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Commentaries on Paul Whittle (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1999):Crossing the Psychoanalytic-Experimental Dividevia a Neuropsychological Perspective: Commentaryby Nancy S. Foldi. Adam M. Brickman. and Joan C.Borod (New York)Nancy S. Foldi Ph.D.a, Adam M. Brickman & Joan C. Boroda Department of Psychology, Queens College CUNY, 65-30 Kissena Boulevard, Room NSB-E318, Flushing, NY 11367, e-mail:Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Nancy S. Foldi Ph.D., Adam M. Brickman & Joan C. Borod (2000) Commentaries on Paul Whittle (Vol.1, No. 2, 1999): Crossing the Psychoanalytic-Experimental Divide via a Neuropsychological Perspective: Commentary byNancy S. Foldi. Adam M. Brickman. and Joan C. Borod (New York), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal forPsychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 219-222, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773310

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Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

Commentaries on Paul Whittle (Vol. 1, No.2, 1999)

Crossing the Psychoanalytic-Experimental Divide via a Neuropsychological PerspectiveCommentary by Nancy S. Foldi, Adam M. Brickman, and Joan C. Borod (New York)

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Whittle's presentation on the divide between psycho-analysis and experimental psychology describes a truedisparity in the field of psychology. It is a phenomenonobvious to anyone in the field, yet his challenge isfor all of us to attempt to understand why these twodisciplines are so separate and why individuals fallonone side or other of the divide. Our response to Whit-tle's paper comes from the perspective of clinical neu-ropsychology. That is, we are trained from theexperimental psychology perspective, and in readingthis paper, we are well aware that our own defensesare at work. In addition, as clinicians, we also recog-nize the value of looking across the abyss to the otherside in an effort to enlighten our own field and reevalu-ate the contribution of psychodynamic mechanismsin clinical work and research as neuropsychologists.Certainly, Whittle succeeds in making us (and all read-ers) review and scrutinize our own position, and ap-preciate whether we are at the edge of that divide orfar from it.

Whittle enumerates appropriate reasons whymembers of each camp do not share their work andresearch. In our commentary, we want to briefly dis-cuss five different issues that are relevant to the sepa-rate ideas of the two perspectives.

Nancy S. Foldi is Associate Professor, Department of Psychology,Queens College and The Graduate Center of the City University of NewYork.

Adam M. Brickman is a doctoral student, Neuropsychology Subpro-gram, Department of Psychology, Queens College and the Graduate Centerof the City University of New York.

Joan C. Borod is Professor, Department of Psychology, Queens Col-lege and The Graduate Center of the City University of New York; AdjunctAssociate Professor, Department of Neurology, Mount Sinai School ofMedicine, New York.

Paul Whittle's paper is posted on the Journal's website at www.neuro-psa.com in the section.

Overlapping Information

Experimental psychology and psychoanalysis each hasits own vocabulary to describe human behavior. Butat one level, the success of psychoanalysis has beenthat much of the vocabulary and many of the conceptshave transcended the field of psychology and falleninto everyday usage. Also, so many analytic termsare incorporated into the vernacular of all fields ofpsychology; in that way, the two different perspectivesdo share some information. No experimental psychol-ogy student in the United States emerges from a gradu-ate program without exposure to concepts of the"unconscious" and "repression," even if they havenever read a paper by Freud. Thus, in areas such asposttraumatic stress disorder and abuse (Herman,1992) the development of predictive models is largelybased on psychodynamic, deterministic concepts eventhough research treatment efficacy has come from anexperimental approach.

In clinical neuropsychology, there is a great tradi-tion regarding the importance of observation. Heretoo, psychoanalysis has influenced clinical practice.Freud, in the tradition of other masters in neurology,was an astute observer and a keen listener, and carriedthose behaviors into the practice of psychoanalysis. Itis that level of observation and description that under-lies the process approach (Milberg, Hebben, andKaplan, 1996) of clinical neuropsychology. For exam-ple, the process of inquiring about the qualitative na-ture of a response (not just whether it is right orwrong) is deeply embedded in this neuropsychologi-cal approach.

