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Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on KuhnAuthor(s): Israel Scheffler

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), pp. 366-374Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/186154 .

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DISCUSSIONVISION AND REVOLUTION:A POSTSCRIPTON KUHN*

ISRAELSCHEFFLERHarvard University

Introduction. In Chapter 4 of Science and Subjectivity,' I offered several argu-ments critical of Professor Thomas Kuhn's views as expressed in his influentialbook The Structureof ScientificRevolutions.2His recent replies to these criticisms3seem to me so inadequate as to suggest that he, and therefore others as well, mayhave failed to grasp their full import. Accordingly, I shall, in the first part of thispaper, briefly recapitulate my earlier arguments and offer a short rejoinder to Pro-fessor Kuhn's replies.4 The second part of the paper will expand upon my earlierdiscussion to consider the basic metaphors of vision and revolution, offered byKuhn to replace the traditional notion of deliberation. My argument here will bethat these new metaphors are incongruous in critical respects, and my discussionwill conclude by considering their relations to the contrast between understandingand accepting a theory.

Part I: RecapitulationndRejoinderIn criticizing Professor Kuhn's view, my discussion in Science and Subiectivity5

offered the following arguments:(1) Self-refutation:If paradigm debates are characterized by an "incompleteness oflogical contact" (p. 109) betweenproponents of rival paradigms,and the transitiontoa new paradigm does not occur "by deliberation and interpretation" p. 121), it isself-defeating to justify this view itself by deliberation appealing to factual evidencefrom the history of science. If it is true that "paradigm changes do cause scientiststo see the world of their research-engagement ifferently ... that aftera revolution

Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967).2Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago and London: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1962). Because of the numerouscitations in the presentpaper,page references to passages in The Structureof ScientificRevolutionswill hereafter be givendirectly following quoted portions in the text, enclosed within parentheses.Note that all suchreferencesare to the firstedition of 1962, ratherthan to the second edition of 1970.3 In the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970, "Postscript-1969,"pp. 174-210; and in "Reflections on my Critics" n I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave,eds., Criticismand the Growthof Knowledge Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970), pp. 231-278).

4 I do not offer a comprehensive xaminationof Kuhn's repliesto his critics,however. DudleyShapere,in "The Paradigm Concept," Science172 (1971): 706 ff., reviews he general effect ofKuhn's recent repliesin a discussion I find persuasive.5 Science and Subjectivity,op. cit. Hereafter, page references to this book will be givendirectly in the text, prefixedby the letters "SS," and enclosed in parentheses. Note that paren-thesizedpage referenceswithout he prefix"SS" always refer o Kuhn's firstedition, as explainedabovein footnote 2.)* Received February,1972.

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DISCUSSION: VISION AND REVOLUTION:A POSTSCRIPTON KUHN 367scientists are responding to a different world" (p. 110), there can be no appeal toostensiblyparadigm-neutral actual evidence from historyin supportof Kuhn's ownnew paradigm.Conversely, f historians antranscendparticularparadigmsandevalu-ate them by appeal to neutral evidence, so can scientists,i.e., they can engage in ra-tional paradigmdebates which are perfectly intelligible. [See SS, 21-22, 53, 74](2) Observationaldifference:It does not follow, from the fact that differentparadigmsorganizetheir observationsdifferently,hattheyare directed o differentobjects-that"after a revolutionscientistsare respondingto a differentworld" (p. 110). From thefact that certain tems are seen in varyingways underdiversecategorizations,t cannotbe inferred hat they are not identical.There s a contrast betweenseeingx andseeingx as somethingor other. [See SS, 41]

