuitabletofaceemergingopportunities

31WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.343.32Ibid.33Ibid.34Foraninterestingoverviewoftheliteratureontheconceptof‘stakeholder’andthebirthof‘stakeholderanalysis’asaresearchmethod,seeR.Brugha&Z.Varvasovszky,‘Stakeholderanalysis:areview’,HealthPolicyandPlanning,vol.15,no.3,pp.239-246.Thepapersuggeststhatstakeholderanalysisasamethodstemmedoutoftheorganisationalandmanagementliteratureofthe1970sand1980s.Accordingtotheauthors,themethodconsiders‘policyactors[…]notonlyasinterestgroupsbutalsoasactiveorpassiveplayersonthepolicyscenewhoarealsoaffectedbythepolicy’.The‘policyscene’-called‘arena’inthisthesis-isnotnarrowlyassociatedwiththegovernmentbutmorebroadlywithallthoseactorsthat,directlyorindirectly,affectthepolicyandareaffectedbyit.Thethesiswillusetheterm‘stakeholder’torefertoactorsaffectedbythepolicy-issueunderstudy,andwillbeusedinterchangeablywiththeterm‘actor/agent’.

22

and challenges. The focus on the system of governance is deemed extremely

important in a study of relations with external actors as it is considered the

synthesisofthestructure-agencyinterplaywithinacountry,onethatishistorically

rootedinideas,interests,relationships,andsoforth,andthusanunavoidableaspect

of the relations with external forces. As Long notes, “all forms of external

interventionnecessarilyentertheexistinglife-worldsoftheindividualsandsocial

groupsaffected,andinthiswayaremediatedandtransformedbythesesameactors

andstructures”35.

Negotiatinggovernance

The act of negotiation is the struggle among groups about the most suitable

patternforgoverningasharedspace, i.e. thearena.Thisstruggle iswhat ismost

commonlyreferredtoaspolitics,i.e.whatHaroldLasswelldefined‘whogetswhat,

whenandhow’36.

The first step of this approach to the negotiation of governance is the

identificationofinterests(foracomprehensivediscussionofinterestsseeChapter

2, section 2.3.2), the second step is the acknowledgement of whether existing

systemsaresuitabletonegotiatetheseintereststothebenefitofinvolvedAfrican

stakeholders,thethirdandlaststepistheenactmentofstrategiestoeitherbring

thenegotiationinsidetheacceptedsystemofgovernanceortransformthelatterto

guarantee that thenegotiation successfully safeguards interests. Three scenarios

arepresented.

Inthefirstcase, iftheintereststhatemergeintherelationswithChinacanbe

pursued through negotiations within an existing system of governance (‘rooted

governance’), then ownership is expressed through the preservation of the

proceduralnorms(conformity)thatareentrenchedintheexistingsystem.Inother

words, China is required to abideby existingnormsof conduct. This procedural

successvis-à-vistheexternalactormaybe,however,theresultofnumerousactsof

negotiation/struggle among domestic stakeholderswithin the specific system of

governance.Thisisbecausesystemsofgovernanceare,firstandforemost,sitesof

negotiation/struggle amongdomestic actors andonly at a second stage they are

sitesofnegotiationwithexternalactors.

35N.Long,‘Fromparadigmlosttoparadigmregained?’,inN.LongandA.Longeds.,BattlefieldsofKnowledge:Theinterlockingoftheoryandpracticeinsocialresearchanddevelopment,Routledge,London,1992,p.20.36H.D.Lasswell,Politics:WhoGetsWhat,When,How,NewYork,1936.

23

Inthesecondcase,iftheintereststhatemergeintherelationswithChinacannot

bepursuedthroughexistingsystemsofgovernance,thenownershipisexpressed

through the identificationof the shortcomings and transformationof the system

(governancein-the-making).Inotherwords,China’spresencehashighlightedgaps

in the systemof governance to the point that this latter, through its entrenched

processes, does not guarantee the safeguard of domestic interests. The

transformationcanbespurredbycontestationorbyrational-choice.Thepresence

ofChinaisnotonlyperceivedasnegative,andthussomethingtore-actagainst,but

can also be used as leverage to achieve emerging interests, thus spurring

cooperation-seeking.Itisworthtopointoutthat‘in-the-making’referstoprocesses

thatcanalsotakeyearstoperfectthesystemofgovernance.

Ontopofthesefirsttwocases, it isalsoexpectedtofindcaseswherepolitical

expediency isused tobypassexisting systemsofgovernanceorwherea specific

systemof governancedoesnot exist.This is oneof themainarguments in Sino-

Africanrelations,accordingtowhichpoliticalandeconomicasymmetriesbetween

theChineseandAfricanactorsoftenleadthelattertobypasssystemsofgovernance

to strike quicker deals with the Chinese, which presumably favour elites.

Alternatively, African actors are believed not to have a strategy or structure to

negotiateintheirbestinterests.

Oneof themainaimsof this thesis is tounderstandhowfrequent these three

strategiesareinprocessesofnegotiationandhowoftentheyhaveanimpactonthe

outcome.HagmannandPéclarddefinedthefirsttypeofgovernance,i.e.rooted,as

“dominated by longstanding conventions on how and by whom statehood is

defined”37, the lasttypeofgovernance, i.e.absent, is insteaddefinedas“lack[ing]

predefinedorcommonlyrecognisedproceduralmodalitiesfordecisionmaking”38,

andfinally,inthemiddle,isgovernancein-the-makingwhichisacombinationofthe

twowhereagovernancesystemeitherdoesnotexistandisunderconstruction,or

doesexistbutwasacknowledgedasinappropriate,henceneedingrestructuring.

Whenexternalactors-themselvescarriersofinterests,norms,institutionsand

structures-enter/joinAfricanprocessesofgovernance,thedomesticallynegotiated

interestsandmodioperandimaybealteredtothepointthatnotonlytheprocesses

37T.HagmannandD.Péclard,‘NegotiatingStatehood:DynamicsofPowerandDominationinAfrica’,DevelopmentandChange,vol.41,no.4,2010,p.550.38Ibid.

24

donotunfoldfollowingthehabitualroute,butalsothenatureofbroadersystemsof

governancewithinwhich they takeplace is transformed. Studying theprocesses

helpsthusunderstandwhy,howandtheextenttowhichsystemsofgovernanceare

preserved,transformedorcircumvented.Inthisrespect,itisworthremembering

thattheoutcomesarestudiedasanend, inthisthesis.Theyare indicativeofthe

degree of safeguarding of interests achieved through negotiations conducted by

African actors rather than as a means to achieve further objectives such as

“economicdevelopment,povertyreductionordemocraticgovernance”39.Although

thesefurtherobjectivesareidentifiedbystakeholders,andoftenformthebasisof

motivationstoact,theyarenotassessedperse.Thisisbecause“thedefenseofa

nationalrealmprotectedtoalargeextentfromexternalinfluenceisanecessarybut

notsufficientpre-conditionforsuchdevelopments”40.

1.4 MethodologyAs outlined in previous sections, studies onChina-Africa relationsmore often

thannothavefocusedonChina’sinfluence,motivations,modalitiesinengagingwith

African realities, while lesser attention has been paid to the African side of the

equationtounderstandtheinfluenceAfricanpracticesandsystemsofgovernance

mayhaveontheoutcomeoftherelationswithChinaasanexternalactor.Tostudy

the African side of the equation, reveal the details of negotiations, and avoid

ungroundedgeneralisationsonChina-Africarelations,theauthordecidedtostudy

asinglecountrywhileselectingdifferentsectorsofengagementwithChina.Inother

words, she decided to move the “comparison from one sector to another while

keepingthenationconstant”41.Thisapproachisexpectedtoprovidemorespacefor

in-depth analysis of the influence that the domestic context has on the overall

relationswithChina.

1.4.1 ThesectoralapproachThechoiceoffocusingononesinglecountryallowsforanin-depthstudyofthe

tensions between structures and agencies while presumably controlling the

39WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.343.40Ibid.41D.Levi-Faur, ‘AQuestionofSize?AHeuristicsforStepwiseComparativeResearchDesign’inB.Rihoux&H.Grimmeds.,InnovativeComparativeMethodsforPolicyAnalysis:BeyondtheQuantitative-QualitativeDivide,Springer,NewYork,2006,p.47.

25

nationalcontext. Thechoiceof focusingonmorethanonesectorwithinasingle

country is tobetterunderstandthetensionbetweennationalandsectoral/issue-

specificinterests.Lookingbeyondaunitaryunderstandingofthenationalinterest

represents a contribution to the current scholarship on Sino-African relations.

African agency in international relations is often framedas the ability ofAfrican

statesto‘holduptheirnationalinterests’42.Thisisproblematicbecauseagencydoes

notonlymeanstateagency.Whileattheinternationalleveltheroleofthestateis

stillpredominant(moreelaborationonthisinthefollowingchapter),whenitcomes

tospecificdomesticpolicyareas,inAfrica,aselsewhere,thestatebecomesoneof

manyactors.Evenmore,withinthestate,bureaucraciescompete,notalwaysfora

unified ‘national’ interest.WhilecurrentaccountsofAfricanagencyinrelationto

Chinarevolvearoundstate-to-staterelations,whichoftenassumetherelationship

isasymmetrical,iftheengagementisapproachedfromasectoralperspective,this

asymmetrymaybelessdramatic(thepreponderanceofpowerresidingwithlocal

actors and their use of governancemethods through formal/informal regulatory

regimes).

AshighlightedbyLevi-Faur,theassumptionbehindthisdesignisthat“sectoral

variations are important”43, i.e. difference within a country, and they can be as

importantasnationalvariations,i.e.differencesbetweencountries.Thisapproach

“emphasises the autonomous political characteristics of distinct policy sectors,

hencethemultiplicityofpoliticalpatternsinanyonecountry.Sectorsareexpected

tobeembodiedinpolicycommunitiesandpolicynetworksorganiseddomestically

inaregulatoryregime”44.Theideatodevelopasectoralanalysisissituatedwithin

abodyofliteraturethatrecognisesthat“actualmodernstatesencompassdozensof

institutionally distinct policy sectors with highly diverse organisational

architectures” 45 , thus aggregating patterns of institutions and practices is not

helpfultoexplainthebalanceofpowerandinteractionbetweenstateandsociety,

and/orbetweendomesticandinternationalactors.Bydisaggregatingthestateand

socialstructuresindefinedpolicyareas,notonlyverticaldiversityisemphasised

(not all state-society relations are the same) but also horizontal heterogeneity

emerges(statebureaucraciesdiffer,soassocietalgroups).Thisbodyofliteratureis,

42A.Fraser,‘EmergingAgentsofChange:AfricanandInternationalNegotiations’,paperpresentedtotheseminarEmergingAgentsofChange?AfricainInternationalNegotiations,ChathamHouse,London,2February2011.43Levi-Faur,op.cit.,p.47.44Ibid.45J.M.Sellers,‘State-Societyrelations’,inM.Bevired.,TheSAGEHandbookofGovernance,SAGEPublications,London,2011,p.5.

26

however, still in-the-making and studies adopting ‘one-country many-sectors’

approachesarestillrelativelyfew.Sellersremindsthat“cross-nationalcomparative

studieshavetendedtofocusonasingledomainofpolicywithindifferentcountries

[…] As a result, the consistent consequences in policy sectors for state-society

relations,andtherelationsbetweensectoralandnationalinstitutionaldifferences

forstate-societyrelationshipsremainunderexaminedandundertheorized”46.

TherearenotcomprehensivestudiesofthiskindintheSino-Africascholarship.

Taylorarguesthat“itiscommonplaceintheliteratureonexternalengagementwith

Africatotalkof“China”or“France,”andwhileheuristicallythismaymakesense,it

doeshavethepotentialeffectofobfuscatingwhatprocessesareunfoldingandwhy.

Ontologically,suchlabelsareproblematicanditisnotplausibletospeakofstates

asmonolithicentities”47.Similarly,Aldenrecognisesthat“speakingabout ‘China–

Africa’ at this stage in the relationship obscures as much as it illuminates”. He

stresses the importance for future scholars to “pursue an agenda formedby the

seeking of a heightened understanding of bilateral relations, a closer reading of

cross-country sectoral studies, and deeper insights into communities. Digging

deeperwillexposethiscomplexity,enrichourunderstandingofmulti-variantties

andrelationships,andultimatelymoveusawayfromthesimplebinariesthathave

characterisedChina–Africastudiestodate”48.Theadoptionofasectoralapproach

thuscontributestothebodyofscholarship.Itassumesthatthe‘game’consistsof

therecognitionfrombothsidesoftheexistenceofoverlappinganddifferentiated

interests,whichareattimesclearlyevident,atothertimesless.Itisthispushand

pullbargainingexercisethatleadstonegotiatinga“win-set”49wherebothparties

gain. It is indeed necessary to acknowledge that the push and pull bargaining

exercisetakesplacewellbeyondthenationallevel.Itisatthesectoral/issue-specific

levelthattheprocessisre-negotiated,throughconsultationandimplementation,by

thelocalsocialenvironmentthatmediatesinterestsandmodalitiesofaction50.

Itisduetoremindthat‘sectors’aredifficulttodefinefullywithinsetboundaries.

There is a range of actors and institutions at the national, sub-national and

international level that influence sectoral processes and outcomes. The scope of

46Ibid.,p.28.47I.Taylor,TheInternationalRelationsofsub-SaharanAfrica,Continuum,NewYork,2010,p.19.48C.Alden,‘ChinaandAfrica:TheRelationshipMatures’,StrategicAnalysis,vol.36,no.5,2012,p.706.49R.D.Putnam,‘Diplomacyanddomesticpolitics:thelogicoftwo-levelgames’,InternationalOrganisation,vol.42,no.3,1988,pp.427-460.50W.M.Habeeb,PowerandTacticsinInternationalNegotiation:HowWeakNationsBargainwithStrongNations,JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,Baltimore,1988.

27

sectorscanalsovaryduetothefactthat“boundariesaredeterminedbyvariables

asdiverse asdomesticpolicypriorities, international interest and influence, and

localandnationalalliances”51.

CaseSelection

Itisimportanttospecifywhatismeantby‘case’inthisthesis.IsKenyathecase

ofthisstudy?Alternatively,isitratherthesectors?Orthespecificissuespresented

undereachsector?Inthisstandsthecomplexityofthisproject,whichisnotatypical

single-countrystudywherethecomparativedimensionoftendisappears.

Thecasesunderstudyaretheissuespresentedundereachsector.Althoughone

in-depthcase-studypersectormighthaveprobablyprovidedmoreanalyticaldepth,

it would not have fully served the purpose of this thesis, which is to provide a

comparisonof various governancebehaviourswithin a single country. Levi-Faur

attempts to explain how tomerge the case-oriented approachwith comparative

designs,referring,inparticular,totheproblemofincreasingthenumberofcasesin

acase-orientedapproach.InKing,KeohaneandVerba’sDesigningSocialInquiry52,a

numberoftechniquesarepresentedconcerningthewaytoincreasethenumberof

cases.Thisthesisadoptstheone-countrymany-sectorsdesignaccordingtowhichthe

mainsubjectunderstudyremainsgovernanceprocessesvis-à-vistheChineseandthe

comparison is carried out by studyingmotivations andmodalities of adherence in

differentcases,i.e. issue-areas.ThisisdonebearinginmindRagin’sdefinitionofa

case,namely“aparticularconfigurationofattributes”53.Hecontinues:“thelogicof

case study is fundamentally configurational. Different parts of the whole are

understoodinrelationtooneanotherandintermsofthetotalpictureorpackage

thattheyform.Thecentralgoal isusuallytoshowhowdifferent ‘parts’ofacase

interconnect[…]Whatmattersmostisthattheinvestigatormakessenseofmultiple

aspectsofthecaseinanencompassingmanner,usinghisorhertheoryasaguide”54.

Hence,theusageofdifferentissue-areas–insteadofasingleone–toprovideamore

articulatepictureofthe‘whole’,i.e.thenationalcontext.Itisarguedthatincreasing

thenumberofissue-areasunderstudyprovidesamorenuancedunderstandingof

howdifferentpartsinterconnect.

51J.MoncrieffeandC.Luttrell,AnAnalyticalFrameworkforUnderstandingthePoliticalEconomyofSectorsandPolicyArenas,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,London,2005,p.13.52G.King,R.O.KeohaneandS.Verba,DesigningSocialInquiry:ScientificInferenceinQualitativeResearch,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1994.53C.C.Ragin,FuzzySetSocialScience,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,2000,p.66.54Ibid.,p.68.

28

Levi-Faurreflectsthatthe‘encompassingmanner’meansthat“thepurposeofthe

inquiry is not necessarily generalisation across cases” 55 . In fact, this study did

eventually end up presenting methodological dilemmas concerning the tension

between plurality and the necessity to generalise beyond individual cases. By

studying different sectors, and caseswithin each sector, the approach inevitably

exposes itself to“important implicationsforthedegreeofcontrolandthenature

andscopeofthegeneralisationthatcouldbeproduced”56.Beingtheliteraturequite

scarce in this field, the discovery of these implications came, predominantly,

throughtheauthor’sownefforts.Theefforttoshowdiversitywasmadeparticularly

difficultbythelackofavailableoraccurateaccountsofKenyandomesticdebates

and actions towards China-related activities. Therefore, this thesis is strongly

groundedinempiricalresearchaccordingtowhichtheselectionoftheissuesunder

study mostly emerged from fieldwork findings and not from pre-determined

decisions.Thisismainlydue,asbetterexplainedbelow,tothefactthattheabsence

ofrelevantdatadidrequireapreliminaryeffortofscopingthesubjectontheground

beforebeingabletoformulateastrategyofresearch.

Groundedresearchisvaluabletominimiseselectionbiases,butalsoproblematic

asthecasesarenotnecessarilyselectedfollowingaspecificmethodologicallogicof

most-similar/most-different.Inotherwords,thecontentoftherelationshipaswell

as the outcomewere not clear before having conducted a full investigation. The

casescouldthusnotbechosenbasedontheirsimilaritiesordifferencesasthese

weretheverysubjectsofinvestigationinthefirstplace.Consequently,theresearch

hadtobeconductedtoanswerfirstwhat-typequestions,i.e.basicfactsdefininga

case,andonlylatertoanswerhowandwhyquestions.Whilemethodologically,and

logically, thesestepscanbedivided, thedifficultyof fieldworkresearchdoesnot

alwaysallowforthisneatseparation,anditforcestheresearchertoinvestigatethe

potential relevance of a casewhile already addressingmore ‘serious’ questions.

Moredetailsabouttheselectionofspecificissue-areasandsectorscanbefoundin

Chapter3(section3.4.3).

55Levi-Faur,op.cit.,p.54.56Ibid.,p.46.

29

1.4.2 KenyaKenya was selected as the country under study. The choice of the country

occurred following three main types of rationale, the elaboration of which was

basedontheinformationavailablewhentheresearchstarted(in2011):1)thelevel

of governance-sharing within the country; 2) the involvement in relations with

Chinaofdifferenttypesofactors,i.e.state,non-state,privatesectorandsoforth;3)

thelackofnaturalresourcesinthecountry.Thisstudyfocusesontheperiod2002

–2014,representing“democraticKenya”57underPresidentMwaiKibakiand,since

March2013,underPresidentUhuruKenyatta.Thisperiodalsocoincideswiththe

creation,in2000,oftheForumonChina-AfricaCooperationthatinstitutionalised

theengagementbetweenChinaandAfricancountries.

Governance-sharing

Giventhattheaimofthestudyisthattounderstandmotivationsandmodalities

of engagementwithChina leading toownershipof governanceprocesses, and in

ordertomovebeyondastate-definedideaofagencytowardexternalactors,itwas

deemednecessaryselectingacountrythatprovidedspacesfornon-stateactorsto

enterthepublicdebate.Sincethestudyisbasedonasinglecountry,itwasbelieved

idealtoselectonewheresuchnon-stateparticipationinpublicaffairsisaverage,

ratherthanparticularlystrongorweak.Kenyaranksnearthemiddleofrelevant

indexesofgoodgovernance,ofwhichthelevelofpublicparticipationisanindicator,

makingitasuitablecase58.

Studyingthedomesticconfigurationofpowerandhowdifferentgroupsreactto

external forces is timely in the Sino-African literature, which has tended to

dichotomize the approach to China: elites are favouring and benefiting from the

Chinesepresence,whilethemassesareresentingandsufferingfromit59.Thisfocus

has led scholars to conclude that the behaviour of African actors towards China

changes according to the role they occupy in society 60 . Elites are believed to

accommodate China’s interests, mainly as a consequence of the fact that China

57H.Patroba, ‘China inKenya:AddressingCounterfeitGoodsandConstructionSector Imbalances’,China inAfricaProjectOccasionalPapern.110,SouthAfricanInstituteofInternationalAffairs,March,2012,p.6.58AccordingtotheIbrahimIndexofGoodGovernance,2010.59SeeD.M.Tull,‘China’sEngagementinAfrica:Scope,SignificanceandConsequences’,JournalofModernAfricanStudies,vol.44,no.3,2006,pp.459–479;C.Alden,&C.Hughes,‘HarmonyandDiscordinChina’sAfricaStrategy:SomeImplicationsforForeignPolicy’,TheChinaQuarterly,vol.199,September,2009,pp.563-584;I.Taylor,‘Sino-AfricanRelationsandtheProblemofHumanRights’,AfricanAffairs,vol.107,no.426,2008,pp.63-87;G.Mohan&M.Power,‘Africa,Chinaandthe‘new’economicgeographyofdevelopment’,SingaporeJournalofTropicalGeography,vol.30,no.1,2009,pp.24-28.60SeeC.AldenandY.J.Park,‘UpstairsanddownstairsdimensionsofChinaandtheChineseinSouthAfrica’,inU.Pillayetal.eds.,Stateofthenation:SouthAfrica2012-2013,HSRC,Pretoria,2013.

30

seeminglyoffersaidwithoutpreconditions,thusprovidingAfricanleaderswitha

validalternativetoWesternaid,whichisinsteadtiedtonormativeconceptionsof

development 61 . Alden and Hughes also suggest that African elites see their

interactionwiththeChinese“asanopportunitytoexertanewkindofinternational

leverageovertheindustrializedcountries”62.Commonpeople,ontheotherhand,

were initially thought to be holding negative perceptions towards the Chinese,

mainly due to poor human rights63and labour standards on theworkplace, job

competition,poorqualityofproductsresultingindamagetoconsumers.However,

Mohan and Lampert suggest that “just as many African governments have

consciously turned to China as a potential partner in national development and

regime legitimacy, African citizens have increasingly reached out to China as a

source of useful resources for personal andbusiness progression”64. Evenmore,

generalisedconclusionsconcerningtheelitesandsociety’sresponsestoChinamay

notholdtrueincasesofcountrieswheretherelationsbetweenstateandsocietyare

morecooperative.

ParticipationintherelationswithChina

Afurtherdecisivestepintheprocessofselectiontookplaceafterapreliminary

investigation on the countries involved in Sino-African meetings, especially

meetings labelled as ‘peoples’. Participation in these meetings was a condition

deemedimportantasasignofwider(thanthestate)participationinSino-African

relations. The selectionwas based on a survey ofmeetings’ attendance65which

showedthatKenyanactors’participationwasthemostdiversifiedandactive(as

organisers)66togetherwithSouthAfricans.SouthAfricawasexcludedasasuitable

caseforthestudybecauseitdidnotmeetthefirstrequirement,asitranksveryhigh

inindexesofgoodgovernance67inAfrica.Whileitwouldhavestillbeenvaluableto

studySouthAfricanmotivationsandmodalitiesofengagementwiththeChinese,the

61Tull,op.cit.62AldenandHughes,op.cit.63Taylor,2008,op.cit.64MohanandLampert,op.cit.,p.100.65Themeetingsconsideredwere:China-AfricaCivilSocietyMeeting,2007,Shanghai;China-AfricanCivilSocietyDialogue,2008,Nairobi;China-AfricaCivilSocietyForumonPeaceandDevelopment,June2010,Beijing;China-AfricaPeople’sForum,August2011,Nairobi;FirstChina-AfricaThinkTankForum(CATTF1),October2011,Hangzhou;China-AfricaPeople’sForum,2011,Nairobi;China-AfricaThinkTankForum(CATTF2),2012,AddisAbaba;China-AfricaPeople’sForum,2012,Suzhou.66Meetings’internalreportswereconsultedandthefollowingcountriesappearedtobeinvolved:Angola,Benin,Botswana,Cameroon,Chad,Congo-Brazzaville,DRC,Ethiopia,Ghana,Kenya,Morocco,Mozambique,Namibia,Nigeria,Senegal,Somalia,SouthAfrica,Sudan,Tanzania,Uganda,Zambia,Zimbabwe.67AlsoaccordingtotheIbrahimIndexofGoodGovernance,2010.

31

casewasexpectedtopotentiallyprovidelessofapuzzleinthestudyofdynamics

betweengovernmentalandsocietalagencyorbetweenagencyandstructures.

Fieldworkdemonstrated,however,thatrelyingonparticipationtothemeetings

asan indicatorofengagementdoesnotprovideanaccuratedescriptionofactual

engagements.Thiswasnotonlybecauseactualengagementsarebroaderinscope

thanthosethatareofficialisedthroughformalmeetings,butalsobecausethereisa

gap in how the Chinese andKenyans understand the role andmeaning of these

meetings.Allthemeetings/forums/symposiums,fromthemosthigh-visibility,i.e.

FOCAC,tothoselessso(suchaspeoples’forums,tradeunionssymposiums,cultural

forums and so forth), are strategically worked out by the Chinese for specific

purposes that relate to Chinese national or sectoral agendas. Kenyan actors are

participants to these meetings, at times organisers, never initiators. Their

understandingoftheseeventsismorearbitrarythanstructurallydefinedandpart

ofacontinuum.

Absenceofnaturalresources

Sino-Africanrelations,especiallyinthefirstdecade,weregenerallyunderstood

asrevolvingaroundinterests innaturalresourceswith littlerecognitionofother

sectors of involvement, including those heavily reliant on Chinese soft power

objectives, such as themedia and education. Studying a country like Kenya also

servesthepurposeofshiftingthefocusfromapresumablyskewedChineseinterest

inengagingwithAfricanresource-richcountries–whichareoftenassociatedwith

authoritarianregimes–toonewhereChineseinterestsappearmorediversified.

Considering the fact thatAfricacan,bynomeans,be takenasasingleunitary

block,thechoiceofKenyatoexplaintheroleofdomesticpoliticswithintheChina-

Africadiscoursedoesnotaimtoberepresentativeofthewholecontinent.However,

thedynamicspresentedinthefollowingchaptersmayshedlightontobehaviours

between the state and non-state actors that could as well facilitate the

understandingofSino-Africandynamicsinothercountries.

32

1.4.3 DesignandDataCollectionDuetotherelative lackofstudiesonKenya-Chinarelationsbasedon in-depth

empirical research, this study adopted a highly flexible design, which generally

evolves during data collection 68 and heavily relies on data collected during

fieldwork.It isatheoretically informedempiricalresearchbasedonaqualitative

design.Thedecisiontouseaqualitativedesignwasconsequentialtothenatureof

theenquiry,namelyaninterestinunderstanding69whatliedbehindtheprocesses

ofengagementbetweenAfricansandtheChinese,theideas,meanings,motivations

uponwhichthebehaviouranddecisionsofactorsdepended.Theauthorwasnot

interestedinmereoutcomes,butratherinproceduraldynamics.Hencetheuseofa

qualitativeapproachappearedtobemorefit70.

Robson suggests that the social constructivist and interpretivist approaches to

researchfocusonhowthesocialworldisinterpretedbythoseinvolvedinit.Asa

consequence,“inprinciplethereareasmanyrealitiesasthereareparticipants–as

wellasthatoftheresearcher”71.Toacquirethesemultipleperspectives,researchers

tendtouseresearchmethodssuchasinterviewsandparticipantobservation.

Accesstorelevantdatahasbeenasignificantchallengeinherentintheresearch.

ThisisnotspecifictoKenya-ChinarelationsbutmoregenerallyapplicabletoChina-

Africarelationsasawhole72.Tryingtotrackdownwhathappensonthegroundwas

notasmalldeal.FOCACcommitmentsaregeneral,andbilateralagreementsarenot

always reported and made public. The data concerning China’s involvement in

individualcountriesisnoteasilyaccessible;itisscatteredanddifficulttoretrieve.

Gatheringdatawasnot, inotherwords,aquicktypeofendeavour.Inthecaseof

Kenya, there is no systematic collection and presentation of the Chinese

involvementinthecountry.Asaconsequence,thesectoralbreakdownwasagood

start to be able to provide an accurate picture vis-à-vis more general national

statistics.

Manyscholarshavebeenreducedtousingmediasources,andmorespecifically

Xinhua reports as a source of information73. Due to the contemporaneity of the

dynamicsunderstudy,theauthoralsooftenhadtorelyonthese.Intheabsenceof

68Robson,op.cit.,p.75.69C.Robson,RealWorldResearch,JohnWiley&Sonsltd,Chichester,2011,p.24.70SeeRobson,op.cit.,2011,pp.24-25;Schwandt,2007.71Robson,op.cit.,p.24.72D.Brautigam,DeborahBräutigamdiscussesdoingresearchonChina-Africarelations.InterviewedbyTheChinaAfricaProject[online],10March2013.73WhileXinhuaisanimportantmediaagency,itisunderChina’smediacensorshipandoftenreportsnewsaccordingtotheofficialgovernment’sline.

33

academicstudies,informationfromthemediawasnecessarytoacknowledgewhat

washappening,but itwasnevertakenasareliablesourceofdata,ratheralways

triangulatedwithinterviewsorothertypeofevidence.Thiswasdue,mainly,tothe

fact thatmediareports tendedtoexaggerate figuresorevents,probablytoserve

journalisticends,i.e.anappetiteforbreakingnews.

Access torelevantdata isnot,however,onlyamediaproblem.Moreover, it is

importanttomentionthatifitwerenotforthenewsreportedbythemedia,alotof

whatisknownwouldhaveremainedobscuretoacademicaudiencesandmore.The

heavyrelianceonthemediaisexacerbatedbyalackoftransparencyintherelease

ofofficialstatisticsandreportsbybothChineseandKenyangovernments. Inthe

caseofKenya,theavailabilityofdatadependedlargelyonthesectorandthecase

under analysis. In some cases, statistics are gathered and updated by the

governmentand/ornon-statebodies, insomeotherstheyarenot.Insomecases,

disclosing data is routine, in some others it is not. For this reason, conducting

fieldwork,especiallyundertheformofinterviewsbutalsothroughthegatheringof

unpublishedmaterial,was fundamental for the construction of the thesis and to

bridgethemanytheoreticalandempiricalaspectsthatawaitedclarification.

The collection of data mainly occurred through interviews, collection of

unpublisheddocuments,openresources,andsoforth.Thoughmostlyqualitative,

quantitative data were used, whenever possible. The author conducted semi-

structuredinterviewswhichallowedtoaskspecificquestionswhileleavingspace

forfurtherinvestigationduringtheinterviewingprocess.Thiswascrucialgiventhat,

at times, the interview served as a moment to first clarify the details of the

engagementandonlytheninvestigatemotivationsandmodalities.Therefore,afully

structured interview would have reduced the scope of the investigation, which

indeedtookshapeinitinere.Similarly,conductingfullyflexibleinterviewswasnot

appropriateastheauthorwasnot lookingforaflowofconsciencebutratherfor

specificanswers.

Initially, people or organisations involved in the relations under investigation

wereidentified.Theauthoridentifiedactorsfromdifferentsidessototriangulate

thefindingsasmuchaspossibleandsheusedtheexpertiseandcontactsofinitial

intervieweestogetintouchwithmorepeople.Attimestheauthorspecificallyasked

intervieweestohelphergetintouchwithothercontacts,atothers,theinterviewees

suggestedagentsthattheauthorhadnotimaginedcouldhaveastakeintheissue

34

understudy.Interviewingverydifferentsourcesonthesamesubjectwasthefirst

meansoftriangulation.Theinterviewsweresupported,asmuchasitwaspossible,

bywrittendocuments.Thesewereattimesfreelyavailableonlineorinarchives,at

others,theirconsultationhadtobeformallyrequested.

Forthistypeofresearch,itwouldhavebeenappropriatetoconductfocusgroups,

so to bring to light interaction dynamics among different groupings. However,

realistically, this was not feasible. Especially elite interviewees often had to be

chaseddowncorridors,evenafterhavingsetupanappointment.Maybeawayto

attractthemtoattendafocusgroupcouldhavebeentoprovidethemwitharather

sizeable incentive to attend, but this act resided outside the author’s ethical

standards.

Itwastheauthor’sdecision,earlyduringfieldwork,nottorecordtheinterviews.

During the first few interviews conducted she asked permission to record but

realisedthat intervieweeswereuncomfortable.Thetopicof thisthesiswasoften

consideredsensitive,especiallybyelitecontacts.Asaconsequence,shepreferred

givinguptherecording,ratherputtingtheeffortinestablishingtrustandgathering

data.Notesweretakentorecord,asfaithfullyaspossible,expressionsusedbythe

interviewees.

The data was then analysed in two phases. An initial one, during fieldwork:

themeswereidentifiedthatallowedtoexpandanddeepentheinvestigation.Anda

second phase, after fieldwork, when a more complete picture of the data was

available.Thedatawasanalysedaccordingtothemaincategoriesidentifiedinthe

theoreticalelaborationofagency:actors,interests,modalities.Theanalysisinthe

next few chapters does not always clearly separate these categories, which is a

compromisethathadtobeacceptedtotellthestoryassmoothlyaspossible.

1.4.4 FieldworkThisthesisisbasedonextensivefieldworkinKenya.Atotalofninemonthswas

spentonthefield.TheworkconductedinKenyaprovidedanecessarygroundupon

which to build an original understanding of the issues under study through the

collection of a sizeable body of original data. The length of the stay was

consequential to a difficult research environment where closure toward

investigationmadeapproachingtheinterviewees,especiallygovernmentofficials,

extremelyslow.ThetimespentinKenyanotonlywasnecessarytocollectdatabut

35

alsokeytoidentifynewmeaningsassociatedwithabodyofexistingliteratureon

Africanstates,societiesandtheirrelationswitheachotherandwithexternalactors,

whichwouldhavenototherwisebeeneasilydiscovered.Inotherwords,thestayin

Kenyaallowed the author to immerseherself in aprocessof localproductionof

meaning that is not only significant per se but is also relevant inasmuch as it

representsadeparture fromthemainbodiesof literatureonthesubjectandthe

theoreticalunderstandinglinkedtothem.By‘localproductionofmeaning’ismeant

thewaysinwhichindividuals(Africans/Kenyansinthisthesis)constructandmake

senseof theeventsaround them.This ‘meaning’directlyemerged from in-depth

interviews with Kenyans, seen as crucial participants in what Robson calls the

‘construction of reality’. He suggests that “research participants are viewed as

helpingtoconstructthe‘reality’withtheresearchers.Valuesoftheresearcherand

othersareassumedtoexistandsubjectivityisanintegralpartoftheresearch”74.In

this case, the researcher, a Western PhD candidate from a UK university but

evidently not British, enquiring about Kenya’s relationswith China, often raised

doubts.Manywerethe instance inwhichtheauthorwasaskedwhethershewas

partofintelligenceorganisations.

Moreover,throughouttheperiodoffieldwork,Kenyawasinthemidstofatense

international atmosphere with the President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and the Vice-

President,WilliamRuto,undertrialattheInternationalCriminalCourt.TheWest

(which the ICCwas representing) and China,were seen as opposed: the former

interferingwith Kenya’s internal affairs, and the latter supporting the country’s

sovereignty.Consequently,askingaboutKenya’srelationswithChinawasalways

initially associated with the ongoing ICC trial and the consequential West/East

divide. The author, due to her origin, was often associated with a pro-Western

approach. This presented not few challenges throughout different phases, i.e.

approaching the contacts, setting up appointments, the interview, following up

when necessary. One of themost important, and challenging,momentswas the

beginning of the interview when the author had to establish trust, which was

necessarytomaketheintervieweescomfortableandgaintheirattention.

The intervieweeswere informed, at the beginning of the interview, that they

wouldremainanonimousunlesstheywouldallowtheirnamestobeusedinthefinal

thesis.Althoughthetopicofthisthesisisnotamongthemostsensitiveinthesocial

74Robson,op.cit.,p.24.

36

sciences, thehistoricalperiod (PresidentandVice-Presidentunder trial)and the

dichotomymentionedabovebetweenpro-Chinaandpro-Westmade itnecessary

fortheauthortobeextracautious,especiallyinregardstosomegroups,liketrade

unions.Interviewwereconductedbytheauthorwhohiredalocalassistanttobe

helpedincontactinglocalfiguresthatweredifficulttogetintouchwith.Whilethe

importance of considering national and subnational manifestations of power-

sharing is acknowledged, the cases selected to be studied aremainly set in the

NairobiareainKenya.Thisisdue,ontheonehand,tothefactthatMinistries,aswell

as headquarters of companies andmajorCSOs, are based inNairobi, andon the

otherhand, due to feasibility limitations. In the first case, it is also important to

mentionthatanumberofprojects,developedincooperationwithChinainthethree

sectorsstudied,werepurposelycarriedoutaroundNairobiduetothemuchhigher

presenceofservicesandinfrastructurethaninotherareasofthecountry.Regarding

feasibilitylimitations,whenspecificcaseswereidentifiedoutsidetheNairobiarea

and deemed important for data collection, interviews were arranged either via

phone/emailorinperson.OthercasesoutsidetheNairobiareathatweredismissed

wereeithernotconsideredcriticalforthedevelopmentofthethesisorthetimeand

resourcesthattheauthorwouldhavehadtodedicatetoarrangingtravelswerenot

deemedlogicalintermsofcost-benefitanalysis.

Kenyacannotbereducedto theurbandynamicsofavibrantcity likeNairobi.

Henceitwouldbeworth,infutureresearch,tofocusonasinglesectorandcompare

governancedynamicsinurbanandruralsettings.

The argument in this thesis is based on contemporary facts with an eye to

processesthatunfoldedmainlyinthepastdecade.Therefore,itmay,attimes,not

fullyshowwhatonlythestudyoflongprocessesallowstoobserve.Itisnonetheless

of value to present a snapshot, in the hope that with time more context and

understandingwillbuildaroundit.Wherethevariablesaremany,andthebodyof

data issignificantlysizeable thusmaking thestudynotaselegantoressentialas

many other theoretical works, the hope is that the richness of details will be

consideredvaluableenoughtoevenoutthegap.

37

1.5 Chapters’OutlineThethesisisdividedintothreeparts.PartIcomprisetheresearchdesign(this

Chapter) and the positioning within theoretical debates, including an initial

conceptualization of agency (Chapter 2). In Chapter 2 a detailed theoretical

approach placing the study in the context of Africa’s interactions with external

forcesispresented.

PartIIofthethesisconsistsofthesectoralanalysisandisdevelopedinChapters

3to6.Chapter3standsasatraitd’unionbetweentheoryandgroundedresearch.

Theliteratureonagency,andthetensionbetweendomesticandexternalinterests,

isherediscussedwithreference to theKenyancase.Thisbroadcountrystudy is

essential for situating more specific sectoral analyses in context. The chapter

concentrates on how historical legacies, including processes of change, and

structuralfeaturesinteractwithactorsandtheinstitutionstheyform.Todoso,a

number of factors must be taken into consideration 75 : historical legacies,

institutions(formalandinformal),processesofchange,structuralfeatures,power,

andideologiesandvalues.

After presenting the broad country study, the following three chapters are

dedicated to a more fine-grained analysis, specific to the sector. Each sector is

unpacked following the conceptualizationof agencypresented inChapter2. The

analysisfocusesonactors,theirbeliefsystemsandtheresourcestheycanrelyonto

safeguard their interests in the relations with China, within specific systems of

governance. The analysis combines reasoning about macro(national)-, meso

(sectoral)- and micro-(issue-specific) level dynamics. The chapters identify the

motivationsandmodalities throughwhichawiderangeofdomesticactorsexert

controlovertherelationswithChina.

Chapter4 focusesonsomeof themostsalient issues inSino-Africanrelations,

namelytrade-relateddisputes.Therhetoricofsolidarity,mutualbenefit,friendship

that the Chinese tend to instil in Africans’ hearts and minds through official

discoursesmayalsobeawaytocounterbalancethenegativeperceptionthathas

growninAfricancontextsespeciallyinrelationtoproblemsassociatedwithChina’s

non-adherencetotradenorms.Thechaptermovesbeyondknownanalysesofthese

relations, thatoften focuson theChinesemisdoings, tounpack theKenyan ‘side’

throughthreecasesidentifiedbyKenyansasthemostimportant:1)thenegotiation

75MoncrieffeandLuttrell,op.cit.

38

oflabourdisputesbetweentradeunionsandChinesecompaniesininfrastructure;

2)theestablishmentoftheAnti-CounterfeitsAgencyinresponsetothethreatposed

byChineseproducts toKenyan intellectualproperty rights;3) thenegotiationof

competinginterestsbetweenKenyanwholesalersandretailersinrelationtotheir

respective engagements with China, including the resolution of the protest that

occurredinAugust2012againstChinesesmallshopownersinNairobi.

Chapter5focusesonKenyanresponsestotheChineseinvolvementinHealthcare.

HealthcareisacrucialsectorforChina’spublicdiplomacy,andincreasinglyforthe

commercial linksrevolvingaround thedistributionof cheapmedicalproducts to

Africa. The chapter explores themotivations andmodalities of Kenyan actors in

insertingChina ina complexscenario regulatedby international institutionsand

populatedbytraditionalpartnersandIndia.Threecaseswereidentifiedasrelevant

to unpack the sector comprehensively: 1) public and private trade in health

products;2)thenegotiationsrevolvingaroundthedevelopmentofinfrastructure

forhealthcarebytheChinese;3)theuseofChinaasamodeltodeveloptraditional

medicinepolicyandpractice.

Chapter6focusesonKenyanresponsestotheChineseinvolvementinEducation

and Training. Similar toHealthcare, Education is an important aspect of China’s

public diplomacy in Africa. The chapter unpacks themotivations andmodalities

according towhichKenyanactorsexplorenewareas for thedevelopmentof the

sector, through the engagement with China. Kenyans identified three cases as

particularlyrelevant:1)thedevelopmentofTechnicalandVocationalEducationand

Training through a partnership with China; 2) the filtering of Chinese offers of

assistance for the development of human resources for healthcare; 3) the

managementoftheset-upofConfuciusInstitutesinhighereducationinstitutions.

InPartIIItheauthorwillpresentandcomparethefindingsofempiricalresearch

whilerelating themto theresearchquestions.Shewillhighlight therelevanceof

such findings to established theoretical scholarships. Chapter 7 reviews and

comparestheempiricalfindingspresentedinPartII.Itsummarisesandcompares

the factors that, in the Kenyan case, were the variables that produced different

responsestotheengagementwithChina.Finally,Chapter8drawstheconclusions.

39

CHAPTER2

‘African’Agency:theState,SocietyandtheInternational

2.1 Introduction

Thischapterlooksattheliteraturemoreindepththanthepreviouschapterand

explains the theoretical lens through which the study is developed. Laying the

theoretical foundations serves the purpose of explaining how Africa has been

interacting with the broader international context and how the literature has

understood and theorised dynamics of engagement. The author is aware of the

problem of speaking of Africa undiscerningly. Real world events 76 and the

scholarshipproducedaroundthemoftenrefertoAfricaasawhole.Whilethisthesis

attemptstomovebeyondgeneralisationsthroughadetailedstudyofKenya,itisnot

possibletoisolatethestudyfrombroaderapproachestoAfricaandtheliterature

emerging from them. There are, across Africa, popular discourses, policies and

trajectoriesofdevelopmentshapedbothfromwithinandfromoutsidethecontinent.

Harrisonsuggeststhatthereare“atleastthreesensesinwhichspeakingof‘Africa’

asawholemightbejustifiedinthiscontext”77:asacollectionofstateswithashared

history; as a collective international actor; and as a discursive category, used, in

internationalpoliticsandpolicy,byAfricansandoutsidersbothnegatively“through

processesof‘othering’”,andpositively“throughassertionsofvalueagainstimperial

derogations”78.LocatingthisthesiswithinthebroadbodyofliteratureonAfrica’s

longhistoryofengagementswithexternalpresencesisastartingpointtoanalyse

empiricalfindingsconcerningthemorerecentrelationswithChina.Thelatterhave

beenchallengingscholarsofdifferentdisciplinesinthepastfewyears,especially

thoseinsearchforgrandtheoriesthatcouldexplainChina-Africaengagements79.

The structure-agency dichotomy typical of international relations’ theoretical

approaches is considered a solid framework to understand the tension between

structurallimitationsweightingonAfricansystemsandthedynamicemergenceof

76For instance, in the caseofChina-Africa, theForumonChinaAfrica cooperation is anexampleofhowChinesepoliciestowardsthecontinentaregeneralandnotcountryspecific.77InBrown,2012(b),op.cit.78G.Harrison,NeoliberalAfrica.Theimpactofglobalsocialengineering,ZedBooks,London&NewYork,2010,pp.14-16.79Alden,2013,op.cit.,p.3.

40

a diverse range of actors in Sino-African relations. The Sino-African relations’

literaturehaspaidenormousattention tostructuralasymmetriesbetweenChina

andAfricancountries,whichsomearguearethecauseofChina’sexploitationofthe

continentand/orthecauseofAfrica’ssubmissiontoChina.Notwithstandingthefact

that in aggregate terms (i.e. national statistics) China has more power vis-à-vis

Africanstates,payingattentiontotheactualdynamicsofengagement,andagency

in particular, achieves the aim of shedding light on the existence of African

capabilities,modalitiesandlogicsofengagementwithChinaandtheinternational

system 80 . It is expected that the national structural asymmetry becomes less

significantwhiletheroleofAfricansindeterminingtheoutcomeofrelationsmore

so.AccordingtoTaylor“criticallyanalysingthemodalitiesofgovernancein large

partsof[Sub-SaharanAfrica]SSAandhowtheycombinewithexternalprocessesis

essential ifwewish to comprehenddiplomaticpractices, global interactions and

broad international relations of Africa’s elites and ordinary citizens” 81 . Alden

suggeststhat:

AnyexaminationoftheChina-Africarelationshipwouldbebetterservedifit

were at least guided by the same strictures that already are evident in other

relationships—say,scholarshipthatstudiesFrance-AfricaorBrazil-Africa.Inthis

regard,thecenteringonthestateandthecontinentisunderstoodtobemerelya

‘highpolitics’depictionofanever-broadeningsetofstoriescascadingdownfrom

thestatetosub-statetosocietallevels,transcendingsovereignboundaries,and

spiralling outward to expose the texture of contacts between individuals and

communities82.

The inclusionofdomestic-levelexplanationssuchas thediversityofstateand

non-stateactorsandtheirinterdependenceiswhatthisresearchaimsatstudying,

intending to contribute not only to Sino-African relations but also to the

understanding of African countries’ role in a changing scenario of international

relations.AcknowledgingthecapabilitiesofAfricanactorsininternationalrelations

is not done “by stressing a voluntaristic, panglossian view of agency, shorn of

structuralconstraintsandhistoricalspecificity,butbyrequiringanaccountofthe

80Habeeb,op.cit.81Taylor,op.cit.,p.2.82Alden,2013,op.cit.,p.2.

41

mutually-constitutingandchangingrelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure”83.

Thistakestheanalysistoacknowledgethatgovernanceiswhatlinksstructureand

agency. Governance is defined as social coordination and is concernedwith the

“natureofallpatternsofrule”84.

First, Africa’s position in international relations and International Relations

Theory(IRT)isdiscussedbyprovidingabriefoverviewoftheoreticalandempirical

problemsfacingAfrica’sroleinIRthroughthelensofthestructure-agencytension,

with a particular focus on state-society relations. Then the connection between

agencyandstructureispresentedthroughananalysisoftheoreticaldebatesinthe

international relations discipline and applied to the debates on Sino-African

relations.Indoingso,actors,interestsandsystemsofgovernanceacrossdomestic

andinternationalcontextsareunpackedtoaccountforthe“mutually-constituting

andchangingrelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure”.Thisbringstolightthe

importance of focusing not only on realist accounts of international relations

accordingtowhichexplanationsresideinthesystem-levelandstatesaretreatedas

unitaryactorsexemptedfromdomesticinfluences.Rather,thenecessitytolookat

a more sociological understanding of agency is acknowledged. As Mohan and

Lampertsuggest“ChineserelationswithmanyAfricancountriesarematuringand

movingbeyondstate-to-statedeals,implicatingmanymoreactors.So,theneedto

movebeyond statist, elite dialogues is not simply a theoretical exercise, but one

made more pressing by this growing ‘embeddedness’ of mutual political and

economic ties”85. As a consequence, the aspects introduced in Chapter 1 of the

institutionalist,constructivistandpluralisttheoreticalapproachesareembeddedin

theconceptualizationofgovernance,whichisfullyunpackedbelow.

2.2 AfricainIRSincethe1950s,whenthefirstsub-SaharanAfricanstatesgainedindependence,

“manytextshavefocusedonAfricaandtheglobalsystem,butfewerhavefocused

on the African element of this relationship or on the intra-African dimension to

foreignpolicy”86.Evenmorerecently“studieshavelargelyfocusedontheactions

83Brown,2012(a),op.cit.,p.1890.84M.Bevir,‘GovernanceasTheory,Practice,andDilemma’,inM.Bevired.,TheSAGEHandbookofGovernance,SAGEPublications,London,2011.85MohanandLampert,op.cit.,p.100.86S.Wright, ‘TheChangingContext ofAfricanForeignPolicies’, in S.Wright ed.,AfricanForeignPolicies,WestviewPress,Boulder,1999,p.1.

42

andstrategiesofexternalactors, thusoverlookingAfricanagenciesandtheways

theymayco-shapenewglobalrelations”87.

ThemainreasonfortheneglectofAfricandynamicsinIRThasbeentheportray

ofAfricanstatesas“fallenpreytoanarrayofdestructiveforcesintheaftermathof

theColdWar”88andoftheAfricancontinentashopelesslydisconnectedfromthe

globalised rest of the world. According to this view, Africans’ lack of political

initiativeandthestructuralasymmetriesbetweenAfricancountriesandexternal

actorshaveallowedthe latter toshapeAfrica’sdomesticaswellas international

relations.ThepredominanceofinformalgovernanceinAfrica,consequentialtothe

absence of a proper division between formal state apparatuses and social

formationshasledtobelievethatAfricanstates“mightberatherdifferentfromthe

statesthattypicallyinhabitatleast‘traditional’IRtheory”89andbecauseofthis,they

could hardly fit IRT 90 . This normative understanding of political dynamics

overlookedthehistoricaltrajectoriesandthecomplexitiesofempiricalstatehood

withoutrealising,asWilliamsclaims,that“Africanstateshelptoprovidesomeof

whatwemightcallthe‘limitcases’butthebroadissuesthatemergeareonesthat

canbeappliedtothinkingaboutstateagencyingeneral”91.

However, evenwhen this convergencebetweenAfrican cases and the general

(Western-producedandoriented92) literature isacknowledged, it isnecessary to

situate the agency of African states and societieswithin history to pin down its

abstract meanings and directly link them to the structural dimensions it is

permeatedwithandthatitconstitutes.AccordingtoBayart,“therootsoftherelative

specificityofAfricansocietiesonwhichsomuchstressislaidinmuchwritingabout

Africa undoubtedly lie in history” 93 . Talking about agency from a less

geographically-determined point of view, Emirbayer andMische claim that it is

“informedbythepast(initshabitualaspect),butalsoorientedtowardthefuture

(as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a

capacitytocontextualizepasthabitsandfutureprojectswithinthecontingenciesof

87T.Dietzet.al.eds.,‘AfricanEngagements:onWhoseTerms?AfricaNegotiatinganEmergingMultipolarWorld’,inT.Dietzet.al.eds.,AfricanEngagements,Brill,Leiden-Boston,2011,p.6.88HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.540.89Williams,op.cit.,p.3.90Brown,2006,opcit.;Lemke,2003,op.cit.;Lemke,2011,op.cit.;Clapham,1998,op.cit.;Williams,op.cit.91Williams,op.cit.,p.3.92J.Hill,‘BeyondtheOther?APostcolonialCritiqueoftheFailedStateThesis’,AfricanIdentities,vol.3,no.2,2005,p.38.93J.F.Bayart,‘TheState’,translatedbyA.M.Berretfrom‘L’Etat’,inC.Coulon&D.C.Martineds.,LesAfriquesPolitiques,EditionsLaDécouverte,1991,retrievedinT.Younged.,ReadingsinAfricanPolitics,TheInternationalAfricanInstitute,London,2003,p.40.

43

themoment)”94. Inotherwords,agency isnotonlya“structurallyembeddedbut

alsotemporally-embeddedprocess”95.Itisthusnecessarytoexplainthehistorical

trajectoriesofAfricandomesticandinternationalprocessestothenunderstandthe

continent’smorerecentrelationswithChina.

While IR theoriesplacegreatemphasison theroleof the state, Iargue that the

analysisofstateinstitutionsmustbeembeddedinabroaderunderstandingofstate-

society relations, onewhere different forms of agency are identified, such as state

versus non-state, leader-dominated versus bureaucracy-dominated, and different

relationships betweenparticular agencies and structures are acknowledged96. This

necessityisnotaconsequenceofthe“particular‘nature’ofthestateinAfrica,making

itontologicallydifferentfromthestateelsewhere”97butratherofanunderstandingof

international relations as constituted by and embedded in the domestic. Brown

suggests that focusing on various forms of agency to explain Africa’s role in

internationalrelations“isinpartanattempttochallengenarrativesofAfricathat

presenttheentirecontinentasperpetualvictimandlackingpoliticalinitiativeand

engageseriouslywiththemorefine-graindetail”98.

2.2.1 Domestically-StateandSocietyTo study processes of governance, it is necessary to understand the relation

betweenthegoverningandthegoverned,andtheirinteractionwithstructuresand

institutions.TheproblemsinstudyingAfricanprocessesofgovernancehaveboth

beentheoreticalandempirical.Intheoreticalterms,ithasbeenquestionedwhether

the institutions of the state and civil society in Africa exist at all given that the

originalformsofassociationalspaceexistentonthecontinentbeforetheadventof

colonisersweresignificantlydifferentinstructuretothewesterndivisionofpowers

between the state and other societal actors. In empirical terms, the presence of

informalityincontextsofgovernancehasledtoconsiderAfricandynamicsasfailed,

rather than as different from the western blueprint upon which much of the

literature rests. Hill suggests that it is the European experience of State, the

normativeattributesstemmedoutofthisexperience,andtherelianceoftheoretical

94M.EmirbayerandA.Mische,‘WhatisAgency?’,AmericanJournalofSociology,vol.103,no.4,1998,p.963.95Brown,2012(b),op.cit.,p.13.96W.Brown,‘Africanagencyininternationalpolitics:scope,analysisandtheory’,paperpresentedattheESRCAfricanagencyininternationalpoliticsseminarNewDirectionsinthestudyofAfrica’sIR:perspectivesfromsouthernAfrica,WallenbergResearchCentre,StellenboschUniversity,2-3November2011,p.13.97HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.558.98Brown,2012(b),op.cit.,p.17.

44

prepositions on this particular experience that has caused other experiences to

appearasinappropriate.Africanstatesare“identifiedasfailednotbywhattheyare,

butbywhattheyarenot,namely,successfulincomparisontoWesternstates”99.

EventhoughAfrica“hasnogreatStatetraditionlikethatprovidedbyStatesin

the West, Central Asia or the Far East” 100 , African pre-colonial societies still

presentedsystemsofsharedgovernancebetweenthegoverningandthegoverned.

Differentindigenousformsofsocial,political,economicandlegalinstitutionswere

based upon a variety of philosophies and cultures. Goody suggests that “even

political formations […] lacking any consolidated form of the state reveal ‘some

spaceformanoeuvrebetweenthepersonalandthepublic’”101.Notwithstandingthis,

itisimpossibletodenythestronginfluencethatcolonialismhashadonthebalance

ofpowersharingbetweendifferentindigenousforces.Africa’strajectoryofpolitical

formation is then, as Bayart suggests, a “hybridization between indigenous

repertoiresofpoliticsandrepertoriesimportedfromoutside–aphenomenonthat

isnecessarilypartandparceloftheconstructionoftheStateinthe‘ThirdWorld’–

[andthat]isoccurringinAfricainuniqueconditions”102.Hecontinuesarguingthat

“thecontemporaryStateinBlackAfricahasahistoricityofitsown.Manyfeatures

ofpoliticallifeinAfricasouthoftheSaharaattestnottoitslackofadaptation,asis

toofacilelysaid,but,onthecontrary,toitsrootednessinlocalsocieties”103.Inother

words, “statehood in Africa should thus be understood as the emanation of

particular historic types of African modes of governing” 104 . Understanding

governancerelationsincontemporarynon-westerncontextsmeansunderstanding

“therelationshipbetweensocialformations,theassociationsthatrepresentthem

and thestate”105and itmeans includingarangeofgroupingsso to “gainawider

understandingofparticularsocietiesandtheirrelationshiptotheirstates”106.

Thehistoricalandculturalaspectsthatunderpinstate-societyrelationsareeven

more evident through an examination of how such relations are accomplished.

Karlstrombringstolightthefactthat“Africansocioculturalarrangementsprovide

their own logic of sovereign accountability, their own public spheres, their own

99Hill,op.cit.,p.148.100Ibid.101C.M.HannandE.Dunneds.,CivilSociety.ChallengingWesternModels,Routledge,London,1996,p.20.102Bayart,2003,op.cit.,p.40.103Ibid.104HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.542.105N.Kasfir,‘TheConventionalNotionofCivilSociety:ACritique’,Commonwealth&ComparativePolitics,vol.36,no.2,1998,p.1.106Ibid.,p.3.

45

forms of nongovernmental organisation and association” 107 . Therefore, it is

importanttolookatstate-societyrelationsinAfricanot“asapromisedagendafor

change”108butasMamdanisuggests,intheir“actualformation”109.Thismeansthat

in defining state-society relations, the focus should be on the broad range of

collective activity and norms, be they democratic or not, that constitute actual

society110.

Thenecessitytobroadenthescenariotoincludenotonlyformalbutalsoinformal

state-society relations, with the aim of better explaining African dynamics, led

ChabalandDaloztoarguethat“aproperunderstandingoftheinformalizationof

politicsmust be grounded in amore resolutely sociological approach. From this

viewpoint, themodern state is the outcome of a process bywhich the realm of

politics is gradually emancipated from society and constituted into increasingly

autonomouspolitical institutions”111.However, theycontinue, “thestate inAfrica

wasneverproperlyinstitutionalisedbecauseitwasneversignificantlyemancipated

fromsociety”112.

Inordertofullyappreciateandunderstandwhat‘state’and‘society’meaninreal

governance,Migdalsuggests to“breakdowntheundifferentiatedconceptsof the

state–andalsoofsociety–tounderstandhowdifferentelementsineachpull in

different directions, leading to unanticipated patterns of domination and

transformation” 113 . Ideology, policy formulation and implementation are

continuouslychallengedbyroutineformalandinformalcontactsbetweenthetop

andthebottom.Infact,“whiletheimageofthestateimpliesasingularmorality,one

standardway,indeedrightway,ofdoingthings,practicesdenotemultipletypesof

performanceand,possibly,somecontentionoverwhatistherightwaytoact”114.

Migdalalsosuggestslookingataspecificdimensionofthestate:“theformulation

andtransformationofitsgoals.Asthestateorganisationcomesintocontactwith

varioussocialgroups,itclasheswithandaccommodatestodifferentmoralorders.

Theseengagements,whichoccuratnumerous junctures, change the socialbases

107M.Karlstrom,‘Civilsocietyanditspresuppositions:lessonsfromUganda’,inJ.L.Comaroff&J.Comaroffeds.,CivilsocietyandthecriticalimaginationinAfrica:criticalperspectives,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1999,p.27.108Mamdani,op.cit..,p.19.109Ibid.110Orvis,op.cit.,p.18.111ChabalandDaloz,op.cit.,p.5.112Ibid.,p.4.113J.S.Migdal, ‘Thestateinsociety:anapproachtostrugglesfordomination’inJ.S.Migdal,A.KohliandV.Shueeds.,StatePowerandSocialForces.DominationandTransformationintheThirdWorld,CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork,1994,p.8.114Ibid.,p.19.

46

and the aims of the state. The state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it

embodiesanongoingdynamic,a changingsetofgoals,as itengagesothersocial

groups”115.

Whilethisapproachassignsgreatimportancetothedomesticvariablesofagency,

it is also necessary to consider the effect that external actors may have on the

dynamic nature of state-society relations. There is seemingly no other continent

whoseformalandinformalinstitutionshavebeenshaped,re-shaped,contestedand

challengedbyexternalactorsthanAfrica.Consequently,theissueofhownational

capacities and international configurations of power interact remains a central

questioninhowAfricanagencyisunderstood.

2.2.2 Internationally-AgencyanddependenceGlobalisation and the increasing interdependence between domestic,

international and transnational actors continue to cause the foreign policies of

African states to be “shaped by rapidly changing international and domestic

environmentstotheextentthatitisdifficulttoisolatepurely‘foreign’policies”116.

HistoryassignsasignificantroletoAfricanstructuresandagencyinthecontextof

politics,notonlyasaconsequenceofcolonialismbutmoregenerally,astheoutcome

ofAfrica’scenturies-longnegotiationswiththeoutsideworld.Bayartsuggeststhat

“thepriceofthissingularhistoricaltrajectorywasundoubtedlytomakethesub-

continent,oratleastpartsofit,dependent,fromaveryearlydate,oncivilizations

thatweremateriallymorepowerful:thoseofMediterraneanAntiquity,thenlater

the Arab-Muslim world, and later western Europe as it gradually asserted

supremacy from the fifteenth century onwards”117. Thiswas often linked to the

imposition,byexternalactors,ofvisionsofgovernancethathadmostlygrownout

ofrealitiesexternalandextraneoustoAfricancontexts,mainlyWesternones.

AuthorslikeMbembeclaimedthatthesepeculiaritiesfedaninabilitytoacton

the international stageand leftAfricaoutof theworld118,marginalisedbyglobal

economic flowsandpoliticaldynamics.On theotherhand,Bayart sustained that

Africawasalwaysanactiveparticipantontheworldstage,intheworld,andthat

“Africanshaveparticipatedintheprocesseswhichhaveledtotheinsertionoftheir

societiesasadependentpartnerintheworldeconomyand,inthelastresort,inthe

115Ibid.116Wright,op.cit,p.1.117Ibid.118Mbembe,op.cit.,p.173.

47

processof colonisation”119.Chabal andDaloz120suggest that “Africans, througha

dialectic of structural pressures and their ownpolitical agency, have continually

interactedwiththeworldinwaysthatencompassnotionsofprogress,orderand

justicealthoughtheseconceptsaredefinedinwaysthatdonotnecessarilyresonate

withdominantliberalapproaches”121.

Indeed,notonlyAfricanshavealwaysinteractedwiththeworld,butasBayart

argues122,Africahasbeenanactiveagentofextraversionstrategies,extraversion

being“thecreationandthecaptureofarentgeneratedbydependencyandwhich

functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social

struggle”123.Hearguesthat“thediscourseonAfrica’smarginalityisanonsense”124.

Africans are seen as agents and contributors to the continent’s domestic and

internationalhistoriesofdevelopmentanddominanceratherthanas“incapableof

cultural development and totally dependent upon external influences (from the

West,theNearEastandAsia)”125.Theyhaveparticipatedbyappropriatingthestate

introducedbythecolonialpowersnotonly“tothebestofwhattheythoughttobe

theirinterests”butthestatewasalso“interpretedbytheminthelightoftheirown

culturalrepresentations”126.

BeforeWorldWarII,thescopeofthecolonialstate’sauthoritywasstriking127.

OnlyafterWorldWarII,whenthereoccurredatransferofpowers fromcolonial

elites to local ones, the voice of African representatives effectively became

recognised,politicalorganisationtoleratedandfreeexpressionaccepted128.Anew

localadministrativeclassstartedemerging,andeducatedAfricansstartedclaiming

backpoliticalpowerand independence fromcolonisers.Risingnational criticism

throughout Africa against the predator state and an increasingly hostile

internationalenvironmentpushedfortheurgentexpansionofsocialinfrastructure.

Thisisthetimewhen,inordertocontinuejustifyingcolonisation,anewdiscourse

of power management emerged: development. Colonisers supported the

developmentof large investmentprojectsso thateducational facilitiesaswellas

119Bayart,2000,op.cit.,p.220.120ChabalandDaloz,op.cit.121Ibid.122Bayart,2000,op.cit.p.222.123Ibid.124Ibid.,p.267.125Dietzet.al.,op.cit.,p.7.126Bayart,2003,op.cit.,p.40.127Young,op.cit.,p.26.128Ibid.,p.27.

48

roads, hospitals, etc. multiplied 129 . Young Africans who began to stand out in

secondaryschoolsandlaterinuniversitiesstarteddemandingformorepowerand

governmentservicewasthenaturalendobjectofeducation130.The1960swerethe

years of independence of African states from colonisation. The state became an

increasinglystronginstitution,controllingtheeconomyandsociallife.Throughout

thefollowingdecade,thenewgenerationofAfricansaimedatstateexpansionand

Africanization,especiallyinlightofthefactthatwhensub-SaharanAfricansfought

for independence in the 1960s and 1970s, they kept their masters’ political

structureswithamicroscopicunderstandingofhowthesestructuresfunctioned.

Itisfundamentaltobearinmindtheimportanceofthelegacyofthecolonialstate

whileanalysingthecharacteristicsofthepost-colonialone,astheformerdefines

the latter in a number of ways. As mentioned above, a strong state is the one

emerging from independence movements in the 1960s. It is a sovereign state

characterised by single-party systems, nepotism, accumulation of resources and

personality cult. Political sovereignty was achieved through anti-colonial

mobilisationandthroughoutAfricaanassaultonaliendominancetookshapeinthe

formofnationalisationandindigenizationpoliticsinthelate‘60s,early‘70s.This

was also the apogee period of the Cold War: new states became a strategic

battlegrounduponwhichtheUnitedStatesandtheUSSRcompeted.Theirwayof

gainingspheresofinfluenceinAfricaconsistedofprovidingeconomicandmilitary

aid.

However, after 1973, when the oil crisis occurred, the African state started

getting into debt and facing international hostility. In the 1980s world leaders

starteddemandingarestorationofdebtsandAfricanstateswerecalledintodeal

withtheirownfinances.Aparadigmshiftoccurredindevelopmenteconomics,with

the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the birth of Structural Adjustment Plans in the

1980s. In fact, “the fundamental nature of post-colonial arrangements was

challengedeconomicallyandpolitically,throughdemands–externalandinternal–

formarketliberalizationanddemocratization”131.Thisperiodwascharacterisedby

aprofoundcrisisofstatestructures.Stateswereaskedtoreformtheireconomic

policiesbydecreasing thestatecontrolupontheeconomy.Africanstatesstarted

reducingtheircontrolfunctions,andthatiswhenthecreationofaprivatisedstate

129Ibid.130Ibid.,p.28.131Ibid.,p.25.

49

occurred,whereprivateactorsoccupiedpublic space that the state itselfhadno

longerthecapacitytocontrol.

In the 1990s “Africa’s relations with the outside world were privatised […]

through thedisplacement of traditional state-to-state relations as a result of the

processesofglobalisation”132. Suchprivatisationeroded theprimaryroleof the

stateinstitution“intheWeberiansenseoftheroutinecapacitytoexerciseultimate

authority within the territorial domain of sovereignty” and “opened space for a

multitudeofactors”133.Newfiguresofpoweremergedsuchas“informal traders,

smugglers, warlords, arms traffickers, youth militia, local associations (‘civil

society’), women’s organisations, religious groups, refugees” 134 . These groups

increasingly operated with varying degrees of autonomy, interacting with state

agents, international agencies, donor representatives and the non-governmental

sector135. Foreigndonors startedby-passing the state toprovide support to civil

society organisations directly. However, the latter soon became a state

manipulationsotoobtainexternalresourcesandcircumventthelimitsimposedby

westerndonors.

AsKhadiagalaandLyonsclaim,“theprocessofthedeinstitutionalisationofthe

stateandtherelatedprivatisationofdiplomacyhasplacedAfricanforeignpolicies

in a profound crisis of consistency and direction. Realist assumptions of state-

centeredness are shamed by the spectre of the African state weighed down by

variousinternalactorsandincreasinglyunabletocompetewithinternalchallengers

intheforeignpolicyarena”136.Moreover,“theproblematiqueofaidconditionality

has accelerated the process of creating dual structures of power. […] African

political societies are duplicated between, on the one hand, a pays legal, a legal

structurewhichisthefocusofattentionformultilateraldonorsandWesternstates,

andontheotherhand,apaysreelwhererealpoweriswielded”137.Informalpolitics

and parallel economies became part of the processes of globalisation. As a

consequence,“itisnolongeraquestionofwhetherforeignpolicyisthepreserveof

the president or the foreign minister but of whether any organised body is in

charge”138.

132C.Clapham,AfricaandtheInternationalSystem,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1996,p.256.133Ibid.134Ibid.135Ibid.136G.M.KhadiagalaandT.Lyonseds.,‘Conclusion:AfricanForeignPolicyMakingattheMillennium’,inG.M.Khadiagala&T.Lyonseds.,AfricanForeignPolicies:PowerandProcess,LynneRiennerPublishers,Boulder,2001,p.213.137Bayart,2000,op.cit.,pp.229-230.138Ibid.

50

UnderstandingthecomplexitiesofAfricanstateandnon-stateactors’interaction

witheachotherandwiththeexternalworldhasprofoundimplicationsforChina-

Africarelations.China’sinitialstate-centricfocusdidnotseemtoacknowledgethe

importanceofmorecomplexdomesticsystemsinwhichpowerisnotthedomainof

onebutadiversityofactors.

2.2.3 TheemergenceoftheSouthThe introduction of new players in Africa’s international relations since the

2000shasraisedissuesconcerninggeopolitical,economic,andnormativeaspects

ofAfrica’srelationswiththeworld.Emergingpowershavecreatedaparallelsystem

ofinternationalrelations,inwhichregionalandinternationalinstitutionshavebeen

created,andnewformsofnegotiationpatternssuccessfullyenteredtheworldstage,

withouttheneedforWesternintermediariesthathavecontrolledtheinternational

arena until now. Far from stating thatWestern countries play a limited role in

Africa’s economic, social and political spheres, the fast-paced entry of Southern

actorshassymbolisedachangeintheWest’sroleasintermediaryand,evenmore

importantly,hasstartedrepresentinganalternativeforAfricanplayers.

Infact,“withtheendoftheColdWar,theworldseemedtomovefromabipolar

systemtoaunipolarworldinwhichtheneoliberalWestgloballyimposesitslaws.

However,duringthelastdecade,ithasbeenacknowledgedthatotheractors,such

as China, India and Brazil, have become increasingly influential, creating

multipolarity at the global level”139. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and

SouthAfrica)groupofemergingeconomiesandtheIBSA(India,BrazilandSouth

Africa) group of emerging democracies represent two of the most increasingly

influentialgroupsofstates,emerginginglobaleconomicandpoliticalaffairs.Their

ideaofworldexchangesisbasedon“arapiddeepeningofinterconnectivitywithin

thedeveloping world—in flows of goods,money, people and ideas—that is

surprisinglyautonomousfromWesterncontrol,resultinginthedevelopmentofa

new,parallelinternationalsystem,withitsowndistinctivesetofrules,institutions

andcurrenciesofpower”140.

139Dietzetal.,op.cit.,p.2;seealso:DIE, ‘Unstablemultipolarity?China’sandIndia’schallengesforglobalgovernance’,DIEBriefingPaper,GermanDevelopmentInstitute,Bonn,2006;D.Dollar, ‘Asiancenturyormulti-polarcentury?’,WorldBankPolicyResearchWorkingPaper4174,TheWorldBank,Washington,2007;J.Clegg,China’sglobalstrategy.Towardamultipolarworld,PlutoPress,London,2009.140N.Barma,E.RatnerandS.Weber,‘AWorldWithouttheWest’,TheNationalInterest,no.90,July/August,2007,p.27.

51

This increasing multi-polarity of international relations – consequence of a

changing world order – has heightened the perception that Africa has renewed

theoreticalutilitytoscholarsofInternationalRelationsTheory(IRT).Somestillsee

Africaassubduedandexplainthecontinent’snewengagementwith itsSouthern

partnersas“extractiveandexploitative”wherethe“newactors(moresointhecase

ofChina consideredas the ‘yellowperil’ inWesternacademicdiscourse)are the

‘newimperial’powersand[…]suchengagementmerelyperpetuatesthecontinent

asaprimaryexporterofrenewableandnon-renewableresources”141.Othersargue

thatitisnecessarytosetasidethebeliefthat“Africaisjustaspaceinwhichexternal

forcesoperate”becausethisinevitably“obscurestheintricaciesanddifferencesof

expressionsofpowerininternationalnegotiationandpoliticalprocesses,andplaces

too deterministic an emphasis on structural forces”142. This focus in turn “binds

Africa’s international relations into a narrow and predetermined position as the

recipientofinternationalaffairsratherthananactiveplayer”143.

The change in the international context with a shift tomultipolarity and the

emergenceofsouthernpowersisasignificanthistoricalelementthathasarguably

madespaceforAfricanactorstobemoreassertiveintheirrelationswiththeoutside

world at both bilateral and multilateral level. Zondi argues that “the growth of

multilateralisminanincreasinglymultipolarworldwiththeriseofChinaandIndia

tochallengethenorth-AtlanticaxishashadapositiveeffectonAfrica’sparticipation

in global affairs” 144 . According to other studies on aid-receiving African

governments, the impact of the global shift has also been felt on bilateral aid

relations,enhancingthescopeforAfricanbargaining,enablingsomestatestotake

muchtougherstancestowardsWesterndonors145.

China

AmongSouthernactors,Chinahasundoubtedlyreceivedunchallengedattention

bythemediaandscholarlydebates.Awideningtrendofargumentssupportsthe

ideathatChinaandtheWestarenowcompetingagainsteachotherinAfrica,ending

141R.Modied.,SouthSouthCooperation.AfricaontheCentreStage,PalgraveMcMillan,Houndmills,2011,p.12.142S.HarmanandW.Brown, ‘InFromtheMargins?TheChangingPlaceofAfrica in InternationalRelations’, InternationalAffairs,vol.89,no.1,2013,p.86.143Ibid.144Brown,2012(b);seealso:S.Zondi,S,‘AfricainMultilateralNegotiations:ACritiqueofAfricanCommonPositions',paperpresented to the seminar Emerging Agents of Change? Africa in International Negotiations, Chatham House, London, 3February2011.145S. Grimm et al. eds.,Coordinating China andDACDevelopment Partners: Challenges to the Aid Architecture in Rwanda,GermanDevelopmentInstitute,Bonn,2010;L.Whitfielded.,ThePoliticsofAid.AfricanStrategies forDealingwithDonors,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2008.

52

thedecades-longWesternsupremacy.Thiscompetition,itisargued,itisfirstand

foremost for natural resources 146 . However, while “Western investment is

concentrated in African countries with better property rights and rule of law,

Chinese [outbound foreign direct investment] ODI is indifferent to the property

rights/ruleoflawenvironment”147.Besidesnaturalresources’extraction,Western

andChineseactivitiesoften tend tocomplementrather thatcompete in termsof

investmentaswellasdevelopmentprojects.WheretheWestmainlyhasaimedat

promotinggoodgovernance,humanrights,theruleoflaw,Chineseactivitieshave

focusedon thedevelopment of infrastructure andbusiness links, aiming at non-

interfering in other countries’ internal affairs. The western ‘civilizing-mission’

approachcharacterisedbyconditions-basedcooperationactivitiesisconfrontedby

aChinesewin-winbusinessstrategybuiltupon,seemingly,no-conditionpillarsand

‘mutuality’. These approaches stem from opposing views of one’s own role in

international relations andas such seem tobeperceivedbyAfricans.With time,

however,theseeminglyconsistentforeignpolicydiscourseonwin-wincooperation

startedbeingquestionedbyAfricansasthepracticesofadiverserangeofChinese

actorsfurtherexacerbatedthediscussionamongsocietalactors,bureaucratsaswell

as international organisations, concerning the exploitative nature of Chinese

activities, often deemed either disrespectful of local rules or not particularly

advantageousforlocalneeds.

