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Editorial

Non-dualism:A New Understanding of LanguageAlexander Riegler Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium ariegler/at/vub.ac.beStefan Weber University of Vienna, Austria weber.mediaresearch/at/t-online.de

> Context Non-dualism suggests a new way of utilizing language without the assumption of categorically extralin-guistic objects denoted by language. > Problem What is the innovative potential, what is the special value of non-dualism for science? Is non-dualism a fruitful conceptual revision or just a philosophical thought experiment with noor little significance for science? > Method We provide a concise introduction to non-dualisms central new proposalsand an overview of the papers. > Results Fourteen contributors show how this way of thinking and speaking can beoperationalized creatively, but also address some of its boundaries. > Implications Since not all of the aspects andproblems highlighted for discussion in the original Call for Papers were answered satisfactorily, further research is nec-essary. For example, research is needed on the relationship between dualisms distinction between object language and

metalanguage on the one hand and non-dualisms distinction between descriptions so farand descriptionsfrom nowonon the other; or on the innite regress allegations by non-dualism against dualism. > Constructivist content Someauthors show that non-dualist thinking is anti-essentialist, in a similar way as constructivist thinking. Some also showthat comparable questions arise; for example, the question of whether non-dualism denies the material world (contain-ing extralinguistic objects). > Key words Dualism, non-dualism, constructivism, descriptions, Josef Mitterer.

Introduction

Non-dualism,as developed by philoso-

pher Jose Mitterer, is an attempt to use

and understand language in a novel way.In 2008, Mitterers central ideas were or

the first time internationally and interdis-

ciplinarily discussed in the special issue o

Constructivist Foundations entitled Te

Non-dualizing Philosophy o Jose Mitter-

er (Riegler & Weber 2008). With this sec-

ond special issue on non-dualist thinking,

we give a urther voice to scientists experi-

menting with Mitterers ideas in areas rang-

ing rom historiography to PR theory, rom

eminism to economics.

For Mitterer, dualism our traditional

way o thinking is just an argumentationtechnique based on the use o dichotomic

distinctions such as language and (extralin-

guistic) reality or descriptions and objects

(categorically different rom their descrip-

tions). Tese dichotomies are introduced

into our discourse whenever conflicts arise;

they lead to the perennial problems o phi-

losophy such as the problems o truth, reer-

ence, and reality.

Mitterers non-dualism tries to operate

without these distinctions. He criticizes the

dualistic paradogma o philosophy rom

within a non-dualistic argumentation that

neither presupposes nor creates a beyondor

regulating and directing discourse (see Mit-

terer 1992).At the core o Mitterers philosophy,

we find his proposal: An object relates to a

description o the object like a description

so ar to a description rom now on. Every

description changes the object into a new

object or urther descriptions.

In traditional thinking, the description

o an object is, or example, the indication o

at least one property the object has. I phi-

losophers reflect on the table (what else!),

the proposition Te table is wooden is a

description o the table. Dualist traditional

thinking usually does not reflect on thequestion o whether table itsel has already

been a description, and, i so, a description

o what? Does an infinite regress arise here

(see Webers paper in this issue), in analogy

to the infinite regress o definitions? Or is

it rather a circle, and i so, maybe a vicious

circle?

We cannot get out o language when

indicating the other side o language (or

descriptions) or example, the real thing

or the not-yet described object. Tis is

where Mitterers philosophy starts. And it

introduces a new notation, leaving the cat-

egorical distinction o object language and

metalanguage behind. In non-dualism, any

object is nothing other than the alreadyexecuted description. Tis description is

marked with execution marks(//, Mitter-

ers invention) instead o classical quotation

marks (). Te next-to-last sentence, or

example, is in Mitterers sense a continua-

tion, a description rom now on, o the al-

ready given or executed description /any

object/. Some o our authors experiment

with this notation proposal and show some

difficulties in utilizing it and in maintaining

it in a consistent way.

Can such seemingly counterintuitive

ideas expose the culprit behind philoso-phys hard problems? Is Mitterers view

meticulously ormulated in two books so

ar (Mitterer 1992, 2001) the culmination

o a development that saw assertions such

as Nelson Goodmans We are confined to

ways o describing whatever is described.

Our universe, so to speak, consists o these

ways rather than o a world or o worlds

(Goodman 1978: 3) and Humberto Mat-

uranas Objects do not pre-exist language

(Maturana 1988: 8.ii.b)?

