2010 fifa world cup tm : (south) ‘africa's time has come’?
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [University of Newcastle (Australia)]On: 06 October 2014, At: 11:35Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
South African Geographical JournalPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsag20
2010 FIFA World CupTM: (South)‘Africa's time has come’?Brij Maharaj aa School of Environmental Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal ,Howard Campus, Durban , 4041 , South AfricaPublished online: 16 May 2011.
To cite this article: Brij Maharaj (2011) 2010 FIFA World CupTM: (South) ‘Africa's time has come’?,South African Geographical Journal, 93:1, 49-62, DOI: 10.1080/03736245.2011.572473
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03736245.2011.572473
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
2010 FIFA World CupTM: (South) ‘Africa’s time has come’?
Brij Maharaj*
School of Environmental Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard Campus, Durban 4041,South Africa
The 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) extravaganza was widely touted as a great Africanmega event that, while located in South Africa, would bring economic and socialbenefits across the continent. The aim of this paper is to critically assess these claims.The key arguments of the paper are that (1) the African connection was mythical, (2)the benefits for poor and disadvantaged South Africans were exaggerated and at bestephemeral, (3) the bid process for 2010 was not transparent and the ruthless profitmotive and political machinations of Federation Internationale de Football Associationwere ignored as it was subliminally presented as a philanthropic organisation and (4)the billions spent on preparing for the 2010 FWC would have made a huge impact inaddressing South Africa’s social, welfare, health and education challenges.
Keywords: FIFA 2010 World Cup; mega events; economic impacts; geography; SouthAfrica
Introduction
Anecdotal media reports in South Africa about the 2010 Soccer World Cup made
metaphorical references to the geographical connection. For example, Thamm (2010,
p. 13) suggested that for the first time in 15 years, the World Cup offers ‘the opportunity
for us, for at least 30 days, to place South Africa firmly on the map’. Journalist Kate
Turkington (2010, p. 29) in an article titled ‘Mapping out the benefits of the FIFA World
Cup . . . ’ contended that ‘another good thing about the FIFA World Cup . . . is that our
geography has improved’.
The importance of ‘space and place as central dimensions of sport is well recognised’
and sporting competitions have been referred to as ‘struggles over space’ (Bale and
Vertinsky 2004, p. 1). There has been some interest in how geography can influence
sporting performance and how the construction and location of sport facilities can impact on
urban and regional development (Jones 2002). Furthermore, although newly constructed
stadiums, for example,
are bounded spatial entities or territories, they function as extensible spaces, connecting to andinfluencing urban relations and processes (beyond) the locale. Stadiums are embedded inspatial hierarchies that relate to the social production of sporting practice at local, national andinternational levels. (Gaffney 2010a, p. 10)
Until recently, the limited scholarly focus on the geography of sport was viewed as
‘paradoxical’ because ‘sport is a major aspect of economic, social and political life’ (Bale
2003, p. 2). However, there has been an emerging body of scholarship focusing on
geography and sport since the early 1970s (e.g. Rooney 1972). The growth in this field was
ISSN 0373-6245 print/ISSN 2151-2418 online
q 2011 Society of South African Geographers
DOI: 10.1080/03736245.2011.572473
http://www.informaworld.com
*Email: [email protected]
South African Geographical Journal
Vol. 93, No. 1, June 2011, 49–62
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
described as ‘steady, though hardly spectacular’ (Bale 1996, p. 163). The earlier work was
largely descriptive and was labelled as ‘cartographic fetishism’ (Bale 1992, p. 71).
By 1994, the expansion in this field warranted an entry in the Dictionary of Human
Geography, in which the geography of sport was defined as the ‘study of spatial variations
in the pursuit of various sports and of the impact of sporting activities on the landscape’
(Johnston et al. 1994, p. 585). The geography of sports has various dimensions, including
‘links to environment, economy and culture’, and is directly connected ‘to the global
political economy and international state system’ (DeChano and Shelley 2004, p. 185).
In the closing decades of the last century, sport, which has traditionally been perceived as
a recreational and leisure activity, has emerged as a powerful tool for economic development,
as well as a powerful geopolitical force. A related trend is a more critical assessment of the
socio-spatial and economic impacts of mega-sporting events. Such events have huge
implications for the socio-spatial restructuring of the built environment in host cities.
Good examples in this regard are the competitions to host the Olympic Games and the
Soccer World Cup (Maharaj 1998, Hillier 2000, Smith 2005, O’Brien 2006). A common
argument is that these sporting events provide opportunities for development by attracting
foreign investment and may serve as ‘new engines of development’ (Levermore 2008).
Bidding to host such global events has become an important local economic development
strategy and has forced cities and countries to compete nationally and internationally.
There is a view that hosting such mega events offers the ‘possibility of “fast track” urban
regeneration, a stimulus to economic growth, improved transport and cultural facilities,
and enhanced global recognition and prestige’ (Chalkley and Essex 1999, p. 369).
Although such events do produce benefits, the international experience suggests that
the privileged tend to benefit at the expense of the poor, and that socio-economic
inequalities tend to be exacerbated (Andranovich et al. 2001, Owen 2002, Waitt 2003).
Furthermore, mega-sporting events were largely organised and funded by the government
in consultation with the private sector, with little or no accountability to citizens, although
such decisions were likely to have major public policy implications (Andranovich et al.
2001). The nature of urban governance associated with these events is ‘characterised by
less democratic and more elite-driven priorities’ (Swyngedouw et al. 2002, p. 542). In
South Africa, there has been some speculation about the urban legacy of the FIFA World
Cup (Pillay et al. 2009).