Despitethepreponderanceofamaterialandpower-basedforeignpolicy,China’s

beliefthatnostandardvaluesshouldbeappliedtodifferentsocio-culturalcontexts

is thevery foundationuponwhichChina’s foreignpolicyapproach isbased.This

approachfindsitsrootsinthefiveprinciplesofpeacefulcoexistenceoutlinedduring

the1955BandungConference.Theseprinciples(equality,trust,sovereignty,mutual

benefitandnon-interference)havebeenelaboratedinresponsetoChina’scolonial

pastanditsdevelopingcountrystatus.Infact,Chinaisstillarecipientcountryofaid,

andassuch,itarguesitisbetterpositionedtoknowhowtomeetdevelopmentgoals,

namelythroughtheelaborationofasystemthatsuitseachcontextspecifically.More

recently,ChinesePresidentHuJintaorevivedtheconceptsof“harmonioussociety”

and“harmoniousworld”,whicharebasedonConfucianvalues.Confucianism’score

values highlighted the importance of harmony and order established through

147W.Chen,D.DollarandH.Tang, ‘HowSimilarIsChineseInvestmentinAfricatotheWest’s?’,OrderfromChaos:ForeignPolicyinaTroublesWorld[blogpost],TheBrookingsInstitution,18August2015.

53

rigoroussuperior-subordinaterelationshipsaccordingtowhichsocialpowerwas

mainly placed “in the hands of the older, more conservative segments of the

population”148.

WiththeadventofMaoism,“the[ChineseCommunistParty]CCPspentitsfirst

threedecadesinpowertryingtoextirpateeveryrootandbranchofConfucianism

that it regardedasa feudaland reactionaryworldviewhinderingprogress”149.A

majorshiftoccurred,withtheStatebecomingmoreandmorewillingto“penetrate

societyandre-createitinitsownimage”150.Revolutionaryideologyplayedavery

significantrole in thisperiod.However,as thepost-Maoperiodcame, theroleof

ideologynotablyrecededineverydaylifeaswellasinthegovernment’swork.Yet,

certain ideological elements remain andexert influenceonpolitical rhetoric and

policy-making.Thishasbeenreferredto,inpoliticalsciencevocabulary,asinformal

ideology,mainlymeaningpoliticalthoughtwithaculturaldimension151.Theuseand

elevationoftheimportanceoftraditionalvaluesintendto“softenthesocialimpact

ofeconomicdevelopmentonthecitizenryatlarge”152.

TheseaspectsofChina’shistorycontributetotheintricacyofChinesedomestic

aswellasforeignpolicy.Inparticular,“therevitalizationofthegreatSageandhis

teaching occurred at a juncture when China was entering a new phase in its

development. The reiteration of harmony (and order)—the essence of

Confucianism—constitutesapolicyrevisionwithregardtothedirectionofChina’s

economicreforms,begunmorethanaquarterofacenturyago”153.Thereareseveral

advantages for the government to promote Confucian values: “domestically, the

affirmationofharmonyismeanttoreflecttherulingparty’sconcernforallclasses

[…]itisanimplicitrecognitionthatthingsarenotsoharmonious;butunlikeMaoist

days, theconflictsmustberesolvedpeacefully,not throughviolentclassconflict.

Internationally the call for peace and harmony is meant to disarm fears about

China’srise”154.This,inparticular,helpsthegovernmenttoorchestratethesearch

formoralitywithinsociety.Ratherthanallowingthemoralvacuumtobe“filledby

Christian sects, Falun Gong, and extreme forms of nationalism” which are

148Ibid.,p.8.149D.Bell,China’sNewConfucianism:politicsandeveryday life inachangingsociety,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,2008,p.10.150Y.HuangandD.L.Yang,‘BureaucraticCapacityandState-SocietyRelationsinChina’,JournalofChinesePoliticalScience,vol.7,issue1,March,2002,p.19.151X.Guo‘RepackagingConfucius:PRCPublicDiplomacyandtheRiseofSoftPower’,AsiaPaper,InstituteforSecurityandDevelopmentPolicy,January2008,p.8.152Ibid.153Ibid.,p.12.154Bell,op.cit.,p.9.

54

considered threats to “the hard-won peace and stability that underpins the

country’s development”, the government has encouraged “the revival of China’s

most venerable political tradition: Confucianism. Likemost ideologies, however,

Confucianismcanbeadouble-edgedsword”155.Thecurrentlackofmeritocracyand

the corruption scandals involving the CCP shed light on the much-needed

transformationthatthepoliticalsysteminChinashouldface.

“Reformandopening”,aswellastheinformationrevolutionhavedecreasedstate

control over society. This environment “has contributed to the growth of non-

governmentalorganisations(NGOs)inChina[…]Ofcourse,ChineseNGOscontinue

tooperateunderseverepoliticalrestrictions.Organisationssuchasreligiousgroups

andfreelabourunionsarebanned.Registrationandapprovalprocessesareunduly

burdensome.However,despitetheseadverseconditions,Chinahasseenthegrowth

of (underground) religious groups and small independent labourunions”156.Not

being unitary, the state structure is also increasingly exposed to the changes

mentionedabove.Asaconsequence,“thenationalstateadministrationisnolonger

tightly disciplined. Local officials negotiate their relations with the higher

authoritiesand,attimes,withthecitizenryaswell”157.

This domestic “softening” has led China “to accept political diversity from a

baselineofnotovertlydictating toothers”, in contrast to “theMaoist impulse to

exportworld revolution”158. TheWhitePaper onChina’sAfricaPolicy, issued in

2006,“providesthemoralbasisofitsexpressionsofpowerinAfricabyasserting

thatChineseforeignpolicywill,unliketheWest,beguidedbyprinciplesthatensure

that the relationshipwill not devolve into one of exploitation”159. The paradigm

promotes home-made remedies rather than a standard set of prescriptions. It is

founded upon the following cornerstones: sincerity, equality, mutual benefit,

solidarityandjointdevelopment.Notwithstandingthis,asArmonyandStraussnote

“beneaththepoliteconstructofformalrelations,Chinaisrifewithprincipal-agent

problems, bureaucratic infighting, and ‘national’ state-owned enterprises in

155Ibid.,p.8.156M.Pei,‘ChangingState-SocietyRelationsinChina’,paperpresentedtotheEuroChinaForum,ChinaEuropeInternationalBusinessSchool,<http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/minxin.htm>.157K.Lieberthal,GoverningChina:fromRevolutionThroughReform,W.W.Norton&Company,NewYork,2004,p.300.158 C. Alden and D. Large, ‘China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering Difference in Africa’, Journal ofContemporaryChina,vol.20,no.68,2011,p.28.159Ibid.,p.29.

55

untrammelledpursuitofprofitandinfluenceoftentothedetrimentofChina’swider

reputation”160.

Gurtovsuggeststhat“WeshouldunderstandChina’sdevelopingworldpoliciesin

essentially domestic terms – that is to say, as a source of support for China’s

sovereignty and internal security” 161 . Chinese leaders “have conducted foreign

policyinwaysthatseektomaintaincontroloverthepace,methods,andstrategyof

economicdevelopmentandpoliticalchange.Theforeignpolicydimensionofthat

determination has consistently been to avoid dependence and […] protect and

promoteChina’ssocialistdevelopmentandthusitssecurityandrecognitionofits

importantplaceintheworld”162.

China has, however, been experiencing a learning curve in relation to its

engagement with Africa, evenwhen it comes to the application of principles as

rootedanddearasthosementionedabove.In2004ChinasignedtheUNHigh-Level

PanelonThreats,Challenges,andChangethatreleasedaninfluentialpolicyreport

entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, which endorsed the

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. While ‘pre-2004 non-interference’ was

quiterigid, ‘post-2004non-interference’becamemoreflexible163.Bellarguesthat

“ifChinaaffectstherestof theworld,howcan itasktherestof theworldnotto

interferewithitsowninternalaffairs?Facedwithsuchconcerns,Chinahasbegun

toplayamoreresponsibleandcooperativeroleininternationalaffairs”164.

Few studies have seriously looked at the contributionofAfricans andAfrican

contextsinthechangeChinaisexperiencing165.

2.3 ConceptualizingAgency

Conceptualizing ‘agency-as-ownership’ is an effort deemed necessary as a

theoreticalexercisebutevenmoreasastartingpointforempiricaldemonstrations.

160A.C.ArmonyandJ.C.Strauss‘FromGoingOut(zouchuqu)toArrivingIn(desembarco):ConstructingaNewFieldofInquiryinChina-LatinAmericaInteractions’inJ.C.Strauss&A.C.Armonyeds.,FromtheGreatWalltotheNewWorld:ChinaandLatinAmericainthe21stCentury,TheChinaQuarterlySpecialIssues,NewSeries,no11,CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,p.4.161M.Gurtov,‘ChangingPerspectivesandPolicies’,inL.DittmerandG.T.Yueds.,China,theDevelopingWorld,andtheNewGlobalDynamic,LynneRiennerPublishers,Boulder,2010,p.24.162Ibid.,pp.14-15.163Z.Pang,‘Playingby'TheRules':IsChinaaPartnerorWard?’,SpiegelOnlineInternational,17October2008.http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/playing-by-the-rules-is-china-a-partner-or-ward-a-584758.html164Bell,op.cit.,p.22.165SeeL.Corkin,UncoveringAfricanAgency:Angola’sManagementofChina’sCreditLines,AshgatePublishing,Surrey,UK,2013;Gadzala,2015,op.cit.

56

Inthepreviouschaptertheconceptofownershipwasintroduced,characterisingit

as the definition and domination of governance processes, in other words, the

safeguardingofthesystemsofgovernanceofacountry.

Blendingtheories

Toconceptualiseagencyingovernanceprocesses,asmentionedinChapter1,it

isfundamentaltoascertainwhat‘governance’isabout.Theapproachhereusedis

nottorelyonasingletheoreticalaccountofgovernance,butratherpulltogether

elements froma few theoretical approaches. This is donewith the belief that to

capture realworld events, the discipline of IR does not provide ready-made all-

encompassingtheoreticalsolutions,butratherneedsablendingofmultipletheories.

IRasadisciplineis,historically,derivativeandmultidisciplinary166,itisthusupon

thisbasisthattheblendingapproachusedinthisthesisisbuilt.

The realist approach contributes to an understanding of governance by

emphasising the centrality of the state and the importance of self-interest in

international relations. It is a starting point in the scholarship to conceptualise

agencyinasymmetricalconditions.However,itdoesnotleavespaceforideas,civil

society,institutionsandtransnationalforces.Thetheoryisparticularlyrelevantin

Sino-African relations. These, as explained in Chapter 1, were initially broadly

structuredandunderstoodasstate-to-stateaffairs.Accordingtothisapproach,the

asymmetrybetweenChinaandAfricancountriesplacestheformerinapositionof

prevalence over the latter.However, as explained above, thismethod,while still

significant to explain the importance of sovereignty and, presumably, the non-

interferenceapproachpromotedbyChinaandcommendedbyAfricancountries,is

not sufficient to understand processes of governance that increasingly include

actorsbeyondthestate.

The institutionalist approach theorises how “formal or informal procedures,

routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure or

political economy”167definebehaviour.According to them, institutions represent

the “principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive

outcomes”168. Institutionalism emphasises path dependence according to which

166ForahistoricalaccountseeJ.M.Hobson,‘ComparativePoliticsandInternationalRelations’,inT.Landman&N.Robinsoneds.,TheSAGEHandbookofComparativePolitics,SAGEPublications,London,2009.167P.A.HallandR.Taylor,‘PoliticalScienceandtheThreeNewInstitutionalisms’,PoliticalStudies,vol.44,no.5,1996,p.936.168Ibid.,p.937.

57

“the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past” 169

mediatetheeffectsofothervariablesatplay.Institutionsarethemostsignificantof

these contextual features170. This paradigm suggests that global interactions are

legitimisedthroughinstitutions,whicharenotonlyformalbutalsoinformalsetsof

interdependent relations between states, societies,markets, transnational forces

and so forth171. This paradigm is very relevant to this thesis, although itsmain

limitationisaninabilitytoaccountforchange,asreliantasitisonpathdependence,

andtoprovideproperspacetoindividualagents.

Constructivism, on the other hand, provides a subjective dimension to

governance,focusingonthesocialconstructionofidentities,ideasandinterests(see

thesectionbelowonRepertoires).This isofparticular importanceas the theory

acknowledgesthat interestsandactionsgainmeaningandvalue, inotherwords,

theybecomerelevant,onlyasaconsequenceofsocialconstructs172.Thiselementis

akeyoneinSino-Africanrelations.Ontheonehand,discoursessuchasmutuality,

solidarity,equalityaregroundedinaperceptionofsharedhistoricalpathsandideas

ofinternationalrelations.Ontheotherhand,realworlddynamicshaveshedlight

onrelativelydifferentsocial,politicalandeconomiccultures.

Finally,thepluralistapproachmovesbeyondstate-centred173conceptualizations

of governance to include civil society, market agents, transnational social

movements174,anditbreaksdownthestateintomultiplebureaucracies.O’Brienet.

al. 175 talk of complex multilateralism to explain how transnational groups

increasingly shape governance by defining global institutions176 . This is, again,

particularly relevant in this thesis for at least two main reasons: Sino-African

relations, though often portrayed as isolated from other global dynamics, are

necessarilydeeplyentrenchedtothem.Secondly,ChinaandAfricancountrieshave

increasinglyacknowledgedthatawiderrangeofactorscontributestoSino-African

relations.Theseinteractions,oftenoutofthestatecontrol,havegivenimpetusto

169Ibid.,p.939.170Ibid.171see:R.KeohaneandJ.Nye,‘RealismandComplexInterdependence’,InternationalOrganisation,vol.41,no.4,2000;F.Biermann,‘EarthSystemGovernance:TheChallengeforSocialScience’,TheGlobalGovernanceProject,Amsterdam,2002.172A.Wendt,‘AnarchyiswhatStatesMakeofit:TheSocialConstructionofPowerPolitics’,InternationalOrganisations,vol.46,no.2,1992,pp.391-425.173K.Ohmae,TheEndoftheNation-State:theRiseofRegionalEconomies,SimonandSchusterInc.,NewYork,1995.174Turner,S.,‘Globalcivilsociety,anarchyandgovernance:assessinganemergingparadigm’,JournalofPeaceResearch,vol.35,1998.175R.O’Brien,A.M.Goetz,J.A.ScholteandM.Williams,ContestingGlobalGovernance:MultilateralEconomicInstitutionsandGlobalSocialMovements,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2000.176Foranoverviewoftheconceptof‘institution’seeG.MHodgson,‘Whatareinstitutions?’,JournalofEconomicIssues,vol.XL,no.1,March2006.

58

processes of adaptation, re-organisation, rejection on both Chinese and African

sides,challengingexistingbeliefs,norms,institutions.

Bypulling together relevant elements of each of these theoretical approaches

presentedabove,theauthorpresentsaconceptualizationofagencythatdoesnot

place the full explanatory power on individuals or structures, but rather on a

complexintertwiningofthetwo.Thisconceptualization:

- Identifies the actors in Sino-African relations. In doing so, the author

recognises the importance of the State in Sino-African relations but she

understands it as acting through human agents, in a non-unitary fashion,

subjectedtosocialandmarketforceswhoseinterestsarenegotiatedthrough

processes of competition and cooperation, based on the asymmetrical

availabilityofresources.

- Recognisesthatgovernanceisfarfrombeingmerelystate-determined,within

onecountry’sboundaries,butisratherincreasinglytheconsequenceofthe

inclusion in the decision-making of social and market forces, including

multilateralorganisations.

- Recognises that agents identify their interests not only based on rational

decisionsbutalsobasedonsocialconstructs,i.e.repertoiresandperceptions.

- Assigns particular relevance to institutions, especially in relation to their

dependenceonhistoricalpaths.Theseinstitutionsconstitutethesystemsof

governancethatinformmobilisationstrategies.

- Finally, all this is subjected to changeover time.Despite the fact thatpath

dependencefindssignificantspaceinthisconceptualization,changeisalsoan

important element of Sino-African relations, as determined by heuristic

approachestointeraction,andofAfrica’srelationswithotherexternalforces.

The actual processes of governance are a synthesis of these theoretical

approacheswhere the shareof theoretical preponderance changes in relation to

specificissues,atspecifictimes.Accordingtotheseelements,agency-as-ownership

ofthegovernanceprocesseswiththeChineseisconstitutedbythewillingnessand

abilitytosafeguardAfricaninterests.Thewillingnesstoexertcontrol,i.e.safeguard

interests,inthenegotiationswithChina,inotherwords,themotivationtodoso,is

strictlyrelatedtothe interests thatanygivenactorperceivestobeaffected in its

relationswithChina.Actorsare,however,conceptualisednotlimitedlyasbundles

59

ofinterestsandcapacities,butalsoasconstitutedbytheideasandmemoriesofthe

communitiesfromwhichtheyemerge177,whichinturncontributetoshapingtheir

interests.

These interests can be consistent among a range of national actors vis-à-vis

externalforces,buttheycanalsobedivergentgivingrisetodomesticconfrontation.

Thewillingnesstosafeguardthedomesticsystemofgovernance,is,inotherwords,

negotiateddomesticallyacrossstateandnon-stateentitiesaswellasacrossstate

bureaucracies.StudyingthewillingnessofAfricanactorstodefineanddetermine

therelationswithChinaisimportantgiventhewidespreadbeliefintheliterature

that‘Chinaacts,Africafollows’.

The ability of agents to exert control in the relations with China is, in turn,

dependentontheresourcestheyhaveattheirdisposal(human,financial)aswellas

thesuitabilityofthestructuresandinstitutionsthatregulateanygivenpolicy-area,

i.e.whetherthesystemofgovernanceissuitabletoguaranteethesafeguardofthe

specificintereststhatemergeintherelationswithChina.Aswiththewillingness,

the ability ofAfrican actors innegotiatingwithChinahasoftenbeen considered

reduced,mainlyasaconsequenceoffinancialandorganisationalasymmetry.

According to thisconceptualization, thegovernanceprocess isa functionof the

interplaybetweenideas,interests,resourcesandstructures,institutions,normswithin

which they engage/operate.Asmentioned in theprevious chapter, the systemof

governanceisthesynthesisofthestructure-agencyinterplaywithinacountry,one

that defines and is defined by ideas, interests, relationships, but also structures,

institutions,norms,andthusanunavoidableaspectoftherelationswithexternal

forces.

This conceptualization of agency allows to “circumvent the crude

individualist/structuralistdichotomy”178.Inotherwords,thefocusisneitherfully

on individuals, nor on the structures within which they operate. It is rather

understood as a continuous interplay between the two. The elements of agency

unpackedbelowaimtorespondtothemainresearchquestions,namelywhatare

themotivationsandmodalitiesthroughwhichAfricanagentsexertownershipinthe

interaction with the Chinese. Unpacking these two aspects provides a basis to

understandthedegreeofownershipthatisexerted.Infact,itisnotaquantitative

177WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.344.178C.Wight,‘TheyShootDeadHorsesDon’tThey?LocatingAgencyintheAgent–StructureProblematique’,EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations,vol.5,no.1,1999,p.134.

60

approachtotherelationshipsthatenlightenstheoutcomebutratheraqualitative

onethatdigsintothemotivationsandmodalitiesofaction,i.e.processes.Similarly

towhatAldenandAmmonsaywithrespecttoFPA,focusingontheprocess,rather

than the outcomes, means accepting that “closer scrutiny of the actors, their

motivations, the structures of decision making and the broader context within

which foreign policy choices are formulated would provide greater analytical

purchase”179.

Tounderstandmotivations,what is lookedatarethebeliefs/repertoiresupon

which agents rely to articulate their interests, and the interests themselves,

understoodaslayeredacrossdifferentlevels,namelynational,sectoral,andissue-

specific. To understandmodalities, on the other hand,what is looked at are the

resources available to actors and how these aremobilised according to existing

systems of governance. This depiction of ownership assumes that the system of

governancethatregulateshowinterestsandresourcesarenegotiatedamongactors

servesasapointofleverageoveractsofnarrowself-interest.Itdoesnot,however,

implythatthesystemofgovernanceis,normativelyspeaking,amorallycorrectone

orthatproceduresareboundbylegalityandformality.Domesticactorsmovealong

national and international environments to negotiate preferred outcomes. These

preferred outcomes are not intended to be, normatively speaking, good or

emancipatory. They can also be aimed at perpetuating existing dependency,

criminalbehaviourandsoforth180.

Thesectionsbelow firstconceptualize ‘actors’, thenmove toexplain the three

steps introduced in the previous chapter that are necessary to study agency-as-

ownership,namelytheidentificationofinterests,theacknowledgementofwhether

existingsystemsofgovernancearesuitabletonegotiatetheseintereststothebenefit

of involved African stakeholders, and the enactment of strategies to bring the

negotiation inside the accepted system of governance, transform the latter to

guarantee that the negotiation successfully safeguards interests, or not safeguard

interestsatall.

179C.AldenandA.Ammon,Foreignpolicyanalysis:newapproaches,Routledge,Abingdon,2012,p.1.180Murray-Evans,op.cit.

61

2.3.1 ActorsBarryBuzansuggeststhattheagentialdimensionofagentsisthe“facultyorstate

ofactingorexertingpower”181.Wight,inprovidingacritiqueofBuzan’sdefinition,

suggests thathisdefinition ismorevalid for thenatural sciences than the social

sciences. He continues by asserting that “what sets the limits of the boundaries

betweenthesocialworldandthenaturalworldarethedualnotionsofmeaningand

intentionality”andbothare“propertiesbestreservedforagents”182.

Wightarguesthatagencyhasa‘tripartitecharacter’.Thefirstdimension,agency1,

ischaracterisedbyadeeplyindividual,‘self’dimensionofhumanagents.Itis“inthe

‘freedomofsubjectivity’thatagencyislocated[…]Thisrecognitionof‘self’doesnot

mean a denial of the role played by social and cultural factors in determining

behaviour[…]ButevenasIacknowledgemyowndependencyonasocialuniverse

which always presents itself in conceptualized form, this conceptualization is

dependentonasubjectcapableofreflectingupon,andconstantlyrenegotiating,the

forcesofconstruction”183.Thisfirstdimension,inotherwords,ischaracterisedby

the “human qualities of reflexivity and creativity”. The notions of meaning and

intentionality are not sufficient to explain agency “for social agents are always

differentiallyempoweredtoactintermsoftheirsocialpositioning”184.Thissecond

characterofagency,agency2,takesintoconsiderationthesocio-culturalbackground

withinwhich agents are born. In away, agency2precedes agency1, as the social

groupsoneisbornintodeeplyaffectthepotentialofone’sownabilitytoact.The

thirddimension,agency3,referstothe‘roles’agentsinhabitinanyspecificcontext

of agency2.The threedimensionsare co-constituted, andWight argues that they

allowto“circumventthecrudeindividualist/structuralistdichotomy”185.AsBrown

suggests,thisapproachsuggeststhat“thereareneithersimplyfreeindividuals,nor

script-definedroleperformance,butbothrolesandsubjectivityshaped inextent

andcontentby,andoperatingwithin,aspecificsocialcontext”186.Thisisprobably

themostimportantaspectofthethesis,i.e.theemphasisonthesocialcontextand

therealisationthatagentsdonotact,asindividualsandrole-players,independently

ofthecontext(thecontextisbetterdefinedbelowasarena).

181B.Buzan,C.JonesandR.Littleeds.,TheLogicofAnarchy:NeorealismtoStructuralRealism,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,1993,p.103.182Wight,op.cit.,p.126.183Ibid.,p.130.184Ibid.,p.132.185Ibid.,p.134.186Brown,2012(a),p.1895.

62

The main problem with Wight’s tripartite approach is his understanding of

politicalactionasadomainofofficialstatehood.Despitetheinitialfocusonstate-

to-staterelations,Sino-Africanengagementshavebeenexpandingtheirscopeand

increasingattentionisgrantedtotheeffectsofencountersbeyondthestatelevel.

Forthisreasonitisimportanttouseatheoreticalframeworkofanalysisthatallows

theinclusionofnotonlystateactors,theirinterestsandthestructuresof,presumably,

formal interaction, but also non-state actors, their interests and structures of

negotiation that, at times, move beyond formality to include informal spaces and

processes.Theauthorarguesthattheintereststhatemergeareconstitutedbyboth

thebeliefsheldbyactorsandthepositionoccupiedinsociety.

Stateandnon-stateagencies

Hagmann and Péclard’s framework, better explained below, helps to move

beyond the state so to include a variety of actors,many ofwhom reside outside

formalpoliticalstructures,andtounderstand“howlocal,nationalandtransnational

actors forgeandremake the state throughprocessesofnegotiation, contestation

and bricolage” 187 . Acknowledging this social diversity in socio-political and

economicnegotiationsisimportantinastudysuchasthis,ofmulti-layereddomestic

interactionwithexternalactors.AsLongnotes,“allformsofexternalintervention

necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and social groups

affected,andinthiswayaremediatedandtransformedbythesesameactorsand

structures”188 . This is especially relevant in the study of Sino-African relations

where, by often not taking into consideration African actors and contexts, it is

assumed that the Chinese side of the equation embodies the entire explanatory

realmandthattheinteractionwithAfricansdoesnottransformit.

Despite the attention tomulti-levelphenomenaandawiderunderstandingof

agency, Hagmann and Péclard’s ‘analytic of statehood’ still focuses on ‘state

domination’ 189 . After all, discussing agency in international relations means

discussing, first and foremost, the role of the state. This ismainly related to the

importanceofsovereigntyininternationalrelations.Althoughundeniably,agency

isexercisedatmultiplelevels, itwouldbereductionisttoassertthatstateagents

187HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.544.188Long,op.cit.,p.20.189HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.544.

63

and non-state actors have the same kind of power in international relations.

Maintainingtheimportanceofthestate,Brownsuggeststhat:

itisinternationalprocessesofmutualrecognitionofsovereigntythatdefine

themembershipof the international ‘club’ of states in the firstplaceandas a

resulttheveryrightstoattendanceandparticipationinthevariedmultilateral

forumsandbilateralrelations[…]Indeed,itisasrecognisedleaders(andhence

‘representative’)ofthestate,thatleadersareabletoclaimarighttospeakfor

andonbehalfofaparticularcountry.Andsovereignauthorityconfersonstate

agentsanabilitytorecogniseornot,givelegitimacyornot,tootheractors190.

He continues by concluding that “states are different and they matter in a

different way from non-state agencies. Not that the latter are unimportant, but

appeals to the importanceof civil society actorswhether inpeace-buildingor in

internationalnegotiationscannotobscurethecentralityofstate-basedagenciesin

the political realm”. 191 Notwithstanding this, “sovereignty itself is inherently

relational inboth its internalandexternalaspects,meaning that stateactorsare

never divorced in a substantive sense from non-state actors”.192An even bigger

problemconcernshowfarstatescanbesaidto‘act’.Thisisbynomeansuniqueto

AfricaalthoughWilliamsarguesthatwhatisdifferentaboutAfricanstateagencyis

theextenttowhichstateagencyissubjectedtogreaterexternalscrutinythanother

states in the international system 193 . Wendt suggests that states cannot be

considered‘persons’194,as“itisnotthestatewhichacts:itisalwaysspecificsetsof

politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state system” 195 .

According to Brown then states “only enact their agency in the sense of acting

throughhumanagents”196.

The literatureonForeignPolicyAnalysis (FPA)provides a good approach for

understandingtheinterconnectednessofdiverseagencytypesandtheirmutually

constituting relevance at the domestic and international level. This branch of IR

investigates the decision-making process, individual decision makers and

190Brown.,2011,op.cit.,p.13.191Ibid.,p.14192Brown,2012(b),op.cit.,p.17.193Williams,op.cit.,p.18.194A.Wendt.,‘TheAgent-StructureProbleminInternationalRelationsTheory’,InternationalOrganisation,vol.41,no.3,1987,p.359.195B.Jessop,StateTheory:PuttingCapitalistStatesintheirPlace,PolityPress,Cambridge,1990,p.367.196Brown,2012(b),op.cit.,p.8.

64

conditionsthataffecttheoutcomesofforeignpolicies.AldenandAmmonnotethat

“byadoptingthisapproach,FPAisnecessarilyconcernednotonlywiththeactors

involvedinthestate’sformaldecision-makingapparatus,butalsowiththevariety

ofsub-nationalsourcesofinfluenceuponstateforeignpolicy.Moreover,inseeking

toprovideafullerexplanationforforeignpolicychoice,scholarshavehadtotake

accountoftheboundariesbetweenthestate’sinternalordomesticenvironmentand

theexternalenvironment”197.

Acknowledgingthatarangeofactorsexerciseagencyinprocessesofgovernance

means understanding the relational concept of power sharing between the

governingandthegoverned.Inotherwords,itisnecessarytolookatstate-society

relationsaswellas“theintrinsiccharacteristicsofgovernmentbureaucraciesand

how these relate to other forms of power”198 . State-society approaches mostly

understand patterns of domination and social change as deriving from the

interactiveeffectsofstateandsocialstructures.Theapproachrejectsperspectives

that understand patterns of domination and change as fuelled mainly by

government policies and structure or, on the other hand, those that see such

patternsasdictatedbycertainsocialformations.Inotherwords,itacknowledges

thatthesubstanceofpoliticsis“tobefoundinthemyriadnetworkswhichlinkthe

various levels of power, from top to bottom”199. According toMigdal states are

deeplyembeddedinsocialforces200andBierschenkandOlivierdeSardanhighlight

howmultiple “power poles”201have substituted a narrow focus on formal state

actorsandinstitutions.Awiderangeofactors,stateofficialsandnon-stateactors

areinvolvedin‘doingthestate’202,bothincooperationandincompetitionwiththe

state203.

Suchdiversitygivesrisetoever-changingcompetinginterests.Infact,“whilethe

imageofthestateimpliesasingularmorality,onestandardway,indeedrightway,

ofdoingthings,practicesdenotemultipletypesofperformanceand,possibly,some

contention overwhat is the rightway to act”204.Migdal suggests a focus on the

197Alden&Ammon,op.cit.,p.1.198HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.545.199Ibid.,p.2.200J.S.Migdal,StrongSocietiesandWeakStates:State-SocietyRelationsandStateCapabilities intheThirdWorld,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,1998.201K.Arnaut&C.K.Højbjerg,‘Gouvernanceetethnographieentempsdecrise:Del’étudedesordresémergentsdansl’Afriqueentreguerreetpaix’Politiqueafricaine,vol.111,2008,p.20.202J.S.MigdalandK.Schlichte,‘RethinkingtheState’,inK.Schlichteed.,TheDynamicsofStates-TheFormationandCrisesofStateDomination,Ashgate,Aldershot-Burlington,2005,pp.14-15.203HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.543.204J.S.Migdal,StateinSociety:StudyinghowStatesandSocietiesconstituteoneanother,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2001,p.19.

65

dynamicnatureofstate-societyrelations,underlininghow“asthestateorganisation

comesintocontactwithvarioussocialgroups,itclasheswithandaccommodatesto

differentmoral orders. These engagements,which occur at numerous junctures,

changethesocialbasesandtheaimsofthestate.Asaconsequence,itisnotuseful

to conceive thestateasa fixed ideologicalentity, rather, it embodiesanongoing

dynamic,achangingsetofgoals,asitengagesothersocialgroups”205.Inanalysing

stateandsocietyasempiricalsubjects,“wefindtremendousvariationinideasabout

goodgovernment,virtueandresponsibility”206.

Actorscanthenbecategorisedasnationalstates(executives),state-basedactors

(the bureaucracies), and non-state actors, ranging from the private sector to

professional associations, trade unions, educational institutions andmuchmore.

Hagmann and Péclard importantly bring into the discussion about ‘actors’ the

“resourcesthatindividualsandorganisedinterestgroupshaveattheirdisposaland

thecompetingrepertoiresthattheymobiliseintheirinteractions”207.Resourcesare

material assets whereas repertoires are symbolic elements, such as norms,

discoursesandideasusedtofurtherinterests.Theyareatthebasisoftheabilityand

motivationtonegotiatedomesticallyandinternationally.Internationally,however,

the literature on Africa, as explained above, has questioned thewillingness and

ability of African actors to mobilise ideas and resources to fulfil their interests

through specific systems of governance. It is then particularly important to

acknowledge that domestic preferences are not important because they are

objectivefacts,butbecausetheyhavesocialmeaningsattributedbyspecificactors

to specific circumstances208. Thesemeanings originate from a complex blend of

history,ideas,norms209.

Repertoires

Agentsdonotidentifytheirpreferencessimplywithreferencetotheirinterests

orthroughrationalcalculation,basedontheresourcesfromwhichtheycandraw

upon.Theymostlyrelyon ideasandmemories210,basedonhistory, identityand

discourse211which in turn create individual spheresofdecisionmaking that can

205Ibid.206HannandDunneds.,op.cit.,p.20.207HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.547.208A.Wendt,SocialTheoryofInternationalPolitics,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1999.209Ibid.210WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.344.211D.J.Galbreath,A.LasasandJ.W.Lamoreaux,ContinuityandChangeintheBalticSeaRegion:ComparingForeignPolicies(OntheBoundaryofTwoWorlds),Rodopi,Amsterdam-NewYork,2008.p.16.

66

impactthebroadercontextwithinwhichtheyact212.HagmannandPéclardcallthis

mix of ideas andmemories, repertoires. Actors “master symbolic repertoires to

further their interests, tomobilisepopularsupport,and togivemeaning to their

actions” 213 . Repertoires are used to “defend and to challenge existing types of

statehoodandpowerrelations”214.

This symbolic realm in Africa involves references to ‘good governance’,

‘democracy’ aswell as anti-western ideologies, ethno-politically defined types of

citizenship, and so forth.With the arrival of China, the range of repertoires has

widened. The repertoires that emerge in Sino-African relations are generally

twofold:oneconsists inframingtherelationsundertheSouth-Southcooperation

label, defining them through concepts of mutuality, equality, solidarity, non-

interference, economic development. The other is the opposite, framing the

relations with China as damaging for locals and counter-productive, mainly

disrespectful of social and economic rights, drawing on the discontent of

populationstowardstheChinesepresence.

Especiallyinastudylikethisonewheresocial,politicalandeconomiccultures

meet, it is crucial togive space to thedifferent symbolic repertoiresuponwhich

normsofconductarebased,tobettercapturetherelations.Sino-Africanrelations

haveparticularlystruggledtofigureoutwhetherdifferentrepertoiressuchasthe

‘economicdevelopment’pushedforwardbyChinaandthe‘democraticgovernance’

pushed forward by Western countries can co-exist and be blended in African

contexts.

Resources

ThestudyofresourcesisanimportantoneinSino-Africanrelationswherethe

economicasymmetrybetweenChinaandmostAfricancountriesisoftenperceived

asareasonforasymmetricaloutcomes.Resourcesreferto“thematerialbasesof

collectiveaction;theyincludetangibleandintangibleassetssuchasbureaucratic

capacities,organisationalskills,financeandabilitytomobilisefunding,knowledge

andtechnicalexpertise”215etc.Atleasttwoaspectsneedtobeconsidered:resources

changewithtimeandnotallactorshaveequalresourcesleadingthustocompetition

212Alden&Ammon,op.cit.,p.65.213HagmannandPéclard.p.547.214Ibid.215Ibid.

67

(between the state and society216, but also internally to each of them217). These

aspects apply to both the domestic context, and the international dimension. In

other words, resource allocation and availability vary domestically based on

differingpriorities(i.e.national,sectoral,sub-sectoral,personal),buttheyalsovary

depending on the specific relations with external partners. They vary based on

preferences,whicharesubjectedtotemporal,spatialandpoliticalvariations218.

Domestically, it is important to acknowledge that not all actors have equal

resourcesattheirdisposal.Resourcesformthemajorbasisofpowerand,asOlivier

deSardanputit,thereareatleasttwokindsofpower,“thepowereverybodyhas

andthepoweronlysomepeoplehave”219.Theexecutiveandhigh-levelbureaucrats

haveaccesstoawiderpoolofresourcesthanlower levelbureaucratsorsocietal

groups,thuscreatingapowerimbalance.However,inmostcases,themobilisation

of the resources available to the former is scrutinised by complex systems of

governancethatreducethepowerasymmetrybetweenthetopandthebottom.This

istruer“inenvironmentsofpeaceandstabilitythaninconflictiveregions,where

the foreign policy elite tends to exclude domestic interests for the sake of the

survivalofthestate”220.

However,lookingatfinancialcapabilitiesshouldnotbetheonlywaytolookat

resources. An analysis of human resources often lacks in Sino-African relations

where studies focus,more often than not, on structural and financial resources.

Nonetheless, focusing on human resources may reveal specific capacities that

emergeinnegotiations,andthatcontributetotheshapingofoutcomes.

2.3.2 LayeredinterestsWhendiscussing agency in Sino-African relations, often the question revolves

aroundtheabilityofaStatetopursueitsnationalinterests.Notsurprisingly,with

time,ithasbecomeclearthatSino-Africanrelationsarepopulatedbyamultiplicity

ofinterests,wellbeyondthoseofficiallyadvanced,asdiverseastherangeofactors

thatembodythem.InterestsareshapedbyWight’stripartiteagents,i.e.agentsthat

have a personality and ‘freedom of subjectivity’, which is shaped by the social

contextinwhichtheywerebornandraised,andwhichisboundbythepositionthe

216M.Bratton,‘BeyondtheState:CivilSocietyandAssociationalLifeinAfrica’,WorldPolitics,vol.41,no.3,1989,p.408.217HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.545.218Ibid.219OlivierdeSardan,op.cit.,p.186.220D.FlemesandS.E.Lobell,‘Contestedleadershipininternationalrelation’,InternationalPolitics,vol.52,2015,p.143.

68

agentoccupiesinsociety221.Oneofthepurposesofthesectoralapproachadopted

inthisstudyistheunderstandingofcompetinginterestswithinthenationalcontext.

Theseareexpectedtovarydependingnotonlyonthecontextofthespecificissue

understudy,andthusspecificactorsinvolved,butalsoonthepositionsthatthese

actorsoccupyinthatcontext,andtherelationsamongeachother.

Sino-African debates rest upon a general critique that African countries have

‘turned East’ adopting country-wide approaches toward China thanks to its

proclaimednon-interferencepolicyandlackofpoliticalconditions222.Thistypeof

critique is linked to the fear that the unconditional support of China for African

economicdevelopmenthascompromisedthedemocraticjourneyofmanyAfrican

countries.However,assumingthatinterestsareunitaryandthattheyemergeoutof

stateagentsonly,wipesoutthecomplexitiesofcountry-systemsanddoesnottake

into account theprofoundly different priorities that different issue-areas occupy

within the national context and in relation to external presences. In actual

governance,macropolicyorientations(forinstance,theLookEastpolicyinKenya)

meetmicrocosmoswheretheydonotnecessarilyresultasappealingastheydoat

thenationallevel.Inotherwords,whileitisimportanttorecognisetheexistenceof

national agendas, it is alsonecessary to acknowledge that theybreakdown into

multipleagendasatsectoralandissue-specificlevels.Thisacknowledgementleads

totalkoflayeredinterests:thenational,thesectoralandtheissue-specific.Through

a study of how these interests are connected and safeguarded it is possible to

determinewhethertheAfricancountries’engagementwithChinaispartofbroader

national developmental frameworks or rather responds to isolated, narrow

interests.Thisis,inturn,akeymomentinthestudyofagency-as-ownership,asit

allows to assess whether the systems of governance guarantee to leverage the

achievementofnarrowself-interests to thebenefitofbroadernational interests.

Sectoral interestsare importantasa linkbetweenthenationaland issue-specific

levelsastheyhelpidentifyhowdifferentsectorsoccupyprioritieswithinasingle

nationalsystem.Intherelationswithexternalforces,sectoralinterestsaretheones

that help identify whether issue-specific interests are in line with development

agendasorareratherrandomlyexpressed.

221Wight,op.cit.,pp.126-134.222SeeMohan&Power,2009,op.cit.;M.Tan-Mullins,G.Mohan,M.Power,‘Redefining‘Aid’intheChina–AfricaContext’,DevelopmentandChange,vol.41,no.5,2010.

69

Beyondthedomesticlevel,China’sinterestsinAfricahaveoftenbeenframedin

sectoral terms. FOCAC documents contain commitments to develop education,

healthcare,politicalrelationsandso forth.Sectoralpatternshavebeen identified

thatgenerallyfocusonbroadcommitmentsbytheChinesetocontributetoAfrica’s

development in that specific sector. However, because China’s commitments are

generallyAfrica-wideratherthancountry-specific, itremainstobeseenwhether

ChinesesectoralpreferencesalignwithKenyansectoralpriorities.

LayeredinterestsapplytoAfricancontexts,asmuchastheyapplytotheChinese.

It is important toacknowledge this, inSino-Africanrelations, as it reinforces the

recent turn in theSino-African scholarship toward comprehensive studiesof the

complexity of Chinese foreign policy management, i.e. the fact that despite the

willingnesstostate-controltherelations,implementationprovestobemuchmore

diversified. Studies of Chinese practices in Africa have revealed discrepancies

betweenthenationalrhetoricaldiscourseofmutuality,win-winandsoforth,and

theimplementationpracticesofSOEs,privateactors,migrants,whoseinterestsdo

notalwaysalignwithChina’sdiscourses.

The following chapters are fully aimed at exposing this. Chapter 3 focuses on

Kenyannationalinterests,rootedinalonghistoricaljourneytowardconstitutional

democracy, and linked to regional and global integration efforts. These interests

constitutethebedrockagainstwhichsectoralagendastakeshapeandagainstwhich

specificissuesarenegotiateddomesticallyandinternationally(Chapters4,5and6).

2.3.3 SystemsofGovernance–NegotiationArenasThe systems of governance are a key element of this thesis as they are the

synthesisofthestructure-agencyblend.HagmanandPéclardcallthemnegotiation

arenas, i.e. the “political space in which relations of power and authority are

vested”223.Negotiation arenas “have spatial, social and temporal dimensions […]

whichneedtobetracedempiricallyonacasebycasebasis”224.Differentactorsand

stakeholderscontributetothecreationandconsolidationofnorms,institutionsand

structures that form an arena, which is historically determined,path dependent.

‘Negotiationarenas’and ‘negotiationtables’(morefullydescribedbelow)arethe

places where negotiation processes are observed. Negotiation arenas host “a

223HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.551.224Ibid.,p.550.

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varyingnumberofactors,someofwhicharerecognisedasparticipantsofformal

decision making at the negotiation table (typically ‘big men’, politicians,

businessmen,diplomats,butalsoreligious leaders,NGOrepresentatives,military

commanders,etc.)andotherswhohavebeendeniedaccesstothenegotiationtable

(typicallyminoritygroups,women,groupswithalowersocio-economicstatus)”225.

Thedefinitionof arenas, in otherwords, refers to thenorms, institutions and

structuresthroughwhichgovernancetakesplace.Throughthestudyofmodalities

ofgovernance(unpackedbelow),itispossibletoidentifywhethertherelationswith

Chinaoccurwithinexistingsystemsofgovernance,iftheydooutsideofthem,when

AfricanactorsdeemthesystemsadequatetonegotiatewithChinaandwhenthey

deemthemnon-fit.Thisthesis,inaway,testswhethertheargumentputforwardby

Claphamin2006holds.Heassertedthat“China’sappearance[inAfrica],however

dramatic,fitsintopatternsthathavebeenlong-established,andthatAfricanshave

historicallyabsorbedandadapted.Thereis,Ibelieve,everyprospectthatChinawill

conform to those patterns, rather than transforming them”226 . Importantly, the

patternsClaphamreferstoarehighlyinfluencedbyexternalactorsandstructures.

Especially in particular sectors the existence of international institutions and

structureshasbeen,especiallyinAfrica,amajorelementdetermininghownational

governancetakesplace.

In a sectoral study like this, it is of particular importance to highlight that

negotiating arenas and tables vary significantly domestically depending on the

sectororissue-areaunderstudy.Aspreviouslymentionednegotiationarenas“have

spatial,socialandtemporaldimensions[…]whichneedtobetracedempiricallyon

a case by case basis”227.Mainly, the concern in the following chapters is that to

identifywhataretheexistingarenas/tablesofnegotiationandwhethertherelations

withtheChineseareenactedwithinexistingpatternsoroutsideofthem.

2.3.4 ModalitiesAccordingtotheconceptualizationputforwardsofar, themodalitiesofaction

vis-à-vis the Chinese are expected to depend on the suitability of the arenas to

safeguard interests. There is a general tone in the literature on Sino-African

relations according towhich having ‘agency’means being able to reject Chinese

225Ibid.,p.551.226C.Clapham,‘FittingChinaIn’,BrenthurstDiscussionPaperno.8,TheBrenhurstFoundation,2006,p.2.227HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.550.

71

termsandconditions228,asifallChineseinitiativesinAfricawereaboutconflictsof

interestandrejectingthemwas,normativelyspeaking,therightthingtodo.This

idea was often consequential to an understanding of Sino-African relations as

mainly conducted by the elites to the detriment of populations, portrayed as

impotent.Therefore,rejectingtheChineseequalledtousingagentialpowertoreject

authoritarianapproachestodevelopment229.Inthisstudy,Iadoptamorenuanced

approachaccordingtowhichhavingagencydoesnotequaltorejectingtheChinese,

assumingthattheirarrivalissynonymouswithexploitation,challenges,andsoforth.

Rather,agencyishereseenastheabilitytoshapeandmaintainpreferencesatthe

negotiationtable,betheyinlineornotwiththeChinesepriorities.Thisagency,as

better explained below, is not only in the form of contestation by social groups

against elites but also cooperation with each other and with the Chinese. To

emphasisethis,thesectionbelowsuggestsfocusing, inempiricalanalyses,onthe

initiatoroftherelations,whichisnotexpectedonlytobeactinginre-actionmode,

but also pro-action and passive modes. In a recent article exploring trade

negotiations,Murray-Evansalsosuggeststhat:

The conflation of agency (an ontological presupposition) with resistance

(empiricalclaims)potentiallyobscuresthevarietyofdifferentpositionstakenup

byAfricanagentsininternationaltradenegotiationsandotherinteractionswith

theoutsideworld.IfwecanonlyobserveAfricanagencywhenitisexpressedas

oppositiontoexternalforces,wemaymiss, forexample,thoseinstanceswhen

African agents agreewith or contribute to dominant ideas or cooperatewith

otherinternationalactors230.

Initiator

Toidentifyandexplainmobilisationstrategies,itisimportanttoputemphasison

the distinctiveness, and yet connectedness, of the national agenda, sectoral and

issue-specific interests.Thistensionisparticularlyrelevantwhentheinterestsof

domesticstateorgansandsocialstructuresarenotparticularlyalignedandwhatis

228SeeMurray-Evans,op.cit.;MohanandLampert,2014,op.cit.;B.Lampert&G.Mohan,‘MakingSpaceforAfricanAgencyinChina-AfricaEngagements:GhanaianandNigerianPatronsShapingChineseEnterprise’,inA.W.Gadzala(ed.),AfricaandChina:HowAfricansandTheirGovernmentsareShapingRelationswithChina,Rowman&Littlefield,Lanham,2015.229SeeE.Mawdsley,‘ChinaandAfrica:EmergingChallengestotheGeographiesofPower’,GeographyCompass,vol.1,no.3,2007.230Murray-Evans,op.cit.,p.1847.

72

observed is a constant adaptation to fulfil both the national and international

interests.Onewaytolookathowthesethreegroupsofinterestsinterplayistolook

at themotivationsaccordingtowhichactors initiate therelationwithChina,and

compare it to broader sectoral and national interests. The types of behaviour

expectedare:contestation,cooperation,passivity.

Contestation is a re-action, expected in cases where Chinese actors/activities

challengeKenyanexistinginterests/values,normsorframeworksofoperationand

provoke a reaction to control such change. Flemes and Wehner suggest that

“strategiesofcontestationcanbedrivenbyhistoricalexperiencesofconflict,and

alsobytheirlegacies”231.Cooperationisapro-activebehaviour.Evenwhenapparent

tensionsarenotobservedwithChinaandbetweenthegovernmentandsociety,itis

interesting tostudy thedomesticconformation insuchcontexts tocompare it to

casescontestation.Pro-activebehaviouremergesincaseswhereacalculatedchoice

ismadebytheactorsinvolvedintheissueatstaketoincludeChineseactorsforthe

implementation of specific policies or projects. Finally, passivity is a behaviour

accordingtowhichnoparticularagency/controlovertherelationshipwithChinais

shown.Neitherthecontentoftherelationsnorthemodalityareactivelydefinedto

safeguardKenyaninterests.Chinaislefttooperateunchallenged.

NegotiationTables

Thenegotiationtablerepresents“aformalizedsettingwherecontendingsocial

groupsdecideuponkeyaspectsofstatehoodoveragivenperiodoftime.Awide

rangeofnegotiationtablesexists,fromdiplomaticconferencesinvolvingheadsof

states,throughdonorconsultationsbetweeninternationalfinancialinstitutionsand

localNGOs,tomeetingsbycustomarychiefsunderthevillagetree”232.‘Negotiation

tables’ vary significantly from case to case so that the range of actors that can

potentiallysitaroundthemisvast.Inotherwords,theyarethesettingswherethe

actual negotiations take place, characterised by the inclusion or exclusion of

stakeholders, at times according to existing systems of governance, at times

irrespective of them.While arenas are harder to alter, tables of negotiation can,

moreeasily,besubjectedtoshort-terminterestsandpoliticisation.

231D.Flemes&L.Wehner,‘Driversofstrategiccontestation:ThecaseofSouthAmerica’,InternationalPolitics,vol.52,no.2,2015,p.166.232HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.551.

73

Sino-Africanrelationsare imbuedwithconcernsthattheeconomicandpower

asymmetrybetweenAfricancountriesandtheChinese leadtheexecutivesof the

formertobypassdomesticsystemsofgovernanceinordertostrikedealswiththe

latter.Thiscanbemeasuredbycontrastingannounceddevelopmentalagendasand

actualprojectdevelopment.Theassumptionisthatagendasarebroadlynegotiated

across arenas, and thus take into consideration different stakeholders’ needs.

Projectdevelopment,ontheotherhand,maybemoresubjectedtoone-offneeds.

Thestudyoftablesofnegotiationandtheirconformitytothebroadernegotiation

arenaissignificanttounderstandwhetherestablishednormsandproceduresare

maintainedorbypassed.Itisalsoimportantasithelpstounderstandwhetherthese

behavioursaresector-definedorrathersector-irrelevant.

2.4 ConclusionsAll the elements of agency just briefly introduced have gained an increasing

significanceinSino-Africanrelationsasatestimonyoftheimportancethatagency

hascometooccupyintheseengagements.Theactors involvedhave increasedin

number and type, internationally as well as domestically (in China and African

countries),rangingfromtraders,toathletes,fromdoctorstopeace-keepers,from

ministerialbureaucratsinchargeofspecificSino-Africaprogrammestoacademics

and so forth. The repertoires used, i.e. discourses, have been fine-tuned as the

relationsevolved.AnexampleistheincreaseduseofsoftpowerbyChinainAfrican

contextsorthe ‘LookEast’discourseemployedbyKenyanstateleaderssincethe

early2000s.Theresourcesattheirdisposalhaveexperiencedprocessesofchange,

astheimportanceofsomeissuesincreasedwhilethatofothersdecreased.Systems

ofgovernance,i.e.arenas,havebeenchallenged,domesticallyandinternationally,

notwithoutuproarsinmanyinstances,thathave,inturn,causedadiversificationof

modalitiesofaction.AsMosleyetal.pointedoutnegotiationstrategiesandlogics

are“boundtochangesignificantly,notleastasaresultofthefactthatafteryearsof

experience both sides of the bargaining table figure outways to neutralize each

other’s strategies”233. Sino-African relations, despite their fast-pacednature, still

233WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.345;seealso:Referringtothefollowingwork:P.Mosley,J.HarriganandJ.Toye,AidandPower:TheWorldBankandPolicy-BasedLending,vol.1,Routledge,London,1991.

74

seemtorequiretimeforeachsidetostudyandunderstandtheother.Thefollowing

chaptersareanattempttoputtheelementsofagencyincontext.

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CHAPTER3

Kenya:domesticpoliticsandtheinternationaldimension

since2002

3.1 IntroductionThischapterstandsasatraitd’unionbetweengeneraltheoreticalelaborationsof

agency and grounded research. It represents the first step of the analytical

framework and aims to provide a broad country-study before undertaking the

second step, i.e. sectoral analyses. An extensive country-study is essential for

situating specific sectoral analyses in context, i.e. identifyingwhat is the level of

importance/priorityeachsectorhasvis-à-vistheothers,withinthenationalcontext.

Referring back to the elements of agencypresented in Chapter 2, this section

introducestheactors(includinganoverviewoftheresourcesandrepertoiresthey

drawupon),theinterestsatstake,domesticallyandinrelationtoexternalactors,

thearena(thebroadnationalsystemofgovernance)andtablesofnegotiation(i.e.

negotiation forums, meetings, etc.). It does so by concentrating first on how

historical legacies, including processes of change, and structural features have

interactedwiththeactorsandtheinstitutionstheyform234,throughadomesticand

international lens. Fifty years after independence from British rule, Kenya’s

relationswithexternalactorsstillplayavitalrolenotonlyinthecountry’sforeign

policybutalsointhedomesticarena.Notwithstandingthis,therelationbetweenthe

stateandsocialforcesshouldfirstbeconsiderednotasacolonialcreationbutas

one emerging out of an existing group of people with specific societal

characteristics235that have led a countrywith 42 ethnic groups to conceive and

adopt,in2010,oneofthemostforwardpeople-centeredconstitutionsinAfrica.

Second, it concentrates on how China has been inserted into the picture,

diplomatically, economically and socially. The engagement of China in Kenya

increasedconsiderablyinthepastfewyears,makingKenyanotonlyamajorbase

forChineseoperationsinAfricabutarguablyoneofthemostimportantintermsof

234MoncrieffeandLuttrell,op.cit.235C.Hornsby,Kenya.AHistorySinceIndependence,I.B.Tauris,London,2012,p.1.

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strategic,diplomaticpresence236.Althoughcorruptionisidentifiedasarisk,Kenya

is also viewed as a politically and economically stable country, where human

resourcesarecomparativelymoreavailableandskilledthaninmanyotherAfrican

countries andwhere the service sector is developed enough to provide Chinese

businessesandactivitieswith thenecessarysupport toestablish themselvesand

grow237.KenyaisalsodeemedahavenwithinthepoliticallyunstableHornofAfrica

andthusstrategicforsecurityoperations238.

Despite the fast-paced expansion of Chinese activities in the country since

PresidentKibakiwaselected in2002, theChinesepresence in the ‘darlingof the

West’-diplomatically,sociallyandeconomically–isstillmarginalwhencompared

to the long-standingWestern one. The Kibaki government significantly reduced

dependenceonWesterndonoraid,withthecountrybeingincreasinglyfundedby

internallygeneratedresourcessuchas increased tax revenuecollectionandnew

ties with China239. However, the rootedWestern presence and India remain an

essentialelement:1)inKenya,2)intheanalysisofKenya’sengagementwithChina,

3)andintheanalysisofChina’sinterestsinengagingwiththecountry.Whilethe

sectionsbelowprovideageneralhistoricalbackground,thefocusison‘democratic’

Kenya,sincetheKibakigovernmenttookseatin2002,andthroughthefirstyearof

UhuruKenyatta’srule.

3.2 Domestically:betweenthestateandsociety

3.2.1 BackgroundKenya,vis-à-vismostcountriesinAfrica,managedto“avoidmilitaryrule,social

instability,warlordism,massmurderorsocialcollapse”duetoanumberofreasons

including “inherited social and economic structures” as well as direct external

influenceandtheabsenceof“strategicminerals”240.Theterritorythatnowforms

Kenyawashome,wellbeforecolonialrule,toatleast42separateethnicgroupsfor

which,“beyondacertainstateoflinguisticandculturalaffinity,[…]nofurtherethnic

236NairobihostsAfrica’sregionalheadquartersofthemainChinesemediahousesforprint,TVandradio.ThecountryissecondonlytoSouthAfricaforthenumberofConfuciusInstitutesestablished.Nairobialsohoststheheadquartersofmajorregionalandinternationalorganisations(UN),aswellascivilsocietyandtheprivatesector.237UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD),AninvestmentguidetoKenyaOpportunitiesandConditions2012,UnitedNations,NewYork,2012.p.iii.238Ibid.239J.Ng’etich,‘WasUhuru’striptoChinaacodedmessagetothe‘cold’West?’,StandardDigital,25August2013.240Hornsby,op.cit.,p.5.

77

identificationcanbeexpected”241.Nonetheless,traditionally“almostallofKenya’s

ethnic groups were characterised by what has become known as ‘egalitarian-

segmentarian’ structures in contrast to more hierarchical forms of social and

politicalorganisation”242.ThisentrenchedandpeculiarfeatureofethnicityinKenya,

inconjunctionwiththeabsenceofanypredominantgroups,mayhavecontributed

to laying the foundations for socialdemocracyand,mostly,peaceful coexistence.

While“ethnicidentitiesarenotincompatiblewitha‘national’onereferringtothe

widerandinternationalsetting,themobilisationofthesesentimentsis,however,a

situationaloneanddependsonthepatternsofcompetitionintheoverallpolitico-

economiccontext”243.

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the links between

ethnicity,politicsandtheeconomy,it is importanttoprovideabriefoverviewas

these linkages come tomatter also in the relationswith China. The fragmented

ethniccompositionofthecountryhasledtocompetitionintheappropriationand

controlofresourcesviaeconomic,socialandpoliticalstrives,wherethestateand

societyhavelearnttoengageeachotherthroughcontestationbutseldomviolent

conflict.Thepost-electioncrisisin2008,however,challengedtheimageofKenya

internally and internationally as an “icon, a bastion of political stability and

economicprosperityinAfrica.Itsurprisedmanythatthisiconwouldgoupinflames

sofast”244.Kanyingasuggeststhat“analysesofwhatwentwrongwithKenyatend

to gloss over the land question and ethnicity as factors behind the violence. Yet

ethnicityandthemannerinwhichthelandquestionintheformerwhitehighlands

andespecially in theRiftValley regionhasbeenaddressed throughout thepost-

colonialperiodplayedanimportantroleinthepost-2007electionviolence”245.

Rightafterindependence“twomajorpoliticalpartieswereformedalongethno-

regionallines:[KenyaAfricanNationalUnion]KANUrepresentednumericallylarge

Kikuyu andLuo communities, while [Kenya African Democratic Union]

KADUrepresentednumericallysmallergroupswhowereworried that the large

groupswould dominate them after independence”246 . Jomo Kenyatta, leader of

241D.Berg-Schlosser,‘Ethnicity,SocialClassesandthePoliticalProcessinKenya’,inW.O.Oyugied.,PoliticsandAdministrationinEastAfrica,EastAfricanEducationalPublishers,Nairobi,1994,p.248.242Ibid.,p.249.243Berg-Schlosser,op.cit.,p.254.244K.Kanyinga,‘Thelegacyofthewhitehighlands:Landrights,ethnicityandthepost-2007electionviolenceinKenya’,JournalofContemporaryAfricanStudies,vol.27,no.3,2009,p.325.245Ibid.246D.Boothetal.,EastAfricanprospects:anupdateonthepoliticaleconomyofKenya,Rwanda,TanzaniaandUganda,OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,London,2014,p.13.

78

KANUandfirstpresidentofKenya,inheritedtheBritishadministrativeboundaries,

andthecrisisassociatedwiththewhitehighlands247.Insteadofsettlingthecrisis,

Kenyatta “skewed the system further under an imperial presidency” 248 . In

rewarding his Kikuyu ethnic group to consolidate power “the ruling party […]

enticed the oppositionwithmaterial interests – land. This enabled theKenyatta

governmenttobegincentralisationofpowerwithlimitedopposition.Intime,the

government began to amend the constitution to provide for a centralised

executive”249. This exacerbated inequality between the Kikuyu and other ethnic

groups250, especially in theRiftValleyarea,originally controlledbyKalenjinand

Maasaiethnicgroups.TheKikuyuremained‘outsiders’andassuchwereperceived

duringthe2007-2008post-electionviolence251.

Moi, a Kalenjin, took power in 1978, arguably “diverting socio-economic

entitlementssuchasinfrastructuredevelopment(roads,educationandhealthcare

provision) to his Rift Valley region”252. The links between business and political

elitesstartedchanging,withtheKikuyubeingexcludedandtheKalenjinintensifying

relations with Kenyan Asians, altering the structure of economic and political

power253.Oppositionroseagainsttheslogan‘Itisourturntoeat’254,andrepression

startedagainstanycritics.Inthe1990s“internalandexternalpressuretoreform

ledtothereintroductionofmultipartyelections”andin2002“oppositionparties

unitedunderonepresidentialcandidate,MwaiKibaki,whowas“overwhelmingly

electedonaplatformtocorrectthehorizontalinequalitiesbetweenethnicgroups,

reduce the powers of the president, address historical injustices, including land

injustices,punishlarge-scalecorruptionandimprovetheeconomy”255.

247ThecrisisconcernedtheownershipofanareaofKenyathatwascalled,duringthecolonialperiod,‘white’highlands(sodefinedbecauseaconsiderablenumberofwhitecolonssettledtherethankstofavorableclimateandsoil).Thelandwasdividedbycolonisersuponarrivalandexpropriatedfromindigenousgroups,i.e.KalenjinandMasaai.Thisredefinitionoflandownershipwasnotonlyneverredressedbutwasalsoexacerbatedinthepost-colonialperiodbyrulingparties,anditisarguedtobeoneofthecausesofthe2007post-electionviolence.SeeKanyinga,2007,op.cit;J.O.Oucho,‘UndercurrentsofPost-ElectionViolenceinKenya:IssuesintheLong-TermAgenda’,inK.KanyingaandD.Okelloeds.,TensionsandReversalsindemocratictransitions:theKenya2007generalelections,SocietyforInternationalDevelopment(SID)andInstituteforDevelopmentStudies(IDS),UniversityofNairobi,2010,p.498.248E.NjokiWamai,‘MediatingKenya’sPost-ElectionViolence:FromaPeace-MakingtoaConstitutionalMoment’,inG.R.Murunga,D.OkelloandA.Sjögreneds.,Kenya:TheStruggleforaNewConstitutionalOrder,ZedBooksandTheNordicAfricaInstitute,LondonandSweden,2014,p.68.249Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.13.250NjokiWamai,op.cit.,p.68;alsosee:D.OkelloandM.J.Gitau,ReadingsonInequality:Sectoraldynamicsandperspectives,SocietyforInternationalDevelopment,Nairobi,2007;F.Stewart,‘HorizontalinequalitiesinKenyaandthepoliticaldisturbancesof2008:someimplicationsforaidpolicy’,JournalofConflict,SecurityandDevelopment,2010,vol.10,no.1.251Ibid.252Ibid.,p.69;alsosee:R.Ajulu,‘Politicisedethnicity,competitivepoliticsandconflictinKenya:ahistoricalperspective’,AfricanStudies,2002,vol.61,no.2.253Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.14.254NjokiWamai,op.cit.,p.69.255Ibid.

79

With Kibaki “some significant reordering of relationships began to occur”256.

Kibaki’sfocuswas,indomesticandforeignpolicies,revolvingaroundtherecovery

oftheeconomy,andwhilehesucceededinincreasingthegrowthrateofGDP,from

0.6percentto7percentbetween2003and2007257,he“failedtorespondtothe

politicalaspirationsofKenyans,suchasdeliveringanewconstitutionalorderthat

wouldpunish large-scalecorruption, limitpresidentialpowersandreduceethnic

andregionalinequalities”258.Asaconsequence,“politicalleadersfromoutsidethe

president’s Kikuyu community felt excluded” 259 . However, his laissez-faire

approach for economic development provided “space for people to engage in

economic activities without major restrictions. The government also began to

undertake major infrastructural programmes, such as building new roads and

rehabilitatingexistingones.Therecoveryoftheeconomyprovidedanopportunity

for all: ‘even thosewithout political connection and influence got a share of the

expandingeconomybecauseKibaki’sapproachopenedthemarkettoeveryone’”260.

KibakihadreceivedsupportfromtheWestthat“backedhiscampaignonaccountof

thepromisetofightcorruption”.However,whencorruptionscandalsemergedand

“thedonorsquestionedthetrackrecordofthegovernmentinfightingcorruption”,

relationswiththeWestdeterioratedandthegovernmentstartedlookingatChina

andIndiaforgrantsandloans261.Whileamoreaccurateaccountofthe‘LookEast’

approachispresentedbelow,bymeansofintroductionitisimportanttomention

that the ‘Look East’ shift was not only a political decision but also one directly

relatedtotheinterestsofbusinessgroupssupportingtheKibakigovernment.This

relationshipwasprofoundlychallengedafter2008,whenKibakisigned,afterthe

Annan-led internationalmediation following thepost-electionviolence,asharing

poweragreementwithRailaOdinga, leaderof theOrangeDemocraticMovement

(ODM).Eachleaderhadlinkswithdifferentsegmentsofthebusinesscommunity

but “power sharing imposed certain constraints on linkagebetweenpolitics and

business”262.

256Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.13.257GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,KenyaVision2030:AgloballycompetitiveandprosperousKenya,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,Nairobi,2007,p.3.258NjokiWamai,op.cit.,p.69;alsosee:G.R.MurungaandS.W.Nasong’o,‘Bentonself-destruction:theKibakiregimeinKenya’,JournalofContemporaryAfricanStudies,vol.24,no.1,2006;G.Prunier,‘Kenya:rootsofcrisis’,openDemocracy,7January2008.259Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.14.260Ibid.,p.17.261Ibid.,p.18.262Ibid.,p.19.

80

The post-election violence, and the subsequent mediation and negotiation

between Kibaki together with his Party of National Unity (PNU), and Odinga

togetherwith his Orange DemocraticMovement (ODM) provided a “transitional

moment”and“aconstitutionalmomentforantagoniststoreorderthegovernance

structures through the introductionofanewconstitution”263.According toNjoki

Wamai, a “constitutional moment arises when all previous forces against the

constitution-makingprocess converge todeliver a constitution”264. InKenya, the

mediation led by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “orchestrated a

constitutional moment by ensuring that Kenyan political leaders accepted a

constitutional amendment that allowed for power-sharing, guaranteeing support

foranewconstitution”265.TheKenyanmediationprocesswasauniquelysuccessful

story of international mediation 266 which led to the promulgation of a new

constitution in August 2010. This constitution addressed the root causes of the

conflict that culminated in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. It did so “by

introducingaffirmativeactioninresourcedistributiontoaddressethnic,genderand

geographicinequality;byenhancingtheruleoflawbyreducingthepowersofthe

executiveandstrengtheningaccountabilityinstitutionssuchasparliamentandthe

judiciary;andbyreducingthepowersofthepresidentandthecentralgovernment

byintroducingdevolutionandencouragingpublicparticipationingovernance”267.

Althoughtherehavebeensetbacksagainstitsinceitspromulgation,mainlydueto

the “absenceofmechanisms toensure full compliancewith theprovisionsof the

promulgatedconstitution”268,thetransformationthatstartedduringthemediation

ledbyAnnanwasaturningpointinKenya’sjourneyofdevelopment,includingthe

managementofethnicdisparities,whichbecameevenmoreevidentinthefollowing

yearswiththeelectionofUhuruKenyattaandWilliamRuto.

WiththeelectionoftheJubileeallianceinMarch2013,thetwoleaders,Kenyatta

andRuto,wereundertheobligationtocomposethecabinetandappointprincipal

secretariesaccordingtotherequirementsofthenewconstitution,whichhadbeen

passed in 2010. Because of these requirements and for “wanting to be seen as

different from the coalition government ofKibaki andRaila, they took charge of

interviewing candidates for thepostsofCabinetSecretaries inperson. Ina clear

263NjokiWamai,op.cit.,p.66.264Ibid.,p.75.265Ibid.,p.76.266Foracomprehensiveaccount,seeMurunga,OkelloandSjögren,op.cit.267NjokiWamai,op.cit.,p.67.268Ibid.,p.76.

81

break with tradition, they briefed the media on the progress made with

interviews” 269 . The Public Service Commission dealt with the recruitment of

PrincipalSecretariesandtheParliament“alsohadtovetthembeforethepresident

couldmakeappointments”270.This,however,doesnotsuggestthat“therewasno

politicalpatronageinfluencingthesenewappointments”271.However,internalunity

between Uhuru and Ruto, which was consequential, among other things, to the

abilityofleaderstoshowthepeoplerespectforaccountability,wascrucialfortwo

leadersthatwerefacingindictmentattheInternationalCriminalCourt.

Even though the “interminglingofpolitical andeconomicpower inKenyahas

always been intense”, the Jubilee governmentmay currently be going through a

relativeshift.AccordingtotheODIreport“byKenyanstandards,thepresidentand

hisdeputydonothavemanypeopletowhomtheyowefinancialloyalty.Thisisnot

toimplythattheyarefreeofobligationstotheleadersofdifferentcommunitiesof

interestthatsupportedtheircampaigns”butratherthatthe“governmentisableto

approachthebusinesscommunityfromarelativelyindependentpointofview”.One

ofthereasonsmaybethatUhuruKenyatta’scampaignwasheavilyfinancedbyhis

family, rather than business elites, and “he does not owe thanks to anyone”272.

Evidenceoftherelativelynewapproachoftheexecutivetowardbusinesselitesmay

alsobethe“proportionon‘newfaces’inbusinessforums”,ofayoungergeneration

comparedtothosearoundKibaki’stwotermsofgovernment273.TheJubileealliance,

sofar,despitebeingacoalitionwithinwhichtheinterestsofeachleaderrespondto

different ethnic andbusiness audiences, “has shown signs of unusual coherence,

partlyongroundsofexpediency,thankstotheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)

indictments”274(moreontheICCtrialisexplainedbelow).

Thealliancehasbeen, forthefirsttwoyearsandahalfofmandate275,sharing

powerequally.Thishashadtodo,firstandforemost,withtheneedtofightagainst

theICCindictmentsusingajointapproach.Whilethenewgovernmentseemstobe

businessfriendly,ithasnotbeenworkingwithanequalcommitmenttoimproving

governance.

269Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.21270Ibid.271Ibid.272Ibid.,p.25referringtoaninterviewwithaninvestigativejournalist.273Ibid.,p.25.274Ibid.,p.viii.275Atthetimewhenthethesiswassubmitted.

82

Socialparticipation:theroadtoconstitutionalreform

The non-governmental sector in Kenya has played amajor role in the socio-

economicdevelopmentof thecountrysince thecolonialperiod.LindandHowell

suggestthat“Kenyancivilsocietywasshapedgreatlybystatebuildingprocesses

begun during colonialism and continuing in the period of industrialisation after

independencein1963.Theseprocessesledtotheformationofmodernformsofcivil

societysuchastradeunions,NGOsandprofessionalsocieties,settingthestagefor

externalengagementwithcivilsociety”276.GapsintheabilityoftheKenyanstateto

effectivelymanageissuesrangingfromhealthcaretoeducationhaveresultedincivil

society,oftensupportedbyexternalactors,becomingincreasinglyactiveinfilling

the void left by the state. Lind and Howell argue that “the Kenyan experience

demonstratesthattheNGOsectorhassincethe1980semergedasamajorplayerin

thedesignandimplementationofprojectsaswellastheactualprovisionofbasic

needsservicestothedisadvantagedgroupsbothintheruralandurbanareas”277.

Since the early 1990s, civil society groupsplayed a critical role278in the path

towardsthenewconstitutionthatwasadoptedviaareferenduminAugust2010.

Despite theMoi regime being extremely oppressive towards critics, civil society

continuedcarvingoutspaceswithinthepoliticalrealm,andin1999theParliament

enactedtheConstitutionofKenyaReviewAct,whichestablishedtheConstitutionof

KenyaReviewCommission(CKRC),appointedtogatherviewsfromKenyansand

provide recommendations to parliament. The leading CSOs active on the

constitutional reformfrontvoicedconcernsabout theParliament-ledreviewand

the lackofprovisions forbroaderparticipation.Theyargued that theparliament

“was not representative of all the voices of Kenya, and they demanded an all-

inclusiveprocesstoculminateinanationalconference.Theirmantrawasa‘people-

driven’constitutionalreviewprocess”279.ThePeople’sCommissionofKenya(PCK)

wascreatedbytheCatholic,Hindu,MuslimandProtestantclergy,thusinitiatinga

“parallelconstitutionalreviewprocess”280.WhentheCKRCandthePCKwerefinally

276J.LindandJ.Howell,‘Aid,CivilSocietyandtheStateinKenyasince9/11’,LSENon-GovernmentalPublicActionProgrammeWorkingPaper,no.21,5June2008.277Ibid.,p.6.278Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,p.100.Alsosee:P.KennedyandL.Bieniek,MovingForwardwithConstitutionalReforminKenya:AReportoftheCSISAfricaProgram,CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS),Washington,2010;G.Maingi,‘TheKenyanconstitutionalreformprocess:acasestudyofFIDAKenyainsecuringwomen’srights’,FeministAfrica,2012,vol.15;M.Vliet,W.WahiuandA.Magolowondo,ConstitutionalReformProcessesandPoliticalParties:Principlesforpractice,CentreforMultipartyDemocracyandCentreforAfricanStudies,Leiden,2012.279Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,p.105.280Ibid.

83

merged under the chairing of Professor Yash Pal Ghai, the constitutional review

processstarted,in2000.

Theintertwiningofstate-societytookanewshapeasthe2002generalelections

approached,andevenmorewiththeNationalRainbowCoalition(NARC)comingto

power281.CivilsocietystronglysupportedKANU’soppositionintherunuptothe

2002elections.Kanyingasuggeststhat“thedefeatoftheKANUinthe2002elections

can be attributed to the inputs andwork by civil society organisations”282. The

electionmarkedthe“consolidationofdemocraticprocessesstretchingbackovera

decade[…]Thedemocratictriumphalismof2002markedtheopeningofpolitical

spaceandashiftinrelationsbetweenthestateandcivilsociety”283.However,while

this,ontheonehand,wasgoodtoendrepressionandopenupthepoliticalarena,

ontheotheritwasconsideredcounterproductive:thecloselinksbetweenCSOsand

theopposition,oncethelattertookpower,turnedtheformerintoweakeractors,

especiallyintheirwatchdogrole284.Infact,afterthe2002NARCelection,leadersof

civil society organisations increasingly assumed governmental positions, even

“occupyingpowerfulpositions”inthenewlyelectedNARCgovernment285.

However,aspreviouslydiscussedat the theoretical level,Kenyancivil society,

not differently from civil society elsewhere, is the realm of ‘contradictory

possibilities’286,characterisedbya‘bifurcatednature’287,presenting‘twofaces’288.