Divides in Other Areas of Study

Whittle's concern about the gap needs to be put incontext as other areas of academia are vulnerable to

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and experience a similar rift. Indeed, there are manyexamples of opposing, or at least alternate perspec-tives, that separate domains of study. For example, inanthropology and sociology, there are divergent meth-ods and approaches, one side more methodologicallybased and the other side more descriptive. Indeed, wedo not have to look further than our own field of neuro-psychology for proponents of the more quantitative,score-based approach to assessment in contrast to themore qualitative, process approach.

Discovery of Underlying Intent

Whittle's reference to the work of Labov and Fanshel(1977) is another area that is relevant for a comparisonof the two approaches. Labov and Fanshel, seminalwriters in the areas of sociolinguistics and pragmatics,investigated the importance of the intent of an utter-ance in the communicative and psychotherapeutic set-tings. Within pragmatics, the speaker-orientedapproach (e.g., Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) is con-trasted with the functionalist, speaker-listener dyadapproach (Halliday, 1970). The speaker-oriented the-ory attempts to establish and verify the "true" intentof an utterance and thus parallels the psychoanalyticsearch for a "true" underlying meaning. The function-alist theory takes a different route: it avoids the pitfallof verifying the unanswerable question of "what thespeaker really meant to say," and chooses, instead,to focus on the listener's response as the observablevariable. That is, functionalists assume that all prag-matic and sociolinguistic cues, together withspeaker-listener interactions, contribute to the successof the utterance. The speaker-oriented approach is dif-ficult to construe within an experimental paradigm.The functionalist approach has been used, for instance,to investigate the effect of brain damage or pragmaticskill, and provides a method to test hypotheses aboutan individual's impaired (or spared) ability to commu-nicate (Holland, 1980; Foldi, Cicone, and Gardner,1983; Paradis, 1998; Borod et aI., 2000). Thus, thereference to Labov and Fanshel raises interesting par-allel approaches: one perspective has the objective ofseeking an underlying meaning of an utterance, andthe other seeks to evaluate the effect of that utterance.In that way, they parallel the debate between psycho-analysis and experimental psychology. Naturally, thetypes of questions raised depend on which perspectiveis taken, but both have their value in the literature ofpragmatics and sociolinguistics.

Foldi-Brickman-Borod

Using Psychoanalysis in New Ways

Recently, Eric Kandel (1999) has revisited conceptsfrom psychodynamic theory as they intersect withthose from cognitive neuroscience. An important as-sumption in cognitive neuroscience is that complexcognitive and behavioral phenomena can be explainedby articulating the underlying neural mechanisms.This approach has had success in experimental psy-chology, for example, in developing cognitive con-structs, such as declarative and nondeclarativememory, which have been linked to neuroanatomicalregions and systems.

Kandel provides a way of operationally defininga number of psychoanalytic constructs. For example,he suggests that the preconscious unconscious can beequated with the cognitive neuroscientific construct ofprefrontal lobe functions. What Kandel is offering isone way of empirically testing psychoanalysis. Kan-del's ideas exemplify a prominent trend in experimen-tal psychology-in order to understand complexbehaviors, we must study the underlying neuralsystems.

One caution about Kandel's approach is that itcould be criticized as being reductionistic (for discus-sion, see Sachdev, 1999). The philosophical underpin-ning of reductionism maintains that complexphenomena are nothing more than manifestations oftheir underlying physical or chemical laws. Indeed,Kandel uses reductionism to explain complex psycho-analytic ideas as processes that occur at biological andneuroanatomical levels. The success of Kandel's ap-proach for the experimental psychologist, as well asfor the analyst, can only be weighed if, and only if,the relationship between the constructs and the ana-tomicallevels is maintained. Kandel's approach doeshave an appeal for experimentalists, since the analyticconstructs can now be tested and equated with under-lying neurologic systems. We would imagine that froma psychoanalytic perspective, Kandel's propositionsare exciting because they present different and newways to approach the psychoanalytic ideas (e.g., howneuroscience can be guided by concepts of psycho-analysis, and how psychoanalytic theory can be di-rected by neuroscience). Kandel's important effortshighlight that, in many ways, the gap that separatespsychoanalysis and experimental psychology may notbe as large as we typically assume, or at least the gapcan be reduced by sharing some common constructs.

