~------------111111!1--1.....-•. ' i •• • ' •l. •• . .. .. U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)

Fleet Post·Office $an Franc.isco, California

DCT/nls. CV37/ AJ.6-l3 Serial:

0172

~~ Aus ''1~ l:rom: Commanding Officer, USS PRINCETON (CV-37) 'i.'o: Chief of Naval Operations fia: (l) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet ( 3) Co<illllander Naval Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Chief, u.s. Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Eleport for the period 4 July 1952 through 6 August. 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 (b) CVG-19 conf ltr ser,030 of 4 August 1952 (Air Attack Reports for the period 7 July through 3 August 1952) 1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the :;>eriod 4 July 1952 through 6 August 1952 is hereby submitted, P!J:lT I . GENERAL NARRATIVE

on 4 July, pursuant to CTF 77 confidential dispatch Ol0642Z of July 1952, the USS PRINCETON with Carrier Air Group Nineteen embarked departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to the operating area. On 6 July the PRINCETON rendezvoused with Task Force 77.

Task Force 77 was composed of four aircraft carriers, the' USS PRINCETON, USS BOXER, USS PHILLIPPINE SEA and the USS BON HO!.~.IlE RICHARD, with variolls heavy support and screening ships. The USS PHILLIP.PI!-.'E SEA was relieved by the USS ESSEX midway in the operating period., t

The mission of this force was as sSt forth in Commander Task Force 77 Operations Order No, 22-51 (Second Revision). Throughout the period of this report the Princeton air· group flew close air support missions, interdiction strikes, and.strikes against supply dumps, billeting areas and industrial

~MAT! ON

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·• '. tuc•, a1oac w1 th ftl'iou tne ••tie• in a\lppO.rt aact 4eteAM Of ted Ratione Baftl JWoea.

'l'lle 1ntu41ot1on atrikea OOilt14ue4 to 'be MAe aaa1nat Borth

ltOl'eu eut oout and uua-rniu\llu rail%'0148. Dallilht .

atl'ikea WUI 41J.teote4 ap1DI 'b.riqea Ml'lballiDC JUU U4

.aeotiou ot vaot whloh wue 41ft1oul t to repail'. R1pt heotler

and daWD reooo flilbta wue ate SA u attup~ to oatoh the eAUlJ

traiu aD4 truota oa the acwe.

he to. the ratbe.r ataUo oon41 U.ou wllioll wate4 al.QDI thl

front linu oloae w au.p)01't 111aa1ou were lJJdtecl. A fn were

flown to MintaiA a atate ot .rM41uaa lhoul4 a Aee4 f• cloae

air support ariae.

llo.re u4 aore, the 11a.1or ettOJtt lbitte4 to tupu ot a·

strateclo utve: powu plaata, ld.AiDa aot1ri.Uea, taot: 1H,

aupplJ atR-se areu • et. ~.

Attaota we.re ccpt1Aut4 apiaat the ~o-eleotrio ooapla.ea

in u ettOl't to obtain o~ete 4 .. uaot10G. In ap1 te ot a

maJor ah1tt ot eaemr AI. 1A 4eteue ot thea• pluta the attaou

were pr .. ae4 bOM with a r.eat t-sree of auooaa. At tlle aaae

tiaa therao-eleovio plu a were broupt QD4u atuot in tbe

MJOJI 1D4uat1'1al o1t1ea &l.OQI the eut oout ot EozaM with aoocl

result..

· Oil 11 l~J 1 a ~o1At RaYJ 1 .. .U.Z. Po.roe u4 ·JiariAe attack wu

macle apJaat JJlCluatrlal tupu 1A PJoauuc, capital ot Borth

ltorea. Putiolpattq la tbe ataot, which 4eYelope4 lato Olle

ot the -~or air ettaru ot the EOI'tu War. the PRINOITCU

launched a deck load atr1te ot Paatllera • ooraat.ra • aD4 Sk7· ra14ers With aood reaulta -laat tbe ua1pe4 tarceta. O.Dl.J

one PRDaftCit alroratt •• loat 1A tMa well ooor41ute4 attack

apSaat llearilJ 4eteDie4 tupta.

Attaob were alao .a4e aplut 1D4u,r1Cll tal'aeta. aloac

the ._., Coast of J:Ol'ea, an.ezoaple ot whiob wu the ataok of

28 lull on the lllohu ~ealte plaDt aat aeaoo1ated fao111t1ea. A total ot thuty-e1sbt al.rcratt, thil'teu ADa aza4 twentJ-f1n ·

PlttJa, in two at1'1ke poupa 4roppe4 tcr.rtJ tou of boaU. a.ra4

rocketa on 'ile taraete, reaul t1a& 1n slxtr perout 4eauuotiOD

ot tile -.neal t'l 'Dlc.at, oOIIPlete 4eavuot1on ot a the:rao- ·

olootrio plc.nt which turll1a&e4 power to the Jllll8D••1 tn plOJlt,

IDtljor damoae to a barro.ots a:roa ul tbJ'ee to t1Ye cuts .n the

m:lin ra1lroo.4 b:rictao lea41DI aouth troa Kilohu. othu atto.oa

aaainat a1a1ltu 1n4u.aulal o.a4 111a1~ act1Y1t1ea thrO\IIbout northeoat 1:&-eo. were eqi&GllJ auooeutul..

2 ALL PFfE-.T.AN lCl5F USi'T Dnr. DRCLASS TFTF.D. A.TT1'R: C:N!O LTR ~ C09D323/654776 "DO\\JJ'GRADE/ D®CliSS .N.AVil.L R:ECO<RLDSo '? .1

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1fcil~nTY MoRMATION

In addition to the major strikes, the Pr1ncoton furnished nr.val gunfire spot flights for surface wnits blockading the coast e~d CAP and ASP flights in defense of the Force.

