Page 1 of 15 AIG/Goldman SachsCollateral Call Timeline DATEDecember 14, 2006March 23, 2007May 11, 2007May 2007 SUMMARY Email thread re 12/06 decision by Goldman to reduce subprime exposure/get closer to home. Timberwolf Offering CircularCraig Broderick (GS) email re downward adjustment of marks & adverse impact on clients. Goldman sends marks to Bear Stearns Asset Management (BSAM) DESCRIPTION12/14/06 email from Daniel Sparks (GS) re subprime risk meeting: he writes that decision made to reduce subprime risk by selling ABX, selling inventory, marking the CDO warehouse more regularly.12/14/06 David Viniar (GS) email response: he writes my basic message was lets be aggressive distributing things because there will be very good opportunities as the markets goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to take advantage of them.PSI. TAB 1From 4/07 through 6/07, Goldman was soliciting Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) (BYAFM) to purchase the Timberwolf CDO. In the offering circular, Goldman discloses that there is no established trading market for the Securities. This risk warning was typical and included in other Goldman offering circulars. TAB 2 Craig Broderick sent an email to several individuals, in which he wrote that Daniel Sparks (GS) and the mortgage group were in the process of considering making significant downward adjustments to the marks on their mortgage portfolio esp. CDOs and CDO squared and that this will potentially have a big P&L impact on us, but also to our clients due to the marks and associated margin calls on repos, derivatives and other products. He also wrote that Goldman needed to survey our clients and take a shot at determining the most vulnerable clients, knock on implications, etc. He noted the significant downward adjustments to the marks were important to senior management, writing this is getting lots of 30th floor attention right now. TAB 3 Goldman sends marks to Bear Stearns that reportedly valued securities in the BSAM hedge funds at 50-60 cents on the dollar. TAB 4 Page 2 of 15 June 7, 2007July 11, 2007July 26, 2007July 27, 2007 BSAM hedge funds announce NAV declineTelephone call between Andrew Forster (AIGFP) and Alan Frost (AIGFP) Goldman notifies AIGFP that a margin call on the SSCDS is on the way $1.8 billion Margin call BSAM hedge funds at revise the 4/07 NAV from minus 6% to minus 19%

TAB 5 at 24-25 Andrew Forster (AIGFP) tells Alan Frost (AIGFP) that (1) he is focusing on CDS and subprime, (2) every f---ing rating agency [came] out with more downgrades,(3) about a month ago I was like, you know suicidal, (4) the problem that were going to face is that were going to have just enormous downgrades on the stuff we got, (5) AIGFP will have to mark its books, and (6) were [unintel] f---ed basically. TAB 6 On 7/26/07, Andrew Davilman (Goldman) emailed Alan Frost (AIGFP), informing him that Goldman would be making a margin call on the CDS it purchased from AIGFP.The next day, Goldman sent AIG an invoice requesting $1.8 billion in collateral. TAB 7 Goldman sends AIGFP a collateral invoice for $1.8 billion with valuations attached.Goldman purchases $100 million of CDS protection on AIG.Attached to this chronology is a listing of each Goldman collateral call on AIGFP, each collateral posting by AIGFP and each purchase of CDS protection on AIG by Goldman. TAB 8 Page 3 of 15 July 30, 2007August 1, 2007August 2, 2007August 10, 2007 Telephone call between Andrew Forster (AIGFP) and John Liebergal (AIGFP) Tom Athan (AIGFP) email to Andrew Forster (AIGFP) Goldman reduces its margin call from $1.8 billion to $1.2 billion. AIGFP posts $450 million of collateral and the companies execute a side-letter agreement Forster (AIGFP) tells John Liebergal (AIGFP) that (1) Goldman margin call hit out of the blue and [] a f---ing number thats well bigger than we ever planned for, (2) Goldmans prices were ridiculous but that the value could be anything from 80 to sort of, you know 95, (3) he would not buy bonds at 90 cents on the dollar because they could probably go low and because it would require AIGFP to mark its books.He specifically stated, we cant mark any of our positions, and obviously thats what saves us having this enormous mark to market.If we start buying the physical bonds back then any accountant is going to turn around and say, well, John, you know you traded at 90, you must be able to mark your bonds then. TAB 9 Athan writes in email to Forster that (1) he had a tough conf call with Goldman, (2) Goldman was not budging and are acting irrational, (3) Goldman insist[s] on actionable firm bids and offers to come up with a mid market quotation, (4) he agreed on the call that we needed to escalate this within AIG FP, (5) we need Joe [Cassano] to understand the situation 100% and let him decide how he wants to proceed, (6) he played almost every card I had, legal wording, market practice, intent of the language, meaning of the CSA, and also stressed the potential damage to the relationship and GS said that this has gone to the highest levels at GS and they feel that the CSA has to work or they cannot do synthetic trades anymore across the firm in these types of instruments, and (7) GS called this a test case many times on the call. TAB 10 On 8/2/07 Andrew Forster (AIGFP) emails Joe Cassano (AIGFP) and Pierre Micottis (AIGFP) a revised spreadsheet from Goldman showing a reduction in the margin call from $1.8 billion to $1.2 billion.Forster states in the email that they [Goldman] realized they needed to use mids not bids (meaning mid point between bid and ask). Attached is a listing of marks from Merrill and Goldman that shows Goldman marks are lower. For example, Goldman valued the Broderick CDO at 0.85 but Merrill valued it at 0.98.Goldman valued the Dunhill ABS CDO at 0.85 but Merrill valued it at 0.99.Merrills estimated values did not represent actual bids or offers. Goldman CDS protection on AIG now $300 million. TAB 11 AIG posted $450 million on 8/10/07. Goldman and AIG execute a side letter agreement in which it was written that the parties had not resolved the margin call dispute and that Goldmans acceptance of the $450 million did not constitute an agreement that the $450 million satisfied the required collateral posting. Goldman CDS protection on AIG now totals $575 million. TAB 12 Page 4 of 15 August 16, 2007September 11, 2007September 13, 2007September 20, 2007 Andrew Forster (AIGFP) email to Alan Frost (AIGFP) re Goldman is aggressively marking down assetsAIGFP internal emails re collateral calls Goldman purchases $700 million of additional CDS protection on AIG Goldman reports 3Q07 results Alan Frost writes in email to Andrew Forster (Forster on holiday) that (1) the $450 million posting was to get everyone to chill out, (2) he will not disturb Joe Cassano, who is also on holiday, (3) this is not the last margin call we are going to debate, (4) Andrew Davilman (GS) told him that marks from Merrill on CDOs [] are starting to look more like where GS would mark them, and (5) AIGFP might start to see some significant margin calls. Forster responds that I have heard several rumors now that gs is aggressively marking down asset types that they dont own so as to cause maximum pain to their competitors.It may be rubbish but its the sort of thing gs would do. TAB 13 Tom Athan (AIGFP) writes to Andrew Forster (AIGFP) and Adam Budnick (AIGFP) that (1)Goldman is now asking for $1.5 billion, (2) SocGen London asked for $40 million based on an 82.5 bid price from Goldman which Athan disputed, (3) SocGen NY said they received marks from GS on positions that would result in big collateral calls but SG disputed them with GS.SocGen disputed marks from Goldman but also that AIGFP is disputing marks of other counterparties asking for collateral. TAB 14 Goldman purchases another $700 million of CDS protection on AIG.Total Goldman CDS protection on AIG is now $1,449,000,000.Reported in Goldman 3Q07 earnings release that significant losses on non-prime loans and securities were more than offset by gains on short mortgage positions. Viniar says during conference call that shorts were profitable. TAB 15 Page 5 of 15 November 1, 2007 November 2, 2007November 5, 2007November 8, 2007 Joe Cassano (AIGFP) email to Elias Habayeb (AIGFP) Goldman increases its margin demand from $1.06 billion to $2.8 billion. Internal AIGFP emailDavid Lehman (GS) email to Andrew Forster (AIGFP) re valuation methodology. Cassano writes that only other collateral call is from SocGen, that it was spurred by GS calling them, and AIGFP had not heard from SocGen since disputing the call. TAB 16 Margin call from Goldman to AIGFP increases from $1 billion on 11/1/07 to $2.8 billion on 11/2/07. Goldman asking for $2.8 billion in addition to the $450 million that has already been posted. CDS protection on AIG remains at $1,449,000,000. TAB 17 Pierre Micottis (AIGFP) email to Joe Cassano, Andrew Forster and Elias Habayeb (AIGFP) attaches spreadsheet showing differences between Goldman and AIGFP marks. The attached chart shows that Goldmans marks were lower than marks estimated by AIGFP utilizing its Binomial Expansion Technique (BET) model and marks provided by other dealers.For example, on Duke Funding, Goldman mark was 70, Merrills was 85 and BET was 99.81.On the Ischus CDO II, Goldmans mark was 55; CSFBs was 90 and BET was 99.92. On Altius II Funding, Goldmans mark was 87.5; CSFB was 85 and BET was 100. On the Sherwood Funding CDO, Goldmans mark was 60; Morgan Stanleys was 90 and BET was 100. TAB 18 Lehman writes email to Forster asking him to