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Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

The Scientific Inquiry

Finally, Whittle raises the nagging question that hasconfronted psychoanalysis for many years; namely, ispsychoanalysis a science? This critique was, as Whit-tle brought up, the cornerstone of Popper's challenge.It was also clearly of concern for Freud himself in hisearly years. In his Clark University lecture series,Freud (1910) acknowledged this uphill battle and wasaware of the fact that his Worcester, Massachusettsaudience, as well as his European skeptics, were chal-lenging this very question of how one could verify theprocess and inner workings of mental activity.

You will perhaps be surprised to hear that in Europewe have heard a large number of judgements on psy-cho-analysis from people who know nothing of thistechnique and do not employ it; and who go on todemand with apparent scorn that we shall prove tothem the correctness of our findings. Among theseadversaries there are no doubt some to whom a scien-tific model of thought is not as a rule alien, who, forinstance, would not reject the results of a microscopicexamination because it could not be confirmed on theanatomical preparation with the naked eye, but whowould first form a judgement on the matter them-selves with the help of a microscope. But, where psy-cho-analysis is concerned, the prospects ofrecognition are in truth less favourable [Freud, 1910,p.39].

As a physician, with a dual focus on patient treatmentand on his theory of psychoanalytic investigation,Freud was appealing to those who were both cliniciansand scientists. That is, treating a patient with a methodand fully understanding the underlying scientificmechanisms of that method was his goal; but as weknow, even today, that objective can remain elusive.No experimentalist would challenge the need for intel-lectuals who have the creativity to devise a theoryand a method. Further, whether or not psychoanalytictheory can meet every criterion of being a science,experimentalists can contribute to the task of de-termining what and how that theory can be operationa-lized.

Concluding Comments

Whittle's call to us to consider the gap between psy-choanalysis and experimental psychology is a valuable

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one. Ryle (1949) reminded us that it was odd for allareas of psychology to be considered one disciplineand he suggested referring to psychology as a "federa-tion of inquiries and techniques." This debate encour-ages those of us sitting on the experimentalpsychology side to learn about and consider the sig-nificant psychoanalytic contributions and to under-stand how psychoanalytic terms and concepts are usedin the language of psychology. Both theories coexistand share the idea that there are underlying mentalprocesses that result in behavior. That common groundshould keep us listening to each other.

References

Austin, J. L. (1962), How to Do Things with Words. Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Borod, J. C., Rorie, K. D., Pick, L., Bloom, R. L., Andle-man, F., Campbell, A., Obler, L. K., Tweedy, J. R., Wel-kowitz, J., & Sliwinski, M. (2000), Verbal pragmaticsfollowing unilateral stroke: Emotional content and va-lence. Neuropsychology, 14:112-124.

Foldi, N. S., Cicone, M., & Gardner, H. (1983), Pragamaticaspects of communication in brain-damaged patients. In:Language Functions and Brain Organization, ed. S. J.Segalowitz. New York: Academic Press, pp. 51-86.

Freud, S. (1910), Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis. Stan-dard Edition, 11: 1-55. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1970), The users and uses of language.In: Readings in the Sociology of Language, ed. J. Fish-man. The Hague: Mouton.

Herman, J. (1992), Trauma and Recovery. New York: Ba-sic Books.

Holland, A. (1980), Communicative Abilities in Daily Liv-ing. Baltimore: University Park Press.

Kandel, E. (1999), Biology and the future of psychoanaly-sis: A new intellectual framework for psychiatry revis-ited. Amer. J. Psychiatry, 156:505-524.

Labov, W., & Fanshel, D. (1977), Therapeutic Discourse:Psychotherapy as Conversation. New York: AcademicPress.

Milberg, W. P., Hebben, N., & Kaplan, E. (1996), TheBoston Process approach to neuropsychological assess-ment. In: Neuropsychological Assessment of Neuropsy-chiatric Disorders, ed. J. Grant & K. M. Adams. NewYork: Oxford University Press, pp. 58-80.