The above themes are especially relevant in analysing the 2010 FWC extravaganza,
which had been widely touted as a great African mega event that, while located in South
Africa, would bring economic and social benefits across the continent. The aim of this
paper is to critically assess these claims. This paper is influenced by the view that a
‘critical geography of mega-events necessarily addresses the instrumental rationality of
hosting the event, the socio-spatial dynamics it seeks to impose, and the possibilities for
developing more socially just alternatives’ (Gaffney 2010a, p. 9). More specifically, the
key arguments of the paper are that (1) the African connection was mythical, (2) the
benefits for poor and disadvantaged South Africans were exaggerated and at best
ephemeral, (3) the bid process for 2010 was not transparent and the ruthless profit motive
and political machinations of Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
were ignored as it was subliminally presented as a philanthropic organisation, and (4) the
poor did not benefit from the billions of state funds spent on preparing for the 2010 FWC
and were likely to be further disadvantaged.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section examines the rising global
influence of FIFA. The second section focuses on the 2010 African bid. The third section
50 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
assesses the economic impacts of 2010. The final section examines the impact of the mega
event on the poor.
FIFA: a new geopolitical force?
FIFA was established in Paris on 21 May 1904 by the French journalist Robert Guerin, and
its initial membership comprised countries from Western Europe. Its present membership
comprises football associations from 208 countries, exceeding that of the UN (192
members). The president of FIFA and its executive committee were accorded the status
equivalent to that of heads of state internationally. The power of FIFA is enormous, with
so many ‘wealthy nations dropping to their knees begging to be given the World Cup
tournament’ (Jennings 2007, p. 65).
In its quest to increase membership, FIFA often turned a blind eye to the undermining
of democracy and the violation of human rights in member states. Sugden and Tomlinson
(1998, p. 38) have argued that ‘FIFA’s politics are volatile, ruthless and characterised by
shameless machination’. There were allegations that senior FIFA officials were close to
corrupt governments and ignored the influence of drug cartels on the game in Latin
America. In the early 1960s, FIFA implicitly espoused apartheid when its British President
Sir Stanley Rous supported the Football Association of South Africa and its racially
segregated teams and matches (Darby 2008). It was only in the 1970s as the international
anti-apartheid movement grew stronger and calls for the global isolation of the racist
regime escalated that FIFA was forced to act against South Africa.
During the 1980s, there was another dramatic turn as the commercial/business arm of
FIFA grew exponentially and ostensibly in response to the development needs of football in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, there were concerns that FIFA had become part
of the ‘capitalist entertainment business’, that it had turned football into a ‘millionaire’s
gambling casino’ and that there was a lack of transparency accountability about how its
funds were spent, and especially payments made to senior officials (Jennings 2007).
There have also been controversies and allegations of corruption relating to how FIFA
sells its TV rights, elects its president and chooses the hosts for the World Cup. For
example, ‘there was barely a murmur in 2006 when a federal judge in New York found that
Blatter subordinates secretly tried to strike a sponsorship deal with Visa in violation of a
contract with long time sponsor Mastercard. FIFA paid Mastercard $90 million to settle
the case’ (Ewing 2008, p. 48). Before a ball has been kicked, FIFA had earned R25 billion
(and was exempted from paying tax and custom duties) from the TV broadcast rights and
sponsorship agreements for the 2010 World Cup, exceeding any previous event. In South
Africa, FIFA was largely presented in the public domain as a benign and benevolent
organisation that would benefit the country and the African continent.
2010: the African bid
The FWC was a quadrennial event which, until 1994, had been hosted in Europe and South
America since 1930. In 1994, it was hosted in the USA and in 2002 in Japan/Korea. In 1997,
the executive committee of the South African Football Association (SAFA) resolved to make
a bid to host the 2006 World Cup in South Africa. Optimism increased for South Africa’s bid
when FIFA President Sepp Blatter expressed support for an African tournament in 2006. This
was because Sepp Blatter won the bitterly contested election as FIFA president in the
Congress in Paris on 8 June 1998 on the basis of the support he received from the African
South African Geographical Journal 51
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
delegates who made up 25% of the voters, and he had campaigned to bring the World Cup to
Africa (Alegi 2010).
South Africa lost the 2006 bid controversially by one vote to Germany. There was
huge disappointment and disillusionment, FIFA was forced to agree to rotate the World
Cup between the six continental soccer federations, and Blatter made a commitment that
2010 would be Africa’s turn (SA2010 2010, p. 7). Sepp Blatter stated that ‘when I became
president in 1998, my greatest goal was to see the FWC played in Africa’ (Nkosi 2010,
p. 1).
In 2004, South Africa successfully bid for the 2010 tournament. Morocco and Egypt
also bid for the 2010 World Cup. South Africa was favoured for three reasons: it had
successfully hosted international sporting events such as the cricket and rugby World Cup
competitions, it had a well-established infrastructure and the trump card, bringing FIFA
officials in contact with world icon, Nelson Mandela (Alegi 2010). Tunisia and Libya also
submitted bids but were disqualified on technical grounds.