(3) Meaning variation:Paradigm change does not inevitablyalter constituentmeaningsthrough altering the language or definitions of basic terms, with the result that"communicationacross the revolutionarydivide is inevitably partial" (p. 148). Thesuppositionof inevitablemeaning change confuses the notion of a language as con-sisting simply of a vocabularyand grammar,with that of a languageconstruedas asystemof assertions. Or else it overlooks the fact that variation of definition or senseis consistent with referentialstability and that only the latter is requiredfor thestabilityof deduction. [See SS, 58-62, 64](4) Gestaltswitch:Assumingthat adoptionof a paradigm s accompaniedby a "relativelysudden"and "intuitive"alteration of perceptionsuch as the "gestalt switch,"it doesnot follow that there are no public proceduresof assessmentby whichsucha paradigmis evaluatedafter it is originated. If, as Kuhn says, "no ordinarysense of the term'interpretation'its these flashes of intuition throughwhich a new paradigm s born"(p. 122), it may not be inferredthat the term 'interpretation'does not apply to theprocesses by which the scientificcommunitydebates the merits of the new paradigm.[See SS, 78-79](5) Perceptionvs. debate:If intuitiveprocessesof perceptioncharacterize he psychologyof the paradigmoriginator,he himself does not defend his paradigm by simple appealto such processes. He engages in debate and proposes arguments.If he is deludedabout the force of these arguments,the delusion cannot be demonstratedsimply byarguingfrom the psychologyof perception,but requiresappealto the content of therelevant debates.Nor areparticularexamplesof debates at cross-purposessufficient.For common criteriamay have borderlineregionsof indeterminacy,and even wheredeterminate, heremay well be differencesof judgmentin application,as well as mis-understanding.[SeeSS, 79-80](6) Inadequacy f normal cience:Paradigmchoicecannot be resolvedby normalscience,accordingto Kuhn, for if differingscientific schools disagreeabout the character ofproblemsand solutions, "theywill inevitablytalk througheach other when debating

the relativemerits of their respective paradigms"(p. 108). Thus, deliberationgivesway to persuasionand conversion. But to assume that deliberationandinterpretationare restricted o normalsciencebegs the very questionat issue. "If paradigmsarenotcorrigible by normal science,it does not follow that they are not corrigibleat all. Ifscientificschools inevitablytalk througheach other when arguingfrom within theirrespective paradigms, it is not further inevitable that they do always argue fromwithintheirrespective paradigms." [SS, 80-81](7) Incommensurabilityf paradigms:Competing paradigms, or Kuhn, are addressed odifferentproblems, embody different standards and differentdefinitionsof science(p. 147); they are based on different meanings and operate in different worlds(pp. 148-149) [SS, 81].Therefore,he argues,"Theproponentsof competingparadigmsarealwaysat least slightlyat cross-purposes" p. 147).Beforethey can communicate,"one group or the other must experiencethe conversion that we have been callingaparadigmshift. Just because it is a transition betweenincommensurables,he transi-tion . . . cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience"(p. 149).But if the paradigmsareindeed so differenthow can they be in competition?If they are indeed rivals, they must be accessible to some sharedperspectivewithin

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368 ISRAELSCHEFFLERwhich they can be compared. Incommensurabilitydoes not imply incomparability.[See SS, 82-83]

(8) Second-order ncommensurability: roponents of differentparadigms, says Kuhn, ac-quire differentcriteria for determiningrelevant problems and solutions. The debatebetween them is circular or inconclusive because "each paradigm will be shown tosatisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few ofthose dictated by its opponent" (pp. 108-109). "Paradigmdifferencesare thus inevi-tably reflected upward, in criterial differences at the second level" [SS, 84]. Thisargument, however, confuses internalcriteria, by which paradigms determineprob-lems and solutions, with external criteria by which they are themselves judged. Thelatter are independent of the former, and, hence, the argumentthat paradigms mustinevitably be self-justifyingcollapses. [See SS, 84-86](9) Resistance to falsification: Paradigms are not rejected when counterinstancesoccur,until an alternative s available, argues Kuhn, while acceptance of a new and untriedparadigm dependson faith (pp. 77, 157). Thus, he concludes "the competitionbetweenparadigms s not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs" (p. 147).But proofis in any case irrelevant,and faith in a new hypothesis s compatiblewith acknowledge-mentof sharedproceduresof evaluation by which the hypothesis s to be assessed.Noris loss of faith in the truth of a hypothesis inconsistent with its continued use as apractical tool of researchor application, or with belief that some modification of thehypothesis is true. Kuhn himself seems to admit the critical point by allowing that,although scientists do not renounce the paradigm provoking crisis, they "may beginto lose faith and then to consider alternatives" p. 77). The global use of terms suchas'acceptance', 'rejection' and 'paradigm' itself, prevents his full appreciationof thispoint. [See SS, 86-88]

(10) Cumulativeness:n denying the cumulative characterof scientificchange, Kuhn says"the successfulnewtheory must somewherepermit predictions hat aredifferent romthose derived from its predecessor.That differencecould not occur if the two werelogically compatible" (p. 96). But if the two are incompatible ogically, they must be,at least in part, commensurable, and a fortiori, comparable. It follows also thataccumulation,while not necessary,is at least logically possible. Further, despitehiscriticismof the notion of cumulativescience, he says that "new paradigms .. usuallypreservea great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievementand they alwayspermit additional concrete problem-solutionsbesides" (p. 168). [See SS, 89, 65]