Paradis, M. (1998), Pragmatics in Neurogenic Communica-tion Disorders. Oxford: Elsevier.

Ryle, G. (1949), The Concept of Mind. New York:Barnes & Noble.

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Sachdev, P. (1999), Is the reduction of mental phenomenaan attainable goal? J. Neuropsychiatry & Clin. Neu-rosci., 11 :274-279.

Searle, J. R. (1969), Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philoso-phy of Language. Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.

Nancy S. Foldi, Ph.D.Department of PsychologyQueens College CUNY65-30 Kissena BoulevardRoom NSB-E318Flushing, NY 11367e-mail: nsfoldi@qc.edu

Peter Fonagy

On the Relationship of Experimental Psychology and PsychoanalysisCommentary by Peter Fonagy (London)

It is by universal misunderstanding that all agree. For if, by illluck, people understood each other, they would never agree[Charles Baudelaire, Intimate Journals, 1877].

The Obvious Misunderstanding

I gradually realized that I must have totally misunder-stood Paul Whittle's superb, elegant essay, filled to thebrim with wisdom, humor, and staggering cultural andhistorical perspective. I surmised that I must have mis-understood him because I found myself in almost totalagreement with everything he wrote. Yet I thought Iheld the diametrically opposite view.

I chuckled at his description of psychologists andpsychoanalysts reading each other's papers, the im-plausibility of a debate, the profound misunder-standings that are inevitably entailed in critiques,psychoanalysts' naIve and misinformed perceptions ofpsychologists, and psychologists' incredulity that suchthings as psychoanalysts still existed. I shuddered withpainful recognition when, describing exceptions to hisrule, he accurately diagnosed that the individuals whoattempt to bridge the divide "are disregarded orthought of as 'unsound' by one or both sides." He isso obviously right that the overwhelming situation isstill one of separation.

His metaphor of the gulf, gap, or chasm betweenpsychoanalysis and psychology generated associationsto dreams I used to have as a child where, standing onan elevated, unstable surface, I suddenly found myselffalling and aware of the inevitability of a disastrousend. "Do I know about the 'fault line'?" I have beenliving on it for the last 25 years! Just as the life he

Peter Fonagy is Freud Professor of Psychoanalysis, Sub-Departmentof Clinical Health Psychology, University College London, London, UK;Director, Child and Family Center, Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.

describes, mine has been split between different dis-courses. Also, I too have long worked in an academicdepartment of psychology, one with equal claims tohaving participated in the creation of the discipline inthe United Kingdom, with both experimentalists andpsychoanalysts in leadership positions throughout itsearly history. I believe Flugel, Spearman, and Burt allhad substantial exposure to psychoanalytic ideas, andmore recently, De Monchaux and Sandler were activeon the faculty, all living the kind of dual existence thatWhittle so clearly elaborates.

I totally agree with his claims that the demonstra-tion of therapeutic efficacy by itself cannot validatethe theory, nor do laboratory tests of psychoanalyticideas have the power to confirm or refute (Fonagy,1982). That is not to say, of course, that experimentaltests of psychoanalytic therapy should not be per-formed, just that we should be clear that the need forthis is by and large administrative rather than theoreti-cal, rooted in the way that psychoanalysis is inter-twined with publicly funded mental health services.Whittle's dichotomy of the subject matter of experi-mental psychology as being mental process, while thatof psychoanalysis is mental content, is a challengingand true statement of a perceived state of affairs,though perhaps less than totally accurate in terms ofa deeper scrutiny. Colleagues and I have attempted tobroaden psychoanalytic conceptualization of pathol-ogy from that dominated by distorted mental represen-tations to a more comprehensive model of pathologythat also takes account of dysfunctional mental pro-cesses (Fonagy, Moran, Edgcumbe, Kennedy, andTarget, 1993). When Kleinian analysts talk of thoughtas antagonistic to fantasy, being fervently resistive,they are in fact discussing the vulnerability of mentalprocesses to unconscious dynamic forces (Segal,1972).

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