In support of the second bid, in 2004, President Mbeki had argued that 2010 would be
an ‘African’ event:
We want on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence fromthe Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughoutAfrica. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as amoment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty andconflict. We want to show that Africa’s time has come. (Project2010 2010)
After South Africa’s successful bid was announced, Thabo Mbeki promised that 2010
would deliver an ‘African cup’ that would extend to all Africans in and beyond the
continent:
When we say this is an African cup that includes all the other countries and also those whocompeted against us – Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt – we want to see them as partners andparticipants in the World Cup. Other Africans in the Caribbean, United States and Brazil – wewant them also to feel part of the African Cup. For this, South Africa will be a home for all Africa.(SA Bid Book 2010, p. 3)
This theme was echoed by the Minister of Transport, Sbu Ndebele, in his address to the
African Renaissance Conference in Durban in May 2010:
The 2010 World Cup will for ever demonstrate Africa’s capacity to deliver world-classevents. It will also serve as a lever for our project of nation-building and social cohesion. TheWorld Cup is indeed an opportunity for Africa to take charge. An African World Cup in 2010is an opportunity for Africans to re-examine where we are in the project of moving Africafrom where it is to where it should be . . . (and) . . . what we should change regarding thecourse of Africa’s development. (Ndebele, S. 2010, p. 1)
The African Legacy Programme for the World Cup, announced in November 2006,
was devised jointly by the 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee and the
Government. More specifically, the aim of the programme was to
(i) support the realisation of African Renaissance objectives, including programmes of
the African Union (AU) such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
(ii) ensure maximum and effective African participation in the 2010 World Cup,
(iii) strengthen, develop and advance African football and
(iv) improve Africa’s global image and combat Afro-pessimism (Donaldson 2004).
Even the UN endorsed the view that the World Cup ‘underlines African renaissance’
and that the event will ‘also contribute to the confidence and pride of many persons and
states in Africa’ (SA2010 2010, p. 2).
52 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Although touted as an ‘African World Cup’ that was ‘celebrating Africa’s humanity’,
less then 2% of ticket holders were from the continent (Grant Thornton 2010), and even
fewer flags from Africa, reflecting a subliminal disconnection from the continent, and a
hankering for an association with the world class, international community (in other
words, the West).
The extremely low ticket sales for the event in the African continent were attributed to
three factors: first, the high cost of tickets; second, difficulties in obtaining a South African
visa and third, purchases could only be made online. Given that less than 6% of Africa is
connected, and few have credit cards, Internet sales were doomed to fail. Even in South
Africa, sales only picked up after the number of cheap tickets (R140) was increased, and
after across the counter sales were introduced on 5 April 2010. However, such sales were
restricted to South Africans and ‘legal residents of the country’ (Cape Argus, 21 May
2010, p. 3). There was disappointment that even the frontline states that supported the anti-
apartheid struggle were barred from purchasing the cheap tickets:
There are no discounted prices for citizens in the former frontline states. And this is whencountries like Tanzania suffered assassinations and bombings in protecting the exiled ANCfrom the apartheid state. What better way to say thank you – inadequate yes but a gesturestill – than inviting the neighbours, who suffered along with you, to drink from the WorldCup? (Ngugi 2010, p. 26)
Limiting cheap tickets to South Africans was also perceived as xenophobic because it
excluded a significant proportion of undocumented migrants in the country from the
Africa continent. There are high levels of xenophobia in South Africa, and the most
serious was the outbreak of violence in May 2008, which started in the township of
Alexandra in Johannesburg and subsequently spread to major informal settlements in the
country for almost 2 weeks. At least 62 people lost their lives and about 43,000 foreigners
were displaced (Maharaj 2010). There were persistent media reports that there will be
another outbreak of xenophobic violence after the World Cup (Davis 2010). Navi Pillay,
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concern about the
contradictions between organising a successful World Cup and threats against foreigners:
By hosting the World Football Cup, South Africa has shown that it can welcome visitors fromall over the globe with flair, generosity and warmth. It should now prove that it is also able toextend such hospitality and tolerance to migrants seeking a better life and protection . . . I amalarmed at recurrent episodes of attacks against non-nationals in my country. (Pillay 2010, p. 14)
Feminist writer and Associate Professor at the University of Witwatersrand, Pumla
Gqola, argued that reference to ‘Africa’s World Cup’ was rhetorical, meaningless,
‘condescending and opportunistic’:
No matter whose lips utter it, ‘Africa’s World Cup’ sounds like a sad attempt at a connectionthat is just not there. Maybe we think that if we say it enough we will start to believe that itdescribes a reality rather than wishful thinking. I suppose saying this is a continental initiativemakes the average South African feel better about our shameful relationship with thecontinent. This way we can stand side by side with Africans from elsewhere without castingthem as menacing presences, or their countries as places ripe for South African corporations toexpand into . . . Against the backdrop of a very conflicted relationship with our kin on thecontinent, why do we think claims of ‘Africa’s World Cup’ are not condescending andopportunistic at the same time? (Gqola 2010, p. 27)
Further evidence of the African disconnection related to FIFA contracted cultural
events which featured international artists, with local and African artists playing
peripheral roles. The World Cup Kick-Off Concert was promoted as ‘the greatest
entertainment show in Africa’ (Cole 2010, p. 5). The concert would be broadcast live from
South African Geographical Journal 53
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Orlando Stadium in Soweto on 10 June 2010 to 192 countries, with over 1 billion viewers.
FIFA awarded the contract to organise the conference to an American company from Los
Angeles, Control Room. The main artists in the concert were international stars such as
Alicia Keys, John Legend, Black Eyed Peas and Shakira, with three South African and
four African artists. South African poet Mzwakhe Mbuli was critical of the ‘Eurocentric,
Americanised line-up’ which undermined African talent (Solomon 2010, p. 3).
