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A littoral gullAMPHIBIOUS Operations arenot new to British warriors- they were on the receiv-

ing end when Julius Caesar

swept ashore in 55BC, andhave seen both sides of thecoin ever since (see page iv).Using the sea to deliver a tell-

ing military blow to an enemycountry on its own doorstep is awell-established tactic, and whenexecuted to plan can add hugeimpetus to a campaign.But as long-time exponents of the

art-also called Combined Operations- British forces only embraced themodern concept after the blunders ofGallipoli (see page iv).

This doctrine, honed in WorldWar 2, has much in common withthe USA and Europe, though thereremains one big difference betweenthe US andUK.

While the former aims to bludgeonits way ashore against opposition,using technological and numericalsuperiority, the British prefer a moresubtle approach, seeking to landagainst weak or non-existant opposi-tion, using intelligence and deceptiontactics to slip ashore.Not that British commandos avoid

a fight; woe betide the defenders whotry to thwart a wave of Royal Marinesheading their way.

But there is an immense effortinvolved in getting the Royals tothat point, and a description of atext-book operation indicates the

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compexity of such undertakings.The trigger for an amphibious

operation need not be a military one,such as the invasion of the FalklandIslands in 1982, or the withdrawal oftroops from Dunkirk in 1940.Amphibious operations can also

help in a humanitarian crisis, andcan also evacuate civilians from a warzone, as in the Lebanon in July.They can also range in size, from

small-scale reconnaissance raids rightup to massed assaults, such as the D-Days landings in Normandy in 1944.But for our theoretical operation,

there is a military objective, and thetop brass have decided that the mis-sion of an amphibious force is to gettroops ashore in a foreign country.One crucial factor is thataland-

ing is a transition, the culmina-tion of a maritime phase andthe genesis of a land phase,andthis overlap has proved the

undoing of many a campaignplan, as admirals and generalsbicker over supremacy.

Today the value of joint planningand a seamless progression from mari-time to land phase is established, andin the days after the decision to deploythere will be much detailed planningby battle staff in all three Services.

At the same time the configurationof the force will be determined; in ourexample the force will leave from itshome base, making availability andstowage of equipment simpler.

In reality the force may alreadybe on deployment by the time the

plans are refined, and the naturethe operation will obviously havebearing on the shape and size of 1task group.

In the meantime the intelligengathering will have started in earne

Satellite imagery, aerial photogphy and intercepted communicaticall have a part to play, but therenothing quite like getting someyour people into the area.

Submarines have a role, capturiand transmitting digital imagesplanners within minutes.But the best option is to land sj

cialist forces or reconnaissance urto assess the strength and positiof enemy forces and to gather infmation about conditions on chobeaches, including tide and weathnatural hazards and the hinterland.The task group will by now

forming up, and ideally will consisti a transport groupi command/communications shipsi a fire support group to proviNaval Gunfire Support (NGS)the Land Forcei an air and submarine deferscreen, based on a carrier groupi amine warfare groupi auxiliaries for resupply.The detailed plans, like a scr

complete with unit objectives, tiings and locations, will be just abcready as the force sets offfor theJoOperations Area (JOA) or battle zo;and commanders will feel a lot hcpier if the wholeplan can be "Amphibious Crehearsed on a initial intelligenc

Marines wait tofrom HMSOcetheir landing crem Iraq;ahoveiofHMS Albion d

-- fire Support;RAclose air suppo,Cdo RM ashore

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tie toof friendly shore en route, confirming the Commando Brigade RM forces - the directing close air supporta order by which troops and equipment 'sea soldiers' of 40, 42 or 45 Cdo U Comms Squadron, providing secure

are landed, highlighting weaknesses maybe found members of539 Assault communications for the LFand allowing troops to get a feel for Squadron RM, 3 Cdo Brigade's inte- U RM PoliceTroop, directing vehicles,their part in the grand scheme. gral landing craft organisation, which escorting convoys and protecting the

St. In the days preceding the actual sets up a land-based command post LF commanderassault itself, small groups of special- and assists with maritime movement " Logistics Sqn, supporting theists will go into the JOA, dropped by of logistics, as well as providing the Brigade HQ and the Support Group.