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Ernst von Glaserseld reerred to Mit-

terers non-dualism as a third conceptual

revision in philosophy (aer ousting the-

ology and metaphysics) that, i carried

out, would thoroughly change the methodand the goals o philosophical investiga-

tion. (Glaserseld 2008: 123)

An example: The ongoingphilosophical puzzlebetween world and language

Let us consider the statement Te uni-

verse is about 14 bil lion years old. As long

as we continue just describing the universe

and not the language we use or describ-

ing it, no major problems o philosophyo language arise. But what happens i we

claim: Te universe already existed be-

ore the universe already existed was ever

said, or Te universe is much older than

the word universe? In these sentences,

object language and metalanguage seem to

mix, but in the strict (dualist!) sense they

must be part o metalanguage. But then it

ollows that we can claim Te universe is

much older than the word universe only

afer we have already spoken o the uni-

verse. As Mitterer put it: Te priority o

the object compared to the indication othe object can only be claimed aferthe in-

dication o the object (Mitterer 1992: 70,

our translation). And as soon as we try to

weaken this argument by distinguishing

between the mere claim that the object is

prior to the indication and the act that it

is, the same problem arises: we can do so

only aferthis claim. Tis is what dualism

oen seems to ignore, and logical problems

could arise here (such as an infinite regress

or a circle).

So, claims o the orm X already ex-

isted beore X already existed was eversaid seem to belong to metalanguage. For

Mitterer, the epistemological consequences

o this insight areundamental. He writes:

I the priority o the object compared to theindication o the object can only be claimed aer

the indication o the object, the categorical di-

erence o the object compared to language can

no longer be justified by reerence to the priority

o the object compared to the indication o the

object.(Mitterer 1992: 70, our translation)

Tis statement implies either a philo-

sophical revolution namely the idea that

there can be no strict ontological gap be-

tween our speaking about things and the

things themselves or just a misleadingphilosophical meander that can easily be

alsified by hard acts provided by current

natural sciences (the world is much older

than human language).

One should note that the crucial point

o non-dualism is not a monistic world-

view but the unity o objects and descrip-

tions in such a way that new descriptions

changeobjects that are nothing other than

descriptions so ar (!).

Consider the ollowing positions o

philosophy o language: Language is a phe-

nomenon categorically distinct rom thematerial world, or Language is an intrinsic

part o our empirical reality. For non-du-

alism, these descriptions are nothing other

than possible continuations o the already

executed description /language/. And this is

also valid or any proposition on the priori-

ty o the world compared to (the emergence

o human) language: Te world is much

older than human language is a continua-

tion o the description /world/.

A word o caution: non-dualism is an

attempt at a new way o using and under-

standing language rather than any provenphilosophical position. Non-dualism tries

to avoid speaking about extralinguistic

objects o reerence or meaning in the usual

semantic sense; this is another important

point or us.

Purpose of this issue

Given the innovative character o Mit-

terers theory, this special issue aims at ex-

ploring the potential o this possible third

conceptual revision in von Glaserseldssense. It asks how Mitterers way o thinking

is related to current debates in philosophy

in particular and the humanities in general.

One central question was: Which phi-

losophers maintain significant positions

comparable to Mitterers in at least some

aspects, and how do they relate to him? We

thought o the inerentialistic non-dualistic

theory o Brandom, and the already men-

tioned reflections on descriptions by Good-

man or on languaging by Maturana. o

our delight, authors came up with a series

o additional thinkers who seem to have

certain ties with Mitterer: Alred North

Whitehead, George Herbert Mead, Ludwig

Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, Judith Butler,and George Spencer-Brown.

Further questions we posed to the au-

thors included:

Does Mitterers non-dualism argue be-

yond the distinction between object

language and metalanguage? Or is the

distinction between object language

and metalanguage a useul tool or criti-

cizing non-dualism?

When introducing the distinction be-

tween language and objects categorical-

ly different rom language, does dualism

lead to an infinite regress (as Mitterertried to show) that can be avoided by

non-dualism?

How does Mitterers non-dualism re-

late to conceptions o language or lan-

guaging in (radical) constructivism

(especially Maturana, von Glaserseld,

Schmidt, and von Foerster)? Or is non-

dualism rather a third philosophy be-

yond realism and constructivism?

What is the relation between non-dual-

ism and neo-pragmatism?

How does Mitterers understanding o

interpretation change the way we con-ceptualize the understanding o texts?

What role can Mitterers non-dualism

play in the humanities and in particu-

lar in media philosophy (e.g., Schmidt,

Weber)?

Does Mitterers non-dualistic way o

thinking change the logic o empirical

investigations?