(11) Reintroductionf criticizednotions:Notions criticizedby Kuhnreemergeoften undernew labels, in his theory. Thus, as just noted, commensurability s implied by hisemphasis on logical incompatibility.Falsificationreturnsunder the guiseof anomaly,crisis,and loss of faith. Cumulativeness s acknowledged n the preservationand ex-tension of past achievement, as noted. Interpretationand deliberationare acknow-ledgedin all the above ways as wellas his emphasison the promiseof a new paradigm"to resolvesome outstandingand generallyrecognizedproblemthat can be met in noother way" (p. 168). The critical distinction between theory-genesis and theory-justificationis thus, in effect, reinstated.(If we take ProfessorKuhn's denialsalone,they form a radicaland interestingdeparture rom olderviews, but they seem clearlyuntenable.If we take just his affirmationsof olderconceptsunder newlabels,we havea plausiblebut no longer novel view. If we take both the denialsand the affirmations,we find an inconsistent account. The strong and exciting part of this accountcan bedefendedby judicious retreat o the weaker and unexciting part,but in no case do wehave both a radical and a tenable view of science.) [See SS, 88-89]

In his recent replies, Professor Kuhn responds to my criticisms and those ofothers by insisting that his book does contain "a preliminarycodification of goodreasons for theory choice. These are ... reasons of exactly the kind standard inphilosophy of science: accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like."6They are, however, he insists, "values" rather than "rules of choice," and may be

6 I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave,eds., Criticismand the Growthof Knowledge, p. cit., p. 261.

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DISCUSSION: VISION AND REVOLUTION:A POSTSCRIPTON KUHN 369applieddifferently by different scientists.7 Nowhere, however, have I argued thatthere must be rules applieduniformlyby scientists. If these reasons are not, in beingconceived as values, to be construed as utterly free of all constraints or themselvesparadigm-dependent,then they allow the comparison of rival paradigmsand makeparadigm debates intelligible. Such intelligibility is, however, at odds with Kuhn'sstatementthat the proponents of competing paradigms"will inevitablytalk througheach other"(p. 108).In his Postscript, he refers to my discussion along with others' as follows: "Be-cause I insist that what scientists share is not sufficientto command uniform assentabout such matters as the choice between competing theories or the distinctionbetween an ordinary anomaly and a crisis-provoking one, I am occasionally ac-cused of glorifying subjectivity and even irrationality.",,Now I cannot be certainwhat others have said but it is clear that my arguments above enumerated do notinclude a demand for uniform assent. Indeed, I explicitly stated, [SS, 80], that "theexistence of common evaluative criteria is compatible with borderline regions inwhich these criteria can yield no clear decisions. And . . . even the objective availa-bility of clear decisions is consistent with honest differences of judgment, not tomention plain misunderstandings."The issue is not uniformitybut objectivity,andobjectivity requires simply the possibility of intelligible debate over the compara-tive merits of rival paradigms.9

Part HI:Vision and RevolutionI turn now to a consideration of certain broader aspects of Professor Kuhn'streatment, which I have not previously discussed in any detail. My earlier critiquedoes note the "striking way in which Kuhn's account applies psychological,

political, and religious categories to the description of scientific change. The olderreferences to logical system, observational evidence, theoretical simplicity, andexperimental test have given way, in his account, to mention of the gestalt switch,conversion, faith, decision, and death" [SS, 78]. We have a replacement of thecategories of interpretation and deliberation by new categories or metaphors intreating of science. The two fundamental and controlling metaphors are those ofvision and revolution.What I shall now argue is that these are incongruous withone another in a philosophically significantway. Neither, taken alone, supportstheview of paradigm change offered by Kuhn to replace the traditional conception.What supports Kuhn's view is rather a hybrid that resembles neither vision norrevolution, but is violated by both. This question seems to me of general interest,independently of the particularsof arguments earlierreviewed, for what is at stakeis the fundamental aspect under which we attempt to make science intelligible toourselves, the controlling analogies by which we tend to think of it.Take first the topic of vision. Kuhn assimilates theoretical change to a gestalt

7Ibid., p. 262.8 TheStructure f ScientificRevolutions,Second edition, p. 186.9 For a discussion of Kuhn's replies relating also to other issues, see Shapere'sreview "TheParadigm Concept", op. cit., (footnote 4 above).