is submarine, ship or aircraft, possibly wherewithall for the LF Commander As the troops forge inland, the logis-of swimming or parachuting ashore, to mount seaborne raids or flanking tics offload from the ships begins in

They will watch the enemy, clear manoeuvres along the coast. earnest, with stores, fuel and equip-ng obstacles and prepare the ground; on Also landed as quickly as possible ment ferried ashore by sea and airso she day of the assault itself they will are the 105mmguns of29 Commando - possibly under counter-attack.

mark beaches for incoming troops and Regiment RA, which provides close For this reason, stores maybe safere- direct gunfire -she latter task mainly artillery support for 3 Cdo Brigade, based as sea under the protection of

falls to 148 (Meiktila) Cdo Forward Fire co-ordination cells will ensure the maritime group.on Observation Battery Royal Artillery, NGS and artillery are effective. Mobile logistic and repair support

RN and Army volunteers. Hot on the heels of the spear-for the LF is provided by the remain-

en The safe arrival of the Task Group head troops is the LF Sup-der of the Cdo Log Regt, formed of

er, in the JOA means that all the com-port Party, a squadron of the Royals, sailors and soldiers in five

ponenss are in place for an assault,Commando Logistic Regiment squadrons.

be although for absolute peace of mind which controls the beach and " HQ Sqn liaises between ships andof the commanders will seek total man-

associated support areas.forward units, processing supply needs

time and aerial supremacy. and prioritising deliveryThe assault may be preceded by a GR7 Harrier bombers, 847 NAS's " Repair and recovery of LF equip-

bombardment, but if surprise is cru- HA Mk7 Lynx or Apaches can also be ment from guns to vehicles is downcial the first sign of an attack could be called on to hit pockets of resistance. to the Equipment Support Sqnthe landing craft hitting the shore and A specialist UK LF Command " The Logistic Support Sqn provideshelicopters flying in additional troops. Support Group then comes into play. mobile stores, fuel and vehicle support

Helicopters have become a vital Headed by a HQ and Signals UTheMedical Sqn can create a 100-part of combined ops since they were Squadron, there are six sub-units: bed dressing station within hours,first used in the Suez campaign in " Brigade Patrol Group (providing close to forward units.

ipt 1956; their unique strength is to allow reconnaissance ahead of and to the As the LF disappears over the hori-troops to be landed behind or on the flanks ofthe main force) zon, with a well-established supportflanks of defending forces. "YTroop, an electronic warfare troop train in place, she amphibious opera-

ins The first objective of the landing "AirDefence Troop, using missiles to tion has achieved its aim, and theis to secure a foothold on the beach, defend specific groups or locations maritime element is ready for rede-and alongside the main infantry of 3 U Tactical Air Control Parties, ploymens.

)perations made simple (clockwise from top left): Submarines such as HMS Torbay can help with:e gathering; rigid raiding craft of539 Assault Squadron carry out a mock raid in Norway; Royalload vehicles from HMSOcean on to their landing craft; troop-carrying Sea king helicopters flyin at the start of an airborne assault; Royal Marines from HMSAlbion test the depth of water asft approaches the assault beach; 40 Commando RM go ashore on the al Fawpeninsula in South-,craft (or Landing Craft Air Cushion -LCAC)of539 Assault Squadron RM operates from the dockuring exercises in Norway(also on frontpage); the 4.Sin gun ofHMSIron Duke, usedin Naval Gun-FGR7Harriers are refuelled on a Royal Navy carrier. The bombers, andApache gunships, provideI for a Landing Force; a Chinook of 18 Squadron RAFdelivers a load ofmortar ammunition to 40in Southern Iraq; a Mexeflote pontoon is used to offload bulk stores from RFA Fort Rosalie

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NAVY NEWS AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SUPPLEMENT, SEPTEMBER 2006

" Oneof the artificial Mulberry Harbours on the Normandy coast,a crucial factor in the success of theD-Day Landings in 1944

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Modern foilce shaneby blunders 01 the

AT FIRST it was a non-contest - every Tom, Dick and Harry (or Norman) who took a shine to the green andpleasant island of Britain just walked straight in and helped themselves.Romans, Angles, Saxons, Vikings, through to William the Conqueror's troops in 1066, found little real resistance from the locals,

who were split into tribes and could be picked offwith some ease by a well-organised and determined assault force.But then things started to look

up for the English; they started todish out some of the same medi-cine they had been receiving.