continue constructive dialogue surrounding valuation methodology and that next step should be line-by-line comparison of GS vs AIGFP prices. TAB 19 Page 6 of 15 November 9, 2007November 14, 2007November 18, 2007November 23, 2007 Marks from MerrillAndrew Forster (AIGFP) email to Joe Cassano (AIGFP) re collateral calls. Andrew Forster (AIGFP) email to Joe Cassano (AIGFP)AIGFP posts $1.55 billion, bringing the total amount posted to $2 billion. Andrew Forster (AIGFP) emails Joe Cassano and Pierre Micottis (AIGFP) a listing of marks received from Merrill that are higher than Goldmans marks.Reservoir Funding: Goldman = 80; Merrill = 95. Jupiter High-Grade: Goldman = 75; Merrill = 95. Broderick: Goldman = 67.5; Merrill = 95.Orient Point: Goldman = 60; Merrill = 95.Southcoast Funding: Goldman = 55; Merrill = 80. TAB 20 Forster writes that AIGFP received significant collateral calls from SocGen ($1.7B) based on Goldman marks; and Merrill ($610M).Asks if AIGFP should dispute and attempt to reach compromise. TAB 21 Forster writes that average GS price on HG deals is 82.18 and 68.36 on average mezz deal. Merrill is 87 HG and 80.57 mezz.Forster also writes that Goldman and Merrill both made collateral calls on Independence V but that Merrills call was based on a mark of 90.81 and Goldmans call was based on a mark of 67.5.Goldman CDS protection on AIG now totals $1,874,000,000. TAB 22 AIG posted an additional $1.55 billion, again with a side letter stating the parties continued disagreement about the proper collateral amount. Collateral demand declines to $1.4 billion after the posting. TAB 23-24 Page 7 of 15 November 27, 2007November 29, 2007November 30, 2007December 4, 2007 AIGFP collateral call analysis showing Goldmans marks lower than other dealers PwC notes of meeting re Goldman collateral calls with representatives of AIG, AIGFP and PwC AIG requests that Goldman Sachs return collateral or continue with dispute resolution discussion Goldman letter to AIGFP. Joe Cassano forwards to Bill Dooley (AIGFP) his email to Forster in which he wrote that the collateral calls from Goldman and others were being disputed, that parties were seeking resolution and that no one seems to know how to discern a market valuation price from the current opaque market environment; and no one is particularly excited about the issue being left open.Attached chart shows collateral calls from Merrill, Bank of Montreal, Calyon, Goldman, SocGen, and UBS. Chart also shows Goldman marks lower than others.Dunhill: Goldman = 75; Merrill = 95. Independence V: Goldman = 67.5; Merrill = 90. Lexington: Goldman = 60; Merrill = 90. Orient Point: Goldman = 60; Merrill = 95. South Coast Funding VII: Goldman = 65; Merrill = 90. CDS protection reduced by$100,000,000 to $1,774,000,000. TAB 25 PwCs Tim Ryan tells AIGFP and AIG executives that the Goldman collateral calls are a major data point and that their impact on the valuation of the SSCDS book needs to be fully understood.Cassano says GS values could impact quarters results by $5 billion. AIG CEO Martin Sullivan says that would eliminate the quarters profits. Forster told FCIC staff that Sullivan also responded to the $5B estimate by saying he would have a heart attack. Sullivan told FCIC that he does not remember this meeting. TAB 26 On 11/30/07, Cassano called Michael Sherwood at Goldman and demanded that Goldman return the $1.55 billion of collateral posted on 11/23/07.Cassano told Dooley the demand was based on pricing provided by an independent third party for 70% of the 3500 reference obligations and AIGFPs valuation for the other 30%.Goldman did not return the collateral. TAB 27 Goldman letter disputing AIGFPs 11/30/07 demand for return of collateral. TAB 27 Page 8 of 15 December 5, 2007December 6, 2007December 7, 2007December 14, 2007 AIG Investor Day ConferenceAIGFP letter to GoldmanAIGFP Letter to Goldman. Andrew Forster (AIGFP) letter to Neil Wright (GS) requesting return of collateral During an Investor Day Conference attended by AIG executives Martin Sullivan, Joe Cassano, Gary Gorton, Andrew Forster, Steven Bensinger, Bob Lewis, and others, Cassano represented that the estimated unrealized valuation loss on SSCDS book was $1.5B; no disclosure was made that onemethod used to estimate the loss included a $3.6B negative basis adjustment.Cassano says some counterparties that made margin calls go away after AIGFP tells them they disagree with their numbers and that other times we sit down and we try to find the middle ground. TAB 28 AIGFP letter to Goldman acknowledging continuing dispute and proposal to discuss dispute. TAB 27 AIGFP demands return of $1,562,720,000. TAB 27 Forster writes in letter that given the significant amount of collateral in dispute that is held by Goldman, we expect either that you now return to us the amount of collateral that we have called for, or that you continue next week to engage actively and constructively with us in discussions toward resolving the dispute and that it would not be appropriate to delay the discussion at this stage. TAB 29 Page 9 of 15 December 21, 2007December 31, 2007January 2, 2008January 7, 2008 Cassano email to Sherwood requesting return of collateral Status of Collateral PostingsGoldman Sachs increased its margin call from $1.6 billion to $2.1 billion. Internal AIGFP email stating that SocGen did not make a margin call based on Goldman marks after discussions with AIGFP. Cassano writes in the email that Goldmans exposure calculations (that Cassano received the previous night) were too high (marks too low), requests Goldman to return collateral but states that discussions will have to wait because of Christmas and New Years holiday. TAB 30 A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral postings as of 12/31/07.Goldman represents 89.4% of posted collateral while it represents about $21 billion or 27% of the $78 billion SSCDS book. $32 million to Bank of Montreal $4 million to BGI $56 million to Barclays $81 million to CIBC $2 million to Deutsche $2.429 million to Goldman Sachs Intl $19 million to Societe Generale TOTAL: $2.718 million TAB 31 Goldman increases margin call to $2.1 billion.CDS protection on AIG remains at $1,774,000,000. TAB 32 Tom Athan emailed Cassano, Forster and others stating that SocGen did not make a collateral call on 11/13/07 based on Goldmans marks after he told them AIGFP would dispute it. TAB 33 Page 10 of 15 January 16, 2008February 6, 2008March 3, 2008March 17, 2008 AIGFP again requested that Goldman Sachs return collateral posted to date. Cassano email to Habayeb and others Goldman increases margin call from $2.5 billion to $4.2 billion. Goldman increases margin call from $4.2 billion to $4.8 billion. On 1/16/08, Cassano sent a follow-up email to Goldman CFO David Viniar and Sherwood in which he again wrote that Goldmans exposure calculations were too high and asked for Goldman to return $1.1 billion of the collateral previously posted by AIG.Enclosed chart shows AIGFP valuing several securities at par.Goldman witnesses including David Lehman and Andrew Davilman, told FCIC staff that AIGFPs valuing securities at par was not credible. TAB 34 Cassano writes that $442M collateral call from SocGen is close to $589M AIGFP estimate using BET model.Goldmans CDS protection on AIG now $2.1 billion. TAB 35 On 3/3/08, Goldmans collateral demand increased from $2.5 billion to $4.2 billion. Goldmans CDS protection on AIG remains at $2.1 billion. TAB 36 By 3/17/08, Goldman increased its demand to $4.8 billion.; CDS protection on AIG remains at $2.1 billion. TAB 37 Page 11 of 15 March 17, 2008April 24, 2008May 16, 2008May 28, 2008 AIG posts $1 billion of additional collateral. Side letter executedSide letter executedCollateral posted by AIGFP totals $4.9 billion of collateral. AIG posted $1.0 billion of additional collateral on 3/17/08 which brought the total amount to $3.0 billion.

TAB 38Goldman and AIG executed side letter to increase AIGs posting to $4.737 billion.The parties reserve all rights to dispute the collateral calls.Goldmans CDS protection on AIG now $2.8 billion. TAB 27 Side letter signed by AIGFP to increase collateral posting to $4.785 billion.The parties reserve all rights to dispute the collateral calls. Goldmans CDS protection on AIG now $3.0 billion. TAB 27 Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $4.912 billion. Goldmans CDS protection on AIG now $3.2 billion. TAB 27 Page 12 of 15 June 18, 2008June 26, 2008June 30, 2008July 2, 2008 Collateral posted by AIGFP totals $5.4 billion. AIGFP and Goldman agree to use third party prices to calculate collateral amount; AIGFP increases amount posted by $484.6 million Status of Collateral Calls and PostingsAIGFP increases amount posted to $5.912 billion Side letter executed to increase collateral posting to $5,427.9 million, with the increase of approximately $516 million associated with five ABACUS CDS transactions. All rights were reserved to dispute the related collateral calls. TAB 27 AIGFP and GSI agreed to a calculation methodology that references third party prices to partially bridge the difference between the parties' calculated exposures. This will result in an increase in the amount to be posted by AIGFP by approximately $484.6 million. Side letter sent to GSI for execution; comments expected on Monday. June 30. Goldman CDS protection on AIG declines to $2.6 billion. TAB 27 A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 6/30/08. Goldman represents 48% of collateral called while it represented about $21 billion or 27% of the $78 billion SSCDS book as of 12/31/07. TAB 31 Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $5.912 billion.All rights were reserved to dispute the related collateral calls. TAB 27 $MillionsSelect Counterparty Call PostedBanco SantanderBank of America $165 $161Bank of Montreal $295 $298BGI $6 $6Barclays $608 $450Calyon $425 $425CIBC $273 $273Coral (DZ Bank) $287 $287Deutshe $51 $2Goldman Sachs Cap M $64 $38Goldman Sachs Int'l $7,493 $5,913HSBC $95 $95Merrill Lynch Int'l $1,875 $1,875Rabobank $71 $46RFCRoyal Bank of Scotland $499 $435Societe Generale $1,937 $1,937Static ResUBS $1,565 $931Wachovia $71 $69Totals $15,780 $13,241Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOs6/30/2008Page 13 of 15 July 18, 2008July 31, 2008August 15, 2008August 20, 2008 AIGFP agrees to increase amount posted to $6.207 billion. Status of Collateral Calls and PostingsAIGFP agrees to increase amount posted to $6.447 billion. AIG agreed to increase amount posted to $6.445 billion. Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $6.207 billion, with an increase of approximately $294.9 million agreed to with respect to the Orkney transaction. All rights reserved to dispute the related collateral calls. TAB 27 A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 7/31/08. Goldman represents 43% of collateral called while it represented about $21 billion or 27% of the $78 billion SSCDS book as of 12/31/07. TAB 31 AIGFP and GSI agreed to increase credit support posting to approximately $6.447 billion, with an increase of approximately $239.7 million agreed to with respect to five ABACUS transactions. Goldmans CDS protection on AIG now $3 billion. TAB 27 Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $6.445 billion, with an increase of approximately $237.6 million. TAB 27 $Millions 7/31/2008Select Counterparty Call PostedBanco Santander $125Bank of America $183 $263Bank of Montreal $405 $244BGI $6 $6Barclays $997 $817Calyon $1,261 $734CIBC $304 $224Coral (DZ Bank) $306 $306Deutshe $388 $450Goldman Sachs Cap M $94 -$7Goldman Sachs Int'l $8,254 $6,217HSBC $183 $21Merrill Lynch Int'l $2,234 $2,127Rabobank $319 $184RFCRoyal Bank of Scotland $435 $242Societe Generale $2,271 $1,977Static ResUBS $1,485 $510Wachovia $71 $61Totals $19,321 $14,376Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOsPage 14 of 15 August 28, 2008 August 31, 2008September 12, 2008 September 15, 2008 AIGFP agrees to increase amount posted to $6.8 billion. Status of Collateral Calls and PostingsStatus of Collateral Calls and Postings AIG Downgrade and Status of Collateral Calls and Postings Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $6.807 billion. TAB 27 A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 8/31/08. Goldman represents 39% of collateral called while it represented about $21 billion or 27% of the $78 billion SSCDS book as of 12/31/07. TAB 31 A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 9/12/08. Goldman represents 39% of collateral called while it represents about $21 billion or 27% of the $78 billion SSCDS book as of 12/31/07. Goldman CDS protection on AIG declines to $2.7 billion. TAB 31 AIG is downgraded and collateral calls increase from $23.4 billion on 9/12/08 to $32.0 billion on 9/15/08. A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 9/15/08.Goldmans demand increased from $9 billion on 9/12/08 to $10.1 billion on 9/15/08. TAB 31 $Millions 8/31/2008Select Counterparty Call PostedBanco Santander $125Bank of America $218 $289Bank of Montreal $400 $236BGI $6 $6Barclays $997 $1,013Calyon $1,231 $1,144CIBC $357 $273Coral (DZ Bank) $300 $300Deutshe $668 $70Goldman Sachs Cap M $94Goldman Sachs Int'l $8,675 $6,818HSBC $173 $101Merrill Lynch Int'l $2,206 $2,133Rabobank $301 $184RFCRoyal Bank of Scotland $435 $419Societe Generale $4,271 $3,981Static ResUBS $1,707 $508Wachovia $77 $70Totals $22,241 $17,545Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOs$Millions 9/12/2008Select Counterparty Call PostedBanco Santander $137Bank of America $222 $288Bank of Montreal $455 $280BGI $30 $9Barclays $1,308 $1,344Calyon $1,231 $1,139CIBC $361 $267Coral (DZ Bank) $290 $290Deutshe $936 -$12Fort DearborneGoldman Sachs Cap M $94Goldman Sachs Int'l $8,979 $7,596HSBC $173 $98Merrill Lynch Int'l $2,278 $2,133Rabobank $301 $184RFCRoyal Bank of Scotland $435 $485Societe Generale $4,280 $4,008Static ResUBS $1,831 $756Wachovia $100 $57Totals $23,441 $18,922Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOs$Millions 9/15/2008Select Counterparty Call PostedBanco Santander $258Bank of America $224 $287Bank of Montreal $455 $291BGI $30 $9Barclays $1,308 $1,633Calyon $1,231 $1,139CIBC $361 $267Coral (DZ Bank) $548 $290Deutshe $1,684 -$12Fort DearborneGoldman Sachs Cap M $94Goldman Sachs Int'l $10,072 $7,596HSBC $273 $98Merrill Lynch Int'l $2,658 $2,133Rabobank $421 $184RFCRoyal Bank of Scotland $538 $526Societe Generale $9,833 $4,320Static ResUBS $1,832 $755Wachovia $193 $57Totals $32,013 $19,573Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOsPage 15 of 15 September 16, 2008September 18, 2008 November 6, 2008November 24, 2008 FRBNY announces $85 billion loan to AIG. AIG posts another $3 billion of collateral. AIGFP agrees to increase amount posted to Goldman $8.8 billion. Amount of collateral posted to Goldman increases to $10.7 billion. Maiden Lane III is created A schedule produced by AIG listed the following collateral calls and postings as of 9/16/08.None of the additional $3 billion went to Goldman. TAB 31 Side letter executed to increase credit support posting to $8.801 billion, with an increase of approximately $1,205 billion. TAB 27 Goldman demanding $1.8 billion in addition to $10.7 billion of collateral posted. Total CDS protection on AIG is $2.3 billion. Maiden Lane III pays Goldman $5.6 billion to terminate most of the SSCDS contracts between AIGFP and Goldman.Tab 39, documents provided by Goldman, show funds paid to GS by AIG and MLIII, and funds paid to GS counterparties.Twelve SSCDS are not part of MLIII and Goldman has $3.5 billion of collateral on these SSCDS. TAB 39 4823-4061-6198, v.3 $Millions 9/16/2008Select Counterparty Call PostedBanco Santander $258Bank of America $222 $342Bank of Montreal $455 $320BGI $30 $9Barclays $1,417 $1,660Calyon $1,231 $1,139CIBC $382 $300Coral (DZ Bank) $1,033 $290Deutshe $1,684 $1,341Fort Dearborne $167Goldman Sachs Cap M $94Goldman Sachs Int'l $10,065 $7,596HSBC $273 $98Merrill Lynch Int'l $3,170 $2,134Rabobank $775 $184RFC $242Royal Bank of Scotland $538 $543Societe Generale $9,818 $5,582Static ResUBS $1,832 $831Wachovia $193 $76Totals $33,879 $22,445Collateral Calls on CDS Written by AIGFP on Multi-Sector CDOs TAB 1 From:Viniar,David Sent:Friday,December 15,20068:57 AM Montag,TomTo: Subject:RE:Subprime risk meeting with Viniar/McMahon Summary Yes.We spent about two hours together.Danand teamdid a very good job going through the risks.On ABX,the position is reasonably sensible but is just too big.Might have to spend a little to size it appropriately.On everything else my basic message was let's be aggressive distributing things because there will be very good opportunities as the markets goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to take advantage of them. Let me know ifyou want to catch up live. From:Montag, Tom Sent:Friday,December 15, 20061:00 AM Viniar,DavidTo: Subject:fIN:Subprime risk meetingwith Viniar/McMahon Summary is this fair summary? From: Sent: To: Subject: Sparks,Daniell Thursday,December14, 200611:04 PM Montag, Tom;Ruzika,Richard Subprimerisk meeting with Viniar/McMahonSummary Mortgage team- Gasvoda,Rosenblum,Swenson and me. Viniar,Bill,Brian Lee(controllers) and some risk guys. Ruzika onphone. Reviewed in detail 6 areas of risk related to subprime: ABXlCDS Loans Residuals COO warehouse Early Payment Defaults (EPDs) Loan warehouse Follow-ups: 1.Reduce exposure,sellmore ABX index outright,basis trade of index vs CDS too large 2.Distribute as much as possible on bonds created fromnew loan securitizations and clean previous positions 3.Sell some more res ids 4.Mark the COO warehouse more regularly (had been policy to true-up quarterly) - willlikely be weekly or more if necessary 5.Stay focused on the credit of the originators we buy loans fromandlend to 6.Stay focusedandaggressive on MLN (warehouse customer and originator we have EPDs to that is likely to fail) 7.Be ready forthe good opportunities that are coming (keep powder dry and look around the market hard) Permanent Subcommittee on Investi2ations EXHIBIT #3 Confidential Treatment Requested by Goldman!GS MBS-E-009726498 TAB 2 Page 2 of 3 Untitled Page6/28/2010 https://ww1.dochunter.net/DHWeb/ImageView/PrintImage.aspx?&DocHunterID={c0b62a...CONFIDENTIAL TIMBERWOLFI,LTD. 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U.S.$ 9,000,000 Class S-1FloatingRate Notes Due 2011 U.S.$ 8,300,000 Class S-2FloatingRate Notes Due 2011 U.S.$100,000,000 Class A-1a Floating Rate Notes Due 2039 U.S.$ 200,000,000 Class A-1 b Floating Rate Notes Due 2039 U.S.$100,000,000 Class A-1c Floating Rate Notes Due 2044 U.S.$ 100,000,000 Class A-1dFloating Rate Notes Due 2044 U.S.$ 305,000,000 Class A-2Floating Rate Notes Due 2047 U.S.$ 107,000,000 Class B Floating Rate Notes Due 2047 U.S.$ 36,000,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2047 U.S.$ 30,000,000 Class 0Deferrable Floating Rate Notes Due 2047 U.S.