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370 ISRAELSCHEFFLERreorganization of vision. "What were ducks in the scientists' world before the re-volution are rabbits afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior of the box fromabove later sees its interior from below" (p. 110). The patterned alteration ofthought and experienceconcomitant with theoretical change is plausibly comparedwith the intuitive and spontaneous shift in perception of a reversible figure, andresemblesit better than it does the piecemeal articulations associated with delibera-tion. Anomalies and crises, says Kuhn, "are terminated, not by deliberation andinterpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructuredevent like the gestaltswitch. Scientists then often speak of the 'scales falling from the eyes' or of the'lightning flash' that 'inundates' a previously obscure puzzle, enabling its com-ponents to be seen in a new way that for the first time permits its solution.... Noordinary sense of the term 'interpretation' fits these flashes of intuition throughwhich a new paradigm is born" (pp. 121-122).The metaphor of revolutionis employed in conjunctionwith that of the gestaltswitch. "What were ducks ... before the revolution are rabbits afterwards"(p. 110). But the notion of revolution is ramifiedin further ways. Competition isvisualized as combat, with victory the prize. The conflict is a matter of "techniquesof persuasion, or about argument and counterargumentin a situation in whichthere can be no proof" (p. 151). Progress always accompanies victory because thewinning camp is in a position to rewritethe textbooks and the implicit history of thesubject. And Kuhn cites Planck's statement that "a new scientific truth does nottriumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but ratherbe-cause its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiarwith it" (p. 150).Now a closer look at these two controlling metaphors reveals a critical incon-gruity between them. While thereis, both in the case of the reversiblefigure and thecase of revolutionaryconflict a certainmutual exclusiveness of elements, the notionof an opposition of claims applies only to the latter. Consider the two views of thereversible cube: These two views are, as a matter of natural fact, exclusive at anygiven moment. We can flip from one to the other and may even come to shuttleback and forth between them with a certain amount of familiarity. However, theycannot both be seen simultaneously. Such exclusivity may be superficially assimi-lated to that of the revolutionary situation in which our allegiance must, at anytime, be given to one side or the other-where we may shift loyalties but where it isimpossible to be loyal to both sides at once or to join segmentsof each in some formof compromise. However-and this is the criticalpoint-a revolution is a matter ofopposed loyalties and allegiances, of conflicting judgments and claims, whereasthere are no analogous questions of loyalty or allegiance or of conflicting claims inthe case of alternative views of a reversiblefigure.Accordingly, having appreciatedthe reversibilityof the duck-rabbit, there is noquestion of arguingover the relative merits of the duck or the rabbit as the properand exclusive view of the duck-rabbit figure, nor is there any clash of opposedloyalties in the interpretation of the reversible cube. No one advocates exclusiveacceptance of the exterior-superiorview of the cube as better than the interior-inferior view, nor is there any question of deliberate assent or commitment to one,

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DISCUSSION:VISIONAND REVOLUTION:A POSTSCRIPTON KUHN 371rather than the other. As there are no arguments over the exclusive merits of theduck or the rabbit, there is no duck-party seeking victory over the rabbit-party oraiming to consign it to the dustbin of history. Nothing in this situation indeedcorresponds to paradigm debates in the case of theoretical controversies. Nor arethere anything like "good reasons" offered in such controversies.The case of revolution is quite different. Each side seeks victory, demandsexclusive allegiance, claims superiority, expresses commitment, propounds argu-ments, engages in interpretation and persuasion, formulates its rationales, rebutsthe argumentsof the opposition. Nor is each party totally enclosed in its own con-ceptual and rhetorical box. It expresses its own view, to be sure, but it attacks theviews of its opponents, claiming to understand them well enough to refute them.It addresses its arguments not only to its convinced adherents and to susceptibleopponents but to as-yet neutral bystanders whose allegiances are sought, and towhose thought-world the revolutionary line needs to be made to relate. Revolu-tionary argument is, to be sure, not necessarily scientific in spirit: it may be dog-matic, metaphysical,deceptive or otherwise defectivefrom a scientificpoint of view.However, it claims commitment, it expresses advocacy, it offers arguments, it givesreasons, it propounds interpretations, t demands acceptance.To reduce the combatof revolutionary parties to a gestalt switch is to leave out the critical aspect of ad-vocacy and opposed loyalties; it is to omit the notion of a claim and that of arationale. Whereas, conversely, to offer the gestalt switch as a case of revolu-tionary transition is to importthe inapplicable concepts of advocacy, commitment,and party combat to merely phenomenally alternative perceptual configurations.The latter point is particularly important. For if we imagine that the relativelyspontaneous intuitive process by which one such configuration replaces another,and to which deliberation seems irrelevant, carries with it a commitment that isexclusive, we have formed a hybrid notion that is true neitherto perception nor torevolution: Visual apprehension is perhaps plausibly described as intuitive, but itneither demands nor presupposes exclusive commitment. Revolution is plausiblydescribed as demanding such exclusive commitment but it emphatically is not aspontaneous nor intuitive process to which deliberationis, or can be assumed to be,irrelevant.

