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15 The "State of the State"

Like nature, Sinology abhors a vacuum. Given

variety an d magnitude of systemic c h an g es th a

curred in th e post-Mao era, it is hardly surp

there s ho ul d b e substantial controversy over h

characterize China's evolving institutional

With Leninist regimes everywhere collapsing o

in g radical reconfiguration, a profound "para

has arisen. Does th e r e fo r min g Ch ine s e politica

more closely resemble communism, capitalism,

cianism? feudalism, federalism, or neo-fascism

tism or civil society?

Bereft of a theoretical compass, with no re

otl'the-sheJf models available to fill th e void l

demise of th e ol d Leninist order, more an d mo

have entered th e paradigm sweepstakes. Th e resu

a wild profusion o f new labels, accompanied

competition fo r shelf space in th e morphologic

place. Re ce n t c o me n de r s fo r taxonomic he g

clude: "nomenclature capitalism,"1 "bureaucra

ism,"2 "capitalism with Chinese characteristics,

socialism,"4 "incomplete state socialism,"5 "loc

socialis01, "6 "danwei socialism, '''7 "socialist corp

"corporatism Chinese style,"" "local state corp

"state-socialist corporatism,"I I "symbiotic clie

"Confucian Leninisnl,"13 "I£oinist palrimo

Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds. 1999. The Paradoxof China's Post-Mao Reforms. Harvard University Press: Cambridge,Massachusetts, London, England.



cial and subprovincial governments broad discretionary a

raise and allocate revenues, major differences remain ov

independent of their higher-level "principals" these erst

"agents" have actually become. At one extreme, it has b

that the reforms have so skewed the balance of fiscal an

Irdtive power in favor of the provinces that Beijing has lo

control over much of the country's economic life. IS

At the other ext rt ,me, it has been argued wit.h equal

decent.ralization has neither diminished Beijing's extracti

(expressed as the ratio of central government revenues to

undermined China's unitary political system (measured

gree of central control over key provincial appointment.s)

interpretation holds that "cenu'al leaders have not so

control as they have chosen not to exercise it because

officials are a powerful bloc in the process of selecting to

nist Party leaders."20 Yet. a fourth view holds t.hat the ent i

cent.er versus province has been improperly framed, sin

not a zero-sum game; and (b) "i t is quite crude to use, .

rary drop in the center's share of resources ... as the in

the relative power of center vs. localities."21The theory of rising provincial autonomy and incipient

ness achieved a certain prominence at the en d of the 198

group of provincial governors, led by Guangdong's Ye

successfully resisted the central government's repeated a

replace the existing system of contractually fixed provin

tances with a system of uniform direct taxes, a change t

have tilted the fiscal balance sharply in Beijing's favor.22

in this per iod tha t local governments in many areas, l

prospect of fiscal starvation induced by Beijing's austerit

1988, ignored central exhortations to curtail expansio

credit, investment, and construction, while at the same tim

a series of protective t rade barriers against product .s f

areas." As a result of such local defiance there were

references in the Chinese media to the rise of "feudal

,tconomies" (%huhou jingji) as well as a spate of oblique-

. es not so oblique-warnings of a possible economic b

.e country. 2'1

Of Principals and Agents

Gmtml-Local Relations

One of the morc intractable controversies in the recent literal

concerns central-local relations. While virtually everyone agrees

an d "bureauprenellrialism.,," In a f ield not normally known for its

fertile heuristic imagination, this profusion of colorful labels and

neologisnls seeins rather remarkable.

To a considerable extent, the current state of taxonomic anarchy

stems from three inescapable facts of reform. First, the "de-totaliza

tion" of the Leninist state is without historical precedent. Second,

China's reforming institutional landscape is complex and polymor

phous, rendering al.lempts broadly to elassify emergent forms and

functions hazardous at best. And third, the institutional landscape is

itself in a st ate of flux, presenting observers with a continuously

moving target.

In some ways th e problem is redolent of th e parable of the blind

men and the elephant: analysts probing different parts of China',

reforming political anatomy often produce substantially dissimilar

sketches of the body politic. Even in cases where the same (or

similar) part of the elephant's anatomy has been touched, there are

often significant differences of interpretation. Further compounding

this difficulty is the absence of a standardized conceptual vocabulary. ,This chapter represents a preliminary effort to describe China 's ')

elephant at this s tage of the reforms. It seeks to make sense o t i

China's sbifting political-economic landscape and to establish a COrb ttext for a"essing the disparate analytical perspectives and empirical "\

findings that appear in the literature generally an d in th e essays in, .this volume in particular. After reviewing some of t he mor e promi- .

nent academic disputes conce rn ing the impac t of reform on key •.

structures of power an d authority i n t he PRC, the chapter explores

various patterns of post-reform accommodation between state and isociety. I t then considers aggregate changes in state capacity, coo-"

eluding with an overall assessment of the "state of the Slate" in t h ~ f t .'<

post-reform era. f

1999_the 'state of the state

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