Inotherwords,“Kenyancivilsocietyisrepletewithactorsofvariedpersuasionsand

multiple motivations. Whereas many actors within civil society were genuinely

committedtothepoliticalreformagendaforthesakeofadvancingdemocracyand

goodgovernance,quiteanumberofotherssawpoliticalactivismforreformasa

gatewaytopower,wealthandprivilege”289.Whilethe‘twofaces’ofcivilsocietyin

Kenya are still present, with “somewell-endowed CSOs [that] choose to remain

politicallyobtuse,therebydebunkingtheoptimisticscholarlyperspectivethatCSOs

281Foranoverviewoftheshiftingroleofstate-societyrelationsinthelate1990s,early2000s–particularlyinrelationtoaid–seeJ.Lind&J.Howell,‘Counter-terrorismandthepoliticsofaid:civilsocietyresponsesinKenya’,DevelopmentandChange,vol.41,no.2,2010.282K.Kanyinga,‘CivilSocietyFormationsinKenya:AGrowingRoleinDevelopmentandDemocracy’,inD.Okelloed.,CivilSocietyintheThirdRepublic,TheNationalCouncilofNGOs,Nairobi,2004,p.23.283LindandHowell,op.cit.,2008,p.2.284Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,p.106.285Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.15.286Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,p.109.Alsosee:M.Mamdani,‘AcritiqueofthestateandcivilsocietyparadigminAfricaniststudies’,inM.MamdaniandE.Wamba-dia-Wambaeds.,AfricanStudiesinSocialMovementsandDemocracy,CODESRIA,Dakar,1995.287Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,p.109.288Ibid.,pp.109-110.Alsosee:S.N.Ndegwa,TheTwoFacesofCivilSociety:NGOsandpoliticsinAfrica,KumarianPress,WestHartford,1996.289Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,pp.109-110.Alsosee:MurungaandNasong’o,op.cit;S.W.Nasong’o,‘ConstitutionalreformandthecrisisofdemocratizationinKenya’inD.Branch,N.CheesemanandL.Gardnereds.,OurTurntoEat:PoliticsinKenyasince1950,Verlag,Berlin,2010,p.231.

84

constituteanunmitigatedbastionoflibertyandaresteadfastcrusadersforpolitical

reformanddemocratisation[…]evenCSOsthatcommitthemselvestothestruggle

forpolitical reformdisplay contradictory tendencieswith regard to the interests

andmotivations of actors therein”290. However, while civil society in the 1990s

“reflectedanarrow,relativelyelitenetworkbasedprimarilyinNairobi”,thanksto

thedevelopmentsof the2000sand theenergygainedafter the2007-2008post-

electionviolence, thenewcohortofcivilsocietyadvocates“is transformingwhat

wasoncefocusedontheeliteintoamorerepresentativeandextendedcivilsociety.

Althoughlargelydependentoninternationalsupportandfunding,KenyanCSOsact

asanimportantalternativepowerwithinthespacebetweenlocalcommunitiesand

government”291.

According toKanyingaasofnow“civilsociety inKenya includesdevelopment

Non-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs),CommunityBasedOrganisations(CBOs),

womengroups,self-helpgroups,religiousgroups,tradeunions,professionaltrade

associations,aswellassocialeconomicormarket-basedassociations.Theconcept

alsoincludeshumanrightsadvocacygroups,social-culturalorganisationsandavast

array of social movements” 292 . The way these groups operate is significantly

diversified293. Major distinctions include: local versus national scope; registered

under specific laws, or as trusts and foundations or still with the Provincial

Administration of the Department of Culture and Social Services; formal

(structurally organised) versus informal (smaller groups regulated by rules and

practices); their scope can range from service delivery to the articulation of

members’interests.Thisassociationallifeisallthemorepresentnow,inacountry,

whoseeconomy“nolongerreliesonthestate;themultipartydemocracyishereto

stayandpresidentialdemandsprovokeasmuchresistanceasobedience”294.

Intermsofpoliticalpresence,evenifinstitutionalisedpoliticalpartiesarelacking,

theParliament“seemstoexertpressureonotherorgansofgovernment.Sometimes

thisisinamannersuggestiveofParliamentbeingaforceforchange”295.However,

even where committees296 conduct investigations concerning public bodies and

recommend prosecutions, “there are no known instances of anyone being

290Nasong’o,2014,op.cit.,pp.109-110.291Ibid.,p.112.292Kanyinga,op.cit.,p.9.293LindandHowell,op.cit.294Hornsby,op.cit.,p.7.295Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.27.296Parliamentarygroups,ofwhichsomehavespecificmandatestomonitorpublicaccounts.

85

prosecutedsuccessfullyonaccountoftherecommendationsofthecommittee.The

executive has the final word on such prosecutions and therefore nothing really

happens”297.Withthenewconstitution,however,thistrendmaybeboundtoinvert

trajectoryas theworkof committees is increasinglymetbyamore independent

judiciary.Infact,especiallyafterthenewconstitutionwaspassed,setbacksagainst

ithavebeenmet“withvigorousresistancefromKenyans,resistancethatconfirmed

thatthemanyyearsspentnegotiatingthenewconstitutionhadintroducedintothe

Kenyanbodypoliticafreshcivicsensitivityagainstrulebypresidentialfiat”298.

ThenewConstitution

Theissueofwhererightsreside:“individualsintheliberaldemocraticcitizenship

model,asthestateformallyespoused,orethniccommunitiesorcollectives”299isa

fundamental constant in Kenya’s socio-political evolution. This rights-based

discourse has come even more to light since the early 2000s with the first

democraticelectionsandlaterwiththeapprovalofthenewConstitutionin2010,

whichhasafar-reachingbillofrights.WithinthenewConstitution,thedevolution

ofgovernmentpowershascomeintoeffect.Countiescanmaketheirdecisionson

issuesthatconcernthemdirectly.Thecountyassemblyrepresentsatypeofcounty-

parliament,which has its government that is directly accountable to the people.

According to the Constitution, “the devolved government is primarily geared

towardsachievingtwomainobjectives:involvethepeopleingovernanceandallow

better supervision and implementation of policies at the grassroots level. The

devolved government consists of 47 counties. Every county government shall

furtherdecentralizeitsservicesandcoordinateitsfunctionsinordertoefficiently

servetheinterestsofthepeopleofKenyaatthelocallevels”300.

Inotherwords,thenewconstitutionprovidesforenhancedpublicparticipation

ingovernanceandstrongerchecksandbalances.Itreplacedthe1969Constitution,

which in turn had replaced the 1963 Independence Constitution. Since 2010,

“Kenyans have been looking to the new constitution as a key to improving

governance.Theconstitutionhascreatedseveralnewcentresofpowerinthequest

toreducethepowersoftheexecutive.Oneisthejudiciary”301.TheChiefJusticeand

297Boothetal.,op.cit.,pp.27-28.298Murungaetal.,op.cit.,p.ix.299Ibid.,p.8.300GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,ConstitutionofKenya,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,Nairobi,August2010.301Boothetal,op.cit.,p.28.

86

newjudgeswererecruitedthroughopenprocesses,increasingpublicconfidencein

theinstitutionandinsomecases“thejudiciarystartedbymakingjudgementsthat

demonstrated independence from the executive” 302 . As with most other public

bodies – and private organisations too – the judiciary is not unilaterally acting

constitutionally. The desire for constitutionalism varies, imbuing the change

process with “a persisting struggle between the status quo and progressive

elements”303.Thisappliestothebureaucracyaswellastocivilsociety.

Development:theEconomicRecoveryStrategyandKenyaVision2030

Since the democratic elections of 2002, development plans have played a

significantroleinthecountry’sgrowth.Thegovernment’sblueprintforthe2003-

2007period,theEconomicRecoveryStrategyforWealthandEmploymentCreation,

was in line with the NARC’s party manifesto. Similarly, Kenya Vision 2030 was

launchedbythecoalitiongovernmentin2008andisbeingcontinued,throughthe

Medium-TermPlanII(2013-2017),bytheJubileegovernmentwhosemanifestohas

threepillars:Unity,EconomyandOpenness.

KenyaVision2030is“anationallong-termdevelopmentblueprint[…]thataims

totransformKenyaintoanewlyindustrializing,middle-incomecountryproviding

ahighqualityoflifetoallitscitizensby2030inacleanandsecureenvironment”,

developed through "an all-inclusive and participatory stakeholder consultative

process, involving Kenyans from all parts of the country" 304 . According to the

pledgesmadein2008forKenyaVision2030,priorityareasinclude:

1. EconomicPillar:“sixprioritysectorsthatmakeupthelargerpartofKenya’sGDP

(57%) and provide for nearly half of the country’s total formal employment:

tourism, agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing IT enabled

services(previouslyknownasbusinessprocessoff-shoring),financialservices”305andinfrastructure306.

2. Social Pillar: “a cross-section of human and social welfare projects and

programmes,specifically:educationandtraining,health,environment,housing

andurbanisation,gender,childrenandsocialdevelopment,youthandsports”307

302Ibid.303Ibid.304GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,‘KenyaVision2030,TheVision’,KenyaVision2030,[website].305GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,‘KenyaVision2030,EconomicPillar’,KenyaVision2030,[website].306Ibid.307GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,‘KenyaVision2030,SocialPillar’,KenyaVision2030,[website].

87

withtheaimof“investinginthepeopleofKenyainordertoimprovethequality

oflifeforallKenyans”

3. Political Pillar: “transformation of Kenya’s political governance across five

strategic areas: the rule of law – the Kenya Constitution 2010; electoral and

political processes; democracy and public service delivery; transparency and

accountability;security,peacebuildingandconflictmanagement”withtheaim

of“movingtothefutureasonenationenvision[ing]ademocraticsystemthatis

issuebased,peoplecentred,resultsorientedandisaccountabletothepublic”.

Most issues, fromeconomic togovernance, findapriorityplanoutlined in the

blueprint documents. This is particularly important in the study of Kenya-China

relations because relations with China, across Africa, are often believed to be

establishedtobenefittheelites’intereststothedetrimentofthepopulation.Asmost

caseswillshowinthesectoralanalysescarriedoutinthenextthreechapters,the

initiativesundertakenwithChinainthesectorsanalysedarepartofpre-established

developmentplans.Thesedevelopmentplanshavenotbeentheprerogativeofthe

executive(hencetheimportanceofalayeredinterestsapproachtostudyspecific

issues).AnintervieweecommentedontheimplementationofKenyaVision2030by

highlightingtheimportanceoftheprivatesectorandNon-StateActors(NSAs)for

agenda setting and implementation. He states that “75% of Kenya Vision 2030

comesfromtheprivatesectorandNSAs.WehaveaPublicPrivatePartnership(PPP)

billthatprovidesawayofengaging.Ifyougotoruralconstituencies,mostofthe

government work is done by NSAs, often faith-based. The government should

definitelyoverlookandensurequalitybutimplementationisdonebyNSAs.NSAs

areseenaspartnersindevelopment”308.Inparticular,thePPPinitiativeisamajor

step in the government’s recognition of significant shortcomings in its ability to

providecitizenswithbasicpublicinfrastructure(includingpower,roads,rail,sea

and airports) and services (including water, health and sanitation) 309 . The

involvementofNSAs, i.e. investors,domesticand international,wasconsidereda

waytobypassthefinancialconstraintsthatthegovernmenthadexperiencedasthe

primaryproviderofsuchinfrastructureandservices310.

308InterviewwithanexecutiveatKenyaVision2030,Nairobi,2014-03-12.309PublicPrivatePartnershipUnit,‘Legal&RegulatoryFramework’,PublicPrivatePartnershipUnit,[website].310Ibid.

88

Kenya,likemanyothercountries,whilestillheavilyreliant,especiallyinsectors

like healthcare, on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), has also been

increasinglyrelyingondomesticresourcemobilisationto funditsdevelopmental

path311.Thismaybecomeevenmoresignificantintheyearstocomeasthecountry

crossedthethreshold,in2014,fromaLow-Income-Countrytoa(Lower)Middle-

Income-Country312.

3.3 International

WhiledomesticdynamicsplayedakeyroleinKenyanpost-colonialjourney,these

havebeen,moresothannot,deeplyconnectedwiththeinternational.

3.3.1 BackgroundHornsbywritesthat“historyrecordsthatithasbeenthecultureofKenyansto

resistdomination,oppressionandexploitation”313.Theformsofthisresistancehave

rangedfromnon-violentconstitutionalformstoviolentarmedstruggle.Whilethe

formerhasbeenthemostembracedoption,thelatterismoststrikinglyexemplified

in theMauMauWar of Independence – amongAfrica’smost violent. Coming to

terms with its colonial legacy “was one of the major tasks” facing the newly

independentgovernmentofKenya314.GordonarguesthatKenyarespondedtoits

colonial legacy via a “reorganisational model” rather than accommodation or

transformation.Reorganisation“recognisesandacceptsstructuraldependenceon

theglobaleconomy;atthesametime,itinvolvesattemptstoreformbothdomestic

structuresanddiversifyandimproveone’spositionintheinternationalorder.This

approachviewscontinuingparticipationintheinternationalorderasopeningup

possibilities for improving bargaining powerwithin it”315. In political terms, the

legaciesofcolonialruleandnarrowlydefinedregionalissuesdominatedtheagenda

ofKenya’sforeignpolicyintheyearsbetweenindependenceandthemid-1970s316.

311S.LewisandL.Kerr,WhoPaysforProgress?TheRoleofDomesticResourceMobilisationandDevelopmentAssistanceinFinancingHealth.ACaseStudyfromKenya,RESULTSUK,2015,p.9.312WorldBank,‘Kenya:ABigger,BetterEconomy’,TheWorldBank[website],30September2014,<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/09/30/kenya-a-bigger-better-economy>.313W.Mutunga,Constitution-MakingfromtheMiddle:CivilSocietyandTransitionPoliticsinKenya,1992-1997,SareatandMwengo,NairobiandHarare,1999,p.1.314D.F.Gordon,‘ForeignRelationsDilemmasofIndependenceandDevelopment’,inJ.D.Barkaned.,PoliticsandPublicPolicyinKenyaandTanzania,PraegerPublishers,NewYork,1984,p.301.315Ibid.316Ibid.,p.297.

89

Kenya’s foreign policy during that period “has been described as one of ‘quiet

diplomacy’,cautiousandpragmaticinitsarticulation”317.AtindependenceKenya’s

economy was dominated by “non-Africans – European farmers, Asian traders,

foreign companies, and local European businessmen”. The external economy,

including trade and foreign assistance,was “closely intertwinedwith the former

colonialpower,GreatBritain”318.

A number of external influences have been ever present in Kenya’s political

economysincethecolonialeraand“theexternalforcesthathavehadmostimpact

onthecountry’seconomicandpoliticalstructuresincludebilateralandmultilateral

donor agencies and states, aswell as foreign investors”319. Hornsby argues that

“therewasalwaysastrongrelationshipbetweenKenyaandforeigngovernments,

andtheBritishplayedtheroleofpatronandguardianuncletoKenyaforthefirst

decadeofitsindependence.AstheinfluenceoftheUKdiminishedinthe1970s,it

wasreplacedbytheUnitedStatesasamorepowerfulbutlessreliablepatron[…]

By themid-1990s, thedebateoverKenya’s dependenceon foreign interestshad

shifted to the ‘tyranny’ of the international financial institutions”320.Thepatron-

client relation 321 that characterised Kenya’s engagement with external actors

duringandaftercolonial timesstartedtakingnewshapewhen,asaresultof the

generalcollapseofthestatesysteminAfrica,donoragenciesstarted,inthe1990s,

bypassingAfrican states,while channelling funds for development toNGOs. It is

againstthisscenariothatKenyanmoderncivilsocietyboomed,“shapedgreatlyby

statebuildingprocessesbegunduringcolonialismandcontinuingintheperiodof

industrialisationafterindependencein1963.Theseprocessesledtotheformation

of modern forms of civil society such as trade unions, NGOs and professional

societies,settingthestageforexternalengagementwithcivilsociety”322.

Historically “Kenya has been in a dependent relationship with Western

governments and international institutions: militarily, financially, economically,

technologicallyandculturally.ThehandofWesternpowers,donorsandNGOscan

beseenineveryaspectofKenya’spolitics,economicsandsociety,encouragingsome

typesof changeanddiscouragingothers”323.Morerecently,however, the “Kibaki

317Ibid.318Ibid.,p.301.319W.O.Oyugied.,PoliticsandAdministrationinEastAfrica,EastAfricanEducationalPublishers,Nairobi,1994,p.429.320Hornsby,op.cit.,p.11.321Ibid.,p.810.322LindandHowell,op.cit.,p.6.323Hornsby,op.cit.,p.809.

90

governmentdemonstratedanewwilltoreduceKenya’sdependencyonWesternaid

[…]Apro-capitalistKikuyu-ledgovernmentprovedmorehostile to foreignfunds

and interventions andmorewilling to challenge the unfetteredmarket than the

skepticalMoi”324. PresidentKibaki’s regime significantly reduceddependenceon

Western donor aid, with the country being increasingly funded by internally

generated resources such as increased tax revenue collection and new tieswith

China.325

MwaiKibaki:‘LookEast’

DuringPresidentKibaki’sgovernment,Kenya’sforeignpolicyunderwentamajor

shift.Asmentionedabove,theKibakigovernmentturnedtoChina326andIndiawhen

western donors –who supportedNARC in the run-up to the elections – started

questioningthegovernment’sseriousnesstoaddresscorruption.AstheODIreport

highlights,twogroupsofpoliticians,highlyintertwinedwithbusinesselites,“hada

handinthemovetowardstheEast”327.TheHurlinghamgroup,formedofpoliticians

comingfromtheMountKenyaregion-Kibaki’shomeandelectoralbedrock–and

businesselites,urgedthePresident“‘tolook[e]astandgetsupportfromChinaon

[the]argumentthatChinawouldgivegrantsandloanswithoutstringsattachedand

withoutcriticisingthegovernmentovergovernanceissues’328”.Atthesametime,

movingtoChinawasastrategytounderminethepoweroftheMuthaigagroupthat,

instead,“hadgrownbytradingwithcompaniesintheWest.Theyhadinvestedin

multinational corporations and were therefore keen to preserve government

relationswiththeWest”329.Thetwogroups,whosememberswereequallycloseto

Kibaki,wererivalin“influencingbusinessoreconomicdecisions”330.

However, when in 2008 Kibaki signed the agreement to establish a coalition

governmentwithRailaOdinga–whobecamePrimeMinister– the linkageswith

business elites were altered. Business elites around Raila “were not as well

entrenchedinbusinessasthosearoundKibaki”andwereinterestedinbeginning

324Ibid.,p.810.325Ng’etich,op.cit.326ThistimecoincidedwithChina’s‘GoOutstrategy’initiatedinthelate1990sandcontinuedundertheHuJintao-WenJiabaoleadership.ChinajoinedtheWorldTradeOrganisationin2001,andlaterstartedtoactivelyandconsistentlypromoteengagementwiththeoutsideworld,atgovernmentalaswellasbusinesslevelthroughtheencouragementofChineseinvestmentsoverseas.327Boothetal.,op.cit.,referringtotheinterviewwithaninvestigativejournalistworkingwithoneofthedailypapers(Oct2013),p.18.328Ibid.329Ibid.330Ibid.

91

investmentsratherthanalreadybeingsolidinvestors.However,beyondthesupport

from non-Kikuyu business leaders, Raila also received backing from powerful

KenyanAsians.KenyanAsiansseemingly“preferanon-Kikuyupresidentbecause

Kikuyu business elites are their competitors in various sectors” 331 . Similarly,

because of Kenyan Asians’ strong connections with India (for sourcing,

manufacturing etc.), they may be not in favour of the involvement of Chinese

businesses,seenascompetitors.Thisisparticularlyevidentintheanalysesofsome

issuesinthenextchapters,especiallyininfrastructureandpharmaceuticals.

Within thisscenario, corruptionscandals involvingbusinessgroupsaswellas

politicalfiguressidingwitheitherKibakiorRaila,emergedshowinganevermore

complexnetworkofbusiness-politics linkages.Thebenefitsofpatronagebecame

more scattered as the government lacked internal cohesion leading, at times, to

policygridlock.Atthesametime,corruptionscandalsweakenedsomegroups,and

withKibaki’sintereststoChinaandinfrastructuralprojects,newbusinesselitesand

newsectorsstartedemerging332.

UhuruKenyatta:theICCtrial

UhuruKenyattaisarguablyfollowinginthefootstepsofKibakiin‘lookingEast’333.

However,therolethatChinahashad,forhim,ismorepersonallysignificant,dueto

hisindictmentbytheInternationalCriminalCourt,wherehewasbeingprosecuted

forallegedcrimescommittedduringthe2007-2008election/post-electionviolence.

The 2013 elections were preceded by threat-like announcements by Western

countriesconcerningthepotentialeffectsforthecountryasawholeifKenyattaand

Ruto,atthetimeprosecuted,weretobeelected.Thisexacerbatedthedifficulties

thatKenyahadalreadystartedhavingwiththeWest,itstraditionaltradingpartner,

tothepointthatthestrengtheningofthe‘LookEast’policyisconsidered“inparta

reactiontotheinternationalsupportfortheICC”334.

Soon after the elections in March 2013, the tensions with western countries

surroundingPresidentKenyattaandVice-PresidentRutowereheightenedbytwo

episodes:Obama’svisittoAfrica,duringwhichKenyawasbypassed,andthecold

receptionby theBritishprimeministerofKenyattaat theSomaliaConference in

May.Thesetwoevents“wereseenashumiliatingandthosearoundthepresident

331Ibid.,p.20.332Ibid.,p.19.333Ng’etich,op.cit.334Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.33.

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quicklycraftedanewagendatointensifycontactswiththeEast”335.InAugust2013,

Kenyattamadestatevisits toRussiaandChina. InChina,hisdelegationsigneda

numberofagreementsamountingto$5billionininvestmentsinanumberofsectors.

However,whiletheseoccurrenceswerepartlypolitically-motivated,theKenyatta-

Rutogovernmentseemed,sincethebeginning,intentionedtosteerKenyatogreater

independence at the global diplomatic arena”336 , partnering with whoever was

willingtoworkwithKenyanstogenerateeconomicopportunities337.Anofficialata

Ministrysummarisedthisbystatingthat“thereisalotofpoliticsbetweentheEast

andtheWest.KenyamainlygotsupportfromtheWestafterindependence.Nowit’s

non-alignedbutithasaclearposition.Whatmattersisthecountry’sinterestsrather

thanaligningwithsomeone.Theinterestisnotwhetherwelookeastorwest,but

ratherhowwelookatourselves.Wedon’tcarewherewegetsupportfrom,whether

it’sfromChina,Russia,theUSorBritain,providedit’sinourinterests.”338

3.4 Kenya-China:actors,stakesandnegotiations?

Kenya-China relationsmust be contextualised not only in relation to Kenya’s

historical linkswiththeWest,butalsowithinChina-Africarelations.Researchon

Kenya-China relations has been relatively limited, especially when compared to

researchconductedonChina’srelationswithresource-richcountries.BeingKenya

a resource-poor country “China’s economic interests […] so far have been

predominantlyoutside themuch-hypedareaof itsvoraciousappetite forAfrican

naturalresources”339,saysChege,UNDPadvisortoKenya’sMinistryofPlanningand

NationalDevelopment.AlthoughexplorationsofoilwellswereconductedbyChina

NationalOffshoreOilCompany(CNOOC),nopositiveresultswereachievedandthe

companyquit in2010340. Thisnotwithstanding, it isworthpointingout that the

significantinvolvementofChinaininfrastructuraldevelopmentprojectsinKenya

shouldbeconnectedtothenecessityofprovidingroutestoresources.Opinionson

China’spresumedlong-terminterestsinKenyarangefromconsideringitsinterests

335Ibid.,p.23. 336KenyaYearbookEditorialBoard,KenyaYearbook2013/2014,CelebratingKenya’s50YearsofIndependence,KenyaYearbookEditorialBoard,Nairobi,2014,p.568.337Boothetal.,op.cit.,p.23.338InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi.2014-11-18.339M.Chege,EconomicRelationsBetweenChinaandKenya,1963-2007,CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Washington,2008,p.35.340Ibid.

93

“nodifferentfromthoseofitsWesternandAfricancompetitors”341,focusingmainly

onthedevelopmentoftradelinks,theinvestmentinconstruction,andtourism,to

morestrategicinsightsaccordingtowhichChinaistryingtogetaccesstoKenyawell

knowingthatKenyahasbeenfordecadesthe“darling”oftheWest,proposingitself

asanoptionnotonly ineconomic terms,butalsosocio-culturallyandpolitically.

Chinesepublicandprivate,big,mediumandsmallenterpriseshaveinvestedina

number of, seemingly, resource-unrelated projects 342 spread across multiple

sectors ranging from infrastructure to trade – particularly in themanufacturing

sector–tourism,health,education,ITservices,financialservicesandthemedia343.

AlthoughthefocusofthisstudyisonKenyanagency,itisnecessarytoatleast

mention that the Chinese community is diversified and less cohesive than often

assumed. Fieldwork reveals that, similarly to cases in other African countries,

competitionamongtheChineseisfierce,accompaniedbydistrusttowardeachother

and fearofbeing cheatedbyotherChinese.Asa consequence,Chinesenationals

tend to avoid interaction with each other. This disaggregation is identified as

counterproductivebytheEconomicandCommercialCounsellorOfficeofthePRC

because it inhibits companies, especially State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), from

respondinginacoherentwaytolocalcriticismconcerninglabourstandards,rules

within their sector of operation and so forth 344 . Therefore, the Economic and

Commercial CounsellorOffice has requested SOEs in the infrastructure sector to

createanassociation, theKenya-ChinaEconomicandTradeAssociation, toshare

concernsaboutsimilarissuesandshowajointapproachtoKenyancounterparts.

Therearealsoassociationsofnon-SOEsenterprisesaimedatprovidingmediation

supportrangingfromorganisingeventswith local institutionssotohelpChinese

nationalsbetterunderstandthelocalcontext,toprovidinglegalsupportforChinese

nationalsetc.(seeChapter4formoreontheseassociations).

KenyanleadersconsidertherelationswithChinaasparticularlybeneficialforthe

fulfilment of Kenya Vision 2030 goals, especially in relation to the so-called

infrastructure ‘enablers’, projectswithoutwhich furtherdevelopments couldnot

341Ibid.342Inthecaseofinfrastructure,itisfrequentlyarguedthattheinfrastructureprojectsChinainvestsinarenecessaryforthetransportofextractedrawmaterials/naturalresourcestoeasierpointsofaccess,i.e.ports.343Dataretrievalonpastandpresentprojectsisparticularlychallengingdespitetherecentcreationofadatabase,AidDataChina,whichgathersagooddealofinformationregardingprojectsundertakenbyChinaovertheworld.Themethodologyusedtocreatethedatabase–mainlynewspapersources–hasbeenhighlycriticisedanditleadstotreatthesourceaspartiallyreliable.SeeD.Brautigam,‘AidData:WhyitisnotWikipedia’,ChinainAfrica:TheRealStory[blogpost],2May2013.344InterviewwithanofficerattheChineseEconomicandCommercialCounsellor’sOffice,Nairobi,2013-11-18.

94

takeplace.IntervieweeshaveconfirmedthatwhiletheMinistryofForeignAffairs

andInternationalTrade,andtheMinistryofFinancehaveacentralizedcommandof

the country’s engagement with China at the high-levels, i.e. steering national

priorities,theyheavilyrelyonsectoralstakeholders,fromministriestotheprivate

sector,whoareinchargeofformulatingandimplementingpolicies.InMay2014,

duringthevisitofChinesePremierLiKeqiangtoKenya,PresidentUhuruKenyatta

stressedtheneedtosetupaBilateralAdvisoryCouncil(BAC),aimedatactingasthe

institutioninchargeofcentralisingtheimplementation,monitoringandevaluation

oftheprojects/initiativesagreeduponsofar.Inhisspeech,hestated:“weagreed

ontheurgencyofconveningaBilateralAdvisoryCouncil.Whenadopted,thecouncil

willprovidean ideal forumforconstantand fruitfulengagementatevery level–

most especially in the implementation,monitoring and evaluationof the various

initiativesandagreementswehaveconcludedsofar.”345

On top of high-level engagements, the Sino-African discourse on people-

centerednesshasfoundavibrantgroundinKenya.Nairobihasbecomethehubof

Chinesediplomacyonthecontinent,withAfrica’sonlyXinhuaregionaloffice,the

first ever CCTV news production centre outside China and the establishment, in

2005,oftheveryfirstConfuciusInstitute(CI)setupinAfrica–followedbyother

threeInstitutesthatmakeKenyasecondonlytoSouthAfricaforthenumberofCIs

percountryonthecontinent.Despitethisinvolvementofnon-stateactors,points

of view concerning the impact that the Chinese modus operandi could have on

Kenya’s democratizing process are quite diversified, ranging from fears that

domestic corruption and lack of transparency in governance will worsen, to

confidencethatChina’sbackwardnessinstate-societyrelationscannotdragbacka

countrysuchasKenya,where freedomshavebeen foughtandnegotiatedamong

groupsatalllevelsforsuchanextendedperiod346.

Below a breakdown of the relations, divided into three main sections: 1)

diplomacy and ideology, 2) social interaction, 3) trade, aid and investment. This

backgroundisfundamentalforprovidingacontexttothespecificsectoralanalyses

presented in the following chapters. By means of introduction, the following

sections present howKenya’s interests are framed in light of Chinese and other

345U.Kenyatta,‘PresidentKenyattaSPEECHontheVisitbyChinesePremierLiKequing’,KenyaToday,10May2014.346Murungaetal.,op.cit.,p.ix.

95

foreign actors’ interests. The sectoral analyses instead will move beyond the

nationalleveltolookmorecloselyatactors,interestsandnegotiationdynamics.

3.4.1 DiplomacyandideologyChina-Kenya diplomatic relations started in 1963. Contrary to many other

AfricancountrieswhoserelationswithChinahavebeenbasedonmutualfriendship

since the years of independence, especially in relation to common ideological

revolutionary struggles against the West, Kenya’s relation with China took a

different trajectory. When in 1964 Chinese premier Zhou Enlai praised the

“excellentrevolutionarysituationinAfrica”, theKenyatta’sgovernmentpromptly

repliedthat“theChinesepremier’sexpectationsdidnotapplytoKenya,asithad

alreadycompleted itsanticolonial revolution in thepreviousdecade”347. In1965

“KenyaadoptedSessionalPaperNo.10of1965onAfricanSocialismthatinfluenced

a‘LookWest’policyandacapitalistpathofdevelopment.AndtheChinesedream

wasitselfstillmiredinthepost-1949CommunistRevolutionpolitics”348.In1966-

1967relationsbetweenthetwodeterioratedandwentintoastalemateforabouta

decade, the reasons being not only KANU’s right wing resistance to a leftist

inclination towards China’s revolutionary agenda, but also “machinations from

WesternintelligenceoperativesinNairobi”349.RelationsbetweenChinaandKenya

startedre-openingupwiththefirstvisit toChinabyPresidentMoi in1980,only

afterbothMaoZedongandJomoKenyattahadexitedthescene.Itisindeed“inthe

wakeofDengXiaoping’s‘fourmodernizations’thathostilitygraduallymutatedinto

afruitfulphaseofinteractionbetweenChinaandKenya”350.

However, like most African countries, the relations with China became

diplomatically, economically and sociallymore relevant in the early 2000s. This

period also coincides with the creation, in 2000, of the Forum on China-Africa

Cooperation that institutionalised the engagement between China and African

countries. As soon as Kibaki was elected in 2002, “he expressed to hold great

account of the relations with China, willing to further deepen and expand the

friendlycooperationbetweenthetwocountries”351.Asmentionedabove,the‘Look

East’ policywas the fruit of internalmachinations but also of a general urge to

347Chege,op.cit.,p.21.348P.Kagwanja,‘WhyChina’s‘softpower’approachappealstoKenya’,DailyNation,10May2014.349Chege,op.cit.,p.20.350Ibid.,p.19.351J.Onjala,AScopingStudyonChina-AfricaEconomicRelations:TheCaseofKenya,InstituteforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofNairobi,2008,p.4.

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revamptheeconomyandoftheneedtobecomelessdiplomaticallydependenton

theWest.TheKenyaYearbook2014 reports that “never since theearlyyearsof

Kenya’sIndependencewasNairobi’sdiplomaticcircuitlivelyandfullofpublicand

private intricatediplomaticwooingandcourtshipdramaanddancebetween the

Western-blocenvoysandtheChinesediplomats,officials,economic-cum-business

leadersaswaswitnessedbetween2003-2007”352.

Evenmore, theelectionofUhuruKenyatta, seenasdisadvantageous from the

West,mainlydue to thependingcriminal investigationat the ICC,hasraised the

issueofKenyabeingcourtedbyEastandWestalike.MrFraser,formerUnitedStates

AssistantSecretaryofState forAfricanAffairscommentedthat“thegeo-strategic

environmenthaschangedentirelyandparticularly(infavourof)China.TheChinese

havechangedtheplayingfield(and)iftheUS,theUKandEuropeansdon’twantto

deal with Uhuru Kenyatta, he has another option” 353 . A Member of the UK

ParliamentalsoexpressedconcernsduringaspecialsessiononKenyaheldin2012:

“the presence of China in Kenya is obvious. They are active everywhere in the

country,andtheyareineverycountryinAfrica.Theyareamajorinfluenceinthe

continent,andwedonotwanttoloseourinfluenceinanypartofAfrica,especially

notinKenya,toothercountries”354.

Socialinteraction:the‘peoples’When it started becoming clear that the social effects of China’s increased

presenceinAfricahadtobetackledtoavoidsocialunrest–fearedtoimpactupon

the implementation of projects/initiatives and consequentially the fulfilment of

interests – Kenyawas among the first countries on the continent to be actively

involved,consideredanimportantbaseforthedevelopmentofChinesesoftpower

onthecontinent.Whilepeople’s forumsstartedbeinginstitutionalised,thesocial

interactioninKenyabetweenKenyanandChineseactorsismorecomplexthanthe

issue-areascovered in the forumsas the followingchapterswillshow.Thereare

thentwodistinctapproachesthroughwhichsocialgroupsfromthetwocountries

interact. One revolves around day to day engagements which impact the real

governance of an issue between Kenyan and Chinese stakeholders. The other

revolves around strategized encounters that are part of a symbolic type of

352KenyaYearbook2014,op.cit.,p.581.353J.Kamau,‘ChinaThreatForcesUKRethinkofKenyaPolicy’,BusinessDailyAfrica,PoliticsandPolicy,21March2013.354UKParliament,GovernmentPolicyonKenya,20March2013.

97

governance, one that is institutionalised, that received funds for the set up of

associations ormeetings and serves the purpose of guaranteeing a space, albeit

government-controlled,tothepeoples,inSino-Africanrelations.

Kenyan trade unions, business associations, schools, traditional medicine

practitioners, andmore, engagewith Chinese actors navigating through existing

domestic governance systems to guarantee social participation in Kenya-China

affairs.However,theseformsofpeoples’involvementinKenya-Chinarelationsare

onlypartiallyrecognisedbyChinesestakeholders,dependingon their interest in

doing so, and their ability to dealwith social groups. Symbolic people-to-people

interactions,on theotherhand, reportsaChinesediplomat, “are initiatedby the

governmentandthefundscomefromthegovernment,buttheorganisationsthat

carry out the plan is universities, local institutions, NGOs”355. Interviewees have

reported that these interactions are not necessarily in areas that are deemed

relevantbyKenyansocialstakeholdersintheirengagementwithChineseonesbut

areidentifiedassalientbytheChinesegovernment.

Itseemsthattherearethustwotypesofpeoples’engagements.Onefromabove,

orchestratedbytheChinesegovernmentandofficiallyrecognised,controlledand

strategic,andonefrombelow,governedbythemyriadsocialgroupsthatengage

withChina on a daily basis andwithwhomChinese companies, traders, etc. are

requestedtodealwith.Inthefirstcasetherelationsarepeople-to-people,meaning

social groups from the Chinese and African side interact. These interactions are

generally financially supportedby theChinesegovernmentandaimatproviding

opportunitiesforsocialgroupstomeet.Theseobjectivesare,however,profoundly

disconnectedfromthesecondtypeofpeoples’engagement,frombelow.Thisis,in

fact, a non-orchestrated kind of dynamic, often emerging out of problems

encounteredbyAfricansocialgroupsinengagingwithChineseactors.Thesegroups

rangefromtradeunionstohumanrightsassociations,fromsecurityorganisations

toeducationalbodies,theyoftenhavelessfinancialresourcesthantheformerand

theirabilitytonegotiatewiththeChinesedependsondomesticgovernancesystems

morethananythingelse.

Ina sense,while the former typeaimsat increasing the legitimacyofChinese

operationsinAfrica,thelatterformsthemuchwidergroundsfromwhichsuchaims

355InterviewwithanofficerattheEmbassyofthePRC,CultureDepartment,Nairobi,2013-10-08.

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originate.Whilethenextthreechaptersarededicatedtounpacking‘real’relations,

thosefrombelow,thenextsectionintroducestherelationsorchestratedfromabove.

Thepeoples’forums

Anumberof‘peoples’forums356wereheldsince2007whenthefirstChina-Africa

Civil Society Meeting was held in Shanghai. Before 2011 these meetings were

welcomedwithcautionbytheChinesegovernmentandweremostlyorganisedby

think-tanksandnon-governmentalorganisationsalthoughtherewasalsogenerally

asignificantattendancebygovernmentofficers.AcentralthemeofFOCAC2009was

the strengthening of civil society links between China andAfrica, to parallel the

governmentalandbusinessconnectionsalreadymade.The2009FOCACmeeting

showedthatBeijingwasawareoftheimportanceofthecivilsocietydimensionto

theChina-Africaengagement,andrealisedthatatruly'win-win'relationshipmust

be people-centred. However, in 2009, the International Institute for Strategic

Studies(IISS)reportedthat“whiletheneedforgreaterdirectengagementhasbeen

recognisedatthehigherlevelsofofficialdom,changeonthegroundisstillatavery

early stage” 357 . The strong presence of governmental actors during people-to-

peopleforumsraisedconcernsabouttherealpurposeofthesemeetings,andthe

grievancesarising fromactualencountersseemedtoshowadisconnectbetween

formaltablesofnegotiationandrealones.

Theseforums,itisnecessarytopointout,wereonlymarginallyrepresentativeof

actualinteractionsamongsocialgroups,whichwerealreadymorediversifiedand

complex. The forums were tackling issues that China perceived as relevant 358 .

Labourissuesforinstance(seeChapter4),werestillnotapriorityatthehighlevels

despite already being an important matter on the ground. In the 2009 FOCAC

ImplementationPlanit isreportedthat:“withtheencouragementandsupportof

bothsides,thesub-forumsundertheframeworkofFOCAC359havemadeenormous

progress.Sub-forumsonagriculture,scienceandtechnology,law,financing,culture,

356HeinrichBöllStiftung-East&HornofAfrica,China-AfricaCivilSocietyDialogue,HeinrichBöllStiftung,Nairobi,2008;CivilSocietyMeeting,Nairobi,2009;ChinaAfricaCivilSocietyForumonPeaceandDevelopment,Beijing,2-4June2010;CODESRIA-FOCACMeeting,Nairobi,2011;China-AfricaPeople’sForum,Nairobi,2011;China-AfricaThinkTankForum,Hangzhou,2011;TacklingInsecurityintheHornofAfrica,Nairobi,2012.357S.Raine,China’sAfricanChallenges,RoutledgeforTheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,London,2009,p.172.358InterviewwithmajorrepresentativesofCSOsinKenya.359China-AfricaYouthFestival,Namibia,2009;FOCACWomen’sForum,CairoandFOCACWomen’sForumDeclaration,2009;3rdChina-AfricaYouthFestival,Beijing,2009;TheChina-AfricaScientificandTechnologicalCooperationRoundtable,Egypt,2009;3rdConferenceofChineseandAfricanEntrepreneurs,2009;TheChina-AfricaAgriculturalCooperationForum,Beijing,2010;China-AfricaPeople’sForum,Nairobi,2011;FOCACThinktanksForum,Hangzhou,2011;2ndChina-AfricaPeople’sForum,Suzhou,2012;4thConferenceofChineseandAfricanEntrepreneurs,2012;FOCACCulturalMinisters’Forum,2012;FOCACCultureForum;FOCACScienceandTechnologyForum;China-AfricaCulturalHeritagePreservationRoundtable;3rdChina-AfricaPeople’sForum,Khartoum,2014.

99

thinktanks,youth,people-to-peopleexchangesandwomenhavebeensetup,some

ofwhichhavebeeninstitutionalised.Thesesub-forumshavebroadenedthescope,

enrichedthesubstance,andenhancedthevigourofChina-Africacooperation.”360As

put by an interviewee at the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi, these initiatives “are

initiated by the government and the funds come from the government, but the

organisationsthatcarryouttheplanisuniversities,localinstitutions,NGOs”361.In

other words, the ‘peoples’ have the opportunity to decide how to conduct the

relationsbutnotwhatrelationstoprioritise.Asaconsequenceofthecontrolover

funding,anumberofinitiativesproposedbyChinaarenotappreciatedbyKenyans

whodonotseeanyvalueattached.Inotherwords,whileKenyanshavebeenactive

in raising concerns throughdomestic channels (at timesechoedby international

organisations), they have not, broadly speaking, been active in suggesting the

creationofinternationalplatformstodiscussissuesconcerningtheirinvolvement

with the Chinese. Not, at least, in the sameway the Chinese do, via tailor-made

forums.Atthesametime,asfieldworkshowed,thesepeople-to-peopleinteractions,

albeitcontrolled,areanefforttofosterdialogue,aninitiativethat,ifitwerenotfor

thefundsoftheChinesegovernment,wouldnoteasilytakeshape.

ThefirstofficiallyrecognisedChina-AfricaPeople’sForumwasheldinNairobiin

2011.This, compared topreviousones,wasmore importantas it symbolisedan

officialacknowledgement,atthehigh-levelsinChinaandAfricancountries,ofthe

importanceofthe‘peoples’totherelationships,notonlyinspecificsectors,butasa

whole.Many,inAfricaandtheWesthadseenthenon-participationofcivilsociety

toSino-Africanengagementsasafrighteningaspectoftherelationship,potentially

impactingupondecades-longdemocratisationefforts.Importantly,interviewswith

majorcivilsocietyrepresentativesinvolvedinthefirstpeoples’forumspointedout

thattherequeststoruntheseforumsalwayscamefromChina.Therewas,inother

words,limitedeffortontheAfricanside,topro-activelyengagewithChina362.This

didnotmeanthatsocialuneasiness363towardthepresenceofChinawaslackingor

thatitwasnotdemonstratedacrossthecontinent.Butratherthatitdidnotmanifest

itselfinanorganisedformneithernationallyorcontinentally.Littleisknownabout

these meetings and the role they play for governmental agenda setting and

implementation activities, if any. These events seem to bemore relevant at the

360ImplementationofFOCAC2009.361InterviewwithanofficerattheEmbassyofthePRC,CultureDepartment,Nairobi,2013-10-08.362InterviewwithmajorrepresentativeofCSOsinKenya.363Ireferto‘socialuneasiness’becausetheseforumswereinitiallycreatedtorespondtoexistingdiscontent.

100

symboliclevelthanasplatformsofrealgovernance.Theeventsarealsogenerally

aimedataddressingissuesatthecontinentallevel,whichmaybeaproblemgiven

theextremediversityofcontextsandlevelsofdevelopment.Forinstance,oneofthe

latestadditiontothe listofpeople’s forumswas, in2014,theChina-AfricaTrade

UnionsHighLevelSymposium,which‘wasattendedbyrepresentativesandexperts

ofChineseandAfricantradeunions,enterprises,governmentsaswellastheUN’s

InternationalLabourOrganisation,inanattempttobrainstorm,shareexperiences,

andfindthebestimplementationplan’364.Whilelabourrelations,inparticularthe

treatmentofworkersbyChinesecompaniesinAfrica,wasoneoftheearliest(since

the beginning of the 2000s)major points of friction between China and African

countries,theissuehadnotbenefitedfromdirecthigh-levelattention.Softpower

instrumentshavebeenincreasinglyusedtosoftennegativesentiments,also–and

maybeforemost–inrelationtolabourissues,butnomeetingshadbeenconvened

under the China-Africa forums’ heading. Labour issues are explored in the next

chapter and show, among other aspects, the disconnect between the priorities

identifiedbythepeopleandthoseidentifiedbyhigh-politics.

AsfarasitconcernsKenya,duringthefirstofficialChina-AfricaPeople’sForum,

heldinNairobi,inAugust2011,attendedbygovernmentalactorsasmuchasnon-

governmentalones,KalonzoMusyoka,thenVice-PresidentoftheRepublicofKenya,

emphasisedthe importancethataccountabilityandtransparencyhavegainedfor

Kenyans.Hisopeningspeech365showedadualityofdiscoursesused:ontheoneside,

the formal language that characterises Sino-African discourses has been used,

stressingthefactthat“ChinaisatruefriendofAfrica”,Kenyaisadoptingthe“very

principledpositiontosupporttheOneChinaPolicy”andfinallyremarkingthatthe

“forum will make a significant contribution to a true and mutually beneficial

friendshipbetweenChinaandAfrica”.However,ontheotherside,H.E.Musyokaalso

talkedoftheKenyan“governmentcommitmenttoensurehealthyandvibrantcivil

societythatisabletomobilisecitizens’participationinallaspectsofdevelopment”,

acommitmentthatisbasedonKenya’srecognitionof“civilsocietyaspartnersin

national development, partner to the delivery of the [Millennium Development

Goals]MDGs andKenya’s Vision 2030”. He continued by underlying that a legal

framework regulates this commitment, and that Kenya’s constitution “grants

364All-ChinaFederationofTradeUnions,‘China-AfricaTradeUnionsHighLevelSeminar’,tr.MaddalenaProcopio,TheChinaAfricaProject,27May2014.365S.K.Musyoka,SpeechincludedintheReportonChina-KenyaNGOsForum,Draft,Rapporteur’sReport,KenyaNGOsCoordinationBoard,Nairobi,August2011.

101

elaborate civil liberties and freedoms that provide civil society with unique

opportunities tomake contributions to national development”. He concluded by

stating that it is “imperative that in theexerciseand theenjoymentof individual

rightsandfreedomswealsorecogniseandrespectotherpeople’sfreedoms.Civil

libertiesdonotprecludeusfromourresponsibilitytoobserveotherlawsaswellas

remainaccountabletoeachother”.

This supports not only the idea of Kenya being aware of the availability of

differentoptionsbutalsoof its renewedconfidence inexpressingviews thatare

oftendeemedcontrastingintheliteratureandbythemedia,namelythecoexistence

ofsocio-politicalandeconomicrightsandfreedomswiththeChina-ledfastpaced

developmentofeconomicrelations.InthewordsofformerKenyanPrimeMinister

Odinga,pronouncedrightaftertheFifthFOCACheldinBeijingin2012,“Chinaisnot

exploitingAfricabutassistingAfrica'stransformation,whichiscreatingawin-win

situation andwill not block cooperation betweenAfrica and other countries”366.

Denise Kodhe, Head of the pan-African think tank Institute for Democracy and

Leadership in Africa suggests that it’s not amatter of "replicat[ing] the Chinese

modelaswholeinAfrica”,buttoadoptitsmethodto“learnfromEurope,Japanand

Malaysiaandpicklessonsthataregoodandareapplicableinthecontinent"367.

3.4.2 Aid,trade,investmentTheengagementofKenyawithChinainaid,tradeandinvestment isscattered

across sectors: infrastructure, healthcare, education, trade, tourism, culture and

more. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

identifiessixmainreasonsforinvestorstoconsiderKenya368,andinterviewswith

the Chinese Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office as well as Chinese

enterprisesconfirmthatthesearethemainadvantagesidentifiedforinvestingin

thecountry,sometimesvis-à-visothersintheregion:1)Diversifiedandestablished

economy with strong business sector; 2) Opportunities in agriculture and

horticulture,tourism,mining,powergeneration,InformationandCommunications

Technologies(ICTs),manufacturingandacquisitionofstate-ownedenterprises;3)

EconomiccentreoftheEastAfricaCommunitycomprising138millionpeopleanda

GDPofUS$138million;4)Internationalairandseagatewaytotheregion;5)Strong

366‘Africa-Chinacooperationnotexclusivebutwin-win,saysKenya'sPM’,EmbassyofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofKenyaviaXinhua,23July2012.367‘ChinapoliticalsystemofferslessonsforAfrica’,XinhuaviaChinaDaily,24April2013.368UNCTAD,2012,op.cit.,p.iii.

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reformgainstoencourageinvestment:coherentvisionforeconomicdevelopment,

regularmeetingsbetweengovernmentleadersandinvestors,newframeworkfor

public-privatepartnerships,reinforcedinvestmentauthority;6)Newconstitution

withgreaterseparationofpowerstomaintainbroad-basedpoliticalstability.

Therearedifferences,however,inhowaid,tradeandinvestmentactivitiesare

conceivedandcarriedoutbyKenyansandbyexternalactors.Withinthiscontext,a

clarificationisdueconcerningtheunderstandinganddefinitionofdevelopmentby

ChinaandtheWest.ForChina,developmentisbaseduponeconomicdriversandthe

belief that economic rights come before other social and political rights. This

translates in great financial commitments, characterised by a relatively scant

attentiontoissuessuchastheenvironment,labourrights,transparencyandsoforth.

On the other hand, Western ideas of development have become increasingly

characterised by less copious financial commitments, while placing particular

emphasis on ‘good’ governance, for long seen as a pre-requisite to economic

development.Inthiscontext,“theloansthatChinaisadvancingtoKenyaaremore

expensivethanthosetheWesthasbeengiving.Moreover‘theWesthasbeengiving

grantsfordevelopmentofvarioussectorsandthisisnotreplaceablewiththeloans

fromChina’”369.

WhileFOCACcommitmentsboastahighnumberofprojectsbeingundertaken

throughoutAfrica,breakingdownthisblockofinformationwasacomplexchallenge.

Notonlyitishardtoretrieveinformationontheactorsinvolvedandtheissuesat

stakebut alsoon theprocessesofnegotiation.A thorough studyofChina-Kenya

relations was published in 2008 by the Centre for Strategic and International

Studies. The study was conducted for the Centre by UNDP advisor to Kenya’s

Ministry of Planning andNational Development to examine the perceptions and

impactofChina'sengagementinKenya.ThereportarguesthattheChinese-Kenyan

relationshiphas,by-and-large,beenmutuallybeneficialcontrarytoawidespread

belief that “often depicts African economies under threat ofmalevolent Chinese

investmentstrategiesandafloodofcheapmanufacturedgoods”370.Chegeargues

that“Kenya’scompetenttechnocraticcadreandbusinesssectorhavethusfarbeen

abletomanagetherelationshiptoKenya’sbenefit”371.Hebringstolight“thepower

ofagency,demonstratingthatAfricanstatesareindeedcapableofmakingchoices

369Ibid.370Chege,op.cit.371Ibid.

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thatbenefitthemintheintensifiedphaseoftradeandinvestmentincooperation

withChina”372.Whilethe‘flooding’ofcheapmanufacturedgoodsfromChinahasnot

exemptedKenya(seeChapter4),thisthesisrevealsthatKenyanactorshaveindeed

beencapableofmakingchoices.

Aid

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) the fact that since

2008/2009Kenyahasbeenexperiencinganincreaseinaidassistance,whichhad

previouslybeen inconsistent, is “not just a result of resumptionof support from

existingpartners,butalsoareflectionof increasingsupport fromnon-traditional

sourcesofaid,suchasChina,andotheremergingeconomies”373.

Aclarificationisdueconcerningtheconceptofaid/assistance.The“absenceof

commondefinitionsandconsistentdatahasledmanyanalyststodraw[…]‘apples-

to-dragonfruits’comparisonsbetweenWesternandnon-Western‘aid’”374.Dreher

et.al.differentiatebetweenOverseasDevelopmentAssistance(ODA),i.e.‘aid’inthe

strictestsenseoftheterm,whichisgenerally“moreconcessionalthanothertypes

ofofficialfinancing”,thusexpectedtobeusedto“buypolitical influenceabroad”,

andOtherOfficialFlows(OOF)whichare“lessconcessionalformsofofficialsupport

[…]providedoncloser-to-market-terms”andthusexpectedto“primarilyadvance

theeconomic interestsof state sponsors”375.Theyclaim that the first type isnot

“predominantlymotivatedbynaturalresourceacquisitioninterests.NordoesChina

seemtotakeintoaccounttheinstitutionalqualityorregimetypeofpotentialaid

recipientcountrieswhenallocatingitsODAbudget”376thussupportingtheChinese

governmentclaimthat itdoesnot interfere inothernations’ internalaffairs.The

authorscontinuebystating that the findingssuggest that “Chineseaidallocation

practicesarenottoodissimilarfromthoseofWesterndonors”377.Bycontrast,they

pointout thatOOFsareassociatedwithnatural resource interests and that they

should not be associatedwith ‘aid’. Due to the lack of transparency from China

concerning the release of data about its overseas development activities, any

comparisonandaccountofKenya’sreceiptofassistancewillhavetobetakenwith

372Ibid.,p.19.373WorldHealthOrganisation,CountryCooperationStrategyataglance,WorldHealthOrganisation,Geneva,2014,p.1.374A.Dreheretal.,‘ApplesandDragonFruits:TheDeterminantsofAidandOtherFormsofStateFinancingfromChinatoAfrica’,Workingpaperno.15,AidData,2015,p.6.375Ibid.376Ibid.,p.19.377Ibid.

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caution,andwith theawareness that the inferencesdrawnmaybeonlypartially

correct.

Chege reminds that “Kenya is not as aid-dependent as most of its African

neighbours, the government is still determined to increase both the volume of

concessionaldevelopmentaidanditsabsorptivecapacityforit,tosupplementlocal

investment,andFDI”378.However,assistanceremainssignificant insomesectors,

healthcarebeingone,withdevelopmentpartnersfundingasubstantialproportion

of resources for activities such as HIV/AIDS, education, and water supply379 . A

number of mechanisms have been put in place since the early 2000s for the

coordination of assistance efforts, following, in particular, the Rome and Paris

DeclarationsonaideffectivenessandtheAccraAgendaforAction(2008).Withthe

aimofenhancingKenyanownershipofaidcoordination,harmonisingKenyanand

donors’ aid delivery procedures, eliminating duplication and enhancing cost

effectiveness,in2004theHarmonization,AlignmentandCoordinationGroup(HAC)

was established under UNDP management, soon reaching a membership of 17

donors.OneofthemajorinitiativesofthegroupwasthecreationoftheKenyaJoint

Assistance Strategy 2007-2012, aimed at replacing individual donor assistance

strategies380.

To date China, togetherwith “emerging non-OECD bilateral partners, vertical

funds, foundations, and international NGOs” is working independently of this

framework381.AccordingtoKing,“Chinaisnotateasewiththediscourseofaid,or

ofbeingseenasamemberofthedonorclub;itmuchpreferstopresentitselfasthe

largest developing country helping the continent with the largest number of

developing countries, to the best of its ability, in South–South cooperation. It is,

therefore,hesitantaboutbeingdrawnintodonorcoordinationandharmonisation

activities”382.However,KingalsopointsoutthatChina’s“shiftfrom‘cooperation’to

‘aid’reflectsasenseofmovingfrombeing‘firstamongequals’inthenon-aligned

states and in the earlier period of opening up, to being now an emergent

378Chege,op.cit.p.29379GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,KenyaJointAssistanceStrategy2007-2012,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,Nairobi,2007,p.16.380F.Mwega,‘ACaseStudyofAidEffectivenessinKenya:VolatilityandFragmentationofForeignAid,withaFocusonHealth’,TheBrookingsGlobalEconomyandDevelopment,WorkingPaperno.8,January,2009,p.24.381GovernmentofKenya,op.cit.2007(a),p.17;InterviewwithanexecutiveatKenyaVision2030,SocialPillarDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-06.382K.King,‘China’scooperationineducationandtrainingwithKenya:Adifferentmodel?’,InternationalJournalofEducationalDevelopment,vol.30,no.5,September,2010,pp.488-496.p.490.

105

superpower”383.ThisisalsolinkedtoChina’sclaimstobeprovidingassistancein

responsemode as if the type andmodalitywere to be largely decided upon by

recipient countries. Interviewees in Kenya suggested onmultiple occasions that

China’semphasisontheprovisionofassistanceinresponsemodeisonlyapartial

truth384.AsDreheret.al.suggestintheirrecentpiece,Chinahasdemonstratedthat

itusesassistanceaccordingtotwomainobjectives:commercialandpolitical,both

respondingtospecificChineseneeds.

Infrastructure is the sector to which China allocates the largest share of

assistance385,bothconcessional loansandgrantaid,andat thesame time, ithas

been an area of limited intervention by traditional partners in Kenya. Due to

transparencyshortcomingsconcerningChina’s–andKenya’s–releaseofdata,itis

hard to estimate the exact share or amount of aid allocated to different sectors

disbursedannuallyandevenlesshowmuchofthatisdestinedtoKenya.In2009it

wasestimatedthatChina“probablydisbursedaidofabout$3.1billion(gross),with

Africa receiving 45.7 percent or about $1.4 billion”386. In 2014 China released a

WhitePaperonaidandstatedthatbetween2010-2012$14.41billionofaidwas

disbursedgloballyofwhichAfricareceived51,8%387.

Withinthisscenario,ChegeremindsthatChinahasofferedvariousdevelopment

aid to Kenya including package deals projects and humanitarian aid 388 . Most

recently, during the famine that struck the largerHorn of Africa, China donated

foodstuff worth KES2 billion to Kenya 389 . According to Patroba “Chinese

developmentaid toKenyasupports infrastructuredevelopment; improvementof

education standards, both academic and technical; human relief and tariff

exemptions. Other areas of assistance include the modernisation of power

distribution;ruralelectrification,water;renovationofsportsfacilities;provisionof

anti-malariadrugs;constructionofamalariaresearchcentreandthemodernisation

ofinternationalairportsinKenya390.”391

383K.King,China’sAidandSoftPowerinAfrica:TheCaseoftheEducationandTraining,Boydell&Brewer,Rochester,2013.p.7.384InterviewswithstakeholdersnegotiatingaidfromChina.385D.Brautigam,‘U.S.andChineseeffortsinAfricainGlobalHealthandForeignAid:Objectives,ImpactandPotentialConflictsofInterest’,inCentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,China’sEmergingGlobalHealthandForeignEngagementinAfrica,CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Washington,2011,p.3.386Ibid.387GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,China’sForeignAid,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,Beijing,2014.388Chege,op.cit.,pp.29-31.389P.Magara,‘Yes,thankChinaforfoodaid,butlearnfromher’,TheStandardOnline,12September2011.390Onjala,op.cit.391Patroba,op.cit.,p.12.

106

China’saidscenarioalsoincludeswhatasourceattheEconomicandCommercial

CounsellorofthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)toKenyadefines“privatisation

ofaid”.MoreaccuratelythistypeofassistancecomesintheformofCorporateSocial

Responsibility(CSR)projectscarriedoutbyChinesecompanies–oftenandmostly

state-ownedenterprises–withpartialfinancialsupportfromtheChinesestate392.

For instance, the projects undertaken by state-owned infrastructure companies

havetendedtobesmallinnatureandrangefromtheconstructionofschools,like

theoneinMathareSlum,justoffThikaHighway393,totheprovisionofhumanitarian

assistance such as food during the 2008 famine in northern Kenya 394 . Other

companies like pharmaceutical Beijing Holley-Cotec and telecommunications

HuaweihaveengagedinCSRprojectsinKenyainvestingconsiderableamounts.For

instance,Holley-Cotecin2006providedKsh3.5millionworthofscholarshipstothe

CollegeofHealthSciences,UniversityofNairobi.Thiswasthefirstdonationdoneby

thecompanyoutsideChina,whichpledgedtocontinuethedonationforatleasta

periodoffiveyears395.

Trade

ThetradebalancebetweenKenyaandChinain2013wassignificantlyskewed

towardsChinawithKenyaimporting$3.22billionfromChina,equivalentto20%of

its total imports but only exporting $50.6 million, equal to 0.97% of its total

exports396.ThemainoriginofimportedproductsisAsian,takingupmorethan50%

(India25%,China20%,Japan5.6%)whilethemainexportdestinationforKenyais

Africa,whereitexports$2.17billion,almost40%ofitstotalexports,withtheEast

African region receivingmore than 30%of Kenya’s total exports397. The second

exportdestinationforKenyaisEurope,whereitexports$1.7billion, followedby

Asia,$850millionandNorthAmerica,$464million398.

Between1980and1993theimbalancebetweenthetwocountrieswasmuchless

significant.Itwasafter1995thatimportsfromChinastartedskyrocketing.In1995

392Interviews.393There-habilitationoftheschoolwasawaytogive‘somethingback’toacommunitywhoselifehadbeendisruptedbythedevelopmentofThikaHighway.ItwasmeanttobeagesturetoimprovetheimageoftheChinese.However,there-habprojectwasverylimitedanditdidnotseemtohaveaparticularlypositiveimpactonlocals–whowereexpectingamorecomprehensivetypeofre-habilitation(suchasthecreationofpublictoilets)ratherthanthemereprovisionofbrickwallstotheschool.394InterviewswithChinesecompaniesinvolved.395UniversityofNairobi,‘WorldClassExcellence:OurInspiration,UoNReceivesScholarships’,VarsityFocus,UniversityofNairobi,December2006,pp.21-22.396A.J.G.SimoesandC.A.Hidalgo,‘KenyaCountryProfile’,TheObservatoryofEconomicComplexity[website],<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ken/>.397Ibid.398Ibid.

107

“importsfromChinaamountedtofive-foldtheir1989value”399.AccordingtoChege

therapidincreaseinKenya’simportsfromChina(orelsewhere)inthesecondhalf

of the 1990s “did not originate from rising incomes in Kenya” 400 . It was the

consequenceofaconfluenceofKenya’sdomesticeconomicliberalizationin1994,

supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and China’s

industrialmodernization.Thefirst“madeitpossibleforKenyanfirmsandcitizens

to purchase foreign currency to import goods at lower real prices than before

because the reform program had also reduced external tariffs, substantially”,

whereas the second provided “products that Kenyans (and Kenyan industries)

desiredatmorecompetitivepricesthanothersuppliers, includingthosebasedin

Kenya”401.Kenya’simportsfromChinastarteddiversifyingand“forthefirsttime,

KenyanfirmsandindividualtradersbegantravellingtoDubaiandtheneastwardto

Hong Kong andmainland China to obtain products directly rather than through

intermediariesliketheoldstatetradingcorporations”402.Currently,Kenyaimports

fromChinamachines(23%ofallimportsfromChina)suchastelephones,electric

tools, batteries, computers; textiles (19%); metals (13%); plastics and rubbers

(9.1%); transportation (6.4%), such as motorcycles, vehicle parts etc.: chemical

products(5.7%)suchasdrugs403.

TwoofthemostimportantaspectsoftradebetweenKenyaandChinaare:1)the

influx of counterfeit products since themid-1990s and themeasures adopted to

contrast the phenomenon; 2) the perceived negative impact that the arrival of

Chinesegoodshascausednotonlyamongmanufacturersbutalsowholesalersand

retailers.TheseissuesareexploredinChapter4.

FDI

Betweenthelate1990sandmid-2000s,mostoftheinvestmentthatdrovethe

economic growth attributed to Kibaki’s economic reform programme was

domestic404.Chegesuggeststhat“foreigndirect investment(FDI) inflows, though

growing exponentially by 2007, were modest in comparison to local capital

formation”405.StatisticsarenotreadilyavailableasKenyastartedcompilingsurveys

399Chege,op.cit.,p.24.400Ibid.,p.25.401Ibid.402Ibid.403SimoesandHidalgo,op.cit.404Chege,op.cit.,p.26.405Ibid.

108

providingcapitalflowsinformationonlyinthelate2000s,startingwithareference

periodof2007-2008.Since2013theForeignInvestmentSurveyhasbeencompiled

annually.

In2012,“countrieswithintheEUaccountedforthebulkofFDIinflowsfollowed

bycountriesfromtheFarEastcontributing36.0percentand31.9percentofthe

totalFDIinflows”406.In2013,however,“therewasareverseinthetrendwithFar

EastcountriescontributingthebulkoftheflowsfollowedbyEUwithashareof38.6

per cent and 16.6 per cent of the total FDI inflows, respectively” 407 . This was

presumablyalsolinkedtoproblemssuchasthefinancialcrisisinEuropeandthe

climateof instability inKenyaaftertheterroristattackattheWestgateShopping

MallinNairobiwheremorethana150peopledied.

The Kenya Investment Authority (KenInvest) reports that there is “no

domination of Foreign Direct Investment [in Kenya] from the Chinese”. The

authority says that it is pursuing amendments to existing legislation thatwould

allow for greater vetting of investors in the country while protecting certain

industriesfromforeigners.KenInvestManagingDirectorstatesthat:“throughthe

reviews we are proposing to develop a negative list that will preclude some

investmentareasforlocalinvestorsonly”408.InChapter4,thelinkbetweensmall

traders and investors in tackled shedding light on how the Kenya Investment

Authority has acknowledged that the arrival of China has exacerbated the

inadequacyoftheexistingsystemofgovernancetosafeguardingKenyaninterests.

3.4.3 ThesectorsofanalysisAsmentionedinChapter2,domesticpreferencesarenotimportantbecausethey

are objective facts, but because they have socialmeanings attributed by specific

actorstospecificcircumstances409.Asaconsequence,the‘relevance’ofasector,sub-

sector,issue-areaissuchbecauseitisperceivedsobyactorsataspecificpointin

time. The idea to develop a sectoral analysis is well situated within a body of

literature that recognises that “actual modern states encompass dozens of

institutionally distinct policy sectors with highly diverse organisational

architectures”410andthusaggregatingpatternsofinstitutionsandpracticesisnot

406KenyaNationalBureauofStatistics,ForeignInvestmentSurvey2015,KenyaNationalBureauofStatistics,Nairobi,2015,p.16.407Ibid.408M.Muthoki,‘EconomictieswithAfricatopagendaofChina’snewpresident’,AfricaReview,24March2013.409Wendt,1999,op.cit.410Sellers,op.cit.,p.129.

109

helpful to explain the balance of power and interaction between domestic and

international stakeholders. By disaggregating the state and social structures in

definedpolicyareas,notonlyverticaldiversity isemphasisedbutalsohorizontal

heterogeneity emerges. Practices of governance have changed in Kenya as a

consequence of democratic reformand constitutional changes (devolution,more

openness towards associational life, etc.), and externally, as a result of political

tensions(theKibakiera,‘LookEast’policy,crownedbytheICCtrials),givingriseto

shifting patterns of power sharing between state and society. Bureaucratic

apparatusesaredifferentintermsofobjectives,autonomyandthescopeofpolicy

tools,andasconsequencetheircapacitytorespondtoforeign-triggeredpressures.

Focusing on sectors also serves the purpose of identifying differences for state-

societyrelationsacrosssectoralandnationalinstitutions411.

Therelevanceofthesector,forKenya,ismeasuredbasedonpolicyframeworks,

inparticularKenyaVision2030.Theseprovidethenationalcontextwithinwhich

interestsareprioritised.However,inanattempttostudy‘real’governance,thesub-

sectorschosentobestudieddonotonlyrespondtonationalbutalsoissue-specific

interests. Similarly, they do reflect not only state preferences, but also the

preferencesofotherstakeholderssuchascivilsocietygroupsandtheprivatesector.

Hencetheimportanceofalayeredinterestsapproach,asconceptualisedinChapter

2.

Althoughinfrastructurewasnotselectedasastand-alonesector,aspectslinked

toitareunpackedthroughthethreechosensectors.InChapter4(Trade),aspects

associatedwiththedevelopmentofinfrastructurearelookedatfromalabourrights

perspective through the analysis of the interaction between Kenyan domestic

institutions (tradeunions, theMinistryofLabourand the Judiciary)andChinese

companies. In Chapter 5 (Healthcare) it is looked at from the perspective of

loans/grants’negotiationandmanagementfortheconstructionofinfrastructurefor

health,namelyhospitalsandtheMalariaCentre.Finally,inChapter6(Education)it

is touched upon from the perspective of the education and training of human

resourcesmainlyinthecontextofindustrialproductiondevelopment.

Thecaseswerenotidentifiedonlyasaconsequenceoftheirrelevanceinpolicy

documents/forstakeholders.Somecasesweredeemedimportantbytheresearcher,

mostly because theKenyan context/dynamics didnot seem to fit general China-

411Ibid.,p.136.

110

Africapatterns.Itwasthusdeemedinterestingtorevealif,inreality,Kenyadidnot

fit,andifso,whyandhow.

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CHAPTER4

Kenya-Chinatradepractices:labourissuesand‘unfair’

competition

4.1 ThecontextTrade-relatedproblemstriggeredbytheChineseincreased/expandedactivities

in Africa have been among the most discussed topics on China-Africa relations.

Perceptions of Chinese companies exploiting the local work force and Chinese

entrepreneurs stealing business to locals have fuelled debates in the media,

academiaaswellasamongstakeholderssometimesleadingtoprotestsandkillings

incountriesasdifferentasZambia,Namibia412,Lesotho413,Kenya414andmore.In

turn, the rhetoric of solidarity, mutual benefit, friendship that the Chinese

governmenthasgraduallystartedpromotingfromthe‘bottom’,throughpeople-to-

people engagements and soft power instruments, has been seen as a way to

counterbalance the negative perception that has grown in African contexts,

especiallyinrelationtolabour-relatedandtrade-relatedissues.Thesere-actionsto

theChinesepresencehaveledtogeneralisationsconcerningtheinabilityofAfrican

statestosafeguardtheirdomesticspaceandtheirpeople’sinterestsintherelations

with the Chinese. As Giese points out, especially in media reports “it is power

differentials, competition, tension and conflict between disempowered African

localsand(atleasteconomically)powerfulChinese–thelatterasexoticizedasalien

“others”–thatareoftenthefocusofattention”415.

Studieshavemostlyfocusedoncapturingthe‘perceptions’ofAfricans416,rather

thanunderstanding theirmotivationsandmodalitiesofaction tosafeguard their

interestsintherelationswiththeChinese.ItisundeniablethatthearrivalofChinese

companiesandtheentranceofChineseproductsinKenya,likeinmostotherAfrican

countries,hasbeenpro-activelycarriedoutbyChineseactors–atleastinthefirst

phases – who were encouraged by the Chinese Go Out policy to invest abroad.

412A.YawBaahandH.Jaucheds.,ChineseInvestmentsinAfrica:ALabourPerspective,AfricanLabourResearchNetwork,May2009.413‘Lesotho:Anti-Chineseresentmentflares’,IRIN,24January2008.414Interviews.415K.Giese,‘Perceptions,PracticesandAdaptations:UnderstandingChinese–AfricanInteractionsinAfrica’,JournalofCurrentChineseAffairs,vol.43,no.1,2014,p.3.416Giese,2014.

112

However, this should not be automatically associated with an unwillingness or

inabilityontheKenyanside,tonegotiatetherelationstoprotecttheirinterests.

TheaimofthechapteristousetradetrendsasastartingpointtoanalyseKenyan

motivationsandmodalitiesinnegotiatingthe,relativelynew,entranceofChinese

investors, entrepreneurs and products. The analysis of this process implies

understanding the meaning that Chinese goods/activities have taken on for

differentKenyanstakeholders(inparticular,inrelationstotheirinterests)andthe

rationale behind the actions taken. In Kenya, the presence of China in trade is

distributed along the socio-economic ladder, ranging from mega-infrastructural

projects brokered by the executive, to middle-sized businesses importing from

China forwholesale distribution, to small shops retailing Chinese products. As a

consequence,theinterestsatstakearelikelytovaryconsiderablywithinthecountry,

givingrisetocompetitionamongnationalactorsevenbeforethatwiththeChinese.

Thelayered-interestsapproachconceptualisedinChapter2thenbecomesacrucial

tooltounpacktherelations.

Thischapterfocusesonrevealingtheprocessesofinteractionbetweenstateand

non-stateactorswhenitcomestonegotiatingandsafeguardingKenyaninterestsin

thecontextofcommercialengagementswiththeChinese.Theanalysislooksatthe

environmentwithinwhichtheserelationalprocessesunfoldsotocontextualisethe

arrivaloftheChinesebetter.Comparedtothenexttwochapters,thisoneisharder

tofitinaspecificsectoralbox.Thethreecasesselectedrepresentthemostcommon

opportunitiesandchallengesKenyanactorsarefacinginthecommercialengagement

withChina,whereChinaisseenasaforcehinderingdevelopmentbutalsoapartner

in development. The cases concern: labour disputes negotiated between Kenyan

trade unions and Chinese companies; the identification of gaps in the system

protectingKenyanintellectualpropertyrights,increasinglydamagedbytheimport

ofcounterfeititemsmadeinChina;thenegotiationofcompetinginterestsbetween

Kenyanwholesalersandretailersinrelationtotheirrespectiveengagementswith

China,includingtheresolutionoftheprotestthatoccurredinAugust2012against

ChinesesmallshopownersinNairobi.

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4.1.1 China-Africalabourissuesand‘unfair’competition Reactions to Chinese trade and investment activities in Africa have been

diversifiedwithsomegroupshighlyvaluingthenew(er)setofactorswhileothers

stronglyopposingthem.StudiesonthesereactionshavefocusedonhowChinese

companieshaveexploitedthelocal(African)labourforceandhowtheyhavetended

toemployChineseworkersvis-à-vislocalones417.Similarly,inthecaseoftradeof

fast-movinggoods,thestudieshavefocusedonhowtheentryofChineseproducts

innational/localcontextshascausedeconomicdamagetolocalmanufacturersand

traders.

However, these specific issues have onlymarginally been tackled on broader

official platforms. For instance, the China-Africa Trade Unions High-Level

Symposiumwasheldforthefirsttimein2014.ItwasorganisedbytheAll-China

FederationofTradeUnionswhoseGeneralSecretarycommented:“thisSeminaris

anewattemptforChinesetradeunionstoconformtothenewrequirementsand

expectationsbyAfricantradeunions,andtoservetheChineseenterprises“going

out” strategy. It is also about Chinese and African trade unions enriching the

cooperationcontentandinnovatingtheformsofcooperationtopromotetheoverall

friendly relations between China and Africa”418 . The officialization of the trade

unions’engagementwasanadjustmenttofillagapconcerninglabourissues.

Inthecaseoftradeoffast-movinggoods,whichhavegivenrisetodebatesabout

unfaircompetitionbytheChinese,institutionalisedmeetingshavemostlyrevolved

around the economic dimension of these relations rather than the social

consequences associated with them or the strategies of interaction devised by

Africanactors.Asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,theconsciouscreation,bythe

Chinesegovernment,ofpeople-to-peopleeventshasbeenconsequential,toagreat

extent, to the discontent that Chinese trade practices have caused in Africa. As

previouslypointedout,theseeventsarenotconceivedtofindpathwaystoimprove

‘actual’ dynamics of engagement but are rather, largely, public relations

platforms419.

417YawBaahandJaucheds.,op.cit.418All-ChinaFederationofTradeUnions,op.cit.419ThisisnottoodissimilarfromthepracticesoftheACFTUwithinChina,wheretheFederationhasnotmanagedtosuccessfullytacklethechallengesthatrapideconomicreformshaveraised(thankstoProf.HowellandDr.LargeforadvisingmetoconsiderthedomesticandinternationalsimilariesofACFTU’spractices).

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4.1.2 Kenya-ChinarelationsInKenyaVision2030’sfirstfive-yearplan,“thetradesectorwasidentifiedasone

ofthekeyenginesoftheeconomyduetoitsimmensecontributiontoKenya’sGDP

andemploymentcreationthroughtrade(exportsandimports)andinvestments”420.

ChinaisseenasakeypartnerintheachievementofKenyaVision2030,inparticular

for the development of enablers such as infrastructure, mainly roads, railways,

ports421.Asshowedinthepreviouschapter,inthepasttenyearsChinahasinvested

inKenyaboth in termsofFDIandtrade flow.However,whileChinese initiatives

haveprovidedopportunities,theyhavealsocreatedchallengesforKenyanstateand

non-state actors to exercise or strengthen control over the modalities and

motivations of engagement. The arrival of China’s products and companies has

givenrisetoawidevarietyofinterestsontheKenyanside.Therefore,itiscrucialto

study the relations, by differentiating actors’ interests and the systems of

governancewithinwhichtheyarenegotiated.