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~NO successful rescue operations resulted when two Corsair pilots were forced to bQil out over enemy territory after their pl~enes were so heavily damaged by flak tho.t engine failure re­sulted, One pilot landed about twenty miles northeast of Ham­hung lntc in the afternoon. A rescue attempt was mc.de that afternoon but failed due to ".dvsrsc weather and darknoss. A second and successful rescue O.ttem.pt wns made as soon as weather parmi ttcd the following morning. The s c~ond pilot bailed out ten miles east of Kilchu and was picked ~p about two hours lntcr. In both instances adverse weather and active enemy opposition were encountered, The cooperation of the USS IOWA and the USB E;::LENA which furnished the helicopters, the team. work of tho RESCAP members from Air Group Nine teen, ®d the survival to •h· lliqucs and prooeduros of tho downed pilot~ woro considcrod out­stc.nding in both cases.

On 3 August, upon completion of flight operations, the· Princeton depr:rted Tusk Force 77 c.nd proceeded to Yokosuka, Honshu, Jcpnn for a period of rest and rcc~cntion.

PART II CllRONOLOGICi~ ORDJ':R OF EVENTS

4 - 6 JUly

Enroute operating urea.

7 - 9 JUly

Conducted air operations otf Northeast Koren. Three hun­dred fourteen sorties were :flown, 212 of -v:hicb. were offensive..

10 July

Replenished.

11 - 13 JUly

Conducted air operations off Northe~st Korea. One hundred seventy-six sorties were flown of which 117 were offensive.

14 JUly

Replenished,

~TION

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15 ~ 16 July

Conducted air operations off Northeast Korea. Sixty-one sorties were flown of which t·wenty-six were offensive.

17 July

Replenished.

18 July

Inclement v;eather conditions forced the co.ncellc.tion of nll air dpero.tions.

19 - 20 July

Conducted c.ir · operctions off Northec,st Ko1•en. Seventy~ eight sorties were flown, 59 of which were offensive.

Replenished.

22 - 24 Jllly

dred Conduot~d o.ir operations fifty-eight sorties were

25 July

Replenished.

26 - 28 July

ott Northeast Koroc:. Three hun­flown, 220 of which were offensive.

Conducted uir operctions off' Northeo.st Koren. T1.vo hundred fifty-three sorties were flown, 162 of which were offensive.

29 July

Replenished.

30 July - 3 August

Conducted uir operntions off Northeast Koren. Three hun­dred twenty-six sorties were flown, 236 of which were offensive.

4 - 6 August

Departed To.sk Force 77 o.nd proceeded to Yokosuko., Honshu, Ja.po.n.

~~TION 4

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PART III ORDNANCE

A. Performance

1. Ship's

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One ordnance casualty was incurred during the period·: the left two barrels of 40MM quad mount number 410 were damaged an~ thrown out of alignment in both train und elevation when an F4U crashed into the mount. The spring-carriage and housing are sprung to such nn extent that replacement of the entire mount is necessary.

One fire control equipment casualty also occured when the turning fork assembly (Y4701) of the port after NK, 56 system ccnsed to function due to en open coil. Si~ce the necessarjr spcrc part is not included on the ship's allowance list, the director wns out of operation for six days pending replacement of the necessary mechanism.

The results of the preventive l!lo.intenunce progr: ... m. <..1nd on-board tr~ining of mQintcnancc personnel is reflected in the low incidence of casualties and the excellent over all pcrformnncc of fire control cquip~cnt.

2. Aircraft

Some difficulty has been encountered with the clectric~l lec,d to the Douglc.s bomb ejector rack on the AD-4's. It is rocOiJ.mcndcd thn.t o.. quiok .... disconncct lead, ins_tcad of the prc,scnt sorcw on type, be instnllcd.

Hung Ordnrmoc Report: 4 July through 6 August 1952

Doug. Bomb Type Ordno.ncc J.ERO l4A lil!C § EOD 2 MK 51 lJK 55 Ejector Totals

100# Fro.&s 250if, 500# 1000#. 2000#

2 3

5

6 \

5

0

5 10

2 2

7 13

6

2 21!

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Disposi-tion of hung ordnc.ncc:

Type La tor · Releases Remaining Drop offs Ordnr.nce m.o.nuetl release by .Jerking on racks on landing Toto..1

100# Frcc~S 1 4 2 7 250~ 1 7 5 13 500 6 ' " 1000;F,

2 2oooif 2 11 7 28

Of the 5,005 bombs carried, a total of twenty-eight bombs or .559 percent hung up.

B. Expcndi tur e

Total J.nununi tion Expended 4 July through 3 ,~ugllst 1952

Q.UANTI'J.X

204 383 740

1934 511

8 1102

150 2 4

14

1189 1704

509 92 28

165 994

305 3547 743 587

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LJI\!l1r:J'oRMATION

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Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K8 K9 Kl2 10.4 K14B

Kli,C

Kl9 K20 K21 K23 K25 K26 K29

K30 K35 K36 K37 K39

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DESCRIPTION

2000if GP. 1000' GP

500'1; GP 250~! GP lOOif GP 350ft DB A.'I-MK 51, 220/260(/ Fro.g lOOif INC Clllster Cluster ..:i.d::.ptcr Bomb, FNg E83,W/fuzc Ml30 ( T48) . Bomb, Frcg, !.183, Vr/ fllze MlJ(T49) . Fuze; Nose; AN-M103Al Fuze; Nose; llN-,1U39iJ. Fuze, Nose, :.N.:!fl401l.l Fuze) Nose; 1~-146 Fuze, Nose; VT, T90 Fuze, Nose; VT, T50El Fuze Nose, VT, AN­IU68/T91El/91) Hose Fuze ll.H-MK 219 AN-MlOOA2/ND) AN-Ml01A2 (. 025) AN-Ml02A2 ( .025) Mll6 ( 4-5)

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Total Ammunition Expended 4 July through 3 August 1952 (Cont.;