$ 22,000,000Income Notes Due 2047 Secured (withRespect to the Notes) Primarily by a Portfolio of COOSecurities and Synthetic Securities (referencing COOSecurities) TheNotes(asdefinedherein)andtheIncomeNotes(asdefinedherein)(collectively,the"Securities")arebeingofferedhereby inthel qualifiedinstitutionalbuyers (asdefinedinRule144A under theUnitedStates SecuritiesAct of 1933,asamended(the"Securities Act")),inrelianCE under theSecuritiesAct,and,solely inthecaseof theIncomeNotes,toaccreditedinvestors(asdefinedinRule501 (a)under theSecuritiesAct)\ worthof notlessthanU.S.$10millionintransactionsexempt fromregistrationunder theSecuritiesAct.TheSecuritiesarebeingofferedhereb States only topersonsthat arealso"qualifiedpurchasers" for purposesof Section3(c)(7)under theUnitedStatesInvestment Company Act of194 (the"Investment CompanyAct").TheSecuritiesarebeingofferedhereby outsidetheUnitedStates tononU.S.Personsinoffshoretransactiom RegulationS("RegulationS")under theSecuritiesAct.See"Undelwriting." See"Risk Factors" for a discussion of certain factors tobe considered inconnection withan investment intheSecurities. Thereisnoestablished tradingmarket for theSecurities.Applicationmay bemade toadmit theSecurities ona stock exchangeof theIs, practicable.Therecanbenoassurance that suchadmission willbesought,granted or maintained. Itisa conditionof theissuanceof theSecurities that theClassS-1Notes,theClass S-2Notes,theClassA-1 aNotes,theClassA-1 bN A-1 cNotes,theClass A-1 dNotes andtheClass A-2Notesbeissued witharatingof "Aaa"by Moody'sInvestors Service,Inc.("Moody's")and"AA &Poor'sRatingsServices,adivisionof TheMcGraw-HiliCompanies,Inc.("S&P,"andtogether withMoody's,the"RatingAgencies"),that theCh issuedwitharatingof at least "Aa2"byMoody'sandat least "AA"byS&P,that theClass CNotesbeissuedwitharatingof at least "A2"byMood "A"by S&P andthat theClassDNotesbeissuedwitharatingof atleast "Baa2"byMoody'sandatleast "BBB"by S&P.TheIncomeNotes willr credit ratingisnot arecommendationtobuy,sellorholdsecurities andmay besubjecttorevisionor withdrawalat any timebytheassigningratin! "Ratings of theNotes." See"Underwriting" for a discussion of theterms andconditions of thepurchaseof theSecuritiesby theInitialPurchaser. THEASSETSOFTHEISSUER(ASDEFINEDHEREIN)ARETHESOLESOURCEOFPAYMENTSONTHESECURITIES.THESECURI REPRESENTANINTERESTINOROBLIGATIONSOF,ANDARENOTINSUREDORGUARANTEEDBY,THEHOLDERSOFTHESEC COLLATERALMANAGER(ASDEFINEDHEREIN),THECASH FLOWSWAPCOUNTERPARTY(ASDEFINEDHEREIN),GOLDMAN,SAC I INITIALPURCHASER(ASDEFINEDHEREIN)),THEISSUERADMINISTRATOR(ASDEFINEDHEREIN),THEAGENTS(ASDEFINEDI TRUSTEE (ASDEFINEDHEREIN),THESHARE TRUSTEE(ASDEFINEDHEREIN)OR ANY OF THEIRRESPECTIVE AFFILIATES. THESECURITIESHAVENOTBEENANDWILLNOTBEREGISTEREDUNDERTHESECURITIESACT,ANDNEITHEROFTHEISSUERS HEREIN) WILLBEREGISTEREDUNDERTHEINVESTMENT COMPANY ACT.THESECURITIESMAY NOTBEOFFEREDORSOLD W I T H I ~ STATESORTO,ORFORTHEACCOUNTORBENEFITOF,U.S.PERSONS(ASSUCHTERMSAREDEFINEDUNDERTHESECURITIES PURSUANTTOANEXEMPTIONFROM,ORINATRANSACTIONNOTSUBJECTTO,THEREGISTRATIONREQUIREMENTSOFTHESEC ACCORDINGLY,THESECURITIESAREBEINGOFFEREDHEREBY ONLY TO(A)(1)QUALIFIEDINSTITUTIONALBUYERS(ASDEFINED UNDERTHESECURITIESACT)AND,SOLELY INTHECASEOF THEINCOMENOTES,ACCREDITEDINVESTORS(ASDEFINEDINRULE THESECURITIESACT)THATHAVEANETWORTHOFNOTLESSTHANU.S.$10MILLIONAND,WHOARE(2)QUALIFIEDPURC PURPOSESOFSECTION3(c)(7)UNDERTHEINVESTMENTCOMPANY ACTAND(B)CERTAINNON-U.S.PERSONSOUTSIDETHEUNITI RELIANCEONREGULATIONSUNDERTHESECURITIESACT.PURCHASERSANDSUBSEQUENTTRANSFEREESOFCLASSDNOTES NOTES(OTHERTHANREGULATIONSCLASSDNOTESANDREGULATIONSINCOMENOTES)WILLBEREQUIREDTOEXECUTEAtI LETTERCONTAININGCERTAINREPRESENTATIONSANDAGREEMENTS,ANDPURCHASERSANDSUBSEQUENTTRANSFEREES NOTES,CLASSA-1aNOTES,CLASSA-1bNOTES,CLASSA-1cNOTES,CLASSA-1dNOTES,CLASSA-2NOTES,CLASSBNOTES,CLI ANDCLASSDNOTESANDREGULATIONSINCOMENOTESWILLBEDEEMEDTOHAVEMADESUCHREPRESENTATIONSANDAGRI SETFORTHUNDER"NOTICETOINVESTORS."THESECURITIESARENOTTRANSFERABLEEXCEPTINACCORDANCEWITHTHER DESCRIBEDUNDER "NOTICE TOINVESTORS." TheSecuritiesarebeingofferedby Goldman,Sachs&Co.(inthecaseof theSecuritiesofferedoutsidetheUnitedStates,sellingthr, agent)(the"InitialPurchaser"),ineachcase,asspecifiedherein,subject toitsrighttorejectany order inwholeorinpart,inoneormorenegotiat' orotherwiseatvaryingpricestobedeterminedat thetimeof saleplus accruedinterest,if any,fromtheClosingDate(asdefinedherein).Itisex ClassS-1Notes,ClassS-2Notes,ClassA-1aNotes,ClassA1bNotes,ClassA1cNotes,ClassA1dNotes,ClassA2Notes,ClassBNotes,I RegulationSClassD NotesandtheRegulationSIncomeNotes willbeready for deliveryinbookentry formonlyinNew York,New York,onora 2007(the"ClosingDate"),throughthefacilitiesofDTCandinthecaseoftheSecuritiessoldoutsidetheUnitedStates,fortheaccountsof! SA/N.v., asoperator of theEuroclear System ("Euroclear")andClearstreamBanking,societeanonyme("Clearstream"),against payment therefor availablefunds.Itisexpectedthat theClassD Notes(other thantheRegulationSClassD Notes)theIncomeNotes(other thantheRegulationS willbeready for delivery indefinitive forminNew York,New York ontheClosingDate,against payment therefor inimmediately availablefunds.Th relianceonRule144A willbeissuedinminimum denominations of U.S.$250,OOOandintegralmultiples of U.S.$1inexcess thereof.TheNotessole RegulationSwillbeissuedinminimumdenominationsofU.S.$100,OOOandintegralmultiplesofU.S.$1inexcessthereof.TheIncomeNotesVI minimum denominations of U.S.$100,OOOandintegralmultiplesof U.S.$1inexcess thereof. Goldman,Sachs&Co. Offerina Circular dated March 232007 . RISK FACTORS Priortomakinganinvestmentdecision,prospectiveinvestorsshouldcarefullyconsider,in addition to the matters set forthelsewhere in this Offering Circular, the following factors: Securities Limited Liquidityand RestrictionsonTransfer.Thereiscurrentlynomarketfor theSecurities. Although theInitialPurchaser hasadvisedtheIssuers thatitintends tomakeamarket intheSecurities, theInitial Purchaser isnot obligatedto do so,andany suchmarket making withrespect to the Securities may bediscontinuedat any time without notice.Therecanbenoassurance that any secondarymarket for any of the Notes will develop or,if a secondary market does develop, that it will provide the Holders of the Notes withliquidity of investment or that it willcontinue for the life of suchNotes andconsequentlya purchasermustbepreparedtoholdtheNotesuntilmaturity.Consequently,apurchasermustbe preparedtoholdtheNotes for anindefiniteperiodof timeor untilStatedMaturity.Sinceitislikely that there willnever beasecondarymarketfor theIncomeNotes,apurchaser mustbepreparedtoholdits Income Notes until the Stated Maturity. Inaddition,nosale,assignment,participation,pledgeortransferoftheSecuritiesmaybe effectedif,amongother things,it wouldrequireany of theIssuer, the Co-Issuer or any of their officers or directors toregister under,or otherwisebesubject totheprovisionsof,theInvestment Company Actor any other similar legislation or regulatory action.Furthermore, the Securities willnot be registeredunder the Securities Act or any state securities laws or thelawsof any other jurisdiction,and theIssuer hasno plans, and is under no obligation, to register the Securities under the Securities Act or any state securities laws or under thelaws of any other jurisdiction.The Securities aresubject to certain transfer restrictions andcanbetransferredonlytocertaintransfereesasdescribedhereinunder"Descriptionofthe Securities-Formof theSecurities"and"NoticetoInvestors."Suchrestrictionsonthetransferof the Securitiesmayfurtherlimittheirliquidity.See"Descriptionof theSecurities-Formof theSecurities." ApplicationmaybemadetoadmittheSecuritiesonastockexchangeoftheIssuer'schoice,if practicable.There canbe no assurance that such admission will be sought, granted or maintained. Limited Recourse Obligations.The Income Notes and the Class 0Notes will belimitedrecourse obligations of the Issuer and the Notes (other than theClass0Notes) will be limitedrecourse obligations of theIssuers payable solely from the Collateral pledgedby theIssuer to secure theNotes.TheIncome Notesaredenominatedasdebt of theIssuer andarenot securedby theCollateralAssetsor theother collateralsecuringtheNotes.Noneof theCollateralManager,theHoldersof theNotes, theHolders of theIncomeNotes, theInitialPurchaser, the Trustee, theIssuer Administrator,theAgents,theCashflow Swap Counterparty or any affiliates of any of the foregoingor the Issuers' affiliates or any other person or entity willbeobligatedtomakepaymentson theNotes or theIncomeNotes.Consequently,Holdersof theNotesandIncomeNotesmustrelysolelyondistributionsontheCollateralpledgedtosecurethe Notes for the payment of principal,interest and premium,if any, thereon.If distributions on the Collateral are insufficient tomake payments on theNotes andIncome Notes, no other assets (and,inparticular,no assetsof theCollateralManager,theHoldersof theNotes,theHoldersof theIncomeNotes,theInitial Purchaser,theTrustee,theIssuer Administrator,theAgents,theCashflowSwapCounterpartyor any affiliatesof any of theforegoing)willbeavailable for payment of the deficiency,andfollowingrealization of theCollateralpledgedtosecure the Notes,theobligationsof theIssuers topay suchdeficiency shall be extinguished. Subordinationof theSecurities.Paymentsof principalontheClassS-1Notes willbesenior to paymentsof principalof theClassS-2Notes,theClassA-1Notes,ClassA-2Notes,ClassBNotes, ClassCNotes andClass0Notesandsenior topayments on theIncome Notes oneachPayment Date. Paymentsof principalontheClassS-2Noteswillbesenior topaymentsof principalof theClassA-2 Notes, Class B Notes,Class C Notes and Class 0Notes andsenior topayments on theIncome Notes on eachPayment Date.Payments of principal on the Class A-1Notes will besenior to payments of principal of the Class A-2 Notes,Class B Notes,Class C Notes and Class 0Notes and senior topayments onthe Income NotesoneachPayment Date.Payments of principalontheClassS-2 Notes andthe Class A-1 37 Confidential Treatment Requested by Goldman SachsGS MBSE-000673707 TAB 3 From: Sent: To: Subject: Broderick,Craig Friday,May 11,20071 :48 PM Rapfogel,Alan;Wildermuth,David;Schick,Sharon; Young,Greg; Welch,Patrick;Hemphill, Lee RE:COO's - Mortgages Sparks and the Mtg group are in the process of considering making significant downward adjustments to themarks on their mortgage portfolio esp COOs and COOsquared.This willpotentially have a bigP&L impact on us,but also to our clients due to the marks and associated margin calls on repos,derivatives, and other products.We need tosurvey our clients and take a shot at determining themost vulnerable clients,knocl, onimplications,etc.This is getting lots of 30th floor attention rightnow. From: Sent: To: Subject: Wildermuth,David Friday, May11,20071:40 PM Sedita,Amy;Broderick, Craig;Schick,Sharon;Young,Greg;Welch,Patrick;Hemphill,Lee;Rapfogel,Alan RE:COO's- Mortgages What is the topic/discussion here?I have a conflict but can probably attend tile first 1/2 hour.Depending onthe topic,I can try to move my 2:30?? From: Sent: To: Subject: When: Where: Sedita, Amy Friday, May11,20071:00 PM Broderick,Craig;Schick,Sharon;Young, Greg; Welch,Patrick;Hemphill, LeeiRapfogel,AlaniWildermuth,David Updated:COO's- Mortgages Friday,May11,20072:00 PM-3:00PM(GMT-OS:OO)Eastern 11 me (US& Canada). 