4.2 Kenya’sresponsesTheinteractionbetweenKenyanstakeholdersinthecommercialsectorvis-à-vis

Chinamainlyrevolvesaroundre-actingtothenewplayerwithinanationalcontext

that is largely defined and legitimised by Kenyan stakeholders. In other words,

Kenyan formal and informal behaviour constitutes a system of governance

characterisedbysignificantinteractionswithforeignactors,andyetstrongdomestic

controlover such interactions.This is setagainstachangingeconomic landscape,

which has been trotting since the mid-1990s, and even more since the 2000s,

toward industrial development. The interaction between the Kenyan state and

society in the trade and investment sector mainly revolves around tackling

challengesraisedbytheentryofChinainKenyaunderdifferentforms.Sometimes

thesechallengesarepro-actively ‘caused’bysegmentsof theKenyanpopulation,

suchasKenyantradersimportingcounterfeititemsmadeinChina,thusenhancing

a national division of interests in relation to the external actor. In other cases,

however,thechallengesaremainly‘broughtin’byChineseactors.

The cases selected reveal that the engagement with China cannot easily be

labelledasbeneficialordetrimentalassuchconclusionslargelydependontheactor

420GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,KenyaVision2030,SecondMediumTermPlan2013-2017,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,Nairobi,2013,p.54.421InterviewwithanexecutiveatKenyaVision2030,Nairobi,2014-03-12.

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at stake. In this sector, more than in the next two, domestic variations in the

understandingofChina’sarrivalaresignificant.Chinaisthusseenasapartnerin

development but also a force hindering development. The instanceswhere such

tensionbetweenbenefitsanddisadvantageshavebeenidentifiedasmostsignificant

bythestakeholdersinvolvedare:

1. The problems encountered by Kenyan trade unions as well as employers’

federationsandstatestructuresinmakingChinesecompaniescomplywiththe

law. The study mainly looks at the interaction between trade unions, the

FederationofKenyaEmployers,theMinistryofLabouraswellasthejudiciary

(embodied,inthiscase,bytheIndustrialCourt).

2. ProductsmadeinChinaimportedtoKenyaandtheirquality.Inparticular,the

focus is on counterfeit goods and the measures adopted to curb the

phenomenon.Suchactionshavegivenbirthtoabrandnewlawandabrandnew

agencyinchargeofdealingwithcounterfeits.Theactorsinvolvedweremainly

the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Parliament, a number of state

institutionsthatlaterformedtheAnti-CounterfeitsAgencyandthePresidency.

3. The competition between Kenyan and Chinese small traders in Nairobi. The

study focuses on the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Kenya Export

PromotionCouncilandtheirinteractionwithlocalauthoritiessuchastheCity

CouncilandChinesestateandnon-stateactors.

Theaimofthechapteristorevealtheactorsinvolved,andstudytheirbehaviour,

iftheinteractionbetweenthemmatterstothesolutionoftheperceivedproblem,

and if so, how.As an interviewee reminded, referring to the challenge posed by

counterfeit goods inKenya, “our focus is on theprocess, not the source”422. The

processreferredtotheinteractionofanumberofKenyanstakeholderstomakesure

theentryanddiffusionofcounterfeitsarecurbedwhilethesourcereferredtoChina,

i.e.thecountryoforiginofmostcounterfeitgoodsenteringKenya(seesection2.2

below). Similarly, in the other cases, this chapter analyses different types of

interaction dynamics – processes – in relation to issues that are perceived

consequential to theChinese entry in the sector – source – focusing on how the

processisdealtwithratherthanontheoriginoftheproblem.Thebreakdownthat

422KenyaInstituteforPublicPolicyResearchandAnalysis(KIPPRA),KenyaEconomicReport2013:CreatinganEnablingEnvironmentforStimulatingInvestmentforCompetitiveandSustainableCounties,Nairobi,2013.

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followsshowshowKenyanactorsmoveacrossformalandinformalstructuresfor

the achievement of interests and negotiate tailor-made solutions, some more

generalisablethanothers.

4.2.1 Labourrelations/disputesThechoicetofocusonlabourrelationswasdictatedbytheneedtounderstandin

depth an aspect of Sino-African relations that is often under the spotlight: the

unlawfultreatmentofworkersbyChinesecompaniesinAfrica.Complaintsbylocals

arenoexceptioninKenyawhereChinesecompanies,especiallyintheinfrastructure

sector,havebecomepredominant inthepast5-10years. In linewiththegeneral

argumentofthethesis,theanalysisbelowfocusesonhowKenyanactorsdealwith

suchcomplaints–ratherthaninvestigatinghowChinesecompaniestreatworkers.

ItisimportanttoremindthatChinesecompaniesarenottheonlyonesbreaching

the law in Kenya – other domestic and foreign companies are found guilty too.

However,itisexplainedbelowinwhatareasChinesecompanieshavebeensingled

outbyKenyanstakeholdersandwhy.

TradeUnionisminKenya

Kenya’stradeunionismisofearlydate,andasputbytheCentralOrganisationof

TradeUnions,itis“achildofeconomic,socialandpoliticalstrives”423.Itoriginated

inthe1940soutofgrievancesconcerningthediscriminationofAfricansbasedon

unequal treatmentcompared to thewhites.By the late1940sanumberof trade

unionshadbeenformed,andin1952thefirstnationalfederationoftradeunions

wassetup:theKenyaFederationofRegisteredTradeUnions(KFRTU).Itwasnota

trade union itself but an umbrella organisation affiliated with the International

ConfederationofFreeTradeUnions.Inthesameyear,1952,oneofAfrica’sbloodiest

strugglesagainstcolonialruleunfoldedinKenya:theMauMaurebellion,alsocalled

Kenya Emergency. A number of trade unions’ leaders were arrested during the

Emergency and Tom Mboya, charismatic leader and key figure in the struggle

againstcolonialismaswellasintheformationoftheKenyanAfricaNationalUnion

(KANU),becametheGeneralSecretaryoftheKFRTU.Inthe1950sand1960s,trade

unionscontributedsignificantlytothefightforfreedomthusbecomingadvocates

423CentralOrganisationofTradeUnions(COTU)-Kenya,‘HistoricalBackgroundoftheTradeUnionMovementinKenya’,COTU[website],<http://www.cotu-kenya.org/site-page/historical-background>.

117

notonlyfortherightsofworkersbutalsoforthefightagainstcolonialismandthe

inequalitieslinkedtoit.In1955KFRTUchangeditsnametoKenyaFederationof

Labour,whichwasde-registeredin1965afterconflictstookplacewithasplinter

umbrellaunion,theKenyaAfricanWorkersCongress,leadingtothedeathofthree

tradeunionistsandahighnumberofinjured.Thesetwobodieswerereplacedby

theCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions(COTU),whichnowrepresents,through

theaffiliateunions,about1.5millionworkersinKenya424.Sincethen“tradeunions

havecontinued tobe strong institutions influencingvariousgovernmentpolicies

throughsocialdialogue.Asagentsofsocialjustice,COTU(K)continuedtochampion

fortherightsofnotonlyworkersbutKenyansasawhole,andthiswasevidentwhen

COTU(K) was part and parcel of the change process that ushered in the NARC

CoalitionGovernmentin2002”425.

StudiesontradeunionsinKenyadonotseemtobediffused,exceptionmadefor

those on the period of the 1950s-1960s, it is thus hard to ascertain the level of

independencetheyenjoyfromthegovernment,especiallytheMinistryofLabour.

What is evident is that the 2010Constitution provides formore space for trade

unions,inparticularSection41.2(c-d)statesthat:“Everyworkerhastherightto

form,joinorparticipateintheactivitiesandprogrammesofatradeunion,andtogo

on strike” and Section 41.5 “Every trade union, employers’ organisation and

employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining”, rights that were not

grantedbefore.Thischange“hasledtoafreshvibrancyintradeunionism”ascan

beobservedbytheunprecedentedseriesofstrikesandother formsof industrial

actionbydisgruntledemployeesindifferentsectorsthattookplacein2012426.

Contemporarydisputeswiththegovernmentmainlyrevolvearoundwagesand,

to a lesser extent, around the registrationof unionsornegotiations forContract

Bargaining Agreements (CBAs). The Central Organisation of TradeUnions is the

umbrella body under which most Kenyan trade unions are registered. As an

umbrella organisation, it does not negotiate directly with companies but rather

pivotsbetweentradeunionsononesideandthegovernmentontheother.

424KenyaYearbook2014,op.cit.,p.542.425COTU,op.cit. 426KenyaYearbook2014,op.cit.,p.542.

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Kenya-ChinaOfficialRelations

Kenya-Chinatradeunionshavehadlinkssincethe1990s427.Theserelationshave

mainly taken place between umbrella organisations, namely Kenya’s Central

Organisation of Trade Unions and China’s All-China Federation of Trade Unions

(ACFTU).AccordingtoaseniorofficeratCOTU,relationswiththeChinesestarted

increasingafter“2005whentheyweretryingtogetintoILOandwerelookingfor

votes”428.According toCOTU, in thatperiod formal relationsbetweenKenyaand

Chinaincreased,intheformof“high-levelmeetingsaimedatestablishingrelations”.

TheexchangesweremainlybetweenCOTUandACFTUandalthoughtheChinese

governmentstartedsponsoring,onayearlybasissince2005,representativesoffive

KenyantradeunionstogotoChinaforworkshopsandtraining,COTUsuggeststhat

“it isnot thetradeunionsthatgobutrathermembersof theBoardofCOTUand

general secretaries”429of tradeunions,whomerelycoveran institutional role. In

otherwords, the actual interaction does not take place between operative trade

unionists,butratheramonghigh-levelofficersandumbrellaorganisations.

AccordingtosourcesoncethedelegatesarriveinChina“there'soneortwodays

ofmeetingsonChinaandthenwevisitfactoriesandtheyshowhowtheyoperate.

Tousitisnotveryuseful,theyhaveacontrolledeconomy,collectivebargainingisa

state function. But they invite us and pay the costs.” 430 Despite Kenyan trade

unionismbeingmoresophisticatedthantheChinese,intervieweesreportthat“we

areinterestedinunderstandingthewaytheyoperate.Heretradeunionsarevery

powerful, theycreate investments inhotels.When theygo there theycomeback

with ideasandthentheinfo ispassedtothetradeunionleadership.Theyreport

how they do things back there, their laws, their collective bargaining and we

comparewhetherChinesecompaniesherearedoingthesame”431.

Beyond the visits to China, ACFTU has provided COTUwith tools to increase

capacity building of trade unions in Kenya. For instance, in 2003 the All-China

FederationofTradeUnionsdonatedabatchofcomputerstoCOTUtohelpthelatter

improve its capacity in information technology 432 . Secretary General of COTU,

FrancisAtwoli,statedthatthecomputersdonatedbyACFTUtogetherwithCOTU's

contributionoftwocomputerswouldbeusedtolaunchacomputertrainingcentre

427InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-01-27.428Ibid.429InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-09-17.430Ibid.431Ibid.432‘China,KenyaTradeUnionsEnhanceTies’,PeopleDaily,8January2003.

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attheTomMboyaLabourCollegeinKenya'swesterncityofKisumutotrainlabour

movementpersonnel.In2012ACFTUdonatedUSD100,000toCOTUtowardsCOTU

and its affiliated trade unions’ capacity building programme. The donation was

aimedatKenya’stoptradeunionleaders.Throughacapacitybuildingprogramme

at Tom Mboya Labour College, the leaders would equip themselves with “the

necessarytoolstoconfrontbothemployersandgovernmentwithfactsasfarasthe

plightofworkers is concerned”433.According to a seniorofficer atCOTU, “COTU

asked for the donation.We designed our own programmewith it, andwe train

leadersincapacitybuilding,governance”.Theprogramme,however,doesnotseem

tobedesigned to learnabout specific challengesposedbyChinesecompanies in

Kenya.ACOTUseniorofficersuggeststhatduetotheChineseinvolvementin‘anti-

social behaviour’ in Kenya, such as poaching, “donating is a way for them of

attracting looking East rather than West”. However, Kenyan trade unions are

generallynotawareof/engagedinCOTU-ACFTUrelations.Consequently,theyare

unable torelate thedonationsofcomputers (usedatCOTUheadquarters)or the

capacity building programme to China’s soft power strategy. This helps to

understand the gap between formal relations and actual relations: COTU is

perceivedtoadvancehighpoliticalinterestswhileoperativetradeunionspromote

theinterestsofworkers.

The focus of the following section is on analysing the interaction between an

operative trade union and COTU, Chinese firms and theMinistry of Labour. The

tradeunionselectedisinvolvedinprotectingworkersintheinfrastructuresector.

ItwillbereferredtoasTradeUnion(TU)434.Thedecisiontofocusondisputesinthe

infrastructuresectorisduetotheirrelevancenotonlytoKenya-Chinarelationsbut

also,morebroadly,toSino-Africanrelations.TheChinesepresence,especiallyinthe

buildingandconstructionsectorinKenyahassignificantlyincreasedinthepastten

yearsandhasbecomepredominantnotonlyinthedevelopmentofmega-projects

butalsoinrealestateandsmallerinfrastructuralprojects.Tradeunionsinbuilding

and construction are the ones whosemembers have beenmost affected by the

Chinesepresence435.

433InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-09-17.434TheethicallogicbehindthedecisiontoanonymisetheunioncanbefoundinChapter1,Methodologysection.435InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-09-17.

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LabourDisputesandNegotiations

AccordingtoTUandCOTU,themainproblemsfortradeunions(inbuildingand

construction)innegotiatingwithChinesecompaniesconcernthelackofwillingness

byChinesecompaniestorecogniselabourunionsandthelackofwillingnesstosign

Contract Bargaining Agreements (CBAs). This stance originates mainly from

differences in employment environments436in Kenya and China.While in Kenya

industrial relationsareoriented towardsworkers’ rightsandwelfare,unionsare

vocalandlegallyprotected,inChinatheyareafunctionofthestate,gearedtowards

productionanddelivery,attheexpenseoffreedomandrights.

Recognition

TU at the end of 2014 had 13 cases open with Chinese companies over

recognitionissues437.Therecognitionagreementstipulatedbetweenatradeunion

andacompanyiscompulsorybylawwhen50+1%employeesofthegivencompany

aremembersofaunion.Itiscommonhabitforlocalandforeigncompaniesworkingin

buildingandconstructiontoregisterwithoneofthethreeemployers’associations

present in Kenya. As a consequence, they automatically recognise the legal

environment,includingtheneedtonegotiateaCBAwithatradeunion,implyingin

turn recognition of the latter. Even when the companies do not register with

employers’associations,thereisawidespreadunderstandingbyforeigncompanies,

letalonelocalones,ofthenormsregulatingthesector:theroleoftheunionsisnot

questioned(theenforcementofCBAsislessstraightforwardandwillbeaddressedin

thefollowingsection).However,Chinesecompanieshavenotregisteredwithany

employers’ association, and “they say they are not bound by that recognition

agreement”438.Registeringwithanassociationisvoluntary,notcompulsory,butthe

Ministry of Labour advises both local and foreign contractors to join one as the

associations provide more protection. Employers’ associations (in building and

construction),arguethattheyare“chasingtheChinesecontractors”439toregister,

asthiscanonlymakeChinesecompaniesfeelincreasinglyintegratedintothelocal

environmentandawareofrulesandregulations,butinstead,“theyhavetheirown

associationof contractors inKenya”440, i.e. theKenya-ChinaEconomicandTrade

436SeealsoChapter6,TVETcase.437InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.438Ibid.439InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaAssociationofBuildingandEngineeringConsultants(KABCEC),Nairobi,2014-09-14.440InterviewwiththeRoadsandCivilEngineeringContractorsAssociation(RACECA),Nairobi,2014-09-16.

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Association. The Association was set up by major Chinese infrastructure State

Owned Enterprises in Kenya, following a request of the Chinese Economic and

Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the PRC. The aim of the association was to

guaranteemorecohesionamongChineselargeinfrastructurecompanies,especially

in their relations with Kenyan institutions, and to increase corporate social

responsibility,whichwasseen,inturn,asfundamentaltoimprovethereputationof

the companies within the local communities 441 . Large Chinese infrastructure

companiesare,reportedly,fiercelycompetingagainsteachotherinKenya,rather

thanagainstlocalorotherforeigncompanies.Asaconsequence,thecreationofan

association was also seen as a measure to boost cooperation and decrease

competitivenessamongthem.However,seniorofficersfromthecompaniessuggest

thatamalgamationistough,bothinternallyamongthecompanies,andexternally

withKenyanauthoritiesandinstitutions442.TheAssociationiswhollyindependent

ofKenyaninstitutionsandhasnorelationswiththeFederationofKenyaEmployers

(FKE)orthethreesectoral(infrastructure)federations.

This lackof internalcohesivenessandadaptability to the localenvironment is

reflectedintherelationswithtradeunions.SomeChinesecompanieshavestarted

recognisingtradeunions,whileothersarestillstruggling.AccordingtoTU,“notall

of them create problems, it depends on the company”443. The seven recognition

agreementsthatTUhasachievedtosignwithmajorChinesecompanies(outofat

least20opendisputes),havecomeonlyafterstrikes,reconciliationattemptsbythe

MinistryofLabour,andanorderissuedbytheIndustrialCourt.Thesestepsarepart

ofthestandardprocedure,buttheyaregenerallytakentoforceacompanytosigna

CBAorenforceit,nottoforceittorecognisetheunions.AccordingtoTU,askinga

companytosignforrecognitionmeans“goingback.Ouraimasatradeunionisa

CBA”butwiththeChinese“askingthemtosignforrecognitioniswhatwedotobe

safe.Iftheydonotsign,wegototheIndustrialCourt”444.

TU, the Ministry of Labour and COTU believe that the Chinese behaviour

originatesfromadifferentlabourrelationsenvironmentinChina,whereunionsare

not particularly significant, and the rights of workers are less important than

productivity.Despiteacknowledging thedifferences innational contexts,Kenyan

actors do not justify the Chinesemisbehaviour in their country and reflect that

441InterviewwithanofficerattheChineseEconomicandCommercialCounsellor’sOffice,Nairobi,2013-11-18.442InterviewswithseniorofficersatbigChineseinfrastructurecompaniesinKenya. 443InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.444Ibid.

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“whenyougotosomebody’shouse,theprudentthingtodowouldbetoknowwhat’s

expected”445.Ontopofthis,despitetheexistenceinKenyaoflegalinstrumentsfor

the protection of workers’ rights, interviewees reported a number of obstacles

encounteredthroughouttheprocessofnegotiation.Thesebarriersoriginatednot

onlyfromtheChineselackofwillingnesstoabidebytherulesbutalsofromwithin

theKenyanbureaucracy.

Forinstance,inthecaseofSynohydro,thecompanywasuncooperativeanddid

notwishtorecognisetheunion.TUorganisedstrikesin2010446mobilisingworkers

workingforSinohydroin5/6projectsacrossthecountry.Thestrikelastedforfive

daysafterwhichTUfiledthecasetotheIndustrialCourt,andthejudgeordereda

referendum.Eventhough73%ofSinohydroemployeesweremembersofTU,thus

legitimisingrecognition,thejudgeruledagainstthecase.Accordingtoasource,this

wasbecausetheChinesecompanyallegedlybribedthejudge,alreadyknownforhis

lackofintegrity.TUfiledanothercase,whichwasruledbyadifferentjudgeandthe

companywaseventuallyorderedtorecognisetheunion.

Apeculiarcase,asdefinedbyTU,concerningrecognitionisthatwithChinaRoad

and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). The company is among the best performing in

termsofCBAenforcement.Eventhoughrecognition,CBAsigningandenforcement

wereallachievedafterprotractedcourtbattles,thecompanywasoneofthefirstto

signrecognition,agreeonCBAs,renewandenforcethem.AnumberofCBAshave

beensignedbetweenTUandCRBCinthepastsincethemid-2000s.However,when

the company started the Nairobi-Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway project, the

management refused to recognise TU. According to TU, the reason the company

opposedtorecognisingtheunionwasthatadifferentCRBCmanagementgroupwas

inchargeoftheprojectandarguednottohavelinkswiththemanagementthathad

beenrunningCRBCprojectsinthecountrybeforethen.Thisledtheuniontoaskthe

allegedly new management to sign a new recognition agreement, which was

eventuallyachievedthroughstrikesanddialogue,ratherthancourtbattles,asthe

unionfeltthat“forthebenefitoftheworkers,wedecidedthatitwasnotworthto

gotocourtjusttosaytheyareonesinglecompany”447.However,thisimpliedthat

thepartieshadtosignanewCBA.AccordingtoTU,thiswasastrategicmovefrom

theChinese.ThethenrunningCBA(CBA1a)wasduetoexpireafterafewmonths.

445InterviewwithanexecutiveandofficersattheMinistryofLabour,IndustrialRelationsOffice,Nairobi,2014-11-19.446‘Kenya:ChinaSINOHYDROCorp.orderedbycourttonegotiateCBAwithKenyaBuildingUnion’,BuildingandWoodWorkersInternational[website],8October2010,<http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?index=3002>.447InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.

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Generally,whenaCBAisrenewed(CBA1b),theminimumwagerateisincreased.By

signingabrand-newCBA(CBA2),theminimumwageagreeduponresultedhigher

thanthatagreeduponintheoldCBA(CBA1a),butlowerthantheonethatwould

havebeennegotiatedintherenewaloftheCBA(CBA1b).OtherChinesecompanies

usedthismethodofnegotiation,and itwasreportedlysomethingthathadnever

happenedinKenya.

While, on the one hand, an existing legal framework channels the type of

interaction between the union, Chinese companies and the Ministry of Labour,

obstacles in the implementation of the framework arise from both Kenyan and

Chinese contexts. To understand the relations more comprehensively, below a

breakdownofthenegotiationprocessesfortheagreementofCBAs.

ContractBargainingAgreements

AllthecompaniesoperatinginKenyaareexpectedtobesigningCBAswithtrade

unions,whichareagreementsregulatingtherelationbetweentheemployerandthe

employeesconcerningwages,workinghours,healthandsafety,andsoforth.They

arestructuredinaccordancewithKenya’slawandnegotiationstakeplacebetween

the Kenya Federation of Employers, or sectoral employers’ federations, and the

trade unions.Once the CBA is signed, it becomes law, and it is registered at the

MinistryofLabour.

ThesigningofsuchagreementiscommonpracticeinKenyabylocalandforeign

firms. Although Chinese infrastructure companiesmainly arrived in Kenya after

Kibaki’sshifttotheEast,intheearly/mid-2000s,mostCBAsweresignedbyChinese

companies only after 2010. While this coincides with the adoption of the new

constitution in Kenya, and with increased guarantees for civil society, legal

frameworks protectingworkers’ rights and the right to bargain collectively pre-

dated the 2010 constitution. The Chinese lack of compliance with the law both

regardingsigningtheCBAandthecontentoflabourrelations(equalpay,minimum

wage,healthandsafety,etc.),hasfuelledlabourrightsadvocates’criticismagainst

Chinesecompanies.This isnotuncommon in therestofAfrica. In fact,whenthe

International Trade Unions Confederation-Africa (ITUC-Africa) pushed African

tradeunionleaderstocarryoutastudyin10countries, itwastoshowtrendsin

Chinese companies’ behaviour in labour negotiations. According to COTU “the

outcomeawakenedtheChinese.Thereportdemonstratedhowtheymistreatlocal

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workers.Forinstance,inMalawi,theyusedtheexcuseofthelanguagebarrierfor

notsigningCBAs,sotheystartedtranslatinglabourlawsinChinese”448.

InKenya,issueswithChinesecompaniesconcerningCBAsrevolvearoundwage

disparitybetweenChineseandlocalemployees,minimumwage,healthandsafety,

overtime, medical protection 449 . Similarly to issues of recognition, Chinese

companieshavetendednottosignaCBAunlesstheyareforcedtodoso.Inanumber

ofcases,afterthenegotiationprocesswasinitiated,thehostilityofthecompanyto

interactledtonotonlyordersbeingissuedbytheIndustrialCourtbutalsotothe

arrest of the company’smanaging director,whowas then forcibly conducted to

courtby thepolice toagreeon theCBA.Aswith ‘recognition’, thesignificanceof

CBAsisvirtuallymeaninglesstoChinesecompanies.Theyattempttobypassthelaw,

and,bydoingso, theydevise tactics that fallbeyondcommonlysharednormsof

conduct. For instance, Jiangxi International, after court battleswithTU, signed a

recognitionagreement.However,innegotiatingaCBA,thecompanyrequestedto

negotiateCBAsbasedonspecificprojectsratherthanunderstandingthataCBAis

generallyagreedatthecompanylevel,andlaysgeneralconditionsthatapplytoall

projectscarriedoutbythatcompany.Negotiatingspecificprojectsisnotcommon

practice in Kenya, so after a number of negotiation attempts throughwhich TU

askedthecompanytosignaCBAcoveringallprojects,theunionfiledacomplaint

withtheIndustrialCourt.

SigningaCBAis,however,onlyafirststeptoimprovinglabourrelationsasformal

complianceoftendoesnotequaltoimplementationcompliance.TUstatedthatthe

enforcementofCBAshasprovedtobedifficulttoachieveevenwithsomelocal,and

afewforeign,companies,thoughamongChinesecompaniesithasbeenwidespread.

In comparison, local companies are “small time companies. They are one man

companies.Theydonotobeyoutofignoranceorbecausetheydidnotreceivegood

legaladvice.ButtheChinesecompaniesaremultinationals”450.

TheChineselackofadaptationtothelocalenvironmenthasbeenfoughtagainst

butalsodefendedbyKenyanactors.Therehavebeeninstancesofthreatstowards

trade unions visiting construction sites by police officers and security forces

engagedbythecompany,oraccompanyinglocalgovernmentofficials.Asourceat

TUdeclared that “evenwhenmeetingswere takingplace, insteadofmeeting the

448InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-01-27.449InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-03-21.450InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.

125

managers of the company, there were Kenyan government people. This never

happened before. There were the district officer and district commissioner to

negotiatewithus”451.TheMinistryofLabourcommentedbyspecifyingthatlabour

officersmustbethethirdpartyinthenegotiationprocess(togetherwithcompanies

oremployers’associationsrepresentingthem,andthetradeunion),notcountyor

districtcommissioners/officers452,whointurnrepresentthenationalgovernment.

Evenmore,thepresenceofaccompanyingpoliceofficers,aimedatintimidatingthe

Union,wasstronglyrejectedbythelatter.TUreports:“Iwasaddressingtheworkers

tellingthemtheyhadrightsandtheOCPDwhispersnottoincitepeople.SoIsaidto

him‘Imtellingpeopletheymustbepaid’.Thenwesaidwedonotwantpeopleof

theadministrationinourmeetingsandweleft.Wewentbackthefollowingday,and

theydidn’t come”453. According toTU, this behaviour byKenyan administrators,

especiallywhenitcomestoChinese-runprojects“isverycommon.Nowwiththe

railwayespecially”454.

Bypassingnegotiationtables,safeguardingthesystemofgovernance

WhilethelackofunderstandingofthelocalenvironmentbytheChineseandthe

difficultiesincommunicatingwiththemarehighlightedbyTUandtheMinistryof

Labour,whatismostperceivedasunacceptablebybothistheinterferenceofthe

Kenyangovernment in thenegotiationprocess.On theonehand, theMinistryof

Laboursuggests that thesituation in thecounties is still chaoticafterdevolution

came into effect. Therefore, there are only 32 district labour officers for 47

counties455.Becauseofthis“adminpeoplearethefirstonestogo.Atthesametime,

becauseofignorancethepolicego,theydonotknowwhatishappeningandtake

advantage”456. However, they add that “the unions are not themost civil actors

often”457.Ontheotherhand,theTUsuggeststhatthetightlinksbetweentheKenyan

andChineseexecutivesaresofar-reaching–downtothelocalgovernments-that

commissionersundertheOfficeofthePresidenttendtodefendChinesecompanies.

451Ibid.452Thenational/countyhierarchyiscomplexandcreates“confusionwhichgivesspacetointerference”(InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaBuildingConstructionTimberFurniture&Trade'sEmployeesUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13).ThecountryhastheMinistryofLabouratthenationallevelwheretheLabourCommissionersits.Therearethen47countiesandforeachcountythereisaCountyLabourOfficer.Eachcountyhasavaryingnumberofdistricts,coordinated,atthecountylevel,bytheDistrictLabourOfficer.EachdistricthasaLabourOfficer.Atthedistrictlevel,thereisaDistrictCommissioner,whoisthecentralgovernmentrepresentativeandisinchargeofadministeringvariousministryrepresentativesatthedistrictlevel,includingtheDistrictLabourOfficer.453InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.454Ibid.455InterviewwithanexecutiveandofficersattheMinistryofLabour,IndustrialRelationsOffice,Nairobi,2014-11-19.456Ibid.457Ibid.

126

TheMinistry of Labour also states that the interference by government officials

seemstosuggestthewillingnessto“trytokeepthefaceofthegovernment”458.This

is perceived as linked to the bilateral nature of infrastructure agreements. The

negotiationsfortheseagreementsoftenexcludeTUandtheMinistryofLabouras

theytakeplaceattheexecutivelevel.AccordingtotheMinistryofLabour,“when

thegovernmentnegotiates,labourissuesarenotgivenprominence[…]theytendto

increasethecostsifnotaddressedimmediately[…]thenegotiationsshouldbeall

inclusiveintheinitialstages”459.TUreportsthattheworkers’perceptionofthelocal

governmenthasledtoprotestswithworkersshoutingatcommissioners“youhave

eaten[takenbribes],goaway”460.Thesedynamicsemphasisehowdisaggregatedthe

interestscanbewithintheKenyangovernment(i.e.MinistryofLabouratthelocal

andnationallevels,theOfficeofthePresident,etc.)andacrossthepolicyarena.

WhenaskedwhetherChina’sstrongrelationswiththeKenyangovernmentcould

poseathreattotheexistenceorthefunctioningoftradeunionsinKenya,theunions

respondedthatthatisnotpossiblebecause“inKenya,thereisanestablishedstrong

law.Onissuesofrights,Kenyansaremoreeducated.FortheChinese,itisnoteasy

to deny Kenyans rights and keep them quiet”. This is reflected in the fact that

ChinesecompaniesarenowincreasinglysigningCBAs461.OfallthevariousChinese

companies in the building and construction sector, according to TU, CRBC is

“starting to behave better”462 , a CBA was signed, and it is being implemented.

However, thinking that other Chinese companiesmay emulate this behaviour is

quite unrealistic, as they are competitors463. On top of this, strategic actions by

Chinese companies, such as claiming to have different branches operating

distinctively,havepushedTUtonegotiatesecondbestoptions,i.e.newCBAs.This

is,inturn,linkedtoamoregeneralunderstandingofthemeaningoflabourlawsand

rights,andfeedsintoabroaderdebateconcerningtheimpactastate-centriccountry

such as Chinamay have in a country like Kenya whose liberal approach is still

consolidating.TheMinistryofLaboursuggested:“wehavemoreprogressivelabour

laws,butwehavetochangetomeetthelevelofproductionthatthiscountrywants

458Ibid.459Ibid.460InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.461InterviewwithanexecutiveattheCentralOrganisationofTradeUnions,Nairobi,2014-01-27.462InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion,Nairobi,2014-11-13.463Ibid.

127

toachieveunderVision2030.Without,though,goingbelowtheminimumlikethe

Chinesetrytodo”464.

The issues raisedbyChinese companies concerning recognitionandCBAsare

regulatedbythelaw,andaresolvedwiththelawbetweenKenyanactors,according

to theofficial systemofgovernanceregulating labourdisputes.Nonetheless, two

deviationsbringtherelationswiththeChinesetemporarilyoutsideofthesystem.

First,theChinesearenottakingpartintheassociationallifeformalisedbythearena,

providingthusamomentofescapefromthelocallydeterminednormsofconduct.

Second, Kenyan unofficial, parallel governance dynamics, i.e. the bypassing of

legitimate negotiation tables through the interference of government officials in

negotiations,alsoplayarole,andimpact,ifpartially,theoutcomeofnegotiations.

While corruption shows individuals’ greediness, a more articulate scenario is

presented by the unofficial interference of government officials in negotiation

processes.Thisseems tosuggest that there isan interest,at thehigher levels, to

mediate between the interests put forward by the unions and the requests of

Chinesecompanies.Thismaybeaconsequenceofthebeliefthatnationalinterests

(inthiscasethedevelopmentofinfrastructureasanenablerfortheachievementof

KenyaVision2030goals)wouldbecompromisedifeitherside,theunionand/or

theChinesecompanies,achievedalevelofdiscontentsuchastohindertheworkof

thecompanies.

4.2.2 CounterfeitsIn Kenya Vision 2030 there is an emphasis on innovation and how it can drive

economicgrowth.Oneofthefactorsinhibitinginnovationinthecountryistheentry

ofcounterfeits.Thiscase’stimelinestretchesbeyondthatusedinthisthesis(2003-

2014).Nonetheless,itisconsideredhighlyrelevanttoshowthedynamicsbetween

thestateapparatusandorganisedcivilsocietyinKenya.Notleastimportantisthat

themainstructuralchangesoccurredafter2004(wellwithinthetimeframeofthe

thesis)andthelegitimationofaprocessthatlastedover20yearsoccurred,finally,

in 2008 with the passing of the Anti-Counterfeits Act by Parliament and the

establishment of the Anti-Counterfeits Agency. The purpose of the analysis that

follows(asareflectionoftheentirethesis)isnottoelaborateontheextenttowhich

464InterviewwithanexecutiveandofficersattheMinistryofLabour,IndustrialRelationsOffice,Nairobi,2014-11-19.

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thecreationofanAnti-CounterfeitsAgency iseffectivetocurbthecounterfeiting

phenomenon in Kenya, but rather how the state apparatus and civil society

recognisedandtackledtheproblemandinteractedtonegotiate,sotocraftoutcomes

tothesatisfactionofvariousstakeholders’interests.Thefocusisthusontheprocess

more than the outcome or the effectiveness of such outcome. Having said this,

followingthecreationoftheAgency,thechallengesposedbycounterfeitproducts

did not end. As a result, the section that followswill also provide evidence and

commentondifferentinitiativesinitiatedbyvariousstakeholders.

ThecreationofACA

In1986,SessionalPaperN.1 ‘EconomicManagement forRenewedGrowth’465,

indicatedthattheKenyangovernmentwasgoingtoliberalisetheeconomy.Kenya

signeditsfirstStructuralAdjustmentLoanwiththeWorldBankin1980,whichwas

baseduponthepledgethatthecountrywouldadopt“moreliberaltradeandinterest

regimesaswellasamoreoutward-orientedindustrialpolicy”466.Thecountryhad

experienced a decade of closure, starting in the early 1970s, in response to “a

balanceofpaymentcrisisin1970-1971,whichwasexacerbatedbythefirstoilshock

two years later”467 . This period allowed Kenya to diversify the development of

industrialsectors,suchasplastics,pharmaceuticals,vehicles,but left thecountry

isolatedfromglobaltrade,withbothimportsandexportssteadilyshrinking468.In

the1990stheeconomyfinallybecameliberalisedandwhileitbroughtadvantages

it also “created a lot of problems for the country. Now that the economy was

liberalised, anyone could bring in stuff” 469 . The imported products’ origin was

mainlyFarEasternandsomeofthegoodsthatwerebroughtinwerecounterfeits.

The trading pattern that was observed between Kenya and the Far East was:

Kenyansgoing toChinawitha sampleofaproductand thenreturning toKenya

bringingingoodsanddistributingthemthroughhawkers470.Therewasanincrease

instreet tradersandhawkers,mostlyofKenyanorigin471.Competition increased

especially because theprices of imported goodsweremuch lower thanmade in

465GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,‘EconomicManagementforRenewedGrowth’,SessionalPaperno.1,Nairobi,1986.466G.Gertz,‘Kenya’sTradeLiberalizationofthe1980sand1990s:Policies,Impacts,andImplications’,backgroundpaperforthisreport:E.Zepedaet.al.,‘TheImpactoftheDohaRoundonKenya’,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,Washington,2009,p.3.467ibid.,p.2.468ibid.,p.3.469InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.470Ibid.471Ibid.

129

Kenyaonesandthereason for thispricedifferencewasthat the importedgoods

weresubstandardandcounterfeit472.Thenumberofseizuresincreasedsignificantly

andasfiguresforlocalmanufacturersstartedgoingdown,theystartedcomplaining

about unfair competition due to sub-standards and counterfeits. The Kenya

Association of Manufacturers 473 raised the flag: “people didn’t know about

counterfeits, they were just complaining that the market was being eroded by

something.Wedidn’tknowwhatanimalwaseroding.Ourmembersfoundproducts

onthemarketthattheycouldn’ttracetothemanufacturer”474.

Customs oversaw checking goods at ports of entry, and the Kenya Bureau of

Standardswasresponsibleofregulating.AnACAseniorofficermentionedthat“it

becamemoreandmoreevidentthattheregulationsinplacewerenomoreadequate

and,asaconsequence, theotherbodieschargedwithcontrolauthoritywerenot

effectiveincarryingouttheirduties.Forinstance,Customsatthattimeweremore

concernedwith the collectionof revenue rather thancontrolof goods.AnActof

Parliamentwasnecessary”475.AccordingtoKAM,“multipleenforcementagencies

filedacasetothecourttosaythatitwascounterfeits.Butthejudgeruledthatthey

were notmandated to enforce against counterfeits. The Revenue Authority and

KEBSlostthecase.”476

Thegovernmentandotherstakeholderscametogethertodiscusshowtostopthe

entryofcounterfeitsandsub-standards,andaninterimmeasurewasagreedupon,

namelytogothroughtheexistingKenyanlawsotofindthegapsandidentifythe

sectionsthatcouldbemodifiedtosuittheactualsituation.Thelawsexaminedwere:

Weights and measure Act, Trade Descriptions Act, Standards Act, Custom and

exerciseAct.

The Trade Descriptions Act turned out to be the most appropriate as in its

provisionstherewasasectionontrademarksandthefactthattheirmisuseleadsto

consumers’ deceit. This was the closest legal mention to the protection against

counterfeits.Whileanationalcommitteewasbeingsetuptolookatanewlaw,the

Trade Descriptions Act was used extensively for the enforcement of anti-

counterfeiting.

472SuchasinthecaseofballpencompanyHacoTigerthatwasimitatedandcopieswerebroughtintoKenya.473Abusinessmembershipassociation.474InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-19.475InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.476InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-19.

130

Thenationalcommitteewascomposedofhighlyplacedpeoplemostlyfromthe

governmentbutalsofromnon-stateorganisations:

1 Anti-dumpingStandingCommittee

2 KenyaAssociationofManufacturers(KAM)

3 KenyaBureauofStandards(KEBS)

4 KenyaIndustrialPropertyInstitute(KIPI)

5 FederationofKenyaEmployers(FKE)

6 KenyaNationalChamberofCommerceandIndustry(KNCCI)

7 CommissionerofCustoms(currentlyunderKenyaRevenueAuthority)

8 DirectorofIndustries

9 DirectorofInternalTrade(MinistryofTrade)

10 DirectorofExternalTrade(MinistryofTrade)

11 DirectorofWeightsandMeasures(MinistryofTrade)

The government recognised that the lack of an anti-counterfeits law was

damaging stakeholders likemanufacturers inasmuch as “IP owners and holders

werelosing,andtherewasdamageininvestmentinIPrightsandgoodwillandtrust

in their brands” 477 . Therefore, the National Committee formed a Legal sub-

committeein2001whosepurposewastocomeupwithhowtocombatcounterfeits

and how tomake Kenya compliantwithWTO regulations on enforcement of IP

rights.ThefirststepinvolvedtheamendmentoftheTradeDescriptionsActsoto

strengthenthelawwhilewaitingfortheActofParliament.

AccordingtoACA“thesub-committeewentthrougheverylawdealingwithtrade.

TheythentooktheTradeDescriptionsActandrecommendedamendments,through

theStatuteLaw,MiscellaneousAmendments,N.2of2002,sotostrengthenthelaw

whilewaiting for theactofParliament”478.AnACAseniorofficialstates that“the

amendment of the Trade Descriptions Act made sure that manufacturers were

protectedbylawbutmorewasneeded:anewlaw.Andthiswasanewphenomenon

for the country”479. The committee came up with drafting instructions for the

Counterfeits Goods Bill 2004 aimed at outlawing counterfeits. Stakeholders’

workshopswere held in the summer of 2004, and the legal sub-committee held

otherforumsincludingoneformembersofparliament,tryingtobuildconsensus.

477InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.478Ibid.479Ibid.

131

ThenthefinaldraftingoftheproposedCounterfeitGoodsBill2004washandedin

totheparliament,“thewordingwasborrowedfromtheSouthAfricanlaw,butyou

know each country wants to have indigenous things, so they renamed it Anti-

CounterfeitsBill2004”480.

From2004,whentheBillwashandedovertoauthorities,to2008whentheBill

becamelaw,“anumberofobstaclesgotinthewayincludingpoliticalissues”481.KAM

suggests that theParliament, specifically, representedachallenge.Counterfeiters

“havealotofmoney.Theycanalsofundorsponsormembersofparliament,sothey

have influence”482. As a consequence, it was necessary to strategize so tomake

parliamentariansunderstandhowaffectedtheycanbe“eveniftheyareuptherein

thesocialarena”483.Finally,in2008“itwasclearthateverybodywasavictim,not

only manufacturers but also consumers. Most counterfeits were fast moving

products andwebrought up the issue of health and safety of consumers […]We

pushedthishealthandsafetyaspectattheKenyanparliamentandthecommitteeof

anti-counterfeitsthatwaspreviouslycreated”484.InNovember,theBillwaspassed

bytheParliamentintolawandPresidentKibakisigneditonDecember24,2008.It

came into force on July 7, 2009. Before becoming effective, in March 2009, the

Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Industrialization set up a Working

CommitteetooperationalizetheAct.Thiswasparticularlyinresponsetothefact

that theNationalCommitteerejected the ideaof lettingexisting institutions take

overbutratheraskedfortheappointmentofabrand-newbodydealingonlywith

counterfeits.

TheWorkingCommitteewasresponsibleoftranslatingtheactintoreality.Ithad

to: develop a work plan for the operationalization of the act; prepare a budget

proposal, a scheme of service for members of staff; advise the Ministry on the

appropriate classification of the agency for recommendation to the State

Corporation Advisory Committee485 , on the nomination and gazettement of the

BoardofDirectors,onthecommencementoftheAct,andanyotherissues.Thework

of theWorkingCommittee started in June2009,up till September2009when it

handedeverythingtothepermanentsecretaryoftheMinistryofIndustrialization.

480Ibid.481Ibid.482InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-19.483Ibid.484Ibid.485Theylookatfunctionsofnewagenciesandcategorisethem,applyaclass:A,B,C,etc.).ACAwascategorizedasclassC,asanenforcementagency.

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Thelegalsub-committeealsofinisheditswork,andasecretariatwasformedoutof

theworkingcommittee.Thesecretariat,withthenamesreceivedfromthevarious

organisations,on9November2009twoprivatesectorsmembersweregazettedas

BoardMembers(GazetteNotice12354of20/11/2009).Thetwomemberswerean

IPexpertandaconsumerprotectionexpert.TheothermembersoftheBoardwere

from the government, so there was no need to gazette their position. More

specificallytheywerefromtheinstitutionsformingthenationalcommittee.On2

December 2009, the Board of Directors was inaugurated by the Ministry of

Industrialization.Thechairmanwasappointedabitlater,inFebruary2010,andhe

isanadvocateoftheHighCourtofKenya.Thepermanentsecretaryhandedoverthe

dutiestotheBoardofDirectors,andtheChairmanstartedcallingmeetings.

In themeanwhile, in January2010, an inductionworkshopwasorganised for

Board members some of whom were not familiar with the issues concerning

counterfeits, with the aim to instruct every institution about the importance of

protecting IP rights, pay attention toborder entrypoints and theneed to create

awarenessamongKenyans.

Thecreationoftheagencysurelyhighlightsalinkbetweenpopularconcern,the

effectiveengagementofthegovernmentbyorganisedcivilsocietyandaresponsive

governmentthatintroducedlegislationinreactiontotheissue.Thecreationofthe

agency,whichis,perse,manifestationofthestateapparatusandsociety’scapability

toengageeachotherindemocraticprocesses,isnotthesolutiontotheproblemas

thechallengesposedbyimplementationshow,butitwasanimportantfirststepto

regulate a phenomenon that involves a high number of institutions and affects

potentiallyeveryaspectofsocio-economicdevelopment.

CounterfeitingafterthecreationofACA

ThesituationconcerningcounterfeitsinKenyaisstillquitealarming,evenafter

theestablishmentofACA.Thesnapshotprovidedbelowisnotaimedatcriticising

howineffectivetheActisbutratheratshowingthatthestruggleagainstcounterfeits

continuestoinvolvestateandsocialforcesinacomplexdomesticenvironmentthat

impactsthewayrelationswithChineseactorstakeshape.AccordingtotheKenya

Association of Manufacturers’ 2007 position paper ‘Position paper on

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counterfeits’486,Chinain2007wasthecountryoforiginofthehighestnumberof

counterfeitsimportedtoKenya.AccordingtoACA,seizedgoodslistedasitemsfrom

2010till2014amounttoalmost3million(2.998.639)items,almostworthKES352

million (KES 351.886.212) 487 . These are both locally and externally produced

counterfeits. Locals mainly contribute with spirits/alcohol, condiments and

seasoning, paints. They contribute “in the sense that they often collect genuine

packagingmaterials, package [non-original] commodities and deceive”488. As for

importedcounterfeits,“whilebeforeitwasKenyansintroducingcounterfeits,now

itisalsotheChinesethemselves”.Importedcounterfeitswereandstillare“almost

onlyfromChina”.Productsinclude:consumerchemicalproducts;cosmetics;motor

spare parts; soaps and detergents; alcohol and spirits; electrical goods; toners

(especiallyHP);drycellbatteries(“drycellbatterieswerepopularintheearlyyears

but not in the past three years”489); ball point pens;mobile phones (Nokia and

Samsung);medicines.

Despitethelegalframeworkbeinginplace,andnotwithstandingthefactthatthe

Anti-CounterfeitsAct–asinnovativeasit is inEasternAfrica–stillhasroomfor

improvement,therealproblemistwofold:thesourceoftheproblem,namelythe

low purchasing power of the Kenyan/East African population, and the lack of

enforcementcapacity. Thesearecomplementedbyotherrelevant issuessuchas

lack of harmonisation in EastAfrica on counterfeits laws490, causing theKenyan

framework tobeworking inavacuum, theabsenceof strict controlmeasures in

China,andthelackofredressmechanismsforconsumersinKenya.

Kenya’spurchasingpower

KAM points out that Kenya’s low purchasing power is the country’s

vulnerability 491 . As a source from KIPPRA noticed “there are two players: the

ChineselookingforamarketandKenyanslookingforaproduct.Wedonotknow

whetheritisdemanddrivenorsupplydriven.Wedonotknowtheshare”492.Ifthe

counterfeitsphenomenonisdemand-drivenduetopoorfinancialcapacity,thenthe

486KAMStandardsandRegulatoryCommittee,‘Positionpaperoncounterfeits’,presentedtotheFinance,TradeandPlanningParliamentaryCommitteeinAugust2007487DataprovidedbyACA.Unfortunately,nobreakdownwasprovided.488InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.489Ibid.490KIPPRAReport2013,op.cit.,p.86.491InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-19.492InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaInstituteforPublicPolicyResearchandAnalysis,CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-03-28.

134

legalframeworkthatACActsanctionsispartofaformalsphereofgovernancethat

isdetached fromthe informalone,withinwhichcounterfeitswill continuebeing

requested and distributed. As a colleague has put it, “copyrights are for the

developedsociety”493forthesimplereasonthatwhencashfluidityisunavailable,

“consumersunknowinglydemandcounterfeitsbecausecounterfeitsarecheap”494.

KAMacknowledgedthat“weareblamingtheChinese,butitisconsumerswhoare

drivingthis.So,thereistheneedtocreateawarenessaboutthefactthattheyneed

genuineproducts”495.TheConsumersFederationofKenya(COFEK)alsoagreesthat

“China is a symptom. China is not the cause”496. There is obviously a distinction

betweenthedemand,bycommonpeople,ofcheapproductsandthedemand,by

retailers, of counterfeits. As advanced by COFEK “no Kenyanwould take poison

knowing it is poison” 497 . However, the lack of border control, post-market

surveillance,andpoliticalgoodwilldonotallowthetwotobedetachedeffectively.

Moreover,whilethelawprotectsIPholders,itdoesnotprotectconsumers.COFEK

isarelativelynewbody,registeredinMarch2010,justafewmonthsbeforethenew

constitutionwas adopted. TheConsumers ProtectionAct, in turn,was passed in

2012.While the legal framework – through the Constitution and the Consumers

ProtectionAct,amongothers–“provideshighthresholdsforconsumerprotection

in all spheresand forbothprivate andpublic sectors”498, implementation is still

problematicmainlyduetolackofawareness499.

Enforcementcapacity

AccordingtoACA,in2014,counterfeitshadbecomeless,comparedtothe1990s

uptothetimeofpassingtheAct.Customsdomorecontrolsbut“counterfeitscan

notbecurbedaltogether. It isanarea that involvedcartels,whatwedo is try to

control.Peoplearestillbringingincounterfeits;sometimestheydeclaresomething

anditissomethingelse,youcannotstopallcontainers.AndtheportofMombasa

servesUganda,Burundi,Sudan,SouthSudan,DRC”500.Borders’controlisaproblem,

worsened,asmentionedabove,bythelackofaharmonisedlegalframeworkinthe

493SkypediscussionwithF.Congolo,22May2014.494InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-19.495Ibid.496InterviewwithanexecutiveattheConsumersFederationofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-07.497Ibid.498ConsumerFederationofKenya(COFEK),‘Aboutus’,ConsumerFederationofKenya[website],20May2013.499InterviewwithanexecutiveattheConsumersFederationofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-07.500InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.

135

East African region. The deficiencies in borders’ controls are aggravated by

weaknessesintheKenyanpost-marketsurveillancesystem.

Toestablishwhetheraproductisacounterfeit,theproductneedstoundergoan

examination that establishes whether it meets quality standard specifications.

However,astheKenyaBureauofStandards(KEBS)argues,“manyproductshaveno

standards, and even if we use international standards we have no capacity to

determine the performance”501. In otherwords, “if there is a complaint about a

productthatdidn’tmeetexpectations,butthereisnostandardandnotesting,there

isn’tmuchthatcanbedone.Wehavenow8.000developedstandardsbuttheBritish

Standards Institution, for instance, has 20.000.We continue to develop, and the

mostimportantproductshavestandards,thosethathaveanimpactonconsumers’

healthandsafety”502.Regulatorybodiesareunderfunded, “ACAshouldhave100

inspectors,theyonlyhave10.Thelackofcapacitymakesnosenseforeverything

else.”503

Chineseinvolvement

The involvement of Chinese authorities in providing controls of goods before

export is, reportedly, “not enough” 504 . Although the Chinese government has

sponsoredanumberofprogrammesforimportcountriesoninspection,“theytake

you around in circles, they are not forthcomingwith info. They say they do not

supporttheirbusinesspeoplewhodobadthings;theysaythesepeoplearemessing

withtheimageofChina.Buttheyknowtheportusedbycounterfeiters,andtheydo

notdoacrackdown”505.KEBScollaborateswithanumberofpartnersaroundthe

worldtoinspectgoodsbeforetheyareloadedontocontainers.InthecaseofChina,

itcollaboratesmainlywiththeChinaCertificationandInspectionGroup.Reportedly

“if they do not verify the quality before issuing a certificate of conformity, we

penalise them”. However, at times these certificates are bypassed and products

shipped. These products at times meet the quality standards, at times do not.

AlthoughthereisapenaltyifproductsonthePre-VerificationofConformity(PVoC)

list–mainlyproductsthataffecthealthandsafety–arenotinspectedandprovided

withacertificate,“itisnotpossibletoinspect100%attheportofentry”506.

501InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaBureauofStandards(KEBS),Nairobi,2014-11-11.502Ibid.503InterviewwithanexecutiveattheConsumersFederationofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-07.504InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaBureauofStandards(KEBS),Nairobi,2014-11-11.505Ibid.506Ibid.

136

Governancein-the-making,throughcollaboration.

Besidesthelegalaspectsofcounterfeitingthatbroughttogetherawiderangeof

institutions,awarenesscampaignsandspecific initiativesbetweenthepublicand

theprivatesectorarebeingcarriedout incoordination.ACA’sAssistantDirector

headed themain campaign and given thenovelty of theAct a number of bodies

“neededtobemadeaware,informedandtrained”.Seminarswereheld,fiveofficers

wenttoEnglandforbenchmarking,andthereare,forinstance,agriculturalshows

whereoriginalandfakeproductsareshownandinformationprovidedonhowto

avoidcounterfeits.Administratorsoflocalareasareengaged,andcollaborationis

takingplaceundertheumbrellaofJointCampaignagainstCounterfeits(JCAC),an

awareness organisation that gathers people directly affected by counterfeits.

FinancialsupportisprovidedbytheAmericanEmbassy(USAIDprovidesfunding

forawareness)andfromtheBritishCommission.

Anumberofinitiativesmobilisingthepublicandtheprivatesectorhavetaken

place since the creation of ACA. For instance, in 2012mobile operators and the

CommunicationsCommissionofKenya(CCK)cametogetheranddecidedtoswitch

offmobilephoneswhosehandsetIDnumbercouldnotberecognised.Theaction

wastakeninanattempt“toprotectconsumersfromsubstandardphones,safeguard

mobilepaymentsystemsandpreventcrime”507.Theswitching-offprovokedstrong

reactionsbyconsumersandsmallbusinesseswhoclaimtohaveboughtthephones

atfullpricenotknowingtheywerecounterfeitandblamedthegovernmentfornot

beingabletostoptheinflux.Disputesovercompensationbetweenthegovernment

and consumers are still ongoing, and KIPPRA raised the concern that anti-

counterfeitlawsdonotprotectconsumersenough–vis-à-visIPowners.Similarly,

theKenyaPlantHealthInspectorate(KEPHIS),agovernmentalagency,startedan

initiativeinvolvingconsumers.Theirmandateistolookintoproductsthatdealwith

plants, seeds, fertilisers.They initiated the ideaofprovidingeachproductwitha

barcode(digits)sothatcustomerscanverifywiththefactorytheoriginalityofthe

product before purchasing it. The input of manufacturers, however, in these

campaigns,isirregularandtherelationswiththemdelicate:“theydonotwantto

show that their products may be counterfeited by someone as this shows

507W.W.Chebusiri,‘Kenya'sbattletoswitchofffakephones’,BBCNewsAfrica,5October2012.

137

vulnerabilityandmayinduceconsumerstoavoidbuyingtheproductfearingit is

counterfeit”508.

The creation of theAct and theAgency represented an importantmoment of

democraticgovernancewitharevisionoflegalframeworksthatwereperceivedto

benomoresuitedtoKenya’ssocio-economicdevelopment.Thiscaseisparticularly

interestingasitwasgenerallyframed,byinterviewees,asacaseofacknowledged

inadequacyofKenyanlaws,and,later,ofimplementationcapacity,ratherthanasa

caseofChina-blaming.Althoughtheactionstakentowardstheissuerepresenteda

re-actiontowardsChineseimports,theproblemwasalwaysframedasdomestically

more than externally-led. The case highlights how the country’s legal, socio-

economicandpoliticalenvironmentcanleavespacetodemocraticgovernanceto

takeplace.However,understandingtherelativelynewco-existenceofdemocratic

governanceandrapideconomicdevelopmentiskeytoexplainingtheinconsistency

inimplementationeffortsandresults.

4.2.3 SmalltradersThetradebalancebetweenKenyaandChinaiscurrently509significantlyskewed

towardsChinawithKenyaimporting$3.22billionfromChina,equivalentto20%of

its total imports but only exporting $50.6 million, equal to 0.97% of its total

exports510.Theinfluxoffast-movinggoods,asseenaboveinthecaseofcounterfeits,

has involved a very diverse range of products. India remains the top country of

originofimportsforKenyain2013(25%ofKenya’stotalimports).However,60%

ofimportsfromIndiaareinrefinedpetroleum.China,ontheotherhand,thesecond

countryoforiginofimportedgoodsin2013,exportstoKenyafast-movinggoods:

machines (23% of all imports from China) such as telephones, electric tools,

batteries, computers; textiles (19%);metals (13%);plastics and rubbers (9.1%);

transportation (6.4%), suchasmotorcycles, vehicleparts etc.; chemicalproducts

(5.7%)suchasdrugs511.

WhilethereisawidespreadawarenessinKenyathatChineseproducts“coverthe

wholerange,fromhighqualitytolow”512,thelocalenvironmentmostlydemands

cheap products, which are not locally available due to limited industrial

508InterviewwithanexecutiveattheAnti-CounterfeitsAgency,Nairobi,2014-02-26.509Statisticscanbefoundat:SimoesandHidalgo,op.cit.510Ibid.511Ibid.512InterviewwithanofficerattheNationalEconomicandSocialCouncil,Nairobi,2014-01-24.

138

development(Kenyamanufacturesmediumqualityproductsforexport,theprices

ofwhicharenotgenerallyparticularlylow),andarenoteasilysourcedfromabroad,

except from India. Interviewees advanced a general claim that Kenyans prefer

productsfromcountrieslikeBritain,Italy,Germany“intheirhomebecausetheylast.

TheyareawarethatthefancyonesfromChinabreak”513.However,mostproducts

imported fromthesecountriesare tooexpensive for themajoritywhile theones

fromChinaareaffordable.

Theseproducts,whosequalityvariesconsiderably,havepenetratedtheformal

andinformal,wholesaleandretailsectors.AsinotherpartsofAfrica,andtheworld,

this influx of products has challenged Kenyan existing systems of production,

procurement and distribution.While the influx of cheap products has, arguably,

damagedmanufacturersinanumberofsectors,thefocusofthissectionisnoton

thecompetitioninmanufacturingbetweenKenyanandChinesefirms.Rather,the

focusisonthecontestbetweenKenyanretailersandwholesalersintheirattempts

todevisestrategiestoprotecttheirinterests,eveniftothedetrimentoftheother.

Understandingthelocalcontextandsystemofgovernanceiskeytocontextualise

the resentment toward the Chinese, here considered a proxy formore complex

domesticrelationaldynamics.

In2012theNairobiCentralBusinessDistrict(CBD)becamethestageofaprotest

ofsmalllocaltradersagainstChineseretailshopowners.Thesectionbelowaimsat

understanding the reasonsbehind theprotestanduses theevent tounderstand,

morebroadly,theagencyofKenyanretailersandwholesalersvis-à-vistheChinese,

namelytheactorsinvolvedandtheirlogicofaction.

Foreigninvestorsversuspettytraders

According to a study conductedbyKIPPRA in2013, “thewholesale and retail

tradeaccountedfor196,000jobsand4.4millionintheformalandinformalsectors

in2007,respectively.Employment in thewholesaleandretail trade increased to

238,000 (formal) and 4.5million (informal) in 2011”514.While the formal retail

sectorisgrowing,withsupermarketchainsstandingtallaboveothertypesofretail

activities,theinformaloneisstillthebackboneofKenya’seconomy.Inparticular,in

Nairobithesizeofinformalactivitiesiscomparativelymoresignificantthaninother

513Ibid.514KIPPRAReport2013,op.cit.,p.88.

139

partsofthecountry.Thetwoareoftenintertwined,anditisnotpossibletotalkof

retailandwholesalesectorswithoutconsideringtheconnectednessbetweenformal

andinformalactivities.Kingarguesthat“inKenya,andparticularlyinNairobi,the

sheerdynamismandactivityoftheinformal(juakali)sectorissuchthatitmight

provedifficult foroutsiders to finda foothold”515.Thedomestic controlover the

penetrationofthesectorbyforeignersisnotjustexertedthroughthepolicieson

migrationandFDIbutalsothroughthevibrancyandcompetitiveness,especiallyof

theinformalsector516.Oneofthemainproblemsaffectingthesectoristhelackof

proper laws to register foreign investors. Such shortcoming has proved to be

particularly problematic in the relations with the Chinese as the absence of

regulationshascausedtheinstalmentofChinesepettytradersthathaveclaimedto

beenteringthecountryasinvestorsbutratherendedupcompetingwithKenyan

smalltraders517.

According to the Kenya Investment Authority, the law does not require all

investorstoregisterwithKenIvest,although,bylaw,theyshouldallregisterwith

theRegistrarofCompanies.However,“evenifacompanyisregistered,itisnotsure

ifthentheyhaveoperationsasattheRegistrartheydonotevenhavethebasicinfo

such asphone and email”518. Themain issue for authorities is to get a complete

pictureofforeigninvestmentprojectsthattakeplaceinthecountry.Inparticular,

KenInvesthighlightsthat“whenthey[theChinese]comeanddopettytrade,thisis

notgood.ItshouldbelefttoKenyans,butwedonotknowmuch,andthereisvery

little data to prove this empirically”519. The Director continues: “We have been

pushingonbureaucracy–wehavebeensettingupaone-stopshopforinvestors,

and there should be a legal change to make it mandatory for investors to be

compelledtosubmitinfotous.Wedonotwanttolimittheir[theChinese]coming

toKenya,butweneedtocontrolhowtheycome, that ishowwecanavoidpetty

trade” 520 . Also, the Consumers Federation of Kenya suggested that “China is a

symptom, they finda lotof loopholesand then theycanextend.China isnot the

cause.Wehaveissueswithborders,surveillance,politicalgoodwill”521.

515King,2013,op.cit.,p.122.516Ibid.517ThisisaproblemthatKenyahadpreviouslyfacedwithIndiansmalltraders.However,thatoccurredatahistoricaltimewhenKenyawasjustbecomingasovereigncountryandisaproblemthathasbeenabsorbedtobecomepartoftheeconomicstructureofthecountry.TherelationswithChinaaresignificantlymorerecentandenterascenariothatKenyansthemselvesgrewtocontrol.518InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaInvestmentAuthority,Nairobi,2014-01-31.519Ibid.520Ibid.521InterviewwithanexecutiveattheConsumersFederationofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-07.

140

The presence of Chinese small traders seems to be quite limited in Nairobi

althoughknowingtheexactnumbersisadifficulttask.AccordingtotheNairobiCity

Council, therehasnotbeen“abig incrementof theChinesecommunity [insmall

businesses]. They are here for big contracts; they are not coming for individual

businesses”522.ThereareafewChineserestaurants,thereisaChinacentre,which

is situated next to the Economic and Commercial Counsellor of the PRC. It was

createdtohostChineseshops,butitfailedbecausepeoplesimplydidnotgotobuy

products, andnowhostsaChinese supermarket, aChinese restaurantanda few

Kenyan-runshopssellingChineseitems-clothes, jewellery,travelagency,andso

forth.Beyondthiscentre,therewereafewChineseshops,mainlyontwostreetsin

theNairobiCentralBusinessDistrictbutafterthedemonstrationsthatoccurredin

August2012,mostChineseownersleftthecountry.

August2012protests

InAugust2012KenyanretailtradersflamedupinprotestsintheNairobicentral

business district against Chinese small businesses’ competition. Unlike other

countries in Africa523 , Kenya had not witnessed any street protests against the

Chinese before then, and no particular episodes of anti-Chinese sentiments had

occurred.Evenduringthe2012protests,thesentimentswerenotdirectedatthe

Chinese in general -who are numerous inKenya in a variety of sectors such as

construction,services,education,restaurants,supermarkets-butratheratasmall

portionofretailshopownerssellingtextilesandmobilephones524.Accordingtoan

intervieweeat theMinistryofTrade“[theChinese]werehawkingonthestreets,

theycomewithtouristvisas.Hawkingisallowedtosomeextentwithpermissionby

the City Council. But the permit is usually not for foreigners. That is foreign

investment”525.Beyondhawking,andmorespecifictothecaseofthe2012August

protests,theChinesewereaccusedofnotpaying“duty,rent,citycouncilcertificate,

andtheybuycheapfromChina,whereasKenyansneedtopayrent,needtoflyto

Chinatobuygoodsandtheycannotcompete”526.

522InterviewwithanofficerattheNairobiCityCouncil,Nairobi,2014-11-28.523SeethecasesofZambiaat‘ZambianminerskillChinesemanagerduringpayprotest’,BBCNewsAfrica,5August2012;‘Lesotho:Anti-Chineseresentmentflares’,IRIN,24January2008;‘Malawi'snewlawtargetingChinesetradersinruralareasdrawscriticism’,TheGuardian,TradeandDevelopment,9August2012;524InterviewwithanexecutiveattheOverseasChineseAssociation,Nairobi,2013-12-11.525InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalTrade,DepartmentofExternalTrade,Nairobi,2013-11-13.526InterviewwithanexecutiveattheOverseasChineseAssociation,Nairobi,2013-12-11.

141

Withweak Kenyan laws regulating the FDI sector, some Chinese entered the

countryassmallretailtradersratherthaninvestorscompetingwithKenyansmall

traders.Accordingtointervieweesreports,giventhepresenceofsuchChinesesmall

traders, Chinese wholesalers started bypassing Kenyans to sell directly to the

Chinese.ThisprovokedresentmentamongKenyanwholesalerswhobelievethey

were being depredated of their middlemen status, i.e. buying from the Chinese

wholesalersandsellingtoKenyanretailers.Accordingtosources,thesewholesalers

pushedKenyansmalltraderstoprotestagainstChinesesmalltraders,sotodrive

themoutofthecountry.

Consultations soon startedamonganumberofdifferent actors, includingThe

Kenya Overseas Chinese Association, which is a Kenya-registered non-

governmental association led by a Chinese national in Nairobi, the Kenya-China

Import-Export Promotion Association and the Chinese Embassy. The Kenya

OverseasChineseAssociationandtheChineseEmbassy“putalotofeffortintothis

issuebecause it canaffectpeople’smindsandhowtheysee theChinese.Wedid

communication with our people and with the Kenyan side”, including not only

organisations protecting Kenyan traders, but also the Chamber of Commerce527.

Therefore,accordingtointerviewees,theChinesehaverealisedthattheycanown

themanufacturing, thewholesale,but theyshould leaveaside theretail. Inother

words, the Chinese are ‘allowed’ to benefit from production, importation,

wholesaling,butretailshouldremaintheprerogativeofKenyans.

However,asnegotiationsstartedbeingheld, itsoonbecameapparentthat the

Chinesewerenotasguiltyastheyhadbeenportrayed.Asasourcehighlyinvolved

inthenegotiationsreported,outofthe20/30black-listedChinesewhowereasked

toprovide theregistration license, taxpay,workpermit,NationalSocialSecurity

Fundcertificate,acertificatefromtheCityCouncil,mostofthemhadallinorder.

Accordingtosources,theprotestrathershedlightonthefactthattheChinesewere

bringingintothemarketanewtypeofbusinessstrategy,whicherodedtheKenyan

controlofthecompetitionwithinthesector.

Rootedinformalgovernance

Anti-Chinesesentimentsstemmedoutofa feelingof threat to thecontrolofa

sectorthat isvital forKenyansmallandmediumbusinesses:retail.However,the

527Ibid.

142

lackofformalregulations,inthiscase,isnotsynonymouswithlackofownership

andcontroloverthegovernanceoftheissueatstake.Informalgovernance,though

not formally and legally regulated, is nonetheless largely based on a system of

governanceconstitutedofacceptednormsofconduct,legitimisedbybothinformal

sectorstakeholdersaswellasformalandstateactors.TheinfluxofChinesecheap

productshaschallengedthesystemofproductionandwholesaleprocurementand

distributioninKenya.Inacontextofnearabsenceofstateformsofcontrol,where

the jua kali, i.e. the informal sector, produces and manages governance, the

emergenceofnewchallengesbroughtinbyexternalactorsisinformallyregulated.

In other words, despite the Chinese often too deterministic faith in the state

authority,inthecaseoftheAugust2012protest,itwasnecessaryforChineseactors

to recognise the major role played by the informal sector and the lack of a

frameworkforthestatetointervene.Infact,legally,Chineseretailerswere,mostly,

abidingbythelaw.Therefore,itisinterestingtoacknowledgetheactivebehaviour

adoptedbyofficialChineseactorssuchastheEmbassytocontrolChinesecitizens.

Thiswasanactiontakeninthenameof‘peacefulcoexistence’inacountryforChina

too strategic to let a minor issue such as that of retail jeopardise the overall

economicrelations.

Kenyanagencyinthiscontextisnotsomuchstateagencyorcollaborativeagency

acrossthestateandnon-stateenvironmentsbutratherinformalagencycarriedout

byinformalsectorleaders,butalsomoremischievouslybybusinessmen.Giventhe

high clientelistic nature of the informal sector, and the potential social

consequences, i.e. upheavals, the Chinese Embassy also played a major role,

interferingwithChinesesmallentrepreneurs’settlement,asitidentifiedtheretail

sectorasano-goarea.At thesametime, this issuehasshed lighton theKenyan

acknowledgement that gaps in the system exist and that the country’s journey

toward industrialisation needs increased guarantees that crucial areas of the

Kenyaneconomyarenotcompromisedbytheencounterwithanincreasinglyfree

andopeneconomy.

4.3 SectoraldynamicsThepresumedexploitationoftheAfricanlabourforceandtheimpactofChinese

productsformanufacturers,wholesalersandretailershasprobablybeenthemost

discussed topic in the analysis of Sino-African relations. Due to the widespread

143

impactatmanysociallevels,thesedynamicsbecamewidelyacknowledged,studied

and speculatedupon.Analysing the actions takenbyKenyan actors vis-à-vis the

Chineseinthetradesectorseemstorevealnotonlyawiderangeofactors,Kenyan

and Chinese but also a range of circumstances under which action is deemed

necessary.Contrarytothenexttwosectors,thisisacasewherere-actiontoward

theChineseismostpredominant,vis-à-vispro-activeorpassivebehaviour.When

theChineseactionsareperceivednegativelybyKenyans,asindamagingKenyans’

interests,re-actionshaverisenatformalandinformallevels.There-actionshave

rotatedarounddiscoursesrangingfromrights,asinthecaseoftradeunionsand

counterfeiting(intellectualproperty),tobusinesscompetition.

Thesystemsofgovernancethroughwhichactorsnavigateandwhichtheyconstitute

areverydiverseinthethreecasesanalysed.Inthecaseoftheunions,thesystemis

highly formalised (rooted) and the presence of trade unions is historically

significantwithin the country. In the secondcase, the systemofgovernancewas

identifiedasweakandwasfullyrestructured(in-the-making).Itstillpresentsmajor

problemsofenforcementnotonlyduetoresourceshortagebutalsotothesocio-

economicformationofthecountry.Finally,inthelastcase,thegovernancesystem

isrooted,thoughdividedbetweeninformalityandformality.Whilethepresenceof

a strong informal framework guarantees the exclusion of the Chinese from an

economicenvironmentthat isvital forKenyans, theproblemispartofabroader

issueconcerningtheregulationofinvestmentsinthecountry,whichlacksproper

legalattention.

Despite their diversity, the perception of threat was generally consequential,

acrosscases,totheChinesenon-adherencetoexistingsystemsofgovernanceand

negotiationtables,i.e.attemptingtochangethenormsofconduct.Inallthesecases,

agency as the willingness and ability to take appropriate action was key to the

outcomeoftheissueandthemanagementofchange.Thisshowsthatdespitethe

obvious financial asymmetry between Kenya and China, where the former is

disadvantagedcomparedtothelatter,theoutcomeoftherelationaldynamicsdoes

notmerelydependonthat.TheKenyanavailabilityofhumanresourcesthatwere

able,andwilling,tonavigatethroughknownframeworks,presumablylessknown

by the Chinese, has proved to be crucial to bringing the engagements with the

Chineseback to settingsofnegotiation thatwouldadhere tobroader systemsof

144

governancewhereKenyanswouldbeadvantaged. Importantly,oncemore, these

systemsarenotalwayssynonymwithlegalandofficialregulation.

145

Table1:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actorsandarenas/tablesofnegotiation–Trade Tradeunions Counterfeits Smalltraders

Interests

Typeofrelation Commercial Commercial Commercial

Issueatstake TreatmentofworkersbyChinesecompanies

EntryofcounterfeitproductsfromChina(mainlybyKenyantraders)+lackoflegalframework

Chineseretailersoccupyingspacesoftrade

Kenyans'issue-specificinterests

MakeChinesecompaniesabidebydomesticlegalframeworks

Controlthedamageattwolevels:consumers'rights(limited),manufactures(mainargument)>hinderingnationaldevelopment

MakeChinesewholesalersandretailersabidebytheinformalnormsofbusiness

OverallobjectivetowardChina

RejectChineseactivities/behaviour

RejectChineseactivities/behaviour

RejectChineseactivities/behaviour

Actors

Initiator Grassrootstradeunions KenyaAssociationofmanufacturers Smalltraders

Otherdomesticactors

MinistryofLabour,IndustrialCourt

MinistryofIndustrialization,privatesectorassociations

CityCouncil,TheKenyaOverseasChineseAssociation,Kenya-ChinaImport-ExportPromotionAssociation,TheChineseEmbassy

Resources

ChinesecompaniesfinanciallymorepowerfulthanKenyantradeunions.ButKenyantradeunions,intermsofhumanresources,weremorepreparedtoengagethedisputemechanisms

KenyanprofessionalhumanresourcescrucialtoalterthesystemofgovernancetosafeguardKinterests:intellectualpropertyrights.

DespitethepotentialfinancialadvantageofChinesewholesalers,attheretaillevelthepresenceofclose-knitanddeeplyrootedinformalnetworkofsmalltraders(humanresources)withtheiracceptednormsandpracticesactsasafeguardtoKenyaninterestsvis-à-vistheChinese

Arenasandtablesofnegotiation

ARENA'theproblem'contextualizedintheKenyandomesticcontext(historicallegaciesandcurrentpolicypreferences)

ROOTED:Highlyregulated(policyandlegal);historicalsignificance+2010constitution

IN-THE-MAKING:Acknowledgedgapinthelegalsystemin2004,legalrecognitionin2008withcreationofACA

ROOTED:Existenceofstronginformalsystemofgovernancesidedbylackofspecificlawstoregulateforeigninvestment(especiallytheminimumendoftherange)withrecentacknowledgementbyKenInvest.

Mobilizationframework

Existinglegalframework>stronglinkbetweenframeworkandimplementation.Informalactionsalongthebureaucraticladderattemptbypassingtheframeworkwithnotmuchsuccess.

Weakinstitutionalframework>officialinstrumentsusedtotriggerdemocraticprocessesofpolicyandlegalchange.

Informalwithpoliticaldynamics.Chineseveryreceptiveofsocialdiscontent,requestedwithdrawalofretailers.Kenyansusedthemeansknown,i.e.protest,evenifoutsideofficialregulatoryframeworks.

ModeofaddressingtheissuewiththeChinese

Re-active Re-active Re-active

Tableofnegotiation Lightalteration Conformity Lightalteration

Source:Author’sfindings

146

CHAPTER5

Kenyanresponsestohealthcarecooperationandtrade

withChina

5.1 ThecontextThe increasingChinesepresence inhealthcaredevelopment, far frombeingas

visibleandcontroversialasthatpresentedinthepreviouschapter,representsone

of the most important cases of so-called South-South cooperation according to

whichtheengagementismovedbysolidarityandmutualitymotivesinspheresthat

relate not only to development assistance but also trade in health products and

devices. It is also, togetherwitheducation,oneof themost important aspectsof

people-to-people engagements as reported in Sino-African documents such as

FOCACdeclarations.Fromtradeinhealthproductsanddevicestotheconstruction

of hospitals, passing through capacity building and development of traditional

medicine,KenyanactorshaverecentlyexperiencedtheentryofChinainanational

environment (the arena) that is mainly dominated by Western companies,

traditionaldevelopmentpartners,India,andtoasmallerextentlocalmanufacturers,

yetregionallysignificant.

ForKenya,thedevelopmentofhealthcare,togetherwitheducation,isoneofthe

most important issue-area of the Social Pillar under the Kenya Vision 2030

framework.Itisworthemphasisingthatthesystemofgovernanceforhealthcarein

Kenyaisacomplexone,“amixedstoryofprogressandinequality.Whileinsome

areastherehasbeengoodprogress,inotherstherestillremainsmuchtobedone

[…]Overallitisestimatedthatforatleast25%ofthepopulationthereisanunmet

needformostformsofhealthcare”528.Consequentialtothis,itisnotsurprisingthat

thespecificissuesunpackedinthischapter(whichreflecttheareasinwhichChina

mostlycommitsitselfinAfrica)presentlotsofvarianceinthestructuraldimensions

ofgovernanceaswellasintheabilityofagentstoworkthroughthem.Inparticular,

theheavyinvolvementoftraditionaldonorsintheprovisionofmostformsofhealth

careisasignificantaspectoftheanalysisofKenya-Chinaexpandingrelationsinthe

sector.