It was hardly surprising thatthe locals became familiar with

domestic subjugation in Wales

amphibious operations; living onan island, any sort of military

and Scotland) was an amphibious ly: . . \

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force, and 4

as theEnglish Navy gathered

~v I, 'lbstrength so the opportunity tomount such amphibious opera-opera-tions became more frequent. ,The English became just as

adept at thwarting enemy attemptsto land, with the Spanish suffering

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a particularly resounding defeat i .frr ...

when the Armada was routed in H - . . ..

1588 and plans for an invasion' . .disappeared.

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The Royal Navy graduallygained almost total mastery of theseas, bringing with it both sue-cess and a very real but hidden s-- - - . - .danger.

It was all becoming a little......................................

too easy - a squadron of "HMS Fearless's Beach Recovery Vehicle allows Royal Marines of 3 commando Brigade adry landingships would sail unchal- at San carlos Bay during the Falklands War in 1982lenged into some far-flungcorner of the empire and,invariably, a landing forcewould take possession ofwhatever it wanted.This mastery bred a kind of

arrogance, which meant the sci-ence of amphibious operationswas never studied by command-ers; by dint of bravery, luck orsheer bloody-mindedness, theBritish would tend to win through,albeit with the odd bloody nose(or much worse) for their efforts.

In too many cases, control ofthe sea did not act as a spring-board for victory on terrafirma.And yes, there were major suc-

cesses along the way.Gibraltar (1704 -a joint opera-

tion between British and Dutchmarines, a combination which stillexists today), Quebec (1759) andin particular Aboukir (1801), forexample, were all well-plannedand well-executed examples ofcombined operations.But all too often there was

friction between Admiral X andGeneralY, resulting in a disjointedand frequently ill-conceived planof action.That parlous state ofaffairs cul-

minated in the débãcle of Gallipoliin 1915, a thoroughly poor cam-paign from inception to execution- the only saving grace was thesuccessful subsequent evacuation,another type ofamphibious opera-tion.

Designed to help put theTurks out of the war by allow-ing an attack on the capital,Constantinople, Gallipoli wasa plan B to the Navy's ill-fatedattempt to force a route throughthe narrow Dardanelles into theSea of Marmara.The Navy took a battering- although ironically, and unbe-

knownst to the Allies, the Turkishforts were on the verge of defeatwhen the warships withdrew - soa landing was suggested, givingthe warships cover in the narrow

AcknowledgementsWith thanks to Lt Col Charlie Wilson RM. Background readingincluded Amphibious Operations, the Projection of Sea PowerAshore, by Col M.H.H. Evans (Vol 4 of Brassey's Sea Power);Amphibious Warfare, the Theory and Practice of AmphibiousOperations in the 20th century, by Ian Speller and ChristopherTuck; and Amphibious Operations by Arch Whitehouse, as wellas the Imperial WarMuseum website.

Photographers whose work was used include P0(Phot)Sean dee (including the front cover of the supplement), P0(Phot) Steve Lewis, L.A(Phot) Christine Wood, P0(Phot) DarrenMacdonald, PO(Phot) Jim Gibson, LA(Phot) Jack Russell,LA(Phot) Dave Gallagher and W02 Giles Penfound.

waters.But with vague plans drawn

up using inaccurate maps andoutdated guides, the odds werealways stacked against the assaultforce, and as the Turks expectedsuch an assault they quickly builtdefences in all the likely spotswhich effectively sealed the fate ofthe landing forces.

British, French, Australian andNew Zealand forces went ashoreon April 25 at Cape Helles andAnzac, but barely left the beachesbefore being bogged down in thekind of attritional trench warfarefamiliar from theWestern Front.A flanking manoeuvre at Suvla

Bay, co-ordinated with a break-out from Anzac, petered out, andthe troops were finally pulled outin December and January.Around 46,000 Allied soldiers

died, with total casualty figuresestimated at 250,000 - but theGallipoli campaign showed theRoyal Navy was learning fast.The Anzac and Helles land-

ings were haphazard, using what-ever boats and craft were available,but at Suvla a more co-ordinatedapproach, using troopships andarmoured transfer vessels, broughtmuch better results, along with amore effective use of naval gunfiresupport, which caused the Turksmuch grief.