QUANTITY

4

18

2596

1337 1372

1372

59297 52794 46093

154361 47920 47920 23960

119700 276500

4730 88

88

176

98 65 18

8 16 90

46 65 10 50

P li.RT IV BATTLE DJJIAGE

A. Ovm

CODE

K48

K49C

K49D

L6A LBB

L9

Ml M2 M3 M4 M6 M7 M8 M9 MlO Nl N2

N4

N6

N7 NlO P2 P3 P4 P7

Pl3 P38 P39 U38

DESCRIPTION

Hydrostatic Fuze, Tail AN-MK 230 Primer Detonator, Ml.4 (0.1) Primer Detonator, 1U4 (0.01) 6;5 Head, (ATAR) MK2 5.0 Rocket Motor MK 10-5 Fin Assembly ror 5.0 MK 2 & 10 20MM !lEI, M97 20MM INC, M96 20M!.! AP-T, M95 Link, 2Ql,fi~ M8 or M8El Cal. • 50 API, M8 CaL • 50 INC Ml Cal,· .50 l.PI-T 1120 Linlc, Cal. .50 A/C M2 Cal, .50 Belted, (2-2-l; Napalm Type 1 or M3 Igniter, t:.P, Ml5 or M215 Ignitor, V1P, l.U6 or M216 · Fuze, ID.57, VI/Burster C8Rl Gas Tank MK 12 Xylenol P2:rachute Flare MK 5 Parachute Flare MK 6 Parachute Flare !AI<; 8-l Parachute Flare, >u~-M26 . DrHt Signal, iJi-MK 5 Bomb Ejtr. Ctg.· MK l Bomb Ejtr. Ctg, !ilK 2 Destructors

The ship sustained no battle damage• See reference (b), !..ir Atto.ck Reports 162-52 through 280-52, for the bo.tt1e damage sustriined by Princeton aircraft.

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B. Enemy

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See re:rerence {b), Air Attack Reports 162-52 through 280-52 for the dnmnge inflicted upon the enemy. P/JlT V PERSONNEL

A. Personnel Count

The average on-board count for the reporting period wns:

Officers Enlisted Total Ship's CoNpnny 120 2024 2144 1·!arines 2 67 69 Air Group 11.2 _MQ 789 Total 261 2741 3002 Tbe following rates were trans:ferred:

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one YNTC(A), one AB2(T), one BTG2, one L~.!IL2, one 1102(T) two BM3, · one BTG J, one HMJ, one MHLJ, three MUJ, one SN one SHSN, eleven SA and one FA.

The following rates were received:

eleven SN, one MUSN, one HN, eight SA, two FN, one FA and one J,TllN.

S. Personnel Performance

It is considered that the Princeton reached the highest level of operating ef:ficiency duxing this tour particu­larly as regards personnel performance. The serious handicap· o:r shortage in petty officer ratings has been overcome, to a ' large extent, by the effective combination of a vigorously prosecuted training program and practical experience. A great .ill.o.ny non-rated men are now cf:rcctively and efficiently taking the place of petty officers.

The pilots exhibited the highest degree o:r flying proficiency as evidenced by the fact that there were a minimum of barrier accidents, no major flight qeck accidents, and keen competition for all flights. Ordnance, maintenance, and air~ crc.ft ground crews continued to give outstanding performances.

~!dATION 8

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~ORMATION

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of the The following dispatches concerning the performance

Princeton were received during the operating period:

FROM: TO:

USS .i'J..STEDE CTF 77

"TRalSFERRED 57.8 GROSS TONS TO PRINCETON IN 23 MI.NUTES X J,VER­i..GE ru,TE 150,7 TONS PER HOUR X THIS BETTERS JJ.;L PREVIOUS RJ,TES lJID UI.DE POSSIBLE BY EXCELLENT COOPER!..TI ON 1.1TD STJ,TI ON I<'"'' PING PRINCETON"

FROM: COMIJ:RPJ,C TO: USS PRINCETON

"RECORD PROVISIONING R!.TE Il\lliCJ,TED JJ..STEDE 140220Z NOTED \,TIR FLE1.8URE X '.'.'ELL DONE ro PRINCETON i.ND JJ.STEDE X SIG!~D VJJJM H IJ MARTIN"

C. Morale

The morele of personnel ramained high throughout the period, which lasted thirty-foUl' days. It· \'las noted, however, that within both the air group and ship evidences of personnel fatigue developed in the last ten days of operations. It is reeommcnded that for full-out operations "on the line" three weeks bG selected as the optimum, when other considerations pormitt in preparing schedules.

~he vigorous and successful conduct of rescue opera­tions hns been a most important factor in maintaining pilot morale. Five Princeton pilots were shot down within enElJlly held terri~ory during the last month. There was no chance of survival for three who crashed with their aircraft but the other two who landed by parachute wore returned expcdi tiously through the combined efforts of a RESCJ~ and helicopters dispatched by tho USS IOVILJ. and the USS HELEN!•.

Same factors contributing to high morelo were regular concerts by the ship's band o.nd ent-ertainment by a. recently organizGd string bund.. J... progre.m. of recorded music also has ~ecn provided over the RBO system; the record library was made up on a loan basis by the ship's complement.

D. Training

During the past operating period on-board training and educational services have reached an all time high both in volume end personnel participation. This fact may be noted by reviewing the monthly training and quarterly U.S.L.F.I. reports.

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Qie t .,_,_., laa.,.tloll 1Ja t-e1at10A to tft1A1D& 11 the 1Aatt.p,1oa of a ._.. IVlapDt oo-tu-tob VaiDlD& propaa. !Ma paop•lau ku ou:rlel •' p»lae paUJ tbi'OU&Jl ue ot •­the-Jo' oheobft .Ueu wlaloh ••• been -~•4 tor taoh ••'­and n• 1ul\de twao,lou. peoullu M .alii olua ot allip.