528LewisandKerr,op.cit.,p.4.

147

Chinahasbeenseenasanimportantpartnerfortheachievementofdevelopment

goals for three main reasons: for the trade in cheap quality drugs, for its

infrastructuredevelopmentcapacityandtheinvolvementincapacitybuilding.For

China, the involvement inhealth-relatedactivities inKenyahasbeenhistorically

rooted in South-South cooperation motives. Assistance provision for capacity

building(throughthedispatchofChineseMedicalTeams)hasbeenthemainform

of cooperation with Africa since the 1960s 529 . However, since the 2000s, the

relationsarefastexpandingbeyondcapacitybuildingtocommercialactivities,with

the Chinese hoping to gain a foothold in markets such as the Kenyan one, i.e.

relativelyadvancedandahubtootherEastAfricanregions.China’sroleinthesector,

however, is still minimal compared to traditional partners and enjoys limited

visibility, despite having expanded quickly in the past ten years. This applies in

particulartoareaswheretraditionaldevelopmentpartnershavenotventuredsuch

asthedevelopmentofmega-infrastructureforhealthcarevis-à-visinvolvementin

community-level projects, or the involvement in researching and developing

traditionalmedicine.

Available English-language studies on China-Africa, let alone Kenya-China,

health-relatedassistanceandtrade,arescarce.TheytendtoconcentrateonChina’s

motivationsforprovidingassistancetoAfricancountries,ratherthanconcentrating

on an analysis of how Chinese assistance meets the needs of receiving

countries/communities, and are strongly framed as South-South cooperation

initiatives – onlymore recently starting to focus on the commercial side of the

relations530. One of themost studied aspects is the dispatch of Chinesemedical

teams to Africa, as an example of historically rooted solidarity531 . However, no

studiesare focusingon ifandhowtheseengagementsare framedwithinAfrican

contexts or how they meet African development agendas. Despite the extreme

importanceincreasinglyattributedtohealthcarecooperationbyChina’stoplevels,

especially in FOCAC documents, relationswith Kenya, as the cases below show,

appear limited if compared to other sectors or Kenya’s engagement with other

partners.Theselectionoftheaspectsunderanalysis,then,wasnotconsequentialto

529SeeA.Li,‘ChineseMedicalCooperationinAfrica’,DiscussionPaper,no.52,NordiskaAfrikainstitutet,Uppsala,2011;X.Wang,J.Zhu,andD.Zhang,‘China’sforeignaidonhumanresourcesforhealth:Experienceandimplications’,JournalofAfricanStudiesandDevelopment,vol.5,no.5,September,2013;Y.Huang,‘PursuingHealthasForeignPolicy:TheCaseofChina’,IndianaJournalofGlobalLegalStudies,vol.17,no.1,2010;530seeBrautigam,2011,op.cit.531SeeLi,2011,op.cit.;Wang,Zhu,Zhang,op.cit.;Huang,2010,op.cit.;D.H.Shinn,‘Africa,ChinaandHealthCare’,InsideAISA,nos.3and4,October/December2006.

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observationsofincreasedinvolvementbutratherreflectedtheneedtounderstand

what characteristics of the Kenyan environment distanced the country from the

discoursesandallegedcontinentalexpandingpracticesofhealthcarecooperation

withChina.

This chapter focuses on understanding the decision-making process in Kenya

whenitcomestoprioritisingandnegotiatinghealth-relatedassistanceprojectsand

commercial activities for the development of the health system. The chapter

unpacksthestudyofthesystem(s)ofgovernanceandtheprocessesofengagement

between actors, namely their interests and the modalities through which they

negotiate,tocontextualiseChina’sassistanceandcommercialpresence.Thethree

cases selected to be explored represent three major types of engagement in

healthcare cooperation between China and African countries, namely the

developmentoftradeinhealthproductsanddevices,infrastructureforhealth,and

traditional medicine. They embody very different forms of cooperation and

assistanceprovisionbyChinatoKenya.Theyalsoshedlightonextremelydifferent

bureaucraticstructureswithintheKenyanhealthsector.Thefocusisnotonlyon

theKenyandecision-makingprocesstounderstandtherationalebehindthechoice

ofpartnersinhealthcareassistancefordevelopmentaswellasintrade,butalso-

andmostimportantlyforthissector-onhowstructuresdefineactions.

Finally,thissectorprovidesanopportunitytostudycomplexdynamicsbelonging

tobothcommercialanddevelopmentassistancespheresofengagement.Whilethe

previouschapterfocusedmostlyontrade,andthefollowingchapterfocusesmostly

ondevelopmentassistance,thisonepresentsamixofthetwo.

5.1.1 China-AfricahealthcarecooperationThechapterfirstlooksathowhealthcarecooperationisframedinChina-Africa

relations.HealthcarecooperationbetweenChinaandAfricancountriesissetagainst

averyarticulateinternationalcontextthatinvolves“26multilateralagencies,more

than40bilateraldonors,and20globalandregionalfunds”532.Despitethelong-term

engagementbetweenChinaandAfricancountriesinhealthcarecooperationdating

back to the 1960s, the relationwas formalised, institutionalised and accelerated

with the advent of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000 and the

532H.Feldbaum,K.LeeandJ.Michaud,‘GlobalHealthandForeignPolicy’,EpidemiologicReviews,vol.32,no.1,2010,p.83.

149

establishmentofparallelforums533.TheseforumshavebeentheplatformforChina

to announce its commitments towards Africa (more so than vice versa, indeed

normally“thetwosidesagree”butitisonlytheChinesegovernmentthat“offers”)

andtoevaluatetheirprogress.Farfrommeaningthatalltheprojectscarriedout

betweenChinaandanygivenAfricancountryarepartofFOCAC,theForumandits

documentsnonethelessprovideanideaofwhat isbeingdone,albeitgeneraland

rarelycountry-specific.

Though stillmainly carried out at the state-to-state level these relationshave

beguntoexpandtopeople-to-peopleexchanges.Thepeople-centredrhetoricisalso

the focus of theMinisterial Forum on China-Africa Health Development, held in

Beijing in August 2013, defined by Li Anshan a “milestone” in China-Africa

relations534 . Li claims that this first ever meeting between Chinese and African

healthministersdemonstrates“commitmentatthehighestlevelstojointlyaddress

healthchallenges”.TheBeijingDeclaration,originatedfromthedeliberationsduring

the same Forum, states: “Under the theme of ‘Priorities of China-Africa Health

Cooperation in theNewEra’,we have recognised health as a central element of

China-Africa cooperation, and its important role in developing China-Africa

relationsandinpromotingfriendshipamongourpeoples”535.Lisuggeststhatthis

recognitionisasignof“anongoingevolutionofChinaandAfrica’sjointeffortstobe

morestrategicandsustainable”536.

‘Morestrategicandsustainable’seemstomeanthatincreasedattentionispaid

toworkinginclosecollaborationwithAfricanagentstomakesuretheengagements

arebeneficialtothespecificneedsofthecountryinquestion,ratherthanaone-size-

fits-allapproachfromChina.Italsomeansthattherelationsneedtomovetoward

the inclusion of actors beyond the state-level in contributing to the

provision/requestofassistance(throughCSRprojectsasexplainedinthesection

below on Development Assistance) as well as the development of commercial

relations (tomove fromassistance to tradeasexplained in thesectionbelowon

Trade).Whether this increasedattention is consequential to the experiences the

533China-AfricaForumonTraditionalMedicineandadoptionofthePlanofActionfortheCooperationofTraditionalMedicinebetweenChinaandAfricanCountries,2002;2ndInternationalRoundtableonChina-AfricaHealthCooperation,2009;3rdInternationalRoundtableonChina-AfricaHealthCooperation,2011;China-AfricaTradeandCooperationonPharmaceuticalsandMedicaldevices,2012;4thInternationalRoundtableonChina-AfricaHealthCooperation,2013;MinisterialForumofChina-AfricaHealthDevelopment(partofFOCAC),2013.534A.Li,‘MilestonemeetingchartsasharedfutureinChina-Africahealthcooperation’,ThomsonReutersFoundation,16August2013.535NationalHealthandFamilyPlanningCommissionofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,BeijingDeclaration,China-AfricaMinisterialForumonHealthDevelopment,16thAugust2013.536Li,2013,op.cit.

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ChinesegovernmentandcompanieshadinAfrica,isstillnotclear.Itisimportantto

mentionthatstudiesontheAfricanlogicsofinclusion(i.e.thethinkingbehindthe

decisionto‘add’China-or‘fititin’,àlaClapham-tothe‘list’ofdonorsfromwhich

toreceiveassistance,and to the listofpartnerswithwhich tostrikecommercial

deals)ofChina’sassistanceeffortsandcommercialpenetrationofdrugsanddevices

arelacking.Tobetterunderstanddynamicsofassistanceandtrade,thetwoaspects

areseparatedintheanalysisbelow.

DevelopmentAssistance

The recognition of health as a priority in the development of China-Africa

relations and in fostering friendship among the peoples is part of a broader

discourseofSouth-Southcooperationaswellas,morerecently,astrategyofChinese

soft power537 . Despite China emphasizing the importance of cooperation while

rejectingthedonor-recipientapproachofDAC-OECDmembers,asKingpointsout,

thereseemtohavebeenslightchanges inChina’sdiscoursesoncooperationand

assistance,namely“anacknowledgementthatinadditiontothediscourseofSouth-

South cooperation which China maintains, it is also operating as a major aid

agency”538.Kingsuggeststhat“theshiftfrom‘cooperation’to‘aid’reflectsasenseof

movingfrombeing‘firstamongequals’inthenon-alignedstatesandintheearlier

periodofopeningup,tobeingnowanemergentsuperpower”539.

SincethefirstFOCACin2000,developmentassistanceforhealthhascontinued

toappearinthedocumentsintheformofpledgesrelatedtosocialdevelopment.

The focus of the assistance became,with time,more articulate. From an almost

exclusivefocusonChineseMedicalTeams,theengagementexpandeditsscopeto

the anti-malaria campaign, training African medical personnel, China-supported

medications,facilitiesandhospitalsinAfrica,andChinesemedicalcooperationwith

WHO and other international institutions 540 but also cooperation in the

development of traditional medicine, anti-HIV/AIDS and other communicable

diseasestreatmentsaswellasmaternalandchildhealth,andemergencyresponse.

ThedispatchofChineseMedicalTeamsisconsideredoneofthemosteffective

formsofChinesehealthcareassistancetoAfrica541.LiAnshanreportsthatChinese

537Brautigam,2011,op.cit.,p.8.538King,2013,op.cit.,p.7.539Ibid.540Li,op.cit.,2011,p.7.541Shinn,op.cit.,p.15.

151

medicalteamshavetreated240millionpatientsaroundtheworldincludingin44

Africancountriesfrom1963to2009,allbutEgypt,IvoryCoast,Kenya,Mauritius,

Nigeria,SouthAfricaandSwaziland.ChineseMedicalTeamshavetreatedthemost

diverse diseases not just through modern medicine but also through Chinese

traditionalmedicaltreatment,“especiallyacupuncture”542.Despitethefactthat,as

justmentioned,Kenyaneverrequested/receivedaCMT,theissueisstillworthof

attentionduetothenatureofthecooperation,namelyeducational.Itwill,however,

beaddressedinChapter6inthecontextofamoredetailedelaborationofassistance

towardshumanresourcesdevelopment.

Infrastructure is the area towhich China allocates the largest share of aid543.

However,duetotransparencyissuesconcerningChina’sreleaseofdata,itishardto

estimatetheexactshareoramountofaidallocatedannuallytoinfrastructurefor

healthcare.AccordingtoBrautigam,upto2009,China“hadfinancedthebuilding

(andoftenequipping)ofmorethan100hospitalsandclinicsworldwide,including

54inAfrica”544.Thenumberprobablyincludedthe2006FOCACpledgestobuild30

hospitalsand30malariacentres.Accordingto theWhitePaperonAid issuedby

Chinain2014545,from2010to2012outof580constructionprojectsbuiltbyChina

overseas–amountingto52,4%oftotalaiddisbursed-80hospitalswerebuilt.

Finally, in terms of medicines and medical equipment donations, China has

providedanumberofAfricancountrieswithfreemedicinestofightmalaria,cholera,

tuberculosis,meningitisamongothers546,equipmentsuchasmosquitonets547and

reproductive health medical equipment 548 . The single most important type of

donationisthatoftheanti-malariadrug,Cotexin,developedin1993bytheChinese

pharmaceuticalcompanyBeijingHolley-Cotec,laterapprovedbytheWHOandused,

since1996,byallChinesemedicalteams–asperrequestfromtheChineseMinistry

ofHealth549. China's leaders visitingAfrica have often offered Cotexin as a state

gift550.Since2006anotherChineseanti-malariadrugenteredthescene,theGuilin

542Li,2011,op.cit.,p.18.543Brautigam,2011,op.cit.,p.3.544Ibid.,p.4.545GovernmentofthePRC,2014,op.cit.546Shinn,op.cit.,p.15547Shinn,2006,p.15548E.Little,‘China’sSmartPowerinReproductiveHealth:ReachingouttoUganda’,inC.McGifferted.,ChineseSoftPowerandItsImplicationsfortheUnitedStates,CentreforStrategic&InternationalStudies,Washington,2009,pp.35-36.549Li,2011,op.cit.550Ibid.,p.16.

152

PharmaceuticalCompany’sArtesunateinjection,approvedbyWHOandconsidered

themosteffectiveintheemergencytreatmentofmalaria551.

Theneedtofindmoresustainablesolutionsforthedisbursementofassistance

andtheneedtocounter-balancenegativeperceptionsinothersectors552mayhave

ledChinatoevolveitsdevelopmentparadigmfromastate-ledtoonethatincludes

private companies and non-governmental organisations in the disbursement of

fundsforassistanceprojects.InKenya,forinstance,CSRprojects(fromemergency

responsetopovertyreduction/development)carriedoutbyprivateorstate-owned

enterprises,areincreasinglyencouragedbytheChineseCommercialandEconomic

Counsellor’s Office553. This was reportedly done so that the companies that are

engagedonthegroundwouldnotonlybeassociatedwithbigprojectsbutalsowith

community-leveldevelopments.Atthesametime,theChineseRedCrosshasbeen

collaboratingwiththeKenyanRedCrossonafewprojectsincludingtheprovision

ofhumanitarianaidtodrought-affectedareasin2011554.

Trade

Healthcarecooperationamongcountriesandmulti-lateralagenciesdoesinvolve

not only development assistance but also trade in health-related products and

servicesthatisdistinctfrom,butalsointertwinedwiththeprovisionofassistance.

Brautigam points out that “services thatwere formerly freewould gradually be

changed into jointly run hospitals, pharmaceutical factories, and other kinds of

‘mutually beneficial cooperation,’ in order to promote the export of China’s

pharmaceutical products and medical services” 555 . China’s pharmaceutical

companies have become competitive internationally and have started exporting,

making the country “the market with the best comprehensive advantages and

greatestpotentialforthefuturedevelopment”556.

TheChina-AfricaTradeandCooperationonPharmaceuticalsandMedicaldevices,

held in September 2012, was convened under the auspices of the East Africa

CommunityandChinaChamberofCommerceforImportandExportofMedicines

andHealthProducts(CCCMHPIE)withtheaimto“facilitateexchangeofinformation

551Ibid,p.17.552Suchasinfrastructuredevelopment.553InterviewwithanofficerattheChineseEconomicandCommercialCounsellor’sOffice,Nairobi,2013-11-18.554‘China'sfoodaidtoAfricaandAgriculturalCooperationwithAfricanContinent’,GovernmentofthePRCviaReliefweb,Beijing,23August2011.555Brautigam,2011,op.cit.,p.8.AlsoseeD.Brautigam,Thedragon'sgift:therealstoryofChinainAfrica,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009,p.118-119.556B.Ochieng,‘AfricaFocus:KenyahailsChina'sassistanceinhealthsector’,Xinhua,19July2012.

153

on the potentials for expanded cooperation between China and EAC countries

related to manufacture, technology exchange and trade in pharmaceuticals and

medicaldevices”557.TheCCCMHPIEVice-PresidentMengDongpingpointedoutthat

“alongwith the tradeandculturalexchange, thehealthcarecooperationbetween

ChinaandAfricahasshowngreatpotentialwiththetradevolumemaintainingan

annual growth rate of 40 percent on average” 558 . Cao Gang, director of the

CCCMHPIE,statedthat“Chinaischangingthehistoricallackofmedicine”559inAfrica

mainlythankstothe“lowpricesandgoodqualityofChina'smedicalproducts”560.

Infact,“AfricahasbecomethelargestexportmarketformedicinemadebyChina

and one of the fastest-growing markets for Chinese medical products […] The

growth rate of exports to Africa was higher than that for European and North

Americanmarketsinthesameperiod”561.Intermsofproduction,Chinastillmainly

produces in China, though a number of pharmaceutical factorieswere set up in

countriessuchasMali,Tanzania,Ethiopiaandsincethe1990s,“someChinese-built

pharmaceutical factories in Africa were privatized, and Chinese companies took

equityparticipationasjointventures”562.

Themajor issue concerning the tradeofpharmaceuticals revolves around the

existence of counterfeit products. TheChinese authorities, in 2007 “closedmore

than 9000 unlicensed pharmaceutical factories, terminated nearly 400

counterfeiting operations and executed theheadof China’s State Food andDrug

Administration for corruption. However, significant weaknesses remain in the

regulationofpharmaceuticalproductioninChina”563.Thefightagainstcounterfeits

involvesgovernmentsaswell asprivate companiesandconsumers inChinaand

Africancountries(seethepreviouschapterfordetails).

5.1.2 Kenya-ChinarelationsThissectionbriefly introduces thesystemofgovernanceregulating thehealth

sectorasawhole(whilemoredetailedaccountsareprovidedforeachcasebelow),

explaininghowexternalactorsinteractwithdomesticactorswithinthesystem.

557Ibid.558Ibid.559Y.Wanged.,‘AfricabecomeslargestChinesemedicineexportmarket’,XinhuaviaEmbassyofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofKenya,4November2012.560Ibid.561Ibid.562Brautigam,2011,op.cit.,p.4.563Ibid.,p.9.

154

TherelationsbetweenKenyaandChinainhealthcaredatebacktothe1980s564.

As inmost cases, the engagement flourished in the 2000swith the provision of

assistance by China and increased trade in medical products and devices. The

emergenceofChineseservicesandproductsmustbecontextualisednotonlywithin

Kenya’sdomesticsystemofgovernancebutalso incomparisonto therestof the

continent. While the Kenyan healthcare system of governance presents

shortcomingsintermsofeffectiveplanninganddelivery,itis,nonetheless,themost

advancedintheEastAfricanregioninpolicytermsaswellaslegislative,regulatory

and institutional,occupyingthe17thposition,outof52countries565intheHealth

clusteroftheIbrahimIndexofGoodGovernance(2013).

Thepublicexpenditure566in2014was61.25%ofthetotalhealthexpenditure567

whereasout-of-pocketexpenditurewas26.1%568.Externalresources569forhealth

amountedto27.5%570ofthetotalexpenditure.Theshareofthegovernment’stotal

budgetallocatedtohealthcarewas4%571ofthetotalgovernmentbudget,farbehind

thethresholdof15%ofthetotalbudgetwhichwassetasatargettobemetby2015

byAfricanGovernmentsintheAbujaDeclarationin2001.ThegovernmentofKenya

isstronglysupportedandcomplemented,inpolicy-makingandimplementation,by

developmentpartners(atbothbilateralandmultilateral level)andimplementing

partnerssuchasfaith-basedorganisations,theprivatesectorandcivilsocietymore

broadly. As reported by Business Monitor International the Ministry of Health

operates approximately 50% of health facilities, with the remainder run by the

privatesector,missionaryorganisationsortheMinistryofLocalGovernment572.For

instance,theCatholicChurch“operatesnearly30percentofallhealthcarefacilities

564InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalServices,Nairobi,2014-09-29.565Rankover52countrieswhere1isthebestand52theworst.566Publichealthexpenditureconsistsofrecurrentandcapitalspendingfromgovernment(centralandlocal)budgets,externalborrowingsandgrants(includingdonationsfrominternationalagenciesandnongovernmentalorganizations),andsocial(orcompulsory)healthinsurancefunds.Totalhealthexpenditureisthesumofpublicandprivatehealthexpenditure.Itcoverstheprovisionofhealthservices(preventiveandcurative),familyplanningactivities,nutritionactivities,andemergencyaiddesignatedforhealthbutdoesnotincludeprovisionofwaterandsanitation.567WorldBankstatistics,2014.http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/kenya/health-expenditure.568AsdefinedbytheWorldHealthOrganisation“Thisisacoreindicatorofhealthfinancingsystems.Thisindicatorcontributestounderstandingtherelativeweightofprivateentitiesintotalexpenditureonhealth.Itincludesexpenditurefrompooledresourceswithnogovernmentcontrol,suchasvoluntaryhealthinsurance,andthedirectpaymentsforhealthbycorporations(profit,non-for-profitandNGOs)andhouseholds.Asafinancingagentclassification,itincludesallsourcesoffundingpassingthroughtheseentities,includinganydonor(funding)theyusetopayforhealth”.Availableat:http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=119.569AsdefinedbytheWorldHealthOrganisation:“anindicatorwhichreferstotheoriginoftheresourcesusedtopurchasehealthservices.Someoftheseexternalsourceswillbechannelledthroughthegovernment'sbudget,somethroughinsuranceagencies,somethroughtheprivateorNGOsectors.Assuch,thesefundscannotsimplybeaddedtothosereportedintheearlierbreakdowns”.Availableat:http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?iid=91570WorldBankstatistics,2014,571WorldBankstatistics,2014.http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/kenya/health-expenditure.572BusinessMonitorInternational,KenyaPharmaceuticalsandHealthcareReport,Q4,BusinessMonitorInternational,2014,p.56.

155

which includes, but is not limited to 54 hospitals, 83 health centres and 311

dispensaries”573.

In2007theKenyaHealthSectorWideApproach(SWAp)wasintroducedbythe

governmentofKenyatoguaranteethatdevelopmentpartners’objectiveswerein

linewiththegovernmentagendaandtoavoidduplicationofefforts.Onlythemajor

partnersadheredtotheCodeofConduct,namelytheUS,UK,Denmark,Germany,

Japan, the EU as well as representatives of multilateral agencies, while others

includingChinahavenot,todate.TheSWApagreementemphasises:

Theneedfordonoragenciestoaligntheirhealth-relatedcommitmentswith

theGovernmentofKenya’sdevelopmentagenda.Atthesametime,itenvisions

thatthegovernment,NGOsanddonoragencieswilldevelopandemploycommon

methodologiesforplanning,disbursementoffunds,procuringcommoditiesand

reportingonprogramoutcomes.TheSWApCodeofConductalsounderscores

theneedfordonorsinKenyatoprovidereliablecommitmentsofaidoveramulti-

yearframeworkinordertofacilitatetheMinistryofHealth’splanningprocess.574

China has not adhered to the SWAp 575 or registered with associations of

manufacturersandserviceproviders,suchastheKenyaHealthcareFederation576,

thus detaching itself from the local institutional and associational environment.

Notwithstanding this, the country is seen as an important partner for the

achievementofdevelopmentgoalsforthreemainreasons: forthetradeincheap

qualitydrugs, for its infrastructuredevelopmentcapacityandthe involvement in

capacitybuilding.Ontopofthis,Chinaisalsoseenasanimportantpartnerforits

involvement in researching and developing traditional medicine. Although this

latterformofengagementisonlyemerging,itisapotentiallyinfluencingsourceof

softpowerthatdrawsuponAfrica’shistoricaldependenceontraditionalmedicine

and China’s willingness to push for global recognition of TCM at the policy and

legislativelevels.DespitetherelevanceoftraditionalmedicineforbothAfricanand

Chinesecontexts,theissuehasbeenoverlookedbyWesternregulatoryinstitutions.

573E.Otuki,‘Devolvedhealthinstitutionstogetsubsidiseddrugs’,BusinessDaily,5August2013.574CentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,‘Kenya:Thebigpictureonhealth’,SmartGlobalHealth[website].575Kenyahasapreferenceofnegotiatingdonors’supportforhealththroughtheSectorWideApproach,since2007.Itisapreference,notanobligation.Thispreferencewasidentifiedasbestpracticetoavoidduplicationofeffortsbydevelopmentpartners.TheimplicationsofsuchpreferenceforChina,whichisnotpartofSWAp,arethatKenyanactorsmightnotbewillingtobypasstheexistingsystemofgovernanceinordertonegotiatewithChina.Theirunwillingnessmightberootedinthefactthatfortheactorsinvolved,SWApisthemostmeaningfulapproach.576BranchofKenyaPrivateSectorAssociation(KEPSA)forhealthcare.

156

The interest in promoting change internationally is accompanied by economic

interestsincreatingamarketforChinesecompanies.

5.2 Kenya’sresponsesTheinteractionbetweenKenyanstakeholdersinthehealthcaresectorvis-à-vis

Chinamainlyrevolvesaroundinsertinganewplayerinascenariowellpopulated

bylong-presentdevelopmentpartnersandcommercialactors.Thisimplieslearning

about the way tomatch domestic needs with the Chinese offer of development

assistanceandtradelinkages.Italsomeansidentifyingwhataspectsofthesystem

ofgovernanceshouldbepreservedandwhataspectscouldbe improvedthrough

the engagement with China. The improvement of the health care system has

emerged as a priority for Kenya since the 2000s. While some objectives were

achieved, such as the curbing of the HIV-AIDS crisis, many others remain and

represent challenges that have an impact on the industrialisation process the

countryisexperiencing.

ThissectionlooksathowandwhydifferentKenyanagentshavemadesenseof

their interaction with Chinese actors and how they have justified their actions

domestically. In other words, it looks at the interplay between the interests

emergingwiththearrivalofChinaandtheexistingsystemsofgovernance.Existing

systems of governance are scrutinised to evaluate whether they are suitable to

guaranteethesafeguardofKenyanactors’interests,betheseoldornew.Opposite

tothecasesofthepreviouschapterwhereKenyanactors’motivationstoengagewith

theChineseweretriggeredbysocialdiscontent,associatedwithanunwantedchange

inthesystemsofgovernancecausedbytheChineseproducts/activities,inthecaseof

healthcarethemotivationstoengagewithChinarevolvearoundalessconfrontational

relationwiththeChinese.

Thecasesanalysedbelowconcern:

1. TheentranceofChinesehealthproductsandtechnologiesinthepublicand

privatesectors.Thestudymainlylooksatthedifferentpenetrationrateof

Chinesegoodsinthepublicandprivatesectors,whichreflectsthestructural

limitations that characterise the Kenyan system of governance and the

significantrolehistoricallyplayedbyinternationalorganisations.

157

2. The negotiation andmanagement by Kenyan actors of the infrastructural

assistanceprovidedbyChina,includingequipment.Thisissueisrelevantto

evaluatehowChina’soffersarecontextualisedwithin theKenyanexisting

systemofgovernance,highlydominatedbymulti-lateralinstitutions.

3. The engagement/cooperation in thedevelopment of theNatural Products

Industryinitiative.ThestudyofthisissueattemptstoevaluatehowKenyan

actors acknowledge the unsuitability of the system of governance to

safeguardemerginginterestsandhowtheyengagewithChinatoimproveit.

5.2.1 TradeinHealthproductsandtechnologiesThemaingoalofKenyaVision2030,Socialpillar,healthcaredeliveryisthatto

provide“equitableandaffordablehealthcareatthehighestaffordablestandardto

all citizens.”577 Chinese products are considered key to achieving Vision 2030’s

goalsthankstotheirextremelyaffordablepricesandgoodquality.However,their

entrance issubjectednotonly tomarketdynamicsbutalso toahighlyregulated

systemofgovernance,which,inconjunctionwithChina’sownlimitations(Chinais

onlystartingtoemerge,internationally,asaproducerofdrugsandmedicaldevices),

actsasa forcehindering, fornow,deeperKenya-Chinarelations.Thiscasesheds

light on how the current domestic structuring of the sector (heavily reliant on

international institutions) interferes with China’s FOCAC pledges of providing

medicinestoAfricancountries.Thiscaseisparticularlyinterestingasitshowshow

important it is to account for sub-sectoral characteristics to understand the

relationsandthewaythestructureofaspecificpolicyareacaninfluencedomestic

andinternationalagentialrelations.

Domesticandinternationalregulatoryinstitutions

Kenya is currently the largest producer of pharmaceutical products in the

CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA)region.Oftheregion's

estimated50recognisedpharmaceuticalmanufacturers,30arebasedinKenyaand,

togetherwith circaother12 localmanufacturers, theyproduceabroad rangeof

productsforboththelocalandinternationalmarkets(primarilyessentialgeneric

medicines). Local manufacturing has capacity to produce formulations – mostly

genericdrugs–andpackagefinishedproducts.Manufacturersare,however,highly

577GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,‘KenyaVision2030,TheVision’,KenyaVision2030[website].

158

reliant on imports of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API), “with local

availabilitylimitedto5%ofthetotal industrialrequirements”578.APIs,whichare

necessary to manufacture medicines, are imported from India, and increasingly

from China 579 . Directly competing with local products are, historically, Indian

products.Lowpricesandgoodqualityarethemainincentivesforthislong-lasting

relationship.IndiancompaniesproduceinIndiamainlybecauseAPIsareavailable

there. Genericmedicines from India havebeenprocured for decades byKenya’s

public and private sectors. APIs are also procured from India, though China is

increasinglyenteringthemarket.

Beyondgenericmedicines,Kenyaishighlyreliantondonors’assistanceforthe

provisionofdrugsforcommunicablediseasessuchasHIV,malaria,TB.Especially

in the case of HIV, according to the National AIDS & STI Control Programme

(NASCOP),thesituationimprovedsubstantiallysince1999tothepointthat“HIVis

oneof theMilleniumDevelopmentGoalsthatwe, inKenya,achieved”580. In1999

Kenya declared HIV/AIDS a national disaster. According to NASCOP “the

governmentwas looking for all sorts of partners”,major ones becoming the US

President’sEmergencyPlan forAIDSRelief (PEPFAR)and theGlobal Fund since

2003.JICAalsoprovidedsignificantassistancebetween2006-2013,butthegrant

wasnotrenewed581.Infact,theintervieweeatNASCOPcontinues,“weneedmore

partners,fundingfromtraditionaldonorsisreducing.Weneedtocontinuewiththe

work and thus need to consider new partners, through the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.Chinawillalsobeconsidered”.Drugsprocuredthroughdonorfundingand

NGOsarefreeofchargeandmustbeWHOpre-qualified.Themaindiseasesthatfall

underthiscategoryareHIV/AIDS,malaria,TBandreproductivehealth,thesame

categoriesChinapledgessupportfor.However,eventhoughChinahaslinkeditsaid

to the United Nations summits on financing theMillennium Development Goals

(MDGs), there seems to be a disconnect on how the country cooperates with

internationalinstitutionsinthecontextofKenya.Asaconsequence,despitethefact

thatChina’spledgeswellalignwithKenyanneeds,China’slackofcompliancewith

internationalmechanismsexcludesitfromtheKenyanmarket.Inotherwords,Kenyan

actorsdecideandchoosetofollowpre-setroutesofmultilateralcooperationrather

thannegotiatingwithChinaindependently.

578BusinessMonitorInternational,op.cit.,p.71.579InterviewwithanexecutiveatthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,RegistrarDivision,Nairobi,2014-02-07.580InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalAIDS&STIControlProgramme(NASCOP),Nairobi,2014-10-08.581Ibid.

159

TheentranceofChineseproducts:procurementanddistribution

As briefly outlined above, the option and choice to procure Chinese health

productsandtechnologies,asnewastheyareintheKenyancontext,varyaccording

to a number of factors including international requirements to which Kenya

subscribes,thecapacityofmanufacturingfirms,andpriceandquality.Consequently,

the entrance of Chinese products is very highly dependent on the existing

governancesystemofprocurementanddistribution.Whileinothercasespresented

in this thesis, there are occurrences where existing governance systems are

challenged by either the Chinese or Kenyan actors (in response to the Chinese

presence),inthecaseofpharmaceuticals’trade,thesystemremainsunvaried.

Localmanufacturingcoversca30%ofKenyanneeds,theremainingisimported

mainlyfromIndia,thoughChineseproductsareincreasing582.Kenyaisthetopone

destinationforChineseproductsinEastAfrica(andsixthlargestintermsofbilateral

trade)583. CCCMHPIEVice-PresidentMengDongping stated that “in the past few

years,tradebetweenChinaandEastAfricahasmaintainedanannualgrowthof20

percent amounting to 145 million dollars whereby in 2011 the bilateral trade

betweenChinaandKenyareached78.87milliondollars,upby21.5percentyearon

year,makingKenya the largestmarket forChina inEastAfrica.”584Kenya,and in

particularNairobi,alsoactasahubthroughwhichtransitproducts forexportto

neighbouringcountries.

Chinese firms produce in China, export to Kenya and distribute through local

agentsexceptforacoupleofcompaniesthatdistributedirectly,mainlythanksto

their size, the type of product exported and international recognition. Chinese

manufacturingplantsarenotpresentinKenyaatthetimeofwritingalthoughthey

weresetupinotherAfricancountries.Somebelievethat“iftheysetuptheirfactory

plantsherethentheywin”bybeatingthecostsIndiafacesbyproducinginIndiaand

exportingtoKenya585.Asafact,“therewasaSino-Kenyagovernmenttogovernment

agreementthatneverenteredintoproduction”586thoughthereasonsareunclear.

ChineseproductsenteringKenyaaremainlyantibioticsandanti-malariadrugsbut

cover a broad range of medicines, including painkillers587 . The only WHO pre-

582InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,PharmacyDepartment,Nairobi.2014-09-30.583Ochieng,op.cit.584Ibid.585InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaPharmaceuticalAssociation,Nairobi,2014-01-31.586InterviewwithanexecutiveatthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,RegistrarDivision,Nairobi,2014-02-07.587Ibid.

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qualifiedChinesedrugthatisallowedontheKenyanmarketisamedicineforsevere

malariathatbecameWHOrecommendedin2012,timeafterwhichKenyaadopted

theWHOregulation588.Itisimportanttostatethatdespitetheimpressivegrowthof

China’spharmasector,thecountry’sroleinAPIproductionandsupply589reminds

that“thecountry’spharmaceuticalindustryremainspositionedatthelower-endof

the global value chain” 590 . Other foreign companies, from Europe and the US,

provide donor-funded drugsmainly for reproductive health. Kenya also imports

fromthembrandedproductsprimarilyfortourists.

Below, a break-down of the systems of governance for drugs’ registration,

procurementanddistribution.

Registrationandqualitycontrol

ThePPBassertsthatChinesedrugsdonotpresentparticularproblemsduring

theregistrationphase.Theonlyproblemobservedisduetolanguagebarriers.The

PPB states: “we reject ifwedo not understand the language, not because of the

qualitybut if you cannotput together adecent application thenwedoubt about

everythingelse.”591Thosethatdonotregisterdirectlydooutsourcing(thiswillbe

further expanded in the section below on manufacturing, procurement and

distribution).Despitetheexistenceofarelativelystrongregulatoryframeworkfor

theentranceofdomesticandforeigndrugsontothemarket,accordingtoamajor

actor intheprivatepharmaceuticalsector,“theregulatoryframeworkwehaveis

good,but it couldbe stronger.ThePPB’s capacity is stillweak in inspectionand

control.Itneedstobestrengthenedsowecanseparatethegoodfromthebad.The

controlsmustnotonlybeatentrybutasacontinuousmonitoringprocess.”592Itis

enoughtosaythatthePPBhasonlystartedin2013tomoveawayfromthemanual

recording of registered drugs and use an online portal for registration, renewal,

paymentofoperationallicenses593.WhilethePPBaffirmsthattherearethousands

ofChinesecompaniesapplyingforregistration594,therearenodigitalrecordsofthe

medicinesthathavebeenapprovedandthosethathaven’t.Theseweaknesses, in

turn,leavespaceforsub-standarddrugstocomeinun-registeredorforregistered

588InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MalariaControlDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-06.589Y.Huang,‘ChinesePharma:AGlobalHealthGameChanger?’,CouncilonForeignRelations[website],31March2015.590Ibid.591InterviewwithanofficeratthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-07.592Interviewwithanexecutive,KenyaHealthcareFederation,Nairobi,2014-10-08.593BusinessMonitorInternational,op.cit.,p.68;InterviewwithanofficeratthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-07.594InterviewwithanexecutiveatthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,RegistrarDivision,Nairobi,2014-02-07.

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drugstopotentiallynotmaintainstandardlevelsofquality.However,itisdifficult

to ascertain whether the belief that “Chinese counterfeits have not entered the

market”595is based on objective facts or a rule of thumb.Mostly, however, it is

believedthatcounterfeitdrugscomefromIndia596.Theproblemwithcounterfeiting

ofpharmaceuticalproductswasatthecentreofamajordisputebetweenpharma

manufacturers/agentsandthepolicy-makingbodiesduringthedraftingoftheAnti-

CounterfeitActtothepointthatthesectionoftheActreferringtomedicineshadto

besuspended597.EventhePPBbelievesthat,toacertainextent,theproblemwith

counterfeitsismorepoliticalthanreal:“ChineseandIndiandrugsaresodemonised.

Somemanufacturingcompaniesproducethesamedrugfordifferentpharmabrands,

itisthesamedrug,thesamecompanyandyetonebrandiswellreceivedandthe

otherdemonised.”598

The main problem concerning sub-standard drugs is the inefficiency of

regulations’ implementation, in particular, in follow-up phases. In 2009 the PPB

introducedpharmacovigilanceguidelinesbecause,asaffirmedbyPPB“itwasbest

practice. Pharmacovigilance is carried out throughout theworld.We decided to

adhere.” 599 Pharmaco-vigilance mostly consists of clinical trials, studies of the

medicinebeforeitisregistered,ratherthanfollowuponcethemedicineisalready

incirculation.Thisisdoneforonlyaportionofdrugsthatundergoclinicaltrialsin

Kenyaorfordrugsthatgiveadversereactions.ThePPBsaysthatthey“dore-active

pharmacovigilance, rather thanpro-active”600.So,even if checksaredoneduring

registrationandallrequisitesaresatisfied,whenthemedicineisshippeditcouldbe

anything else 601 , and the mechanisms in place to control are undermined by

implementationconstraintsincludinglackofpersonnelandcorruption.

Procurementanddistribution:Publicsectorandprogrammeitems

The procurement of pharmaceutical products is mainly divided into602: APIs,

essentialdrugs(firstlinetreatment,i.e.stockitemsinhospitals),programmeitems

(drugstargetingspecificdiseasessuchasmalaria,TB,HIVandreproductivehealth),

595InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaPharmaceuticalAssociation,Nairobi,2014-01-31.596Ibid.597InterviewwithanexecutiveatthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,RegistrarDivision,Nairobi,2014-02-07.598Ibid.599InterviewwithanofficeratthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-07.600Ibid.601InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,PharmacyDepartment,Nairobi.2014-09-30.602InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaMedicalSuppliesAgency(KEMSA),Procurement-DonorFundedProjectsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-17.

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medicalsupplies(dressings,nursingcare,etc.).Thepublicsectordoesnotprocure

APIsbutonlyfinishedproducts,whereastheprivatesectorimportsca90%ofAPIs

fordistributiontoKenyanmanufacturersandfinishedproducts.TheKenyaMedical

Supplies Agency (KEMSA) is a semi-autonomous institution responsible for

supplying drugs to public facilities. It does so through an open tender system

financedby theMinistryofHealth.KEMSAcompeteswithotherdistributors, the

mainonebeingMEDSintheprivatemarket603.

Theprocurementpatterninthepublicsectorvariesaccordingtothetypeofdrug,

whetheressential,programmeitemsormedicalsupplies.Regardingessentialdrugs,

theyare70%locallymanufacturedand30%imported.Thelocallymanufactured

include Kenyan and Kenyan-Indian, but also multi-nationals such as GSK.

Programmeitems(mustbeWHOqualified)arecloseto100%importedfromIndia

withasmallpercentagecomingfromEuropeandtheUSforreproductivehealth.

AccordingtoKEMSAChinesecompaniesrarelywinthebidsforthistypeofdrugs,

exceptfromonesinglecaseforwhichthepre-qualifieddrugonlycomesfromChina

and it is a medicine to cure severe malaria produced by a major Chinese

pharmaceuticalcompany604,which,asmentionedabove,wasadoptedbyWHOas

first-linetreatmentin2012.Intermsofmedicalsupplies,thescenariochangesas

70%areimportedwithonly30%locallymanufactured.Oftheimportedgoods,70%

comesfromChinaandtherestfromIndiaandothercountries,with“onlyasmall

portionfromthedevelopedworld”605.TherelationsKEMSAmaintainswithChinese

companiesarelimitedand,sofar,notconsistentintermsofprocurement,which,

the agency stresses, “takes place through competitive bidding”. The statistics

provided,however,areanindicationofanincreasedpresenceinthepastfewyears.

Stillpartofthepublicgovernancesystembutfollowingadifferenttrajectoryare

thedonationsofmedicines.AccordingtoKEMSA“usuallywedonotrequestthem,

but they come out of bilateral discussions”606. In 2003 the Chinese government

donatedabatchofmalariadrugs to thegovernmentofKenya.Thedonationwas

administeredbyKEMSAandwaschannelledthroughtheGlobalFund607.AnMOU

was signed by the Treasury and the Chinese government in the presence of the

603BusinessMonitorInternational,op.cit.,p.68.604InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MalariaControlDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-06.605InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaMedicalSuppliesAgency(KEMSA),Procurement-DonorFundedProjectsDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-17.606InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalServices,Nairobi,2014-09-29.607InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,PharmacyDepartment,Nairobi,2014-09-30.

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MinistryofHealth608.In2007/2008therewasanotherdonationbut,accordingto

KEMSA,theanti-malariadrugdonatedwasnotinlinewiththeapprovedtreatment

andhadtobedonatedtoneighbouringcountriesexceptfromashareofitthat,after

beingapprovedbytheDirectorofMedicalServices,wasusedinselectedgeographic

areaswheremaincommoditieshadrunout.Accordingtoothersources,themain

problemwiththedonationwasthatdespitebeingaregisteredproductitsshelf-life

was short 609 . In 2010-2011 the Chinese government gifted another batch of

duocotexinandinjectionartemisinthroughtheMedicalServicesandPublicHealth

Division.Ontopofconventionalmedicines,in2011/2012thegovernmentofChina

alsodonatedherbalmedicines,throughtheMinistryofHealth,forthetreatmentof

HIV.

ThePPB’sguidelinesfordonationsmainlyrestricttheexpirydateandthequality

althoughdonations, if thedrug is registered in the country, arenot subjected to

follow-upmechanisms.Intheformsattachedtothedonation,donorsmustjustify

whythatproductcannotbesourcedlocally,thensigntheagreement.Accordingto

the PPB, “our focus is on avoiding the dumping of low-quality products. Some

donationscome,andyouseeintheboxthatsometabletshavebeenusedalready.”610

Theseoccurrences,however,arenotuniquetodonationsfromChina.

Procurementanddistribution:Privatesector

MEDS is theequivalentofKEMSA for theprivate sector.According to sources

interviewed at the institution,MEDS has no substantial experience in procuring

productsfromChina.TheprivatesectorratherprocuresfromChinamainlythrough

agents.The sector’s institutional environment isorganisedandvocal.TheKenya

HealthcareFederation(KHF)istheumbrellabodythatgatherscorporatemembers

aswell as institutional andprofessional associations ranging fromsmall to large

hospitalsandclinics, fromdoctors’associationstopharmaceuticalmanufacturing

ones and so forth. The Federation is comprehensive enough that analysing its

relation–throughreportsofmembers’behaviour–withChina,ishereconsidered

sufficienttogeneraliseforthesector.

AccordingtoKHFnoChinesecompanyrequestedmembership,probablybecause

theyarenotdirectlypresentinthecountry,butareratherrepresentedbyagents.

608Ibid.609InterviewwithanofficeratthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-07.610Ibid.

164

However,“mostChineseproductsonthemarketarerepresentedbyoneormoreof

ourmembercompanies”611.KHFbelievesthatChinesecompanies,especiallythose

that are operating in Kenya directly (i.e. without intermediaries), should stop

avoidingtheinstitutionalenvironment,andjointhenetwork.KHFsuggeststhat“it

wouldbegoodforthemtojoinusasweprovidenetworkinganditwouldbegood

forthemtogetintegratedintotheKenyansystemratherthanjustactingontheir

own”612.

TheprivatesectortradewithChinamainlyrevolvesaroundequipmentand,more

significantly, active pharmaceutical ingredients. All 42 Kenyan pharma

manufacturingcompaniesuseimportedAPIs,andimportsfromChinacompetewith

those from India. Between India and China, they cover ca 90%of themarket613

whereIndiacovers30%andChina70%614.Until2011/2012theprivatesectorwas

highlydominatedby Indianproducts for thepharma side, andbyEuropeanand

American products formedical products and devices.While in pharmaceuticals’

tradeChinesecompanieshavenotexploredthemarket–theyratheractthrough

local agents – in the tradeofmedicalproducts anddevices “quite a shareof the

marketistakenbyChineseproducts”615.Oneofthereasonsbelievedtobekeeping

Chinesecompaniesawayfrominvestingdirectlyisthat“thesectorisdominatedby

anumberof forces and the costof investment is toohigh,25millionUSD is the

startingpoint.ThatiswhytheChinesearenotpenetratingtoomuch”616.

Beyond this complex domestic system of governance which obstructs the

penetrationofChineseproducts,thenegativeperceptionassociatedwiththequality

ofproductscomingfromChinaalsohasasignificantimpactonthepossibilityfor

theChinesetogetashareofthemarket.Particularlyregardingmedicaldevices,the

factthatKenyanfacilitiesarehistoricallyaccustomedtoproductsfromEuropeand

the US makes it difficult to open to Chinese goods, which are currently mostly

distributedtolevel2or3clinics/hospitalsintheprivatesector.Thesearesmaller

facilities,notthetopendoftheprivate.Accordingtosources,thereasonwhythey

servethesehospitals isthattheyarecheaper.Anumberofagentsnotedthatthe

611Interviewwithanexecutive,KenyaHealthcareFederation,Nairobi,2014-10-08.612Ibid.613Ibid.614InterviewwithanexecutiveataKenyan-Indiancompanydistributingmedicalproductsanddevices,Nairobi,2014-10-15.615Interviewwithanexecutive,KenyaHealthcareFederation,Nairobi,2014-10-08.616InterviewwithanexecutiveataKenyan-Indiancompanydistributingmedicalproductsanddevices,Nairobi,2014-10-15.

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lowercostsofChineseproductssometimesequalstolowqualitybutoftendoesnot.

Thisvariationisfoundalsoinproductsfromothercountries.

Structurally-definedgovernance

This case shows how the entry of Chinese products in the Kenyanmarket is

subjectedtoahighlyregulatedsystemofgovernance,bothinprivateandthepublic

sectors.Theinterestsatstakearediversified,rangingfromnationalintereststocurb

thecostofhealthcare,thuslookingatChinaasanopportunity,tothemorespecific

interestsof stakeholders suchasprivate sectormanufacturers,distributors,who

lookatChinathroughalensofmarketcompetition,totechnicalofficersinpublic

institutions,wholookatChinathroughalensofabidancetoproceduralstandards.

Thissystemishighlyintertwinedtotheinternationalenvironment,dependentupon

internationalinstitutionsforitssurvival.Withinthisinternationalcontext,Chinais

not, yet, a particularly strong player (China is only starting to emerge,

internationally, as a producer of drugs and medical devices), and Kenyans’

evaluation of the benefits of engaging with China are informed by the Chinese

relative weakness in the sector. As a result of these structural conditions, the

Chineseofficialrhetoric,accordingtowhichChinaischangingthehistoricallackof

medicinesinAfrica,isonlylimitedlycatchingoninKenya.

Inthepublicsector,whilethe lackofresourcesmaygiverisetoasymmetrical

dynamicswithChineseactors,thepresenceofastrongsystemofgovernancemostly

preventsthisfromoccurring.Thepresenceofinternationalinstitutionsisthemain

factor interfering with trade dynamics. Procurement takes place through

competitive bidding and, especially because of international institutions, it is

difficulttobypass it.Becauseoftheseinternational institutions, theprocurement

processdoesnotfavourChineseproducts,whicharemostlynon-WHOprequalified.

Intheprivatesector,dynamicsaresubjectedtotheexistenceofastrongstructure

where a few companies have historically dominated the stage, mainly

Indian/Kenyan-Indian.Thelackofgovernmentinterventiontoregulatethesector

hasprovidedspaceforpurely freemarketdynamicswhereChineseproductsare

onlypartiallygainingprominence,mainlyintheareaofmedicaldevices,ratherthan

pharmafinishedgoods,wheretheKenyanmanufacturingabilityislimited,andthe

productsfromEurope/USaresignificantlymoreexpensive.

166

Inotherwords,bothinthepublicandprivatesector,Chineseproductsareused

to fill a gap in the system rather than used to change a system that is broadly

acceptedassuitable tosafeguardthe interestsofdifferentstakeholders.This isa

storyofresiliencetosafeguardintereststhroughexistinggovernancesystems.

5.2.2 InfrastructureforhealthcareInKenyaVision2030andtheKenyaHealthPolicy2012-2030thereisparticular

emphasisontheneedtodevelop“adequateandappropriatehealthinfrastructure”.

ThepresenceofChinaininfrastructuredevelopmentforhealthcareisnewinKenya

andlesswide-spreadcomparedtooldertraditionalpartners’,butthemagnitudeof

theprojectsdevelopediscomparativelymoreimpressive,i.e.majorhospitalsrather

thancommunity-leveldispensaries.Theimportanceofstudyingthisaspectofthe

relationistoshedlightonthenegotiationprocessbetweenKenyanstakeholdersso

tounderstandthemotivationsbehindtheselectionoftheChinesepartners(orthe

acceptanceofChineseoffersofassistance)andthedefinitionofcontractdetails.The

presenceofChina,as in thecasepresentedabove, is relativelynewandentersa

systemofgovernancethatishighlyregulatedbymultilateralinstitutions.

Kenya-ChinaInfrastructureforhealthcare

ThepresenceofChinainprovidinginfrastructureforhealthisrelativelyrecent

inKenya.Thenumberofprojectsdeveloped is relativelysmall,butsignificant in

termsofvisibilitygiventheyaremajorhospitals,vis-à-vissmallerprojectscarried

out by traditional development partners 617 . The Chinese have engaged in the

constructionofhospitalsasbigasMamaLucyorKenyattaTeachingandReferral

Hospital.Before2006,whenthenegotiationsforthebuildingofMamaLucyHospital

started,Japanwasthemajordonorininfrastructureforhealth,togetherwiththe

UK.Sincethen,however,China’sinvolvementincreasedtothepointofdelivering

theconstructionandequippingofKenyattaTeachingandReferralHospital.Under

Kenya Vision 2030, one of the priorities is “improving the nation’s health

infrastructure, particularly in rural and severely deprived areas and

communities.”618Asshownbelow,theconstructionofmajorinfrastructurebyChina

617InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,InfrastructureDevelopmentDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-30.618GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,KenyaVision2030,FirstMediumTermPlan2008-2012,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,Nairobi,2008,p.104.

167

isnotexactly in “ruralandseverelydeprivedareasandcommunities”butrather

orbitingaround,mainly,thecityofNairobi.

Whilethemainprojectsregardinghealthcareinfrastructureoutlinedbeloware

hospitals,itisimportanttomentionthatKenyaalsoreceivedadonationfromChina

in2009tosetupamalariacentreandhasapproachedChina to fund themobile

clinics’ project. At the time fieldworkwas conducted theMinistry of Health had

submittedaproposaltotheTreasuryaskingtoengagetheChinesegovernmentin

fundingthemobileclinicsprojectaimedatnomadicpopulationswhodonothave

easy access tohealthcare facilities.The initiativeoriginated from theMinistryof

Health and was elaborated to take form through a loan from China. Further

investigationwillbeneededtofollowupontherealisationoftheinitiative.

China has provided Kenyawith bothgrants and loans for the construction of

infrastructureforhealthcare.Thetypeofprovision,i.e.grantversusloan,isattimes

suggestedbyChina,atothertimesitisnegotiatedattheMinisteriallevelinKenya

andputforwardasarequesttoChina.ThesupportprovidedbyChinainthecaseof

GatunduandMamaLucyhospitalsisinbothcasesintheformofagrant,inwhich

case:

TheChinesearegiventheleewaytoappointacontractorfromChina.They

appointacontractorwhocanundertakethemagnitudeofthatwork.Once

agreeditisagrant,withtheletterofeconomicengagementtheyareallowed

tochoosetheirowncompaniesinChinatocomeandimplementtheproject

inthecountry.Theyonlybringintheirtechnicalpeople,butgenerallabour

shouldcomefromthelocalareaofthecountry.TheChinesebenefitfortheir

technicalpeople, butKenyabenefits as theprojectbenefits locals and the

labourforcecomesfromthecountry619.

However,ifitisaloan,“itisnotmandatorythatyouuseaChinesecompany.Then

itisopentoall.Butifcombiningaloanandagrant,theconditionmaybesetasthe

Chinesearegivenpreference”620.Therearegenerallynootherconditionsattached

by theChinese,except the fact that the landmustbemadeavailable, theKenyan

government must be responsible for facilitating the exemption of taxation for

importedmaterial andwhere there is no exemption,VAT anddevelopment levy

619InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,InfrastructureDevelopmentDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-30.620Ibid.

168

should be paid by the beneficiary, that is, in this case, the Ministry of Health.

Alternatively, if not paid in the first place by the Ministry, a refund should be

provided.Ontopofthis,theKenyangovernmentmustfacilitatetheworkpermits

fortheChineseenteringthecountrytoworkfortheprojectandensurethesafetyin

theareaswheretheprojecttakesplace621.

In the cases presented below, Kenyan actors’ behaviour is mainly pro-active

(meaningKenyaengagingChina)thoughsetwithinamoregeneralChineseagenda

ofhealthcarediplomacyandeconomicinterests.Inotherwords,inallthecasesof

thefourmajorhospitalsfundedbyChina,ofwhichtwoasgrantsandtwoasloans,

theideatoaskforfundstoChinaoriginatedatMinisteriallevelinKenya(eitherat

the Ministry of Health or Treasury). The only case when the Chinese directly

approached the management suggesting their availability to sponsor the

constructionwasthecaseofKenyattaTeachingandReferralHospital.

MalariaCentre

Asforthemalariacentre,itdeservesseparateattentioninlightofthefactthatit

isoneoftheflagshipprojectspromotedbytheChineseinFOCACdocumentsaspart

oftheirhealthdiplomacy.Thecentrewasnotrequested;itwasratheraspontaneous

donationbytheChinesegovernment.Accordingtosources“[theChinese]originally

startedtheMalariaCentre.TheywantedtosetitupinahospitalonMbagathiRoad,

buttherewasnospace.Wesuggestedanotherhospital,MamaLucy,butitwastoo

farforthem.Andthentheycamehere;itisonlyaroom,asmallcentre”setupat

KenyattaHospital622.Beyondequippingthecentrewithmicroscopes,aPCRreader

andfridges,underthePublicHealthLaboratory,Chinaalsoprovidedtraining for

staffonmalariaand,morerecently,abus623.ItisapparentlytheChineseEmbassy

thatfostersrelationsalthoughitisnotclearunderwhichChineseMinistrythisis

done.

Chinadoesnot,however,figureasoneofthemainpartnersoftheKenyanMalaria

ControlDivision,themainonesbeing,inorderofshare:USAID,GlobalFund,DFID624.

AccordingtoKenyansources,despitethedonation,thelackofpreviousconnections

withChinaandtheconsequentinabilitytojudge“howtheywork”isanimportant

reasonwhytheengagementisnotdevelopedvis-à-visthatwithpartnerslikeDFID

621Ibid.622InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MalariaControlDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-06.623Ibid.624Ibid.

169

thathave“beenheresincetimeimmemorialandweknowhowtheyoperate.”625The

otheressentialelementisthattheMalariaControlDivision-undertheMinistryof

Health–whileleaningonthestrengthsofmulti-lateralcooperation(it“thrivesfor

partnerships”), isboundbytheexistingsystemofgovernance.Thismeansthat it

cannot single out a partner as coordination is at multi-lateral level. This is an

importantaspectoftherelationwithChinathatrepeatsitselfindifferentcontexts,

underlining,potentially,theimportanceofweighteddecision-makingonthepartof

Kenya,andstructurallimitations.Inotherwords,Kenyaisstructurallydependent

onmultilateralismandnotwillingtoshifttobilateralnegotiations.

MamaLucyKibakiHospital

BelowthecaseoftheconstructionofMamaLucyKibakiHospitalispresented,at

times comparing it with the cases of Gatundu, Moi and Kenyatta Teaching and

Referralhospitals.MamaLucyHospital is oneof themajor fourhospitalswhose

(re/)construction was funded by the Chinese government in the past ten years

througheithergrantsorloans.Theothersbeing:Gatundu(grant),MoiTeachingand

ReferralHospital (loanrequestedbutnotgiven),KenyattaTeachingandReferral

Hospital (loan).ThereasonwhyMamaLucywaschosenasa fullcase is that the

projectwascompletedandisrunning.Theotherswereeitherpartlyrunningorstill

innegotiation/constructionatthetimeoffieldwork,anditresultedbeingtoughto

get in touch with the management in charge of overseeing the project. This

presented research complexities mainly because the only actors that could be

interviewedwereatministeriallevel.Theaimis,ontheotherhand,toshowhow

differentKenyanactorsengagedChineseactorsintheinitiationphaseandpartlyin

implementation.

In2006theMinistryofHealthsuggestedthattheareaofKayoleinNairobihad

nohospitalandneededonetocaterforcircatwomillionpeople.Atthesametime,

thenPresidentKibakiwentonanofficialtriptoChina,andthroughbilateraltalks,

he secured a grant of Sh544million from the Chinese government to build the

hospital. Once the Treasury signed the deal, theMinistry of Health engaged the

constructorandsignedanagreement for implementation626.Theagreementwas

contemporary to the third FOCAC Action Plan (2006) in which, quantifiable

625Ibid.626InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,InfrastructureDevelopmentDivision,Nairobi,2014-09-30.

170

initiatives were announced, including the commitment to build more than 30

hospitalsacrossAfrica.MamaLucywasoneofthem.

Thehospitalwasadonationwhosecontract includedbuildingandequipment

(including CT scan, theatre equipment, generators). The Kenyan government

contributed with land, water, security, consumables and other equipment, and

human resources 627 . Through the Kenyan government, circa 15 hospital staff

members were trained in China for threemonths, including bio-medics, nurses,

physiotherapists, lab technicians,administrators628.Chineseexperts in theabove

fieldswereneversent toMamaLucyHospital,a trend that isobserved inKenya

where Chinese (modern medicine) doctors are extremely few, especially in the

publicsector629.Thehumanresourcesaspectwillbedealtwithinmoredetailinthe

Educationchapter.

Negotiation

Themainissueconcerningthiscaserevolvesaroundestablishingandhonouring

thetermsandconditionsnotforthebuildingoftheinfrastructurebutratherforthe

structure’sequipmentprovision.Thenegotiationcanbedividedintotwophases.

Theinitialphasewascharacterisedbytheagreementsignedbetweenheadsofstate.

Itdidnotfollowstandardproceduresasthecontractwasneverfullycommented

uponbytechnicalofficers.Thehospitalatthatstagewasnon-existent,therewasno

managementandallthedecisionsweretakenattheMinisteriallevelorabove.The

monopoly of the negotiationwas in the hands of “the big bosses” and technical

experts“couldn’tsaymuch”630.Thesecondphase,ontheotherhand,showsashift

inthenegotiationprocess.Bythenthehospitalwasrunning,andthemanagement

was in place. The existence of this latter guaranteed more transparency as it

contributedtooutliningthespecificationsoftheequipmentandtoselectingit.

Inthefirstphase,theequipmentsuppliedwasnew,butitstechnologywasold,

itsdurabilitylimitedandhadtobereplacedpartlywithhospitalfunds,partlywith

agrantfromtheKenyangovernment631.Theageoftheequipmentwasnottheonly

problem;therewerealsoissueswiththepowersupplyrating,differentfromthatof

Kenya,andwithaftersaleserviceandsupportwhichwasdifficult toobtain.The

627InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi,2014-10-14.628Ibid.629InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMedicalPractitionersandDentistsBoard,Nairobi,2014-12-5.630InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalEngineeringDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-18.631InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi,2014-10-14.

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hospital’smanagementisclearinexpressingthattheproblemwasontheKenyan

sideratherthantheChineseinasmuchasitwasthedutyoftheMinistrytosetthe

specificsfortheequipmentprovision.Accordingtoanintervieweeatthehospital,

“itwasafailurefromourside.TheChineseareclearandconsistent;theywantto

assist and want to have a foothold in the Kenyan market.” 632 The lack of

communicationbetweenthehospitalandtheMinistrydoesnotonlyexistinrelation

toChinese-supportedprojectsbutwithotherdonorstoo.Forinstance,theMinistry

signeda contractwith theWorldBank for theprovisionof equipmentwhile the

hospitalpointsoutthatimmediateneedsdonotconcernequipmentsuchasMRIs

butratherhumanresourcesandextrabuildingspace.Inthesecondphase,however,

the negotiationwas less concentrated, and themanagement of the hospitalwas

includedinthedecisionsconcerningtheoutliningoftheequipmentspecifications.

Consequently,themachinesreceivedturnedouttobenotonlyappropriatetothe

hospital’sactualneedsbutalsoofexcellentquality.

ItisimportanttoemphasisethattheMinistryofHealthneedsnotbestudiedasa

unitarybloc.TechnicalofficersattheMinistrymentionedthat“thereareguidelines

by theMinistry of Health on equipment, but they are difficult to implement for

donations.”633Exceptfortheequipmentclassifiedashighrisk, therest isdifficult

nottoacceptwhenitisadonation.ThisisthereasonwhytheMinistryofHealth

preferstoaskforloansratherthangrants,“withloansitiseasiertoabidebythelaw.

However a lot of the equipment by China comes through a grant, so there are

problems”634mainlybecause,due to thenatureof the funding, i.e. agrant rather

than a loan, there is no open bidding and at the Ministry of Health sources in

technicaldepartmentsreportthatonlywhentheChinesehaveselectedthecompany

for the provision of equipment the Ministry can then choose among available

products,addingthat“sinceyouaregivenitforfree,youdon’tspeaktoomuch,even

if it’s not very good.” 635 Another problem seems to have been concerning the

language: “once policy makers signed the papers, bureaucrats have language

problemswhen itcomestospecificationsofequipmentandsupplies.This leaves

leewaytothediscretionofthesupplier.”636

632Ibid.633InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalEngineeringDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-18.634Ibid.635Ibid.636InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi,2014-10-14.

172

Evolvinggovernancepatterns

This case is characterised by the presence of a rooted system of governance,

historicallydependentonmultilateralinternationalinstitutionsaswellasforeign

funds.TheMinistryofHealthisarelativelyweakministryinKenyaduetoitshigh

fragmentationandtotheheavyrelianceonmultilateraldonors.Itisimportantto

rememberthateventhoughKenyaismuchlessdependentonODAthanthemajority

ofAfricancountries,thehealthcaresectoristheexception.Giventhevolatilityof

aidprovision,thestrengtheningofdomesticcapacityhasbeeninconsistent637.

China thus enters a systemwhere actors are accustomed to negotiatingwith

traditionalpartnerswithinmultilateralsettings,whilelessinstitutionallystrongto

negotiate bilaterally. Kenya is partly unable, partly unwilling to negotiate at the

bilaterallevel.Bothaspectsareconsequentialtothecountry’sstrongdependence

oninternationaldonors.Inabilityisduetothefactthatvolatilityindonors’funding

hasexacerbatedinconsistenttrainingandthusavailabilityofwell-preparedhuman

resources. While these resources have gathered experience (albeit limited) in

negotiatingatthemultilaterallevel,theyhavenotdonesoatthebilaterallevel.Even

more,whiletheyhavegainedexperienceinnegotiatingwithtraditionalpartners,

theylackexperienceindealingwithChina.Unwillingnessisinsteadduetothefact

thatKenyahasidentifiedmulti-stakeholdercooperationasabestpractice,vis-à-vis

bilateralcooperation.

TheabilityofKenyanactors to act to safeguard their interests is subjected to

fluctuation.WhileontheonehandtheprovisionofChineseassistance(sometimes

asgrants,sometimesas loans)hasbeenwelcomedbyKenyansonthewhole,the

interference of the political elites, including high-level bureaucrats in the

negotiationofthecontractshasbeenresentedbythetechnocratswhowereunable

to leverage their recommendations and guarantee the safeguard of procedural

standardsinthecontracts.

This applied to both the content and themodality of interaction. In terms of

content, the absence of technical staff during the negotiation of contracts has

resultedintheprovisionofinfrastructurethatwasselectedbytheChineseandnot

suitableforKenyanstandards.Intermsofmodality,China’snon-adherencetomulti-

lateral frameworks exacerbated the inconsistency in negotiations where high-

politics fill themany gaps existing in the governance framework. Particularly in

637SeeMwega,2009,op.cit.

173

relationstoinfrastructure,includingtechnologicalinfrastructure,muchneededin

thecountry,theasymmetricalrelationswithChina(andwithmostexternalpartners)

leadthebureaucracytoaninabilitytocontrolthenegotiationprocess.

The construction of Mama Lucy Hospital was the first important work of

infrastructureassistanceinhealthprovidedbyChinatoKenya.Theunfamiliarityin

negotiatingwiththeChineseandtheconsequential learningcurveseemstohave

playedaroleinshiftingstrategyandsettingstricterrulesforthenegotiationofthe

secondphaseofequipmentprovision.However,abiggerproblemseemstopersist

between theMinistry and thehospital, notbecauseof theChinesepresence, but

becauseoflackofcommunicationconcerningprioritiessetting.Whiletheinability

tocoordinateacrossthenationalbureaucracyimpactsnegotiationswithalldonors,

not only China, the lack of experience with the latter further exacerbates the

problem.

5.2.3 TraditionalMedicineSince the early 2000s traditional medicine has been gaining momentum

worldwideandinKenya.In2002theWHOlauncheditsfirsttraditionalmedicine

strategy.Inthesameyear,thefirstChina-AfricaForumonTraditionalMedicinewas

held in Beijing. The Chinese system was already one of the most advanced for

traditionalmedicineresearchandpolicydevelopment.Thediffusionoftraditional

medicine abroad had been part of China’s healthcare diplomacy, through the

dispatch of ChineseMedical Teams, since the 1960s638, as forms of South-South

cooperation. The engagementwith African countries became institutionalised in

2000withthefirstFOCACactionplaninwhichthepromotionofcooperationinthe

useoftraditionalmedicineandpharmacywaspledged.InAfrica,upto80%ofthe

populationuses traditionalmedicine tohelpmeethealth careneeds,whereas in

China40%ofallhealthcaredeliveredcomesfromtraditionalmedicine639.

Theaimofstudyingthiscaseistoshedlightonhowanewaspectofdevelopment

is identified, pushed forward in policy and legislative circles and the choice of

partnersmadetoachievedesiredoutcomes.Likeintheothercasespresentedinthis

chapter, the relation with the Chinese is not studied because of the challenges

caused to Kenya (some, but limited), but because of the choice of Kenyans to

638ThefirstChineseMedicalTeaminAfricawasdispatchedtoAlgeriain1964.639WorldBank,‘TraditionalHealerServices’,TheWorldBank[website].

174

establisharelationwithChinafortheimprovementofthesystemofgovernance.

The caseunder study is that of theNatural Products Industry initiative, and the

purpose of the analysis is to explain: 1) how the decision-making process was

articulatedacrossplatformsandbyanumberofdifferentstakeholders;2)theextent

towhichChineseexpertisewaspurposelysoughtandusedtodevelopadomestic

industry.

While the fragmented domestic governance environment has led different

stakeholderstoengageeachotherwithcaution,thenatureoftheissueatstake,i.e.

thedevelopmentofthesectorthroughtheNaturalProductsInitiative,hasalsoseen

themworkincollaboration.ThedevelopmentoftheNPIinitiativedidnotoriginate

inavacuum.Itisthusimportanttobrieflyoutlinethesocialconstraintsaswellas

thepolicyandlegislativedomesticandinternationalimperativesoutofwhichsuch

initiativewasborn.ThisisparticularlyrelevantasChinahasshowninterestinusing

traditionalmedicineasatoolofsoftpowernotonlytoattractAfricangovernments

andpeoplebutalsotousetheirsupport to increasetheprofileofTCMonglobal

platforms such as the WHO, where traditional medicine has been for long

overlooked.

Inotherwords,theanalysisbelowlooksathowtheactorsinvolvedinthesystem

ofgovernancehaverecogniseditsunsuitabilitytosafeguardemerginginterestsand

haveusedtherelationshipwithChinatoimprovethesystemofgovernance.

TheWitchcraftAct1925

In 1925, the British government enacted theWitchcraft Act, Cap.67, Laws of

Kenya,whichwas laterrevised in1962and1981butneverrepealed to thisday.

Anythingrelatingtotraditionalmedicinewasassociatedwithwitchcraftaspartof

a broader demonization of African traditions. Modern health services were

introduced,andtheyreplacedwhatwasseenbycolonialauthoritiesasprimitive

practices 640 . The practice survived but only underground and it started being

accepted asnot illegal only towards the endof the1970s,moreprecisely in the

1979-83DevelopmentPlan,althoughthe“legislationcontinuedtoabstainfromthe

regulationoftraditionalmedicine”641.

640P.Ongugoet.al,ProtectingTraditionalHealthKnowledgeinKenya:TheroleofCustomaryLawsandPractices,InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment,London,2012,p.9641Ibid.

175

According to theNationalHealthPractitionersAssociation (NATHEPA642), this

lackorgapinthelegalandpolicyframeworksopenedthedoortoforeigners.Itwas

somewhateasierforforeignerstopracticethanforlocals,“therewassegregation,

andthisputAfricanslast”643.Thegovernmentstartedproviding“licensestohealers

fromChinaandIndiatoopentraditionalhealth-carepractices”644.Atthesametime,

especiallyAsians, i.e. Indians,hadbeeninKenyafordecadesandkeptpractising.

The1980s and1990swere years of openingup andofficializationof traditional

medicine, uplifting it from the negative connotation that had characterised the

practicesincethecolonialperiod.Withthe2000s,astheinternationalenvironment

startedpayingincreasedattentiontomattersrevolvingaroundtraditionalmedicine,

Kenyatooadvancedmorerapidly.Multi-stakeholderworkshopsandotheractivities

wereheldtoformulateapolicytosustainanddevelopthepractice645.Intheprocess

ofsector’srestructuring,Chinarepresentedagovernancesystemtoemulate.

TraditionalMedicinedevelopmentsinthe2000s-2010s

Since the early 2000s traditional medicine has been gaining momentum

worldwideandinKenya.In2002theWHOlauncheditsfirsttraditionalmedicine

strategy, and the Kenyan government signed the international agreement that

pledged to put regulatory mechanisms in order. In Kenya, “stakeholders in

traditionalmedicineandmedicinalplantshavebeenholdingworkshopsandother

activitiestocomeupwithapolicytosustainanddevelopthepractice”646.Aftertwo

nationalconferencesin2001and2003organisedbytheMinistryofHealthaimed

at producing a Bill of practice in traditional medicine, and the creation of a

committee and sub-committees led by the National Council for Population and

Development (NCPD) in the Ministry of Planning and National Development, a

policynamed ‘TraditionalMedicine andMedicinalPractice’wasdrafted in2005.

According tostakeholders, thepolicywas “not thebestpolicy”647butprovideda

much-neededguidelinetoemergeoutofavacuumthatwasnotguaranteeingthe

properprotectionoftheproductsandpractice.Nexttoitin2009the‘NationalPolicy

642NATHEPAisanassociationoftraditionalmedicinepractitioners,thattheMinistryofCulturedecidedtocreatewiththeintentofunitingpractitionerssotheycouldhavemoreleverageinnegotiatingtheirinterests.643InterviewwithaprofessorofpharmacyandtraditionalmedicineatKenyattaUniversity,2014-11-04.644ExportProcessingZonesAuthority,Kenya’sPharmaceuticalIndustry2005,ExportProcessingZonesAuthority,Nairobi,2005,p.4.645MinistryofSports,CultureandtheArts,‘DraftoftheNationalPolicyonTraditionalMedicineandMedicinalPlants’,MinistryofSports,CultureandtheArts,Nairobi,September2005,p.6646Ibid.647InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,TraditionalMedicineDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-10.

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onCultureandHeritage’came intoexistenceofficiallystrengtheningthevalueof

traditionalmedicineandthestepsthegovernmentshouldhavetakentointegrateit

intothenationalhealthcaresystem.

The2010Constitutionacknowledgedtheimportanceoftraditionalmedicineand

includedanoteonthedutyofthestateto“protectandenhanceintellectualproperty

in, and indigenous knowledge of, biodiversity and the genetic resources of the

communities”648.Researchersnotedthat“TMwasbecomingmuchmorerecognised

bypoliticiansandpolicy-makers.Peoplewerecomingouttoputproductsonthe

market”649.Inthesameperiodthe‘TraditionalMedicineandMedicinalPlantsBill

2010’ was drafted and presented to Parliament for discussion. The Bill made

provisions for the establishment of a Council to spearhead the management of

traditionalmedicineandtoregulatetraditionalmedicinepractitioners.Atthatpoint

alsothePPBrealisedthattheproductshadtoberegisteredandissuedthe2010

guidelines for the ‘Registration of Herbal and Complementary Products’. The

guidelinestargetedtheproductsonly,notthepracticealthough“separatingthemis

verydifficult.Thisiswhatthepolicyistryingtodo”650.In2013whentheIIMedium

TermPlanofKenyaVision2030waslaunched,apledgewasaddedhighlightingthe

importance of “Develop[ing] policies and guidelines to embrace research on

alternativemedicines(naturalproducts)underpinnedinthelegalandinstitutional

framework”651andtheNaturalProductsInitiativebecameaflagshipprojectunder

the economic pillar with an emphasis on research andmanufacturing based on

“locallyderivednaturalhealthproducts”652.

Theyear2014wasmarkedbythepublicationoftwoimportantdocumentsfor

traditionalmedicine,namely:theTraditionalHealthPractitionersBill2014andthe

Health Bill 2014 which included a full section (Part VIII) on traditional and

complementarymedicinesthat,albeitstillvague,providedfortheestablishmentof

a regulatorybody, thedocumentationandmappingaswellasstandardizationof

traditional medicine, and the development of policy guidelines for integrating

conventionalandtraditionalmedicinesystems.TheMinistryofHealth,despitenot

beingthemainresponsiblefortraditionalmedicine(nonethelesshavingadivision

fortraditionalmedicine),hasshowninterestinthebudgetaryaspectsrelatingtothe

648GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,ConstitutionofKenya,op.cit.PartII,Art69(1)(c).649InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaMedicalResearchInstitute(KEMRI),Nairobi,2014-11-05.650Ibid.651GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,KenyaVision2030,SecondMediumTermPlan2013-2017,op.cit.,p.81.652Ibid.

177

inclusion of the use of traditionalmedicine in the national framework of health

provision.Bybeingcheapand locallyavailable, traditionalmedicinewouldbean

assetfortheMinistrytocutcostsondrugs’expenditure.OncetheHealthBill2014

becomesanAct, itwillprovide traditionalmedicinewithproperrecognitionand

otherdocumentswillthenbeabletobeformalisedandimplemented.Forinstance,

the Traditional Health Practitioners Bill 2014 would provide IP protection to

practitionersoncetheydeclarewhattheirmedicinesaremadeof653.Thisissueisin

turnlinkedtotwomajoraspectsthatneedtobeconsidered:thedomesticcontext,

in particular the organisational structure of practitioners, and the international

contextthatdoesnoteasilyreconciletraditionalmedicinewithintellectualproperty

laws.