Responding to criticisms about the sidelining of local and African artists, FIFA
contended that although there was ‘an African World Cup’, the concert was ‘an international
event’ (Seale 2010, p. 6). South African Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulu Xingwana, was
sympathetic to the plight of local artists, but conceded that ‘FIFA had a say in most matters
related to the World Cup’ (Tshangela 2010, p. 7). Local artists and promoters ‘accused FIFA
of undermining the local music industry and denying them a rare opportunity – the chance
to showcase local culture and music during the tournament’ (Tshangela 2010, p. 7). The
Creative Workers Union threatened to mobilise civil society organisations to ensure that
local and African artists are more representative in, and benefit from, the concert. The
impasse was mediated at a meeting between Danny Jordaan, head of the World Cup local
organising committee, Minister Xingwana and the Creative Workers Union, which agreed
that more local artists will be included in the opening concert, local promoters will work
with the US promoters and there will be more opportunities for local artists to perform in fan
parks (Ndebele, G. 2010).
A major concern of FIFA and the South African Government was what was perceived
to be negative reporting about South Africa’s ability to organise a successful event,
especially by the English media which highlighted the high crime rates in the country.
There were also suggestions that FIFA had a ‘back-up’ plan to move the World Cup to
Germany if necessary, although this was denied by Sepp Blatter and attributed to ‘Afro-
pessimism’ (Hamlyn 2008).
Economic impacts
In July 2003, Grant Thornton (2003 p. 4), the project assessors for the South Africa Bid
Committee who were responsible for the financial impact report, argued that the 2010
Soccer World Cup would be hosted in South Africa ‘with minimal tangible and intangible
costs’. Furthermore, Grant Thornton estimated that the World Cup would generate 159,000
jobs, it would require state expenditure of R2.3 billion, it would contribute R21.4 billion to
the South African GDP and a further R7.2 billion will accrue to the government in taxes.
Tourists would spend R12.7 billion in the country (Table 1). However, these figures are
‘ephemeral and unmeasureable’ (Webb 2010, p. 1). Intangible benefits included an increase
in tourism and foreign direct investments, as well as fostering national pride. Intangible
negative impacts included an increase in traffic flows, crime and displacement of traditional
tourism (Table 1).
In revised projections released by Grant Thornton on 21 April 2010, based on ticket
sale trends, the total number of visitors decreased by 111,000 from 483,000 to 373,000
(Table 2). In March 2010, Match Hospitality AG, a FIFA subsidiary, had cancelled
450,000 of the 1.8 millions beds it had reserved in hotels and bed and breakfast enterprises,
as well as cancelling 45,000 seats booked on South African Airways (Tolsi 2010).
This decrease was attributed to the global economic recession. However, average
spending per trip would be higher as visitors were staying longer (18 days, compared with
14 days in earlier projections) and attending more matches (5 compared with 3.4). Grant
Thornton (2010) estimated the ‘gross economic impact’ to be R93 billion of which 62%
54 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
was generated in the pre-2010 preparations (government expenditure was estimated to
have increased from R17.4 billion to R30.3 billion).
Data released by Statistics South Africa (2010, p. 8) revealed that in June 2010,
721,311 tourists visited South Africa compared with 505,431 in June 2009, an increase of
215,880, which can be attributed to the 2010 World Cup (Table 3). According to Statistics
South Africa (2010, p. 8) in July 2010, 680,414 tourists visited South Africa compared
with 623,414 in 2009. The increase of 57,000 in July 2010 can be attributed to the World
Table 2. Revised visitor projections (April 2010).
Was Now % Change
Total visitors 483,000 373,000 222.7Average length of stay (overseas visitors; in days) 14 18.7 33.0Average spend per trip in South Africa R22,000 R30,200 35.5Overseas ticket holders 288,867 228,519 221Overseas non-ticket holders 25,000 20,000 220African ticket holders 48,145 11,289 277African non-ticket holders 100,000 85,000 215Matches per foreigner 3.4 5 –Germany (matches per foreigner) 2.6 – –
Source: Grant Thornton (2010, p. 12).
Table 1. Costs and benefits of 2010 World Cup (2003 estimates).
Costs Benefits
GovernmentTangible†R2.3 billion upgrade of stadia and
infrastructure†R7.2 billion paid in taxes
†R21.4 billion contribution to GDP†159,000 new jobs created
Intangible†Negative impact on traffic flows †Interest generated and profile raised of
the country†Negative impact on residents living close
to stadiums†Increase in tourism and direct foreign
investment†Negative impact on local governments †Other similar events held in South Africa†Possible soccer violence †Foster confidence and pride in the
local population†Increase in petty crime †The reuse of building materials for
housing†Displacement of normal tourism †Relive pressure on the welfare system
Private sectorTangible†Expenditure due to increased demand †R12.7 billion in revenues earned from
spectator spendsIntangible†Over expenditure on facilities †Increased demand for tourism facilities
†Additional revenues from similar events†New direct foreign investment†Public–private partnerships for the supply
of equipment†Marketing opportunities
Source: Grant Thornton (2003, p. 3).
South African Geographical Journal 55
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Cup (Table 3). Hence, there was an increase of 272,880 tourists associated with the World
Cup event, at least 100,000 less than the revised Grant Thornton estimates of 373,000 and
200,000 less than the original estimate of 483,000 visitors. There were 421,074 visitors
from Africa in June 2010 (95% from the SADC region) compared with 376,280 visitors in
June 2009, hence a net increase of 44,794 (Statistics South Africa 2010, p. 9).
Disturbingly, the cost of stadiums had virtually doubled from R8.4 billion to R16.2
billion without any public oversight (Table 4). Six new stadiums were constructed and four
stadiums were upgraded. FIFA would have been comfortable with eight stadiums with a
minimum capacity of 40,000 seats. The most controversial was the Greenpoint stadium in
Cape Town, where the local preference was upgrading the existing Athlone stadium, which
was located in a ‘coloured’ township. FIFA opposed the Athlone option because it did not
want to expose international television audiences to the poverty of the surroundings.