Not all these complex questions were

answered by our authors, and we see many

more aspects or uture research.

In the next section, we provide an over-

view o the accepted papers arranged inour groups: Exploring Mitterers theory,

Comparing Mitterer with other philoso-

phers and theorists, New applications o

non-dualism, and Critical papers.

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Contributors to this issue

So ar, Mitterers books have not been

translated into English and there are only

a ew o his papers available in the Englishlanguage. In this issue, we present another

translation, On interpretation, which is

published here or the first time and pre-

cedes the submitted contributions in this is-

sue. In it, Josef Mittererdeals with the ques-

tion o how interpretations o texts relate to

each other and whether it is possible to dis-

tinguish between text and interpretation.

Most o the ollowing submitted contri-

butions either deal with certain aspects o

non-dualism or link it with other philoso-

phies. However, there are also critical pa-

pers that challenge its claims.

Exploring Mitterers theoryStefan Weber explores the infinite re-

gress allegations against dualism as raised

by Mitterer in his main book Te Beyond o

Philosophy. Weber tries to answer the ol-

lowing questions: Does the dualist distinc-

tion between the not-yet described object

and the description o the object lead to an

infinite regress, and, i so, is it a benign or

a vicious one? Current literature on infinite

regress arguments does not, as expected,

discuss Mitterers alleged regresses at all.One possibility is to show that Mitterer

ailed to establish an infinite regress argu-

ment. Another interpretation is a benign

regress because the argument would not

lead to a contradiction at any stage. Only i

the regress can be seen as vicious, do seri-

ous problems or dualism arise and the

need or a non-dualist alternative seems

plausible. Otherwise, non-dualism would

be nothing more than a thought experi-

ment.

Katharina Neges seeks to answer a cen-

tral question oen asked by dualist think-ers: Does non-dualism deny the existence

o material objects? It is, by the way, the

same question also oen heard rom realists

discussing constructivist positions: Does

constructivism deny the existence o a real

world, o things-as-such? Neges gives an

unusual answer. She argues that the ques-

tion itsel operates with dualist distinctions

not presupposed by non-dualists. So non-

dualists could leave that question behind

in a relaxed manner, as she proposes.

Te aim o Franz Ofners paper is to de-

velop a theory o science that is compatible

with Mitterers non-dualism. According to

the author, the main problem is that the

non-dualist deals with descriptions as re-sults o inquiriesbut has to understand an

inquiry itsel as not categorically different

rom descriptions. Is this a causal para-

dox? Oners solution comes rom George

Herbert Meads theory o action and com-

munication, which allows or connecting

describing and inquiring non-dualistically.

Marzenna Cyzmans contribution ocuses

on the relation o fiction/non-fiction. She

proposes Mitterers non-dualism as a new

kind o description o literary texts. In

particular, Cyzman claims that the on-

tologizing or textualizing type o liter-ary discourse is the core o a type o du-

alistic epistemology, which she calls the

towards-object epistemology, and that

in this ramework it is the text that verifies

its fictionality or non-fictionality. Cyzman

offers an alternative approach and con-

cludes that Mitterers philosophy must be

considered as the oundation o a radical

non-essentialistic way o thinking about

literature.

Comparing Mitterer with other

philosophers and theoristsIn his paper, Martin G. Weissshows that

the anti-essentialist, anti-oundational,

constructivist approach o Judith Butler

can help to explain and enrich Mitterers

view. By applying a comparative analysis o

the core concepts o Mitterers and Butlers

work, the author claims that Mitterers cri-

tique o the analytic and constructivist (!)

philosophies or their blind adoption o a

dualistic epistemology based on an onto-

logical difference between the world and

the words can be solved by Butlers concept

o culturally inherited linguistic practices.Carsten Ochss paper aims at compar-

ing Mitterers non-dualistic epistemology

withAlred North Whiteheads process phi-

losophy. Te author claims that Whitehead

offers an even better background or get-

ting beyond dualism than Mitterer. Using

a so-called reality check, the author then

constructs a daily situation (two individu-

als entering a room and observing a table)

as a check or both positions, Mitterers and

Whiteheads. Ochs goes on to reconstruct

Whiteheads philosophy and to show how it

can be understood non-dualistically.

In her paper, Patricia Ene shows some

similarities between Mitterers notion o

descriptions and George Spencer-Brownsnotion o the orm o a distinction. Her sug-

gestion is the expansion o Mitterers ocus

using Spencer-Browns more general and

abstract theory o distinctions in order to

apply non-dualism also to fields outside o

language, such as empirical investigations.