Gallipoli was a lesson for theAllies, and one which paved theway for the successful landings inWorld War 2, such as OperationTorch in North Africa, Anzio andSalerno, and the D-Day Landingsin Normandy.

In the case of Normandy,detailed plans were made using

the best intelligence (including thegathering of thousands of picturepostcards and family snaps of thecontinental coast) and specialistequipment, from ships to vehicles,was provided.And although such a huge

operation could not go entirelyto plan, all the boxes were ticked- an element of surprise (decoysand feints misled the Germansinto concentrating on the Pas deCalais, further east), air and seasuperiority, a sufficiently largelanding force and an ingeniousand well-executed logistics opera-tion.Whatever the political machi-

nations behind the Suez Crisisof 1956, the assault was a mili-tary success for the Royal Navy,and the troops of 45 CommandoRM were the first to conductan amphibious air assault, flyinginto Port Said using helicoptersbased on HMSTheseus andHMSOcean.But perhaps the best example

of a classic British amphibiousoperation came in the FalklandsWar, when the British task groupmanaged to win almost completecontrol of the sea, and subduedthe Argentine air threat sufficient-ly to allow landings to take place.These were made at the isolated

and undefended San Carlos area,allowing an unopposed landingand time for the land force togather itself and 'yomp' into anultimately successful engagementwith the Argentine defenders, whohad been weakened by bombard-ment and blockade.

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" Troop-carrying Sea King Mk4s line up on the flight deck of HMSOcean

New taco forsea power

UK AMPHIBIOUS capability has undergone a radical overhaul to allowthe Armed Forces to undertake Combined Ops - flexible enough todeploy rapidly in an emergency, but strong enough to do a job.The Royal Navy's largest vessel, helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, was

commissioned in 1998 and can handle up to 12 Sea Kings, plus sixLynx. She can also cope with Apache and Chinooks helicopters.

Ocean, a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), can carry up to 830Royals, four landing craft, two hovercraft, 40 vehicles and equipment.

FleetAir Arm assets involved would most likely be the Mk4 Sea King'Junglies' of 845 and 846 NAS, and the Mk7 Lynx of 847, althoughArmy Apaches will eventually undertake the anti-armour role. Merlinswould also have an anti-submarine role in the defensive screen.Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ships Albion and Bulwark, commis-

sioned in 2003 and 2005 respectively, can also handle Sea King andChinook aircraft, but can transport and land up to 400 troops each onaircraft and landing craft using a floodable dock aft.

All three vessels have state-of-the-art command and control facilities.The Navy's two aircraft carriers, Ark Royal and Illustrious, are also

able to stand in for Ocean if the need arises.Landing craft available to British forces include the 240-ton Landing

Craft Utility (LdU) MklO, carrying up to 120 troops, and the 25-tonLanding Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LdVP) Mk5 (35 troops). Allcan also carry certain light vehicles and stores.The old Landing Ship Logistics (LSLs) of the Knights of the Round

Table class are being supplanted by the much larger and more capableBay-class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary), similar in design to theDutch Rotterdam-class.The fire support group would most likely comprise frigates and

destroyers using their 4.Sin guns for Naval Gunfire Support (NGS),while the same ships can also provide varying degrees of air cover andanti-submarine protection for the Task Group and Landing Force; hav-ing a British carrier in the area also means that close support for troopson the ground can be provided by GR7 Harriers.Hunt and Sandown-class mine countermeasures vessels may be

included to ensure a safe path to shore, and auxiliaries can supplyboth the Task Group itself and the force ashore when the main logisticsoffload gets under way.Hydrographic vessels can also be used for preliminary littoral

surveys.At this stage powered pontoons, known as Mexeflotes, and special-

ist landing craft and workboats, operated by 17 Port and MaritimeRegiment the Royal Logistic Corps, allow greater tonnages of equip-ment to be brought ashore at a more measured pace -though defenceagainst sea or aerial attack is just as important to ensure the LandingForce is properly supported.

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