A major concern was that no consideration had been given to the sustainable viability
of the stadiums after the World Cup, and they were likely to be ‘white elephants’ and a
burden on taxpayers who would have to shoulder maintenance costs. For example, the
annual maintenance costs of Soccer City would be between R25 and R30 million, Port
Elizabeth R19 million, Mbombela R9.2 million, and Peter Mokoba R17 million (Table 4).
This is referred to as ‘underestimated costs – countries left with underused stadiums and
facilities which are ruinously expensive to maintain’ (Goldblatt 2010, p. 2). It was also
disconcerting that 3 months after the 2010 World Cup, FIFA still owed the host cities
R500 millions (Waterworth 2010). In the light of the huge costs, there were some
disturbing questions about the returns and benefits:
Will the cost of infrastructure, stadiums, security, and marketing be worth the gains fromtourism, trade and ticket sales? And will the event be able to spark, if only indirectly, longterm economic development? The fear is that SA is spending billions on a month-long advertfor the country that will fail to deliver the promised returns. (Bisseker 2010, p. 1)
Impacts on the poor
Irvin Khoza and Danny Jordaan, Chairperson and CEO, respectively, of the South Africa
2010 World Cup Bid Committee, assured FIFA in their submission letter that ‘almost 80
percent of the total sponsorship revenue of the African continent is generated within the
borders of South Africa. We have developed a plan to present FIFA with risk-free
opportunity on African soil (emphasis added) (UN News Service 2010). In other words,
unlimited opportunities for FIFA to accumulate profits.
Given the nature, structure and preparations for the tournament, it was inevitable that
the profits from the World Cup will accrue to the economic elite (especially in the
construction sector). According to a notice in the Government Gazette of 25 May 2006, the
World Cup would be a ‘protected event . . . on the understanding that [it] is in the public
interest and that the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) has created opportunities for
Table 3. Comparison of foreign visitors in June and July 2009 and 2010.
Month Visitors 2010 World Cup increase
June 2010 721,311 215,880June 2009 505,431July 2010 680,414 57,000July 2009 623,414
Source: Adapted from Statistics South Africa (2010).
56 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Tab
le4
.2
01
0S
tad
ium
cost
s.
Sta
diu
mC
on
stru
ctio
nb
ud
get
Pla
nn
ing
bu
dg
etT
ota
lfu
nd
ing
To
tal
cost
Mai
nte
nan
ceco
st,
ann
ual
(Maj
or
up
gra
de)
So
ccer
city
R1
.53
bil
lio
nR
30
mil
lio
nR
1.5
6b
illi
on
R3
.2b
illi
on
R2
5–
30
mil
lio
n(N
ew)
Cap
eT
ow
nR
1.9
3b
illi
on
R3
0m
illi
on
R1
.96
bil
lio
nR
4.5
bil
lio
nR
4.4
mil
lio
n(N
ew)
Du
rban
R1
.80
bil
lio
nR
30
mil
lio
nR
1.8
3m
illi
on
R3
.4b
illi
on
Un
dis
clo
sed
(New
)P
ort
Eli
zab
eth
R8
95
mil
lio
nR
86
mil
lio
nR
98
1m
illi
on
R2
.1b
illi
on
R1
9m
illi
on
(New
)M
bo
mb
ela
R8
55
mil
lio
nR
20
mil
lio
nR
87
5m
illi
on
R1
.3b
illi
on
R9
.2m
illi
on
(New
)P
eter
Mo
kab
aR
69
7m
illi
on
R2
0m
illi
on
R7
16
mil
lio
nR
1.2
bil
lio
nR
17
mil
lio
n(M
ino
ru
pg
rad
e)F
ree
stat
eR
21
9m
illi
on
R2
mil
lio
nR
21
1m
illi
on
R3
15
.5m
illi
on
n/a
(Min
or
up
gra
de)
Ro
yal
Baf
ok
eng
R1
47
mil
lio
nR
0m
illi
on
R1
47
mil
lio
nR
79
7m
illi
on
n/a
(Min
or
up
gra
de)
Ell
isP
ark
R2
29
mil
lio
nR
1m
illi
on
R2
30
mil
lio
nR
50
0m
illi
on
n/a
(Min
or
up
gra
de)
Lo
ftu
sV
ersv
eld
R9
8m
illi
on
R1
mil
lio
nR
99
mil
lio
nR
13
1m
illi
on
n/a
To
tal
R8
.40
bil
lio
nR
22
0m
illi
on
R8
.62
bil
lio
nR
16
.3b
illi
on
So
urc
e:A
dap
ted
from
Cit
yP
ress
,7
Mar
ch2
01
0,
p.
21
;1
0O
cto
ber
20
10,
p.
8.
South African Geographical Journal 57
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
South African businesses, in particular those from the previously disadvantaged centres’
(South Africa 2006, p. 3).
Hence, there was some expectation that it would also provide opportunities to the
informal and micro-enterprise sector: ‘the seller of boerewors rolls, the taxi driver, the
township tour operator, the slick musician who drums up a catchy World Cup melody, the
lucky artist who designs the cuddly mascot’ (Alfred 2004, p. 1; see also South Africa Bid
Book 2010, p. 11). This was reinforced in the ANC’s 2009 Election Manifesto in which it
emphasised its intention to
ensure that the 2010 FIFA World Cup leaves a proud legacy that our children and ourcommunities will enjoy for many years to come, and contributes to the long term developmentof the country. The ANC government will work with all stakeholders to ensure that this worldevent contributes to create decent work opportunities, particularly for the youth, women andstreet traders. (ANC 2009, p. 15)
The labour movement in South Africa had supported the 2010 World Cup because there
was an expectation that it would bring socio-economic benefits, decrease apartheid
inequalities and promote development in terms of creating jobs and reducing poverty.