If we apply such a hybrid notion to the case of scientific theory change, we areled to develop a view that emphasizes the intuitiveandspontaneousshift of thoughtand leaves no room for deliberation or interpretation,but we also emphasize thatthis shift requiresexclusive commitment, that it representsa victory for one side ina conflict of loyalties. Such a conception of paradigm change, as determinativeofcommitmentbut itself immune to deliberation,approximates Kuhn's view of para-digms: they are not alteredthrough interpretation.As he says, "Rather than beingan interpreter,the scientist who embraces a new paradigm is like the man wearinginverted lenses" (p. 121).Anomalies and crises "areterminated,not by deliberationand interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructuredevent like the ge-stalt switch" (p. 121).Moreover, adopting a new paradigm s not just like the visionof the duck for the first time in the duck-rabbit figure: the paradigmaticvisiondemands commitment, acceptance; it is jealous of other paradigms and seeks to

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372 ISRAELSCHEFFLERtriumph over them. Indeed, its victory enables it to celebrateits triumph by stamp-ing itself into the records, textbooks, and chronicles under its control.Such a view, insofar as it derives any plausibility from the analogies with visionand with revolution, does not deserve such plausibility. For these analogies, takenin combination, orm a hybridwhich is true to neither.Nor is this simply a matterofthe pragmatic incongruityof models, a gauche mixing of philosophical metaphors.The mixture perpetuates an old philosophical mistake that consists in derivingvalues from visions; Plato thus supposed a vision of the form of the good to yieldwisdom in life and imagined the role of philosopher-king as that of social authorityresting upon superior insight.10But values cannot be seen; nor are visions judg-ments or the premisses of judgments. Value judgments, on the other hand, arecertainly judgments; they make claims and demand acceptance and commitment.Insofar as this is true, they invite discussion, interpretation,and deliberation: theyallow of a weighing of evidence and a scrutinyof reasonspro and con. This processof deliberationover a claim cannot be short-circuited by a spontaneous vision orinsight. Philosophers have tried hard, to be sure, in the interests of one or anotherdogmatic and authoritarianconception, to end the deliberative discussion of prosand cons by authoritative appeals to a favored superiorvision. But the attempt canhardly be sustained upon reflection.Nor can the use of the further analogy with conversion improve the situation,For if converts rest only with the occurrenceof mystical experiences, they cannothope thereby to propound claims andjudgmentseven though their perspectiveonlife may be fundamentallyaltered.If, on the other hand, they appealto evidence andstated considerations, their claims invite debate logically, no matter how resistantthey may be to such debate. The matter is furtherconfused by the fact that conver-sion itself is sometimes defended on the analogy with vision.How then shall we construe the process of theory-change? If the metaphors ofvision and revolution cannot be applied simultaneously, can one or the other bechosen in itself to representthe process, or can both be employed, but not in com-bination? Let us consider the situation once again and recall also the special fea-turesof the analogies in question.The duck and the rabbit do not make rival claims upon our acceptance. Onceyou have seen both the duck and the rabbit,you may perhapsbe puzzled by variousaspects of the reversible figure, but the question as to which is to be exclusivelyaccepted does not arise. There is no choice to be made, no common problem orstandardby referenceto which such a choice could be made intelligible.You acceptboth "readings" of the puzzle figure as facts and make no decisions of exclusiveacceptance. The "readings" themselves make no claims upon your commitment.They may be mutually exclusive as natural occurrencesbut they are not logicallyincompatible nor do they generate rival claims and loyalties. Having seen themboth, you can rise above them and contain them without logical or moral conflict.