Ooaa14t2ablt·4ltt1oultr bae bean Clpe:r1enoe4 1D obtain• in& wainiac atulala, tu"ooJr.a aa4 V.1nSna 4t11.o•• 1A the Iapan uea. lt J.a :retCIIaaaled' ._, ..,., MMI'lala ba •4• . aftllable fflf tulOit 4e11wJ{.! the nztlou wea 1A lapa. ,,4

IIO:re ap to 4a'- Vd.DlAI uae Me4e4 to l'e)alaoe thoee wllioh ua 4et1A1~7 CM&W.MI. . ·

1. OU.:Ltlu . · llalp • a oCW»~Q paaOIUltl allttal'el-no ouual tlee 4v1D8· _

~· pu1o4. '&a tollowllal ... -.l,S.ea wue t.Aou:rt& br AU Gl'OUJ RiA•,••a pe:ra01Ul6lt .

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u lall 19521. l.tlll z..r. IJUIIMl'L&, \'~195~ -· \ :tap•W ld.a81rii1A ao\loa Wllea ld.e jl).t. auM4 whUe 011 a avua 011 PJoauu&~ Oa'•• ot the uuh aa •nUJ poWI4 tue.

1) 1u11 1951t VI a.s.· ~ vr-192, wu \

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wo\ID4e4 111 taM let\ ua 'bJ aa11 uu til'e le OA a oloee au •UDOI'~ lliaalon.· JJf IWIIOIIt ..Sa • -I'PDOJ laa41q ac \t•S2.

21 l:!ll9S2s J4' •• 8. ICIIUliR, u .. 192, :reoe1Ya41

I wow:l48' oa Ilia taM ahou14e:r 11han Ida l4U •• hit bJ eneJQ grOUD4 tue. L! ~ MAe aa MUceMJ l&D41D& at K-18 •

. 27 lt4119S2t D1 r.D. SIEIRIR, "·191, ._. t I kill•& Whea hla l9f2 euhtt lathe ••• attar a micl·alr ooll1a1on

wh.Ua ca a GAP tllabt.

1 qQit 19S2: 11110 0.1. BOUWf, VA•l95 ftl

t lt1Ut4 1D aotlOD wbea lab AD-• oruhtcl SDto 1ihe aea toUowUc

1 a avars. .. aae. · fte ._.. at the c~aah 1a belieYe4 to ban beea .. .., CIOUII rue.

) Atapat 1952: Ll W.l. IULtUIJ II, 11'•193, waa \

I Jd.ll.t4 lA ao1i101l whea bla 1411-~ osauluMl *11• oc a br14&• aw11ce Cause ot 1iht oruh 1a Ml1eft4 to ban -.ea ene~Q poua4 tire. Du-~ pu1o4 Mftll pUo-. we:re srcun4e4 &Q4 t~mee wRe hcapl MllM t• . abort ~rs.au ot tS.., prt.r111 fa:t ainor · oonwaloDa uc1 •u•~ wouAI laounel u a reault ot 41 toblqa. baUouu, aa4 ut1.Wontt tue. ·

10 KtL PRfE-J.f,11J l q~F, DS~PV"r n-p,t;J),ASSHTFID. A.TI'l't!: Cnq'O I~:R S·ER

009D323/G::S~776 "[)(1\~'};l:•R,A.:JE/ DEGLASS N:AVAL RECOrRIDS. I '

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:.:t .. TION

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SUJlllllary of pilots lost from the Air Group from 4 July to 6 August 1952:

Deaths Pilot Air crewman

Hissing in A.ction - Pilot Psychological Injury Disposition Board

Total

P..;RT VI SPECI;J. co;J,iENTS

A. Carrier 1-ir Group NINET'W:N

l, Operations

3 0 1 0 6 0

IO

During the period 4 JUly through 6 August, CarJ:ier .hir Group NINE~.EEU "flew 1 1 567 sorties tor a total of 3 ;s36.5 hOli.l'S during 18,5 operational days. l.J.l assigned comQitments were met) the only cancellations being due to non-operational v1eather over the target area. The .. · .. ir Group was unable to operate a total of 3,5 days. An average of seventy-seven sorties per day was flown by the la.ir Gr.oup. The average number of flights for the jet pilots was twenty, ar.d for prop pilots 10.8, Average time in the air was 31.8 hours per pilot.

Strike tactics varied with the schedUles and targets assigned, By launching larger strike groups the force was able to hit heavily defended targets, sUch as Chosen #1 hydroelectric plant and Pyongyang, in spite of intense anti-aircraft fire encountered. Strikes from this 0roup had a normal composition of from eight to twelve jet aircraft for initial flak suppression, twelve to twenty-eight C()rsai!'s for secondary flak suppression and/or bombing, and eig~t to rou:rtoon JJ)I s for the .major bombing effort. Coordinatlon of the strike elements was achieved by launching the co!l­ventional prop aircraft about one-half hour before the jet launch and effecting a rendezvous of the two types about ten to fifteen miles from the target area, This enabled all aircraft to proceed to the target and execute the attack as one tactical unit. It is recommended that on strikes against such targets one carrier launch maximum effort for any g~ven stril.:e. '

The use of jet aircraft for flak su~pression we.s substantially increased during this :PGriod of combat and

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the overall effectiveness of flak suppression materially in­creased by the use of up-to-date flak studies and target photographs in .briefings. In cases where anti-aircraft gun positions were difficult to pin-point due to terrain or camouflage, the wide urea coverage of the VT fuzed 260 pound fragmentation bomb afforded sufficient blast effect to provide

effective suppression. However, where the individual f~ .

pcsitions were prominent and easily detected, the 6.5 ineh cnti­tank and five-inch HVJ~ rocket proved best, both in actual damage to the positions and ih adverse psychological effect on the enemy ground troops.