More specifically, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) at its 2006
Congress ‘resolved to campaign for the 2010 World Cup to have a developmental focus
and act as a catalyst for achieving the broader goals of equity and development’ (Chinguno
2010, p. 30).
Criticisms about the negative impacts of the 2010 World Cup on the poor emerged
from the NGO and civil society sectors. For example, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)
contended that
the massive amounts of public funds used to build new stadiums and related infrastructure forthis World Cup have only served to further deny poor people the development and servicesthey have been struggling for over many years . . . This World Cup is not for the poor – it isthe soccer elites of FIFA, the elites of domestic and international corporate capital and thepolitical elites who are making billions and who will be benefiting at the expense of the poor.(APF 2010)
The Durban Social Forum, a coalition of more than 20 civic, NGOs and community
organisations, similarly asserted that
the ANC have not given a World Cup for All but again chose to deliver to the rich instead ofthe poor . . . The ANC government delivers world class facilities and infrastructure to the richthat the majority of South Africans will never enjoy . . .Vulnerable children, traders, the poor,homeless, shackdwellers, refugees . . . are forcible removed so tourists won’t see them . . .Our government has sold its citizens out for a gigantic, short term publicity stunt and we mustnot let them forget their responsibilities. (Durban Social Forum 2010, p. 1)
Amnesty International (2010, p. 1) expressed concern that thousands of poor people
living in informal housing and street traders were moved out of inner city zones in
preparation for the World Cup ‘without prior notice, provision of adequate alternative
housing or compensation and in violation of domestic law prohibiting forced evictions’
(see also Van Blerk in this issue, pp. 29–37). In Cape Town, about 600 homeless people
and street children were moved to an apartheid-style relocation or transit camp in
Blikkiesdorp, 30 km from the city centre (Webb 2010). There were allegations of bribery
and corruption in the allocation of tenders for stadiums, as well as at least 26 labour
disagreements leading to strike action during construction and involving more than 70,000
workers (Herzenberg 2010, Zirin 2010a).
In major zones around host cities and stadiums, the South African Constitution was
suspended for the duration of the tournament to produce
58 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
a sanitised and securitised world of private accumulation where only certain signs, symbolsand behaviours are permitted. Worse, this FIFA-world is controlled by public and privatesecurity forces that act to ensure the smooth production of a global spectacle. (Gaffney 2010b)
The ‘South African Government was obliged to enforce FIFA’s laws, including the
curtailing of democratic rights such as peaceful marches and protests’, which hark back to
the apartheid era (Bond et al. 2010, p. 422). As Zirin (2010b, p. 1) has succinctly argued, in
the ‘hands of FIFA and the ruling ANC, the World Cup has been a neoliberal Trojan
Horse, enacting a series of policies that the citizens of this proud nation would never have
accepted if not wrapped in the honour of hosting the cup’. Street traders and hawkers were
banned from the so-called FIFA zones. Consequently, as Cheche Selepe, a spokesperson
for the World Class Cities for All Campaign (WCCA) contended:
The World Cup has been a missed opportunity for the people who are employed in this so-called informal economy . . . It has delivered poverty, eviction and children who find theirparents now income-less. Many of the hawkers and traders have been moved [from thestadium areas] without any alternative. The traders at Soccer City were there before the WorldCup was announced, were there as the stadium was built, and were then moved on when thetournament started. You cannot move people without giving them proper alternatives to makea living. (Dawon 2010)
South Africa has competing demands for health, welfare, housing and education to
address problems relating to poverty and unemployment. Official unemployment was
estimated at 26%, although the UN has suggested that this is likely to be closer to 40%.
In terms of the Human Development Index (which measures education, life expectancy
and standard of living), South Africa was ranked 129 of 182 countries (Human
Development Report 2009). Instead of using scarce state resources to reduce such high
levels of socio-economic inequalities, the government diverted R25 billion to the
Gautrain project, which excluded commuters in areas such as Soweto and Diepsloot (Bond
et al. 2010).
Conclusion
Since the successful bid in 2004, the 2010 World Cup was persistently punted by the South
African Government and FIFA as an African event that would benefit the entire continent.
However, as this paper has argued, this was mere rhetoric. As Runciman (2010, p. 25) has
argued, ‘for all the hype about an African tournament the 2010 World Cup is still shaped
by a European elite and run in its interests.’ The South African case demonstrated how
‘FIFA trump constitutional rights, cementing the organisation’s status as a sort of traveling
oligarchy, enjoying all the benefits of power with none of the disadvantages, like having to
. . . be remotely accountable’ (Hyde 2010, p 1).
The 2010 FIFA World Soccer Cup was an outstanding technical success, and Sepp
Blatter rated South Africa 9 of 10 (‘because nobody is perfect... but South Africa was
close’). It could not fail, after all, at least R60 billion (‘R1250 per citizen’) from the public
purse had been spent on this event (a conservative estimate) to subvent FIFA’s profits
(Amato 2010, p. 5). The costs of the stadiums had increased by 100%.
Scarce South African resources were used to fund FIFA’s flourishing fortunes.
Although hosted in a developing country in 2010, South Africa was so compliant with
FIFA’s every whim and fancy, and meekly pliable, that its profits increased by 50%
compared with the 2006 event in Germany. Also, insufficient consideration had been given
‘post-event utilisation of facilities’, especially in a developing country context ‘where
prudent allocation of limited resources is critical’ (Goliger 2005, p. 176).