9B-- "'Dam:800- 7 Mod Part 10_ *updated with dial in #. Confidential Treatment Requested by Goldrr _=Redacted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiations Permanent Subcommittee onInvestigations EXHIBIT #84 GS MBS-E-009976918 TAB 4 JOHN D. WORLAND. JR.(JW1962) ANTONIA CmON DANIEL CHAUDOIN JEFFREY WEISS 08-t JONATHAN COWEN BRIANSANO

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 100 F St., N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549 Phone: (202) 551-4438 (Worland) Fax:(202) 772-9246 (Worland) E-mail:worlandj@fec.gov .UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, -against-RALPH R.CIOFFI and MATTHEW M. TANNIN, Plaintiff, Defendants. ------------------------------ x COMPLAINT BLOCK, J. POHORELSKY,M.J. INF'ILED (J.e.Ot:, lCor couJ:7Cf! ,..JJt'r E.O.N 8UN 192008ROOJQl'N ' OFFICE 08 Civ.() JURYTRlAL DEMANDED Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), alleges the following against defendants Ralph R. Cioffi (''Cioffi'') andM. TanninSUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 1.This action concerns fraudulent acts and misrepresentations made by Cioffi and Tannin in connection with the high-profile collapse of two now-defunct hedge funds which they managed; the Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies . . misrepresented to Bank No.1 - or failedtoreport toBank No.I as required by the total return swap agreement - the EnhancedLeverage Fund's performance, portfolio composition, and true condition. 75.By the middle of May, Cioffi had concluded that the EnhancedLeverage Fund would not survive at all.OnMay13, 2007,he admitted to Tannin and the Third Manager:"1think ... the [Enhanced Leverage Fund]has tobeliquidated which seems to be somewhat certain given the redemption activity."(emphasis added).However, Cioffi and Tannin never disclosed this conclusion toBank No.1, despite a duty under the total return swap agreement toinform Bank No.I of material events. 2.Cioffi and Tannin Misrepresented the Funds' Net Asset Value 76.Most of thefunds'short positions had readily obtainable market prices and were marked tomarket daily.However, most of the funds'long portfolio consisted of highly illiquid securities that lacked a market quotation. 77.Pursuant toBSAM's pricing policy, thefunds sought to obtain mUltiple "marks" (i.e., prite quotations) fortheir long securities on a monthly basis, either from the dealers that had sold them securities or from other dealers who had become familiar with the funds'holdings.The funds sent their positions to dealers on the street at the end . of each month and typically averaged the marks that they received to determine a month-end valuation for each security.When the funds couldnot obtain sufficient marks, or when Cioffi thought the marks were incorrect, the fundsrelied on so-called "fair market" valuations, which Cioffi determined.Any fair market valuations hadto be approved by BSAM's pricing committee. 22 78.BSAM and the funds,with input from the defendants, computed a daily net asset value ("NA V") and month-to-date return for the High Grade and Enhanced Leverage Funds.However,these figures only took into account month-to-date changes tothefunds'hedges andtheir few exchange-traded .long securities and assumed that the rest of the long portfolio had remained the same valuation as the prior month-end marks.As a result,the fundsand the defendants historically not provide intra-month estimates tomost of their investors because such estimates were unreliable.Instead, they provided "preliminary estimates" within a couple of weeks after each month's end, followedby a final NAV about six weeks later.Preliminary estimates were issued after most dealer marks had been received.The finalNAV came out once all of the marks were available.By early 2007, many sUbprimewere rapidly declining in value, and thus BSAM and the defendants could no longer reasonably rely on stale, prior month-end marks as an indication of current values. 79.As late as mid-March 2007, Cioffi was adamant that intra-month estimates not be released toinvestors, castigating aBSAM sales person, internally, that the figures were unreliable:"You should also know better [than to release intra-month figures 1. in that our hedges are marked realtime [and] our assets at the end of each month.We've said that 1000 times!!" 80.. 'By April 2007, however, Cioffi was anxious to present the funds'April performance in alight.Thus, he not only took the unusual step of providing an intra-month estimate on the April 25, 2007 investor conference call, but also did so without any notice tothe callparticipants of the severe limitations inherentinthe estimate.The only information that Cioffi providedwas as follows:"The estimated 23 returns for Aprilare -0.6points for High Grade and -0.7 for Enhanced [i.e., -0.06% and -0.07%, respectively]."These "estimated returns" were disastrously off the mark, as the finalNA: Vs for April were -5.09% for the High Grade Fund and -18.97% forthe Enhanced Leverage Fund, stunningly large monthly losses for fundsthat Cioffi and Tannin hadmarketed as operating "I'ike a bank." 81.Tannin actively participated in the April25, 2007 call.Although he constantly interjected his opinions to reinforce and explain Cioffi's claims, in this instance, he said nothing toexplain the estimates'limitations. 82.Throughout May, Cioffi' became increasingly to fair value his funds'portfolios and bring the finalApril numbers as much in line with earlier estimates as possible, thereby avoiding the need to report a huge disparity and prompt a likely flood of additional redemptions.Cioffi's efforts, however,ultimately ran into resistance from BSAM's pricing committee. 83.At a May 31, 2007 meeting, the pricing rejected everyone of Cioffi's requests toset aside a dealer mark and use his own valuation.When challenged, Cioffi had virtually noevidence to support his desiredvaluations, andconceded in a contemporaneous e-mail toa coIIunittee member, "There is no markeL .. its [sic] all academic anyway [because] -19% [i.e.; the EnhancedLeverage Fund's anticipated final April NA V)'is doomsday." 84.Later inthe day on May 31sl,after the pricing committee had already met, Tannin e-mailed Cioffi to ask whether investors should still be given "the [preliminary] 24 -6.5 april or the larger down april?"Rather than simply telling TalUlin to use the most recent and accurate number, Cioffi even then continued toequivocate, responding, "Ah that's correct[.]I think that one deserves a phone call [to discussl" 85.Cioffi and Tarmin failedto disclose to the funds'investors the significant limitations on the April 25th "estimated returns," rendering the figuresmisleading under the circumstances.The estimates were material toinvestors. 86.Tannin also independently misrepresented the funds'April NAV.On or about May 3, 2007, he falsely represented to a significant institutional counterparty that the funds'pelformance had been flatto slightly positive in March and April and that the NA V s continued toincrease. 87.Furthermore, by the middle of May, at the latest, Cioffi and Tannin were aware that theEnhanced Leverage Fund's finalApril NA V would reflect losses of more than10%.Even thoughthe total return swap agreement with Bank No.1required Cioffi and Tannin tonotify Bank No.I of any actual or anticipated losses greater than10%, they failedtomake the required disclosure. 88.On June 7,2007, BSAM announced the Enhanced Leverage Fund's final April NA V and froze redemptions.The following day, it announced the High Grade Fund's final returns.Margin calls subsequently could no. longer be met, and creditors began seizing the funds'assets. 