Efforts to inoroose the size and effectiveness of night heckler missions were continued. with good results, 1. ten-plane launch composed of two F4U-4's from·11F-192 with

·qualified night pilots, four F4U-5N's fl!blli VC-3, and four 1~4NL's of VC-35 proved most suocessfnl. This launch of ten aircraft in five sections provided, in addition to the obvious advantage Of greater. intruder potential, more rapid and comprehensive weather reconnaissance of the target areas

cssigned to early morning strike groups.

The importance of good photo coverage for planning and executing all strikes cannot·be over-emphasized,

both for target identification and the accurate locution of l~l positions in the area,

During this period of operations, target o.ssignm.ents were veried E>.nd it was obvious that the Task Force Commander was continually searching for lucrative t~rgets. This variation in attacks ~eightened pilot in­terest and enthusiasm. It is also believed that employing the element o~ surprise served to·reduce losses as well as

insure more ·effective usc. of e.vailabl_e force.

The rail inte~diction program c.ppears to be decreasing in effectiveness-. The cotn.binntion of !JJ.\ defense. at key locations and rapid repairs of rail outs has reduced' the time rail lines are out of commission and has given the

enemy a relatively froe period of operation onch nigh·t" It is recommended that considerably more emphasis be placed on night operations, at the same time shifting from rails to locomotives and rolling stock as targets, keeping a few

hecklers over the tnrget area all nigllt lone whenever opernting conditions permit.

From obscrvntion it appears that the highway

,system is being improved, particularly bridges; and that

~LU.TION 12

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truck traffic is increasing, If interdiction of supply lines is to be effective, it is believed that more emphasis could be placed on ettnckins and herassing highway ttaffic, particularly at night,

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Inc:reased AA defense at the parti!llly destroyed power plant sites is an indication of tho importan<'le placed by the eneoy on these installations and the necessity for effecting repairs. Periodic surveillance and attacks to keep the power plants out of commission are strongly recommeadod. In order to make these ~ttacks yield the maxim~ result at the least cost to ourselves, it is recorr~ended that coordinated f.lak suppression flights be scheduled on those targets where AA ;is expected, Jets ccu1 be cc1ploycd here, The attacks should also be concentrated and hco.vy with at lcnst twelve or more aircraft using henvy boobs (at least five-hundred pound bombs and preferably one-thousand or two-thousc.nd pound bombs).

2, Mtlin tona.noo

The usual ·aoount of ignition' trouble Vitia onaountorod at tho oommenoenent of this tour. This trouble is believed to be aggravated by pin-wheel operations.

The use of overhauled RB-19 spark plugs has resulted in additional ignition trouble throughout the tour. J;o new RB-19-2 spark plugs have been received aboard, Reworked ~ugs have been averaging only sixty hours instead of the prescribed 120 hours, It is strongly recommended that only new spark plugs be stocked in the fol'ward area.

The availability of spare parts in the aviation supply system is the largest rmintenanoe difficulty. Some o.ircraft. are operating without .APX-6 1 s, auto-pilots, auto-cowls, auto·- oil coolers, G-2 compasses, degrenser units or turn-and-bank indica­tors. Others are often down for night or instruuent flying be­cause of instrw.J.ent inadequacies. Sched\lles have only been; met by shifting instruments fran planes which were down for other reasons.· Several days availcbili ty was lost because flaps, ailerons, ·cylinders, push rod packings, rocker box cover gaskets 2nd windshields were not available.

In view of the present pattern of Taslc Force 77 operations it is felt that ti~e would be saved if tools and a suall selected list of spare p~rts for the F9F, F4U, and AD were !m"n!l~fu"l.""""'''1<~'!>. -~··--"-· ..... -- ....

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3. Electronics

The GV allowance of electronics equipcent shou~d in­?lude two sets of UPM-8 (APX-6 test equipment). This increase ~n allowance is deemed necessary due to the slow replacement of spaxc pc.rts for this equipment. ·

The principal electronics discrepancies for the ro­pol'ting period have occurred with VHF transceivers, These discrepancies were pritlD.rily internittent fading and cutting out of both transmitted and received signals, This intcruittent fading occurred, to a varying extent, in all three of the .IJ];W configurated aircraft, The cause of this fading and cutting out vms found to be corroded antenna and ground leads. The dis­crepancy was corrected by a general cleaning and burnishing of 2.ll antenna and ground connections. A policy of more frequent inspections of such connections has been instituted and should prevent rccurranoe of this discrepancy.

4. Survival

The following report is a compilation of comments and recommendations of the survival officers of the squadrons and staff of this command:

VF-191 has produced locally a small knapsack for the E{-2 raft container, All survival gear in the raft kit is placed in the knapsack for immediate renoval, The pack has been colored green for sWMJGr use and the squadron has rccoQllend­ed white for winter use.

Two pilots of VF-192 received wounds in flight during dive bombing runs. One received a snall arms wound in the a.r!l. He steppe~ bleeding by the use of a locally cede tourniquet carried in the cockpit. It was made in the parachute loft of. one and one-half inch webbing, approxinately thirty-siX inches long, folded over and sown to a one-fourth inch width, with a five inch loop in one grid for easy application, Instruction in the proper use of the tourniquet has been given by the flight surgeon _of this command, A second cockpit aid is the installation of ~~a cc amoonia aopulcs {each pilot also carries a one-third co ammonia caps~e), to be used in case of dizziness or weakness in flight. The flight surgeon also has given instruction in the proper use of this item.