Practitioners:indigenousandforeign

The organisational structure of practitioners is problematic and immature.

Interviewees in the sector point out that “practitioners are still organising

themselves. There is fear of competition and personality issues”654. The fear of

competition also stems from the fact that the practice and the products are not

protectedandthatif“stolen”noredressmechanismisinplace.Forthisreason,the

NPIprioritisedthedefinitionofhowpropertyrightscanbeappliedtotraditional

medicineand indigenousknowledge: theKenya IndustrialProperty Instituteand

theKenyaCopyrightBoardareworkingonit.Also,intheOfficeoftheAdministrator

General,mandatedtoadministercopyrights,theissueoftraditionalknowledgeand

culturalexpressionsisgainingprominence.Besidesthislegalmatter,whichwillbe

further expanded below in relation to the international context, the above-

mentioned lack of structural organisation by traditional healers, according to

KEMRIleavesspacetoforeignerstooperatealmostwithnocontrol.Apparentlydue

to fragmentation of the associational life of traditional healers, the Ministry of

Culture initiated NATHEPAwith the aim ofmaking sure traditional healers had

representatives,andtheassociationcouldactas thenationalpointofcontact for

foreignpractitionersoperatinginKenya.Itisnotcompulsorytoregisterwiththe

associationandgivenitslackoforganisationpractitionersarenotincentivizedto

doso.

653InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,PharmacyDepartment,Nairobi.2014-09-30.654InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-17.

178

Chinese practitioners, for instance, tend to go to the Ministry of Health that

providesthemwithalicensetosetupclinics.Fortheregistrationofproducts,the

PPB receives applications and “lists” products. The lack of harmonisation is

currentlybeingtackledbytheMinistryofHealth’sDivisionoftraditionalmedicine

whichistryingtosynchronisedifferentpolicies655.Despitethislackofstructured

control,attheMinistryofHealth(traditionalmedicinedivision),asourcereported

that generally the documents providedby the Chinese abide by the law and are

presented by qualified personnel. At the same time, the source also points out:

“Thereareelementsforwhichwehavequestionmarks,concerningthepracticeand

thequalificationsbutwehavenowaytoassessthem”656.

Internationallegalshortcomings

Oneofthemainproblems,perceivedbytraditionalhealers,whichleadsthemto

operateinisolation, isthefactthatthelawdoesnotprovideguaranteesfortheir

inventions.ThelawoncopyrightsdrawsfromWesternlawswhichareclaimed,by

Kenyans, not to be comprehensive in the definition of a “patentable thing”, if

conceivedinrelationtoindigenousknowledge.Theproblemresidesinthefactthat

indigenous knowledge and products are not novel per se – pre-requisite for

somethingtobepatentable–astheyhavebeenintradition,passeddownorally,and

keptsecretforasmuchasmanhasexisted.Whatcanbenovelaboutthemisthefact

thattheyarerevealed,andtheirpotentialindustrialapplicability657.

Theproblemofintellectualpropertyrightsandindigenousknowledgedoesnot

applytoKenyaalone.Sourcesinvolvedinpolicy-makingaffirmthat:“theworldis

cripplingonhowtocategoriseindigenousknowledgeandseehowitispatentable.

Thisneedsasuigenerisapproach.There’snomovingawayfromtherealitythatthis

knowledgeisasourceofnewinnovation”658.WorkshopsorganisedbytheChinese

often highlight the issue by discussing how to make TCM more acceptable

internationally,intermsofregulations,safetyandqualitycontrol.659

655InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaMedicalResearchInstitute(KEMRI),Nairobi,2014-11-05.656InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,TraditionalMedicineDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-17.657InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-17.658Ibid.659Ibid.

179

TheNaturalProductsIndustryinitiative

The primary driver for establishing a proper framework is the potential to

contribute tonationaldevelopment,but the threat fromoutside is thesecondary

driver:“becauseKenyadidnothavesuchaprogramme,despitehavingwealthin

traditional resources, that void attracted foreign companies to exploit such

resources.ChineseandotherforeignersvisitKenya,theygoandtalktocommunities

and take away indigenousknowledge”660.Nonetheless, theproblem identified in

relationtoChina’spresenceinthemarketisrelativelysmall.Kenyanpractitioners

do not perceive competition due to the fact that Chinese products are more

advancedintermsofpackagingandarescientifically-produced661.Accordingtoan

intervieweeattheMinistryofCulture“therearenoKenyancompaniespackaging

traditionalmedicines[…]Traditionalhealershavetheirclinicswheretheyalsohave

medicines”662.Theneedtoemphasisethevalueofproperpackagingresultedinthe

creation,in2008,oftheNaturalProductsIndustryInitiative.

For the development of the initiative, China was identified as one of the

“experiencedcountries”663,together,mainly,withIndia,fromwhichKenyaaimed

tolearn.Whilecollaborationinitiativeshavebeenputinplace,KEMRIsuggests664

that most research projects were aimed at studying Chinese products and the

feasibility of their commercialization in Kenya/Africa, rather than studying how

indigenousKenyanproductscouldbedeveloped.Itbecameevidentthatinorderto

operate,aproperregulatoryframeworkhadtobeputinplace.Thedevelopmentof

the NPI became a key reason to regulate the sector but also to push for the

promotionofresearchon,andmanufacturingof,Kenyanproducts.TheConvention

onBiologicalDiversitywasdomesticatedtocreatetheNaturalProductsIndustry

Policy2014.

Thedevelopmentofthiscollaborationispremisedonanumberofnationaland

mutualintereststhatarejustgainingprominenceandareyetpromisingtobecome

a major area of national and international development. Kenya’s interest in

establishingarelationwithChinaismainlytwofold:learnfromtheChineseexpertise

through training and capacity building programmes, and partner to develop a

scientifically-basedcommerce-orientedindustry.WhilethepartnershipwithChinais

660Ibid.661InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,TraditionalMedicineDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-10.662Ibid.663InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,TraditionalMedicineDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-17.664InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaMedicalResearchInstitute(KEMRI),Nairobi,2014-11-05.

180

nottheonlyone,Indiaalsoplayingamajorrole,accordingtotheMinistryofCulture,

China is the most important bilateral partner 665 . The programme started in

2008/2009, and since then a very wide range of actors participated in its

development. The multi-stakeholder approach was fundamental because “by its

nature,thisprojectneedsdifferentskills”includingtheknowledgeofcommunities,the

department of culture, natural resources managers, scientific experts (for plants,

animals,etc.),expertsofproductdevelopment(pharma,personalcare,nutritionists),

marketingandsoforth.

Although partnerships are not in place yet with research institutes and

companiesinChina,theaimoftheNPIisthattoforgestrategicalliances666.Amore

detailedaccountofthisaspect,i.e.educationandtraining,isprovidedinChapter6.

However,bymeansofintroductionitisimportanttomentionthatoneofthekey

motivationstochooseChinaasapartnerfortheNPIwasthepossibilitytoincrease,

through training provided by Chinese institutions, capacity building not only in

medicaltrainingbutalsoinmanagement,includingthesyncingofconventionaland

traditionalmedicineusageinthenationalhealthcaresystem.NPIleaderssuggested

that“onewayofensuringthatwedonothavetogothroughunnecessaryexpenses

istocomeupwithateamthatlearnsfromtheproceduresandthepracticesofChina

aswellasthelegalmechanismsthatmakethatpracticepossible”667.Thepossibility

tolearnfromacountrythatwaschallengedbyaWesternideaofhealthcaredelivery,

andyetperfectedaconventional-traditionalblendedversionofhealthcaredelivery,

resonatedwiththeKenyanexperienceandprovedtobeakeyfactorinwantingto

partnerwithChina.

TheaimoftheprojectwasalsothattoprotecttheKenyanindustryfromnon-

indigenous traditional products and practitioners entering the country. An

intervieweepointedout:“eveniftheChinesecandobetterthanusatthemoment,

weunderstandourownmedicine.Chinesetraditionalmedicineisforeigntous;itis

traditionaltoChina”668.Toprotecttheindustry,theintentionisthattousemodern

science and business expertise to help practitioners add value to traditional

medicineliketheChinesehavedone,forinstance,withArtemisin(adrugformalaria

recognisedbytheWHO)whichisadirectconsequenceofTCM.Artemisiahasbeen

665InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,TraditionalMedicineDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-10.666InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-17.667ParliamentaryDebates,NationalAssembly,9December2009,(A),(Mwiria,AssistantMinisterforHigherEducation,ScienceandTechnology),p.34.668InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,TraditionalMedicineDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-17.

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usedinChinaforcenturiestomanagemalariatothepointwhenresearchersstudied

what, in the plant, controls malaria and made modern medicine, tested and

recognisedbytheWHOforuniversaluse669.

PartoftheNPIwasaninitiativein2014betweentheChinesegovernmentanda

numberofKenyanstakeholders.TheideaofacollaborationstartedwhenaChinese

governmental“high-level”delegationvisitedKenyaand,inanattempt“tofindhow

to alleviate health problems” while commercialising a Chinese product, advised

KEMRItodevelopaconceptnoteoutlininghowtheythoughtthecooperationwith

theChinesegovernmentcouldbenefitthem.KEMRIandtheNationalMuseumsof

Kenya,togetherwiththeMinistryofHealth(NaturalProductsdivision),thenstarted

collaboratingonaconcept“articulatedaroundthepossibilityofsettingupasmall

industry, within the Institute or through the Kenyan government” 670 . More

specifically the aim outlined in the concept was that to “develop a small

manufacturingindustry,tomanufactureHIVproductswhichareregisteredinthe

countryandbringAfricansandtheChinesetocollaborateanddosomeresearchon

theindustry”671.

Governancein-the-making

ThecaseoftheNPIshedslightonhowaproblemisidentifiedandacteduponby

anumberofgovernmentalandsocialstakeholderstodrivepolicychange/creation.

It is important on both the domestic and international levels. The state pivots

betweena localdimensioncharacterisedbytheneedfordeepstructuralreforms

andtheinternationalcontextfromwhichitaimstolearn.Itisacaseofgovernance

in-the-making,wheretheideologicalandpracticalrelianceonChinaplaysakeyrole.

Domestically,thehistoricaldemonizationoftraditionalmedicinehascreateda

vacuuminthesocialandgovernmentalstructuresofgovernance,leavingspacefor

ananarchicaldomesticorganisationofthesectorandthepenetrationofforeigners.

The relations between governmental organs and social groups, including

practitionersandmanufacturers,arehighlydisjointduetolackoftrustbythelatter

intheguaranteesofprotectionprovidedbytheformer.Internationally,therevival

of traditional medicine is perceived as a reparation against the imposition of

669InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya,Nairobi,2014-10-17.670InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaMedicalResearchInstitute(KEMRI),Nairobi,2014-11-05.671Ibid.

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WesternvaluesandthelimitsplacedupontheworldbyWestern-ledinternational

institutions.

Within this context, the presence of China is neither the cause nor the

consequence of the domestic change, but rather an example of successful

development with which Kenyan stakeholders engage for the achievement of a

statedgoal.Inotherwords,theChinesepresenceisnothereimportantasatrigger

forchangebutratherasachosenfacilitatorforsuchchange.Stakeholders,however,

remind that the Chinese government aswell as private companies have specific

diplomatic and commercial interests in getting a foothold in Kenya. Chinese

interestshavetendedtooverlookKenyandomesticneeds,suchasthedevelopment

ofKenyantraditionalmedicineratherthanthedevelopmentofChinesemedicinefor

Kenyan audiences. The weakness of the domestic system of governance, in this

sense,couldprovidespacestotheChinesetopenetratethesectorfurther.However,

thereareatleasttwoelementsthatsuggestthiswillnothappen:atthetoplevels

there isaninterest indevelopingKenyantraditionalmedicineas it isbelievedto

contributetothereductionofcostsintheprovisionanddeliveryofhealthcare.This

is true forKenyan traditionalmedicine, rather than traditionalmedicineofother

countries,asitislocallysourced.Therefore,itislikelythatbothbureaucraticand

researchcircleswillnegotiatetosafeguardthisinterest.Atthesametime,whenit

comes to consumers, though Chinese traditional medicine has been gaining a

foothold in Kenya, this has happened on a relatively small scale. This is mainly

becausetheworldofbeliefswhichsurroundstheusageoftraditionalmedicineis

directly linked to specific local/indigenous traditions which have historical and

collectivemeaning.Suchmeaningcannotthuseasilybedetachedfromtheterritory

andimportedfromabroad.

5.3 SectoraldynamicsAs mentioned above, China’s provision of healthcare assistance and trade in

health-related products is not new to Africa, but it is quite so to Kenya. The

relationshipwithtraditionalpartners(bothintradeanddevelopmentassistance)is

akeyfeatureofthediscussionsconcerningtherelativelynewpresenceofChina.All

three cases highlight how international standards have become embedded in

Kenyan systems of governance. Asmentioned in the introduction, healthcare in

183

Kenyaisahighlydiversifiedsector,whichpresents“amixedstoryofprogressand

inequality” 672 . Particularly relevant to understanding this diversification is the

acknowledgement that the heavy involvement of donors and international

organisations in the provision of most forms of health care has made domestic

institutions less independent from broader systems of governance. The large

bureaucracyoftheMinistryofHealthandthestrong,albeituneven,interferenceof

international institutions in the management of aid, has caused Kenyan actors’

decreasednegotiatingpowervis-à-visChina.

As opposed to the cases presented in the previous chapter, the cases in this

chapter do not revolve around a particular problem with which Kenyan actors

identify theChinesearrival.Onthecontrary, thecaseshave incommona lackof

contestation and a nuanced and calculated approach to the external actor. This

nuancedtypeofrelation,inasenselessconfrontationalcomparedtothatpresented

inthepreviouschapter,betweenstateandsocialforcesbutalsobetweeneachof

them and Chinese actors, appears to be informed by both a cautious approach

towardsanewpartnerindevelopmentandstructurallimitations.

Thesystemsofgovernanceandactorsinvolvedarequitedifferentinthethree

cases.Thefirsttwocasespresentasystemofgovernancethatishistoricallyrooted

whereKenyaninterestsarebroadlysafeguardedthroughthesystem.Thecontent

andmodalityoftheChineseengagementwithKenyansarenegotiateddomestically

inawaythattendstopreservetheexistingsystems.Inthesetwocasesofmodern

medicine,thehistoricaldependenceupondonorsforthedevelopmentofthesector

seemstohavecreatedasystemwheresuchdependenceisnotchallengedbutrather

sought.Withthedecreaseofaidprovisionfromtraditionalpartners,thenextlogical

stepidentifiedisthatto lookfornewpartners,ratherthanstrengthenthesector

fromtheinside.Thisisconsequentialtotheacknowledgementthatlocalresources

– human and financial – are insufficient. The third case, however, is onewhere

governance isbeing restructured, andChina isperceivedasakeycontributor to

suchrestructuring.ThelackoforganisationwithinKenyaresultingintheabsence

of formal engagement between the state and social forces is the focus of a

governmentinitiativeaimedat,amongotherthings,changingtoprotectandboost

localknowledge.ThepresenceofChinaissofarnotdetrimentalbutratherakey

exampleduringadelicatephaseofpolicyandlegislativeformulation.

672LewisandKerr,op.cit.,p.4.

184

Kenyanbehaviourislargelypro-active,namelyaconductofengagementdictated

byanincreasingawarenessthatChinaisprovidingcomplementaryoptionstothose

oftraditionalpartnersattimesmoresuitabletofulfilKenyanemergingobjectives.

However, in comparison to other partners, China is identified as only relatively

significant for theachievementofsuchobjectives.This isdueto the fact that the

Chinese interests in engaging with Kenyan actors are not equally relevant to

Kenyans.However,evenmore,itisduetothefactthatChina’snon-adherencetothe

modalitiesof interactionamongforeignandlocalstakeholders,as ‘prescribed’by

thesystemofgovernance,contributestoitsisolation.

185

Table2:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actors,andarenas/tablesofnegotiation-Health

MamaLucyHospital Tradeinmedicalproductsanddevices

NaturalProductsInitiative

Interests

Typeofrelation Aid Commercial Commercial-aid

Issueatstake Lackofinfrastructureandequipmentinhospital

NeedofcheapproductsintertwinedtomismatchbetweenwhatchinapledgestoprovideandwhatcanbeprovidedtoKaccordingtodomesticandinternationalnorms

NeglectofKenyantraditionalmedicine,increaseofChinesetraditionalmedicine

Kenyans'issue-specificinterests

UseChinesecompanytoachievedomesticdevelopmentplan.

SourcecheapChineseproducts

UseChineseexpertise(companiesandeducation)toachievedomesticdevelopmentplan.Intheprocessofsector’srestructuring,Chinarepresentedagovernancesystemtoemulate.

OverallobjectivetowardChina FittingChinain EngagingChinaasapartner

indevelopmentEngagingChinaasapartnerindevelopment

Actors

InitiatorMinistryofhealth-Minister'soffice(verylargebureaucracy)

Grassroots-wholesalers NationalMuseumsofKenya

Otherdomesticactors Hospitalmanagement PharmacyandPoisonBoard

MinistryofCulture,MinistryofHealth(includingPPB),KEMRI(researchinstitute)

Resources

Economicasymmetryleveragedbythepresenceofprofessionalhumanresourcesabletosafeguardthesystemofgovernance

KenyanprofessionalhumanresourcescrucialtoalterthesystemofgovernancetosafeguardKenyaninterests:introductionoftraditionalmedicineinthehealthcaredeliverysystem

Arenasandtablesofnegotiation

ARENA'theproblem'contextualizedintheKenyandomesticcontext(historicallegaciesandcurrentpolicypreferences)

ROOTED:Highdonorassistance.Foreignaidnegotiationregulated,esp.since2004/2007toincreaseKenyanownership,butpresenceofdonorsunderminedthestateofinstitutionalcapacity.

ROOTED:Regulatedbybothdomesticandinternationalinstitutions(veryintertwinedduetothedevelopingstatusofK).TradeSectordominatedbyprivateactorsandassociationsoperatingsidebysidewithAidproviders.Nochangeinpolicyorlegalpreferencesforeseen.

IN-THE-MAKING:Newlysignificantissue-area,triggeredbyawarenessofbenefitsforhealthcarebudget,andtheincreaseofforeignpractitioners.Witchcraftact,unregulatedsector.RecentacknowledgementoftheneedofpolicyandlegaltransformationtoincludeTMinhealthcareprovision.Recentpolicychanges(2005,2009,2010,2013,2014)

Mobilizationframework

Weakframeworkfordonations,easilybypassedbyhigh-levelofficialsinordertosecurefunding(andhighpolitics)>Re-orientationofstrategywithhospital'sinvolvement

Strongwholesalersgroups,operatingwithinformaldomesticandinternationalframeworks

Mainlyhorizontal,betweenministries.stillatdraftingstage.littleinvolvementofNATHEPA(whichisfractionedonitsown,within)

ModeofaddressingtheissuewiththeChinese

Passiveandre-active Pro-active Pro-active

Tableofnegotiation Lightalteration Conformity Lightalteration

Source:Author’sfindings

186

CHAPTER6

EngagementintheEducationSector

6.1 ThecontextTypicallyanareaofpeople-to-peoplecooperationundertheFOCACframework

andChineseaidpolicy,educationcooperationanddevelopmentassistancebetween

KenyaandChinaisanincreasinglydynamicareaofengagement.Thiscooperation

involvesgovernment-to-governmentdealsaswellasagreementsbetweenschools

and the private sector or civil society organisations, which are crucial actors in

implementing and re-defining governments’ plans. Current projects range from

establishing Confucius Institutes to sending students on exchangeprograms and

againtotraininghumanresourcesinseveralprofessionalfields.

For Kenya, the development of education and training, together with health-

relateddevelopment,isthemostimportantissue-areaoftheSocialPillarunderthe

KenyaVision2030framework.Kenyaaimsatproviding“agloballycompetitiveand

qualityeducation,trainingandresearch”andtobe“aregionalcentreofresearch

anddevelopmentinnewtechnologies”.ThefocusofKenyaVision2030onhigher

educationandresearchisconsequential tomajorpolicychangesoccurredwithin

thesector–andthecountry–sincetheNARCgovernmentwaselectedin2002,the

mostrelevantofwhichwastheshiftfromaprimarytoasecondaryeducationfocus.

The arrival of China has, on the one hand, opened up space to explore areas of

educationthathadbeenneglected,inparticularhighereducation,suchasTechnical

andVocationalEducationandTraining(TVET)ortraditionalmedicine.Ontheother

hand,however,ithasshownhowtheWesternfootprintisdeepinacountrywhere

there is a general mentality according to which “if I’m Chinese-trained, I'm not

associatedwithgoodtraining”673,vis-à-vistrainingcarriedoutinEuropeortheUS.

Whilethisbeliefdoesnotseemtobefullyconfirmedbythosewhoengagedirectly

withChina,itisindicativeofthegeneralatmosphere.

ForChina, engaging in educational cooperationandassistancehasbecomean

importantaspectofforeignpolicy,aninstrumentdevisedtomovebeyondhigh-level

rhetoric,usedtoaddressnegativeperceptionsandsocialdiscontentoftencausedby

673InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-31.

187

the presence of Chinese activities, products and agents. In other words, fierce

critiques against the Chinese at the grassroots levels in Africa have spurred the

Chinesewillingnesstostepin,tocontrolrelationalprocessesthroughthepro-active

buildup of positive images. While the provision of assistance is one reason for

China’sinvolvement,morerecentresearchsuggeststhatmotivationsalsoconcern

thedevelopmentofChinesefirms’industrialcapacityinAfrica,andthepenetration

ofmarketsthroughtheprovisionofequipmentandtrainingonit.Inotherwords,

themotivationsbehindtheprovision/negotiationofeducationalcooperationand

assistanceareincreasinglyexpandingfrompublicdiplomacytomarketseeking.

Availablestudiesoneducationalcooperationandassistance,exceptionmadefor

theConfuciusInstitutes,arefew.TheytendtoconcentrateonChina’smotivations

forengagingAfrica’sstudentsandtechnicalstaffwhilethereisalmostnoattention

intheliteratureinunderstandingifandhowtheseengagementsareframedwithin

Africandomesticagendasofdevelopment674.Thischapterfocusesonunderstanding

thedecision-makingprocessinKenyawhenitcomestoprioritisingandnegotiating

educational projects for the development of the education and training system,

studying the environment and the processes of engagement between actors to

contextualise China’s assistance and cooperation. The three cases selected to be

explored represent threemajor types of engagement in educational cooperation

between China and African countries, namely the development of: technical

cooperation,humanresourcesforhealth,andChineselanguagethroughConfucius

Institutes. They embody very different forms of cooperation and assistance

provision by China to Kenya. They also shed light on extremely different

bureaucraticstructureswithintheKenyaneducationalsector.

6.1.1 China-AfricaEducationalCooperationandAssistanceEducationalcooperationbetweenChinaandAfricancountrieshasboomedwith

the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000, andmore

specificallyafterFOCAC2006as the rangeof cooperationactivitiesexpanded675.

ThecooperationbetweenChinaandAfricancountries,however,datesbacktowell

beforethe2000sandexpandsbeyondFOCACcommitmentstobilateralagreements.

DrawinguponSouth-Southcooperationprinciplesofmutualsupportandbenefit,

674W.Benjekkoun,‘China-AfricaCo-operation:CapacityBuildingandSocialResponsibilityofInvestments’,PolicyInsightsno.24,SouthAfricanInstituteofInternationalAffairs,August,2015.675ForamoredetailedaccountseeKing,2013,op.cit.,pp.34-35,andFOCACActionPlans2003,2006,2009.

188

the formal trainingofAfrican technicians,managers, skilled labour, studentshas

been part of China’s foreign policy since the 1950s when the first educational

exchangestookplace(betweenEgyptandChina)676.Theyincreasedinthe1990s

whenuniversitypartnershipsbetweenChineseandAfricanuniversitiesstarted,in

support of science laboratories, and took a new flavour in the 2000s as Chinese

migration toAfrica intensified,oftencausingclashesbetweenmigrantsand local

populations,thuselevatingeducationalcooperationtopriorityforeignpolicystatus.

Despitethefocusoncooperationprinciples,whicharenestedinthebeliefthat

the two sides are equal, the relationsbetweenChina andAfrican countrieshave

oftenbeenframedastheprovisionofexpertsfromChinatoAfrica677.Whilethis,on

theonehand,seemstoremindofNorth-Southasymmetricrelationsineducation

and training,on theother,Kingsuggests that “reciprocity shouldnotbeequated

with exact symmetry […] reciprocity could involve looking across [FOCAC]

commitments as awhole andmaking a judgement aboutwin-win economic and

socialcooperation”678.

Predominantly led by China’s interests to develop its soft power, the

engagements with the African continent range from the set-up of Confucius

Institutes, to the training of human resources in several professional fields, the

provision of scholarships to study/train in China, the construction of schools,

including China-Africa friendships schools (FOCAC 2009), cultural exchanges,

university linkages, and more specific projects such as ‘Cultures in Focus’, the

‘China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan’ or the ‘20+20 Cooperation

Plan’679.DifferentlyfromotherdevelopmentpartnerssuchasKoreaInternational

CooperationAgency(KOICA,SouthKorea),JapanInternationalCooperationAgency

(JICA,Japan)andtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID,UK),King

remindsthatChina“doesnotproduceglossyaccountsofitseducationdevelopment

projects […] Nor does it produce regular sector policy statements about

education”680.FOCACdocumentsandtheWhitePapersonChina’sForeignAid(2011

and2014)aswell as the2013WhitePaperonChina-AfricaEconomicandTrade

CooperationoutlineChina’scommitmentsbutthelackofmoredetailedstatistical

676King,2013,op.cit.,p.34.677SeeFOCACdeclarationsandactionplans(2000,2003,2006,2009,2012,2015);WhitePaperonChina’sAfricanPolicy(2006);WhitePaperonChina-AfricaEconomicandTradeCooperation(2013).678King,2013,op.cit.,p.31.679SeeFOCACdeclarationsandactionplans(2000,2003,2006,2009,2012).AnnexIIprovidesasummaryofcommitments.680K.King,‘China’sHigherEducationEngagementwithAfrica:ADifferentPartnershipandCooperationModel?’,inEducation,Learning,Training:CriticalIssuesforDevelopment,InternationalDevelopmentPolicyseriesno.5,GraduateInstitutePublicationsandBrill-Nijhoff,GenevaandBoston,2014,p.2.

189

datamakesittoughtoidentifywhatshare–bothintermsoftypeandquantity–

goestospecificcountries(seeAnnexII).

6.1.2 Kenya-ChinaEducationalCooperationandAssistanceTheconnectionsbetweenEgertonUniversityinKenyaandNanjingAgricultural

University in China started in the 1990s. Together with a few scholarships and

short-termtrainingsupporttostudyinChinaprovidedsincethe1980s,thesewere

thefirstformsofeducationalcooperationbetweenKenyaandChina.Inotherwords,

the cooperation between the two countries before the 2000swasminimal681. A

majorshiftoccurredintheearly2000s.AccordingtoKing,“theFOCACprocess,from

late2003,producedadramaticchangeinshort-termtrainingnumbers,fromjusta

handfulayear toover100annually”682.Similarly, long-termscholarships “which

hadbeenrunningatjustsometenayearfrom1982,wentuptosome40annually

from2007”683.Concomitantly,in2005,thefirstConfuciusInstituteinAfricawasset

upat theUniversityofNairobi. Since thenahighnumberof studentshavebeen

awardedscholarshipsandawardstostudyinChina.Thisperiodofchangecoincided

withabroadershifttakingplaceinKenya–andinAfrica–sincetheelectionofthe

NARC government in 2002, and since a shift in global development cooperation

(withtheadoptionoftheRome,ParisandAccradeclarationsin2003,2005,2008

respectively)whichacknowledgedtheneedfordonorstoaligntheiragendaswith

local objectives. Thehistorical absence and the relatively recent arrival of China

mustbeunderstoodwithinthiscontextofdomesticeffortsandinternationalshifts

inaidprovisiontoeducation.

Kenya:domesticandinternationalframeworks

Since independence, and before the NARC government election in 2002, the

education sector had received uneven national and international attention.

Domestically,thestruggleconcernedtheprovisionoffreeanduniversaleducation

for all, set against ever-present governmental financial constraints and regional

disparities in resourceallocation684. Internationally, the focusofdonors changed

significantlyovertime,shiftingfrombasiceducationtoskillsdevelopment,mostly

681King,2010,op.cit.,p.490.682Ibid.683Ibid.,p.491.684C.ColcloughandA.Webb,‘TheImpactofAidonEducationPolicyinKenya’,RECOUPWorkingPaperno.36,UniversityofCambridge,2010,p.7.

190

dependingonthe“interestsandexpertiseofthebilateralagencies”685ratherthan

recipients’needs.

However,asmentionedabove,amajorshiftoccurredintheearlytomid-2000s

atbothdomesticandinternationallevel.TheNARCgovernmentcametopowerin

2002, making education a fundamental aspect of the electoral manifesto.

Concomitantly,anewphaseof improvedrelationswithdonorsstarted,basedon

increasedtrustinthedemocratically-rungovernmentandonsounderplanningin

education,andinothersectors686.Thisistheperiodwhennotonlythenumberof

OECD-DACdonorsincreased(“from17inthe1990sto34by2008”687),butalsonon-

OECD donors started emerging, most notably China 688 . In 2005, thanks to the

technical support of the World Bank, the Kenya Education Sector Support

Programme (KESSP) was launched, in alignment with the country’s Economic

RecoveryStrategy689.AccordingtoaDFIDreport,recallingtheMinistryofEducation

Science and Technology, “explicit also was the aim of establishing strong and

coordinatedrelationshipswithdonors,whilstmaintainingownershipofthepolicies

beingimplementedatthenationalandlocallevels”690.Inthesameperiod,theRome

(2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008) declarations were adopted marking a

substantialchangeinglobaldevelopmentcooperation,whichemphasisedtheneed

for donors to align their agendas with local objectives while also encouraging

increased local ownership of the policy agenda and implementation systems.

Nevertheless,inKenya,‘localownership’wasonlypartiallysuccessfulduetoatleast

acoupleoffactors:first,donorswerescepticalabouttheabilityofexecutiveofficers

in Kenya’s ministries to operate efficiently and accountably thus ending up

requiringKenyato followdonors’procedures insteadof itsown691.Secondly, the

differencesbetweendonors’budgetagendasandthoseofKenyainfluencedKenyan

objectives.Asaconsequence,primaryeducation–favouredbymostdevelopment

partners vis-à-vis secondary education – remained the focus of Kenya’s

developmentagendainthe2000s692.Although“thedevelopmentofbothTVETand

685Ibid.,p.12.686Ibid.,p.9.687Ibid.,p.11.688Ibid.,p.11;alsoseeKing,2010,op.cit.689ColcloughandWebb,op.cit.,p.15.690Ibid.,p.16.691Ibid.,p.22.692AfricanDevelopmentFund,‘SupporttotheEnhancementofQualityandRelevanceinHigherEducation,ScienceandTechnologyProject’,AfricanDevelopmentFund,2012,p.3.

191

tertiaryeducation693wereincludedamongsttheprioritiesofKESSP,[…]planning

forthemwasweak,andtheydidnotfindfavourwithdonorswhocontributedtothe

pool” 694 . Therefore, while the objectives concerning the delivery of primary

educationtoallweremet,secondaryeducationstillneeded,throughoutthe2000s

uptotheearly2010s,seriouspolicyandimplementationattention695.

While“thegovernmentremainsthemainfinancierofhighereducation”696,the

allocation of resources is insufficient to meet the rise in enrolment in higher

educationfacilities697–consequentialtoanimprovedprimaryeducationsystem,as

wellasa“changingeconomiclandscapeinAfrica,whichrequiresspecializedskills

incriticalnumbers”698.While themajoreducationdevelopmentpartners–DFID,

CIDA,USAID–“continuetosupportbasiceducationprimarily”699,afewothershave

started engaging in higher education development. The AFB, China and the

Netherlands have been supporting TVET institutions, the French Development

Agencyis“supportingstudiesonprivatesectorengagementinhighereducationand

universityeducationfinancingmechanisms,whiletheGermanAcademicExchange

Servicewillcontinuewithcapacity-buildingactivitiesinhighereducation”700.Most

development partners adhere to aid effectiveness principles, specifically with

regardstocountryownership,andhavedevelopedagendasinlinewithKESSPand

Vision2030.China’sengagementineducationalcooperationandassistanceisnot

comparabletootheragencies’modalities,namelysector-wideapproaches.

TheentranceofChina

Chinaisactingaccordingtoagendasoftendetachedfrommulti-lateralparadigms,

mainlyprovidingunsystematicassistanceratherthanadopting“large-scaleproject

approaches”701. King reports that China’s cooperationwith the formal education

sector inKenya involves “provisionof schoolbuildings,university linksprojects,

Chinese language training in formal settings like Nairobi, Kenyatta and Egerton

Universities, or the provision of short- and long-term training”702. However, the

693AccordingtotheWorldBank,tertiaryeducationincludes:universities,colleges,technicaltraininginstitutes,communitycolleges,nursingschools,researchlaboratories,centersofexcellence,distancelearningcenters.Availableat:WorldBank,'TertiaryEducation(HigherEducation)',TheWorldBank[website],<www.worldbank.org/education/tertiary>.694ColcloughandWebb,op.cit.,p.26.695Interviews.696AfricanDevelopmentFund,op.cit.,p.3.697Ibid.698Ibid.,p.2.699Ibid.,p.3.700Ibid.,pp.3-4.701King,2013,op.cit.,p.ix.702King,2010,op.cit.,p.489.

192

support to human resource development does not only involve government-to-

government projects. There are increasing privately provided language training

centres,aswellasa“verywiderangeofenterprise-basedtrainingassociatedwith

the spectrum of Chinese companies, which span the range from the high-tech

Huawei,ininformationtechnology,toChinaRoadandBridgeCorporation,toalarge

pharmaceutical likeHolleyCotec, tovehicleassemblers likeDFM,FocinandKing

Bird,andtoamultiplicityofmuchsmallerfirms”703.Thetrainingprovidedbythese

companiesgenerallyfulfilsthecompanies’directneedsandisnotpartofbroader,

coordinateddevelopmentprograms.

This diversified scenario provides for a range of Chinese interests behind

education and training cooperation and assistance with Kenya, namely the

promotionof its image(throughsoftpowerinstruments likeConfuciusInstitutes

and scholarships), the increase of Chinese companies’ sales and production

(throughthetrainingoflocalhumanresourcesandexposuretoChineseproducts)

and to a smaller extent cooperation in scientific research and exchanges. These

interestsareframedaspartoftheSouth-Southrhetoricwhichreliesonconcepts

such as equality andmutuality. However, despite the commonly held belief that

ChinaprovidesassistancetoAfricainthe‘responsemode’ratherthanprescribing

forAfrica704,thecasesbelowshowthattheresponsemodeisrarelytheapproach

adopted. The ‘response mode’ is intended as the provision of assistance by the

Chinese upon request of the local environment. Quite inversely, there are often

specific Chinese interests behind these actions, informed by agendas that range

fromindustrialdevelopmenttosoftpower.These interestsoftenpresumeapro-

activeChineseapproachsotoachievethe(Chinese)stakeholders’objectives.While

thesemayoverlapwithlocalneedsintermsofcontent,themodalityofprovision

may distance itself fromwhatKenya has come to identify as a best practice, i.e.

coordination.

Bearinginmindthemainresearchquestionthesectionbelowlooksathowand

why different Kenyan agents havemade sense of their interactionwith Chinese

actorsandhowtheyhavejustifiedtheiractionsdomestically.

703Ibid.,704King,2013,op.cit.,p.xi.

193

6.2 KenyanResponsesTheinteractionbetweenKenyanstakeholders intheeducationsectorvis-à-vis

Chinamainlyrevolvesaroundinsertinganewplayerinascenariowellpopulated

by long-present development partners. This implies learning about the way to

match domestic needs with Chinese offers of educational cooperation and

assistance.ItalsoimpliesacknowledgingthattheeconomiclandscapeinKenya,and

inAfricamoregenerally,ischanging:industrializationhasbecomeakeypolicyarea

thatrestsuponfundamentalsocialdevelopmentstobeenacted,themostimportant

ofwhichisthedevelopmentofhumanresourcestocaterforthecountry’semerging

needs. For instance, the improvement of healthcare professionals’ training and

workingenvironmentsisconsideredkeytoguaranteeingahealthypopulation,in

turnabletoworkandproduce;thetraininganddevelopmentoftechnicalexpertsis

crucial for the country to engage activelywith the construction boomand other

emergingsectors.

Despite the widespread emphasis put on China’s role, the collaboration with

China, at times requested, at other times speculatively received (in linewith the

tensionmentionedabovebetweenassistanceandbusiness),ismadesenseofwithin

apre-existingdomesticagendaaccordingtowhichthecollaborationisadapted.The

dynamicsbetweenstateandsocietalorgansconcerningtheopeninguptothenew

partnerareinterestingtostudyforthewaychangeisperceivedandactedupon,not

onlyattheorganisationallevelbutalsoatthelevelofindividuals.Themerefactthat

China isanew(er)partnerprovides for interestingprocessesofdecision-making

withinwhichdeliberationsaremadeastowhataddedvalueisprovidedcompared

tootherpartnersandtowhatisthepriorityforKenyavis-à-vispotentialclashing

Chinesepriorities.

Theareasidentifiedassalientare:

1. Startingpartnershipsbetweentechnicalandvocationaluniversities

and colleges and Chinese companies. In particular, understanding the

readinessandflexibilityofKenyanactorstobothadapttotheChinesemodus

operandi and, at the same time, dictate the rules of ownership and

cooperation.ThestudymainlylooksattheinteractionbetweentheTechnical

UniversityofKenya,anumberofcolleges, theMinistryofEducation,AVIC

International.

194

2. Educationandtraininginhealthcare.Thestudylooksattwoaspects

ofthecooperation:themanagementofChinese-offeredtraininginKenyaand

themanagementofChinese-offeredscholarshipstostudy/traininChina.The

sectionaimsatunveilingthemechanismsandsynergiesbetweenstateand

social organisations and the sectoral structure that have restrained the

arrivalofChinesemedicalteamsandlimitedthenumberofKenyanstudents

from undertaking medical training in China. The stakeholders under

consideration are the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Culture, Kenya

MedicalResearchInstituteandafewprivatecompanies.

3. ThecaseofConfuciusInstitutes.Thefocus isontheroleofKenyan

stakeholders, their deliberations and motivations to set up Confucius

Institutesinthree(atthetimeofresearch)Universities.Thisisaparticular

caseastheissueofCIshasreceivedextraordinaryjournalisticandacademic

attentioninthepastdecade.KenyaishometothefirstConfuciusInstitutein

Africa, set up in 2005 at theUniversity ofNairobi.Most available studies

focus on China’smotivations behind this educational initiative,with little

emphasisplacedontheroleofthelocalcontext705.Theaimoftheanalysis

belowistocontributetothedebatebypresentinghowdifferentuniversities

inKenyahavereceivedandblendedtheChineseinitiativeintolocalcontexts.

6.2.1 TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingCriticism toward China’s limited employment of local human resources,

especially in the infrastructure sector, isoftencontrastedbyChinese companies’

claimsthatAfricansarenotadequatelyqualifiedtocovermanagerialortechnical

roles.WhileknowledgetransferandsupportforthedevelopmentoftheTechnical

andVocationalEducationandTraining(TVET)sectorinAfricancountriesispledged

forinFOCACdocuments,thereisapaucityofstudiesthatfocusonunderstanding

howthedevelopmentiscontextualisedwithinAfricandomesticagendas.TheTVET

issuewassingledoutbytheKenyanMinistryofEducationwhenaskedinwhatareas

KenyamostlycooperateswithChina.

ForKenya,thedevelopmentofTVEThasbecomeoneofthemainobjectivesof

thedevelopmentblueprintdocument,KenyaVision2030,launchedin2008.Inturn,

705SeeM.Procopio,‘TheeffectivenessofConfuciusInstitutesasaToolofSoftPowerinSouthAfrica’,AfricanEast-AsianAffairs/TheChinaMonitor,Issue1-2,June,2015.

195

forChinathedevelopmentoflocalhumanresourcesfortechnicaljobsinKenyais

reportedlyfundamentaltobeabletorelymoreconsistentlyonlocallabour,reduce

thenegativeperceptionsofChina’spresencebyinvolvingthelocalworkforce,and

expose future experts to Chinese industrial machineries/products (through the

provisionof industrial706machines for trainingpurposes).Thechoiceto focuson

this issuestemmed from theneed tounderstandhowKenyanstakeholdershave

blendedChina’scommitmentstooffertrainingandotherinterestsintoachanging

domesticgovernanceenvironment.Thechangingenvironment refersboth to the

booming industrial development in Kenya and to the recognition of higher

educationasakeysector.

StudyingthecooperationinTVETisfascinating,especiallybecausetheencounter

occursbetweenculturesthathavedifferentunderstandingsoftherelationbetween

education and labour. Fieldwork research led to finding out that the problem

perceivedbyChinaconcerningthelackoftrainedhumanresourcesisconsequential

to a Kenyan domestic context characterised by a culture of separation between

technicalandvocationaleducationanditsapplicabilityinrealscenarios,vis-à-vis

theChinesesystemwherefactoriesandcollegesaremoreintegrated.Evenwhen

TVETislinkedtoproduction,inKenya,itisoftenamatterofsmallscaleproduction

ratherthanindustrial707.AccordingtoaleadingKenyanemployers’associationin

theconstructionsector,“thetrainingwasnotanecessitybeforeasconstructionwas

small,therewasnodemand.Nowthereisaconstructionboominthewholeregion”,

andthereistheneedformoresystematictraining708.

WhileeducationandtrainingofhumanresourcesbytheChineseinKenyaoften

takes place at the company level 709 with varied commitment and results, the

MinistryofEducation-TVETDirectoratehasstartedtoleadprojectsincollaboration

witheducational institutions in thecountry,with theaimtostartdeveloping the

sector more consistently and comprehensively. The largest project led by the

Ministryhasbeen supportedby theChinese state-ownedaerospace anddefence

company,AVICInternational,throughaconcessionalloan,andhasbeendeveloped

attheTechnicalUniversityofKenyaandotherhighereducationcolleges.

706Thesemachineshaveindustrialcapacity.Inotherwords,theyarenotdesignedfortrainingbutforindustrialproduction.707J.Simiyu,EntrepreneurshipEducationasaTooltoSupportSelf-EmploymentinKenya,TVETBestPracticeClearinghouse,issue2,UNESCO-UNEVOC,Bonn,2010.708InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaAssociationofBuildingandEngineeringConsultants(KABCEC),Nairobi,2104-09-14.709SeeKing,2013,op.cit.foracomprehensiveaccount.

196

The analysis below mainly focuses on the relation between the Ministry of

Education-TVETDirectorate,theTechnicalUniversityofKenya(TUK),apublicbody,

andtheirengagementwithAVICInternational.

TVETandKenyaVision2030

WhiletheTVETsectorhasexperiencedmoderategrowthoverthepast40years,

with Vision 2030 it has become “the leading engine that the economy must

essentially rely upon to produce adequate levels of themiddle level manpower

neededtodrivetheeconomytowardstheattainmentofthevision”710andas“the

vehicleforsocio-economicandtechnologicaltransformation”711.

In 2010, Sessional Paper No.5 mentioned the need to revamp technical

education 712 . According to different sources, the main challenge for technical

education was the lack of equipment and infrastructure. Because of these

shortcomings,“aproposalwasdonetoseeksupportfromforeignpartners”713,and

anumberofMOUsweresignedwithADB,theNetherlandsandChina,throughan

agreementbetweentheMinistryandtheEmbassyofChina714.Atthesametime,the

awarenessthatappropriatetrainingneededtobeprovidedgrew,andin2011the

University-Industry Partnershipwas created. Before this initiativewas born the

relation between educational institutions and industries only revolved around

coordinatingindustrialattachmentsratherthancriticallylookingatthechallenges

andneedsoftheindustrysotoaddressthemattheuniversitylevel715.Inasense,

according to sources, therewasa failure in communicationbetweeneducational

institutionsandtheindustryastheskillsofstudentsgraduatingfromuniversities

orcollegeswerenotnecessarilythoserequestedbytheindustry.

The significanceof the sector continued togrow, and theTVETAct2013was

passedon4thJune2014withtheaimofregulatingtheoperationofTVETinstitutions.

The Act requested the creation of the Technical and Vocational Education and

Training Authority (TVETA), the creation of the Curriculum Development

AccreditationCertifyingCouncil(CDACC)thatwasinauguratedinNovember2014,

710MinistryofEducationScienceandTechnology,‘DraftTechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining(TVET)Policy’,MinistryofEducationScienceandTechnology,GovernmentoftheRepublicofKenya,March2014,p.11.711UnitedNationsEducational,ScienceandCulturalOrganisation(UNESCO),'WorldTVETDatabase-CountryProfilesKenya',InternationalCentreforTechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining(UNEVOC)[website].712Interviewwithanexecutive,MinistryofEducation,TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-19.713Ibid.714Ibid.715InterviewwithprofessorsofengineeringattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-05.

197

andthecreationofaTVETfund,asourceforresourcemobilisation.Thepurposeof

the creation of these bodieswas regulatingTVET training and re-organising the

TVET sector tomeet Vision 2030’s goal of industrialisation716that “places great

emphasis on science, technology and innovation in general and TVET in

particular”717.Accordingtoaninterviewee,“wewanttogetindustrialisedandtodo

thatweneedsoundTVETtrainingsopeoplecanstartchangingrawmaterialsinto

finishedproducts.Thegovernmenttooktheeffort.”718Whileorchestratedfromthe

top,attheMinisteriallevel,thedevelopmentofTVETanditslinkswiththeindustry

arestrictlyreliantoneducationalinstitutionsandtheindustrialsector,publicand

private. In fact, TVET in Kenya is delivered by both government and private

providers, which include for-profit and non-profit NGOs and church-based

institutions 719 . As mentioned above, the ADB and the Netherlands have also

participated to providing external funding for the development of the sector.

However,intervieweessuggestedthattheengagementwithChinaisthelargestand

mostcomprehensive.

Chineseequipmentandtraining

Theareasthatmostlyneededtobetackledfordevelopingthesectorwerethus

equipment, infrastructureandtraining. In2010,afteracknowledgingtheneedto

seek support from foreign partners, mainly due to the fact that domestic

stakeholderswerenotusedtosupportingmajoreducationalprojects,theMinistry

of Education signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Chinese

Embassy and later entered a contract with AVIC International for the supply of

equipment, capacity building and civil work, namely buildingworkshops, for all

technical training institutions, to be completed within 5 years. A year later the

projectwasdeemedtoovastandreducedinsizetoprovideequipmentandcapacity

building to 10 institutions only720, selected by theMinistry of Educationwith a

visiontostrengthenTVET.

TheTechnicalUniversityofKenyawasselectedbytheMinistrytoleadtheproject,

anditwasprovidedwiththefullrangeofequipment,i.e.mechanical,electricaland

electronic,rapidprototyping,whiletheothernineinstitutionsreceivedonetypeof

716Ibid.717UNESCO,op.cit.718InterviewwithprofessorsofengineeringattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-05.719MinistryofEducationScienceandTechnology,op.cit.,p.13.720Interviewwithanexecutive,MinistryofEducation,TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-19.

198

equipment only. The equipment was negotiated between the Ministry and the

institutionsthatwererequestedtosuggestthekindofequipmenttheycouldbenefit

frombasedontheirtraditionalareasoftraining721.Accordingtosources,however,

theMinistry already had inmind the fact that the equipment had to benefit the

developmentofTVET.AtTUK,theequipmentavailablebeforethebatchfromAVIC

Int’larrivedwas“fromthe1970s,itwasoldbutfunctional,itwasEuropean-made,

inBritain,Germany,Italy.Itisnowstillinusebutonothercampuses”722.Thenew

equipment isveryadvanced,and it isbelievedtohave improvedtheuniversity’s

capacityinmechanicalandelectricalengineeringalthoughitisnotallinusedueto

powershortage723.TheequipmentprovidedbyAVIC Int’lhas industrialcapacity,

not mere training capacity. This aspect is considered significant by educational

stakeholdersforhowtherelationbetweeneducationandindustrycandevelop.The

availabilityofmachinescapableofproducingfortheindustryisseenasanincentive

toproduce,andproductionleadstowardsindustrialisation,i.e.KenyaVision2030’s

ultimategoal.Thisprovisionis,however,accompaniedbyanawarenessthat“the

Chineseareinterestedinbusiness[…]Thisprojectisforshowcasingwhattheycan

do.ThisisawayofmarketinginAfrica”724.Accordingtoasource“thefactthatthe

ChinesemaydonateandthenwanttohavereturnsisnotonlyaChineseproblem.

Anyonewhodonatessomethinghasareasontodonateequipment.Thenstudents

are more familiar with this equipment, and when they have to suggest to

procurementdepartmentswheretobuy, theysuggestbuyingthisequipment[…]

I’m not surprised if the Chinese have an agenda in doing this”725 . While other

partners,suchasagroupfromtheNetherlands,onefromBelgiumandADB,more

recently provided equipment, the project with AVIC Int’l is deemed the largest

projectintheeducationsector.

The provision of equipment was contracted together with the provision of

trainingforlearninghowtouseit.Acascadeapproachwasadoptedwhereeachof

theteninstitutionssenttwoteacherstoChinafora3-monthtrainingin2012,and

theteachers,uponreturn,trainedmoreteachersandstudents.Whatprovedtobe

significantinthiscontextofcooperationatthelevelofhighereducationwastobe

721InterviewwithprofessorsofengineeringattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-05.722InterviewwithanexecutiveattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-04.723Ibid.724InterviewwithprofessorsofengineeringattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-05.725InterviewwithanexecutiveattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-04.

199

abletocalibratewhattheChineseofferedtowhattheinstitutionsneeded,andmore

generallywhatthecountryaimedtoasawhole.

WhilethetrainingassociatedwiththeprovisionofequipmentbyAVICInt’lhas

beenhighlyconsideredthankstoitsblendingwiththedesiredtrajectoryofTVET

development,inthecaseofanothermajorcollegeinthecountry,theabsenceofa

complementaryagendabetween theChineseandKenyanstakeholders led to the

rejectionofChinesetrainingoffers.AChinesegroupofferedtosetupaChinese-run

trainingcentrewithintheCollege,whichtrainsteachersinKenya.Accordingtothe

offer,aChinesefirmwouldhavesponsoredtheestablishmentofanadhoctraining

centrewithintheinstitution,runningitonitsowntermswhileofferingadifferent

programmefromwhatwaspartofthecurriculum,which,accordingtotheInstitute,

was aimed at enhancing “competence based training, to provide people with

practicalskillssowhenstudentsleavetheyarereadyforthejobmarket”726.While

thecompetency-basedtrainingwouldhavematchedtheneedtodevelopTVET,it

didnotmatchtheinstitute’strainingmandate,focusedonteachers’trainingrather

thanskillsdevelopment,andwasrejectednotonlybytheInstitutebutalsobythe

Ministry of Education that “felt uncomfortable”mainly because it perceived the

Chineseofferasaimedat“supportingChinesecompaniesinKenya”727.

TheMinistryalsopointedout that theprovisionof funding to start a training

centre should not have misled the Institute to accept it as “there are a lot of

programmesouttherethatdonotworkbecausetheyarenotframedforus[…]You

needinvolvementfromthestakeholderstomaketheseprogrammessustainable”728.

ThisinvolvementiswhatthecooperationwithAVICInt’lprovidedabasisfor.Ina

way, the provision of equipment provided the grounds for intensifying relations

withtheindustrythroughtheinvolvementofsocietalstakeholdersasexemplified

below.

‘AfricaTechChallenge’linkingschoolstofactories

TheequipmentrequestedtoAVICwasnotmeanttosatisfytrainingneedsonly

but,thankstoitsindustrialcapacity,itwasintendedtoleadtheinstitutionsusingit

towardsproduction729.Thiswasadeparturefrompreviouspracticesasproduction

726InterviewwithanexecutiveandanofficerattheKenyaTechnicalTrainersCollege,Nairobi,2014-10-10.727Interviewwithanexecutive,MinistryofEducation,TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTrainingDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-19.728Ibid.729Ibid.

200

had mostly been limited to training purposes or to help the “immediate

community”730throughsmallscalesimpleproductionofitemssuchasmachinesto

cutthegrassforcows.

Withthelong-termaimofchangingthispatternoflimitedinteractionbetween

educational institutions and factories, and of enhancing technical training to

supportsmallfactorydevelopment731,theMinistryofEducation,TVETDirectorate

generatedacompetitionnamedtheAfricaTechChallengethattookplace,forthe

firsttime,insummer2014,aimedatproducingasparepartthatcouldbeusedin

industrialenvironments.AfricaTechChallengesawtheparticipationof18institutes

includinguniversities,eachcomposedofateamofthreepeople.Aninitialtraining

period of 6 weeks was provided, after which the competition started with a

preliminary phase and a final phase in which six teams competed to win. The

trainingwashostedbyTUKandthemachinesusedwerethoseprovidedbyAVIC.

However, of all the institutes participating, not all were beneficiaries of AVIC

equipment meaning that for a number of students the training of Africa Tech

Challengeprovidedthefirstchancetoworkonveryadvancedmachines.

AVIC International, which was already partnering with the Ministry for the

equipmentsupplytoTUKandothercolleges,wasthefirsttobeapproachedbythe

Ministry and was asked to sponsor the competition. AVIC agreed by providing

trainers and guaranteeing that the winning products would be bought by the

companyoritsaffiliatestobeusedintheheavymachineryindustry.Thecontracts

foreseetheproductionofthreetypesofspareparts,twoofwhicharethengoingto

be shipped to China and one, produced through a collaborationwith the Kenya

NationalYouthService,isgoingtobeusedinKenyaintheheavymachineryindustry.

Theideaoflinkingeducationalinstitutionstofactorieswasnotnew,butitwas

now possible to intensify it thanks to the widespread presence of advanced

equipmentandthankstotheideaofusingtheinstitutions’premisesandmachines

toproduceitemstobeusedinrealcontextsofproduction.However,attheMinistry,

anintervieweepointedoutthatlinkingthefactoriesandeducationalinstitutionsis

stillatanearlystageofconceptdevelopmentandturningtoproductiononaregular

andconsistentbasiswilltakealongtime732.Inordertofacilitatethisprocessand

guarantee its sustainability, after the success of the first round of Africa Tech

730Ibid.731Ibid.732Ibid.

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Challenge, the Ministry of Education invited a number of Kenyan organisations

whosemembersarehighlyimpactedbythelevelandqualityofhumanresources’

training,suchastheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers,theKenyaPrivateSector

AllianceandtheFederationofKenyanEmployers,tojointhesponsoringofAfrica

Tech Challenge and to make their members aware that there are a number of

institutionsacrossthecountrythathavehumanandmachinecapacitytosupport

theirdevelopment733.Accordingtosources,anumberoflocalinstitutionsagreedto

jointheinitiativebyprovidingemploymentattachments734.

As a source at an educational institution pointed out “nowwe have the best

equipment, some of which is not even available in the industries. It is now a

challenge for us to use the facilities to train students and workers to use the

machines.”735Accordingtointervieweesinthesector,theavailabilityofadvanced

machinery could be a way to revolutionise the whole idea behind production,

learning from countries like Germany where the industries rely on training

institutions and the state-of-the-art machinery available there to spearhead

products before fully developing them736 . While Kenya currently “follows the

industry”bylookingat“whatindustriesdoandtrainpeopletodothat”737theaimis

toreachsuchacollaborative levelof interactionaccordingtowhichthe industry

makesuseof training institutions’ intellectual aswell asmachinery’s capacity to

developbetterproductsand“whentheyseethat itbecomesprofitable, theymay

acquirefacilities.”738

Collaborativegovernance,in-the-making

Thiscaseisoneofgovernancein-the-makingwheredomesticactorsidentified

theunsuitabilityofexistingsystemsofgovernancetoachieveemergingobjectives.

Becauseofthisperceiveddeficiency,acollaborativetypeofgovernancewasdevised

todrawuponpublicandprivateresources.ThepresenceofChinesecompaniesin

Kenyawasnotidentifiedasthecauseofchange,butasanelementthatemphasised

theneedtorestructurethesystem.Thecasefocusesontheinitiativesconceivedby

Kenyan actors to create the conditions to fill the gap systematically, in higher

733Ibid.734Non-stateactorswereincludedinthesecondroundofthecompetition,includingKenyanGearboxsoftwareandiHub.Formoreinformation,refertowww.avicatc.org.735InterviewwithprofessorsofengineeringattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-05.736Ibid.737Ibid.738Ibid.

202

education facilities rather than in factories, as part of a long-term project of

educationaldevelopment,whilediscouragingtheissuetobeaddressedonaneed-

basisbyindividualChinesecompanies.

The example of China’s relations between education and the industry is well

valued. However, it is not singled out, other countries’ approaches are equally

appreciated.Notwithstandingthis,whileotherdevelopmentpartnershadengaged

incapacitybuilding,China’sAVICInternationaldidnotmerelyprovidetrainingbut

wasalsowillingtoprovidemuch-neededequipmentthatwasperceived,byKenyans,

to be the missing link for the development of more comprehensive relations

betweeneducationandthe industry.WhileAVICInternational’sengagementwas

widelypraised,anintervieweeatTUKsuggestedthat“ahugenumberofpeoplein

KenyaareeducatedintheWest.ItwilltakealongtimeforKenyanstoplacepeople

withadegreefromaChineseuniversity.Thesearerootsfromthecolonialera”739.

Infact,despitethefundamentalandpositiveroleplayedbyAVICInt’lforthestart

of the Africa Tech Challenge project, the TVET Directorate of the Ministry of

Educationencouragedtheparticipationofdifferentdomesticassociationswiththe

aimoftacklingtheproblematthesource,namelyguaranteeingamoredirectlink

betweendomesticfactoriesandeducationalinstitutions.Collaborativegovernance,

though still in-the-making, seems to be characterising the relationship between

state and non-state actors. The way the collaboration with Chinese actors was

processed,andKenyanandChineseagendascompared,showsthatconfrontation,

rather than accommodation, took place, to guarantee that the Chinese offer of

assistancewouldwellmatch localneeds.Theopeningup to includeanumberof

otherdomesticorganisationsandtheadhesionoftheseorganisationstotheproject

issymptomaticofaresponsiveandcollaborativeenvironmentwherenotonlythe

state bureaucracy but also the private sector iswilling to participate inwhat is

perceivedasaprocessofchangeandacornerstonetoachievingtheVision2030’s

goalofindustrialization.

6.2.2 HumanresourcesforhealthcareIn the case just above, Chinese and Kenyan actors identified a problem that

impacted stakeholderson either side (Chinese andKenyan) - namely the lackof

locallyavailabletechnically-trainedhumanresourcesleadingChinesecompaniesto

739InterviewwithanexecutiveattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-04.

203

relyonChinesetechnicalpersonnelratherthanKenyan-andnegotiatedawayto

overcomeit.Contrarytothat,inthecaseofHumanResourcesforHealth(HRH)740,

theproblemisnotidentifiedbythestakeholdersinvolved.Itratheremergesfroma

comparisonofChina’scommitmentstowardshealthcaredevelopmentinAfrica(see

AnnexI)andthespecificcaseofKenya.DespitetheChinesecommitmentstoprovide

educationandtrainingassistancetoAfricancountries,anddespitethedireneedfor

Kenyatodevelopitshumanresourcesforhealthcare,theengagementbetweenthe

twohasbeenlimitedbothintermsofChinesepersonnelworking/visitingKenya,

for instance Medical Teams, and in terms of Kenyan students and staff

studying/traininginChina.ResearchconductedinKenyahasrevealedamismatch

between the type of assistance China pledges to offer and the kind that Kenyan

stakeholdersfindtobeappropriatetothelocalneeds,inlinewiththeexistingsystem

ofgovernance.

The Chinese involvement in education and training for healthcare has been

framedfordecadesundertheSouth-Southcooperationumbrellawiththedispatch

ofChineseMedicalTeams(CMTs)toAfricasincethe1950sandtheuseoftraditional

Chinesemedicine741.MorerecentlyCMTshavealsobeenidentifiedasinstruments

toincreaseChina’ssoftpowerinAfrica.However,asFanpointsoutdiscussingthe

Beijing Declaration of the first Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Health

Development, the risk China incurs is that of focusing “on providing ‘things’ –

sending medical teams, drugs, prefabricated clinics” 742 not focusing on the

sustainabilityoftheprojectsoronwhethertheyalignwiththerecipientcountry’s

specificneeds.Asa consequence, taking the caseofKenya, the softpowerChina

attempts toexercise remains limited in itspotentialeffectivenessas theanalysis

belowdemonstrates.

AnincreasinglyemergingrationalebehindChina’sinvolvementintheeducation

andtrainingofHRH,similarly towhatwas foundout forTVET, is that toexpose

Kenyanhealthcareprofessionals,fromtechnicianstodoctors,toChineseproducts,

throughtraining.Inotherwords,theideaisthattousepublicdiplomacytocreatea

market.ThisallowsprofessionalstofamiliarisewiththeproductstheChineseoffer

740“Humanresourcesforhealth(HRH)includepublicandprivatesectordoctors,nurses,midwives,pharmacists,techniciansandotherparaprofessionalpersonnel,aswellasuntrainedandinformal-sectorhealthworkers,suchaspractitionersoftraditionalmedicine,communityhealthworkers,andvolunteers”,WorldHealthOrganisation,Theworldhealthreport2006–Workingtogetherforhealth,WorldHealthOrganisation,Geneva,2006.741Li,2011,op.cit.742V.Fan,'China-AfricaHealthCooperation:ANewEra?',CentreforGlobalDevelopment(CGD)[website],23August2013.

204

and, presumably, increases chances of commercial exchange743 vis-à-vis others,

suchasWesternorIndianproducts(whicharestill,however,dominantasshowed

inthepreviouschapter).

ForKenya,inturn,theengagementwithChinaineducationandtrainingisvery

new, it is not yet developed and remainsmarginal in the overall picture of the

development of human resources for health. The question is then how and the

extenttowhichtheKenyangovernmentandsocialstakeholdersfiltertheprovision

ofassistanceandsteerittowardswhatisneededratherthanmerelyacceptwhatis

offered.Asmentionedabove,despitetheChineseemphasisonthe‘response-mode’,

in the case of Kenya, assistance is mostly provided in line with China’s African

commitments(namelythedispatchofChineseMedicalTeams,theset-upofMalaria

centersandthetrainingofpersonnelinbothconventionalandtraditionalmedicine),

ratherthanbasedonlocalgovernancesystemsandnecessities.

Cooperation in education and training in healthcare is not (yet) structured

betweenthetwocountries,itrathertakesplacethroughtheChineseprovisionof

unsystematic assistance, often not part of longer-term projects. In collaborating

with Kenya, China enters an environment that is already highly populated by

international andmultilateral organisations.However, the systemof governance

presentsitselfasfragmented,“withseveralministriesandgovernmentdepartments

takingdifferentrolesandresponsibilities.Thegreatestchallengehasbeenthelack

of coordination among the various training agencies, resulting in inefficiency,

duplicationofeffortandwastageofresources(Ministriesofmedicalservicesand

publichealthandsanitation,2009)”744.Asdemonstrated in thepreviouschapter,

thehealthsector,notonlyHRH,isonewherethereisconsiderablevarianceinthe

successful agenda design and implementation. In particular, the presence of

developmentpartnersandinternationalinstitutionshasweakenedtheindigenous

public management of resources as showed in the previous chapter (case of

infrastructure development). Therefore, public bodies are too heavily reliant on

international institutionsandarethusunaccustomedtonegotiatebeyondknown

boundariesandmethodologies.Chinanon-adherencetointernationalmechanisms

makestheprocessesofnegotiationevenmoreunusual.

743Brautigam,2011,op.cit.,p.8;Brautigam,2009,op.cit.,p.118-119.744H.Kiambati,C.KiioandJ.Toweett,‘UnderstandingTheLabourMarketofHumanResourcesforHealthinKenya’,WorldHealthOrganisation,WorkingPaper,November2013,p.7.

205

Educationandtrainingforhealth:nationalandinternationalframeworks

SeveralfactorshaveinhibitedKenya’sabilitytoprovideadequatehealthcarefor

itscitizens.Themostimportantisunderfundingofthehealthsectorwhichhasan

impactonhumanresourcesavailabilityanddistributionthat,inturn,influencethe

provisionofadequatehealthcare.TheWHOhasflaggedKenyaas“facinganacute

shortageofhealthworkers.Universitiesandtrainingfacilitiesareonlyproducing

40percentoftheneededhealthworkforce,andpoordistributionandretentionisa

seriousconcernparticularlyinruralareaswheretheneedisgreatest”745.TheKenya

MedicalTrainingCollegetrainsthelargestnumberofhealthworkersinKenya746.

Dataistoughtogather,andonlytheNursingCouncilprovidesstatisticsrelatedto

thetrainingofnurses.TheCouncilsuggeststhat“thepublicandmission-sponsored

institutionstrainthelargestnumberofnurses.Theproportionofthepublicsector

increasedfrom60%in2005to75%in2009.Onaverage,thepublictrainsabout

70%,whereas themissions trainabout20%.This implies thatmostof thenurse

trainingreliesonpublic sector resources”747.Due topoorpayandpoorworking

conditions“overtheyears,Kenyahasexperiencedabraindrainofhealthworkers

[…]manyendingupinWesterncountries”mainlytheUKfollowedbytheUS,Canada

andAustralia748.Since2009,however,“thenumberofhealthworkersseekingnew

jobopportunities[abroad]hasdeclinedbecauseofimprovedworkingconditionand

remunerationinKenyainboththepublicandprivatesectors”749.Thecountryhas

madesignificantprogressintherecruitmentofhealthprofessionalsalso“througha

collaborativeeffortwithdevelopmentpartnerssuchastheUnitedStatesAgencyfor

International Development (USAID), Danish International Development Agency

(DANIDA)andtheGlobalFundtoFightAIDS,TuberculosisandMalaria(GFATM)

whohave funded the recruitment of healthworkers on short-term contracts for

bothpublicandfaith-basedorganisations.”750Thiscollaborationwithdevelopment

partnerswasalsoconsequentialtorequestsputforwardbytheKenyangovernment

to“anycountrytoprovidehelpsotoguaranteereachingthethresholdsetbythe

WHOofhealthworkersperperson”751.To tackle the issue, twowere the crucial

745USAID,'USAIDKenyaHealthSystemsStrengthening',USAID,September2013.746Kiambati,KiioandToweett,op.cit.,p.7. 747Ibid.748BusinessMonitorInternational,op.cit.749Kiambati,KiioandToweett,op.cit.,p.7.750KenyaMinistryofStatefortheDevelopmentofNorthernKenyaandotherAridLandsandIntraHealthInternational,HumanResourcesforHealth(HRH)AssessmentReportforNorthernKenya:OverviewofHealthWorkforceDistributionacross10Counties,May2013,p.72.751InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi,2014-11-18.

206

aspects:increasethenumberofhealthcarestudents,andretaintheminthecountry

aftergraduation.

China’sentranceWhen in the1970s “thenumberofCMTs inAfricagreatly increased”with the

“adventofCMTsin22countries”752,KenyaandChinawerestillfacingastalemate

intheirdiplomaticrelations,situationunderwhichCMTsareusuallywithdrawnor

notdispatched753.However,sincetheestablishmentofFOCACin2000–andwith

theadventofKibaki’sLookEastPolicy–thetwocountrieshavedeepenedrelations

inanumberoffields,includingthemedicalone.FOCACcommitmentsconcerning

humanresourcesforhealthmainlyrevolvearoundthedispatchofChineseMedical

Teams,thesetupofMalariacentres,thetrainingofpersonnelinbothconventional

and traditionalmedicine (seeAnnex I). ChineseMedical Teamshave treated the

mostdifferentdiseasesnotjustthroughmodernmedicinebutalsothrough“Chinese

traditional medical treatment, especially acupuncture” 754 . Given CMTs are

reportedlydispatcheduponrequest, theattentionof thisanalysis focuseson the

Kenyan system and attempts to find the reasons why requests were never put

forward,orifso,iftheywererejectedbytheChinese.Similarly,whileanti-malaria

training provision by China has been widespread across Africa755 , again Kenya

benefitedonlylimitedly.

Educationandtrainingcooperationandassistancebetweenthetwocountriesis

veryrecent,andalthoughthisstudypresentsasnapshotofthesituationuptoearly

2014,therelationskeepevolving.Forinstance,attheMinisterialForumonChina-

AfricaHealthDevelopment,held inBeijing inAugust2013,China’scommitments

madereferencetonewareasofcooperationsuchas“cooperationbetweenacademic

andresearchinstitutionsinChinaandAfrica”aswellastheestablishmentof“joint

researchlaboratoriesandethicalconductinthemedicalfield”andtheopeningup

to“inviteyoungscientistsfromAfricatoChinatocarryoutacademicresearchand

vice versa”. Finally, the declaration also includes a commitment to “facilitate

communication and cooperation between non-government organisations in the

health sector”, particularly through the “China-Africa friendly civil partnership

plan”756.

752Li,2011,op.cit.,p.9.753Ibid.754Ibid.,p.18.755Ibid.,p.15.756MinisterialForumonChina-AfricaHealthDevelopment,Beijing,August2013.

207

ChineseeducationandtraininginKenya

Despitethelackofhumanresourcesforhealthandtheratioofdoctor/patient

stillbeingextremelyinadequateinthecountry,ChineseMedicalTeamswerenever

requested by Kenya. CMTs are demand-driven, like, arguably, most assistance

providedbyChina.IntervieweesinKenyaconfirmedthatpermitswereneverissued

toChinesehealthcareprofessionalstooperateinKenyaexceptfromabriefperiod

in2010whentheChinesenavyhospitalship,PeaceArk,dockedatMombasaport

between13and18October.According to theMedicalPractitionersandDentists

Board,thebodyinchargeofissuingpermitsforforeignHealthCareProfessionals

(HCPs)tooperateinKenya,thedoctorswerelicensedtoworktemporarilyinKenya,

“theystayed less thanamonth,and that isunusual.Doctorsatmissionhospitals

usually stay longer.”757The Human Resources division of theMinistry of Health

suggeststhatthereasonwhyKenyaneverturnedtoChinais“historical,duringthe

ColdWar,KenyawasmorealignedwiththeWest,itneverintendedtogetsupport

fromtheEastuntil theotherday, in the1990s,when theWest started imposing

sanctions”758.On theonehand, thecountryhasbeenaccustomedto theWestern

provision of doctors on a voluntary basis, and of training through Western

organisations,neverconsideringtheChinese.Ontheotherhand,thepreferenceof

thecountryhasbeenonprovidingtrainingtoKenyanhumanresourcesratherthan

givingspacetoforeignhumanresourcestooperateinthecountry.ForeignHCPsare

mainly “volunteers at mission hospitals. There are circa 700 foreigners in the

country,mostlyfromtheUS,UK,Sweden,Netherlands,SouthAfrica(few),India”759.

Theproblemmainly seems to concern theexistenceof stronghistorical linkages

withWesterninstitutions,includingfaith-basedorganisationsprovidinghealthcare

andacceptingforeigndoctorstoworkforthem,ratherthanwithadeliberateaction

toopposetheentryofChinesephysicians.Infact,responseslikethiswerefrequent:

“iftheycame,theChinese,theywouldbehelpful.Ihaveinteractedwiththem,they

areeasy,theyhaveminimaldemands”760.

BeyondCMTs,ChinahascommittedtofocusingonprovidingtrainingtoAfrican

countriesaspartofgovernmentassistanceonmalariamanagement,HIV-AIDSand

other communicablediseases (seeAnnex I). In2003,LiAnshanreports that “six

757InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMedicalPractitionersandDentistsBoard,Nairobi,2014-10-07.758InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi,2014-11-18.759InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMedicalPractitionersandDentistsBoard,Nairobi,2014-10-07.760InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi,2014-10-14.

208

Chineseexpertsand28Africanparticipantsfrom14countriesattended[amalaria-

management] one-week training course, which was highly praised by African

participants as well as the Kenyan Minister of Health and the Chinese

ambassador”761.Again, in 2007-2008Chinesepersonnelwas inKenya todeliver

training762inmalariamanagementandin2014theChinesegovernmentsponsored

a training in China to which experts from the Malaria Control Division and the

MinistryofHealthparticipated763.However,asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,

the sector’s reliance on multilateral cooperation makes it difficult for Kenyan

stakeholderstoallowChinatocarryouttrainingandinitiativesdisjoint fromthe

existing system of governance. As a consequence, the provision of this training

seemstobeanendinitself,wheretheChinesearenotcontributingtotheKenyan

managementof thediseasebut continue,nonetheless, toprovide training that is

defined, in content and modality, by what is recognised as important flagship

initiativesofChinesehealthcarediplomacy.

As far as it concerns the involvement of non-state actors in the provision of

educationandtraining,BeijingHolley-Cotec in2006hasdonatedKsh3.5million

worthofscholarshipstotheCollegeofHealthSciences,UniversityofNairobi, for

needyandoutstandingstudents764.However,theHealthcareFederationofKenya,

branchoftheKenyaPrivateSectorAlliance,suggestedthatdespitethedireneedof

training,Chinesepharmaceuticalcompanieshavenotsupportedany.Explanations

providedbytheFederationrevolvearound“alanguageproblem,aculturalproblem

andasenseofcomfortthatwedonothavewiththeChinese.Wegetgeneralrequests

fortheprovisionoftrainingbyGermany,theNetherlands,nottheChinese.Iwould

be interested in getting in touch with the China Healthcare Federation, our

counterpart. And if Chinese pharma companies do provide training, thenmaybe

theirawarenessisweakaswedonotknowaboutthat”765.Thisisonemorecasein

whichChineseactorsarenotpartoftheassociationalenvironmentthatconstitutes

ashareofthesectoralsystemofgovernance.

761Li,2013,op.cit.,p.67.762InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MalariaControlDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-06.763Ibid.764UniversityofNairobi,VarsityFocus,op.cit.,pp.21-22.765Interviewwithanexecutive,KenyaHealthcareFederation,Nairobi,2014-10-08.

209

Beyondtheprivatesector, therehavenotbeenotherChinesenon-stateactors

involved in the sector, except the Chinese Red Cross through which Chinese

companies’donations(CSR)havebeenchannelledonacoupleofoccasions766.

ChineseeducationandtraininginChina

ThecooperationineducationandtrainingdoesnotonlytakeplaceinKenyabut

also through theopportunities created for students andprofessionals to train in

China.Chinaisprovidingscholarshipsfortraininghealthpersonnelfromtwoweeks

to master level. It is providing the highest number of short courses and has

surpassed Japan that was previously the leader through JICA767 . Long courses,

instead, aremainly providedbyCommonwealth countries such asBritain, India,

Australia. China mainly provides courses in service delivery and critical areas

whereasGermanyistheleaderinmanagementwithJapanprovidingboth768.While

the scholarships can be offered to different departments at both theMinistry of

Education and the Ministry of Health, generally it is the Human Resources

DevelopmentDivisionattheMinistryofHealththatassignspostgraduateandin-

service scholarships through a needs assessmentwhile theMinistry of Education

assignsthoseforundergraduatestudies769.AccordingtotheMinistryofHealth,the

support fromChina has been increasing, andKenyan stakeholders decidewhich

typeofprofessionalfiguresshouldreceivetrainingopportunities.Theissuesaround

which the training revolveare,however,oftenestablishedbyChinaand involve:

malaria, HIV, health system management, community health, laboratory. The

MinistryofHealth,forinstance,sent“notlessthanahundredpeople/personnelto

short training in China since 2011. In 2013, 30 peoplewent to get training and

deepen the understanding of the healthcare system”770 . As far as it concerns

undergraduate training, for instance that undertaken by medical students, the

KenyaMedicalandDentistsBoardsuggeststhatstudentsreturningfrommedical

studiesinChinaoftenseemnottopasstheexamsinKenyaduetothefactthatthe

curriculumstudiedinChinaisdifferentcomparedtothatinKenya771.However,due

totherelativelynewnatureoftherelations,nospecificactionshavebeentaken,yet,

766‘DonationtoKenyaRedCrossSocietybytheChineseCommunityinKenya’,EmbassyofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofKenya,6January2008;L.Hou,‘Chinesecommunitiesdonatetovictims'familiesafterKenyaattacks’,ChinaDaily,08April2015.767InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi,2014-11-18.768Ibid.769InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi,2014-11-18.770InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalServices,Nairobi,2014-09-29.771InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMedicalPractitionersandDentistsBoard,Nairobi,2014-10-07.