3.Cioffi Misrepresented an Upcoming CDOl Issuance as a Guaranteed Source of Liquidity 89.From2005through December 31,2006, BSAM and the funds issued approximately seven of their own COOs or CD02s into the marketplace.On the April25, 2007investor call, Cioffi claimed that the fundshad "significant amounts of 25 liquidity," in part because of what he variously called a "trade," "transaction," "facility," or "funding vehicle" - actually a C002 issuance - to be undertaken by Cioffi's team and BSAM with a domestic bank ("Bank No.2").Cioffi asserted that this transaction "should be done thismonth and will close in May."According toCioffi, this was a "significant transaction toget done."Cioffialsohad touted the transaction on the March12, 2007 conference calL 90.Although Cioffi continually presented the Bank No.2 C002 issuance as imminent throughout the spring, he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the deal would not actually be available to the funds until late Mayor early June, at the earliest. Moreover, he knew, or was recklessin not knowing, that the issuance would not solve the funds'current and/or prospective liquidity problems because there were essentially no buyers for new CDOs inthe market, which severely limited the amount of money that could be raised in an offering.I ~mid-April, Cioffi admitted to a broker that there was no "buy interest on anything anywhere in this world or universe[.l[I]think we need to go into outer space tofindnew buyers of cdo's." 91.When the dealwas ultimately done, in late May 2007, it failedtoimpart benefits tothe funds sufficient to solve their liquidity problems. 92.Cioffi misrepresented toinvestors the timing of t h ~Bank No. 2 CD()2 issuance and-its impact on the funds'liquidity.These misrepresentations were material toinvestors. D.CIOFFI AND TANNIN MATERIALLY MISREPRESENTED THE LEVEL OF INVESTOR REDEMPTIONS 93.As- April 2007 progressed, the defendants knew thatmany investors inthe funds were either submitting redemption requests or considering doing so.The 26 TAB 5 JOHN D. WORLAND. JR.(JW1962) ANTONIA CmON DANIEL CHAUDOIN JEFFREY WEISS 08-t JONATHAN COWEN BRIANSANO

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 100 F St., N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549 Phone: (202) 551-4438 (Worland) Fax:(202) 772-9246 (Worland) E-mail:worlandj@fec.gov .UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, -against-RALPH R.CIOFFI and MATTHEW M. TANNIN, Plaintiff, Defendants. ------------------------------ x COMPLAINT BLOCK, J. POHORELSKY,M.J. INF'ILED (J.e.Ot:, lCor couJ:7Cf! ,..JJt'r E.O.N 8UN 192008ROOJQl'N ' OFFICE 08 Civ.() JURYTRlAL DEMANDED Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), alleges the following against defendants Ralph R. Cioffi (''Cioffi'') andM. TanninSUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 1.This action concerns fraudulent acts and misrepresentations made by Cioffi and Tannin in connection with the high-profile collapse of two now-defunct hedge funds which they managed; the Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies . . misrepresented to Bank No.1 - or failedtoreport toBank No.I as required by the total return swap agreement - the EnhancedLeverage Fund's performance, portfolio composition, and true condition. 75.By the middle of May, Cioffi had concluded that the EnhancedLeverage Fund would not survive at all.OnMay13, 2007,he admitted to Tannin and the Third Manager:"1think ... the [Enhanced Leverage Fund]has tobeliquidated which seems to be somewhat certain given the redemption activity."(emphasis added).However, Cioffi and Tannin never disclosed this conclusion toBank No.1, despite a duty under the total return swap agreement toinform Bank No.I of material events. 2.Cioffi and Tannin Misrepresented the Funds' Net Asset Value 76.Most of thefunds'short positions had readily obtainable market prices and were marked tomarket daily.However, most of the funds'long portfolio consisted of highly illiquid securities that lacked a market quotation. 77.Pursuant toBSAM's pricing policy, thefunds sought to obtain mUltiple "marks" (i.e., prite quotations) fortheir long securities on a monthly basis, either from the dealers that had sold them securities or from other dealers who had become familiar with the funds'holdings.The funds sent their positions to dealers on the street at the end . of each month and typically averaged the marks that they received to determine a month-end valuation for each security.When the funds couldnot obtain sufficient marks, or when Cioffi thought the marks were incorrect, the fundsrelied on so-called "fair market" valuations, which Cioffi determined.Any fair market valuations hadto be approved by BSAM's pricing committee. 22 78.BSAM and the funds,with input from the defendants, computed a daily net asset value ("NA V") and month-to-date return for the High Grade and Enhanced Leverage Funds.However,these figures only took into account month-to-date changes tothefunds'hedges andtheir few exchange-traded .long securities and assumed that the rest of the long portfolio had remained the same valuation as the prior month-end marks.As a result,the fundsand the defendants historically not provide intra-month estimates tomost of their investors because such estimates were unreliable.Instead, they provided "preliminary estimates" within a couple of weeks after each month's end, followedby a final NAV about six weeks later.Preliminary estimates were issued after most dealer marks had been received.The finalNAV came out once all of the marks were available.By early 2007, many sUbprimewere rapidly declining in value, and thus BSAM and the defendants could no longer reasonably rely on stale, prior month-end marks as an indication of current values. 79.As late as mid-March 2007, Cioffi was adamant that intra-month estimates not be released toinvestors, castigating aBSAM sales person, internally, that the figures were unreliable:"You should also know better [than to release intra-month figures 1. in that our hedges are marked realtime [and] our assets at the end of each month.We've said that 1000 times!!" 80.. 'By April 2007, however, Cioffi was anxious to present the funds'April performance in alight.Thus, he not only took the unusual step of providing an intra-month estimate on the April 25, 2007 investor conference call, but also did so without any notice tothe callparticipants of the severe limitations inherentinthe estimate.The only information that Cioffi providedwas as follows:"The estimated 23 returns for Aprilare -0.6points for High Grade and -0.7 for Enhanced [i.e., -0.06% and -0.07%, respectively]."These "estimated returns" were disastrously off the mark, as the finalNA: Vs for April were -5.09% for the High Grade Fund and -18.97% forthe Enhanced Leverage Fund, stunningly large monthly losses for fundsthat Cioffi and Tannin hadmarketed as operating "I'ike a bank." 81.Tannin actively participated in the April25, 2007 call.Although he constantly interjected his opinions to reinforce and explain Cioffi's claims, in this instance, he said nothing toexplain the estimates'limitations. 82.Throughout May, Cioffi' became increasingly to fair value his funds'portfolios and bring the finalApril numbers as much in line with earlier estimates as possible, thereby avoiding the need to report a huge disparity and prompt a likely flood of additional redemptions.Cioffi's efforts, however,ultimately ran into resistance from BSAM's pricing committee. 83.At a May 31, 2007 meeting, the pricing rejected everyone of Cioffi's requests toset aside a dealer mark and use his own valuation.When challenged, Cioffi had virtually noevidence to support his desiredvaluations, andconceded in a contemporaneous e-mail toa coIIunittee member, "There is no markeL .. its [sic] all academic anyway [because] -19% [i.e.; the EnhancedLeverage Fund's anticipated final April NA V)'is doomsday." 84.Later inthe day on May 31sl,after the pricing committee had already met, Tannin e-mailed Cioffi to ask whether investors should still be given "the [preliminary] 24 -6.5 april or the larger down april?"Rather than simply telling TalUlin to use the most recent and accurate number, Cioffi even then continued toequivocate, responding, "Ah that's correct[.]I think that one deserves a phone call [to discussl" 85.Cioffi and Tarmin failedto disclose to the funds'investors the significant limitations on the April 25th "estimated returns," rendering the figuresmisleading under the circumstances.The estimates were material toinvestors. 86.Tannin also independently misrepresented the funds'April NAV.On or about May 3, 2007, he falsely represented to a significant institutional counterparty that the funds'pelformance had been flatto slightly positive in March and April and that the NA V s continued toincrease. 87.Furthermore, by the middle of May, at the latest, Cioffi and Tannin were aware that theEnhanced Leverage Fund's finalApril NA V would reflect losses of more than10%.Even thoughthe total return swap agreement with Bank No.1required Cioffi and Tannin tonotify Bank No.I of any actual or anticipated losses greater than10%, they failedtomake the required disclosure. 88.On June 7,2007, BSAM announced the Enhanced Leverage Fund's final April NA V and froze redemptions.The following day, it announced the High Grade Fund's final returns.Margin calls subsequently could no. longer be met, and creditors began seizing the funds'assets. 