South African Geographical Journal 59
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Notwithstanding the government and FIFA’s promises, the different 2010 projects
paid rhetorical lip service to reducing the socio-economic inequalities in South Africa, and
addressing the needs of the poor, were largely driven by corporate interests and were
underwritten with public funds, with limited or no public participation. The FIFA 2010
mega event did produce benefits, and in keeping with the international experience with
such projects, the privileged benefited at the expense of the poor, and the socio-economic
inequalities in South Africa were further entrenched. There are many reasons for the
failure of such projects, all of which centre around the unequal relationship between the
political and business elite and the poor. As Gaffney (2010b, p. 4) has argued, the ‘World
Cup and Olympics need to be massively reconfigured, re-scaled and re-thought, or they
will continue to destroy environments, economies, communities and lives around the
globe’.
Mega-sporting events such as the 2010 FWC should create zones of opportunity for
those who had been historically disadvantaged, integrate the city so that urban resources
are accessible to all citizens and ensure popular participation in the planning process.
Greater emphasis should be placed on policies that sustain growth through redistribution.
This will also require a more direct intervention by the state than that currently envisaged
by international agencies such as FIFA.
References
African National Congress (ANC), 2009. Election Manifesto. Available from: http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2009/manifesto [Accessed 20 August 2010].
Alegi, P., 2010. African soccerscapes – how a continent changed the World’s Game. Athens, OH:Ohio University Press.
Alfred, L., 2004. Historic decisions will touch every South African and is a resounding victory forsport, the guardian of dreams. Available from: http://www.kapweine.ch/sa/wm_e.asp [Accessed10 April 2010].
Amato, C., 2010. Weighing the World Cup’s worth. Business Times, 22 August, p. 5. Johannesburg.Amnesty International, 2010. Human rights concerns in South Africa during the World Cup.
Available from: http://www.commondreams.org [Accessed 10 June 2010].Andranovich, G., Burbank, M., and Heying, C., 2001. Olympic cities: lessons learnt from mega
event politics. Journal of Urban Affairs, 23, 113–131.Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), 2010. The Soccer World Cup is here but the poor continue to ‘feel’
hardship. APF [online] 10 June. Available from http://www.apf.org.za [Accessed 20 August2010].
Bale, J., 1996. Space, place and body culture: Yi-Fu Tuan and a geography of sport. GeografiskaAnnaler B, 78, 163–171.
Bale, J., 2003. Sports geography. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.Bale, J., and Vertinsky, P., 2004. Introduction. In: P. Vertinsky and J. Bale, eds. Sites of sport –
space, place and experience. New York: Routledge, 1–7.Bisseker, C., 2010. Money well spent. Financial Mail, 28 May. Available from: http://www.netassets.
co.za [Accessed 21 June 2010].Bond, P., Desai, A., and Maharaj, B., 2010. Lessons from the World Cup. In: B. Maharaj, A. Desai
and P. Bond, eds. Zuma’s own goal – losing South Africa’s ‘war on poverty’. Trenton, NJ:African World Press, 417–432.
Chalkley, B., and Essex, S., 1999. Urban development through hosting international events: a historyof the Olympic Games. Planning Perspectives, 14, 369–394.
Chinguno, C., 2010. 2010 World Cup – what have workers and poor gained? South African LabourBulletin, 34, 30–33.
Cole, B., 2010. Cup concert attracts world stars. Daily News, 17 March, p. 5. Johannesburg.Darby, P., 2008. Stanley Rous’s ‘own goal’: football politics, South Africa and the FIFA Presidency.
Soccer & Society, 9, 259–272.Davis, G., 2010. Xenophobia a ‘credible threat’. Mercury, 23 June, p. 2. Durban.
60 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
Dawon, M., 2010. 2010 World Cup: boon or bane for South Africa. Seer Press News, 1 July.Available from: http://www.seerpress.com/2010-world-cup-boon-or-bane-for-south-africa/1881 [Accessed 20 July 2010].
DeChano, L.M., and Shelley, F.M., 2004. Using sports to teach geography: examples from KansasCity. Journal of Geography, 103, 185–191.
Donaldson, A., 2004. Mbeki pledges to make 2010 FWC an ‘African Cup’. Available from: http://www.kapweine. 15 May. [Accessed 10 July 2010].
Durban Social Forum, 2010. The poor still ‘feel’ the hardship, Memorandum presented to theeThekwini Municipality, 16 June. Durban.
Ewing, J., 2008. Emperor of the World Cup. Business Week, 13 October, pp. 48–50. Johannesburg.Gaffney, C., 2010a. Mega-events and socio-spatial dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 1919–2016. Journal
of Latin American Geography, 9, 7–29.Gaffney, C., 2010b. Brazil 2014: looking back, looking forward, going nowhere. Available from:
http://www.indyweek.com/.../brazil-2014-looking-back-looking-forward-going-nowhere[Accessed 10 August 2010].
Goldblatt, D., 2010. Footing the World Cup bill. Available from: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk[Accessed 7 June 2010].
Goliger, A.M., 2005. South African sports stadia – from the perspective of the 2010 FIFA WorldCup. Bautechnik, 82, 174–178.
Gqola, P.D., 2010. Whistling a different tune on the World Cup. City Press, 16 May, p. 27.Johannesburg.
Grant Thornton, 2003. SA 2010 Soccer World Cup Bid – economic impact. Executive summary.Available from: www.wiredspace.wits.ac.za [Accessed 21 July 2010].
Grant Thornton, 2010. Updated economic impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Available from:http://www.gt.co.za/News/Press-releases/Strategic-solutions/2010/2010eia.asp [Accessed 30April 2010].
Hamlyn, M., 2008. FIFA: Afro-pessimism hits cup preparations. Available from: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-10-03-FIFA [Accessed 10 August 2010].