210

to improve the partnership to ensure that the teaching content and quality

standardsofthetwocountriesalign.

An interesting aspect concerning health-related training in China is that of

perceptions. Kenyans are yet to establish trust toward the Chinese in health

productsandpractices.Mostintervieweesreportedthatitisgeneralbeliefthatthe

WestoffersbettertrainingthanChinabutthatsinceitislimited,itisworthtaking

advantage of the Chinese offers too. Perceptions play a significant role in the

understanding of the medical profession as carried out by Chinese nationals in

KenyaoroftrainingorganisedinChina.Thisperceptionisoftencomparedtoone

concerningtheWest’sprovisionofeducationandtraining, largelydeemedbetter

than the Chinese. Ministry’s bureaucrats and healthcare professionals at the

directoratelevelinvariousstructuresareawareofthiswidespreadperceptionand

often stand in the middle reporting that “those trained in China feel it wasn’t

good” 772 , and “come back with good stories for sightseeing” 773 , leading to a

generalisedperceptionthatChinesetrainingisnotserious.However,thisdepiction

isbalancedwiththeacknowledgementthatthereare,asperexperience,brilliant

Chinesedoctorsand trainingcanbe top level. So far,however, thequalityof the

traininghasnotbeensystematicallyassessed774.Mostly,studentsandprofessionals

go to China to undertake training on conventionalmedicine although traditional

medicineisalsogainingmomentum.

Traditionalmedicineeducationandtraining

The attention to training in traditional medicine is set against a maturing

domestic environment that recognises the potential importance of traditional

medicinetoreducingthecostsofhealthcareprovision.Fortraditionalmedicineto

haveanimpact,however,Kenyanactorshaveidentifiedtheneedtoimproveand

formalise education and training significantly. China’s dominant role,

internationally,inthedevelopmentanduseoftraditionalmedicineinhealthcare

provision,wasrecognisedasadeterminingfactortointensifylinks.

AlthoughitisnottheonlyinitiativeundertakenincollaborationwithChina,the

NaturalProductsIndustryInitiative(explainedinChapter5)shedslightontwokey

KenyanmotivationsforchoosingChinaasapartnerineducation.Thefirstconcerns

772InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi,2014-10-14.773InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MedicalEngineeringDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-18.774InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofHealth,HumanResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi,2014-11-18.

211

thepossibility to increase, through the trainingprovidedbyChinese institutions,

capacitybuildingnotonlyinmedicaltrainingorproductdevelopmentbutalsoin

management,includingthesyncingofconventionalandtraditionalmedicineusage

in the national healthcare system. The possibility to learn from a country that

perfectedaconventional-traditionalblendedversionofhealthcaredeliveryproved

tobeakeyfactorinwantingtopartnerwithChina.Thesecondmotivationconcerns

the fact that the presence of China symbolises more than a mere partner in

development.Itsymbolisesthepossibilityofunearthingindigenoustraditionsfor

longburiedundercolonialismandpost-colonialism.

Asdescribedinthepreviouschapter,theinstitutionalenvironmentsurrounding

thedevelopmentoftraditionalmedicineisweak,undermajorrevisionbyconcerned

governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in Kenya. Because of the

fragmentedandunofficialenvironment,educationandtrainingarenotregularised,

evenlessformalisedbyinstitutionsofhigherlearning.Whiletraditionalhealersin

Chinaareformallyrecognised775,inKenyatheyarenot.AccordingtotheMinistryof

Culture(TraditionalMedicinesection),“therearenocoursesordegrees,butweare

intheprocess[ofcreatingeducationalopportunities][…]workingonaformulato

developacollegewithcertificatediplomaanddegree”776.AtKenyattaUniversity,

for instance, the curriculum of the Faculty of Pharmacy is still based on the

Commonwealth curriculum. While some staff has been trained in China in

traditionalmedicine,tointegratetheknowledgeintotheactualteachingisproving

quitedifficult.The legal frameworkneedsreform, i.e. repealing the1925Act, for

traditionalmedicineuseandpracticetobelegalisedandthusappealstudents,staff

andthegeneralpublic.

Regarding research, according to the Kenya Medical Research Institute,

TraditionalMedicineDivision, “there isnocollaboration.The Japanesewhobuilt

thisInstitutewerethefirstcollaborators.Weweredoingresearchforourproducts,

andtheyfundedalot.TheChineseascollaborators,theywanttodeveloptheirown

products as the industry comes up” 777 . This is not well received and, as a

consequence, partnerships have not taken off. One of the challenges to these

partnerships, beyond the Chinese focus on Chinese product development, is

identifiedinthesecrecythatsurroundsthepracticeanduseoftraditionalmedicines

775WorldBank,'TraditionalHealerServices',op.cit.776InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,TraditionalMedicineDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-10.777InterviewwithanexecutiveattheKenyaMedicalResearchInstitute(KEMRI),Nairobi,2014-11-05.

212

inbothcountries.Someresearchershavementionedthatevenduringtheirvisitsin

Chinatheirunderstandingofcompositionswasverylimitedduetolimitedexposure

bytheChinese.

TheonlytypeofinteractionbetweenKEMRIandtheChineserevolvesaroundthe

provision of scholarships for students and researchers to visit China. In China,

training revolves around the Chinese experience rather than exploring

commonalitiesacrosstraditionalmedicineculturesmorebroadly778.Thisappliesto

boththeresearchandpolicyenvironments.Accordingtotheleadinggroupofthe

NPI,in2011theChineseEmbassyinvitedthemtoattendaworkshopinBeijingfor

aboutamonth.Anintervieweereported“Theyframeit:wewanttohelpyoudevelop

yourcapacity.ThatisappealingtoAfricaandeventous.Wecannotaffordprimary

care for citizens”779. The training revolved around traditional Chinesemedicine,

“how thatnowcontributes tonationaldevelopment, how to integrate it into the

medicalsystem,theirlegislativeframework,howtheymanagedtocreateabusiness

becoming very important. Their focus was to discuss how to make TCM more

acceptableinternationally,regulationsandsafetyandqualitycontrol”780.Similarly,

according to an interviewee from the Ministry of Health, Traditional Medicine

Division,“whentheyinviteAfricanpeopletogotoAfrica,theyshowacupuncture

andthebasicsofChinesetraditionalmedicine”781.EventhoughthetraininginChina

is inChinese traditionalmedicine, according to an interviewee the training “was

useful,itempoweredme,Iknowwhereweneedtotakeourmedicine,towhichlevel.

Weneedscientificevidence”782.

Inaddition to theengagements inhighereducationandwithstateorgans, the

relations between Kenyan and Chinese stakeholders in traditional medicine

educationandtrainingalso involvepractitionersaswellasproducers. InKenya,

despitethepresenceofsettledChinesepractitionerstheinteractionbetweenthem

and Kenyan traditionalmedicine practitioners is very limited due to a secretive

mentalityonbothsides.TheMinistryofCulturesuggeststhatona fewinstances

Chinese practitioners visited the country, “when they come we organise

seminars/workshops,wecanbuild capacity.Mostly the training is in theareaof

packagingbut also for theuseofmedicine”783.Membersof associations, such as

778InterviewwithanofficeratthePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi,2014-10-07.779InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya,2014-10-17.780Ibid.781InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,TraditionalMedicineDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-17.782Ibid.783InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,TraditionalMedicineDepartment,Nairobi,2014-10-10.

213

NATHEPA, and traditional medicine centres, have also travelled to China on

scholarships provided by the Chinese Embassy 784 . Chinese private companies

sellingtraditionalmedicinesinKenyaalsoprovidetraining,whichisspecifictothe

useoftheirproducts.Forinstance,acompanyproducingherbalproducts“invited

doctorsfromNairobiHospitaltogotoChinatovisitthefactory,theplantsweuse,

thepackaging,thewholeprocess.Sothatwhentheywriteaprescription,theyhave

a more self-confident approach to prescribing it. It is not just about smashing

plants”785.

ThetrainingprovidedbyChinaisdeemedbeneficialbyKenyanactorsforboth

policy development and product development. There is, however, an increasing

awareness of the Chinese interests behind such benevolent actions, namely an

interest to gaina foothold in theKenyanmarket.WhileKenyanshave shownan

interest in developing Kenyan products, they are still working out a system of

governancesuitabletoprotectsuchinterests.

Rootedgovernance,partiallyin-the-making

Fromthestudy,whatemergesisthatthemanagementofeducationandtraining

forconventionalandtraditionalmedicinediffers.

SimilarlytothecasespresentedinChapter5,China’sassistanceforconventional

medicine encounters an articulate system of governance, populated by a high

numberofgovernmentalandnon-governmentalactors,domesticandinternational,

whichcooperatewiththeMinistryofHealthandtheMinistryofEducationinlong-

term assistance projects, often coordinated at multi-lateral level. These make it

difficult for a new partner to penetrate the system, especially when the latter’s

provisionof assistance is independentof such system.China’s assistance,mostly

shorttermandoftenone-off,isnotdecisiveinasectoralcontextthatishistorically

populatedbytraditionaldevelopmentpartnersandproducts.TheChineseprovision

ofmedicalteams,orexpertsinmalariacentres,despitebeingconsidered‘flagship’

projectsbytheChineseinFOCACdocuments,istemporary,itisnotcontextualised

inlong-termdevelopmentprogramsanddoesnotspeakdirectlytoKenya’sneeds

inhealthcareprofessionals’development.Atthesametime,thefactthatthetraining

providedbyChinaisoftenconsideredsub-standardshedslightontheabsenceof

784Ibid.785InterviewwithanexecutiveataChinesecompanymanufacturingtraditionalmedicines,Nairobi,2014-02-06.

214

Kenyanactiontoguaranteethattheteachingcontentandqualityprovidedoutside

thecountryissuitabletoKenyanstandardsandneeds.

Inthecaseoftraditionalmedicine,thesystemofgovernanceisidentifiedasfully

unsuitableforsafeguardingemerginginterests,i.e.thedevelopmentoftraditional

medicinepoliciesandproductstocontributetothedeliveryofamoreaffordable

andwidespread health care provision system. Chinese-provided training is thus

useful to gain knowledge so to develop a more suitable system of governance.

DespitetheChinesefocusontheChineseexperienceandChineseproducts,Kenyan

actorshaveidentifiedtheneedtore-adaptthelessonstotheKenyansystem,thus

excludingChineseoffersofresearchpartnershipstodevelopChineseproducts.In

other words, even though the system of governance is weak and under full

restructuring,singlenegotiationsareshowingtheKenyanwillingnessandabilityto

usetheChineseinvolvementtotheirbenefit.

Thiscasethensuggeststheco-existenceoftwotypesofsystemsofgovernance:

onethatisrooted(conventionalHRHeducation)thoughitpresentsdeficiencies,and

theotherthatisin-the-making(traditionalHRHeducation).Inthecaseoftraditional

medicineeducation,thoughthesystemofgovernanceisstillbeingstructuredand

although the Chinese have attempted to act in ways that would benefit their

products’ expansion in Kenya, thus non-conforming to the Kenyans’ priority of

developing the Kenyan system, Kenyan actors have demonstrated an ability –

though still limited and, presumably, non-comprehensive – to bring back the

relation with China to fulfil Kenyan priorities. In the case of conventional HRH

education, however,what is observed is a heterogeneous set of behaviour,most

likelyconsequentialtothefragmentednatureofthesystemofgovernance.Hence,

whileChineseMedicalTeamshavenotset foot in thecountry,conformingtothe

preference to train locals rather than welcoming foreigners, the system faces a

stalematewhenitcomestoguaranteeingthatthetrainingprovidedbyChinaisin

line,intermsofteachingcontentandquality,withKenyanstandards.Theabsence

ofspecificactionstotackletheproblemleadstobelievethatKenyanactorsaremore

passivelythanactively,addressingtheissue.

215

6.2.3 ConfuciusInstitutesConfuciusInstitutesareapeculiarformofeducationalassistanceprovidedbythe

Chinesegovernmenttohighereducationinstitutionsallovertheworld.Theyarea

Chineseinventionthatdoesnotfindequalsinotherdevelopmentpartners’formsof

educational cooperation. At times compared to the British Council, the Alliance

Française,theGoetheInstituteandtheInstitutoCervantes786,theydifferfromthese

mainlybecauseoftheirsetupwithinforeignuniversities,whichimpliesaformula

of cost-sharing as well as curriculum negotiation 787 . According to King, “as to

locating the Confucius Institute as a particular aid modality, there are clearly

problemswithidentifyingitasaformofofficialdevelopmentassistance,asmore

than 50 percent of the support from China is going to Confucius Institutes and

ConfuciusClassroomsinso-calleddevelopedcountries”788.

Theyhavereceivedmuchmoreattentionbythemediaandacademiathanany

otherformofeducationalcooperationandassistancebyChinainthepastfewyears.

This is mainly because the involvement of the Chinese government, and the –

debatable–useofConfuciusInstitutesasofficialtoolsofsoftpower,mayimpact

freedomofexpressioninhostuniversities789.ThisappliestoCIsworldwidethough

Africahasbeentargetedasaparticularcontext for theprojectionof this formof

Chinese soft power790. The expansion of CIs in Africa is often consideredmore

peculiarthaninotherregionsduetotheabsenceofChineselanguagecentresprior

totheestablishmentofCIs791andduetothearguablyenhancedpowerasymmetry

betweenanygivenAfricancountryandChina792.

ForKenya,thehostingofCIsmustbecontextualisedinabroaderenvironmentof

rapidinternationalisationofhighereducation.Thoughforeignlanguageteachingis

not identified as a primary need inmost policy documents, the development of

policy and practice of tertiary education, thus including language learning, has

becomefundamentaltothecountryasaconsequenceofanincrementofstudents’

enrollmentsincetheearly2010s.The firstConfucius Institute inKenya(alsothe

786SeeF.Hartig,‘ConfuciusInstitutesandtheRiseofChina’,JournalofChinesePoliticalScience,vol.17,2012,p.57.787King,2010,op.cit.788King,2014,op.cit.,p.8.789Fordebatesaroundtheissueof‘softpower’inrelationtoConfuciusInstitutessee:King,2013,op.cit.,pp.173-175;Hartig,2012,op.cit.;Guo,2008,op.cit.;S.Ding,TheDragon’sHiddenWings:HowChinaRiseswithItsSoftPower,LexingtonBooks,NewYork,2008;F.Hartig,‘SoftPowerPushorConspiracy:ACaseStudyofConfuciusInstitutesinGermany’,AsianStudiesAssociationofAustralia,18thBiennialConference,Adelaide,Australia,5-8July2010;R.S.Zaharna,J.HubbertandF.Hartig,‘ConfuciusInstitutesandtheGlobalisationofChina’sSoftPower’,FigueroaPress,LosAngeles,2014.790SeeProcopio,op.cit.791F.Hartig,‘TheGlobalisationofChineseSoftPower:ConfuciusInstitutesinSouthAfrica’,inZaharna,HubbertandHartig,2014,op.cit,pp.53-54.792Procopio,op.cit.,p.101;seealsoKing,2013,op.cit.foranaccountoftherelationsbetweenhardandsoftpower.

216

firstinAfrica)wassetupattheUniversityofNairobiin2005.Itwasfollowedbythe

CI at Kenyatta University established in 2008, and the CI at Egerton University

launchedin2013.AfourthCIwasestablishedinearly2015atMoiUniversitybut

thetimingfallsbeyondthetimeframeofthisthesisandtheanalysisbelowdoesnot

thusincludeit.Itisimportanttoemphasisethattheinstitutionshostingthethree

ConfuciusInstitutesunderstudypresentverydifferentenvironments.Modalitiesof

action within the university, the interaction with Chinese stakeholders, the

integration of the CI to the local teaching system all differ significantly. This is

seeminglyduetothetypeofinstitutionandthedegreetowhichtheteachingofa

foreignlanguagesuchasChineseiscontextualised,butalsototheChineseinterests

insettinguplinkswiththatspecificinstitution.

WhileChinesemotivationsandmodalitiesofactionbehindtheestablishmentof

CIshavebeenstudiedatlength,theyareonlybrieflytoucheduponinthisanalysis,

whichratherfocusesontheKenyanmotivationsandmodalitiesofengagement.

Foreignlanguageandcultureteachinginthe2000s

In a context of increasingly high enrolment rates in universities and higher

education institutions, foreign languages in Kenya are seen as “tools of global

commerce and thus of growing importance to the country and to university

graduates” 793 . The internationalisation of higher education through the

collaborationbetweenlocalandforeigninstitutionsisseenasamechanismusedto

improve access 794 . Universities – especially leading ones such as Nairobi, Moi,

Kenyatta–areincreasinglyunderpressureto“offercoursesthatareintandemwith

marketneeds”,soto“expandtheirstudentregisters”795.Chinaisthenonlyoneof

thevariouscountriesthatareattemptingtogainashareofthestudents’population.

Languages such as French and German, but also Arabic, are becoming more

important in a context of rapid regional integration and expansion. French, for

instance, is deemed by investors a key language to support expanding Kenyan

interests“inRwandaandBurundi–twoFrench-speakingcountriesseenasgrowth

frontiersbyKenyancompanieskeentoexpandtheirbusinesshorizonsbeyondthe

nationalborders”796.Arabic“isalsogaininggroundasmoreKenyansheadtoDubai

793G.Nganga,‘Kenya:Cashinginonforeignlanguagelearning’,UniversityWorldNews,4July2010.794D.Alusa‘InternationalizationofHigherEducation:TheCaseofKenya’,UnitedStatesInternationalUniversity-Africa,Nairobi,2015.795Nganga,op.cit.796Ibid.

217

and Saudi Arabia to work, as well as to Sudan for emerging business

opportunities”797.

Whiletheteachingof languagessuchasFrench,German,Arabic, ishistorically

rootedinKenya,theteachingofMandarinismuchmorerecent.Whiletheformer

are generally fully integrated within university systems, the latter is provided

throughConfuciusInstitutesthatarejointlymanagedbythelocaluniversityanda

partneruniversityinChina.Becauseofthismodalityofengagement,theteachingof

Mandarinresemblesmoreanacademicpartnershipthanalocaluniversityinitiative.

This has consequences for the management of the teaching. In fact, while the

teachingoflanguagesintegratedwithinanyspecificuniversitysystemissubjected

totherulesthatensurequalityassuranceatthatparticularinstitution,theteaching

ofMandarin issubjectedtotherulesof theHanban(theChinesebodyunderthe

MinistryofEducationregulatingtheteachingofChineselanguageoverseas),which

alsoprovidesfundstotheCIsfortheirsetupandrunning.Despitetheincreasing

importance of higher education development, according to Alusa “there is no

specializedagentforaccreditationofcollaborationactivitiesinhighereducationin

Kenya”798.Thisisconfirmedbyinterviewsconductedwitharelevantofficeratthe

MinistryofEducation,HigherEducationDepartment799.Theabsenceofaproper

systemofgovernanceleavesspaceforinterpretationbybothdomesticandforeign

actors.

ConfuciusInstitute,a‘response-mode’assistance?

Even though Confucius Institutes are labelled as ‘demand-driven’ forms of

assistance, the cases in Kenya do not readily support the statement. The only

universityinKenyathathadpreviouslinkswithChineseuniversitiesbeforetheset-

up, in 2005, of the first Confucius Institute, was Egerton University. Egerton

UniversitystartedapartnershipwithNanjingAgriculturalUniversityin1997.From

1998 to 2003 the university received volunteer Chinese teachers teaching the

language. Importantly, the university also established research links with the

Chinese counterpart and trained students in agro-production. Then, in 2012,

according to a source from the University, “we decided to do an administrative

changeandsetupaConfuciusInstitute.Themaindriveforthiswastoimproveour

797Ibid.798Alusa,op.cit.799InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofEducation,HigherEducationDivision,Nairobi,2014-11-19.

218

own research environment and students’ training. Many of us are increasingly

studyinginChina”800.

ApartfromthecaseofEgertonUniversity,inallothercases,thedecisiontoset

up the instituteswas not driven by students or staff demand butwas rather an

executivestrategy.Thisstrategywasformulated,firstandforemost,bytheChinese.

AChineseCIexecutivestatedthatKenyawaschosentosetupthefirstCIinAfrica.

Hecontinued:“ThereasonwhyKenyawaschosenasthefirstlocationtosetupan

Instituteis,tomyadvice,thefactthatKenyaisinagoodgeographicposition,itisa

smoothcountry,withnomuchproblemandthatdevelopedwell.UONisalsothe

bestUniversity inEastAfrica.AndNairobiprovidesagoodcontext,with theUN

offices, etc.”801 . On the other side, Kenyan CI executives stated that the idea of

introducingtheChineselanguagewasnotlikeforotherlanguageswheretherewas

integrationinonedepartment.InthecaseoftheChineselanguage,“therewasthe

needtocaterforoneinstitute”802.

Similarly,withthestudents,theuseoftacticsbytheConfuciusInstitutetoattract

themleadsKenyanintervieweestobelievethattheinterestinlearningthelanguage

ismorerootedinthefinancialsupportreceivedthanintheChineselanguageand

culture.Atthelaunchofoneoftheinstitutes,thestudentsoftheCIwerepaidtobe

theaudience.TheeventhadtobeattendedbyChinesehigh-levelpoliticalfigures,

onavisit fromChina.Similarly, inanother institution, thestudentsareprovided

withfeewaiverstostudyChineseiftheyaregoodatsingingandwillingtojointhe

CI choir,which is an important instrument forCIs to show the cultural embrace

betweenChinaandKenya,atinternationalandpoliticalevents.

A Kenyan administrator at a Confucius Institute also suggests that students

largelylearnthelanguagenotbecauseofpureinterestinitorChineseculture,but

becausethroughtheInstitutetheyhaveanopportunity,totravel,toexperience.The

factthattheInstituteprovidesscholarshipstotraveltoChina“isabigchancefor

studentshere. If youpromise to take studentsabroad, ithelpsattract them.The

Chinesealsohostmanyevents, competitions, students’ activities– and theygive

studentsincentivestoparticipate,includingfinancialincentives”803.Similarlywith

teachers,aChineseexecutivesuggeststhat“ifweofferthecoursetheycome,ifwe

800InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-11-22.801InterviewwithaChineseexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-03.802InterviewwithKenyanandChineseexecutivesataConfuciusInstitute,2014-11-14.803InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-31.

219

do not offer it they do not come”804, emphasising the importance that financial

aspectsplayintherelations.

WhilethesecasesdonotaimatconcludingthatinKenyathereisnointerestin

learningtheChinese languageandculture–orthat if itwerenot fortheChinese

strategies torecruitstudents,noonewouldstudyChinese– theydononetheless

suggest that theChinese interest in theexistenceof the Institutes ismorethana

mere ‘response’. On the Kenyan side, however, it is important to understand

whetherfinancialassistanceisfilteredandconditionallyaccepted,i.e.basedonthe

universities’qualitystandards,orisratherundiscerninglyreceived.

Administrativevs.Academicautonomy

The fact thatConfucius InstitutesareusedasChinese foreignpolicy toolshas

triggeredcriticismaroundtheworldconcerningthedegreeofacademicautonomy

foreigninstitutionscouldmaintainovertheteachingoftheChineselanguageand

culture.Theissueconcernstheamountofcontrolthatthehostuniversitycanexert

over,mainly, teaching content and human resourcemanagement. This ability to

control the relations must be contextualised in a relationship where economic

asymmetry issignificant.For instance, theChineseHanbanhasprovided funding

not only for the set-up of the Institute, the Director, teachers, textbooks and

activitieslinkedtotheInstitutebut,insomecases,ithasalsolinkedtheConfucius

Institutetootherdeals,suchastheprovisionofinfrastructuretotheuniversity,i.e.

equipmentandconstructionofclassrooms.AKenyanintervieweecommented:

thefacilities[attheConfuciusInstitute]aresodifferent,sogood.Ifyouenter

aChineseclass,it’snotKenya.EquipmentisfromChina,computersareavailable,

whatevermaterialisalwaysavailable,there’snoriskforstudentstorunoutof

textbooks,whateverthelevel.Thereadingmaterialisgivenforfree,sometimes

alsowritingpens.Therewasatimeinwhichweenteredaclass,therewereabout

300students,theyallhadaspecialpenforreadingthepronunciation.Theyare

verystrategic;theyputinalotofinvestment805.

804InterviewwithaChineseexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-03.805InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-31.

220

The Chinese contribution, in a context like that of Kenyan universitieswhere

fundsarehardtogather,doesseemtomakeadifference.TheChineseprovisionof

significant funds is a sign of the Confucius Institutes’ high importance for the

Chinesegovernment.Becauseofthis,Kenyanstakeholdersexpressedtheideathat

sometimestheyfelttheyhadlostcontrol806.AKenyanintervieweefromoneofthe

Institutes suggests that “they [theChinese]arepowerfulbeyond thedepartment

anduniversity.Forinstance,ifthereisacomplaintaboutamemberofstaff,itisa

question that should be dealtwith at the Faculty level. But instead, the Chinese

EmbassygoestotheVice-ChancelloralthoughtheVice-Chancellordoesnotknow

anythingabout the issue”807. Inotherwords, theChinesebypass thegovernance

systemsandaresupportedfromtheinsideoftheuniversitysystembyafigurethat

ishighlypolitical:theVice-Chancellor.Thispermissivenessisalsoconsequentialto

alackofcontrolatthegovernmentallevel,wheretheMinistryofEducationisfully

unresponsive.

Theserelationshave led toquestioning theextent towhichKenyansmaintain

freedom in choosing the teaching content and modalities. The main problem

identifiedisthatofwhodecidesthecurriculumandhowqualityisensured.Inall

thecases, thecurriculumdevelopment ismediatedbythehostuniversity. Inone

case,representativeoftheothers,aKenyanCIexecutivementionedthat“they[the

ChineseattheCI]developtheprogrammebuthereattheuniversitypeoplehavea

lotofsay.TheprogrammegoesthroughtheDepartment, theFaculty, theCollege

andSenate.Wearguedthatabigpartshouldbelanguage.Thentheprogrammewas

moderated”808.

However,althoughtheuniversities,throughthestructuresinplacetoguarantee

quality,attempttoexertcontrol,Kenyanintervieweessuggestedthatitisnoteasy

todoso.Thisislinkedtotheissueofhumanresources:mosthumanresources,from

thedirectortoteachers,aredependentupon,andselectedby,theHanban.Similarly,

theexamthatstudentsareaskedtotaketoevaluatetheirprogress(HSK) isalso

administeredbytheHanban.Consequently,whenitcomestotestingthequalityof

teaching, there is no independent assessor. Only recently Kenyan graduates in

ChinesearestartingtogobacktoKenyatoteach.Thisisperceivedtobethemain

avenue to increase transparency of the teaching content and quality, and

806Ibid.807Ibid.808Ibid.

221

sustainabilityoftheproject.ConfuciusInstitutesinKenyaare,infact,fullyreliant

on theHanbanwith no intent, to date, tomove toward a sustainable version of

Chineselanguageteaching,i.e.fundingindependentcourses.

Passivegovernanceandnon-conformity

This is a case where the system of governance is very weak. The interests

emerging in the cooperation with China (i.e. language teaching/learning) are

relatively new, and there has not been a full acknowledgement, yet, by Kenyan

actors, of the significance this carries for the country. While this applies to all

languages,notonlyMandarin,thecaseofConfuciusInstitutesispeculiargivenits

presence directly inside foreign institutions. The existing regulatory framework

doesnotspecificallyregulatethepresenceofforeignorganisationswithinKenyan

educationalinstitutions.Althoughthestructurestoensurequalityassurancewithin

universitiesareusedtofilterthisChineseformofeducationalassistance,thesame

structures were also bypassed – at the moment of setup and later in specific

circumstances – to serve higher political aims. For the Chinese, these aims

concerned the establishment of the Institutes as tools fromwhich to launch soft

powerinitiatives,whileforKenyansthe‘higher’aimsincludedthereceiptoffunds.

In fact, the significant deployment of Chinese financial and human resources,

consequentialtotheChinesestateinterestsinusingConfuciusInstitutesastoolsof

soft power, exacerbates a dynamic of dependence upon foreign resources. The

justificationbehindtherelianceupondependenceseemstobethattheprovisionof

Chinese language teaching for free ismore important to the development of the

country than the safeguard of academic independence (from the Chinese

government)andthestrictcontrolofthequalityofeducation.

SimilartothecaseofconventionalHRH,theabsenceofspecificactionstotackle

the problem of quality assurance leads to believe that Kenyan actors are more

passivelythanactively,addressingtheissue,thoughsomehowconsciouslydoingso

toperpetuatefinancialdependence.

6.3 SectoraldynamicsAs introduced above, the interaction between Kenyan stakeholders in the

educationsectorvis-à-visChinamainlyrevolvesaroundinsertinganewplayerina

222

scenario well populated by long-present development partners. This implies

learningaboutthewaytomatchdomesticneedswithChineseoffersofeducational

cooperation and assistance, learning about different values, such as production

versusrights,andunderstandinghowandifthesenoveltiesfindspaceinKenyan

contexts. Importantly, thewayownership isunderstoodandexercisedcannotbe

separatedfromtheinterestsofChinesestakeholdersandtheircapacitytoachieve

objectives.Forinstance,ConfuciusInstitutesareanestablishedandcomprehensive

policyinitiative,withfinancialanddiplomaticcapacity,whereasinthecaseofTVET,

theChineseinitiativeisnotashighlyregulated,theactorisoneandtheresources

available,thoughsignificant,aremorelimitedthanthoseforCIs.Theseresources

are, in fact, dependent on a private company’s willingness to expand its CSR

portfolio–andbringproductiontoAfrica–ratherthanonthegovernment’sfunds

andwillingnesstoachievevisibilityforsoftpoweraims.

ThesystemofTVET,highlycontrolledandregulatedbytheMinistryandhigher

educationinstitutions,haspromptlyengagedtheChineseandisaimingtodevelop

an inclusivegovernanceapproach. In thecaseofhumanresources forhealth the

relationswithChinaareof twokinds:1) theengagement inconventionalHRHis

characterisedbyextremelylimitedandcircumscribedrelations,mainlyshort-term

training, which is arguably providing only limited benefits due to the fact that

teaching content and quality does not align with Kenyan standards; 2) the

engagement in traditionalHRH is insteadcharacterisedby relations that revolve

around knowledge-transfer for the re-structuring of the system of governance.

Whilethefirstcaseshowsconformitytotheexistingsystemofgovernance,apartial

acknowledgementofitsdeficienciesbutnoactiontotacklethem,thesecondcase

showsthat,despitethefactthatthesystemofgovernanceisweakandunderfull

restructuring,singlenegotiationsareshowingtheKenyanwillingnessandabilityto

usetheChineseinvolvementtotheirbenefit.

Similarly to the case of conventional HRH, the case of Confucius Institutes

presentsatypeofKenyanownershipthatisextremelylimited.However,whilethe

formerconformstoasystemofgovernancethatdespitebeingrootedissignificantly

fragmentedreducingtheabilitytojudgethesuitabilityoftheChineseengagement

to Kenyan needs, the latter bypasses known tables of negotiation – through the

directlinksestablishedbetweentheChineseEmbassyandthehigherranksofthe

Universities–withnoparticularactiontakentotransformthesystem.

223

Finally, in the casesofTVETand traditionalHRH, the involvedKenyanactors

highly valued legal and institutional frameworks, feeling protected by their

existence. Even in cases where these frameworks were not adequate and thus

neededrestructuring,thefirststepofthechangeprocesswasthattoidentifyhow

theframeworkscouldbeimproved.However,inthecaseofConfuciusInstitutes,and

partially in the caseof conventionalHRH, the legal and institutional frameworks

seemtobevirtuallymeaningless.Inthefirstcase,thisisduetotheconvenienceof

dependingonforeignresourceswithoutconstraints,inthesecondcaseinstead,itis

amorenuancedtypeofdisregardofthesystem,mainlyconsequentialtoitsvery

fragmentedanddisorganisednature.

224

Table3:Sectoralcomparisonofinterests,actors,andarenas/tablesofgovernance-Education

TechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining

Humanresourcesforhealthcare ConfuciusInstitutes

Interests

Typeofrelation Commercial-aid(CSR) Aid(withsomecommercialreturns) Aid

Issueatstake

LackofKenyanskilledworkforcefortheindustries,withtheChinese,arguably,takingoverthejobsandtrainingKenyansonlyforspecificpurposes.Needtodevelopthesectorcomprehensivelyandstrategically.

Lackofhealthprofessionals,withChinapledgingtoprovidehelptoovercometheproblemaspartofitssouth-southcooperation,butfocusingonAfricancommitmentsratherthanKenyanspecificneeds.

RegulatingtheoperationsoftheConfuciusInstituteswithinuniversities,andlanguageteaching

Kenyans'issue-specificinterests

UseChinesecompanytoachievedomesticdevelopmentplan,i.e.traininganddevelopmentoftechnicalexpertsabletoactivelyengagewiththeconstructionboomandotheremergingsectors.

UseChineseaidtoachievedomesticdevelopmentplan,i.e.trainingofhumanresourcesforhealth,necessarytoguaranteeproperhealthcaredeliveryandthusahealthypopulationabletowork.LearnfromtheChinesefortraditionalmedicinetraining.

UseChineseaidtodeveloplanguagecoursesandlinkswithChina.

OverallobjectivetowardChina

EngagingChinaasapartnerindevelopment

FittingChinain(conventional),engagingChinaasapartnerindevelopment(traditional)

FittingChinain

Actors

Initiator MinistryofEducation–TVET(smalloffice)

MinistryofHealth-HumanResourcesoffice,MinistryofCulture

Universities(Nairobi,Kenyatta,Moi,Egerton)

Otherdomesticactors

Educationalinstitutions,Privatesectorassociations

MinistryofEducation,NATHEPA MinistryofEducation

Resources

KenyanhumanresourcescrucialtoalterthesystemofgovernancetosafeguardKenyaninterests:increasedrelationsbetweenschoolsandfactoriestoimprovetheindustrializationprocess

Asymmetryinfinancialandhumanresourcesseemstonotprovideguaranteesforthesafeguardingofacademicindependence

Arenasandtablesofnegotiation

ARENA'theproblem'contextualizedintheKenyandomesticcontext(historicallegaciesandcurrentpolicypreferences)

IN-THE-MAKING:Newsignificantpolicy-area,whoserelevanceistriggeredbyincreasedindustrializationandrecognitionofsecondaryeducationascrucialforthecountry'sgrowth.Recentinstitutionalization(2014),previouslynotsignificant.

ROOTED>Conventional:significantlackofHRH,relianceonexternalactors.Fragmentedsystemofgovernance,lackofcoordinationatdomesticlevel.IN-THE-MAKING>Traditional:weakinstitutionalenvironment,educationandtrainingisnotregularized,norformalizedbyhighereducationinstitutions

NON-EXISTING:Recentinternationalizationofhighereducationtofulfilincreasingdemandandmarketneeds.Weaksystemofgovernancetoregulateinternationalizationandevenmorelackofaspecificsystemofgovernancetoregulatethepresenceofaforeigninstitutionwithinlocaluniversities.

Mobilizationframework

NewframeworkofengagementspearheadedbyAfricaTechChallenge(MinistryofEducation).Stillweaklinkbetweenframeworkandimplementation,butKenyanownershipmaintained.

Weakframeworktonegotiatebilaterally,heavyrelianceonmultilateralinstitutions

WeakframeworkthatallowsfinancialassistancetobeundiscerninglyreceivedbytheCis,withthetacitconsentofuniversitymanagement(attimes)andunresponsivebehaviourbytheMinistryofEducation

ModeofaddressingtheissuewiththeChinese

Pro-active Passive(conventional),pro-active(traditional) Passive

Tableofnegotiation Conformity Conformity(conventional)+

lightalteration(traditional) Nonconformity

Source:Author’sfindings

225

CHAPTER7

NegotiatingGovernance:Contestation,Cooperationand

Passivity

7.1 OverviewThisChapter looksat the findingspresented inChapters4,5and6discussing

theminrelationtotheconceptualizationofagencypresentedinChapter2.Inthe

previous chapters, the author has scrutinised governance in the sub-national

sectoral settingswhere itmost often occurs809. This approachhashelped reveal

“previously unexamined sources of agency” 810 in Sino-African relations. These

sourceshaveraisedissuesconcerningtheroleofindividuals,theirbeliefsystems,

the systemsofgovernance including institutionsandnorms,and finally, theway

preferences are safeguarded. Through the comparative study of the interplay

betweeninterestsandarenas,thischapterattemptstoidentifytrendsinbehaviour,

theimplicitandexplicitnegotiatingstrategiesthatKenyanactorsadopt811andthe

waytheyguaranteethesafeguardoftheirinterests.

However,beforemoving to theanalysis, it is important toremember that this

studyisaboutrealgovernance,whichaccordingtoOlivierdeSardan“iscomposed

ofmultiple dimensions, some convergent andothers contradictory; it is also the

productoflocal,sectoralandindividualmicrodynamics;andlastly,itfacesonevery

front a pluralism of forms of action”812. Therefore, it is not surprising that the

empirical work highlighted two challenges for the identification of patterns: the

diversity of organisational architectures across sectors and sub-sectors and the

changingnatureofsucharchitectures.RecallingHabeeb813,thisthesissuggeststhat

thefactorsthatcontributetoKenya’scontroloftherelationswithChinashouldnot

be identified in the state’s aggregate power, or the sumof state’s resources, but

ratherinthecontextandthestructureofthespecificnegotiations.Inacountrythat

hasundergone,inthepasttwelveyears,incrediblechangesingovernance,firstwith

theopeningup,albeitinacontrolledfashion,tomulti-partydemocracy,andthen

809Sellers,op.cit.,p.135.810Ibid.811WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.342.812OlivierdeSardan,op.cit.,p.4.813Habeeb,op.cit.

226

withamajorconstitutionalreformin2010,domesticgovernanceisentirelyinflux.

This does not mean that the country is totally destabilised, but rather that the

constitutionalchangesrequiredadynamicupdatingofbureaucraticstructures,thus

putting the country in a transition era. This transition occurs at varying speed

dependingon the actors’ ability andwillingness to respond to constitutionalism.

UnderlyingthisistheacknowledgementthatKenyaasacountryhaschangedsince

the early 2000s, the economy “no longer relies on the state; the multi-party

democracyisheretostayandpresidentialdemandsprovokeasmuchresistanceas

obedience”814.

AsAldenandAmmonhighlightintheirworkonFPA,thefocus“ontheforeign

policyprocessasopposedtoforeignpolicyoutcomes,ispredicatedonthebeliefthat

closerscrutinyof theactors, theirmotivations, thestructuresofdecisionmaking

andthebroadercontextwithinwhichforeignpolicychoicesareformulatedwould

provide greater analytical purchase”815. The previous chapters aimed to unpack

exactlytheseprocessesbydefiningtheactorsinvolved,theirmotivationstoengage

with China individually or to seek collaborationwith other domestic actors, the

structuresofdecisionmakingindifferentsectorsthathavelimitedorfacilitatedthe

intereststobefulfilledandsoon.Althoughtheultimateoutcomesoftheseprocesses

mayallseemsimilar,namelythatKenyanactors,moreoftenthannot,acttoassert

ownership(thoughtodifferentdegrees),studyingtheprocessesallowstoascertain

that there is not one single way of negotiating governance. This is particularly

importantinastudyofrelationswithexternalactors.Knowledgeofthegovernance

systemswithinwhich external actors attempt to insert themselves in pursuit of

theirinterestsseemsmoreimportant,fromtheanalysisofthepreviouschapters,

thanChinahasaccounted for,especially in the initialphasesof its relationswith

Kenya.

In the sections below a comparison of the interests involved in Kenya-China

relationsispresented,ofwhetherthesystemsofgovernancehavebeenconsidered

suitabletoguaranteethesafeguardofsuchinterestsandfinallythestrategiesused

to either bring the relations with China within existing systems or to alter the

systemsinordertomakethembettersuitedtosafeguardthespecificintereststhat

emergedintherelationswithChina.Intheanalysisthatfollowswhatisemphasised

814Hornsby,op.cit.,p.7.815Alden&Ammon,op.cit.,p.1.

227

isthediversityofapproaches,morethanthevarietyofoutcomeswhich,asnoted

above,generallyresultedinKenyanactorsassertingownership.

7.2 ActorsAsintroducedinChapter1, thewillingness toexertcontrol inthenegotiations

withChina,inotherwords,themotivationtodoso,isstrictlyrelatedtotheinterests

thatanygivenactorperceivestobeaffectedinitsrelationswithChina.Actorsare

not,however,amereconcentrateof interests,astheyarefirstconstitutedbythe

ideas and memories of the communities from which they emerge 816 (Wight’s

agency2,comesbeforeagency1andagency3817)andtheresourcesavailabletothem,

generallydependinguponthepositiontheyoccupyinsociety.Thesectionsbelow

comparativelydiscusstherepertoiresandtheresourcesthatcontributetoshaping

theintereststhatarefoundbehindKenyans’actionstowardtheChinese.

Beforemoving to theanalysis,aspecification isnecessary.Theprevious three

chaptershaveshownthatthetypesofactorsengagedinnegotiatingKenya-China

relations are quite diverse. Contrary to the belief that only state actors, such as

governmentofficials,definetherelations,theyarealsoforgedbyanumberofagents

thatarenotpartofthepolitico-administrativestructure.Therearethosethathave

arguably turned to China for personal and business reasons. And there is also a

wider range of actors, from upper to lower level bureaucrats, professional

associations, tradeunions,privatesectorrepresentatives, informalsector leaders

andsoforth,thathaveexperiencedChinaduetotheroletheycoverinsocietyrather

thanfordirectpersonalinterests.

Despitethefactthattheliterature818tendstoputforwardanideaofSino-African

relations as broadly divided between an elite understanding of the relations as

positive, and the wider masses’ understanding as negative, presumably

consequential to the degree of interests’ fulfilment, the cases presented in the

previousthreechaptersdonotreadilyconfirmthis.Ratherthanfocusingexclusively

onthisfunctionaldistinction(agency3,namelytheroleoccupiedinsociety,i.e.the

agent’sfunction),tobetterunderstandagents’behaviour,oneneedstoturnto“the

competingrepertoiresthat[agents]mobiliseintheirinteractions”819,andthentothe

816WhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.344.817Wight,op.cit.818seeAldenandPark,op.cit.819HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.547.

228

“resourcesthatindividualsandorganisedinterestgroupshaveattheirdisposal”820.

Inotherwords,thefirststeptounderstandingtheagents’willingnessandabilityto

negotiatetheirinterestsistorecognisethattheyhaveapersonalunderstandingof

Kenya’s relationswith China, which is partly consequential to the position they

occupy,definedbytheresourcestheyhaveattheirdisposal,butalsoequally,ifnot

more,consequentialtotheirownbeliefs,originatingfromideasthatarerootedin

thesocio-politicalandeconomiccontextfromwhichtheycome.

7.2.1 RepertoiresAsmentioned in Chapter 2, repertoires are used to “defend and to challenge

existingtypesofstatehoodandpowerrelations”821.Therepertoiresthatemergein

Sino-African relations are mostly twofold: one consists in framing the relations

under the South-South cooperation label, defining them through concepts of

mutuality,equality,solidarity,non-interference,economicdevelopment.Theother

istheopposite,framingtherelationswithChinaasdamagingforlocalsandcounter-

productive,mainlydisrespectful of social and economic rights. InKenya too this

dichotomousunderstandingof the relationswithChinawasobserved.Especially

theLookEastpolicyandthetrialsofUhuruKenyattaandWilliamRutoattheICC

have created a basis for challenging existing developmental discourses and the

country’srelationswithexternalactors.FromarelianceonWesternpartnersand

their focus on socio-economic rights, Kenya has started shifting the focus of its

developmentalpathtoeconomicdevelopment,followinginthefootstepsofChina

andIndia.Itwould,however,beinaccuratetodepictthecountryasfullyfocusingon

economic development, dismissing the importance of constitutional rights and

duties.Thisisevenmoreevidentwhenonelooksatthespecificcasesanalysedin

the previous chapters. Across all the cases a common thread is the perceived

necessity,byconcernedstakeholders,tohavealegalandregulatoryframeworkthat

guaranteesthesafeguardofinterestsinajustmanner.ThishighlightsthatKenyan

actorsdokeepingreatconsiderationtheruleoflaw,despiteacknowledgingthatits

implementationisdifficultandunequallyguaranteed.

ProbablythemostsignificantaspectoftheanalysisofrepertoiresisthatKenyan

actors’understandingofChinawasalways inreferencetotheirunderstandingof

820Ibid.821Ibid.

229

traditionalpartners’behaviour.Forsomeagents,negotiatingwithWesternpartners

orJapansignified‘serious’negotiations,wherequality(fromtrainingtoproducts)

andthegeneralgoodofKenyanswassafeguarded.Theseagentscomparedthisview

withonewheretheengagementwithChinawascharacterisedbysuperficialpublic

relationsratherthanprofessional,absenceofquality,Chineseinterestssafeguarded

rather thanKenyans’.Otheragentsexpressedoppositeperceptions, according to

whichChina represented thebest partner thanks to their hands-onpragmatism,

convenient deals and non-normative approach, rather working to fulfil what

Kenyansidentifyastheirpriority.TheargumentforappreciatingChinawasinmost

cases in opposition to not appreciating the West. An extreme example was an

interviewee that compared the relation Kenya has with China and the West to

medicalmethods:“eveninmedicinesometimesweintroduceadiseasetokickout

another disease. The same with the Chinese and the West, we introduced the

Chinese to kick out the West” 822 . Between these two extremes, some agents

identified pros and cons in dealing with either traditional or Chinese partners.

Mostly, this last category of agents acknowledged the need to mediate either

approach. Idealsofgoodgovernance,democracy,andso forth, remain important

pillarsofKenya’snationalprioritiesasdemonstratedbytheConstitution,andbythe

many grassroots actions that attempt to conform to them. However, prolonged

exposure to and engagement with Western partners has clearly evidenced the

West’s self-interests behind seemingly benevolent actions. This is an important

lessonthatKenyanslearnt,whichistransferredtotherelationswithChina,creating

asenseofawarenessas towhat liesbehindtheproclaimedbenignnatureof the

engagement.Anintervieweesuggestedthat“wedon’tlookeitherEastorWest,we

lookforward,drawingfromwhicheversidesupportcomesfrom”.Thissupportis,

however,rarelyblindlyreceived;itmostlymustfulfilexistingpriorities.

Consequential to this, a mix of positive and negative beliefs and perceptions

toward thenewcomer, i.e.China,are foundatall levels: rankinghigherup in the

bureaucracyor lowerdown in civil society groupswasnot an indicationofhow

agents understood China. Kibaki’s Look East Policy, and the Kenyatta-Ruto’s

continuationofsuchpolicy,isfirmlygroundedinpersonalneedswhichcanforman

importantmotivationalbasisforthedirectionthecountrytakesinforeignpolicy.

822InterviewwithaprofessorofpharmacyandtraditionalmedicineatKenyattaUniversity,2014-11-04.

230

These personal needs have been exacerbated by the trials at the International

CriminalCourt,framedastrialsbytheWestagainstAfrica,inwhichChinaplayed

the positive role of alternative power, non-interfering in national governance.

However,beyondtheexecutive,whichhaspowersthatare,moreor less, limited

accordingtothepolicysectorunderconsideration,theroleoccupiedonthesocial

ladderwasnotdirectlyproportionaltothedegreeofappreciationtowardChina.

Thus, it is possible to find small traders that praise Chinese products and

businessmen that provide them with goods to sell, but also small traders that

condemntheChineseforstealingtheirjobsorputtingthemoutofbusiness.There

areofficialsinministriesthatopenuptonegotiationswithChinabecauseitis‘faster,

lessprescriptive,moreconvenient’ thanwithtraditionalpartners,andthosethat

rejectChineseproposalsbecausenotinlinewiththedivision’sinterests,regardless

of how much money could flow. These points of view fluctuate throughout

bureaucraciesaswellassocialgroupings.Becausefunctionalattributes,namelythe

roleoccupiedinsociety,donotguaranteecohesiveapproaches,intra-grouptensions

emerge.Thetensionsareattimesarticulatedonthebasisofpersonalbeliefs–‘the

ChineseareexploitingKenya’or‘theChinesearegivingKenyaachancetodevelop’

– at timeson thebasisofprofessionalbeliefs – thequalityofproducts, training,

contract development is not adequate to Kenyan/sectoral standards, versus not

only it is adequate in terms of quality but also affordable. Especially in this last

sphereofprofessionaljudgement,inanumberofcasesitwasemphasisedthatthe

relationswithChinaarenotperfect,i.e.Chinaisnotthebestproviderintermsof

qualityofservices/goods,buttheysuitKenya’scurrentneeds,hencemakingChina

themostappropriateprovider. This leads to thenextsection thataddresses the

resourcesavailabletoKenyanactorstoassesstherelationswithChinaandsteer

themtowardtheprotectionofKenyaninterests.

7.2.2 ResourcesAsmentionedinChapter2,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatnotallactorshave

equalresourcesattheirdisposal.Resourcesformthemajorbasisofpowerandas

OlivierdeSardanputitthereareatleasttwokindsofpower,“thepowereverybody

has and the power only some people have” 823 . The executive and high-level

bureaucrats have access to a wider pool of financial resources than lower level

823OlivierdeSardan,op.cit.,p.186.

231

bureaucrats or some societal groups (not always true in the case of the private

sector), thuscreatingapowerimbalanceacrossthesystemofgovernance,which

theyallarepartof.However,inmostofthecasesanalysedinthepreviouschapters,

the mobilisation of the resources available to the executive and high-level

bureaucrats is circumscribedby complex systemsof governance that reduce the

powerasymmetrybetweenthetopandthebottom.Thisisconsequentialtothefact

thatinmostcasestheexpertiseresideswiththelowerbureaucraticlevelsandsocial

groups such as professional organisations, trade unions, educational institutions

andso forth. Inotherwords,while thepoliticizedhigh-levelsof thebureaucracy

potentiallyhavemorepowertostrikedirectdealswithexternalactors,andmore

financialpowerthanthelowerlevels,itisgenerallythelowerlevelbureaucratsand

socialgroupsthat,bybeinginchargeofimplementingthedeals,managetoleverage

thedecisionstakenatthetop.Itisthusimportanttolooknotonlyatfinancial,but

alsohumanresourcesavailabletoKenyansinthenegotiationprocess.

An analysis of human resources often lacks in Sino-African relations where

studiesfocus,moreoftenthannot,onstructuralandfinancialresources.Bylooking

atnegotiatingagentsinKenya,theprofilethatemergesisthatofactorswithavery

goodknowledgeofthesectorswithinwhichtheyoperate.Fromtradeunioniststo

technicaluniversities’directors,fromofficersattheMinistryofEducationtothose

in the National Economic and Social Council, from manufacturers associations’

leaders toprivatesector representatives in thepharma industry,all theseactors

have demonstrated a very comprehensive set of skills in negotiating with the

Chinese. These have included: full knowledge of the legal, institutional and

regulatoryenvironmentwithinwhichtheyoperate,goodknowledgeofthegaps(or

lack thereof) that the Chinese aimed at filling, a relative understanding of the

Chinesestrategies.

For instance, in the case of trade unions, Chinese companieswere financially

strongerthanKenyantradeunions.However,intermsofhumanresources,Kenyan

tradeunionsweresignificantlymorepreparedtoengagethedisputemechanism,

despite the interference from bureaucrats interested in preserving the relations

withtheChinese.Theirskillswouldhave,however,beenalmostmeaninglessifnot

supportedbyalegalandinstitutionalsystemregulatinglabourdisputes.Similarly,

inthecaseofcounterfeitsaswellastraditionalmedicineandTVET,Kenyanhuman

andfinancialresourceswerenecessarytoaltertheexistingsystemofgovernanceto

232

benefitKenyaasawhole(i.e.protectionofintellectualpropertyrights,introduction

of traditional medicine in the healthcare delivery system, increased relations

betweenschoolsandfactoriestoimprovetheindustrializationprocess).

Incasesofdependenceuponassistance/aid,theissueofresourceasymmetryis

moresalientasitisassumedthattheeconomicasymmetryleadstoanimpossibility

ofsafeguardingKenyaninterests.Forinstance,inthecaseofConfuciusInstitutes,

theeconomicasymmetryseemsnottoprovideguaranteesforthesafeguardingof

academicindependence.However,inthehealthcaresector,alsohighlydependent

ondonors,whiletheChineseoffersofaidarewelcomeonsomelevels,China’snon-

adherence to Sector Wide Approaches has acted as an obstacle to the

implementationof projects. This is seen as an act of agencybasedon theuseof

professional human resources, vis-à-vis the politicised top levels, to leverage

financialasymmetry.TheacceptanceofoffersbeyondSWAPs,suchasthesetupofa

Malaria Centre, followed a rationale according to which the offers were a free

surplus,andtheywouldnotaltertheexistingsystemofgovernance.

These skills are a necessary element to obtain positive outcomes in the

negotiationsthoughtheyarenotsufficient.Thequantityanddistributionofhuman

resources,togetherwithfinancialresourcesareindispensableandoftenlacking,if

not at the decision-making level, at the implementation one. Kenyans’ lack of

resources ismost evident in implementation/enforcing scenarios rather than in

decision-makingoragenda-setting.Infact,whiletheabilitytoidentifythe‘right’set

of legal, institutional and regulatory tools for governing specific issues is often

demonstrated,whenitcomestoimplementationthereareoftengapsthatreducethe

abilitytocontroltheoutcomes.ThisisnotuniquetotheengagementswithChina,

althoughinsomecasesChinawasidentifiedasthemainproblem,oritseffortsto

penetratethatsectorservedasacatalystforaction.ThedevelopmentofthePublic

PrivatePartnership initiative (legalisedby anAct ofParliament andPresidential

Assent in2013)824isonewaydeemedrelevant topotentially solve this resource

shortage in the long run, by merging public and private financial and human

capacities.

824PublicPrivatePartnershipUnit,op.cit.

233

7.3 LayeredinterestsAsmentionedinChapter2,studyinginterests iscrucialastheyemphasisethe

importance and relevance that the engagement with China has for different

stakeholders.Huftysuggeststhat“inanygivensituation,what isatstakemaybe

completely different for each actor”825. The interests can be consistent among a

range of national actors vis-à-vis external forces, but they can also be divergent

giving rise to domestic confrontation. It is the very confrontational dynamics

between domestic players, as they attempt to safeguard their interests, that

emphasisethesuitabilityofasystemofgovernancetosafeguardbroaderdomestic

interests. As a reminder, domestic interests are assumed to be best safeguarded

throughthesystemsofgovernancethatleverageactsofnarrowself-interest.

Sino-African debates rest upon a general critique that African countries have

‘turned East’ adopting country-wide approaches toward China thanks to its

proclaimednon-interferencepolicyandlackofpoliticalconditions.EveninKenya,

the adoptionof theLookEastPolicyhas often led commentators to sustain that

Kenyaispro-Chinaandthatthecountry’sinterestsalignwiththeEasternpower’s.

However, as demonstrated in the sectors studied, assuming that interests are

unitaryandthattheyemergeoutofstateagentsonly,wipesoutthecomplexitiesof

country-systemsanddoesnottakeintoaccounttheprofoundlydifferentpriorities

thatdifferentsectorsandspecificissuesoccupywithinthenationalcontextandin

relationtoexternalpresences.

InChapter2theimportanceoffocusingonlayeredinterestswasemphasised:the

national, the sectoral and the issue-specific. In all three empirical chapters, the

analysis startswith the identification ofmacro-level approaches to the sector to

understand the emphasis put on it in Sino-Africandiscourses. By then exploring

specificcases,theinterestsbecomemorespecific,attimesaligning,attimesclashing

withmacro-orientations.

At thenational level, twobroadcategoriesof interests are identified: the first

concernseconomicdevelopment,thesecondthesafeguardofconstitutionalrights

and the democratic journey. In Sino-Africa relations it is often argued that the

Chinese contribution to the former has deeply compromised the latter. These

national interests are incorporated in Kenya’s development blueprints and are

825M.Hufty,‘Investigatingpolicyprocesses:Thegovernanceanalyticalframework(GAF)’,inU.Wiesmann,H.Hurnieds.,withaninternationalgroupofco-editors,ResearchforSustainableDevelopment:Foundations,Experiences,andPerspectives,PerspectivesoftheSwissNationalCentreofCompetenceinResearch(NCCR)North-South,UniversityofBern,vol.6,GeographicaBernensia,Bern,2011,p.408.

234

absorbedbyimplementingactors,who,attimes,favouroneovertheother,though

most often recognise the value of both. In particular, Kenya Vision 2030 can be

consideredasynthesisofthecountry’swillingnesstomovetowardindustrialisation,

i.e.economicdevelopment,whilepreservingconstitutionalrights,clearlyevidenced

by the focus on collaborative governance to achieve economic and social

development.TheverydevelopmentofKenyaVision2030wasconsequentialtoa

longconsultativeprocesswithsocialgroupsatlarge,includingtheprivatesector,

andthusavarietyofstakeholders,notonlystateactors,generallyidentifywithit.

TheinvolvementofChinainthenationalcontextisdeemedkeytodevelopingKenya

Vision2030: China is seen as a contributor to the economic development of the

country.However,China’semphasis(atleastinitially)onstate-to-staterelationsdid

notalignwith theothernational interest, i.e. inclusivedevelopment.TheKenyan

governmentdid,inafewcases,attempttosidewithChina,bypassingotherrelevant

domestic actors, in the name of rapid development. This has occurred mainly

becauseofdirectpersonalinterestsfromtheexecutiveorbusinesselites,butalso

asaresultoftheChinesecorruptingstrategicKenyanactors,suchasjudges.

While thenationalpolicyhassurelyprovided incentives toengagewithChina

(and India) increasingly, thesectoraland issue-specificanalysesseemtosuggest

that,attheselevels,thisisnothappeningwiththesameenthusiasmandpromptness.

Infact,asmentionedabove,theLookEastpolicyisoneamongmanyforeignpolicy

approaches, a relatively new one, whose existence has not phased out existing

preferences altogether. The interests behind the sectors emerge out of complex

dynamicsofdomesticgovernance.While thepriority level thata sectoroccupies

withinnationalpoliciescanbeupgradedordowngradedby thegovernment, the

actual change also depends on how the interests of a variety of stakeholders

(nationalandinternational)withinthesectorareaffected.

Even more evidently, when the specific issue under the sectoral umbrella is

unpacked,theperceivedcomplementarityofKenyanandChinesenationalagendas

doesnotalwaysfindafit.ThisistosaythatevenifKenyanandChineseinterestsin

developingasectorarecomplementaryfromabroadpointofview,theseinterests

may become void if contextualised within specific policy and implementation

environments.Rhetoricalinterests,whichimbuenationalandsectoralapproaches,

maybedismissedattheissue-specificlevelwhereactorsbecomemoreconcerned

withthepracticalitiesoftheengagement.Forinstance,whilehealthcareasawhole

235

is a key sector for Kenya 2030, some elements of it aremore important in the

priority ladder than others. To add complexity, while China as a whole has its

priority objectives, namely ideologically-charged notions of assistance to Africa

throughthetradeincheapproducts,equipmentandinfrastructure,whenitcomes

to specific sectoral cases China’s broad general direction is challenged and

renegotiatedbyimplementingactorsandtheirspecificpriorities.

7.4 ArenasAs mentioned in Chapter 2, arenas represent the “political space in which

relations of power and authority are vested”826. The analyses carried out in the

previous three chapters found that negotiation arenas vary significantly

domesticallydependingnotonlyonthesectorbutalsothepolicyareaunderstudy.

This, in turn, makes it difficult to talk about a ‘Kenyan’ approach to China in

safeguardingdomesticinterests.Verydifferentarenaswerepresentedintheprevious

three chapters, some fully domestically defined, others mostly defined by the

internationalenvironment,somebureaucracy-led,otherssocially-orchestrated,some

regulated,others lackingdefinedmodesof conduct. Inotherwords,arenascanbe

formalisedsystemsofgovernancewithinwhichactorsinterplay,butalsoinformal

or amix of the two. According to the issue at stake, they can span across local,

national, international contexts (see the role of multilateral international

institutions in sectors such as healthcare and education). Different actors and

stakeholderscontributetothenorms,lawsandintereststhatformanarena,which

is historically determined. As anticipated in Chapter 1, some of these

patterns/systemshavebeen“dominatedbylongstandingconventionsonhowand

by whom statehood is defined”, i.e. rooted governance; others were defined as

“lack[ing]predefinedorcommonlyrecognisedproceduralmodalitiesfordecision

making”827, i.e.absenceofgovernancesystem;and finallya third typewhich isa

combination of the first two, i.e. governance in-the-making, where a governance

system either did not exist and is under construction, or did exist but was

acknowledgedasinappropriate,henceneedingrestructuring.

AsmentionedinChapter2,systemsofgovernanceleveragenarrowactsofself-

interest.InthecaseofKenya,thisisparticularlyrelevantgiventhedirectpersonal

826HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.551.827Ibid.,p.550

236

importanceChinaplayedforPresidentsKibakiand,evenmore,Kenyatta.Presidents

KibakiandKenyattahavehadpersonalinterestsinthedevelopmentofthecountry’s

relations with China. The political environment and the relations with external

sources of economic and political power (emphasising the East/West divide

especiallyaroundtheelectionsin2002and2007forKibakiandRaila,andwiththe

ICCtrialsforKenyattaandRuto)haveallowedthepresidentstooccupyarelevant

position in foreign policy and steer its impact on the domestic environment.

Notwithstandingthis,asexemplifiedinthevariouscasespresented,understanding

real/actualgovernanceinKenya-Chinarelationsrequiresanefforttoconsider“big

men” as the tip of an iceberg that is constructed upon broader bases of socio-

politicalandeconomicgovernanceframeworks.

7.4.1 Rootedgovernanceandgovernance-in-the-makingAsmentionedinChapter2,negotiationarenas“havespatial,socialandtemporal

dimensions[…]whichneedtobetracedempiricallyonacasebycasebasis”828.This

is what has been done in the previous three chapters, identifying the way

governanceisnegotiatedandestablishingwhethertherelationswiththeChinese

areenactedinconformitywithexistingsystemsofgovernanceorratherleadtotheir

alteration.Arenaswereattimesidentifiedasadequatebystakeholderstofacenew

challengesandopportunities,attimesnot.ThesystemsofgovernancethatChina

hasencounteredare,broadlyspeaking:rooted,andin-the-making.Thesecan,inturn,

beformallyorinformallyactedupon.

Table4:Typesofsystemsofgovernance Rootedsystemofgovernance Systemofgovernancein-the-making

Formal Informal Formal Informal

Domesticallyshaped

Tradeunions

Smalltraders Counterfeits

Internationallyshaped

Tradeofhealthproducts;Infrastructureforhealth;ConventionalHRH

Traditionalmedicine;traditionalHRH;TVET

ConfuciusInstitutes

Source:Author’sfindings.

828Ibid.

237

What has been found is that Kenyans’ relations with China mostly unfold in

contextswheregovernanceframeworks(formalorinformal)areinplace,rooted,

legitimised by concerned stakeholders. Rooted governance is characterised by

highly regulated patterns of rule though it is important to emphasise that these

patterns canbe verydifferentdependingon the specific issue-area.They canbe

formal (as showed in the cases of trade unions, trade of health products,

infrastructureforhealthcare,humanresourcesforhealthcare)or informal(small

traders).Theycanbedomesticallydetermined(tradeunionsandsmalltraders)but

alsodeeplyshapedbyinternationalstructures(healthandeducationrelatedissues)

andbythepresenceof traditionalexternalactors inspecificsocialandeconomic

sectors.Thefactthatgovernanceisrooteddoesnotequaltostatingthattheactual

behaviour conforms to established norms of conduct. This aspect will be better

lookedatbelowwhenthemodalitiesofinteractionareexplored.

Governancein-the-makingis,inturn,characterisedbyasystemofrulethatisin

thecourseofeitherbeingrevisitedorcreated.Becauseofitschangingnature,itis

notfullydefined,andnegotiationswerestilltakingplaceatthetimeofresearch(the

casesofcounterfeits,traditionalmedicine,TVET,ConfuciusInstitutesareexamples).

Thecasespresentedshowdifferentbasesuponwhichchangeoccurs.Inthethree

casesunderformalgovernance,thegapsinthelegalsystemwererecognisedtobe

the main problem, although institution-building was also a major factor in the

decisiontorestructurethesystem.InthecaseofConfuciusInstitutes,thesystemof

governance is fragile. The regulatory framework does not specifically address

foreignlanguageteachingwithineducationalinstitutionsorthepresenceofforeign

organisationswithinKenyaneducationalinstitutions.Ontopofthis,thesignificant

deploymentofChinesefinancialandhumanresources,consequentialtotheChinese

state interests inusingConfucius Institutes as toolsof softpower, exacerbates a

dynamicofdependenceuponforeignresources.Thebeliefbehindtherelianceupon

dependenceseemstobethattheprovisionofChineselanguageteachingforfreeis

more important to the development of the country than safeguarding academic

independence(fromtheChinesegovernment)andthestrictcontrolofthequalityof

education(seeTablebelow:Sub-sectoralsystemsofgovernance).

In these cases of governance in-the-making, although the systems are found

inadequateforsafeguardingKenyaninterests,oftenthecasesanalysedemphasised

theacknowledgedinadequacybyKenyansoftheirlegalandinstitutionalsystems,

238

Source:Author’sfindings

Rooted

In-the-making

Absent

Tradeunions

Highlyregulated(policyandlegal);historical

significance+2010constitution

Counterfeits

Acknow

ledgedgapinthelegalsystemin2004,

legalrecognitionin2008withcreationofACA

Smalltraders

Lackofspecificlawstoregulateforeign

investment(especiallytheminimum

endof

therange)withrecentacknowledgem

entby

KenInvest.

Mam

aLucyHospital

Highdonorassistance.Foreignaidnegotiation

regulated,esp.since2004/2007toincrease

Kenyanownership,butpresenceofdonors

underminedthestateofinstitutionalcapacity.

TradeinMedicalProductsandDevices

Regulatedbybothdomesticandinternational

institutions(veryintertwinedduetothe

developingstatusofK).TradeSector

dominatedbyprivateactorsandassociations

operatingsidebysidewithAidproviders.No

changeinpolicyorlegalpreferencesforeseen.

NaturalProductsInitiative

Acknow

ledgedgapinthelegalsystem:

existenceofthewitchcraftact.Andrecent

acknow

ledgem

entoftheneedofpolicyand

legaltransformationtoincludeTM

in

healthcareprovision.Recentpolicychanges

(2005,2009,2010,2013,2014)

TechnicalandVocationalEducationand

Training

Acknow

ledgedlackofinstitutionalization,

whichoccurredin2014.Beforerecentyears,

thispolicy-areawasnotparticularlt

significant.Recentlyitsrelevancewas

triggeredbyincreasedindustrializationand

recognitionofsecondaryeducationascrucial

forthecountry'sgrowth.

Hum

anResourcesforHealth

Conventionalm

edicine:significantrelianceon

externalactorstoguaranteeHRH.Fragm

ented

system

ofgovernance,lackofcoordinationat

domesticlevel,yetrootedindependenceon

foreignactors.

Traditionalmedicine:weakinstitutional

environm

ent,educationandtrainingisnot

regularized,norformalizedbyhigher

educationinstitutions,hencetheneedto

changethegovernancesystem

.

ConfuciusInstitutes

Thesystem

ofgovernanceisnotinplacefor

thespecificissue,thoughthereareaccepted

normsofbehavior.Recent

internationalizationofhighereducationto

fulfilincreasingdemandandmarketneeds.

Weaksystem

ofgovernancetoregulate

internationalizationandevenmorelackofa

specificsystem

ofgovernancetoregulatethe

presenceofaforeigninstitutionwithinlocal

universities.

Table5:Sub-sectoralsystemsofgovernance

239

and,later,ofimplementationcapacity,ratherthanfocusingonChina-blaming.Even

thoughthepresenceofChinamayhavehighlightedtheneedforchange,theproblem

wasalways framedasadomestic issuemore thananexternally-drivenone. It is

particularlyinterestingtoobserve,duringanassessmentofagency-as-ownership,

thecasesofgovernancein-the-making.TheseareoccurringatatimewhenKenyais

fullyonthewaytowardtheimplementationofconstitutionaldemocracy.Whilethe

values associated with democratic development are kept in high consideration

during the formulation of ideal systems of governance, the reality of economic

(under)development represents an obstacle, or at least a point of separation

between the official realm of policy-making and the actual possibilities of

governance. For instance, in the case of counterfeits, despite the exemplary

democraticprocessthroughwhichthegovernancesystemwasrestructured,thefact

thatmuchofthepopulationstillrequestscheapproducts,irrespectiveofthelevel

ofquality,isamajorobstacletotheactualsuccessfulimplementationofthesystem.

For foreigners, inserting themselves in such different systems of governance

requires understanding the rules of the game. However, even in cases where

governanceisrooted,theChinesehavetendedtoeitherignore,i.e.notbeawareof

thenormsregulatingthesector,ortofeelnotboundbyexistingnorms,thusacting

beyond them 829 . The Chinese non-abidance to locally accepted frameworks,

domesticallyorinternationallydefined(i.e.relianceonmultilateralcooperation),is

oftenreducedbyrequestingtheChinesetoabidebythelawsandinstitutions,ifthey

exist,orbycreatingmoreappropriatelegalandinstitutionalframeworks.

Thereisnoindicationthatincasesofrootedgovernanceactorsendupbeingmore

successfulinnegotiatingwiththeChinesethanincasesofgovernancein-the-making.

However,what is important to note is that in all cases, except that of Confucius

Institutes and partially the case of conventionalHRH, the actors involved highly

valuedlegalandinstitutionalframeworks,feelingprotectedbytheirexistence.Even

incaseswheretheseframeworksarenotadequateandthusneedrestructuring,the

first step of the change process is that to identify how the frameworks can be

improved.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthroughactualgovernancepracticesallactors

fullyandalwaysadhere,butratherthatthecountryasawholeincreasinglybelieves

inthevalueofthelawtoprotectinclusiveprocessesofgovernance.Itisbylooking

829‘10thingsChinesepeopleshouldknowaboutdoingbusinessinAfrica’,translatedbyOlander,TheChinaAfricaProject,29December2015,<http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/translation-10-things-chinese-people-should-know-about-doing-business-in-africa/>.

240

atthemodalitiesofengagementthatoneunderstandshowtheseframeworksare

valued,whentheyarebypassedandwhy.

7.5 ModalitiesDependingonthesuitabilityofthearenastosafeguardinterests,themodalities

ofactionbyKenyanactorsvis-à-vistheChinesechange.First,actionsareunpacked

by looking at the initiator, then actual mobilisation practices are analysed to

establishwhethertheyconformtoexistingpatterns.Thisisdonebystudyingthe

tables of negotiation, which, as specified in Chapter 2, are “a formalized setting

wherecontendingsocialgroupsdecideuponkeyaspectsofstatehoodoveragiven

period of time”830.While arenas, i.e. systems of governance, are harder to alter,

tables of negotiation can, more easily, be subjected to short-term interests and

politicisation.Sino-Africanrelationsare imbuedwithconcernsthat theeconomic

and power asymmetry between African countries and the Chinese lead the

executivesoftheformertobypassdomesticsystemsofgovernancetostrikedeals

with the latter. This can bemeasured by contrasting announced developmental

agendas and actual project development. The assumption is that agendas are

broadly negotiated across arenas, and thus take into consideration different

stakeholders’ needs. Project development, on the other hand, may be more

subjectedtoone-offneeds.

Thistensionbetweenarenasandtables,whichtranslatesintoatensionbetween

agendasandactualdevelopment, isan importantpointnotonly forKenya-China

relationsbutSino-Africanrelationsintheirentirety.ThepresenceofChina,despite

its non-interference discourse, has been feared to have an impact on existing

systemsofgovernance,especiallydemocraticprocessesofdevelopmentinAfrica,

through the alteration of procedural standards of negotiation.Also, even though

Sino-African relations have their platforms of engagement, such as FOCAC and

people-to-people meetings, while these may act as springboards for advancing

bilateral engagements, they do not seem to play a particular role in the actual

negotiationsbetweentheKenyansandtheChinese.ThefactthatChinaoftenacts

outside multilateral systems of governance has been demonstrated in previous

chapters.ThisisfoundtobethemainreasonwhyKenyansfinditdifficulttoengage

830HagmannandPéclard,op.cit.,p.551.

241

withtheChinese. Indeed,morethanthecontentoftheengagement(thatoftenis

complementarytoKenya’sneeds),whatpreventsKenyansfromfullyengagingwith

Chinaisthemodalityoftheengagement. In fact,whatseemstoberelevanttothe

ultimatecontrol/ownershipofthenegotiationwiththeChineseistheconformityof

negotiationprocessestothegeneralsystemofnormsandpracticesasunderstoodand

legitimisedbyKenyans.

The following sections look at modalities of action, dismissing the idea that

Africans only engage in contestation with the Chinese, meaning that the

circumstances of engagement are not only threat-related circumstances but also

cooperation-seeking,whereKenyanagencyispro-active.

7.5.1 InitiatorFocusingontheinitiatorhelpsidentifyunderwhattypeofcircumstancesKenyan

actorsengagewithChina.Focusingonactors,especiallyonwhoinitiallyidentifies

the engagement with the Chinese as salient, and who then contributes to the

governance of the relations, is fundamental to acknowledge power relations

domesticallyandinternationally.Basedonthemainassumptionsintheliterature,

thefindingsshowthatitisnotonlyChineseactorsinitiatingtherelationwithKenyan

actors but also vice versa. This is an essential element to ascertain thedegreeof

ownershipinengagementdynamics.Studyingtheinitiator’sactionsinspecificcases

providesinsightsonthemotivationsforengagement,whichinturnarenecessary

to understand how Kenyan actors perceive the presence of China and their

engagement with it. In order, however, to understand internal dynamics of

interaction it is not sufficient to focus exclusively on the initiator but it is also

necessary to pay attention to the other actorswithwhich the initiator interacts

withinspecificframeworksofgovernance,atnegotiationtables(presentedbelow).

Re-activebehaviour/Contestation

There-actionismoreintensenotwhentheinterestswiththeChineseclashbut

whentheinterestsbetweendifferentKenyangroups,responsibleof‘governing’the

specific issue, diverge. The more a threat is perceived, the more a re-action is

expected.Thisbehaviourisparticularlyevidentintheanalysisofthetradesector

where thearrivalofChineseproductsandbusinesses isperceivedasa threatby

local associations, traders and manufacturers. In the case of traders, the threat

242

concerns the Chinese occupation of business spaces traditionally belonging to

Kenyansandthechallengeofexistingframeworksofbusinessgovernancebetween

wholesalersandretailers.Inthecaseofcounterfeits,theentryofcounterfeitswas

perceivedasa threat to innovationandnationaldevelopment. Inbothcases, the

initiator was a non-state actor: small traders in one instance and the Kenya

AssociationofManufacturersintheother.Asfortradeunions,thethreatwasthe

lack of respect of laws and the subtle relations between Kenyan governmental

officialsandChinesecompanies.Inthesethreecases,thechallengesprovidedbythe

Chinesearenovelinthesector.

