AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

August 30, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. ISIS may establish a safe haven in southwestern Libya after the U.S.-supported campaign on Sirte ends, from which it could still operate.

2. A negotiated settlement remains unlikely in Yemen even after a new U.S.-backed plan made concessions to the al Houthi-Saleh alliance.

3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

al Qaeda NetworkAL QAEDA CONTINUES TO COMPETE FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT AND THE

SUNNI COMMUNITY BY CAPITALIZING ON ISIS’S TERRITORIAL LOSSES IN IRAQ AND SYRIA. AL QAEDA EMIR AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI SOUGHT TO GALVANIZE SUPPORT BY EXPLOITING RECENT ISIS SETBACKS IN TWO

STATEMENTS THAT AL SAHAB MEDIA FOUNDATION POSTED ON TELEGRAM ON AUGUST 25 AND AUGUST 29. ZAWAHIRI URGED SUNNIS IN IRAQ TO REORGANIZE THEIR FIGHTERS FOR A LONG-TERM GUERILLA WAR

AGAINST AMERICAN AND IRANIAN OCCUPATION IN HIS FIRST STATEMENT. HE ACCUSED THE U.S. AND IRAN OF FORGING AN ALLIANCE TO DOMINATE IRAQ AND SYRIA WHILE EXTERMINATING SUNNIS IN THESE

REGIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF COMBATING ISIS. HE ALSO PRAISED ABU MUSAB AL ZARQAWI, THE LATE LEADER OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ, AND URGED THOSE WHO HAD PLEDGED TO ISIS TO RECONSIDER THEIR

ALLEGIANCE AND FOLLOW IN ZARQAWI’S FOOTSTEPS. IN HIS SECOND STATEMENT, ZAWAHIRI CALLED FOR UNITY IN THE GLOBAL SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN SYRIA. HE CALLED FOR THE CREATION OF A “SHARI’A JUDICIARY” TO HELP UNIFY DISAGREEING FACTIONS. THIS VIDEO CONTINUES A SERIES IN WHICH

ZAWAHIRI CRITICIZED ISIS FOR DIVIDING THE GLOBAL SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT.

MEMBERS OF THE GLOBAL SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT CONTINUE TO REAFFIRM THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH AL QAEDA AS ISIS SUFFERS TACTICAL SETBACKS. ABU DHER AZZAM, A BURMESE RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR WHO

PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS A MUFTI IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU), STATED THAT HE IS NOW OPPOSED TO ISIS. AZZAM LISTS ISIS INFIDEL-BRANDING OF THE AFGHAN TALIBAN, KILLING OF MUSLIMS,

AND DENOUNCEMENT OF THOSE WHO REFUSE TO JOIN ISIS, AS REASONS FOR SWITCHING HIS ALLEGIANCE. FACTIONS OF THE IMU HAD PREVIOUSLY REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR AL QAEDA AND RENOUNCED

TIES TO ISIS ON JUNE 14. THE AFGHAN TALIBAN DECIMATED THE FACTION THAT HAD PLEDGED LOYALTY TO ISIS.

HARDLINE LEADERS IN JABHAT AL NUSRA MAY BE DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THE REBRANDING OF JABHAT AL NUSRA AS JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM APPEAR MORE

LEGITIMATE. ABU HAMMAM AL SHAMI, A HIGH-RANKING JABHAT AL NUSRA COMMANDER, DISAVOWED JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM ON AUGUST 5. IYAD AL TUBASI, A FOUNDING MEMBER AND HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL IN JABHAT AL NUSRA, RENOUNCED HIS TIES TO JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM ON AUGUST 23. AL QAEDA’S SYRIAN AFFILIATE, JABHAT AL NUSRA, REBRANDED ITSELF AS JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM ON JULY 29, ENDING FORMAL

TIES WITH AL QAEDA. JABHAT FATAH AL SHAM CONTINUES TO PURSUE AL QAEDA’S OBJECTIVES IN SYRIA DESPITE THE LACK OF FORMAL TIES.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT ISIS’S TACTICAL LOSSES AND UNITE THE SALAFI-JIHADI COMMUNITY.

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Political• U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan for Yemen on August 25 based on the formation

of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded in previous efforts. Al Houthi-Saleh representatives announced they will participate in renewed peace talks only if the Saudi-led coalition ends its air campaign. Secretary Kerry emphasized that al Houthi-Saleh forces would need to withdraw from Sana’a, an unlikely action due to public support for the newly formed Supreme Political Council (SPC). An al Houthi delegation met with Iraq’s foreign minister on August 29 to seek support for the SPC, continuing earlier efforts to legitimize the new governing body.

Outlook: Peace negotiations will probably not resume under Secretary Kerry’s proposed conditions.

SecurityHadi government and allied forces, supported by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, continued offensives on Sana’a and Taiz. Hadi’s vice president, Lieutenant General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, visited troops in Ma’rib governorate, east of Sana’a, on August 24, indicating an imminent offensive on Sana’a city. Al Houthi-Saleh forces contested areas north of Sana’a that are vital to the Hadi government’s impending offensive. Hadi government forces continue to contest territory in Taiz city. The Saudi-led coalition targeted transportation routes surrounding Taiz and Sana’a in support of the Hadi government offensives.