14

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" _,,. __ ·-_ .. .1 • '" ' • . . ' ( • • • •

• •

VF-l9J has had three pilote down in enemy territory {two of them during this operating period), Two ot these had modi~ied JJ:l/CRC-7 radios, They l>oth expressed the opinion thut the noise on "receiver" was too loud, even to tho extent of giving thcdr position away to the enemy, One did not uso his radio for that rec.son, whcrccs t!1e other expressed u high opinion of its general vnluc. · It was found in the single case in which the JJ:l/CRC-7 was used that the battery did not lc.st longer than approxinmtcly one ho~, It is recommended that new batteries be supplied to assure longer life for the radios, The !JK, III mirror wc,s used by the pilot mentioned ubovc who did not usc his radio. The REsc;,p lcedcr stated that "it looked like u so:>rch light nnd could dcfini tely not be '"istnJ<:en for a wutcr reflection,"

v:.-195 hus installed snaps on tho left shoUlder harness six inches above the shoUlder strap !ldjustment buckle, l\nd .!1 ring on the oxygen trunl<: nc!ll' the quicl<-relaasa fitting, By hoolting the rin~; into tho snc.p tho weight of the oxygen trunl<: is taken eft the ra.ask, m.o.king it more com:t'ortc.bls to wca.r.

..

Pilots of Vh-195 report that bnokaches occur when the metal plate formed sponge-rubber· beck-pad is used nnd reoo1lllllcnd thr:.t itS usc be discontinued. They further reco.lll.:lond a. considerat· increase in the allotment of life vest compasses {Stk #R-18-C-158C-200) to the supporting ship. Loss by ditchings nnd bail-outs h<1s resulted in n serious snort~ge of this item for re-outfitting of pilots for return to flying, This srune cowucnt holds true for other i toms of light go::tr :-.nd personal scfety and sur vi val equipment such as sheath knives, , 38 culibcr pistols, flashlights, penlights nnd holmo.ts.

In· accordance with a. proposed technica.l order in Bu.l.~.cr letter 54438, web t!lbs hcwe been o.ttc,chcd to the parnohute quick­adjust buckles of squndrons of this eo~~d. They hnvo been found highly effective for quick relecse of the p!lrachutc harness and it is believed thnt they would be especially helpful when in the m:ter where the buckles arc especially hard to loosen,

Modified iJ:l/CRC-7 radios have been installed in ::11 PK-2 raft kits possible, One hundred percent installation will be conpleted as soon as the remnining quantity of radios required is received. '

pilots Many pilots of this coJ1l.ll10Jld, acting on recom.::end"' ti ons c c

who have been on the ground in Korea or hit by 1~ fire,

15

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' • ,_ • • . • ' • • •

now wear their oxygen musks (hose unattached), two-lensed goggles, and n wrupped neck scarf during their runs over the target for maximum protection from fire, splintered canopy and flak. A s.econd (us\lally darker) plastic lens is worn over the goggles to prevent, as much as possible, splintering that could damage the eyes.

B. Operations Department

1, Aerol,ogy

a. General Weather Summary

Weather <>enditions throughout most of the operating period were influenced by weak· high pressure cells with· a stationary front extending along the Japanese Islands. Rain, fog, and increased cloudiness resulting from a northerly movement'ot' this front restricted operations on 9, lO,·and 15 through 18 July. During the period 28 through 31 July, opera­tions were again curtailed by rain, poor visibility, and low clouds, a result of the rapidly deepening low that formed in the region of the Pan Tao Peninsula and moved eastward. The vortex of this storm passed over the operating area on 30 July.

b. Equipment

Experiments in tracking the target reflector RR-29/AM were unsatisfactory due to the fact that the minimum range or the SK radar is too great (approximately three miles). Satisfactory· tracking of the reflector target ML307B/AP was accomplished, using fire control radar.

c. Communications

Guam radio-teletype reception was good, however, coverage of Korear.. reports \'.las poor.

except area.

Tokyo radio-teletype reception was fair when a front existed between Tokyo and the operating Coverage of Korean reports was good.

Facsimile reception in general was good with the exception of interference from CW transmissions.

2. Air Operations

Air operations has revitalized its instrument training program in order to maintain pro~iciency among the

~MATION 16

;.

' • • ~ / .:·{;'''';.:''"~;:,1'~~1~~~~~::~~

·'"

,. •

ship's eompany·aviators. The Instr~ent·Board planned a series of lectures on flight procedures, the subject matter being ex­tracted from pertinent portions ot j;he Naty "Alt Vfeather Flight Manual". In addition, a oo~rehen$~ve flight check sheet was edited and a sixty question ~itten examination prepared on CAR and the flight procedure syllabqs;

>;"

During replenisl)mep.t and foul weather operatill!'l days ship's company aviator.s are briefed on instrument flying with particular emphasis on il.irways flying.

· Effective instrument cards are held by all shin's aviators who were attached to this command prior to deployment from the United States. Two aviators who have reported for duty While in the forward el:'ea are now in the process of preparing for the w:-itten examination. 'i'h6SG officers will be processed through the flight sylla":lu.B du1·~.ng the in-port period.

). Combat Information Center

a. Equipment Performance:

The pe!'formance of the S:X: and SPS-6b radars has been excellent. The maintenance opportunity afforded each replenishment day was ample to keep the gear in top operating condition. In spite of the obvious advantages or the SX as an all purpose radar, the SPS-6b is far superior to it for air search especially where jet aircraft are concerned.

D~cting effect has been observed more fre­quently during this period than on previous operating tours. This phenomena usually oecurB at altitudes below tour thousand teet. On several occasions two aircraft have been tracked out to ~40 miles by radar and kept in contact with Mark X IFF up to 16c miles. Surface contacts have been picked up at ranges up to ninety miles.

RBI information has been reliable but the limited range ot th11t6ear ltbirt:v-tivo to forty-five miles)' is considered to be a vcry serious handicap in the effective interception of high speed,l)igh altitude aircratt,

b• Operating Procedures

It has been found by experience that a four section, six-hour wqtoh is the optimum for continuity and peak

.individual performance, This schedule places the watches on a maal to meal basis; The watch sections stand the same watch for four days then rotate, usually on a replenishment day.