IncasesofdependenceonChina’sresources,likecertaincasesinhealthcareand

educationshow,contestationislesslikelytooccur.Dependenceherereferstothe

narrowconceptofdependenceonaidratherthanthebroaderconceptoflessdirect

economicdependencesuchasintrade.Theissuethenbecomeswhetherthedonor-

recipientrelationinterfereswiththedecision-makingtotheadvantageofChina(or

any other external actor) or the mechanisms available in the country regulate

donations/assistance to thepointofguaranteeingKenyanownershipdespite the

possiblelimitedcontestationbehaviour.Acasesuchasthatoftheconstructionand

equipping of Mama Lucy hospital, case in which a donation from the Chinese

governmentwasprovided,showshowthemanagementcanstepupcontrolsover

thedevelopmentoftheprojectevenifeconomicasymmetry(especiallyincasesof

donations)constrainsthefreedomtoopposeresistance.Thiscaseisalsoimportant

asitshowshowre-activebehaviournotonlycanbeinplaceevenincasesoffree

assistance but also how the relationships are not static and the elaboration of

strategic behaviour can occur at different stages of the engagement. Sectors like

healthcare and education, as opposed to trade, are historicallymore externally-

influenced.Assuch,China’sarrival isnotperceivedasa threatbutratherasone

morepresencethatneedstobe“fitin”.

Economicelitesalsoplayamajor role, and inKenya theyareoftenextremely

intertwinedwithpoliticalbureaucracies831.Despitenotalwaysopenlycontesting

Chineseactivities,ifChinapursues“self-servingeconomicstrategiesthatnegatively

affectinfluentialdomesticcoalitions”832thenthegovernment–ofteninresponseto

moreor lessopenlyvocaldomesticpressures–maydevelop counter-policiesor

831Boothetal.,op.cit.832Flemes&Wehner,op.cit.

243

strategies like in the case of the creation of ACA, case in which manufacturers’

groups advocated for the creation of national institutions to halt the spread of

counterfeitsfromChina.

Pro-activebehaviour/Cooperation

Inthesecases,itisinterestingtounderstandhowKenyanactorsarticulatetheir

motivations to engage the Chinese vis-à-vis other, often better known and long-

present, partners. The situation, as opposed to the re-active mode, is a ‘non-

confrontational’ situation although the entry of China in the country may have

spurred the actions to change. Pro-active behaviour is characterised by the

recognitionbyKenyanactorsofspecificneedsineachsector/area,followedbythe

identification of Chinese resources as useful for the achievement of desired

outcomes.Theactorsinvolvedintheissueatstakethusinitiateatransformationof

thesystemtoincludeChineseactorsfortheimplementationofspecificpoliciesor

projects.Thecasesthatexemplifythisbehaviourare:tradeinmedicalproductsand

devices,TVETandNPI.Whileinthefirstinstancetheinitiatorisanon-stateactor,

namelywholesalers, in the other two cases the initiator is a state actor, i.e. the

MinistryofEducation,TVETDirectorateandtheNationalMuseumsofKenya,under

theMinistryofCulture.All the casesare,however, characterisedbyan inclusive

approachtogovernancewherebothstateandnon-stateactorsaredeemedkeyto

achievingsuccess.

Inthesecases,Chinaissoughttofillagap,mainlyintermsofresourceprovision,

whiledomesticactorstendtomaintainfullcontrolofthegovernancedynamics.In

thecaseoftradeofhealthproducts,themotivationforwholesalerstoengagewith

Chinese firmswas the sourcingof cheapproducts.Kenyan-Indianmanufacturers

anddistributorshavelimitedthepenetrationofChinesegoodsbyfavouringtrade

with India while the government has not been able to favour Chinese products

despite their advantageous price. In both the cases of TVET and the case of the

Natural Products Industry, knowledge of the country’s structural limitations has

pushedstateorganstore-organiseinternallyandseeksupportexternallynotina

‘full dependence’ approach but rather through trade and support to training. In

theseoccurrences,itisinterestingtostudyhowthemotivationtoapproachChina

wasarticulatedbecauseitshowscontrolnotonlyoverthedomesticscenariobut

alsooverwhatexactlyisneededfromtheexternalactor.InthecaseofTVET,the

244

motivationincludedthepraiseofthepragmaticapproachoftheChinesetolinking

educationandproduction,togetherwithAVICInternationalavailabilitytoprovide

trainingresourcesandeducation.Whereas in thecaseof theNPI, themotivation

included a practical aspect, namely learning from the expertise that China has

gainedgloballyinthedevelopmentoftraditionalmedicineandanideologicalaspect,

namelypartneringtofreeKenyafromthenegativeconnotationthatBritishcolonial

rulershadplacedupontraditionalmedicine.

Passivebehaviour/Passivity

While the cases above have dismissed the general belief that Africans are

unwilling and unable to negotiate to their benefit, it is also necessary to

acknowledgethattherearecasesinwhichthebehaviourofKenyanactorshasbeen

passive,andnoagency/controlovertherelationshipwithChinawasshown.There

can be various reasons why a passive-type of behaviour occurs: perception of

complete domination/inability to act, the issue is not perceived as significant or

relevant,and/orthepotentialthreatisnotyetperceived.Inthecasesanalysedin

this thesis the types of passivity that are observed vary. It is worth noting that

passivity can be a normal behaviour if limited in time. It becomes chronic,

potentiallyassumingnegativeconnotations,whenitisprotractedintime.

Minorcasesofpassivebehaviourarefoundinthehealthcareandeducationsector.

OnlyonemajorcaseofpassivebehaviourwasidentifiedintheConfuciusInstitutes

case. The establishment of Confucius Institutes is consequential to high levels of

interestbyChina(theinstitutesusedasasoftpowertool)encounteringrelatively

uncritical acceptance by Kenyans. This lack of control concerns both the

management of the Institute and the content of teaching. Both theMinistry and

UniversitieshaveminimalcontrolovertheadministrationoftheInstitutes.While

the reason could be, as mentioned above, the fact that education is a sector

historicallyinfluencedbyexternalactorsandhighlyfragmentedinthedeliveryof

education and training, this specific case also highlights how university leaders

uncriticallyacceptfinancialdependence,potentiallytothedetrimentofthequality

of education. Similar cases are found in the management of China’s offers of

assistanceininfrastructureforhealthcare(seetheinitialnegotiationforMamaLucy

Hospital)andincasesofChina’sassistanceinconventionalHRH.

245

Inallcases,thesystemofgovernanceisaweakone,reliantonexternalfinancial

resourcesandnotinstitutionallyfittoavoidthefulfilmentofnarrowself-interests,

mostlydeterminedbyhigh-politicalmotivations.Thelackofdomesticnegotiations,

mostlyduetotheweaknessofthesystemofgovernance,leadsthenationalcontext

tobecomeirrelevanttotheoutcomeoftherelationwithChina.

246

Table6:Initiator’sbehaviour(bysub-sector)

Source:Author’sfindings.

Tradeunions

Counterfeits

Smalltraders

Mam

aLucy

Hospital

Tradein

medical

productsand

devices

Natural

Products

Initiative

Technicaland

Vocational

Educationand

Training

Hum

an

resourcesfor

healthcare

Confucius

Institutes

Kenyans'

motivationto

engagewiththe

issue

MakeChinese

companiesabide

bydom

esticlegal

frameworks

Controlthe

damageattw

olevels:

consum

ers'rights

(limited),

manufactures

(main

argument)>

hindering

national

developm

ent

MakeChinese

wholesalersand

retailersabideby

theinformal

normsof

business

UseChinese

companyto

achievedomestic

developm

ent

plan.

sourcecheap

ChineseproductsUs

eChinese

expertise

(com

paniesand

education)to

achievedomestic

developm

ent

plan.Inthe

processof

sector’s

restructuring,

China

representeda

governance

system

to

emulate.

UseChinese

companyto

achievedomestic

developm

ent

plan,i.e.training

anddevelopm

ent

oftechnical

expertsableto

activelyengage

withthe

construction

boom

andother

emergingsectors.UseChineseaid

toachieve

domestic

developm

ent

plan,i.e.training

ofhum

an

resourcesfor

health,necessary

toguarantee

properhealth

caredeliveryand

thusahealthy

populationable

towork.Learn

from

theChinese

fortraditional

medicine

training.

UseChineseaid

todevelop

languagecourses

andlinkswith

China.

KenyanInitiatorGrassrootstrade

unions

Kenya

Associationof

manufacturers

Smalltraders

Ministryofhealth

-Minister'soffice

(verylarge

bureaucracy)

Grassroots-

wholesalers

National

Museumsof

Kenya

Ministryof

Education–TVET

(smalloffice)

Ministryof

Health-Hum

an

Resourcesoffice,

Ministryof

Culture

Universities

(Nairobi,

Kenyatta,Moi,

Egerton)

Otherdom

estic

actors

Ministryof

Labour,

IndustrialCourt

Ministryof

Industrialization,

privatesector

associations

CityCouncil,The

KenyaOverseas

Chinese

Association,

Kenya-China

Import-Export

Prom

otion

Association,The

ChineseEm

bassy

Hospital

managem

ent

Pharmacyand

PoisonsBoard

Ministryof

Culture,Ministry

ofHealth

(includingPPB),

KEMRI(research

institute)

Educational

institutions,

Privatesector

associations

Ministryof

Education,

NATHEPA

Ministryof

Education

Modeof

addressingthe

issuewiththe

Chinese

Re-active

Re-active

Re-active

Passiveandre-

active

Pro-active

Pro-active

Pro-active

Passive

(conventional),

pro-active

(traditional)

Passive

overall

objective

towardChina

RejectingChinese

activities

/behaviour

RejectingChinese

activities

/behaviour

RejectingChinese

activities

/behaviour

FittingChinain

EngagingChina

asapartnerin

developm

ent

EngagingChina

asapartnerin

developm

ent

EngagingChina

asapartnerin

developm

ent

FittingChinain

(conventional),

engagingChinaas

apartnerin

developm

ent

(traditional)

FittingChinain

247

7.5.2 TablesofnegotiationAsmentionedinChapter2,thestudyofnegotiationtablesandtheirconformity

tothebroadernegotiationarenaissignificanttounderstandwhetherestablished

normsandproceduresaremaintainedorbypassed.Itisalsoimportantasithelps

to understand whether these behaviours are sector-defined or rather sector-

irrelevant.NegotiationtableshaveincreasedasnewissuesemergedbetweenKenya

andChina.Inthecasesanalysedinthisthesis,negotiationtableswithChinahaveat

timesconformedwithwhatwasenvisionedinthesystemofgovernancetowhich

theybelong,whileattimestheyhavebeensubjectedtoalterations,theextremeof

which was full non-conformity. Conformity refers to both domestic actors’

conformityandexternalactors’conformitytoexistingproceduralnorms.

InfourcasesthetableofnegotiationwiththeChineseconformedwithexisting

normsandpractices.However,infivecasesanalterationwasobserved.Ofthese,4

casespresentedalightalteration,whileonecase(ConfuciusInstitutes)presented

fullnon-conformity.

Table7:Conformitytotablesofnegotiation(bysub-sector)

RootedGovernance Governancein-the-making

Conformity Lightalteration Non-conformity Conformity Lightalteration Non-conformity

Tradeofhealthproducts Tradeunions Counterfeits Traditional

medicine ConfuciusInstitutes

HRHconventional

Infrastructureforhealth TVET TraditionalHRH

Smalltraders

Source:Author’sfindings.

Inthecasesoflightalteration,thisdependedonverydifferentfactors.Inthecase

oftradeunions,despitetheexistenceofastrongsystemofgovernancefordispute

resolution, the government interference was based on broader interests in

infrastructure development, from which originated the need to maintain good

relationswiththeChinese.Thegovernancesystemprovidesforanegotiationtable

populatedbythreetypesofactors,namelythetradeunion,theMinistryofLabour,

andthecompanyortheemployers’associationonitsbehalf.Ontopofthese,the

negotiation also involves the Judiciary, i.e. the Industrial Court, for caseswhere

248

stakeholders do not manage to settle disputes. The arena is legally and

institutionally defined, though recently challenged by devolution processes of

implementation.Itis,however,generallylegitimisedwithinthecountry.Thetables

of negotiation with the Chinese, i.e. the actual negotiation, shows, however, an

alterationofthenormsandpracticesdeemedlegitimateinthedomesticarena.This

alterationismostlyrelatedtotheChinesepresence,ratherthanforeignpresence.It

entailsallegedcorruption,aswellasimpropergovernmentinterference.

Inthecaseofinfrastructureforhealth,asimilarscenariowasobserved(notethat

bothcasesrevolvearoundinfrastructuredevelopment)but,contrarytothecaseof

tradeunions,therelationswithChinashowedagapinthegovernancesystem.In

other words, the heavy reliance of the Ministry of Health on international

institutions has weakened the institutional ability to negotiate. This becomes

particularlyevidentwhentheMinistrynegotiateswithanactorthatdoesnotadhere

totheinternationalinstitutions’system.However, it isdeemeda ‘light’alteration

becausetherelationalprocesswiththeChinesehasshownalearningcurvebased

on which the role played by high-level bureaucrats was downplayed by the

professionalsinvolvedinthenegotiation.

In thecaseof traders, thescenariodiffersas thegovernancesystem ismainly

informal, though heavily supported by business elites, often linked to political

constituencies. The alteration, in this case, consists in the acknowledgement, by

formal authorities, that the informal system of governance, while balanced

domestically,isvulnerabletoinputsfromforeignactors.Despitetheabilityofthe

informal sector to control the entry of Chinese traders, this was not based on

formallyrecognisedinstruments.TheKenyaInvestmentAuthorityrecognisedthat

theChineseexposedamajorgapinthecountry’ssystemofgovernanceofforeign

investment,namelythelackofaproperregulatoryregime.Whiletradersarenot

necessarilyinvestors,thefactthattheyareallowedtoenterthecountryandsetup

smallactivitiesisperceivedassuch.This‘allowance’ismainlyconsequentialtothe

factthatinvestmentlimitsarenotregulated.TheChinesehavehadtocometoterms

withthefactthattheiractivitiesmustnotonlycomplywithformal,legallyregulated

norms,butalsowithinformalnorms,notlegallyregulatedbutnonethelesshighly

regulated, not state-led but often approved – if not directly supported – by

governmentagents.

Thesecasesof‘light’alterationpresentatemporaryinabilityofKenyanactorsto

249

guarantee negotiation tables conform to the broad system of governance. The

temporarynatureoftheseoccurrencesisshapedbytheabilityofKenyanactorsto

identifytheweaknessesthattherelationswiththeChinesehaveemphasisedand

acttoresolvethem.AsMosleyetal.pointedout,“anynegotiatinggameisboundto

changesignificantly,notleastasaresultofthefactthatafteryearsofexperience

both sides of the bargaining table figure out ways to neutralize each other’s

strategies.”833

Theonly caseof non-conformity is the caseof Confucius Instituteswhere the

governance system is still at the initial stagesof a substantial restructuring.The

Confucius Institutes, peculiar and unique as they are at global level, have thus

entered a system that is not well articulated to safeguard Kenyan interests

(perceived to be academic independence over dependence on external financial

resources). The fact that the negotiations occur mainly between the Chinese

EmbassyandtheVice-ChancellorsoftheeducationalinstitutionswheretheCIsare

setupisnotwellreceivedbutitcannoteasilybecontestedeither,giventhelackof

regulatoryframeworks.Atthesametime,thepassivityofeducationalinstitutions

andtheMinistryofEducationinattemptingtocreatestricterproceduralnormsof

conduct is understood as an act of convenience which exacerbates financial

dependence,accommodatingChineseinterests.

7.6 ConclusionsActors move across regulated and unregulated spheres of action for the

achievement of their interests. The patterns observed in the cases studied here

combine everything from elements of the democratic model – constitutionally

grounded since 2010 in Kenya – to informal clientelism. The frequent lack of

adherenceofChina toexistinggovernance frameworkshasbeenreceivedwitha

diversityofreactions,rangingfromexclusiontoaccommodation.WhiletheChinese,

knowingly or unknowingly, often bypass existing governance frameworks, the

instances in which Kenyan agents and structures bring governance back to

existing/legitimised patterns aremore than the instances inwhich the opposite

occurs.Thisoccursacrosssectorsandalsoacrossmodalitiesofinteraction,i.e.trade

versusaid,forexample.ThefactthatKenyansaremorelikelytobringgovernance

833Mosley,HarriganandToyle,1991,citedbyWhitfieldandFraser,op.cit.,p.345.

250

backtoexisting,institutionalisedpatterns,ratherthanbeingdominatedbyexternal

frameworks,isimportantnotonlyinthecontextofinternationalrelations,butalso

inadomesticscenariowheredemocratizationisnotmerelyconstitutionaljargon,

but a de factomoment occurring throughmyriad of actions carried forward by

bureaucratsandsocietyalike.

Interestingly,itisfoundthatmoreoftenthemodality,ratherthanthecontentof

the negotiation, represents the point of fracture between Chinese and Kenyan

agents.Inotherwords,mostcasesstudiedshowthatKenyansarenotagainstthe

relationswithChinabecausetheybelievetheywouldnotbebeneficial,butbecause

theChinesedonotadhere toexistingmodioperandi.This lackofalignmentwith

normsofconductisattimesexacerbatedbyKenyans,attimesitisrecognisedasa

productofweakdomesticproceduralnorms.Eventuallywhatseemstoberelevant

to the ultimate control/ownership of the negotiation with the Chinese is the

conformityofnegotiationprocessestothegeneralsystemofnormsandpracticesas

understoodandlegitimisedbyKenyans.

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CHAPTER8

Conclusions

8.1 OverviewOneoftheproblemsoftheliteraturewithinwhichthisthesisrestsistheimpulse

toprovide a ‘grand’meaning toChina-Africa relations, an impulse thathasbeen

difficult to fulfilentirely.First, thisexpectationwasbasedonanassumptionthat

China had one coherent set of interests acrossAfrican countries,which arewell

plannedinBeijingtobeexportedtoAfrica.Second,itwasbelievedthatthereception

in Africa would not vary extensively across 54 countries.While the first aspect

startedbeingunpackedby scholars andpolicymakerswith thriving interest, i.e.

breakingdown‘China’intothemultiplicityofinterestsandstructuresitismadeof,

the second aspect remains highly un-problematized, i.e. Africa largely remains a

collectivediscourse,a‘receiving’,‘unsuspecting’834continentacteduponbythelast-

comer in a long list of external presences that had normatively advised and

pragmaticallyexploitedelitesandpeoplessouthoftheSahara.

HencetheneedtofillthisgapandpayattentiontoAfricansandtheircontexts,

unpacking themultidimensional aspects of specific African social, economic and

politicalrealitiestoachieveamoreaccurateandrepresentativeunderstandingof

relations.Thisledtheauthortoselectonecountry,ratherthanmultiplecountries,

whichprovedtobeanimportantmethodforaparticularisedstudyofthearguably

asymmetricalrelationsbetweenAfricansandexternalactors,andofthe‘win-win’

discourse between China and African countries. Transcending the disciplinary

boundariesthatoftenadoptsinglelevelsofanalysis,thisthesiscombinesreasoning

aboutmacro-,meso- andmicro-level dynamics, i.e. national, sectoral and issue-

specific.ItstudiesKenya-Chinarelationsbymovingbeyondthelimitationsof‘one

sector’comparisons,wherethebroadercontextrarelyplaysarole.Itiscrucialto

recognisethatcountriesdonotnecessarilyhavesimilarprioritieswhenitcomesto

specificissues,sectors,evennationalinterests.Therefore,usingsuchthree-layered

approachandpayingattentiontothespecificandbroadercontextssimultaneously,

leverages the strengths and weaknesses that a country-system adopts vis-à-vis

834Gadzala,2015,op.cit.

252

external forces, allowing analysts to balance conclusions concerning the

asymmetricalrelationsofpower,whichhavelongbeencharacterisingthescholarly

debatesaroundAfricaininternationalrelations.

AlthoughAfricacannotbetakenasaunitarysingleblock,andthechoiceofKenya

toexplaintheroleofdomesticpoliticswithintheChina-Africadiscoursedoesnot

aimtoberepresentativeofthewholecontinent,themethodused(layeredinterests)

and the relational dynamics that were observed domestically and in relation to

China,are likelytofacilitatetheunderstandingofSino-Africandynamics inother

countries.Indeed,whatisuniqueinthefindingsarenottherelationsbetweenKenya

andChina,butratherthestanding-pointfromwhichtheserelationswereobserved.

Thisdissertationchangedthestanding-pointfromwhichSino-Africanrelations

havelargelybeenobserved,givingAfricaamoreprominentposition.Inthiscontext,

itquestionswhetherknownconceptsandnormsofinternationalrelationscanor

should be applied to Sino-African relations. Starting with the issue of whether

AfricancountriescanhavetheoreticalutilityinInternationalRelationsTheory,to

challengingthewidelyheldpositionsthatAfricansareunwillingandunableagents

in international relations, theanalysisof the relationsbetweenKenyaandChina

providesabasis to thinkabouthowthediscoursesandpractices thathavebeen

widelygeneralisedshouldbereviewedwithcaution.

The approach adopted in the thesis was a critique of International Relations

Theory in its (non) engagementwith Africa. The findings tend to reveal that IR

theories,when applied toAfrican scenarios, can indeedhave explanatory power

leadingtobelievethatIRtheoristsshouldengageseriouslywithAfrica,ratherthan

keepingitatthelimitsofthediscipline.Atthesametime,however,thefindings–

boththeoreticalandempirical–suggestthatothertheoreticalbodiesofscholarship

couldwellexplainthesereal-worlddynamics,maybeinconjunctionwithIRT.

For instance, the thesis brings to light units of analysis that are typical of the

International Political Economy (IPE) discipline, such as sources of finance,

regionalism, transnational governance. By bringing African dynamics to the

foreground,thisthesisdemonstrateshowanAfricancountryinsertsitselfintothe

international political economy of specific sectors, not as a passive agent, but

throughactivestrategiesofengagement,mainlyofcontestationandcooperation.

Passivity, instead, is more rarely observed. Similarly, a focus on theories of

institutionalchangecouldhaveshedmorelightonthedistinctionbetweenformal

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and informal institutions835and their impact on Kenya’s relations with external

forces.Itcouldhavealsohelpedtoexplaintheconditionsunderwhichinstitutions

stopfunctioningandinstitutionalchangeislikelytooccur;andtheroleofactorsin

determiningtherulesofthegame836.

Despitetheabsenceofthesetheoreticalbodiesinthisthesis,thesectionsbelow

highlightsomeofthemainfindingswiththehopethattheycanbethestartingpoint

todeveloptheSino-Africanliteratureinfurtherunexploreddirections.

8.2 Agency-as-ownershipofthegovernanceprocess.AnewwaveofscholarlyattentiononAfricanagency in internationalrelations

has started emerging in the early 2010s. However, available studies on African

agency have not provided yet a comprehensive account of the elements that

contributetoit.Thatiswhatthisthesishasattemptedtodo,notmerelybyfocusing

onagencyasactors’decisions,butmorebroadlyonagencyastheownershipofthe

governance process, which is constituted by the interaction of beliefs, interests,

resourcesandsystemsofgovernance.Thistypeofagencyiscontingentonhistorical,

political, cultural, economic realities and does not thus allow to talk of 'African'

agencyeasily.Asthecasesinthisthesisdemonstrate,itishardtotalkabout‘agency’

inunitarytermsevenwithinasinglecountry,letaloneacrossacontinent.

Theconceptualizationofagencythatispresentedinthisthesisputsforwarda

few propositions. First, above all, the thesis adopts a state-society approach to

understandingagency.Thisdecisionwasgroundedinthebeliefthatthegovernance

ofdomesticorforeignaffairscannotbecircumscribedwithin‘state’and‘non-state’

boundaries.Inotherwords,thethesisdoesnottreatagencytowardexternalactors

as an affair of either the state or society, but rather as the inevitable relational

process between the two. It is in the very transcendental nature of this

conceptualizationofagencythatthecoreofKenyanagencyisfound.Whilecasesof

strained relations between the state and non-state actors exist, so do cases of

cooperation.Thoughtheconceptualizationofagencyishereappliedtoacountry

wheregovernance-sharingisincreasinglyvaluedandhasbecomeconstitutionally-

protected,theelementsofagencyidentifiedintheconceptualizationcanbeusedto

835G.HelmkeandS.Levitsky,‘Informalinstitutionsandcomparativepolitics:Aresearchagenda’,PerspectivesonPolitics,vol.2,no.4,2004,p.727.836K.A.Shepsle,‘Rationalchoiceinstitutionalism’,inS.Binder,R.RhodesandB.Rockmaneds.,OxfordHandbookofPoliticalInstitutions,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2008,p.25.

254

analyseagencyelsewhere.Thecontentoftheanalysisisexpectedtodifferacross

countries,asmuchasitdifferswithinKenya,acrosssectors.

Infact,therelationsbetweenKenyaandChinaarefoundtobeascomplexas,and

a reflection of, domestic politics. To understand this, onemust not look beyond

nationalboundariesasthecomplexityistobefound,firstandforemost,inhowthe

domesticcontextconceivesforeignpresences,strategizingthemtoachievedomestic

and foreignaims. Inotherwords,while thepresenceofChinamaybepeculiar in

terms of specific Kenyan perceptions and interests that come into play, it is

conceiveddomesticallyasnothingmorenorlessthananexternalactor.Thecases

presented suggest that the outcomes of the relations with China are highly

dependentuponKenyans’willingnessandabilitytoeitheruseexistinggovernance

systemsorcreatemoresuitableones,tofacetheopportunitiesandchallengesChina

hasbroughttothecountry.Inotherwords,theexplanatoryrealmisfoundwithin

Kenya,morethanoutside.

The focusof thisstudyon localgovernance,andtherelevanceofstate-society

interdependence, consciously departs from the dichotomy that is often found in

Sino-African studies between state-to-state and people-to-people interactions, of

limited utility to understand the complexity of the engagements. To capture the

complexity and the fast-paced shifts of Sino-African relations it was urgent to

identifymorefine-grainedunitsofanalysisthanthestateandpaycloserattention

tomicro-leveldynamics.Thisdoesnotaimatdiminishingtheimportanceandthe

powerofthestate.ThedichotomywasusedtounderstandAfricanelites’relations

with China as revolving around the safeguarding of patrimonial linkages within

national boundaries, to the detriment of the population. However, the cases

analysedshowthat,whilepatrimoniallinkagesarepresentatsomelevel(seethe

businesselitesduringtheKibakiera,Chapter3),theyarenotexcessivelyevidentin

allinstancesandinsuchawaythatendsupbenefitingfewattheexpenseofothers.

EspeciallywiththeKenyatta-Rutoleadership,patronagerelationshipshavediluted,

mainlyduetothesplitnatureofgovernance.

Stringent political reasons have remained relevant in Kenya-China relations

including essential elements of interdependence where Kenya needs China but

ChinaalsoneedsKenya(seethecaseofUhuruKenyattaandWilliamRuto’strialsat

the International Criminal Court, and the ‘use’ of China to leverage theWestern

influence).However,beyondhighpolitics,theactivitiesinwhichKenyanstateand

255

socialgroupsengagewithChinaaregenerallypartofbroaderplansofdevelopment,

nationalorsectoral,publicorprivate.Thismeans that ineverydayactivities, the

engagement of Kenyan actors with the Chinese is not as exceptional as often

believed. The layered interests approach helps understand that while national

interests are rhetorically framed around mutual benefit etc. sectoral and issue-

based interests are often revisited to fit existing meanings and patterns of

engagement.

ThisalsoshedslightonthefactthatstateandsocialgroupsinKenyadonotset

theirmotivations,anddonotactmuchdifferentlyfromwhatisexpectedfromthe

literature in IR. To gather amore representative picture of empirical dynamics,

though,itwasnecessarytoacknowledgethederivativeandmultidisciplinarynature

ofIR,notthususingasingleapproachbutrathercombiningfeaturesdrawnfroma

rangeofapproaches.

8.3 Democracyoreconomicdevelopment?Blendedgovernanceinstead.Animportantquestionthatarisesfromtheanalysescarriedoutthroughoutthe

thesis concerns whether the governance-in-flux that has been described is

symptomaticofaparticularmomentinthehistoryofKenya,onecharacterisedby

the arrival of China, or is rather a continuation of a pre-existing trajectory.

Contemporarydiscourseshavebeensuggestingthatanationalbreakwiththepast

hasbeentakingshape,withthecountry’sdomesticpoliciesLookingEast.However,

howquicklyaregrassrootssectoralinterestsadjustingtothis internationalshift?

Having China as a partner-option for development does not mean choosing the

countryoverothers.TherationalebehindtheselectionofChinaasapartner,where

applicable, isoftencalculated todrawbenefits thataremorecomplex thanmere

‘economicadvantagewithoutconditions’.First,themyththatChinadoesnotattach

conditionsissoondispelledbyactors involvedinthenegotiations837.Second,the

conditionsaregenerallynegotiated,rarelyacceptedintheiroriginalformat838.The

837Seethecasesof:infrastructureforhealth,wherecontractswiththeChineseinvolvepurchaseofChineseproducts,orthecaseoftheMalariaCentre,whereChineseconditionsarenon-negotiableandendupnotfittingintotheexistingframeworkofprocurement/projectdevelopment;thecaseofConfuciusInstitutes,wheretheestablishmentoftheinstitutesismainlydecidedanddevelopedaccordingtoChineseactors’agendas(ratherthanprovidingtheserviceinresponse-modeasstated);thecaseofTVET,wheretheChinesewantedtoestablishaschoolundertheirconditionswithinanexistinginstitute;thecaseoftradeunions,wheretheChinesecreatedanewcompanyinordertoavoidraisingtheminimumwageoftheCBA.ItisnormalthatChineseactorssetconditions,itisnotnormaltoexpectthattheydonotdoso.838Seeallthecasespresentedinthenoteabove,andhowKenyanactorsnegotiatedwiththeChinese.

256

contactswithChinaareinfactalsousedasstrategicmeanstonegotiatewiththe

Westwhenthislatterisconsideredtoofferbetteroptions.

One of the main questions revolving around Sino-African relations is that of

whetherChina’spresenceinAfricawillcontributetothecontinent’semergenceand

developmentorwillratherthrowitbackintoaphaseofcolonialrule.Linkedtothis

is the question of whether China’s lack of attention to democracy and good

governance,i.e.transparency,accountability,etc.,willspoildecadesofefforts,from

the West and African countries to put Africa on the ‘right path’ to democratic

development,inordertofavoureconomicdevelopment.Inherentinthisconcernis

thebeliefthatthetwoapproaches,oneheraldedbytheWest,theotherbyChina,

wouldnotbeeasilyreconciled. ItwasoftenassumedthatAfricancountrieshave

beenstandingatajuncturesincethearrivalofChina,askedtochoosebetweenone

directionor theother, i.e. theWestern liberalapproachor theEasterneconomic

developmentmodel.Thegeneralideathateitheroneortheotherapproachmustbe

chosenseemstoreflectanideologically-chargedideaofAfricatrappedbetweenthe

East/Westdivide.

In fact, as demonstrated in this dissertation, what appears to emerge more

strongly from the analysis of actual contexts is the idea of a blended type of

governancewheretheconstitutionaldemocraticmodelstartsbeingabsorbed,and

theeconomicdevelopmentmodeliscatchingonatsignificantspeed.Theargument

IputforwardbasedonthecasesanalysedinthisthesisisthatKenyansareworking

tounitethesepaths,presumablyparallel,intoagovernancemodelthatmakessense

domestically.Inevitablyeach‘original’paradigmisboundtolosesomethingonthe

way, but the emerging model, freed of normative prescriptions and economic

lessons,mayeventuallybemoresuitedtothecountry’scurrentspecificneeds.An

interviewee commented the construction of a road by the Chinese: “there were

complaintsaboutstandards,butcomparedtowhatwastherebefore…this isnot

about perfection” 839 . This highlights a tension between an understanding of

development as comprehensive development vis-à-vis possible development, i.e.

basedonactualavailableresourcesandcapacities.

A senior officer at the Kenya National Highways Authority (the institution in

chargeofmanaging infrastructuralmega-projects inKenya, highly involvedwith

839InterviewwithanofficerattheNationalEconomicandSocialCouncil,Nairobi,2014-01-24.

257

Chineseconstructioncompanies)840, inhisownwords,expressed theadvantages

anddisadvantagesofthetwomodelsforKenya:

TheWorld Bank introduces all those rules on governancewhich are a

thing.Theywantthestrengtheningofcapacityetc.Whentheprojectisover,

in10/15years this iswhat isgoing tostay.Theypushedus tosetup the

NationalTransportSafety,thoughitisstillababyinstitution,andtheyare

nowworkingtochecktheuseofalcoholonthestreets,etc.Thesethingshave

alongtermimpact.Theircontractsarewellstructured,andthingsaredone

properly.ButtheChineseprovideuswithfastdelivery.Andforme,thereis

awayforboth.WeneedtheChinesenow,tomoveon[i.e.keepthepaceof

infrastructural and economic development], andweneed institutions like

theWBtohelpussetthoselongtermgoalsthatarenecessaryforKenya’s

future.Butweneedtorememberwealsoneedspaceforthelocalindustry.

At the airport now, they [the Chinese] stay841behind offices, in economic

accommodation,butthingswillchange.Nowtheycandothat,butovertime

itishumannaturetowantmore.Therewillcomeatimewhentheirprices

willnotbecompetitiveanymore.EveninChinanowwagesareincreasing.It

isgoodfornowwhileitlasts,butweneedtobuildupourlocalcapacities.

While the Chinese model of development, i.e. economic development before

socialandpoliticalrights,iscurrentlyadvantageousforKenya,itwouldbeshort-

sighted not to see its limits. Similarly, while the Western emphasis on

comprehensivecontracts,whereworkers’rightsaresafeguarded, is important to

build a better social texture, the inability to pay comfortably for those services

cannotbeignored.

Hence the idea of a blend which emerges from a very specific national

environment where constitutionalism is being absorbed, and economic

developmentisbeingvaluedandpromoted.AlthoughitisundeniablethatinKenya

developmenthasoftenbeenlinkedtoclientelisticlegitimacy,thepicturethatwas

840InterviewwithanofficerattheKenyaNationalHighwaysAuthority,Nairobi,2014-02-19.841Chinesetechniciansandworkersworkingforconstructioncompaniesareoftenaccommodatedontheconstructionsite,inmodestaccommodationunits,withfewcomforts.This,inturn,lowerstheproject’scosts,makingChineseprojectsmoreaffordablethanWesternones.Theargumentoftheintervieweeisthatsoonerorlater(expectedtobesoonerratherthanlateraccordingtotheincreaseofminimumwagesinChina)evenChinesetechniciansandworkerswillstartrejectingsuchlivingconditionsandwilldemandbetteraccommodation–andmaybebetterpay.Inturn,Chineseprojectswillnotbeasaffordableastheycurrentlyare.

258

observedwas also one of bureaucrats and common peoplewho believed in the

country’s development and acted professionally to achieve the objective, not

motivatedbyallegiancetoaleader,butbytheirpersonalandprofessionalethics.In

other words, while corruption and clientelism are part of the story, so are

transparencyandcompetence.Thisoccursinacountrywheregovernanceisinflux,

wheretheeconomy“nolongerreliesonthestate;themulti-partydemocracyishere

to stay and presidential demands provoke asmuch resistance as obedience”842.

Especiallyafterthenewconstitutionwaspassed,setbacksagainstithavebeenmet

“withvigorousresistancefromKenyans,resistancethatconfirmedthatthemany

yearsspentnegotiatingthenewconstitutionhadintroducedintotheKenyanbody

politicafreshcivicsensitivityagainstrulebypresidentialfiat”843.

Consequentially,thestatethatemergesintheKenyancontextisnotonlyonethat

wouldmerelyperpetuateclientelisticnetworks,butalsoonethatisdependentupon

societalforcesincludingtheprivatesector.Atthesametime,civilsocietyisnotonly

composed of actors embodying the normative good reflected in much of the

literatureoncivilsociety,butalsonarrow-purposedgroups,businessnetworks,etc.

far frombeing exemplaryorganisations acting for the goodof themajority.This

argumentgoeshandinhandwiththeideathatSino-Africanrelationsarewelcomed

bytheelitesanddespisedbythepopulation.Thepictureislessneatthanthis,more

blurred,confused,andyetmorebalanced.Boththestateandnon-staterealmsare

filledwithactorsofdiversebeliefsandmotivations.Thisiswhylookingatbeliefs,

perceptions, ideologies (toward China, and other external actors) is crucial.

Unpackingthemallowsonetoobservehowtheyarelessrole-determinedandmore

person-determinedthanpreviouslythought.

8.4 DependenceforsustainabilityAnother important aspect concerns the dependence upon external forces and

if/howthearrivalofChinaisperpetuatingthisbehaviour.Itisnotanoption,buta

condition, that Kenya relies on external forces to continue on its journey of

development.Inaway,itispossibletostatethatKenya’spre-existingextraversion

strategiescontinuewiththeChinese.However,anumberofotherelementsseemto

842Hornsby,op.cit.,p.7843Murunga,OkelloandSjögren,op.cit.,p.ix.

259

suggestthatdependenceonexternalpowersisboundtodiminishintheyearsahead.

Thesheerdynamismofthecountry’sgrowingmiddleclass,thenationandsector-

widecommitmenttoindustrialization,theincreasedawarenessthatdemocracyis

“heretostay”,thepurposivedetachmentfromWesternaidandtheadoptionofaid

provision declarations such as the Paris and Accra ones that focus on the host

country’selaborationofpriorities.AlltheseelementssuggestthatKenyansaremore

interestedintakingownershipofthedevelopmentpath,‘frominside’.Afterall,the

relationswithChinaandtherecentfinancialcrisishaveemphasised,oncemore,that

theforeignprovisionofassistancedoesnotlastforever,andthatitissubjectedand

vulnerable to alterations occurring in donor countries. Not only, there is also a

growing segment of the population, i.e. the youth, that is increasingly educated,

digitalized and dynamic enough to strategically use domestic and international

resources to create new spaces of development within the country, rather than

outsideofit.

Consequentially,whiledependenceimpliesanasymmetricalrelationship,what

seems to emerge from the analysis is that sustainability in development is

increasingly becoming an established concept, guiding Kenyan approaches to

externalactors.Thisdoesnoteliminatedependenceonforeignfinancialandhuman

resources, but it suggests that the country is gearing up to make use of these

resourcesforlong-termdevelopmentsratherthanusethemasone-offfreegrants.

PartofthispictureistherecognitionthatKenyadoesnotmerely‘receive’Chinese

trade,investments,assistance,butalso‘requests’them.Forlongintheliterature,it

wasbelievedthatifanything,AfricancountrieswerestrugglingtofittheChinese

into contexts where they imposed themselves. However, it was clarified that

focusingonAfricaastherecipientprovidesapartialportrayofactualengagements.

Pro-activebehaviourisalsoobservedaccordingtowhichKenyanactorsidentifyand

chooseChinaasapartnerintrade,developmentandmore.

8.5 TimeforsocialchangeFinally,internationalrelationstheoriesdonoteasilycontributetoaccountingfor

variationsthroughtime.Thisstudyemphasisestheimportanceofaccountingforthe

dynamic nature of processes, how agentsmodify them in itinere and how these

processes modify agents. Understanding the relatively new co-existence of

260

democratic governance and rapid economic development requires awareness

concerningthefactthatuncertaintysurroundsimplementationeffortsandresults.

KenyanandChineseactorsarestillstudyingeachotheralthoughtheintensification

ofsocial,politicalandeconomicactivitieshasexposedthemtooneanothermore

oftenandmorecomprehensively.

Nonetheless,beyondthepoliciesonpaper,socialchangetakestimetohappen.

Oneintervieweesuggestedthat“itwilltakealongtimeforKenyanstoplacepeople

withadegreefromaChineseuniversity”844mainlybecausestudyinginChinaisnot,

yet,synonymouswithhighqualityandsocialstatus.Similarly,anotherinterviewee

pointedoutthat“theChineseworkfor longhoursbutAfricansdonotthinkthey

haveoutstandingintelligence,vis-à-vistheWest.Itistheirbrainpowerthatshould

impactAfrica,butithasnot.Theyarenotadmiredforhowtheythink.Theycome

fortheirskillsbutnotforoutstandingthinking.”845

Understanding that the relativenewness of the Chinese inKenya is a variable

influencing perceptions, ideas and potentially the outcomes of the relations is

crucial.Chinaisoftendefinedasnew,extraneousand,therefore,requiringKenyans

tobealert.EvenincaseswhereactorsarepositiveabouttheengagementwithChina,

a sense of unfamiliarity is emphasised, especially in comparison to traditional

externalactors.AnumberofagentsclaimtheylackunderstandingoftheChinese

behaviourandthuslearnandre-learnmainlybyengagingwiththem.Thishighlights

theheuristicaspectof the relations, according towhichperceivedsuccessesand

failures in the engagement reorient preferences and thus strategies for the next

round.

Although the focus of the thesis has been on Kenyan contexts, inevitably the

analyses have also revealed a variety of Chinese agents, interests, structures. As

Corkin suggests “China´s foreign policy towards Africa is far from the “grand

strategy” concept espoused by Pehnelt and Abel 846 . Instead, it is developed

incrementally, largely on a trial and error basis” 847 . The Chinese became

increasingly aware of the context within which they operate, namely the

weaknesses and strengths of Kenyan governance systems. While in some cases

844InterviewwithanexecutiveattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,Nairobi,2014-11-04.845InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute,2013-10-31.846G.Pehnelt&M.Abel,‘China’sDevelopmentPolicyinAfrica’,Reportno.1,TheSouthAfricanInstituteofInternationalAffairs,Johannesburg,2007,p.9.847L.Corkin.,‘AfricanagencyinthecontextofChina-Africarelations’,ForumIssue1and2,AfricanEast-AsianAffairs/TheChinaMonitor,CentreforChineseStudies,StellenboschUniversity,2015.

261

betterknowledgeofthegovernancesystemwasusedtobypassitmoreeasily, in

othercasesitwasacatalystforachangetowardgreateradherencetoKenyanrules.

Inaway,theexposuretoKenyannormsofconducthascontributedtotheChinese

socialisationtoamoreinclusivesystemofgovernance.

Consideringtherapidityoftherelations,thecasesanalyseddoshowarangeof

promptnessinaddressingchange.ActorsuseknownlogicstoengagetheChinese,

with somemorepromptly responding to thenewcomer and some less. Broadly

speakingKenyansseemquiteawareofChina’spresence,andarelearning,bydoing

or observing, what the consequences of these new engagements may mean.

Eventually,thisis,probablymorethananythingelse,astoryofacountrywherea

relativelysuddenmigrationofforeignershasshakensocial,economicandpolitical

bases.However,whiletheinteractionmayshowdistinctivefeatures,itisastoryof

adaptationandre-adaptationbetweenthelocalenvironmentandaforeignpresence.

262

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‘Kenya lauds Chinese investment in hotel industry’, Xinhua via Embassy of the

People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, 21 February 2013,

<http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/zkgx/t1022690.htm>.

‘KenyanbusinessesabsolveChinafirmsfromtenderclaims’,XinhuaviaEmbassyof

thePeople’sRepublicofChinaintheRepublicofKenya,28September2012,

<http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/zkgx/t978424.htm>.

‘Lesotho: Anti-Chinese resentment flares’, IRIN, 24 January 2008,

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/76405/lesotho-anti-chinese-

resentment-flares>.

‘Malawi's new law targeting Chinese traders in rural areas draws criticism’,The

Guardian, Trade and Development, 9 August 2012,

<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/aug/09/new-

law-targets-chinese-traders-malawi>.

296

‘Zambian miners kill Chinese manager during pay protest’, BBC News Africa, 5

August2012,<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19135435>.

297

AnnexI–FOCACcommitmentsforhealth

Declaration Actionplan Achievementafter3years

FOCAC2000-Beijing

Thelastofa10pointdeclaration:"10.WedecidetovigorouslypromotefurtherChina-Africaco-operationintheeconomic,trade,financial,agricultural,medicalcareandpublichealth,scientificandtechnological,cultural,educational,humanresourcesdevelopment,transportation,environmental,tourismandotherareasonthebasisoftheprinciplesenshrinedinthisdeclarationandtheProgramforChina-AfricaCo-operationineconomicandsocialDevelopmentadoptedattheForumsoastopromotethecommondevelopmentofChinaandAfrica."

14.1-theAfricanMinisterswelcomethecommitmentmadebytheChinesesidetosendmoremedicalteamstoAfricancountriesandtheypromisetocreatesuitableworkingandlivingconditionsfortheseteams.

ChinahascontinuedtodispatchmedicalteamstoAfrica.Inthepastthreeyears,53protocolshavebeenconcludedorrenewedforthispurpose;

14.2-thechinesecommittocontinueprovidingafricancountrieswithmedicalequipment,facilities,medicineandmoretrainingtolocalmedicalpersonnel,andpromoteco-operationintheuseoftraditionalmedicineandpharmacy.

convocationin2002oftheChina-AfricaForumonTraditionalMedicineandadoptionofthePlanofActionfortheCooperationofTraditionalMedicinebetweenChinaandAfricanCountries;

14.3-conductco-operationinsuchareasasreducinginfantandmaternalmortalityrates,andpreventingandtreatingHIV/AIDS,malaria,tropicalandotherdiseases.

Chinahassignedorrenewedprotocolswith40AfricancountriesondispatchingChinesemedicalteams,pledgingcontinuedprovisionfreeofchargeofpharmaceutics,medicalequipmentandotherhospitalmaterials,andcooperationwithAfricainthepreventionandtreatmentofHIV/AIDS,malariaandtuberculosis.

FOCAC2003-AddisAbaba

undersection5SocialDevelopment:5.1HumanResourcesDevelopmentandEducationalCooperation,5.2-CooperationinMedicalCareandPublicHealth,5.3CulturalExchangeandCooperation,and5.4People-to-PeopleExchange

5.2.3-ChinawillcontinuetosendmedicalteamstoAfrica.ChinawillendeavortoaddressAfricancountries'requestaboutthecompositionoftheteams..ChinawillcontinuetoprovideAfricancountrieswithsomefreemedicine,medicalinstrumentsormaterials.Itwillstepupthetrainingoflocalmedicalworkers.

5.3.4-enhancetheirtraditionalmedicineR&Dcooperation,experience-sharingandtechnicalexchanges,inparticular,inthepreventionandcontrolofHIV/AIDS,malaria,tuberculosis,SARSandEbola,takethetrainingofspecializedhealthcarepersonnelasapriorityoftheircooperationonhumanresourcesdevelopment.

theChineseGovernmenthasadoptedeffectivemeasurestoprovidetimelyassistancetoAfricancountriesinthepreventionandtreatmentofmalaria,HIV/AIDSandavianinfluenza.

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FOCAC2006

undersection5CooperationinSocialDevelopment:5.1DevelopmentAssistanceandDebtRelief,5.2HumanResourcesDevelopment,5.3Culture,5.4Education,5.5MedicalCareandPublicHealth,5.6EnvironmentalProtection,5.7Tourism,5.8NewsMedia,5.9People-to-People,YouthandWomenExchanges

5.5.2toincreaseexchangesandcooperationinthepreventionandtreatmentofHIV/AIDS,malaria,tuberculosis,Ebola,Chikungunya,avianinfluenzaandothercommunicablediseasesandinthefieldsofquarantineandpublichealthemergencyresponsemechanism.

5.5.3build30hospitals,RMB300millionofgrantforprovidinganti-malariadrugs,build30demonstrationcentrespreventionandtreatmentofmalaria,sendChineseMedicalTeams,providemedicinesandmedicalsupplies,helpestablishandimprovemedicalfacilitiesandtrainmedicalworkers

constructionhasbeenstartedon26ofthehospitalsandwillstartbytheendofthisyearforanother2;30malariapreventionandtreatmentcentersandprovidedanti-malariamedicineto36Africancountriesforthreeconsecutiveyears;1,200medicalworkersto42Africancountriesandregions,includingfourmedicalteamssenttoChad,Senegal,AngolaandMalawi;medicalequipmenttoMauritiusandNiger

5.9.3(people-to-peopleexchanges)300youngvolunteerstoAfricancountriestoworkinmedical,health,sports,agriculture,educationandotherfields,aspartofPEOPLES-TO-PEOPLESexchanges

FOCAC2009-sinceFOCAC2009theDeclarationandActionPlanwerecomplementedbyathirddocumentImplementationofFOCAC2006(thepreviousFOCAC)

Section5Cooperationinthefieldofdevelopment:5.1AssistanceandDebtRelief;5.2Humanresourcesdevelopment;5.3Education;5.4CooperationinScienceandTechnologyandTechnologyTransfer;5.5CooperationinPovertyReduction;5.6MedicalCareandPublicHealth;5.7ClimateChangeandEnvironmentalProtection;5.8DisasterReductionandRelief;5.9Tourism

5.2.3US$1.5millioncontributiontosupportNEPAD’sprojectstotrainnursesandmaternityassistantsinAfrica;5.6.4RMB500millionyuanworthofmedicalequipmentandmalaria-fightingmaterialsto30hospitalsand30malariapreventionandtreatmentcentersbuiltbyChina;ChinawillinviteAfricanprofessionalsworkinginmalariapreventionandtreatmentcenterstotrainingprogramsinChinainanefforttoensuresustainabledevelopmentoftheproject;trainatotalof3,000doctors,nursesandadministrativepersonnel;sendmedicalteams

thecashaidforthetrainingofnursesandmidwivesforNEPAD'sprojectsisbeingchannelledinseveralinstalments.Chinahasdispatched42medicalteamstoAfricancountries.Thereare1,067ChinesemedicalpersonnelinAfricanow.Chinahasprovidedmedicalequipment,materialsandmedicinesto30hospitalsand30malariapreventioncentersinAfricaandhassent13malariapreventionteamsto27Africancountries;Chinahastrained24,000[thisisabignumberandthementionbelowisonlyfor7,500people.Whatabouttheother16,500?]Africanprofessionalsinvariousfields,including1,500headmastersandteachers,3,000agriculturalexpertsand3,000doctorsandnurses.

FOCAC2012

Section5Cooperationinthefieldofdevelopment:5.1Assistance;5.2Humanresourcesdevelopment;5.3ScienceandTechnologyCooperationandKnowledgeSharing;5.4CooperationinPovertyReduction;5.5MedicalCareandPublicHealth;5.6ClimateChangeandEnvironmentalProtection

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5.5.3expandtheirexchangesandcooperationintheprevention,treatmentandportcontrolofHIV/AIDS,malaria,tuberculosisandothermajorcommunicablediseases,healthpersonneltraining,maternalandchildhealth,healthsystembuildingandpublichealthpolicies.

5.5.4ChinawillcontinuetoprovidesupporttothemedicalfacilitiesithasbuiltinAfricatoensuretheirsustainabledevelopmentandupgradethemodernizationlevelofthehospitalsandlaboratories.

5.5.5Chinawillcontinuetotraindoctors,nurses,publichealthworkersandadministrativepersonnelforAfricancountries.

5.5.6Chinawillconductthe"BrightnessAction"campaigninAfricatoprovidefreetreatmentforcataractpatients.

5.5.7send1,500medicalworkerstoAfricainthenextthreeyears.

Source:FOCACdeclarations,actionplansandfollow-updocuments.

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AnnexII–FOCACcommitmentsforeducation

Declaration Actionplan Achievementafter3years

FOCAC2000-Beijing

thelastofa10pointdeclaration:"10.WedecidetovigorouslypromotefurtherChina-Africaco-operationintheeconomic,trade,financial,agricultural,medicalcareandpublichealth,scientificandtechnological,cultural,educational,humanresourcesdevelopment,transportation,environmental,tourismandotherareasonthebasisoftheprinciplesenshrinedinthisdeclarationandtheProgramforChina-AfricaCo-operationineconomicandsocialDevelopmentadoptedattheForumsoastopromotethecommondevelopmentofChinaandAfrica."

15.1-expandcooperationthrough:15.1.1grantmorescholarshipstoAfricanstudentstostudyinChina,continuetosendteacherstoAfricatohelplocalinstitutionsofhigherlearningimprovetheirdisciplinesandspecialties,andsetupchannelsofcommunicationsbetweenuniversitiesofthetwosidesforthestudyoftheChineseandAfricancivilizations,15.1.2-establishanAfricanHumanResourcesDevelopmentFundandgraduallyincreasefinancialcontributiontotheFundforthetrainingofprofessionalsofdifferentdisciplinesforAfricancountries.

ChinahassetupanAfricanHumanResourcesDevelopmentFundexclusivelyforAfricanpersonneltraining.Overthepastthreeyears,ChinahasorganizedtrainingcoursesorprogrammesofdiverseformsforAfricaunderthisspecialfund.

15.2-workoutcountry-specifictrainingplansthroughappropriatechannels,identifyspecificco-operationprojectsandfacilitatetheirimplementation.

FOCAC2003-AddisAbaba

undersection5SocialDevelopment:5.1HumanResourcesDevelopmentandEducationalCooperation,5.2-CooperationinMedicalCareandPublicHealth,5.3CulturalExchangeandCooperation,and5.4People-to-PeopleExchange

5.1.3ChinawillfurtherincreaseitsfinancialcontributiontotheAfricanHumanResourcesDevelopmentFundforthetrainingofupto10,000Africanpersonnelindifferentfields.

20065.2.1Chinahastrainedover10,000AfricanprofessionalsinvariousfieldsundertheAfricanHumanResourcesDevelopmentFund(AHRDF).

5.1.4.cooperationismainlybilateralbutinordertomakethecooperationonamultilateralbasismoreeffective,Ethiopia,incooperationwiththeAfricandiplomaticcorpsinBeijing,willserveasacoordinatorresponsibleforcommunicatingwithChinaonAfricancountries'requests,proposalsandspecificarrangementsconcerninghumanresourcesdevelopmentinthenextthreeyears.

5.1.5exchangeteachersandnewscholarshipsandset-upchannelsofcommunicationforexchangeofideasbetweentheirinstitutionsofhigherlearningandTechnicalandVocationalEducationandTraining(TVET).

FOCAC2006

undersection5CooperationinSocialDevelopment:5.1DevelopmentAssistanceandDebtRelief,5.2HumanResourcesDevelopment,5.3Culture,5.4Education,5.5MedicalCareandPublicHealth,5.6EnvironmentalProtection,5.7Tourism,5.8NewsMedia,5.9People-to-

5.2.2basedonAHRDF,totrain15,000professionalsforAfricancountriesinthenextthreeyears.TheAfricansideundertooktoprovidenecessarysupportandassistanceintermsofselectingtraineesandprovidinglogisticalservices.

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People,YouthandWomenExchanges

5.3.2activelyimplementthebilateralgovernmentexchangeprogramsandsupportandpromoteculturalexchangesaswellasartexhibitionsandperformancesatthelocallevelandbetweenthepeoples.SetuptheAfricanCulturalVisitorsProgramtoenhanceculturalexchangesbetweenthetwosides.

15AfricangovernmentalculturaldelegationshavevisitedChina;chineseculturalcentresweresetupinEgypt,Mauritius,Benin;734membersofChineseartistictroupesfrom20provincesandcitieshavevisitedAfricatostageperformanceandtakepartin27artfestivalsandcelebrationsheldbyAfricancountries.TheChinesesidehasinvitedatotalof370artistsfrom21AfricancountriestoperforminChinaandparticipateininternationalartfestivalshostedbyChina;"CultureinFocus"activitiesInOctober2008,theactivity"AfricanCultureinFocus2008"wassuccessfullyheldinShenzhen.FromApriltoOctober2009,Chinastagedthe"ChineseCultureinFocus2009"inmorethan20Africancountries;Since2007,theAfricanCulturalVisitorsProgramlaunchedbyChina'sMinistryofCulturehasbeenfurthersubstantiated.Atotalof61AfricanculturalofficialsandpersonageshavebeeninvitedtoChinainsixgroupstoparticipateinactivitiesliketheRoundtableConferenceonCulturalPolicy,theAfricaGuestPaintersVisitChinaProject,andMuseumProfessionalsonWorkReplacementandResearch,thusdeepeningtheculturalexchangesbetweenChinaandAfrica;In2009,themonthlymagazineAfricawaslaunchedbytheChinese-AfricanPeople'sFriendshipAssociation

5.4.2holdthetheChina-AfricaForumofMinistersofEducationonaregularbasis

5.4.3moreexchangesandclosercooperationbetweeninstitutionsofhigherlearningofthetwosides,ensuretheeffectivenessofthebilateralstudentexchangeprograms,carryoutconsultationonconcludingagreementsonmutualaccreditationofacademicdegrees.

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5.4.4setup100ruralschools,scholarships(chinesegovernment)fromcurrent2,000peryearto4,000peryearby2009,annualtrainingforanumberofeducationalofficialsaswellasheadsandleadingteachersofuniversities,primary,secondaryandvocationalschoolsinAfrica;establishConfuciusInstitutes,encouragetheteachingofAfricanlanguagesinrelevantChineseuniversitiesandcolleges.

teachingequipmentforthe30schoolshasbeendeliveredandtheconstructionof91outofthe96schoolshasstarted,ofwhich66havebeencompleted;scholarshipswere2000in2006,+700=2700in2007,+700=3400in2008,+600=4000in2009;Chinatrainedover15,000professionalsinbusiness,education,health,scienceandtechnology,culture,agriculture,povertyreduction,customs,qualityinspection,telecommunications,environmentalprotection,maritimeaffairsandmedia;theChinesesideheldtwoMPA(masterofpublicadministration)programsfordevelopingcountriesinPekingUniversityandTsinghuaUniversitywiththeparticipationof42studentsfrom16Africancountries.ChinaalsoworkedvigorouslytohelpAfricancountriestrainprofessionalsandtechnicians.AvocationalschoolbuiltbyChinaandtheEthiopianGovernmentjointlywasopenedinSeptemberthisyear;23ConfuciusInstitutesorclassroomshavebeenopenedin16AfricancountriesincludingEgypt,Benin,Botswana,Togo,Zimbabwe,Cameroon,Kenya,LiberiaandRwanda

5.9.3(people-to-peopleexchanges)300youngvolunteerstoAfricancountriestoworkinmedical,health,sports,agriculture,educationandotherfields,aspartofPEOPLES-TO-PEOPLESexchanges

totalof281youngChinesevolunteershavebeentosuchAfricancountriesasEthiopia,Zimbabwe,theSeychelles,Tunisia,Mauritius,Eritrea,LiberiaandGhana,toprovidemedical,health,sports,agricultural,educationalandotherservices

FOCAC2009-sinceFOCAC2009theDeclarationandActionPlanwerecomplementedbyathirddocumentImplementationofFOCAC2006(thepreviousFOCAC)

Section5Cooperationinthefieldofdevelopment:5.1AssistanceandDebtRelief;5.2Humanresourcesdevelopment;5.3Education;5.4CooperationinScienceandTechnologyandTechnologyTransfer;5.5CooperationinPovertyReduction;5.6MedicalCareandPublicHealth;5.7ClimateChangeandEnvironmentalProtection;5.8DisasterReductionandRelief;5.9TourismANDSection6CulturalandPeople-to-PeopleExchangesandCooperation:6.1Culture;6.2.Press;6.3ExchangesBetweenAcademiaandThinkTanks;6.4People-to-People,YouthandWomenExchanges;6.5Sports;6.6WorldExpo

Overthepastthreeyears,togetherwithNGOsfromSouthAfrica,Zimbabwe,MalawiandMozambique,Chinalaunchedpublicwelfarecampaignssuchascataracttreatment,HIV/AIDSpreventionandtreatmentandin-kinddonations.ChineseenterprisesandexpatriateshavealsobeenactivelyinvolvedinAfrica'ssocialandpublicwelfareprograms,playingapositiveroleinAfrica'seducationaldevelopment,medicalservice,socialreliefanddisasterpreventionandcontrol.

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5.2Humanresourcesdevelopment;

5.2trainatotalof20,000peopleinvarioussectorsforAfricancountriesinthenextthreeyears,US$1.5millioncontributiontosupportNEPAD’sprojectstotrainnursesandmaternityassistantsinAfrica;trainatotalof3,000doctors,nursesandadministrativepersonnel;

trained24,000Africanprofessionalsinvariousfields,including1,500headmastersandteachers,3,000agriculturalexpertsand3,000doctorsandnurses.

5.3Education;

5.3build50China-Africafriendshipschools;Proposeimplementationofthe20+20CooperationPlanforChineseandAfricanInstitutionsofHigherEducation;Admit200middleandhighlevelAfricanadministrativepersonneltoMPAprogramsinChina;increasenumberofscholarshipsto5,500;trainteachersforprimary,secondaryandvocationalschoolsinAfrica,andhelpAfricancountriestrain1,500schoolheadmastersandteachers;ContinuetopromotethedevelopmentofConfuciusinstitutes,increasethenumberofscholarshipsofferedtoChineselanguageteacherstohelpthemstudyinChina,anddoubleeffortstoraisecapacityoflocalAfricanteacherstoteachtheChineselanguage.

built19newschoolsinAfricaandprovidedequipmentto42schools;TheChina-AfricaUniversities20+20CooperationProgramwaslaunched,and20pairsofChineseandAfricanuniversitiesconductedcooperationprojects;in2010Chinaprovided5,710,in20116,316scholarships;4newConfuciusInstitutes,therearenow29ConfuciusInstitutesorConfuciusClassroomsin22Africancountries;

6.1Culture

6.1.2holdFOCACCultureForum;promote“CulturesinFocus”events;strengthenexchangesandcooperationbetweenculturalandartauthoritiesandprofessionals;StrengthencooperationandbuildmoreChineseculturalcentersinAfrica;Promoteculturesofthetwosidesthroughnewtechnologiessuchastheinternet;

Duringthe"2011ChineseCultureinFocus",morethan130projectswereconductedinover30Africancountries;21exchangesofministerial-levelculturaldelegationsandChinahassignedculturalagreementsorimplementationplanswith15Africancountries;theFOCACCulturalMinisters'ForummarkedtheestablishmentoftheChina-Africaculturalstrategicdialoguemechanism;

6.3ExchangesbetweenAcademiaandThinkTanks

6.3.2toimplementaChina-Africajointresearchandexchangeplanthroughavarietyofways,suchasseminars,mutualacademicvisits,andjointresearchprojects.

Chinaconducted88jointresearchanddemonstrationprojectswithAfricancountries.Chinareceived42Africanpost-doctoralstudentsanddonatedresearchequipmenttoreturningAfricanresearcherswhohaveconcludedtheirjointresearchtasksinChina.ChinahasactivelyimplementedtheChina-AfricaJointResearchandExchangeProgram.14internationalseminars,sponsoredmorethan500ChineseandAfricanscholarsforfieldtripsandacademicexchanges,andsupported28researchprojects.

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FOCAC2012-Beijing

Section5Cooperationinthefieldofdevelopment:5.1Assistance;5.2Humanresourcesdevelopment;5.3ScienceandTechnologyCooperationandKnowledgeSharing;5.4CooperationinPovertyReduction;5.5MedicalCareandPublicHealth;5.6ClimateChangeandEnvironmentalProtectionANDSection6CulturalandPeople-to-PeopleExchangesandCooperation:6.1.Culture,6.2Education,6.3Press,PublishingandMedia,6.4ExchangesbetweenAcademiaandThinkTanks,6.5People-to-People,YouthandWomenExchanges,6.6Sports

5.2.2"AfricanTalentsProgram".Inthenextthreeyears,Chinawilltrain30,000Africanprofessionalsinvarioussectors,offer18,000governmentscholarshipsandtakemeasurestoimprovethecontentandqualityofthetrainingprograms.

5.2.3ChinawillprovideassistanceforAfrica'svocationalskillstrainingfacilities,trainprofessionalsandtechnicalpersonnelforAfricancountriesand,inparticular,helpAfricanyoungpeopleandwomenenhancetheirjobskills.

5.3.2Chinawilllaunchthescienceandtechnologyforabetterlifecampaign

6.1Culture

Maintainthemomentumofhigh-levelinter-governmentalmutualvisitsanddialogueintheculturalfieldandcontinuetofollowthroughontheimplementationplanoftheChina-Africabilateralgovernmentculturalagreements;Proposetoimplementa"China-AfricaCulturalCooperationPartnershipProgram"andpromotethebuildingoflong-termpairedcooperationbetween100Chineseculturalinstitutionsand100Africanculturalinstitution;Raisetheprofileofthe"CulturesinFocus"eventsinChina-Africaculturalexchanges;ContinuetoimplementtheprogramofChina-Africamutualvisitsbetweenculturalpersonnel,andstrengthenexchangesandcooperationbetweentheadministrativepersonnelandprofessionalsoftheculturalandartcommunities;SpeedupthebuildingofChineseculturalcentersinAfricaandAfricanculturalcentersinChina;strengthenexchangesandcooperationinthepreservationofculturalheritageandholdthe"China-

305

AfricaCulturalHeritagePreservationRoundtable";ChinawillprovideassistanceforthedevelopmentofAfrica'sculturalfacilities.

6.2Education

6.2.2continuetoimplementthe20+20CooperationPlanforChineseandAfricanInstitutionsofHigherEducation

6.2.3ThetwosideswillcontinuetopromotetheestablishmentanddevelopmentoftheConfuciusInstituteandConfuciusClassroomsinAfrica.Chinawillextendactivesupportintermsofteachingstaff,personneltrainingandteachingmaterialsandequipment.

howcanitbecomesustainableifchinaisincreasingtheprovisionofresources?

6.2.4US$2millionannuallyundertheframeworkoftheUNESCOtrustfundtosupporteducationdevelopmentprogramsinAfrica,inparticularhighereducation

6.2.5ChinawillcontinuetohelpAfricancountriesbuildeducationalandtrainingfacilitiesandprovidemoreopportunitiesforshort,mediumandlong-termtrainingandscholarships.

6.4Echangesbetweenacademiaandthinktanks

6.4.1Sponsor100programsbyacademicinstitutionsandscholarscoveringtopicalresearch,internationalsymposiums,mutualvisitsofscholarsandpublicationofworks;Proposetoimplementthe"China-AfricaThinkTanks10+10PartnershipPlan"toselect10Chinesethinktanksand10thinktanksfromAfricancountries;Encourageandsupportscholarsofthetwosidestoconductjointresearchandpublishtheresultsoftheirjointresearchininternationalacademicjournalsandotherpublications.

6.4.2institutionalizetheFOCACthinktanksforum

6.4.3Thetwosideswelcomeandencouragemoreenterprises,financialinstitutionsandacademicinstitutionstoprovidesupportforacademicinteractionsandpeople-to-peopleandculturalexchangesbetweenChinaandAfrica.CSR?

306

6.5People-to-people,youthandwomenexchanges

6.5.2ThetwosideswilllaunchtheChina-Africapeople-to-peoplefriendshipaction,andencourageandsupportexchangesandcooperationbetweennon-governmentalorganizations,womenandyoungpeopleofthetwosidesbyjointlyundertakingsmallandmicrosocialprogramsandpromotingmutualvisitsbetweenpeople'sorganizationsofthetwosides.

6.5.3institutionalizetheChina-AfricaPeople'sForum

6.5.4institutionalizetheChina-AfricaYoungLeadersForum

6.5.5sendyoungvolunteerstoAfrica

6.5.6ChinainvitesyoungpeopleinAfricatovisitChinaforstudytoursbysuchmeansasholdingworkshopsforyoungleadersofpoliticalpartiesofAfricancountries.

6.5.7continuewomenexchanges

Source:FOCACdeclarations,actionplansandfollow-updocuments.

307

AnnexIII–ListofInterviews1. 2013-10-03,InterviewwithaChineseexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute.2. 2013-10-08, Interview with an officer at the Embassy of the PRC, Culture

Department,Nairobi.3. 2013-10-11,InterviewwithanexecutiveatEcoBuildAfrica,Nairobi.4. 2013-10-29, Interview with an executive and an officer at the Management

SciencesforHealth-CivilSocietyPortalforHealthcare,Nairobi.5. 2013-10-31,InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute.6. 2013-11-11,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheInterRegionEconomicNetwork,

Nairobi.7. 2013-11-13, Interviewwith an officer at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and

InternationalTrade,DepartmentofExternalTrade,Nairobi.8. 2013-11-15, Interview with an officer at the Ministry of Finance, Treasury,

Nairobi.9. 2013-11-18,InterviewwithanofficerattheChineseEconomicandCommercial

Counsellor’sOffice,Nairobi.10. 2013-11-22,InterviewwithaChineseexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute.11. 2013-11-22,InterviewwithaKenyanexecutiveataConfuciusInstitute.12. 2013-11-27, Interviewwith an officer at theMinistry of Foreign Affairs and

InternationalTrade,EastAfricanCommunityDivision,Nairobi.13. 2013-11-28, Interview with an officer at the Kenya China Friendship

Association,Nairobi.14. 2013-12-02, Interview with an officer at the Institute of Economic Affairs,

EconomicRegulationandCompetitionPolicyDivision,Nairobi.15. 2013-12-02, Interview with an officer at the Kenya Association of

Manufacturers,ExportDivision,Nairobi.16. 2013-12-05, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Medical Research

Institute(KEMRI),Nairobi.17. 2013-12-05, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Medical Research

Institute(KEMRI),Nairobi.18. 2013-12-11, InterviewwithanexecutiveattheOverseasChineseAssociation,

Nairobi.19. 2014-01-24, Interview with an officer at the National Economic and Social

Council,Nairobi.20. 2014-01-24,InterviewwithanofficerataKenyaninfrastructuredevelopment

company,Nairobi.21. 2014-01-27, Interviewwithanexecutiveat theCentralOrganisationofTrade

Unions,Nairobi.22. 2014-01-31, Interviewwith an executive at the Kenya Investment Authority,

Nairobi.23. 2014-01-31, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Pharmaceutical

Association,Nairobi.24. 2014-02-06,InterviewwithanexecutiveataChinesecompanymanufacturing

traditionalmedicines,Nairobi.25. 2014-02-07, Interviewwithanexecutiveat thePharmacyandPoisonsBoard,

RegistrarDivision,Nairobi.26. 2014-02-12,InterviewwithanofficerattheChineseEconomicandCommercial

Counsellor’sOffice,Nairobi.27. 2014-02-12,InterviewwithanofficeratHuawei,Nairobi.

308

28. 2014-02-13,InterviewwithanexecutiveatChinaWuYi,Nairobi.29. 2014-02-16,InterviewwithanofficeratChinaRoadandBridge,Nairobi.30. 2014-02-19, Interview with an officer at the Kenya National Highways

Authority,Nairobi.31. 2014-02-25, Interviewwith an executive at MCEDO-Beijing School, Mathare,

Nairobi.32. 2014-02-26, Interview with an executive at the Anti-Counterfeits Agency,

Nairobi.33. 2014-02-28, Interviewwithanofficerat theKenya Institute forPublicPolicy

ResearchandAnalysis,TradeandForeignPolicyDivision,Nairobi.34. 2014-03-19,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMissionforEssentialDrugsand

Supplies(MEDS),OperationsDivision.35. 2014-03-21,InterviewwithanofficerataTradeUnion[anonymityrequested],

Nairobi.36. 2014-03-26, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Chemical and Allied

WorkersUnion,Nairobi.37. 2014-03-28, Interviewwith anofficer at the FederationofKenyaEmployers,

Nairobi.38. 2014-03-28,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalConstructionAuthority,

Nairobi.39. 2014-03-28, Interviewwithanofficerat theKenya Institute forPublicPolicy

ResearchandAnalysis,CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi.40. 2014-03-12,InterviewwithanexecutiveatKenyaVision2030,Nairobi.41. 2014-09-14, Interviewwithanexecutiveat theKenyaAssociationofBuilding

AndEngineeringConsultants(KABCEC),Nairobi.42. 2014-09-16, Interview with the Roads and Civil Engineering Contractors

Association(RACECA),Nairobi.43. 2014-09-17, Interview with an officer at the Central Organisation of Trade

Unions,Nairobi.44. 2014-09-17, Interviewwith an officer at the KenyaMedical Supplies Agency

(KEMSA),Procurement-DonorFundedProjectsDivision,Nairobi.45. 2014-09-19, Interview with an officer at the Kenya Association of

Manufacturers,Anti-CounterfeitsDivision,Nairobi.46. 2014-09-23,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalConstructionAuthority,

Nairobi.47. 2014-09-25, Interview with an executive at the KenyaFederation of Master

Builders,Nairobi.48. 2014-09-29, Interview with an executive at the Ministry of Health, Medical

Services,Nairobi.49. 2014-09-30, Interviewwithanexecutiveat theMinistryofHealth,Pharmacy

Department,Nairobi.50. 2014-09-30,InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,Infrastructure

DevelopmentDivision,Nairobi.51. 2014-10-06,InterviewwithanofficerattheMinistryofHealth,MalariaControl

Division,Nairobi.52. 2014-10-06, Interview with an executive at Kenya Vision 2030, Social Pillar

Department,Nairobi.53. 2014-10-07,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheConsumersFederationofKenya,

Nairobi.54. 2014-10-07, Interview with an executive at the Medical Practitioners and

DentistsBoard,Nairobi.

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55. 2014-10-07, Interview with an officer at the Pharmacy and Poisons Board,PharmacovigilanceDivision,Nairobi.

56. 2014-10-07, Interview with an officer at the Pharmacy and Poisons Board,RegistrarDivision,Nairobi.

57. 2014-10-08, Interviewwith an executive at the National AIDS& STI ControlProgramme(NASCOP),Nairobi.

58. 2014-10-08,Interviewwithanexecutive,KenyaHealthcareFederation,Nairobi.59. 2014-10-10,InterviewwithanexecutiveandanofficerattheKenyaTechnical

TrainersCollege,Nairobi.60. 2014-10-10,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheMinistryofCulture,Traditional

MedicineDepartment,Nairobi.61. 2014-10-14, Interview with a professor of traditional medicine at Kenyatta

University.62. 2014-10-14,InterviewwithanexecutiveatMamaLucyKibakiHospital,Nairobi.63. 2014-10-15, Interview with an executive at a Kenyan-Indian company

distributingmedicalproductsanddevices.64. 2014-10-17,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheNationalMuseumsofKenya.65. 2014-10-22,InterviewwithanexecutiveatKenyattaUniversity.66. 2014-11-04,Interviewwithaprofessorofpharmacyandtraditionalmedicineat

KenyattaUniversity.67. 2014-11-04,InterviewwithanexecutiveattheTechnicalUniversityofKenya,

Nairobi.68. 2014-11-05, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Medical Research

Institute(KEMRI),Nairobi.69. 2014-11-05, Interview with professors of engineering at the Technical

UniversityofKenya,Nairobi.70. 2014-11-10, Interviewwithanexecutiveat theMinistryofHealth, Standards

Division,Nairobi.71. 2014-11-11, Interview with an executive at the Kenya Bureau of Standards

(KEBS),Nairobi.72. 2014-11-13, Interview with an officer at the Kenya Building Construction

TimberFurniture&Trade'sEmployeesUnion,Nairobi.73. 2014-11-14, Interview with Kenyan and Chinese executives at a Confucius

Institute.74. 2014-11-17, Interview with an officer at the Ministry of Health, Traditional

MedicineDivision,Nairobi.75. 2014-11-18, Interview with an officer at the Ministry of Health, Medical

EngineeringDivision,Nairobi.76. 2014-11-18, Interview with an executive at the Ministry of Health, Human

ResourcesDevelopmentDepartment,Nairobi.77. 2014-11-19,InterviewwithanexecutiveandofficersattheMinistryofLabour,

IndustrialRelationsOffice,Nairobi.78. 2014-11-19,Interviewwithanexecutive,MinistryofEducation,Technicaland

VocationalEducationandTrainingDivision,Nairobi.79. 2014-11-19, Interview with an officer at the Ministry of Education, Higher

EducationDivision,Nairobi.80. 2014-11-20,InterviewwithanofficerattheExportPromotionCouncil,Nairobi.81. 2014-11-28,InterviewwithanofficerattheNairobiCityCouncil,Nairobi.82. 2014-12-01, Interviewwithanofficerat theMinistryofFinance,TreasuryE-

commerceDivision,Nairobi.

310

83. 2014-12-05, Interview with an executive at the Medical Practitioners andDentistsBoard,Nairobi.