Outlook: An upcoming Hadi government offensive will not remove al Houthi-Saleh forces from Sana’a.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP and ISIS continue to undermine security in southern Yemen despite clearing operations by Hadi-allied forces. Reported U.S. airstrikes targeted AQAP militants in Ma’rib and Shabwah governorates on August 24. Coalition-backed security forces dismantled AQAP cells in Aden and Lahij governorates on August 23 and cleared villages in Abyan governorate on August 23-25. ISIS detonated an SVBIED inside a Hadi-allied recruitment compound in Aden on August 29, demonstrating a continued ability to target government entities despite a month-long lull in activity.

Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue assassination campaigns against Hadi-allied officials.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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PoliticalAmnesty programs for al Shabaab fighters continue to play a limited role in weakening the group. A high-ranking al Shabaab education official surrendered to the Somali government on August 29. Somalia currently operates three Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegrate (DDR) programs in major cities that are typically most effective for attracting low-level militants. The Southwest Administration, a regional governorate, announced an amnesty plan for youth fighters on August 28.

Outlook: Al Shabaab members may take advantage of amnesty policies, but it is unlikely to have a significant effect on the group’s leadership corps.

Security Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces are coordinating to improve their capacity to counteract al Shabaab in the lead up to the September and October Somali parliamentary and presidential elections. SNA and AMISOM forces held a joint conference on August 24 to improve coordination and effectiveness. SNA forces killed an al Shabaab commander and seven other militants in a raid on a training camp in Qansax Dhere, Bay region on August 23.

Outlook: Coordination between SNA and AMISOM forces may improve security in some areas, but increased coordination is unlikely to continue beyond the 2016 election cycle.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab continues to conduct large-scale explosive attacks on civilian targets in Mogadishu. Militants detonated an SVBIED in front of a popular restaurant in Lido Beach, Mogadishu on August 25. Militants conducted a second SVBIED attack in front of a hotel adjacent to the Somali Presidential Palace on August 30. A senior military official claimed that hundreds of al Shabaab fighters have infiltrated Mogadishu in preparation for attacks during the election season.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase the frequency of attacks targeting urban centers during the 2016 election season.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalThe Libyan National Army (LNA) is increasing its military rule in eastern Libya as the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) flounders. An LNA-allied governor replaced the civilian mayor of al Kufra with a military commander on August 27, following similar actions in Benghazi and Ajdabiya. An LNA spokesman threatened to attack GNA-allied militia forces and criticized foreign intervention on behalf of the GNA. GNA leadership is struggling to draft a new cabinet that will appease competing factions following a no-confidence vote by the House of Representatives on August 22.

Outlook: The LNA’s aggression may reignite clashes between factions and hamper international counterterrorism efforts.

SecurityCompetition between Libyan factions is hindering the fight against Salafi-jihadi militants in Benghazi. The LNA continues to position troops near the Zueitina oil port, which is controlled by a GNA-allied federalist militia. Militant groups, including ISIS and the al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, continue to defend their safe havens in Benghazi from the LNA.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will probably maintain safe havens in western Benghazi despite LNA offensives.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS may be establishing a safe haven in southwestern Libya as it loses control of its final strongholds in Sirte. Local sources reported increased ISIS activity near Sebha on August 29. ISIS has a facilitation network in northern Libya and continues to conduct a high-casualty explosive campaign against U.S.-backed militias attempting to secure the city. ISIS deployed suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), landmines, and snipers to defend their few remaining neighborhoods in Sirte on August 28, causing more than 200 casualties.

Outlook: ISIS will continue to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks on GNA-allied military targets after the loss of Sirte. These attacks may intensify or shift to civilian targets after the conclusion of the U.S. air campaign, set for August 30 or 31.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Tensions are escalating in the Western Sahara after Morocco deployed security forces to the area, allegedly to counter smuggling activity. The deployment, according to a UN document, violates the 1991 ceasefire that ended hostilities in the region. Moroccan forces interdicted arms caches belonging to the Polisario Front, the armed group that represents the Sahrawi people. Polisario militants mobilized to counter Moroccan forces, but the two sides have yet to openly fight. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a statement urging both sides to stop military activity. Outlook: Instability in Western Sahara could provide an opportunity for Salafi-jihadi groups to escalate activity in Morocco.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Uqba Ibn Nafa’a, an AQIM affiliate, continues to conduct defensive jihad in western Tunisia. Militants attacked a Tunisian military patrol near Jebel Samama on August 29. The attack is a response to increased patrols in the area and challenges the security apparatus of Tunisia’s new government, which was sworn in on the same day. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a and AQIM released statements claiming responsibility for this attack, possibly indicating a renewed relationship between the groups. Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a may increase its operational tempo in an effort to undermine the new national unity government Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din conducted small-scale attacks in northern Mali. The unresolved conflict between the Self-Defense Group of Imghad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA), a pro-government militia, and the Coordination for the Movement of Azawad (CMA), a coalition of Tuareg ex-separatist groups, remained at a tense standstill.

The Nigerian military claimed to fatally wound Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in northeastern Nigeria. Shekau’s injury is not confirmed, and the Nigerian military has falsely reported Shekau’s death in the past. Shekau’s death would facilitate the integration of Shekau’s faction into a faction with close ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Outlook: GATIA will launch an offensive against the CMA in Kidal in upcoming weeks.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569