~MATION 17

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• • •

• .... • •

The "middleman" feature of the AFJV aircraft has proved invaluable on days when weather conditions over tar­gets is marginal and frequent weather 'reports are needed from recco planes. Furthermore, during rescue operations the use of this gear has enabled the controlling ship to attain information with a speed not possible otherwise because of the distrunce in­volved. Usually a destroyer exercised control over the ASP aircra:l't but during the above mentioned usage of "middleman" it has been found more efficient to turn control over to the strike control ship.

c, Training

In order to promote mutual appreciation of other department's problems and limitations, CIC \latch Officers stand a daily watch on the bridge. At the present time two CIC officers have qualified as OOD; two more will be qualified in the near future. The ultimate goal is to have as many CIC officers as possible qualified as COD. In addition, officers qualified as OOD stand watches in ClC as Surface Watch Officer and Gunnery Lie~ Officer. Aa increase in coordination ef­ficiency between the bridge and CIC may be attributed to this program.

For this operating period and during re­p~enishment days, all radar equipment has been secured far periods or one to two hours for purposes of conducting passive ECJ,! drills and operator training. Although interference has been noted from the radar. of other ships in the force, this type of training has proved beneficial to both' operators and equipment.

4. Communications

Several factors contributed to the success of communications operations during this period. One of the most important of these factors was the changing of George Fox broadcast speed of transmission from 25 words per minute to 22 words per minute since it ;permitted the department to utilize as watohstanders many men not. qualified to operate on the farmer frequency. Furthermore, the release of experienced personnel made possible by this change has permitted the department to place more men back on the nets. ·

In order to distribute the work load within the Task Force, larger units have e.ssu.tned guard on various circui-ts t;t the direction and discretion ·of the Task Force Commander •

... ORMaTION 18

•P' ' ......

,, ' ' -- ---' ' !liC'tJR!I "''om·JmoN

This' move has "bviated duplication of effort It has worked. out very satisfactorily and is to the personnel shortage. in ruany instances. a partial solution

The Task Force RATT has proved to be a most valuable circuit even thougll its maximum efficiency has not been. reached. Alert handling and strict circuit discipline have keynoted RATT operations. However 1 the number of units on a RATT net and tbe fact that it is a simplex circuit prevent traffic from moving witb optimum speed end efficiency. Further­more, these factors hev'e created frequent circuit tie-ups and transmission errors. It is suggested that 'tapes be cut for every dispatch wherever practicable. •

On-board training bas proved insufficient to fill gaps created by the loss of experienced personnel. It is hoped that school quotas requested from COm!lirP~c tor QPI, Jilli, and T3 r&tings will be approved. If this approval is secured the personnel concerned will be sent to the training center a month ·befoJ'e the sh~p' s arrival in the United States and thus will be &vailable to the ship upon completion of scheduled Y5rd avail~. ability.

5. Intelligence

a. Photo Interpretation The volume of work required of the Photo Interpreter during this operating period 'm\s considerably less

than that of preceding periods. This was due primarily to the inclement weathel' which prevailed i.n the operating area. ~,he decrease in preparation and usc of touraids was a second con­tributing factor. However, target and flak mosaics were pre­pared· and reproduced on a continqing, basis.

The fallowing method of plotting AA gun positions for jet flak suppression was employed during the lest pert of the period: rather than placing tbe symbol directly · Over the position, it is plotted in the immediate vicinity and connected to the position by a narrow line, thus enabling the pilot to get a view of the actual position end eqjacent terrain. This system, devised in conjunction with the Commanding Officer of VF-191, has received favorable comments from the pilots Involved.

c. Gunnery Department Performance gunnerY exercises has

-m:AT:LON

of deck-seamanship evolutions and been excellent •. The shipboard training

19

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.. -RIIiTION

program has been en effective aid in increasing the proficiency of the crews.

Replenishments during the period covered by this report have been characterized by efficiency and high average rate of loading. The message received from the USS ALSTEDE (see PART V) after one replenishment indicates the high celiber of these operations.

The Princeton has faeled destroyers on nineteen sepcr,ate occasions during this period, all but three of these being after "darken ship". The following lighting arrangements have been .:·ound desirable:

1. Red light every twenty feet along ship-to­ship distance line (for station keeping).

2 •. Red light on each saddle of fueling hoses (for use of fueling crew).

J, Red light on materiel being transferred by high line.

4. Green light showing outboard on tip of each fueling boom (for fore -and -art station keeping).

The above 11.ghts ere all one-ce,ll life-jacket flesh­lights With painted lenses. They are turned on just prior to use. For deck working lights, which are held to a minimum, red-lensed battle lanter~s and flashlights are used, They are not permitted to show outboard, Destroyers have no difficulty keeping station, '· hoses are always properly positioned, control or material being transferred is sure and no violation of "darken ship" is committed, D. Air Department

Helicopter Unit NmE ot: HU-1 based aboard the Princeton flew tor this period a total of 119.2 hours in twenty-six flying days for what is believed to be a new record. No missions were aborted and one hundred. percent availability was maintained at Qll times. The unit accomplished the rescue of one Princeton pilot, following a water landing. During the last two oporating eeriods Commander Task Force 77 has assigned a duty helicopter ·for each replenishment day, utilizing, on a rotational basis, each of the helicopter units with the Task Force. The continued employ­ment of this system is highly recommended in that it. affords LU5~1m.um maintenanc_e time on non-duty days.