Where theories in science are in opposition, the samecannot be said; the conflictis not simply a matterof inability to hold both theories in view simultaneously, so to10 CompareK. R. Popper,TheOpenSocietyand its Enemies London:Routledge andKeganPaul, Ltd., 1945,Third edition (revised) 1957), Chapters7 and 8.

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DISCUSSION: VISION AND REVOLUTION:A POSTSCRIPTON KUHN 373speak, but a conflict of claims demanding resolution. Here there is a choice to bemade, a resolution to be sought which will determine acceptances and commit-ments. You may not be able to reach a decision comfortably, or at all, but youcannot tolerantly rise above the situation and adopt a sophisticated nonchalance.In these respects the vision metaphor is clearly inadequate.Further, the process of resolution is neither relatively sudden nor intuitive norindividual. Kuhn speaks of the "flashes of intuition through which a new paradigmis born" (p. 122). But the birth of a paradigm in the mind does not exhaust theperiod of its ascendancy and triumph. If "interpretation" does not properly de-scribethe process of birth, t certainly describesthe processes by which the paradigmis submitted to public scrutiny and runs the gauntlet of debate and criticismwhich precede its victory. Crises are not, contrary to Kuhn, terminated by gestaltswitches (p. 121). The gestalt switch is only the beginning. The new paradigm ideahas to be formulated, published, argued, defended, tested, and submitted to exami-nation by colleagues with different preconceptions and with access to various sortsof evidence. In this respect too, the metaphor of the gestalt switch is inadequate,and that of revolution, with its notion of prolonged struggle and ultimate decision,seems superior.Yet, once we recognize that the adoptionof a new theory or paradigm is not aninstantaneous or individual affair,we may find a certain point to the vision meta-phor after all. It is a myth to suppose that paradigmsare units, that they are simplyaccepted, or simply rejected as such, and in a momentary spontaneous process atthat. This picture needs complication in many directions. At least one complicationinvolves separation of the birth of a paradigmfrom its testing in the public arena.Now we must not suppose that the originatorgives it over to others to test; thathe himself is, of necessity, fully convinced through the origination itself. On thecontrary, the originator's own conviction is, in principle, subject to the vicissitudesof the public process of scientific discussion and evaluation. He originates the ideaand there is no way of telling how he does it, nor any way of reducing creativitytorule, but his conviction in his idea depends, at least in part, upon how it fares.When others contribute to testing the originator's idea they must first appreciateit: they seek to determine its content and its logical bearing upon the availableevidence.The process of grasping or understanding theory (whether by the originator orhis colleagues) may perhaps plausibly be compared to vision. Indeed seeing is astandardway of describing comprehension. ntuition is a matter of seeing thepoint.It may indeed be relatively sudden, and like creativity itself, impossible to reduce toroutine or mechanical rule. Understanding does not, however, in itself, imply ad-vocacy or commitment, nor is it excludedby rejectionof the theory in question.This is indeed a central point of the scientific attitude. Understanding a theory,our acceptance or denial of it is not thereby prejudged.Our advocacy or rejectionitself depends upon the outcome of tests and argumentation; it is not predeter-mined simply by our comprehension. Conversely, rejectinga theory does not implythat we do not understandit.In sum, vision may perhaps appropriatelyserve as a metaphor for comprehension

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374 ISRAELSCHEEFLERof a paradigm or theory, though not for its testing and acceptance or rejection.The latter involve advocacy and claims to commitment; they involve debates andcounterdebates, a period of testing and ultimate ascendancy or decline. In theselatter respects, the revolutionary metaphor is appropriate, as earlier argued. Butas also remarked earlier, revolutionary debate is not necessarily scientific debate.Advocacy in itself is not necessarily fair, logical, or responsive to competentargument or relevant evidence. In these respects, science can only be comparedin very limited ways to revolution. The quality of scientific deliberationsmakes for aspecial and rare form of argumentation.It demands responsibility to the evidence, openness to argument, commitment topublication, loyalty to logic, and an admission, in principle, that one may turn outto be wrong. These special featuresof deliberation go far beyond the gestalt switchanalogy and they outstrip the revolution metaphor as well. An understanding ofscience requires appreciation of these special features, a recognition that scienceitself marks a revolution in the quality of human thought.