3.Cioffi Misrepresented an Upcoming CDOl Issuance as a Guaranteed Source of Liquidity 89.From2005through December 31,2006, BSAM and the funds issued approximately seven of their own COOs or CD02s into the marketplace.On the April25, 2007investor call, Cioffi claimed that the fundshad "significant amounts of 25 liquidity," in part because of what he variously called a "trade," "transaction," "facility," or "funding vehicle" - actually a C002 issuance - to be undertaken by Cioffi's team and BSAM with a domestic bank ("Bank No.2").Cioffi asserted that this transaction "should be done thismonth and will close in May."According toCioffi, this was a "significant transaction toget done."Cioffialsohad touted the transaction on the March12, 2007 conference calL 90.Although Cioffi continually presented the Bank No.2 C002 issuance as imminent throughout the spring, he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the deal would not actually be available to the funds until late Mayor early June, at the earliest. Moreover, he knew, or was recklessin not knowing, that the issuance would not solve the funds'current and/or prospective liquidity problems because there were essentially no buyers for new CDOs inthe market, which severely limited the amount of money that could be raised in an offering.I ~mid-April, Cioffi admitted to a broker that there was no "buy interest on anything anywhere in this world or universe[.l[I]think we need to go into outer space tofindnew buyers of cdo's." 91.When the dealwas ultimately done, in late May 2007, it failedtoimpart benefits tothe funds sufficient to solve their liquidity problems. 92.Cioffi misrepresented toinvestors the timing of t h ~Bank No. 2 CD()2 issuance and-its impact on the funds'liquidity.These misrepresentations were material toinvestors. D.CIOFFI AND TANNIN MATERIALLY MISREPRESENTED THE LEVEL OF INVESTOR REDEMPTIONS 93.As- April 2007 progressed, the defendants knew thatmany investors inthe funds were either submitting redemption requests or considering doing so.The 26 TAB 6 N arne:Forster Date:7/11/07 Time: Desk:38 CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BYA!G-SEC1910855 GROUP,!NC. J23G.txt 11236 2MAN:Hi. 3ANDRlW:HOy. 4 MAN:Howilreyoudoing? 5ANDREW:I'm You? 6 M/\!'-J:[OVERU\PPING]Yeah,so,sohowwas 7thebigbirthdayparty? 8ANDREW:uh,yeah,'i twasgoodactua 11 y, 9yeah. 10MAN:Howold? 11ANDREW:Hewasfau ryes te relay. 12MAN:Oh.Yeall. 13ANDRE\-J:[OVF:RLAPPING]It,wasactually 14fouronSunday.Hisbirthdaypartyyesterday. 15 That'sabiqone. 16ANDREI':ohyeah.[LAUGHS]Exactly. 17MAN:Urn,I'veguttvtelldfunnysLor'y 18andIgotacoupleacoupleofthingsforyou. 19Urn,Iwasawaythi sweekendwi thmybudd>i esonmy 20annualgolft.t'ip.Thisyearwewentto,uh, 21[PINEHURST7J,in.uh.Scotland. 22ANDRE-\;J:Right. 23MAN:Andwe'red rj vi ngbacktothe 24airporTandwealwaysplay,we'r'e,youknov..,...we 25knowPilchver'y,very,verywell.Putit 1thatway.And.uh,weah;aysplaythesefunny 2games.Myfri end[,lI.,LAN?J[U\ST?Jwasw'i1:h 3meandanotherbuddy.Andhecameupwiththis CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. page1 1 2 A!G-SEC1910856 1236.txt 4gamewherehehadt:osaywordsthatwehadto 5guesshowyouwould5flYthf>m,youknow,ifyou 6wereinEngland. 7/\NDREt'J:Ri ght.[LAUGHS] 8 Youknow,[LAUGHS]causemyfri end 9A1 anhappenstobeve ry..HeIsgotagoodearfor, 10for.forlinguisticsandhelike,heca.npickup 11allkindsof...likehowyou'dsaygarageinstead 12ofgarage;thingslikp. 13ANDREW:Right. 14M)\N:That'slikeakindofhokeyone. 15Anyway,everytimehe'dsayawordoneofmy 16fi 1Stwaysoftryi ngtofi gu roeouthov-vit mi ght 17bepronounced,pronouncedisItriedtoimagine 18ifyouwe resayi ng;ttome.For'somereasonyou 19WAremygo-"tomen'tal,uh,imagefortheaudible 20[UNINTELJ 21 ,L'..NDREtJ:[OVERL,A,PPlt-1G]Isee,I 22wasthi-,youwerethinkinqaboutme. 23 r1AN:exact'l y.And,uh,maybe,,"Ican' t 24remembersomeofthewordshepicked.urn,uh,urn, 25oninsteado-Fsayln9specialtyIguessintheUK, 1yousayspeci ali t:y.Isthatri ght?Isthat."i 5 2that .. _ thatisone? 3ANDR[W:Speciality,yes,specia'lity, 4yeah. Righ-t.Suit,it wasagamelike 6that.Weweredrivingthecarfrompinehurstto 7theairport,aboutanhour'surive.Andthdt 8wouldbeatypicalgamethatwewouldcomeup 9wi th.So,anyway,it j sbeenonmym-ind. CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. page2 3 A!G-SEC1910857 " 1236.txt 10Speakingofwhich,how,uh,howis 11everything? 12ANDREW:It's,uh,youknow,alright. '1"11A",I Ie 1 .LJ ..)J 14Imeanwhat' 5goi ngon1 i keSOl't 15of...whathdveyoubeenlh i nk-j ngaboutorfocused 16onor ..andhow[UNINTEL] 17ANDREl'J:[OVERLAPPINGjwhatar'ewe 18on?.!.'mfocusingonCD.A.Sandsuhprimeo 19MAN:Yeahobviollsly. ANDREW:Nuthingelse.Andspending21ofmytimeanswel'ingquestionsof[ENTERGY?] 22guys,AIG,youkllOw,sullivan,[MCDEAN7],Lewls, 24'-'iAN:Right. 25Everyfuckingoneyouknow. 1Everyratingagencywe'vespokento.Youknow, 2everytimetheycomeoutwithvJe 3havetogoandgetthatandthenanalyze,,11the 4exposureswe'vegotintherestof .;+- C-,.,.,."''' 'L ..yvu 5know,fair'lytimeconsum-ing.So ... 6MAN:Urn,andhow ...f\partfromthefact 7 it'stotallydistractingandtota-Ilynot 8di rectional-Iythe waywewanttogo,tlOW ... 9soareyou[THOROUGHLY?Jconcernedoryoujust 10sortmore[UNINIEL] 11Aim Rcw' :[OVERLAPPING]Ah,youknow,if ynu'daskedme,urn,uh.probablyaboutamonth 13agoIwas1 ike,youknow,;,uicidalsid.1mean1 14guessit's,uhthE'actualstuffthatcotn'i ngup 15rUNINTEL]actua 11 yis,is51i gtlll ybe Ue rthan ... page3 CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. 4 A!G-SEC1910858 ,. 1236.txt 16youknow,itkindof[CEMEt\:TO?],youknow,the, 17thehopewasalwaysthati 1:ISgo; ngtobe2006 18stuffand2005collateralwillbe,uh,youknow, 19performmuchbetter. 20MAN:yeah. 21ANDREW:Andther'atin9agencystuffI 22guessisslightlY,youknow.confirmingthat. 23MAN:YUP.yup. 24,A.NDREW:Igues ssoithe 1 psfromthat 25pointofviewinter'msofsortofultimateloss. 1Theproblemthatwe'regoingtofaceisthat 2we'regoingtohavejustenormousdowngradeson 3thestuffthat'Ne' VBgot_ 4MAN:Right, 5ANDREW:So,youknow,yuuknow,weso r-t 6ofsittherewitha60billioncoobookand.you 7know,nowwe'resorts'lttingandsaying,yeah, 8yeah,it's[SUPERSENIOR?j,itlssupersenior, 9youknow.Itisn'tgoingtobe,toomuchlonger 10beforewe'resaying,yeah,okay,alrigh-t,we've 11got,youknow,20bi'llionofsingleArisknow. 12Andthat!sgoingtohappen. nodoubt 13aboutit. 14MAN:lOVERLAPPING][UNINTEL]Youthink 15it Isdownthatfar',s i ngl e.,A,? 16ANDREW:Yeah,ohyeah,Butthisisjust 17goingtogofromtriple...Imeanit's 18immediatelyjustgoingtogotripleA,doubleA, 19singleA.Andit=sjust.-20MAN;Yeah, 21ANDREW:YOUknow,you'vegottripleBs page4 CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. 5 A!G-SEC1910859 1236.txt 22downgradedtotriplecs,youknow,alotoft.he 23tripleBSaregoingtogodowntosingleB.It's 24goingtogetvery,urn,very,veryuglyforthe 25next[UNINTEL]. 1MAN:They' r"e,um ...Isthel"cconcernthat 2theres ...that, thaTevenTcouldcauseus 3[HAVETOMARK?J? 4ANDREW:Youknow,a IIofthi 5stuff 5doesn'the'lpbecause,youknow,all,allthe 6accountsaresittingthet'eandtheyreadthe 7papersthatsay,youknow,murksdownhen:.'and 8peoplearetryingtohidemarksandtherestof 9it.Sothey,youknow,there's of 10fromthemastowhyrUNINTEL],youknow. 11Everyonetellsmethati'tistradingand 12it'stl,\'Olowerandallther'pstofit i'!nd 13howcomeyoucarl'tmarkyourbook.Soit's 14definite']ygoingtogiveitfocus. 15MAN:Right. 16ANDREW:Imeanwecan' L.\\'f::'hdveto 17markit.it's,uh;we're[UNINTEL]fucked 18baSically. 1.9MI'\!'i:yeah.no,clearlyit'sprettybig, 20uh,onetohavetomark. 21 Yeah. 2?MAN:But,uh,Imeantheque,Imean .. , 231getafairly,afairlygoodargumenttobemade 24isifit was tomarkwhpnitwasSUP-,super 25sen4or,itdoesn'tmeanit'sanyeasiertomark CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. Page) 7 A!G-SEC1910860 1236,txt 1justbecausethere's ...it'snotsuperSenlQr 2anymore. 3ANDREW:Yeah,youknow,wethoughtwe'd 4tryto ..."fiEobviously tryingto ...ImeanI,I 5thinkit's[UNINTEL] 6iViAN:[OVERLAPPING]Insomeways 7especiallyI,1wouldargueit'shardertomark 8now.Causenowyouhavedifferentopinionson 9what's[UNlt-JTEL]quality.\.A/hef1it.'ssupersenior, 10when[UNINTEl]agreesit'ssuperseniorthe-11ANDRD'J:Theproblem-isthere':;moreof 12marketnow,Thatpeopleareactually,youknow", 13Befor-e-14,olAN:yeah, 15ANDREW:Youknow,ifyouthi nkaboutit 16befo re...[BACKGROUNDVOICE]ohholdon.Yeah_ 17[BACKGROUNDVOICE] 18[am01=TAPE] 19 20 21 22 23 24 1AplusRecordingandTranscribing,adivisionof 2Aplusoificesystems,statesthatthe 3precedingtranscriptwascreatedbyoneofits 4employeesusingstandardelectronictranscription 5equipmentandisatrueandaccuraterecordof 6theaudi aontheprovi dedmed'i atothebestof CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. Page6 8 A!G-SEC1910861 1236.txt 7thatemployee'sability.Themediafromitvhichwe 8workedwasprovidedtoliS.Wecanmakeno 9asTOitsauthenticity. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Attestedtoby: path ck Page7 CONF!DENT!AL TREATME!\!TREQUESTED BY GROUP,!NC. A!G-SEC1910862 TAB 7 From: Sent: To: Subject: 20bb of supersenior ----- OriginalMessage -----Davilman,Andrew 07126/20070548:06 PM Frost,Alan Re:Sorry to bother YOllon From: Alan.Frost@aigfpc.com To: Davilman, Andrew Sent: ThuJul26 17:47:012007 Subject: Re:Sorry tobother youon Onwhat? ----- OriginalMessage -----From: Davilman, Andrew To:Frost, Alan Sent:Thu Jul2617:29:35 2007 Subject: Sorry to bother youon Vacation.Margin callcomingyour way.Want to give youa heads up. 't Page1 of 2 ConfidentialTreatmentRequestedby AmericanInternationalGroup,Inc. AIG-FCIC00370077 to them. Page 2 of 2 TAB 8 Goldman Sachs International Peterborough Court 1133 Fleet St J London, EC4A2BB Goldman Sachs International is authorised aJ1d regulated by the Financial Services Authority To Attn: Phone No: Email: From Phone No: F.ax No: Email: Today's date Valuation as of Close Market Exposure (USD) Credit Derivatives Equity Options Equity Structured Product Total Exposure TriggerlThreshold Margin Required Collateral Value (USD) Increment Minimum Call Amt Margin Call Inslruclions USD Cash, Margin and Coupons: Manhatlan BanK, NewYorll, ABA#021000021 AcooW]\; 9301011483 Account: Goldman, Sachs & Co. Reference: COLLATERAL Collateral Invoice A1G FINANCIAL PRODUCTS CORP Group aigfpcolJateral@aigfpc.com Do Tom 212-902-7461 212-42B-4n5 do.tom@gs.com 27-JUL-2007 26-JUL-20D7 1,835,008,531.69 43,695,495.23 6,722,114.70 1,885,626,131.82 75,000,000.00 1,810,626.131.82 0.00 10,000.00 100,000.00 1,810,630,000.00 .6oJllmab sadts '..