20

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E.. Ne. vice tion De pr..rtment

During the pe~iod of this report an intensive program tor the training of underl.vay deck watch officers wus started. Until this time :few ship's company line officers had any opportunity foi' the needed experience to qlmlify ns Officers of the Deck Underwa.y. A situation had developed where u s®ll. stnff of well trained underway Deck Wntoh Pfficers were the only ones gaining ship handling ability. This group to.taled fifteen wrrtch standcrs with the following dcpartLlcntal break­down:

DEPART!.:ENT EUGIBLE ·:iATCE OFFICERS ACTUA.L~'J:CII a~~~,.... c·--··· ·· .t t J... _J;:.;;.~. :, Operations (Incl. Nuv,)

33 3 Air 13 0 Gunnery ...ll.. .E._

Total 61 15 It is apparent, that the Guntwry Depo.rt.ment wo.s the one whose officers were given the greatest opportunity for valuable ship control experience required for command. The twenty ship's company aviators eligible for watch standing (LCDR and below) nll had time-consuming primary duties in CIC, Air Plot, Air Intelligence, or on the flight deck. Of thoso,-only one had been allowed to stand watches on the bridge, as well as in Air Plot.

In an effort t'o correct the above situation the following program for the training of unde:rway Deck y,J,"c.C';o Officers is being conducted for eligible line of:rice:cs f<on Ensign to Commander:

1< Study progr~m of all applicable publications, regulations, and fleet letters,

2. Maneuvering boe.xd.

3. Comruunic~tions, with emphasis on use of t~ctical circuits.

4. Ra.do..r capa.bili ties und applJcatia.'_!. 5. Engineering Plant-capabilities and limitations. 6. Familiarization tours and instruction on the nuvi~ation bridge. 7. Emergency bills. 8, Steering gear--including n conplote tour of tho system a.nd practica.l ,instruction c.t the helm..

-R:J;.TION 21

-' .

~a selr~study· is prosecuted concurrently with lectures end practical work. A quiet, unocc11pied sea cabin in the island is used as an ideal retreat fOr study and a library of pertinen~ reading matter is made available there. Practical experience is made possible by the assignment of five candidates to the watch bill as a.third JOOD on a dey-to-day basis, FreqUency of the watch is necessarily less than that of the regular watch bill end each candidate is assigt~ed watches which normallY will not inter• fere with his primary duty,

Under •he guidance of the Orficer of the Deck, every opportunity is taken to qualify the candidate at eoch function of the watch. To give the officer an immediate feeling of prog­ress end realization of the problems of ship handling he is ·:Unwed to l!lalleuver the ship, The process is then one of "make ;'OU learn• as opposed to learning by observation.

The number of OOD's is drawing ahoad of the Bura8U of 2ersonnel•s detaching orders end a beck log of qualified officers 'llho can be "put on ice• has developed. Senior officers aboard who had never stood a bridge watch are gaining experience; they '1ear their own voices raised in command, conning a large ship, ':lith the responsibility of •having the deck" comes the increase in abilities end self-confidence in ship bsndlibg needed by our '1 a vy today.

F. Medical Departlne.nt

Tho general henlth of the crew oontinued at its previous excellent level. There were no serious diseases or injuries. Three wounded pilots.were returned aboard for care. ~ere were sixty-eight admissions to the sick list for venereal diseases during the period of this report. A series of venereal disease end First Aid lectures were given ~nd approximately ninety-eight percent or the total ship's company end air group personnel attended. ·

G. Chaplain

The following program of reli_gious activities was carried <>ut during the operating period: An evening prayer was ~ffered nightly at 1900 with Catholic and Protestant Chaplains c:l ternating. Two Protestant and three Catholic services were Gonducted on S<1ndays. Daily masses end confessions were held c·or men of the Catholic faith, with religious instruction classes conducted Monady througb Friday. Protestant Divine services were held daily end Bible classes were conducted three days per week.

~RMATION 22

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•

A memorial service for personnel lost during the operating p·eri­od was held upon departure from the Tssk Force.

Although a HE1.!11L1ond organ end pormDnent public address systen~ e.re installed for hangar deck services, operstions with the Tesk Force ~t times precluded cny use of these facilities. The problem was resolved by conducting services in the crew's librery r.nd messing compBrtmonts.

The Catholic ChaplGin has instituted French classes five days per week in addition to educational consultation end a:~ aching in various subjects.

The Protestant Choir, composed of officers end men of the ship's company and air group, continued to provide religious .:::usia for services and secular music for ship's entertainment. The choir and its individual members will present a program at the "Ernie Pyle Tbeater in Tokyo under the auspices of the ArrJy

Special Services while in port.

Copies to:

CNO (2) Advance CINCPACFLT (2) Advance CCMNAVFE (1) Advance CO~SEVENTHFLT (1) Advance CTF 77 (1) Advance CINCPACFLT Eveluation Group CCmAirPac ( 5) ComServPe.c Co.mFe.irJ"epan ComFairAlameda Navel VVer College comCerDiv 1 ComcarDiv 3 ComCarDiv 5 CCmCarDi v 15 ComCarDiv 17 USS ESSE;; (CV-9) USS TICONDEROGA (CV-14) USS IDXER (CV-21) USS IDN HOMME RICHARD ( CV-31) USS KEARSARGE (CV-33) USS ORISKANY (CV-34) USS llNTIETAM ( CV-36 ) USS VALLEY FORG!l (CV-45) •

PAUL D, STROOP

USS l?HILll'l?INE 8":;. : CV-4 7) USS BAT~\N (CVL-29). USS RENDOVA (CVE-114) USS BAIROKA (CVl-115) USS BADOENG STRAIT ( CVE-ll6) USS SICILY (CVE-118) USS POINT CRUZ ( G i8 ·' 19) Cerrier Air Group 2 carrier Air Grour 5 carrier Air Group 7 Carrier Air Group ll carrier Air Group 15 Carrier Air Group 17 carrier Air Group 19 Carrier Air Group 101 Carrier Air Group 102 Carrier .1ar Task Group l Carrier .::..ir r.l'-"' ::::1: G.!'..:> UP 2 CO, Fair!leTuPoc ( 2) . CO, Composit Sque.dron 3 CO, Compo sit Sque.dron 11 CO, Coruposi t Squadron 35 CO, CCruposit Squcdron 61