1 lessons from the sub-prime crisis kevin davis commonwealth bank chair of finance, university of...
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Lessons from the sub-prime crisis
Kevin Davis
Commonwealth Bank Chair of Finance, University of Melbourne
Director, The Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies
www.melbournecentre.com.au
November 2008
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Outline
• Origins of the Crisis• Features of the Crisis• Regulatory Responses• Future Regulatory Responses
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Origins of the Crisis
• Financial engineering and financial products• Liquidity creation and leverage• “Shadow banking” & risk sharing and
spreading• Inadequate public information
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An Increasingly Complex Financial System
CentralBank
Banks & ADIs
InvestmentBanks
ManagedFunds
HedgeFunds
Pension Funds
FinanceCos.
InsuranceCos.
PrivateEquity
CashCash
CDO’sCDO’s
RMBSRMBS
CFDsCFDs
FuturesFutures
SwapsSwapsOptions
Options
Warrants
Warrants
ABCPABCP
Conduits
ConduitsSIV’sSIV’s
Debentures
Debentures
IndexedIndexedFundsFunds
Margin
MarginLoans
Loans
ShortShortSellingSelling
SecuritiesSecuritiesLendingLending Reverse
ReverseReposRepos
ReposReposDepositsDeposits
FXFX
BondsBonds
SharesShares
LoansLoans
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Origins of the Crisis
• Financial engineering and financial products• Liquidity creation and leverage• “Shadow banking” & risk sharing and
spreading• Inadequate public information
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7
Easy Credit – An ExampleLarge Business Credit Spreads - Australia
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Sep-98
Sep-99
Sep-00
Sep-01
Sep-02
Sep-03
Sep-04
Sep-05
Sep-06
Sep-07
Quarter
%
Spread over 30 day bank bill rate
Source: RBA
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Origins of the Crisis
• Financial engineering and financial products• Liquidity creation and leverage• “Shadow banking” & risk sharing and
spreading• Inadequate public information
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An Interdependent Financial System
CentralBank
Banks & ADIs
InvestmentBanks
ManagedFunds
HedgeFunds
Pension Funds
FinanceCos.
InsuranceCos.
PrivateEquity
CashCash
CDO’sCDO’s
RMBSRMBS
CFDsCFDs
FuturesFutures
SwapsSwapsOptions
Options
Warrants
Warrants
ABCPABCP
Conduits
ConduitsSIV’sSIV’s
Debentures
Debentures
IndexedIndexedFundsFunds
Margin
MarginLoans
Loans
ShortShortSellingSelling
SecuritiesSecuritiesLendingLending Reverse
ReverseReposRepos
ReposReposDepositsDeposits
FXFX
BondsBonds
SharesShares
LoansLoans
10
Origins of the Crisis
• Financial engineering and financial products• Liquidity creation and leverage• “Shadow banking” & risk sharing and
spreading• Inadequate public information
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Public Information
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A simple explanation
Ian Ramsay April 1, 2008 http://business.theage.com.au/opes-prime-who-understood/20080331-22qf.html
Illustration: Michael Leunig
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Features of the Crisis
• Consumer sophistication• Incentive structures• Outsourcing due diligence• Regulatory avoidance• Inadequate risk management systems• Excessive liquidity creation
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Features of the Crisis
• “Shadow banking sector” importance• Deposit insurance inadequacy• “Freezing” of funding and asset liquidity• Liquidity support facility arrangements• Inadequacy of risk based capital• Globalization issues• “Flight to quality” issues
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Regulatory Responses
• Protection of national banking systems• Liquidity Creation/restoration• Bail Outs• Temporary regulations
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Regulatory Responses
• Protection of national banking systems• Liquidity Creation/restoration• Bail Outs• Temporary regulations
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The Flight to Quality Effect
CentralBank
Banks & ADIs
InvestmentBanks
ManagedFunds
HedgeFunds
Pension Funds
FinanceCos.
InsuranceCos.
PrivateEquity
CashCash
CDO’sCDO’s
RMBSRMBS
CFDsCFDs
FuturesFutures
SwapsSwapsOptions
Options
Warrants
Warrants
ABCPABCP
Conduits
ConduitsSIV’sSIV’s
Debentures
Debentures
IndexedIndexedFundsFunds
Margin
MarginLoans
Loans
ShortShortSellingSelling
SecuritiesSecuritiesLendingLending Reverse
ReverseReposRepos
ReposReposDepositsDeposits
FXFX
BondsBonds
SharesShares
LoansLoans
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Regulatory Responses
• Protection of national banking systems• Liquidity Creation/restoration• Bail Outs• Temporary regulations
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Socializing the losses
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Regulatory Responses
• Protection of national banking systems• Liquidity Creation/restoration• Bail Outs• Temporary regulations
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A Fragile Financial System?
CentralBank
Banks & ADIs
InvestmentBanks
ManagedFunds
HedgeFunds
Pension Funds
FinanceCos.
InsuranceCos.
PrivateEquity
CashCash
CDO’sCDO’s
RMBSRMBS
CFDsCFDs
FuturesFutures
SwapsSwapsOptions
Options
Warrants
Warrants
ABCPABCP
Conduits
ConduitsSIV’sSIV’s
Debentures
Debentures
IndexedIndexedFundsFunds
Margin
MarginLoans
Loans
ShortShortSellingSelling
SecuritiesSecuritiesLendingLending Reverse
ReverseReposRepos
ReposReposDepositsDeposits
FXFX
BondsBonds
SharesShares
LoansLoans
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Banking Crises: 1980-96
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Financial Crises since 1996
• Asian crisis 1997• Russian crisis 1998 (& Long Term Capital
Management)• Brazil 1999• DotCom Bubble 2000• Argentina 2001• “since the collapse of Argentina in 2001, the international financial
system has been an oasis of stability. Some believe this is merely good luck, and that the bad old days will return. They are wrong.” Andrew K. Rose 31 May 2007 CEPR Policy Insight No. 1, June 2007
• http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/199• Subprime Crisis – June 2007 - ??
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Future Regulatory Issues
• Central Bank targets• Macro-prudential policy• Mark-to-market accounting• Deposit Insurance• “Too big/important to fail”• Automatic recapitalization stabilizers
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Future Regulatory Issues
• Basel II• Domain of Prudential Regulation• Reporting and Information Requirements• Promoting organized exchanges• Transactions taxes and volatility
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Future Regulatory Issues
• Governance and agency problems• Financial consumer protection• Securitization structures• Financial sector concentration
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Conclusion
• Was it inevitable – probably!• Who’s to blame – enough for all to share!
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Conclusion
• Was it inevitable – probably!• Who’s to blame – enough for all to share!• Will a depression result – probably not!• Will similar financial crises recur – probably!• Will the financial system be restructured
– Needs to be, but vested interests are strong!