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;0 c CDCJ)\J 0 z " 0 m Z -I r -I ::0 S m Z -I ::0 m 0 C m en -I m 0 0::1-< Q 0 r 0 S :P Z en () :::r en !(o () 0 (i) (J) o 00 (0 Tr.ldcRelerenoe IdReference Obliga!lon NUUQ409IPOOaoooooooReSeRVOIR FUNDING LTD. SDS2012866141.0.0CO\.UMBIA CENTER TRUST 5082012987952.0.0.0CO20Q5.CDICOMMERCIAL MORTGAGS TRUST 5082012986050.0.0.0GE CAPITAL COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION 5082Oi2988045.0.0.0aE CAPITAL COMMERCIAL MORTGAGe CORPORATION S08533920572.0ING BANK N.V. NUUQSIOOLOaeOOOOOODORIENT POINT COO, LTD. 5082012886109.0.0.SANC OFAMERICASTRUCTURAL SECURITY TRUST 508201.967809.0.0.0BANC OFAMERICA STRUCTURAL SECURITY TRUST 5062012006211.0.0MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL SDB2012ge8071.0.0.0MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL NuUa409HS0060000000REseRVOIRFUNDINQLTD. SDBS33S82552. 1.0COX.NA.lG,HVOl.8 NUUQ4102NOO6OOOO000MERCURY COO 2004-1. LTD. NUUQ505SC0080000000SAiURN VENTURES I,LTD. 50B2012986059.0.0.0JP MORGAN CHAse COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SEes CORP 5082012686119.0.0SANC OFAMERICA STRUCTURAL SECURJTY TRUST S082012966056.0.0.0JP MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIA\. MORTGAGE SEes CORP 5062012987938.0.0.0SANe OFAMERICA STRUCTURALSECURITY TRUST SOB2012986057.0.0.0JP MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAl. MORTGAGE SEes CORP BuuaSI11500eOo.o.o.OBRODERICK 1 COO LTD. 5062012006145.0.0JP MORGAN CHAseCOMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SEes CORP 5082012986058.0.0.0JP MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SEeS CORP NUUQ6014MOO6O\lOOOOOSOUTH COAST FUNDING VlIIl.TO NUUQ5030KOOBOO.0,0.OHUNTINGTON COO.\. TO. REPUBLICOF ITALY NUUQ6090VO030000AOOABACUS 2005NS1,LTD. SOB532354359.0REPUBLICOF ITALY . NUUQS04GOOOSOOOOOOOSOUTH COA$T FUNDING NUUQ6013AOoaoooOOOO50UTH COAST FUNDING VIII lTD suuasOeOJooaoocooooISCHUS coo IlTO BUUQ5060KOOSOOOOOOOISCHUS coo I LTD NUUQS10DPOO800.0.0.0ORIENT POINTCOO,LTD. Nuua5100NOO800.0.0.0ORIENT POINT COO, lTD. NUUQ4123NOO800.0.0.0OUMHILL ASS COO l.TO S092012988052.0.0.0Of CAPITAL COMMERC!AL MORTGAGE CORPORATION SDBS:lo3080300.1.4KRAFT FOODSINC. SOS2012886121.0.0BEAR STEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGESECUR!TIES INC S062012987943.0.0.0BEARSTEARNS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES INC SOB2012968060.0.0.0LBuas COIv'oMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST soa2012aaEi201.0.0L6uas COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUST NUUQ512BMooaooooOOOKLEROSPREFERRED FUNDING II,LLC SOB2012388062.0.0.0LBUSS COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE TRUsT S08533918096.0BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC Counlelparty ReI.Number 772240772:1;44 7722 I -l ;::0 :s:: m Z -l ;::0 m 0 C m (f) -l m 0 III -< (j) 0 r 0 S :t> Z CJ));> (") :c CJ)po 0 9 (j) (f) o co N W W Trade Reference IdGS NumberFixed Mid Currenl RateSpread 9asedI NO 80B20129S8061 ,0,0,0SPBWM6SN ewaSII16OOBOOOOOOO8RCNC710N 80B981652352,0,0.00N 5092012886139,0,0B8HA0712N 509508568674.064NOO7SO N 80B2012987856,0.0,06N SD6201286Bll1,0,0aPTtP712N $06504492883,0,0,0al'JV9K90N , SOB504493409,0,0,0SM9L70N 50B50467oo0$,0.0,0 0N S092012988054,0,0,08RPOO76N 80B53391812a.o3J49Ll49N S082012886131 ,0,05018GB12N 50853209211;16,0GZOXY915N 5062012986074,0,0,0BP3TBG8N NUUQ409HROO80000000BNV2P311N NUUQ409INOOSOOOOOOO8NV2p311 N 50B201'2937971 ,0,0.0SRXN72BN 506201288621 6,0,0SpaTBS6N NUUQ5078S00BOO,0,0,0SQBZN30N 8QB5Q4678635.0,0.081\N9K9 N 506503-565139.0,0.0esXUES0N 5D6201268616:1,0,0BRXN72BN 8062012666165.0.08SSSE7SN . NUUOS035BOQBOOOOOOOBPHUPIIZN 80620129B8040.0.0.0aS55E78N 80B2012600151 ,0,08pnQS12N 5082012968077,0.0,08P9EWZ8N 50B531906737,02ROGWZ38N NUU0510lJDOSOQ,Q,0,08R2SGS0N S062012967916,0,0,06R6P128N S092012885113,0,0BSH9S612N BUUQSI20LOO800,0.0.O8RHKESQN 5082012981934,0,0,06RSJMSaN S062012866220.0,0aROJ048N NUU04123000eOOOOOQO11N 5092012987973,0,0.06R1U17BN S092012886125.0,08RMOG712N 50B:!0IZ8861;l.3.0,DeSHA6112N NuuaS09IUOO8OO000008R38Z310N NUUQS09IVOOBOOOOOOO8R36Z310N S082012886117.0.08RLM3812N NUUQ504GE00800.0.0,06PRL460N SD620129S00s3,0,0,06R97'vVS,9N -uo 0 o::J -:::!1 oc. CD CD -u!il -u CJ)c0 OJ"O ::J:::::::!. OW UJ-< CD OJ::JC OJ CJ)CD s OCD oCJ)::J ="::J

OJ OJ;:::+: o '.Trade RererenceIdGSNumberFlJCed RBleApprox Mid Curren! RaleSprud 8aoed INO BUU0511110600.0.0.0SR.9U930N 'S06532092397.02ECM0917N S062012886159.0.0a03lE6BN S082012987954.0.0.0I!R97818III5092012987940,0,0.0B03lESaN SDB20129BIlOB4.0,O.0BROJ04BN NUUQ4102Q0060ooooo011N 5082012866137.0.08SOSK912N S092012966055.0.0.0SPXCLSBN NUUQ5030LOoaoOOOOOOep3JI110N $OB2012886153,0.08RLSGJ12III 508201 '2SI36123,O.OBSH9V912N SOB20129B8042.0.0.080U3R98N 5062012886147.0,0aSH6S'12N 80B20129BS088.0.0.0BRGYf38N 50B2012998043.0.0.0eOU3we10N 5092"012866135,0.0BRTY9512N NUUQS022AOD700.0.0.00N 5082012966047.0.0.08PZDW5eN 8Q50A2 '2 N 50B20, 2986046.0.0,0SP6WR510N 5092012988167.0,0.0a03lxs8III SOB2012988048.0.0.0SPS9LOBN 50B2012988168.0.0.08S54S48N NUUQ507COOOeooooooo6OBZN310N 50B2012987947.0,0.0BRP005aN 8082012866155.0,0SSHAU912N 5DB2Gl296B092.0.0.0BRV8S76N 5092012988039,0.0,08RGWFl8N BUUQ5111900800000006RCHF710N NUUQ4'25HOO80000000 1\N 8082012987959.0.0,06P5997eN 508503565516.0,0.08SXUF50N 5062012987962.0.0.06PSOP J-\.-lLI-LI Al Al It shouldbe noted that aswIth Calyon,Socgen donot calculate pnces themselvesand simply askthe dealer they bought the bondrromrora current estimate or current levelsand thev then passthis level on to us in the form of the CSA call.Half of the trades they have made callsunder are using levels provided by Goldman. Socgen also appreciate illiquid nature of the nlarket andthe !:'lctthatt..l)eyhave no real ability to"gut check" the prices they have received.As yvith others they have happily enteredintoa diaiog-ue to try and conie toan acceptable solution in the face of nowaytogettrue dealer levels. We have 8 negative basis trades on with UBStotalling 6.3bn.There isnothreshold for the CSA.They have made cfllisof 40nun on 3 trades asshoyvnbeloyv: SUlllmit R.MD S CDO 1,Ltd. Vcrtil'ul Triaxx PriIlle 200G-I A11..-10 ,, 1\- I Al

9g.91% 99.08% There are5 other trades where they have made nocalls lmplymg pnces of lOO.OO%. These 5 are: lschus HG T,ongHill Long lIill Margate Whalcly \Vachovia AIS A-SIVF A-SlT AIS AlA we nave 6tradescovenngiiransaciion \viih Wachovia fora toiaiof 8 i 8mm.There isan8% threshoid onthistrade and they have made nocoiiateraicaiL Davis Sq.TT AIAMT CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY AMERICANINTERNATIONAL GROUP,INCAIG-SEC1364138 Davis Sq.IT Davis Sq.II DaVISSq.11 I)avis Sq.II Davis Sq.TT!\lBMI A1CMT A1AMM AIH MM AICMM Summary of mices we haye received: I think thetable below perhaps best sUlTI111ariseswhat we have recei ved - basically the prices ,ye have receivedareallover th.eplace an.deveryone ,ve talk torwsoperJy adrnitted that the bonds \ve are referencing,have not,and donot trade. For iiiustration i have copiedbeiow the overaii summary of me deais that have been referenced in our recent CSA cails.As you can see where we do have more than one level they are