Ene also argues that Mitterers alleged infi-

nite regresses are sel-made because they

can only be observed rom the viewpoint o

non-dualism. Her final claim is that dualis-

tic and non-dualistic approaches are both

argumentation techniques.

In his paper, Thomas Himmelfreundpointnercompares Mitterer with LudwigWittgenstein

and Richard Rorty. For Himmelreund-

pointner, Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Mitterer

developed their respective positions rom

a similar sense o discomort with tradi-

tional philosophy. Te crucial difference is,

however, that Mitterers non-dualism is no

longer occupied with the difficulties o epis-

temological problems but seeks to overcome

the problems arising rom the belie in the

possibility o an epistemology. In particular,

Himmelreundpointner claims that the di-

erence between seeing and seeing-as (as-pectual vision), as introduced by Wittgen-

stein, is still a dualizing perspective, while

Mitterers view is more radical.

New applications of non-dualismBernhard H. Vollmar claims that the eco-

nomic scienceswould profit rom a non-du-

alistic perspective. Vollmars main argument

is to use Mitterers approach to ask about

the role o language and communication in

economic theory. As such, the author pro-

vides new insights in the process-character

o economy.Olaf Hoffjannexamines the epistemologi-

cal oundations o public relations commu-

nication in terms o a comparison o realist,

constructivist, and non-dualist epistemolo-

gies. He argues in avor o a non-dualist

account because both the realist and the

constructivist paradigm either all into

epistemological traps or do not even tackle

some o the relevant questions such as how

and why PR descriptions ail, what PR can

do so that its descriptions are believed, and

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how trend-observations can be explained in

a plausible manner. As such, or Hofann,

Mitterers non-dualism is a third philosophy

beyond realism and constructivism.

In his contribution, Achim Landwehropens up a discussion between Mitterers

philosophy and historiographical theory, and

asks whether non-dualism is able to show

a way out o the opposition o act and fic-

tion. Since non-dualism avors relationism,

it shows a way to research the many entan-

glements and complexities between past re-

alities and their descriptions. Tereore the

alternative way o writing history means a

history o realities.

Critical papers

Alan G. Gross recognizes a resemblancebetween his own earlier work, mostly in his

bookTe Rhetorics o Science, and Mitterers

non-dualism as both advocate a method

o analysis as distinct rom a metaphysical

position. However, Gross casts doubt on

whether there is only the world o discourse

(Mitterers claim) or whether there is a sense

in which some acts and some theories are

beyond arguments. By reerring to examples

rom science, philosophy, and literary criti-

cism, he arrives at the conclusion that it is

not possible to argue against certain acts

and against progress. Te same holds or phi-losophy and literature. Some claims about

science also appear to be inconsistent with

Mitterers non-dualism, which considers va-

lidity claims to be limited to interpretations.

Peter Kglers paper argues that because o

its lack o a clear and convincing semantics,

Mitterers non-dualism is inconclusive. Tis

can be seen, in particular, when compared

to a specific version o pragmatic semantics,

which the author distills rom Wittgensteins

meaning is use approach. Deending con-

ceptual relativism, Kgler finds Mitterers

critique o conceptual relativism incorrect

and implausible.

Michael Dellwing argues that the activity

o anti- or non-dualist philosophers includessome contradictions. Non-dualists attack

the practice o dualistic discourse but at the

same time they join in with it. Tey still do

not change the practices o philosophy, as

they are written by and or philosophers con-

templating disembodied situations. So to be

genuinely committed, non-dualists should

consequently end doing philosophy.

Conclusion

Does non-dualism mark the end o phi-losophy or rather the beginning o some-

thing completely new? Te third conceptual

revision would deprive us o a amiliar and

immensely comortable entity: the world (or

even worlds?) out there different rom hu-

man linguistic thinking about it. Aer the

deconstruction o any spiritual level (god,

gods, ghosts, and so on) and o any meta-

physical assumption (such as the thing-in-

itsel, the untouched, or the unrecognizable

reality behind or beore all constructions),

Mitterer intends to say arewell to the flow

o things, to the nature out there in its col-ors and orms as existing independent and

categorically different rom our linguistic

activities. Is this a philosophical revolution

or i not an epistemological cul-de-sac

(language solipsism or description mo-

nism are just two examples o labels rom

opponents)? We have no doubt that Mitter-

ers philosophy is the linguistic turn taken

literally. We are confident that the contribu-

tions to this special issue will shed light on at

least some o these aspects.

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