Herzenberg, C.S., ed., 2010. Player and referee: conflicting interests and the 2010 World Cup,Monograph 169. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Hillier, H., 2000. Mega-events, urban boosterism and growth strategies: an analysis of the objectivesand legitimations of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid. International Journal of Urban andRegional Research, 24, 439–458.
Human Development Report, 2009. Overcoming barriers: human mobility and development. NewYork: UNDP.
Hyde, M., 2010. FIFA’s arrogant treatment of Nelson Mandela is the latest example of the power itexerts over World Cup host nations. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/jul/15/sepp-blatter-south-africa-FIFA [Accessed 15 August 2010].
Jennings, A., 2007. FOUL! The secret world of FIFA. London: Harpersport.Johnston, R.J., Gregory, D. and Smith, D.M., eds., 1994. The dictionary of human geography. 3rd ed.
Oxford: Blackwell.Jones, C., 2002. Public cost for private gain? Recent and proposed ‘national’ stadium developments
in the UK, and commonalities with North America. Area, 34, 160–170.Levermore, R., 2008. Sport: a new engine of development? Progress in Development Studies, 8,
183–190.Maharaj, B., 1998. The Olympic Games and economic development – hopes, myths, and realities:
the Cape Town 2004 Bid. In: R. Freestone, ed. Twentieth century urban planning experience.Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 583–588.
Maharaj, B., 2010. Immigration to South Africa: critical reflections. In: U.A. Segal, N.S. Mayadasand D. Elliott, eds. Immigration worldwide: policies, practices and trends. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 363–377.
Ndebele, G., 2010. Artists’ union and FIFA end 2010 music war. The Times, 15 April, p. 3.Johannesburg.
Ndebele, S., 2010. Address at the African Renaissance Conference, Durban, 25 May. Availablefrom: http://www.polity.org.za [Accessed 8 June 2010].
Ngugi, M., 2010. Let them eat football. BBC Focus on Africa, 21 (July–September), p. 26.Nkosi, B., 2010. Blatter awarded national orders. Available from: http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.
com [Accessed 9 June 2010].
South African Geographical Journal 61
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014
O’Brien, D., 2006. Event business leveraging: the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Annals of TourismResearch, 33, 240–261.
Owen, K.A., 2002. The Sydney Olympics and urban entrepreneurialism: local variations in urbangovernance. Australian Geographical Studies, 40, 323–336.
Pillay, N., 2010. Give migrants dignity we struggled to get. Sunday Tribune, 11 July, p. 14. Durban.Pillay, U., Tomlinson, R. and Bass, O., eds., 2009. Development dreams – the urban legacy of the
2010 Football World Cup. Pretoria: HSRC Press.Project2010. 2010. 2010: the story so far [online]. Available from http://www.project2010.co.za
[Accessed 9 June 2010].Rooney, J., 1972. A geography of American sport: from Cabin Creek to Anaheim. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.Runciman, D., 2010. Football’s goldmine. The Guardian Weekly, 25–27, 4 June.Seale, L., 2010. FIFA to meet SA artists unhappy at concert billing. Star, 9 April, p. 6. Johannesburg.Smith, A., 2005. Reimaging the city: the value of sport initiatives. Annals of Tourism Research, 32,
217–236.Solomon, M., 2010. FIFA to issue new list of performers for concert. Daily Dispatch, 31 March, p. 3.
Durban.South Africa, 2006. Government Gazette (25 May 2006). Pretoria: Government Printer.SA2010, 2010. Africa’s time has come! SA is ready! [online]. Available from http://www.sa2010.
gov.za [Accessed 9 June 2010].South Africa, 2010. Bid Book.Statistics South Africa, 2010. Tourism and migration June 2010. Available form: http://www.statssa.
gov.za [Accessed 30 September 2010].Sugden, J., and Tomlinson, A., 1998. FIFA’s World Cup wars. New Statesman, 127 (4348), p. 38.Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F., and Rodriguez, A., 2002. Neoliberal urbanisation in Europe: large
scale urban development projects and the new urban policy. Antipode, 34, 542–577.Thamm, M., 2010. Cup spectacle is time to show the world SA exists. Sunday Times, 16 May, p. 13.
Johannesburg.Tolsi, N., 2010. From a flood to a trickle. Mail and Guardian, 23–29 April, p. 4. Johannesburg.Tshangela, T., 2010. Musos blast FIFA over cup event. City Press, 28 March, p. 7. Johannesburg.Turkington, K., 2010. Mapping out the benefits of the FIFA World Cup is a learning curve. The
Sunday Independent, 27 June, p. 29. Johannesburg.UN News Service, 2010. South Africa: Football World Cup in country underlines ‘African
Renaissance’ – UN Envoy. Available from: http://allafrica.com/stories [Accessed 28 June2010].
Waitt, G., 2003. Social impacts of the Sydney Olympics. Annals of Tourism Research, 30, 194–215.Waterworth, T., 2010. FIFA’s R500-million huff. The Independent on Saturday, 9 October, p. 1.Webb, C., 2010. Selling South Africa: poverty, politics and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Available
form: http://www.globalresearch.ca [Accessed 11 June 2010].Zirin, D., 2010a. The South African World Cup: invictus in reverse. Available form: http://www.
edgeofsports.com/2010/03/10 [Accessed 15 August 2010].Zirin, D., 2010b. South Africa on the eve of the World Cup. Available form: http://www.am
andlapublishers.co.za/special-features [Accessed 15 August 2010].
62 B. Maharaj
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f N
ewca
stle
(A
ustr
alia
)] a
t 11:
35 0
6 O
ctob
er 2
014